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NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY
CIENTIFIC
UARTERLY
QUARTERLY
no 4(93
(93)
WARSAW 2013
SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE
Associate Professor Andrzej Glen, Ph.D. – chairman, Professor Stanisław Zajas, Ph.D. –
deputy-chairman, Professor Waldemar Kaczmarek, Ph.D. – Management and Command
Faculty, Professor Waldemar Kitler, Ph.D. – National Security Faculty, Dr James Corum –
Baltic defence College, Col. Miroslaw Dimitrov, Associate Professor – National Defence
Academy in Sofia, Lieutenant-General Professor Teodor Frunzeti, Ph.D. – National
Defence University in Bucharest, Doc. Ing. Mariana Kuffova, Associate
Professor – Armed Forces Academy in Slovakia, Professor Pavel Necas – Armed Forces
Academy in Slovakia, Col. Dimitar Tashkov, Associate Professor, Ph.D. – National
Defence Academy in Sofia, M.A. Adam Szynal
Thematic editor: Assoc. Prof. Ryszard Chrobak, PhD
The list of reviewers:
Colonel Instructor Stan ANTON, Ph.D.;
Commander Professor Vasile BUCINSCHI, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof. Dipl. Eng. Pavel
BUČKA, Ph.D.; Colonel Assoc. Prof. Gheorghe CALOPĂREANU, Ph.D.;
Colonel Miroslav Stefan DIMITROV, Assoc. Prof.; Colonel Instructor Pascu FURNICĂ, Ph.D.;
Doc. Ing. Peter LIPTAK, Cs.C.; Colonel Assoc. Prof. Iulian MARTIN, Ph.D.;
Colonel Professor Dimitar NEDYLKOV; Colonel Assoc. Prof. Constantin POPESCU,
Ph.D.; Colonel Professor Ion ROCEANU, Ph.D.; Researcher Alexandra SARCINSCHI,
Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof. Dipl. Eng. Peter SPILÝ, Ph.D.;
Assoc. Prof. Andrzej Glen, Ph.D.; Prof. Waldemar KACZMAREK, Ph.D.;
Prof. Waldemar KITLER, Ph.D.; Col. Prof. Dariusz KOZERAWSKI, Ph.D.;
Prof. Stanisław KOZIEJ, Ph.D.; Prof.Marian KOZUB, Ph.D.;
Assoc. Prof.Zdzisław KURASIŃSKI, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof. Józef MARCZAK, Ph.D.;
Col. Assoc. Prof. Maciej MARSZAŁEK, Ph.D.; Col. Assoc. Prof. Wojciech NYSZK, Ph.D.;
Maj.Gen. Assoc. Prof. Bogusław PACEK, Ph.D.; Prof. Jacek PAWŁOWSKI, Ph.D.;
Prof. Piotr SIENKIEWICZ, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof. Stanisław SIRKO, Ph.D.;
Prof. Zenon STACHOWIAK, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof. Jeremiasz ŚLIPIEC, Ph.D.;
Col. Prof. Jarosław WOŁEJSZO, Ph.D.; Col. Prof. Marek WRZOSEK, Ph.D.;
Prof. Stanisław ZAJAS, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof. Janusz ZUZIAK, Ph.D.
Editorial committee:
Anna Doraczyńska, M.A. – chief editor (tel. 6/813-516),
Jeremy Wysakowski-Walters, M.A. – editing of papers in English
Address: 00-910 Warszawa 72
al. gen. Antoniego Chruściela 103, bl. 4
tel./fax: (6)813-516
e-mail: [email protected]
All articles are available in Polish in Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Obrony Narodowej
National Defence University Scientific Quarterly has been indexed in the international database
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individual opinions of the authors; they are also verified by an anti-plagiarism system.
National Defence University
Typesetting, printing and binding: Publishing House of National Defence University, order no 668/2014,
edition of 150 copies
TABLE
OF CONTENTS
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
Col. Assoc. Prof. Maciej MARSZAŁEK, Ph.D.
Irmina DENYSIUK, MA
Components of stabilisation and reconstruction processes in contemporary crisis response
operations ............................................................................................................................................. 5
Assoc. Prof. Andrzej CIUPIŃSKI, Ph.D.
Treaty principles of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy ................................................. 30
Stanisław MAKSIMIEC, Ph.D.
„Fathers of Europe” uniting ideas in integration practice ................................................................... 51
Assoc.Prof. Agnieszka LEGUCKA, Ph.D.
Conflict management in the EU-Russia shared neighbourhood. Between soft and hard power ......... 71
Jerzy Tomasz LIMANOWSKI, Ph.D.
BRICS - a security's creator in the international environment - the role of the Russian Federation
against the background of the Crimea Crisis ...................................................................................... 89
Lt. Col. Sławomir IWANOWSKI, PH.D.
The ‘French White Paper on Defence and National Security’, April 29, 2013 ................................. 112
NATIONAL SECURITY AND STATE DEFENCE
Marian KULICZKOWSKI, Ph.D. Eng.
State defence preparations in the national security system of the Republic of Poland
– classification and description of defence tasks .............................................................................. 129
Prof. Waldemar KITLER, Ph.D.
Organisation of the National Security in Poland in the Context of a Country’s Internal Order
Protection ......................................................................................................................................... 148
Assoc. Prof. Ryszard CHROBAK, Ph.D.
Col. Assoc. Prof. Marek KUBIŃSKI, Ph.D.
State Security Threats ....................................................................................................................... 166
Col (ret.) Eugeniusz JENDRASZCZAK, Ph.D.
Development of Contemporary Security Tools ................................................................................ 180
Bogdan MICHAILIUK, Ph.D. Eng.
Rescue and Civil Protection Subsystem ........................................................................................... 189
Jarosław SOLARZ, Ph.D. Eng.
Chemical contamination – typology of threats ................................................................................. 207
3
Robert MARCJAN
Marek ŁAKOMY
Michał WYSOKIŃSKI
Kamil PIĘTAK
Marek KISIEL-DOROHINICKI
Criminal intelligence supported with spatial analysis tools in LINK application .............................223
EDUCATION FOR SECURITY
Marcin MAZUREK, Ph.D.
Civic determinants of security education ..........................................................................................241
Ilona URYCH, Ph.D.
New challenges for safety education - physical activity “cure” for selected peacetime threats
in the XXI century ............................................................................................................................260
Cdre Assoc. Prof. Ryszard SZYNOWSKI, Ph.D.
Military Administration Personnel ....................................................................................................272
4
NDU Scientific Quarterly no 4(93) 2013
Zeszyty Naukowe AON nr 2(59) 2005
ISSN 0867–2245
ISSN 2353-1789
COMPONENTS OF STABILISATION AND RECONSTRUCTION PROCESSES…
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
COMPONENTS
OF STABILISATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION PROCESSES
IN CONTEMPORARY CRISIS
RESPONSE OPERATIONS
Col. Assoc. Prof. Maciej MARSZAŁEK, Ph.D.
National Security Faculty NDU
Irmina DENYSIUK, MA
Abstract
Stabilization and reconstruction of countries, although are often considered as distinct
actions, usually are an integral part of many activities undertaken in the scope of crisis
response operations, including mainly peace support operations. Therefore the statement
that stabilization and reconstruction is a set of actions and tasks taken within the confines
and background of crisis response operations, which is acknowledged as a main
assumption of this consideration, needs to be emphasized.
Taking into consideration the need of comprehensive approach to crisis response that is
stressed nowadays, such a perception of the processes outlined above seems to be fully
justified and desired, both by the political and military decision-makers. It also needs to be
pointed out, that wide object scope that includes stabilization and reconstruction, requires
knowledge systematization and its distribution among all subjects involved in these specific,
but extremely necessary actions. Military success is just a prelude to further actions aimed
to achieve a stable situation in a country, and only then the reconstruction of its
governmental structures and security forces can be carried out. At the end of the process we
should be able to pass on complete responsibility for a proper country's functioning to the
local authorities.
Key words – failed states, failing states, crisis response operations, stabilization and
reconstruction, PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams), SSR (Security Sector Reform)
Introduction
Stabilisation and reconstruction of countries, although they are often
considered as distinct actions, are usually an integral part of the many activities
undertaken in the area of crisis response operations, which mainly include peace
support operations. These activities are often seen as distinct operations; however,
such a singling out seems to be an attempt at exposing their importance and
5
MACIEJ MARSZAŁEK, IRMINA DENYSIUK
character. Therefore, the statement that stabilisation and reconstruction are a set of
actions and tasks taken within the confines and background of crisis response
operations, which is acknowledged as the main assumption of this consideration,
needs to be emphasised. Thus, it should be emphasised that the set of these
ventures is not accidental. On the contrary, it is consciously directed at achieving
an established purpose and, therefore, it can be considered as a process. It means
that the process of stabilisation and rebuilding should be understood as a sequence
of changes (actions, tasks) undertaken in the framework of crisis response
operations, occurring one after the other or overlapping, according to the guidelines
included in operational plans.
Source: Own elaboration based on: J. K. Wither, Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN), Materials from the
scientific conference „Misje stabilizacyjne dla odbudowy państw”, organized on 13–14 May 2009 at the
National Defence University, also in: M. Marszałek (ed), Koncepcja użycia sił zbrojnych w wojnach
nieregularnych, research work no. III.5.1.0, AON, Warsaw 2011, p. 11.
Figure 1: Location of stabilisation and reconstruction activities in crisis response operations
Taking into consideration the need for a comprehensive approach to crisis
response that is stressed nowadays, such a perception of the processes outlined
above seems to be fully justified and desired, both by political and military
decision-makers. Increased interest in this subject was also recently triggered in the
context of the continuing operations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in
Afghanistan. Considerations are focused, in particular, on their effectiveness and
actual capacity for creating a safe and stable environment. The multidimensionality
of these activities and the multitude of subjects' involved also needs emphasis.
Therefore, a lot of attention in the context of stabilisation and reconstruction is
given to multi-agency cooperation in their realisation. Operational lessons learned
so far show that cooperation is not at the expected level yet. However, it can be
6
assumed that the North Atlantic Alliance, the European Union and the United
Nations are all noticing a growing need for joint use of diverse object abilities.
Only such an approach can guarantee success in future operations that will
certainly include stabilisation and reconstruction activities.
It also needs to be pointed out that the wide objective , which includes
stabilisation and reconstruction, requires knowledge systematisation and its
distribution among all subjects involved in these specific, but extremely necessary
actions. Achieving the desired end state defined by political decision-makers
requires not only effective stabilisation activities, but also a myriad of activities
aimed at state reconstruction. Whereas military success is just a prelude to further
actions aimed at achieving a stable situation in a country, and only then the
reconstruction of its governmental structures and security forces can be carried out.
At the end of the process we should be able to pass on complete responsibility for
a country's proper functioning to the local authorities.
The stabilisation and reconstruction process considerations featured in this
article have been broken down into general research questions and specific ones.
The general problem is: How do the elements used by third party forces in the
stabilisation and reconstruction process support failed or failing countries?. Taking
into consideration the complexity of the problem, it seemed advisable to identify
the following specific research questions:
• What is the essence of stabilisation and reconstruction operations?
• Which elements supporting them can be singled out and what is their role in
the countries' stabilisation and reconstruction?
• How was the practical use of these elements organized in operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan?
This article describes the results of research conducted in frames of statutory
research activity by the National Security Department of National Defence
Academy. The output is, therefore, presented in the form of a cohesive and
synthetic explanation of devices and methods used in the supporting of the
reconstruction process and the rebuilding of countries.
The present-day vision and mission of the stabilisation
and reconstruction of states
The stabilisation and initial reconstruction operations, as Richard Nelson calls
them, can be seen in a traditional way, which is usually preferred by the military.
This approach outlines the aims, roles, missions, tasks, operational concepts and
desired results. Therefore, it is important that planned military operations must be
made to fit properly into the existing political conditions. Hence, one of the
definitions of stabilisation and reconstruction operations, given by R. Nelson,
explains these activities as a process that enables lasting peace to be achieved in an
7
unfriendly operating environment1. Avoiding any merits-related and methodological
correctness of this definition, it can be stated that its contents stress the meaning of
the final political state, which is more important than any previously achieved
military success. This approach, in the opinion of the quoted author, seems to be
consistent with an approach worked out by the North Atlantic Alliance that refers
to the majority of operations from an array of non-article 5 crisis response
operations which include actions connected with stabilisation and reconstruction.
In the opinion of the authors of the study “Improving Capacity for Stability and
Reconstruction Operations”, the efforts identified as stabilisation and reconstruction
activities involve many overlapping missions, which themselves, considering the
diverse objective we are discussing, are the components of strategies (approaches)
and actions. In their opinion, stabilisation refers to all the efforts aimed at
termination of the conflict and the social, economical and political turbulence it
causes2. Achieving stabilisation in each of enumerated areas is essential before
reconstruction activities begin. One can agree with the authors’ assessment the
mentioned study that without achieving and maintaining the stability and security
associated with this, any other venture usually only leads to a short-term effect.
Following this line of reasoning, it can be assumed that stabilisation is one of the
fundamental elements of activities (components) undertaken during an operation.
Stabilisation, as already mentioned, can be a part of crisis response operations.
In this case, its aim is to terminate the conflict. Stabilisation is also essential after
combat operations end, which can knowingly or unknowingly lead to the outbreak
of another (additional) conflict. Furthermore, stabilisation is recognised as an
extremely important part of actions allowing the suppression of insurgency, once it
has been estimated as a threat by the international community. In these specific
operations, which are extremely difficult for the armed forces, great importance is
ascribed to the results of stabilisation. Thus, the need for receiving strong support
from the local community arises, which is correctly treated as the centre of
gravity3. Obtaining this support mostly depends on ensuring the security of the
civilian population, and thus bringing the armed violence to an end and eliminating
any situations that bear signs of threats for the local community. The elements of
stabilization can also include antiterrorist operations (Counterterrorism Operations
– CT) or counterinsurgency (Counterinsurgency operations – COIN), which were
classified in the set of crisis response operations4. If these operations are conducted
1
R. Nelson, How Should NATO Handle Stabilisation Operations and Reconstruction Efforts?,
The Atlantic Council of the United States, Washington D.C. 2006, pa. 2.
2
N. Bensahel, O. Oliver, H. Peterson, Improving Capacity for Stability and Reconstruction
Operations, RAND, Santa Monica 2009, pa. 3.
3
The centre of gravity is the attribute, opportunities or places, from which the country (nation),
the Alliance, the armed forces or other groups derive latitude of action, physical strength or will. See:
Słownik pojęć sojuszniczej obrony powietrznej, AON, Warsaw 2003, pa. 30.
4
See: AJP-3.4, Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations, Brussels 2010; M. Marszałek,
Operacje reagowania kryzysowego NATO. Istota, uwarunkowania, planowanie, Difin, Warsaw 2013.
8
in an uncertain environment, stabilisation may be crucial for obtaining intelligence
information. Stabilisation may be also considered as a part of activities to be run
after the conflict ends, which are necessary efforts aimed at achieving country
reconstruction.
Moreover, reconstruction concerns the building and rebuilding process of the
state structures, which ensure effective handling, social and economic development
and national security. Reconstruction becomes possible only when a proper level of
stabilisation is achieved in each of the previously described sectors. Therefore, it
seems reasonable to conclude that stabilisation is a sine qua non condition of
reconstruction. Without stabilisation, all the efforts made in the field of
reconstruction will not bring the desired, and equally important, long-term effects.
When considering armed conflicts, two groups of tasks were outlined.
Originally, stabilisation was considered among experts as the key to the cessation
of the use of violence. Reconstruction, for a change, was seen as a component
which played a role in preventing the re-escalation of violence. Although there is a
clear difference between stabilisation and reconstruction, these activities are
interrelated, and what is more, dependent on each other.
Taking into consideration the varied environment (conditions) for conducting
stabilisation and reconstruction operations, it must be pointed out that the range of
tasks carried out by the armed forces can be on the one hand wide, but on the other
limited5. However, tasks connected with security should be primarily aimed at
ensuring it is available to all personnel and subjects involved in the operation. Such
details must be obligatorily a matter of negotiations at the early stage of operation
planning and the developing of its appropriate mandate6. These are the main
mission areas that include: forcing the agreement on cease fire, disarming warring
parties, collecting and destroying weapons and armaments, controlling
demilitarised zones and establishing proper relations with local civilians. It is
widely known that creating a safe environment first of all requires the
concentration of security forces. It is also worth mentioning that according to
American experts, the term “security forces” embraces not only the armed forces,
but also police, border guards and other subjects responsible for ensuring national
security in the country.
Protection of combat measures and ammunitions' storehouses should be treated
as a priority by military components designated for stabilisation and reconstruction.
The North Atlantic Alliance's experiences in this field, gathered from operations in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, as well as conclusions collected from
a number of the United Nations’ peacekeeping operations7, confirm the thesis that
the process of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former soldiers
5
The Armed Forces, e.g. the North Atlantic Alliance, may only be an element of supporting
stabilisation and reconstruction operations, as in the case of the NATO training mission in Iraq.
6
R. Nelson, op. cit., pa. 6.
7
Widely: M. Marszałek, T. Limanowski, Operacje pokojowe Organizacji Narodów
Zjednoczonych. Geneza – struktura – planowanie, AON, Warsaw 2011.
9
can be extremely difficult, but rightly considered as a key factor in the long-term
stabilisation of a post-conflict area.
It is also important to inform public opinion about the conducted operations.
The NATO armed forces must communicate with the local community. Forces
pursuing stabilisation and reconstruction operations should use public organisations
and mass media to pass on actual information, exercise control and prevent social
unrest, as well as display important announcements in the local language.
Armed forces must also ensure the security of the territory where stabilisation
and reconstruction are being conducted. The range of activities connected with this
includes peacekeeping by establishing an effective controlling system over the
country’s borders. Such a system should also consist of border checkpoints that
will be able to stop the smuggling of weapons and illegal goods, prevent insurgents
from infiltrating the area of operation, and the uncontrolled movement of organised
criminal groups and terrorists, and at the same time ensure the security of returning
refugees. The last item usually requires special attention from intervening forces,
which in a natural way causes the allocation of necessary forces and measures
aimed at their protection. Moreover, one can agree with R. Nelson's claim that
allied forces carrying out stabilisation and reconstruction activities can also be
involved in establishing and maintaining people's freedom of movement within the
country. This seems to be a necessary undertaking for the return of refugees and
internally displaced persons. These forces then aim at making trade and movement
of people legitimate, controlled, and hence more secure.
Furthermore, a separate group of stabilisation tasks refers to forcing and keeping
security and public order. The main effort, in the opinion of the quoted author, should
focus on protection of civilians, ensuring free access for humanitarian organisations
carrying assistance for victims, as well as temporary fulfilment of typical police tasks
and demining the area where the operation is conducted. R. Nelson's idea that
including the high risk of grounded ethnic struggles, which can happen in the
envitonment of post-armed-conflicts, in the main effort for stabilisation and
reconstruction that should be directed at ensuring long-term public order, seems
relevant. The conclusions from the operations carried out in Afghanistan and Kosovo
prove that organised crime and groups involved in drug production and trafficking can
pose a serious obstacle for the implementation of any projects related to stabilisation
and reconstruction. There should be reflection on the application of the rules of the use
of force adequate to the situation and the tasks carried out8. These rules, as emphasised
by, inter alia, R. Nelson, should be extremely clear and, also importantly, regularly
monitored and modified if needed.
NATO’s armed forces, and also those of other countries involved in
stabilisation and reconstruction, must shield and ensure the security of the critical
infrastructure. The most important political leaders, governmental institutions and
previously deployed military installations must also be under protection. Ensuring
8
10
Rules of Engagement (ROE) are also called rules of use the armed violence in the right order.
efficient protection of listed subjects and objects is considered essential in creating
a safe environment.
Coordination of activities in the security field is of great importance in such
operations. Throughout the time in which stabilisation and reconstruction are
running, the coordination of NATO's armed forces’ activities becomes crucial, with
efforts directed towards the security of other subjects, such as: armed forces of
non-NATO countries participating in an operation, local armed forces (providing
that they are going to be formed), civilian police and other institutions responsible
for security in a country. Coordination must be led in a transparent manner, guided
by clear rules of force engagement and conception of the operation.
NATO's armed forces can have appropriate input in initial reconstruction that
aims at bringing basic help to meet the most urgent needs of the local people. The
logic behind this is that if local or other sources essential for rebuilding are
unavailable, it is the foreign armed forces, either in coalition or alliance, that must
begin the rebuilding of critical infrastructure. During the initial phase,
reconstruction activities should focus first of all on bringing back the damaged
infrastructure, to allow the influx of humanitarian aid and to guarantee the supply
of electricity, water, food, medical assistance and transport services.
Another component vital to operational success is ensuring the continuity of
the stabilisation and reconstruction. One can agree with the thesis that it is a big
challenge due to the high frequency of rotation of personnel involved in the
operations and, usually, the long-term nature of the problems that need solving. It
seems that these problems can be solved by extending the operations' duration,
especially in the area of the engagement of senior staff. Also, the standardisation of
policy conducted and procedures employed might be beneficial.
Elements of stabilisation and reconstruction support
The unity of efforts undertaken in the framework of operations is not only the
basic premise, and thus a fundamental principle of crisis response operations, but
also a certain minimum necessary for coordinating the activities. Their uniform
perception and application in practice is of particular importance in the context of
efforts to achieve stability in a difficult and dangerous operating environment, both
in failed or failing states. In the light of the first lessons learned (Iraq, Afghanistan
and the Balkans), a need for comprehensive action to make homogeneous and
uniform use of procedures was pointed out.9 The elements, which in this way are to
9
The key, however, is to state that standardisation which aims at having more uniform support
elements such as PRTs, reduce their ability to respond flexibly and rapidly to dynamic and changing
circumstances typical to post-conflict zones. Flexibility of the activities undertaken in modern conflict
environments plays an important role and is identified with the types of activities undertaken, the way
they are undertaken, involvement of the individual force components for their performance and the
possibility of a modular use of these forces.
11
support the stabilisation and reconstruction process, are: the idea of the Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), the strategy of the Security Sector Reform (SSR)
and other aid programs founded from governmental or nongovernmental funds by
the host country and third party countries.
The concept of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams was a response to the
growing threat of a resurgence of conflict, which paradoxically occurred in the
initial stages of the stabilisation process. PRTs are to focus their attention primarily
on aspects of the implementation of civil-military tasks in a difficult environment:
urbanised and populated by the local community, where support is indispensable to
create and maintain a level of relative stability and local security.
The Provincial Reconstruction Teams are generally multinational. Their
structure is built by the components of forces from different countries (usually two
or three), but clear differences are emerging and not only within individual Teams.
These internal differences can be minimised by the principle of voluntary
association and, thus, the possibility of cooperation with national groups that are
close to us culturally. Especially noticeable differences are, however, those
between the Teams stationed and performing their tasks in different provinces. It
seems that one can point to at least two sources for these structural differences.
First of all – the different levels of risk and (de)stabilisation of regions. The
adaptation of both the structure of the Teams and the nature of their undertakings to
the conditions prevailing in the regions of their responsibility is obvious. Secondly,
far-reaching differences in terms of tasks being carried out, and thus the structure
of the teams, point to their inability to make rigid standardisation.
However, regardless of how diverse PRTs function in reality, they have one
fundamental thing in common – they serve the local society to improve its living
conditions. The adoption of such a general purpose as the “core curriculum” of the
functioning of PRTs makes each of the countries responsible for a given province
aim at achieving the goal by different ways and using different means. In contrast,
the individual aspirations of the countries involved may lead to different results of
the stabilisation and transformation process, such as the empowerment of local
business tycoons at the expense of, for example, weakening the position and
authority of the host-state government.10
Despite the numerous differences in the functioning of the Teams, a certain
immutable framework indicating the fundamental imperatives that should dominate
and define the core of each PTRs was set. This should include11:
– a strong link between civil and military aspects;
– orientation of the tasks primarily aimed at stabilising the region and creating
the necessary conditions for achieving stabilisation;
10
M. Marszałek (ed), Obszary działań i zadań sił zaangażowanych w odbudowę i utrzymanie
bezpieczeństwa w środowisku miejskim, research work no I.1.7.1.0, AON, Warsaw 2012, pa. 50–51.
11
PRT Playbook. Tactic, Technic and Procedures, Center of Army Lessons Learned, No 07-34,
September 2007, pa. 18.
12
– multinational, multifunctional and multi-institutional nature;
– functioning in accordance with the idea of support towards the host state
government and at its explicit request;
– operating in the provinces, away from the capital and the main centre of
power;
– functioning of all PRTs on the principles of command appropriate for the
leading nation;
– significant reduction of the possibility to use resources, personnel,
operations, rules of engagement and armaments;
– significant dependence on the logistical and military support of other
entities, high level of support obtained from the population;
– principles of operation and implementation of security and development
solutions of the province are often created ad hoc and adapted to the circumstances;
– long-term ultimate goal has a political character and the criterion for success
of the PRTs is to create stability and a reliable local authority.
Moreover, it was assumed that the military components in the composition of
the PRTs are responsible primarily for maintaining stability and, to a lesser extent,
for taking immediate defensive or offensive action. Each Team requires the
participation of diverse forces so that they are able to respond to the full spectrum
of events adequately to each situation, both of a military and non-military nature.
The armed forces should, therefore, be ready to take action simultaneously in two
different directions – against the enemy, as well as in support of the local
community. In shaping their local security environment, PRTs can benefit from the
help of international non-governmental agencies and organisations which are able
to use their competences in order to work out the joint success of the operation.
The foundation of the civil-military nature of the PRTs was thus based on the
ineffectiveness of responding in a complex environment with operations in only
one dimension – military or civilian. It was pointed out that the military component
is able to effectively realise the military task, while lacking skills in political, social
or economic challenges. The civil component, on the contrary, needs relative
stability in order to pursue its diplomatic and social tasks, because it only uses the
traditional mechanisms and means of action and cannot overcome the unstable
conditions of the environment.
Tasks performed by the PRTs are mainly intended to have a static and not
kinetic character12, while simultaneously assuming the possibility of their use to
strengthen military activities. Depending on the situation in which they have to
function, PRTs can take responsibility for the main effort of the operation. More
often, however, they complement the leading emergency response operations, in
which they care about gaining the favour of the public carrying out the tasks of
rehabilitation and reconstruction of damaged regions and restoring basic public
services and the rule of law. On the other hand, the work of PRTs can be seen as a
12
PRT Playbook…, op. cit., pa. 2.
13
way to provide a stable environment for its own forces stationed in the area of
operation. However, regardless of the options considered, it should be noted that
the purpose of the PRTs is to reduce the number of situations that generate conflict
and, thus, the motivation for the use of violence in solving existing and emerging
problems.
The PRTs’ primary task is to improve stability and security, while the second is
to build the capacity of the host state to govern, to strengthen the economic
mechanisms, and to provide basic public services, such as the provision of law and
order, public access to justice, health care and education. These requirements are
aimed primarily at ensuring the relative level of stability that is needed to start the
rebuilding process.
Source: Own study based on: PRT Playbook…, op. cit., p. 4.
Figure. 2. Major tasks of PRTs
The simultaneous contribution of PRTs to the reconstruction and development
of local institutions ensures responsibility for overall security gradually passes to
the local “self-governing” structures (the so-called Transition phase). Therefore,
the analysis of objectives and targets achieved and the success of the conducted
operation depends not only on the efforts of the Teams, but also on the authorities
of the host country, the entire nation, mutual relationship, and the degree of
14
interdependence of the actors and their cooperation. The factors that are jointly
responsible for the smooth and effective functioning of the PRTs include the
opinion of the international community responsive to dynamic media reports from
the “battlefield”. Therefore, the success of the actions realised by the PRTs can be
seen as the result of the following elements:
– the degree of support from the local and international community for the
authorities of the host country;
– the degree of involvement of local communities in the activities of (local)
government and pro-government behavior;
– the degree of visible improvement of material and non-material conditions of
life and development,
– reliability of the PRTs work.13
It is worth stressing that the PRTs function as units of a temporary nature,
despite the fact that their commitment is long-term, which was repeatedly verified
in Afghanistan. In such a long-term performance of their tasks, the Provincial
Reconstruction Teams should take into account the possibility of a re-escalation of
crises due to human activities. Therefore, the success of the operation cannot be
declared prematurely and international security forces must not be withdrawn from
the province.
The Provincial Reconstruction Teams can also be considered in an instrumental
perspective, as tools of improvement. Such an approach is a consequence of the
search for new, effective methods of stabilisation and post-conflict normalisation
after direct combat operations such as, among others, the one in Afghanistan.
Difficulties in the stabilisation and reconstruction process somehow forced the
international security forces to take a “civil” action and the apparent increase in the
percentage of these activities in relation to conventional military action led to an
open debate on the possible scope of cooperation at the civil-military level. No less
important was the need to pursue the strategy developed by Lakhdar Brahimi,
according to which everything must be done by the soldiers involved in the
operation so that they are not perceived by the Afghan people as occupiers.14 The
PRTs are, therefore, the effect of a consensus between expectations and the actual
capacity for achieving the formulated objectives; with an awareness of the
necessity to possess not only light arms, but also the right to use violence beyond
cases of self-defence.
The key assumption of PRTs is also their range of influence reaching far
beyond the capital city of Afghanistan – Kabul, including the distant regions of the
country, and gradually all its provinces. This is a consequence of the
implementation of measures to extend the influence of the Afghan government and
13
PRT Playbook…, op. cit., pa. 2–3.
M. Gauster, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. An innovative instrument of
international crisis management being put to the test, “Occasional Paper Series”, European Center for
Security Studies, No 16, January 2008, pa. 8.
14
15
to promote the value of order, law and justice. It is worth noting that the nature of
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), stationed in Afghanistan since
2001, did not meet such formulated assumptions. The Provincial Reconstruction
Teams, as part of the task force of ISAF, have, however, a potential ranging from
50 to 500 civilian and military experts deployed in the all provinces of the country.15
Teams thus became an instrument used to create the foundation for a national
administration, also contributing to accelerating the pace of the self-reliance and selfsufficiency of Afghanistan. Therefore, the PRTs coordinate projects in three main areas
of stabilisation and reconstruction. These are the tasks of :
– direct provision and maintenance of security;
– enabling the development of state institutions throughout the country;
– creating conditions and facilitating reconstruction.16
It is, however, indicated that these tasks and the political end-goal of operation
require a long-term effort, as opposed to the rapid achievement of military
objectives, to which we all have become accustomed (eg. operation Allied Force in
Kosovo – 78 days). The PRTs effort, however, is measured in years rather than
months. Therefore, upon experience and an analysis carried out after five years of
PRT operations in Afghanistan, the authors indicate the need for the continuous
presence of PRTs in their structures and locations for at least 10-20 years. The
civilian population is also favourable to such an assumption and recognises the
PRTs as a centre of the province’s life providing direct assistance and a job.17 The
authors also recognise that such an outlined long-term effort is often contrary to the
desire of a quick political success.
Undoubtedly, the concept of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams is a forwardlooking way of implementating the S/R tasks (Stabilization and Reconstruction),
but one should pay attention to the need for regularity and consistency in the quest
to achieve a satisfactory level of their readiness. Presently, the PRTs have a great
potential and ability to implement innovative solutions in accordance with the
concept of “think globally, act locally”. However, this is only one of many
elements that should be undertaken in long-term and multi-faceted commitment to
the reconstruction and development of fragile post-conflict states.
Security Sector Reform is another undertaking implemented in the stabilisation
phase. SSR is a concept of reform of the state in the area of security, which is
particularly justified in the post-conflict phase, when some dysfunctions in its
functioning are visible, or political institutions are not able to provide public safety.
This reform can also be understood as a reconstruction of the security sector
(including not only military forces but also the state paramilitary forces such as the
15
Ibidem.
Ibidem.
17
Projects that modernise roads, builds schools, or implement vocational training for the Afghan
population. See more: Projekty 2012. Polska pomoc dla mieszkańców prowincji Ghazni w 2012 roku,
www.isaf.wp.mil.pl/pl/127.html (25.10.2012), and others, ibidem.
16
16
police). It also aims at increasing operational efficiency and the effectiveness of
these forces.
After conflict settlement, SSR may include activities such as disarmament of
former combatants (often including women and children), strengthening the rule of
law, judicial reform and training of forces responsible for security in the country,
carried out under the supervision of the local legitimate and democratic
government. Therefore, SSR can have a significant impact on the improvement of
security conditions and permanent prevention from renewal of conflict.18 However,
it is important to keep in mind that SSR is a long process focused primarily on
solving the structural causes of insecurity and, therefore, does not cover all levels
of necessary involvement in the state-building post-conflict phase.19 In practice, the
SSR is a component implemented by the Allied forces in the performance of their
tasks in the PRT area.
The first symptoms of the need for security sector reform in Afghanistan
became a subject of discussion at the G8 Summit in Tokyo in January 2002, where
a preliminary draft was outlined and the responsibilities of the countries
participating in the reform of the various security fields were defined. Germany
had to deal with reform of the police, Italy – justice, and the United Kingdom –
with the fight against drugs. Another lasting program of reform in Afghanistan was
signed in January 2006 in London between representatives of the Afghan
government and the international community and was called the “Afghanistan
Compact” agreement, which highlighted the need to rebuild the state, including the
security sector, and conduct a reform of the judiciary, law and police.20
The security environment of Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s
regime was correctly assessed as unstable. Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were in a
state of decay, unable to stand up to crime and violence in a society that did not
trust the coalition forces and where a formal state authority did not exist, which
was effectively used by insurgent groups and terrorists. The coalition involvement
in Iraq had, therefore, to include many reforms, starting with the elimination of
rebel forces, rebuilding structures and the capabilities of the Iraq Security Forces so
it could take responsibility for overseeing the situation in the country, and to make
a thorough security sector reform.21 The SSR in Iraq was to provide a safe
18
A. Bryden, H. Hanggi, Reforming and Reconstructing the Security Sector, [in:] A. Bryden,
H. Hanggi, Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, Geneva Centre for the Democratic
Control of Armed Force (DCAF), LIT 2005, pa. 24–25.
19
M. Sedra, Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan and Iraq: Exposing a Concept in Crisis,
“Journal of Peacebuilding and Development”, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2007, pa. 7–23. The author also
approaches the issue of the assessment and effectiveness of SSR and enumerates seven conditions that
must exist in order for the Security Sector Reform to be considered effective.
20
F. Ayub, S. Kouvo, R. Wareham, Security Sector Reform In Afghanistan, Initiative for
Peacebuilding, April 2009, pa. 9.
21
A. Rathmell, O. Oliker, T.K. Kelly, D. Brannan, K. Crane, Developing Iraq`s Security Sector,
The Coalition Provinsional Authority`s Experience, RAND National Defense Research Institute,
2005, pa. 1.
17
environment for political reforms and initiate the rebuilding of state structures from
the authoritarian regime to those of a democracy.22 Reforms included the following
sectors of national security: the security of state institutions, the defence sector, the
ministry of internal affairs, the justice system, the security of the infrastructure, the
intelligence services, along with the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
of the forces.23
Aid programs are projects financed and realised by the individual states,
creating and co-creating PRTs. The U.S. Department of Defense’s CERP
(Commander's Emergency Response Program) provide support for the smooth
functioning of their national PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq. The funds provided are
to enable the commanders of the local Teams to conduct rapid response in
emergencies, provide urgent humanitarian assistance and to implement programs in
the field of reconstruction, which contribute to improving the living conditions of
the local population. The CERP, according to the principles of the Financial
Management Plan 200524, can be implemented in the following nineteen areas:
– construction/repair/ treatment of water sources, wells and drains;
– irrigation;
– production and distribution of food;
– agriculture;
– electricity;
– health care;
– education;
– telecommunications;
– economic development;
– transport;
– justice;
– development of civil society;
– support for services of security and public order;
– renovation of cultural facilities and public facilities;
– implementation of financial compensation for damages resulting from the
military activities under the leadership of the United States;
– providing compensation to civilians and their families for death, bodily
injury or damage to property caused by the activities of the coalition of states under
the leadership of the United States;
– providing compensation for interned people;
– other projects in the field of small state infrastructure, including street
lighting;
– other short-term relief projects.
22
Ibidem, pa. 4.
Ibidem, pa. 22–73.
24
Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation, Volume 12, Chapter 27,
September 2005.
23
18
The CERP projects are implemented on a smaller scale than the whole of the
PRTs. It should be emphasised that they are subject to constant monitoring by the
DoD.
It is also important to indicate that other countries, including, inter alia, the
Republic of Poland, within the framework of their own and joint US-Polish
responsibility for the province, conduct separate aid projects. The Polish
contingent, supporting Ghazni province, has been implementing projects in the
energy, road and bridge infrastructure, education, health, justice and law sectors
since 2008. Moreover, the contingent directs its activities towards building
appropriate relations with the civilian population, seeking, in the long term, to
develop a sense of social belonging to the province and responsibility for it.
Polish aid projects are implemented and funded by the Polish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. However, the entire team of the US-Polish PRT in Ghazni has two
budgets: from the operational fund of the CERP and from the Polish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs’ annual fund. The activity of the CIMIC specialists, both Polish
and American, is not only dictated by the availability of financial resources, but is
also adjustable to the project cycle. Each of the projects submitted for execution is
subject to its own national legal regulations, yet since it contains similar
requirements, according to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs it is a legal
proposal of regulations. A sample model of the project cycle is shown in Figure 3.
Source: Structure of PRT functioning, Ghazni, PKW Afganistan, http://www.isaf.wp.mil.pl/pl/114.html (28.10.2012).
Figure 3. Five-phases project cycle of a PRT task according to legal regulations of the Polish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
19
The first phase is usually initiated by those who need it (a government, a local
representative of the authority of the host-state), and rarely by non-governmental
organisations operating in the province. Aid projects, which require intensive
manpower and resources, often have to get positive feedback from other stakeholders.
In Afghanistan, the consultative body on issues important to the development of the
province is the Provincial Development Council (PDC), which makes sure that projects
are implemented in accordance with the established order of priority. The Council also
analyses and evaluates the submitted project applications.
Afterwards, the submitted application is reviewed in terms of its feasibility and
advisability by the Reconstruction Team, who submit it to the funding body
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DoD). The preparation of documents and the
launching of a tender procedure, which reveals the executive agent, make up the
next phase. All the implemented actions are controlled at both formal and
executive level. Acceptance of the executed work is carried out by a commission
composed of experts in the field, who then decide to transfer the realised project to
the representatives of the province.
In 2012, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to devote PLN 23 m
(EUR 5,5 m) to the development of the Ghazni province.25 By June 2012, the
submitted projects amounted to EUR 19 m in total. This contributed to 21 aid
projects26 that encompassed modernisation of roads, construction of schools, other
public buildings and the critical infrastructure of the province, including the
construction of a dam, vocational training (weaving and sewing, and specialising in
the field of electrical engineering) and equipping schools with the necessary
educational aids.
The practical dimension of stabilisation and reconstruction
In Afghanistan, the operational environment was shaped by two key elements
of the allied forces, who carry out their duties as part of operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) and ISAF. Operation OEF and the forces of CFC (Command
Force) were commanded by the United States Central Command in Kabul.
Currently the ISAF mission constitutes the foundation of the S/R operation
(stabilisation and reconstruction), and provides the second pillar of the common
efforts of Western Countries in Afghanistan. ISAF forces contain about 40 000
soldiers from 37 countries (including eleven non-NATO)27 and they fulfil their
25
In 2011 it was PLN 22,9m ($7,5m), in 2010 – PLN 16m ($5,2m), in 2009 – $4,2m, in 2008 – $1 m.
Polska Pomoc dla mieszkańców prowincji Ghazni w 2012 roku, PKW Afganistan,
http://www.isaf. wp.mil.pl/pl/127.html (28.10.2012).
27
The number of ISAF forces has changed over the years. In November 2006 they amounted to
32.8 thousand, while in January 2009 there were already 55.1 thousand soldiers from 39 countries,
most of them from the U.S. (23.2 thou.) and the UK (8.9 thousand). See: Słownik pojęć i organizacji
międzynarodowych, http://www.stosunkimiedzynarodowe.info/haslo,ISAF (06.02.2014).
26
20
duties under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and NATO
operational plan NATO OPLAN 10302ISAF(2006).
ISAF forces are functioning in the structure of 28 Provincional Reconstruction
Teams and they are subordinate to five regional commands: the Capital command,
command North, East, South and West. Each team consists of military and civilian
personnel numbering between 50 and 500 people, representing governmental and
international agencies, carrying out duties in the area of security, stabilisation and
reconstruction. The first Reconstruction Team was set up in Gardez city in Pakita
province on 1 February 200328. Thus, in a real post-conflict environment, mission,
tasks and PRT's operation domain, were defined. Seven others were located in the
provinces of Kunduz, Bamiyan, Mazar-i-Shafif, Parwan, Herat, Nangarhar and
Kandahar to the end of that year. Next, in 2004, the potential of the forces was
expanded to eleven PRTs. It was the American component that was mostly
involved in creating PRT structures, commanding twelve of twenty-eight Teams.
Others were under the command of other ISAF countries29.
It needs to be noted that the beginning of the operation in Afghanistan was
carried out in the conditions of a failed state, in which government institutions and
administration were not functioning. There was no electricity, running water,
schools, hospitals or roads. The reasons for this were undoubtedly the long-term
civil war in the country and the Taliban regime that destroyed the country.
PRTs in Afghanistan are functioning in the wide spectrum of the involvement
of civil-military forces, fulfilling duties which can generally be divided into own
and outsourced. Own tasks are closely related to the mandate of fulfillment and
implementation of aid projects (the American CERP and others). Their main
financing sources are governments of countries involved in ISAF. We must,
however, bear in mind that not all of the submitted projects receive approval and,
thereby, financial help for finalising them. Outsourced tasks are based, first of all,
on PRT cooperation (commanders, civilian representatives) with the Afghan
community and its leaders (usually these are local level officials – province,
district, religious and clan leaders). Due to numerous cultural differences, daily
cooperation is a current problem for the province. Therefore, PRTs are helping
local authority representatives in solving tribal disputes, as well as forming
regional development processes by promoting the rule of law, good governance
and democracy, establishing organisations and coordinating their activities30.
However, the primary aim of the presence of forces in Afghanistan is to provide
security. It is also one of the three main goals assigned to the PRT, next to
stabilisation and reconstruction; nevertheless,their mutual interdependence must
also be taken into consideration. Creating a safe environment must be based on the
28
M. Marszałek (ed.), Koncepcja użycia…, op. cit., pa. 19.
C. Malkasian, G. Meyerle, Provincial Reconstruction Teams: How do we know they work?,
Strategic Studies Institute, March 2009, pa. 3.
30
Ibidem, pa. 7–8.
29
21
realisation of smaller sectorial tasks in social, cultural, political economic and other
areas, such as reducing insurgent activity, ensuring the (alternative for illegal)
source of family income or the country’s economic development. Together they are
the foundations of security which, properly managed, can contribute in the longterm perspective to excluding violence as an essential means for the existence of
the state and the nation.
Provincial Reconstruction Teams, being a part of crisis response operations, are
therefore responsible for supporting the development of effective security
management by legally chosen state structures31. General indications, ideas,
mission and aims, set as a compulsory part of PRTs’ activities, are leading the
scope of their activities. However, looking towards an analysis of areas of the
functioning of the fulfillment of tasks by PRTs in Afghanistan, the impossibility of
their unequivocal specification must be pointed out. This difficulty is, first of all,
caused by the great diversity of each of Afghanistan's provinces, their individual
needs and challenges. This diversity is also a consequence of multinationality in
crisis response operations and acquiescence of the use of national management
models, realised in the frames of PRTs. Detailed discussion of the areas of
engagement and activity of PRT components would need all specific Rebuild
Teams; however, research efforts are focused only on characterisation a group of
tasks functioning within one province. It is also crucial to point out that changes in
both political and economic aspects and, most of all, mental aspects must be
assessed. The last one is most significant as it represents the attitude and
assessment made by local people.
The authors of the report Provincial Reconstruction Teams: How do we know
they work? made such an assessment, taking as its criterion three factors: the level
of community participation in governance, their involvement in functioning
political institutions at the local government level and the level of assurance by the
government bodies of key services for the public and the corruption level. For the
purposes of this study it was decided to analyse the area and activities of PRT
forces in Ghazni province.
Involvement of PRT forces in Ghazni
Ghazni province is inhabited by approximately 931 thousand people. This
province is considered as one of the most dangerous ones in the country – insurgent
activity, despite numerous efforts to restrict it, remains high. The issue of the ethnic
division of the province is also significant in creating the security landscape. The
percentage of the Pashto people is higher, representing about 42 percent of the
province population, although the Hazara constitutes a strong minority group32.
31
32
22
Ibidem, pa. 10.
Ibidem, pa. 21.
However, it was proven that violence and insurgent activity were not the only
problem, since the low legitimacy and efficiency of local governing structures was
indicated, with the corruption level estimated as the 9th highest of all the
19 districts.
The PRT started its activity in Ghazni in 2006, primarily dealing with the
improvement of the security management process in the area.
Specific tasks that were undertaken in this area were:
– direct, daily support to officials and government bodies (Provincial Council,
Ghazni Provincial Development Committee) by American PRT officers;
– combating corruption by controlling the tendering process;
– implementation of plans to improve public services in the province,
including health care by regular meetings with representatives of health care
institutions (directors of clinics, hospitals), and cooperation in this regard with
representatives of NGOs;
– arrangement of training courses, seminars, workshops and lectures on health
care for the Afghan people and health professionals, including distant districts;
– building of a "social network” monitoring the activity of the insurgents;
– realisation of large building projects, 55% of the overall spending package
has been dedicated to improving the quality of roads or their building, linking
distant areas of the province with the capital, which allowed, among other things,
transport of agricultural products from small farms to a collection point and
increased public participation in the political and social life of the province;
– establishing cooperation with tribal elders and inciting them to participate in
the political life of the province;
– pursuing policies of informing about ongoing projects as well as their own,
such as the government’s, particularly the consultation proposals both with the
provincial authorities and also with the local assemblies in each district.33
The engagement outlined above has confirmed that the political participation of
the community can contribute to the improvement of stabilisation and security in
the area of responsibility. It needs to emphasised that, similarly to other provinces,
increased insurgent activity occurred there as well. Therefore, it has been stressed
that measures aimed at minimising the activity of the Taliban cannot be taken
solely by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. It should be noted that all PRT aid
projects were also funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Republic of
Poland, CERP, USAID, or the Afghan government programs (NSP - National
Solidarity Program) supported by the World Bank and the Ministry of
Rehabilitation and Rural Development (MRRD).
33
Ibidem, pa. 21–25.
23
Source: Historia PRT Ghazni, http://www.isaf.wp.mil.pl/pl/115.html (06.11.2012).
Figure 4. Financing aid projects implemented by the Polish team of PRT Ghazni
This Ministry is coordinating implementation of economic aid projects, thereby
initiating the cooperation of the local assembly of the elders, management districts
and provinces of the central government in Kabul34.
PRT in Iraq
Arrangement of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq was taken by the U.S.
administration from the idea of their use in Afghanistan as an effective tool for
stabilisation and reconstruction in post-conflict countries, and was successfully
transplanted there in 2005. Ten initial PRTs have been established, and for the next
two years their activity was supported by subsequent teams. In total, a PRT was
functioning at the centre of each province35. Moreover, at the lower stage (local
government administration), their tasks were fulfilled by the so-called e-PRTs
(13)36, which were supporting development of economic, administration, business,
rules of law and the idea of a civil society37.
Despite the adaptation of PRT solutions from Afghanistan, the organisation and
forces structure of Iraq Reconstruction Teams included a significantly smaller
share of the military component. The first three of the ten PRTs (in Mosul, Kirkuk
and Hilla) were functioning relying on representatives of the U.S. State
34
Ibidem, pa. 27.
In 15 of the 18 provinces of Iraq, under the assumption that one team in Erbil impacts with its
range comprising three northern provinces of Iraq. See: U.S. Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq, http://iraqprt.usembassy .gov/index.html (05.11.2012).
36
For example in Baghdad, the capital city, their tasks are performing one PRT and 6 ePRTs.
37
PRT Playbook…, op. cit., pa. 66.
35
24
Department, the Department of Justice and Agriculture and USAID. Their main
aim was ensuring safety for developing aid programs realised by Americans,
outside Baghdad. The extension of the PRT's involvement occurred in 2007, when
President Bush presented the project for supporting Iraq on its way to
independence under the name "New Way Forward"38. This assumed a
strengthening of reconciliation, supporting counterinsurgency operations, support
aimed at accelerating the development of Iraq and building the capacity of the
authorities to perform their duties. Nevertheless, the activity of the PRTs was
focused on shaping the political environment rather than rebuilding the
infrastructure. Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), were called up as a support for the
carrying out of new ventures. Newly created PRTs in Baghdad, Anbar Province
and Babylon were to be functioning within the framework. Along with these
intentions, the PRTs created by the BCT were supposed to be small groups of forty
states’ representatives, supporting the process of the planning of future operations.
Experts from agriculture, firm management or business fields were employed as
well. In the BCT and PRT unit created to function together, firstly their division
competences were specified. BCTs were to be responsible for security and PRTs
for protection and ensuring operational support. Following the changes, the PRTs
in Iraq were focused on the areas of their involvement, gradually expanding on
activities related to reconstruction and state-building.
Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq were civilian-military diplomatic
outposts, whose missions and tasks expanded greatly. They served as an assistance
to local governments in developing and maintaining the capacity for governance
and justice, economic development, education, culture and public health care39.
The long-term aim (strategic goal) of PRTs in Iraq was to achieve stability and
the security and independence of the country. Therefore, a decision to expand the
areas of engagement was made, creating partnerships with local people. This
cooperation was bearing fruit, as solutions to everyday problems were found more
easily, enhancing the implementation of development projects relevant to the
citizens’ quality of life. In the field of justice, PRTs worked with local courts,
assisting them in the development of investment and economic growth through an
overview of property rights and enforcement of commercial law. They also
provided protection for Iraq's legislative system, verified the preservation of human
rights, oversaw the functioning of the prison system, supported the fight against
corruption, and improved the position of women in the country as well40.
In promoting economic development, PRTs used relationships and contacts
established with the provincial government. Representatives of the U.S. Ministry of
Treasury and Agriculture, through cooperation with local experts, organised
38
R. M. Perito, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq, Special Report, United State Institute
of Peace, PRT_IRAQ.pdf.
39
U.S. Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq, http://iraq-prt.usembassy.gov/index.html (05.11.2011).
40
Governance & Rule of Law, http://iraq-prt.usembassy.gov/governance.html (05.11.2012).
25
conferences, fairs, summits, seminars and discussions on a wide range of topics
such as banking, finance, agriculture, transport, energy, energy resources, irrigation
systems, sewerage and access to water. These were the key services delivered by
the state, including the protection of the critical infrastructure of the country. They
proved essential to its proper functioning and growth of the level of development
of society41.
PRTs were also involved in improving the functioning of educational
institutions at all administrative levels in Iraq, in order to expand learning
opportunities for children, youth and adults, and to increase their capacity to put
the skills and acquired knowledge into practice. An important part of the
educational process has been dedicated to learning English, so that a long-term
perspective international cooperation in Iraq could be established. It also enabled
the creation of partnerships between universities and schools, through student
exchanges and international scholarships, such as the Fulbright program42.
Tasks for promoting the development of culture and general national
improvement in the field were fulfilled by PRTs through supporting the Iraqi State
Board of Antiquities and Heritage. Measures taken in this direction aimed at
promoting the protection of monuments and creating and supporting state
institutions responsible for the protection of cultural heritage43.
PRTs were also involved in improving the capacity of the Iraqi Ministry of
Health and its delegations in the provinces in order to improve public services in
the field of caring for the life and health of citizens. First of all, necessary technical
assistance was delivered, so that health services and equipment could be operated
by qualified medical personnel. In a wider aspect, PRT professionals contributed to
the efficiency and effectiveness of the whole stabilisation and security process of
Iraq, by improving the quality of essential services, which undoubtedly are the
conditions for a dignified life and health44.
Conclusions
Contemporary armed conflicts are characterised by a high probability of reescalation. Many suitable measures will be taken to prevent them. In the case of
Afghanistan, one of the organisations actively participating in stabilising the
conflict and the reconstruction of the destroyed state is the North Atlantic
Organisation, which, apart from the ongoing operations, has to deal with the entire
spectrum of other global threats. As part of these endeavours, NATO's involvement
in activities related to the stabilisation and reconstruction in countries with a fragile
41
Economic Development, http://iraq-prt.usembassy.gov/econ-development.html (05.11.2012).
Education & Culture, http://iraq-prt.usembassy.gov/education.html (05.11.2012).
43
Ibidem.
44
Public Health, http://iraq-prt.usembassy.gov/20100823may1.html (05.11.2012).
42
26
power structure is necessary. NATO has many resources to conduct these types of
activities. However, while engaging in crisis response operations, the alliance must
be prepared to take action targeted firstly at stabilising the situation, then
reconstructing the state with all its military and non-military potential, and
rebuilding its personal and material resources. Efforts in this field are based on the
concept of the use of the support elements of the process. Among these measures,
the idea of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), the concept of Security Sector
Reform and the implementation of any kind of assistance, the idea of functioning in
an operational environment seems crucial.
It's clear that NATO's involvement in the stabilisation and reconstruction
processes around the globe will be based on the lessons learned in Afghanistan.
ISAF forces were operating within the structure of 28 Provincial Reconstruction
Teams subordinated to the five regional commands. Their structure was integrating
civilian and military forces, which proved an optimal solution. Their role was to
help local government solve tribal disputes, promote the process of development of
the region through the rule of law and democracy, institution building and the
coordination of their activities. Provincial Reconstruction Teams, as an element of
crisis response operations, should therefore be responsible for supporting the
development of effective security management by the local legal authorities of the
country.
In conclusion, it is vital for us to answer the question: how do the elements
used by the allied forces in the stabilisation and reconstruction operations support
failed or failing states? In the context of post-conflict stabilisation in the country,
allied forces used different means and methods. For example, the state responsible
for the operation of the PRT in the province strove to achieve the projected end
state of operation by different ways and means; nevertheless, the main assumptions
of operations remain unchanged. To the elements used by the alliance force in the
stabilisation and reconstruction process we must also include all kinds of assistance
programs that are implemented and funded by individual states, which form the
PRTs. For example, the CERP program of the U.S. Department of Defense
provided sufficient support for the better functioning of their national PRTs in
Afghanistan and Iraq. The financial resources allowed PRT commanders rapid
response in emergencies, to provide urgent humanitarian assistance and the
implementation of its programs in the field of reconstruction. This all affected the
improvement of living conditions for the local population. In addition, other
countries, including the Republic of Poland, carried on their own assistance
programs. The Polish contingent, which has been supporting Ghazni province since
2008, put the projects for the energy sector into effect, including infrastructure
(such as roads and bridges), education, health, justice and the law. Moreover, the
PRT directed its activities towards building appropriate relations with the civilian
population.
27
In conclusion, it should be emphasised that successful completion of the
stabilisation operation should not only result from PRT commitment, but also from
the host country’s efforts, the ability to build relationships with other parties
engaged, the degree of interdependence between actors and the effectiveness of
their cooperation. To the factors contributing to the successful execution of its
activities we should also include the opinion and attitude of the international
community, the role of the media and their direct relation to the "battlefield". The
interaction of all these components enhances the stabilisation of post-conflict
situation in a given region and then the country, boosts proper economic
development and creates good living conditions for its citizens.
Bibliography
Ayub F., Kouvo S., Wareham R., Security Sector Reform In Afghanistan, Initiative for
Peacebuilding, April 2009.
Bensahel N., Oliver O., Peterson H., Improving Capacity for Stability and Reconstruction
Operations, RAND, Santa Monica 2009.
Bryden A., Hanggi H., Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, Geneva Centre
for the Democratic Control of Armed Force (DCAF), LIT 2005.
Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation, Volume 12, Chapter 27,
September 2005.
Gauster M., Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. An innovative instrument of
international crisis management being put to the test, “Occasional Paper Series”,
European Center for Security Studies, No 16, January 2008.
Malkasian C., Meyerle G., Provincial Reconstruction Teams: How do we know they work?,
Strategic Studies Institute, March 2009.
Marszałek M. (ed), Koncepcja użycia sił zbrojnych w wojnach nieregularnych, research
work no III.5.1.0, AON, Warsaw 2011.
Marszałek M (ed.), Obszary działań i zadań sił zaangażowanych w odbudowę i umacnianie
bezpieczeństwa w środowisku miejskim, research work no I.1.7.1.0, AON, Warsaw
2012.
Marszałek M., Limanowski T., Operacje pokojowe Organizacji Narodów Zjednoczonych.
Geneza – struktura – planowanie, AON, Warsaw 2011.
Materials of scientific conference „Misje stabilizacyjne dla odbudowy państw”, organized
on 13–14 May 2009 in AON.
Nelson R., How Should NATO Handle Stabilisation Operations and Reconstruction
Efforts?, The Atlantic Council of the United States, Washington D.C. 2006.
Perito R. M., Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq, Special Report, United State
Institute of Peace, PRT_IRAQ.pdf.
PRT Playbook. Tactic, Technic and Procedures, Center of Army Lessons Learned, No 0734, September 2007.
Rathmell A., Oliker O., Kelly T.K., Brannan D., Crane K., Developing Iraq`s Security
Sector, The Coalition Provinsional Authority`s Experience, RAND National Defense
Research Institute, 2005.
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Sedra M., Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan and Iraq: Exposing a Concept in Crisis,
“Journal of Peacebuilding and Development”, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2007.
Economic Development, http://iraq-prt.usembassy.gov/econ-development.html
Education & Culture, http://iraq-prt.usembassy.gov/education.html
Governance & Rule of Law, http://iraq-prt.usembassy.gov/governance.html
Historia PRT Ghazni, http://www.isaf.wp.mil.pl/pl/115.html
PKW Afganistan, http://www.isaf. wp.mil.pl/pl/127.html
PKW Afganistan, http://www.isaf.wp.mil.pl/pl/114.html
Public Health, http://iraq-prt.usembassy.gov/20100823may1.html
U.S. Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq, http://iraq-prt.usembassy .gov/index.html
29
NDU
Scientific
Quarterly
4(93)
2013
Zeszyty
Naukowe
AON nrno
2(59)
2005
ISSN2353-1789
0867–2245
ISSN
ANDRZEJ CIUPIŃSKI
TREATY PRINCIPLES OF THE EU’S
COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY
POLICY
Assoc. Prof. Andrzej CIUPINSKI, Ph.D.
Abstract
The aim of this article is to analyse the long political and military process of forming
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). At the beginning it was the separate
pillar of the European. For the European security issues was responsible the NATO and the
Western European Union. After almost twenty years the Lisbon Treaty on European Union,
which entered into force on 1 December 2009, changed the competence of the European
Union in the security sphere. Treaty of Lisbon created the Common Security and Defence
Policy (CSDP) and for the first time put so much attention to European Union’s
international activity. Responsible for this is the High Representative of the Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. For this function was appointed Catherine Ashton. She
is assisted by the European External Action Service. HR is also one of the Vice-Presidents
of the European Commission, chairs the Foreign Affairs Council, contributes through
proposals towards the preparation of the CFSP and ensures implementation of the
decisions adopted by the European Council and the Council, especially in the security
matters. Lisbon compromise also led the termination of the Western European Union in
2011. Several prominent leadershave voiced support for a common defence for the Union.
This possibility, requiring unanimous support among the member states, was formally laid
down in Article 42 the Treaty of Lisbon extended the enhanced co-operation provision to
become available for application in the area of defence. This mechanism enables
a minimum number of member states to deepen integration within the EUs institutional
framework, without the necessity of participation for reluctant member states.
Key words – Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), High Representative of
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), Common Security and Defence
Policy (CSDP). European External Action Service (EEAS).
From Maastricht to Lisbon
Until the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, foreign and security policy issues
had fallen within the scope of the EU’s second pillar. In the Treaty on European
Union signed on 7 February 1992, in Maastricht, Title V was introduced, it
contained provisions regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy (or
30
TREATY PRINCIPLES OF THE EU’S COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY
CFSP). Articles J.1 - J.11 stated the general objectives, which effected positively
the notion of introducing any restrictions, concerning activity in areas of foreign
security. Article J.4 constituted, that: “The Common Foreign and Security Policy of
the security of the European Union, in particular through the implementation of
a common foreign and security policy, including the eventual framing of
a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence”1.
The targets of the Common Foreign and Security Policy were presented in five
points: 1) the protection of the common values, essential interests and
independency, 2) strengthening the security of the EU and Member States, in all
ways, 3) peace preservation and strengthening international security by following
the principles of the Charter of the United Nations (or UN), Helsinki Final Act and
the targets of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe; 4) support of the international
collaboration; 5) development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of the
world, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Defence abilities, including military ones, were also developed prior to the
Maastricht Treaty introduced some restrictions, which limited such development.
Namely, the issue of security was distinguished from the activities in defence areas.
Aspects such as, disarmament, assets and weapon rotation were in the scope of
security issues. All actions leading to the use of armed forces are classified as
defence issues and such actions were ascribed to the Western European Union (or
WEU). The defence issues were explicitly excluded from the CFSP’s area of
activity2.
The Treaty of Maastricht introduced also a provision, concerning Member
States protection, in the scope of their sovereign rights regarding security,
diplomacy and defence. First of all, Member States received an assurance, that the
EU’s policy did not violate their obligations, resulting from the North Atlantic
Treaty. Secondly, the provisions of the Treaty on European Union could not hinder
the closer cooperation of the countries, in the area of defence and military, within
NATO and the Western European Union.
The accurate specification of the security and defence areas resulted in the
verification of the Treaty, which took place after the Inter-Governmental
Conference. Consequently, a new Treaty on European Union was accepted and
signed in Amsterdam on 2 October 1997. The new Treaty expressed wider support
for the Common Foreign and Security Policy by introducing a number of elements,
which enabled the enhancement of the competencies in the area of crisis response.
1
Treaty on European Union [w:] W. Czapliński, R. Ostrahinsky, A. Wyrozumska (ed.), Prawo
Wspólnot Europejskich. Dokumenty. Orzecznictwo. Scholar, Warszawa 1994, p. 134; J. Barcz,
Wprowadzenie i przekład [w:] Treaty on European Union,. Consolidated version, Warszawa 2000, p. 57.
2
W.M. Góralski, Rozwój i ewolucja systemu decyzyjnego Wspólnej Polityki Zagranicznej
i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej [w:] Dyplomacja czy siła? Unia Europejska w stosunkach
międzynarodowych, edited by S. Parzymiesa, Scholar, Warszawa 2009, p. 57. A. Ciupiński, Wspólna
Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony Unii Europejskiej. Geneza. Rozwój. Funkcjonowanie. Difin
Warszawa 2013
31
ANDRZEJ CIUPIŃSKI
The CFSP became the EU’s domain, but previously it belonged to the
competencies of the European Union and Member States. These modifications
resulted in the expansion of the union bodies rights in the decision-making process,
concerning the domestic relations and security policy3. A substantial change to the
Treaty was the introduction of the EU’s integrity provisions duty and the
strengthening of its security, in all ways. The European Council and the Council of
the European Union reinforced their competencies. The most significant action was
the introduction of a new post, the High Representative for the CFSP.
The Amsterdam Treaty specified the relations between the European Union and
the Western European Union. Based on art. 17 par. 1, the Western European Union
is obliged to support the EU in “determining defence aspects of the Common
Foreign and Security Policy.” The subordination was strongly expressed in the
statement: “The Western European Union will serve an instrument to elaborate and
implement the decisions and actions of the EU, which influences the defence
issues”4. The Petersburg tasks had serious consequences on the development of
crisis response abilities. Art. 17 par. 2 stated that: “the matters defined in this
article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping missions and
military mission, which serves in crisis management, including peace-making
process”.
The instruments presented in the Amsterdam Treaty are, as follows:
1. the specification of general principles and guidelines for CFSP,
2. the specification of common strategies,
3. joint actions,
4. common positions,
5. systematic cooperation between Member States,
6. constructive abstention5.
The implementation institutions were strengthened by assigning the High
Representative for the CFSP, whose post was merged with that of the SecretaryGeneral of the Council (Art. 18, AT). The European Parliament and the European
Commission also joined the CFSP6. The Amsterdam Treaty enabled defence and
security policy introduction and military capacities development within Helsinki
Headline Goal. Almost immediately after the treaty conclusion, but before its entry
into force, it was necessary to make amendments to the treaty of the European
3
Ibidem, s. 59–61.
Treaty on European Union,. Consolidated version [w:] J. Barcz, Traktat o Unii Europejskiej.
Wprowadzenie i przekład, Warszawa 2002, pp. 53-60; J. Starzyk, Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna
i Bezpieczeństwa, Warszawa 2001, J. Z. Pietraś, Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa po
Traktacie Amsterdamskim [w:] M. Chorośnicki, E. Cziomer (ed.), Unia Europejska i integracja
w Europie, Kraków 1999.
5
A. Legucka, Podstawy normatywne reagowania kryzysowego Unii Europejskiej [w:] J. Gryz
(red. nauk.), System reagowania kryzysowego Unii Europejskiej, Wyd. Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2009,
pp. 117-119.
6
W.M. Góralski, Rozwój…, op. cit., p. 61.
4
32
Union. The next Inter-Governmental Conference was convened in order to resolve
a problem of the, so called, Amsterdam leftovers.
Some issues were specified in the Nice Treaty, nevertheless records concerning
the WEU were excluded. The European Union's preparation for significant
enlargement took place in Nicaea, whereas the contribution towards the area of
European Security and Defence Policy (or ESDP) was small. Rafał Trzaskowski
was right by assuming that “this very conclusion of the agreement was already
a success”7. With difficulties and limitations a formula of enhanced cooperation
within CFSP was forced through (art. 27A-e), being determined to serve a common
values and interests protection of the European Union, and confirming its identity
on the international scene. It was a significant limitation to exclude from this
cooperation the issues having military or defence implications8.
The issue of the EU’s reform, including the domestic and foreign security
complex, was postponed until the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty. The Treaty
abridged the EU institutional reform, thus was rejected by the French and the
Dutch. Consequently, a new and shorter version was introduced – the Lisbon
Treaty, also known as the Reform Treaty.
Common Security and Defence Policy within the Treaty of Lisbon
After many political incidents the Lisbon Treaty came into force on
1 December 2009, and introduced the Common Security and Defence Policy (or
CSDP)9. The CSDP was incorporated within the complex of “EU external actions”,
which consist of: Common Foreign and Security Policy, common economic,
development and humanitarian policy, and foreign policies aspects (e.g. cultural
policy)10.
Common Security and Defence Policy was defined in Title V, in Articles 21-46. It
was concluded that it constitutes an integral element of the CFSP, and it should
serve to assure operational capacities, which rely on civil and military supplies.
7
R. Trzaskawski, Dynamika reformy systemu podejmowania decyzji w Unii Europejskiej,
Warszawa 2005. p. 243–244.
8
J. Barcz, Trakat z Nicei. Zagadnienia prawne i instytucjonalne, Warszawa 2003, p. 122–125;
R. Zięba, Instytucjonalizacja bezpieczeństwa europejskiego…, op. cit. p. 213; J. Czaputowicz,
Polityka zagraniczna i dyplomacja Unii Europejskiej a Traktat Konstytucyjny, CSM „Raporty
i Analizy”, nr 4,Warszawa 2005.
9
It is worth noting, that the name of policy contains again the adjective “common”, which
initially appeared in the Declaration adopted in Koeln in June 1999, whereas the adjective
“European” was eliminated, as the European Union has not covered the whole continent.
10
c.f. J. Barcz, Zasadnicze reformy strukturalne ustroju Unii Europejskiej [w:] Traktat
z Lizbony. Główne reformy ustrojowe Unii Europejskiej, (ed.) J. Barcz, Warszawa 2008, p. 60–61.
Ewa Górnicz, Rola Unii Europejskiej na arenie międzynarodowej w kontekście zmian Traktatu
z Lizbony, Unia Europejska na forum globalnym, Departament Analiz i Strategii ,,Biuletyn Analiz”,
Nr 23, grudzień 2009, pp. 4–26, www.polskawue.gov.pl (2.10.2011).
33
ANDRZEJ CIUPIŃSKI
These supplies are used to maintain peace and strengthen international security.
However there were almost no far-reaching references to obtaining its own
supplies by the EU. The Union, as of yet, will implement peace-making tasks using
forces and assets, which will be offered by Member States. In the light of the new
regulations, the European Union can lead the forces and assets to implement six
mission types: 1. common disarmament actions, 2. humanitarian and rescue
missions, 3. military counselling and support, 4. armed actions and service to ease
the crisis, 5. peace-making, 6. conflict ending and stabilization.
As in the case of previous treaties, the issue of a possible “common defence”
was postponed for an indefinite time. It will be developed, if the European Council
makes a unanimous decision. The treaty respects the security and defence policy of
these Member States which want to implement the common defence policy within
NATO (art. 42 par. 2 LT). The obligation clause, which Member States have
towards each other in case of armed aggression aimed at one of them, sounds
promising. Under the solidarity clause, Member States are obliged to come to the
rescue of one another, when one of them is threatened by a terrorist attack or
natural disaster, or else any catastrophe caused by a human. Structures and
competencies of institutions responsible for the Common Foreign and Security
Policy or Common Security and Defence Policy were defined in the Treaty on the
functioning of the European Union.
The role of the European Council in the development of security
and defence policy
The European Council is the most important political body of the European
Union. The European Council meetings consists of the leaders of countries or
heads of EU’s Member States governments. Pursuant to the Treaties (Maastricht,
Amsterdam, Nice) the European Council had a right to coordinate the actions of
three EU’s pillars and had a great influence on the European integration
development. On 26 June 2002, in Seville, the European Council made a decision
on the meetings, which are to be held four times a year, and also arrange
extraordinary meeting, if needed11. Initially, referring to the development of
security and defence policy and military capacities, its competencies had a limited
and non-treaty character. Only the Amsterdam Treaty in accordance with the
art. 13, entitled the European Council to make decisions on defence issues. Based
on art. 17 par. 1, AT, the European Council was enabled to make decisions
concerning “the integration of the Western European Union into the European
Union”, which framed the formation of the process of creating EU’s independent
military capacities.
11
p. 61.
34
R. Zięba, Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej, Warszawa 2007.
Commencing as of June 1999, since meeting in Cologne, the European
Council, each 6 months, made decisions which influenced the military capacities
development. In Cologne decisions concerning independent military capacities
were made. Next, on 10-11 December 1999, the Helsinki Headline Goal was
introduced in order to develop the European Union Rapid Reaction Force. In Santa
Maria da Feira, under Portugal's presidency, The European Council made
a decision on the formation of civil segments of the crisis response system. At the
EU meeting in Nice, on 7-9 December 2000, the Helsinki Headline Goal Force
Catalogue was accepted, as well as decisions concerning structures responsible for
the EU military capacities development (the Political and Security Committee, the
European Union Military Committee, the European Union Military Staff). In
December 2001 at a meeting in Laeken, the European Council introduced the
European Capabilities Action Plan – ECAP. The European Union interfered
directly in the development of the military capacities creating new institutions and
programs regarding force and assets, on numerous occasions. The European
Council adopted a document entitled, A secure Europe in a better world, which
was a crowning achievement of concept works in the European Security and
Defence Policy. In 2004 the European Council determined the subsequent Helsinki
Headline Goal - 2010 The European Council makes periodic appraisals, both
within the implementation of the program, as well as within the evaluation of the
goals achievement progress, which were set by the European Security Strategy.
Under art. 24 LT, the competencies of the European Council included:
1) defining EU strategic interests, 2) determining general guidelines and strategic
objectives within the CFSP, 3) specifying common approach which constitutes an
object of general interest and making necessary decisions12. Based on art. I-22 LT,
the European Council elects the representative of the European Council, who
represents the European Union in international relations within the CFSP. After the
Lisbon Treaty came into force, Herman van Rompuy was elected to hold this
position. The tenure of the European Council Representative runs for 2,5 years.
The competencies of the European Council within the Common
Security and Defence Policy
The European Council, on the basis of its general directives, develops the
CFSP and performs a crucial role in the decision-making process concerning the
crisis response system. It determines and initiates the main objectives, and decides
on the issues within the CFSP13. Foreign Ministers of the Council of Europe meet
as the General Affairs and External Relations Council (fr. CAGRE – Conseil
Affaires générales et relations extérieures). Since the European Council meeting in
12
13
W.M. Góralski, Rozwój i ewolucja…, op. cit., p. 73.
J. Starzyk, Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa, Warszawa 2001, p. 71–76.
35
ANDRZEJ CIUPIŃSKI
Seville in June 2002 the CFSP problems got distinguished from the “general
affairs”14.
The Council is a crucial decision-making body in the scope of planning,
conducting crisis response operations, both in military area as well as in civil
aspects. The decision-making areas underwent some changes. Under the Maastricht
Treaty the decisions of the Council were made unanimously, excluding Denmark
(pursuant to protocol no 5 enclosed to the Treaty on European Union). Qualified
majority voting was allowed in the case of undertaking common activities and
positions only if all Member States gave their approvals. The Amsterdam Treaty
allowed for qualified majority voting if the EU Council decided on common
activities and positions implemented within a common strategy, approved prior.
Another condition was that the decisions referred to the common activities and
positions15. There were two cases indicated, which excluded qualified majority
voting. Firstly, if one of the Council members declared that: “for national policy
reasons” he opposes the application of majority voting procedure. Secondly,
majority voting procedure cannot be applied in the case of military and defence
implications. It was determined that the use of force shall be preceded by
a unanimous decision. The Amsterdam Treaty gave a possibility of a flexible
approach to the issue of security and defence policy by introducing so called
constructive abstention (art. 23 par. 1). Then the European Council made
unanimous decisions within the CFSP, however the abstention did not hinder the
decision-making process. A country, or countries, which did not take part in the
decision-making process, were not obligated to implement any resolution and did
not incur any costs concerning this process. By the abstention, the country accepted
that the decision is binding for the EU, and this being the case, the country cannot
undertake any action which would hinder the EU proceedings. The decision on the
application of the constructive abstention procedure cannot be followed, in the
case that the absenting countries derive more than one third of the weighted
votes16.
The failure of the Constitutional Treaty of 2005, caused numerous concessions
to the benefit of the opponents to equip the EU’s defence capacities. The position
of Ireland was crucial concerning the above issues. This state was in strong
opposition to the treaty's ratification in its modified and shorter version. Prior to the
decisive referendum, the opponents of the ratification scared their fellow citizens
with the idea hat the European Union will become a military power. The last
negotiations, regarding the Lisbon Treaty, were held between Ireland and the
British government. The agreement was reached before the EU’s meeting. The
document was in the form of a binding protocol (primary law) and a political
14
F. Tarpen, La politique de sécurirté et de défense de l’Union Européene, Paris 2010, p. 20–21.
J. Barcz (wprowadzenie i przekład), Treaty on European Union,. Consolidated version, MSZ,
Warszawa 2001, p. 65–66.
16
J. Starzyk, Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa, Warszawa 2001, p. 87–88.
15
36
declaration of Irish government. The protocol concerns mainly the issue of the Irish
position towards European Security and Defence Policy17. In the Irish Protocol the
objectives concerning the common defence decisions were repeated, confirming
that such decisions must be made unanimously by the European Council.
On November 13, the Czech government, as the last, deposited in Rome the
Lisbon Treaty ratification documents. According to the arrangements, a new treaty
came into force in December 2009. It was tremendous progress for the the EU’s
external activity; the European Union became a legal and international personality.
Pursuant to art. 26 LT, the Council performs fundamental functions
implemented in the area of the CFSP by making:
1) necessary decisions to fulfil the guidelines and strategic objectives approved
by the European Council,
2) “executive” decisions in the form of activities and positions, which should
be undertaken by the EU (art. 28 par. 1),
3) decisions determining the EU approach to a specific problem of a geographic or
subject character.
The Council is entitled to determine both the financing methods of CFSP and
access to budgetary funds (art. 41 par. 3 LT). The Council cooperates with the
High Representative in order to ensure the unanimity, coherency and effectiveness
in EU activities within the CFSP (art. 26 par. 2 LT). The Council determines the
principles of the organizing and functioning of the External Action Service of the
European Union (art. 27 par. 3 TEU).
The Spanish presidency initially showed its activity in enhancing the CFSP. On
25 February 2010, in Palm de Majorca another informal Defence Ministers’
meeting was held, on which the postulate of reshaping the meeting into a Council
of a decisive character was examined. In his speech Carme Chacon highlighted that
the Lisbon Treaty significantly strengthen defence policy. It is necessary to call
a formal body on the European level, which could examine issues such as: effective
conducting of military operations, defence capacities and conditions of clause
implementation of mutual defence or the application of the solidarity clause,
Catharine Ashton accepts the concept promoted by the French and the Spanish.
Although she did not take part in the Mallorca meeting, she filed a letter to the
Defence Ministers which favours the idea of a regular meeting of this this body.
The French and the Spanish found allies in the European Parliament. In the
17
The Irish wished for the approval of two principles: first, the policy of defence and common
security will not influence Irish national security policy and its obligations; second, the Lisbon Treaty
will not influence the Irish traditional neutral military policy. Each country will decide on the aid
forms they wish to provide to the EU Member States in case of terrorist attack or armed aggression.
Likewise permanent structural cooperation and European Defence Agency, each country will decide
whether to be involved in such activities. The protocol contains the assurance, that the Lisbon Treaty
does not stipulate forming the European army, as well as military trainings. Additionally, Ireland and
other countries determine the amount of military expenses “Council of The European Union”,
Nr 11225/09, Brussels, 19 June 2009, pp. 3–5.
37
ANDRZEJ CIUPIŃSKI
resolution, March 2010, it was noted that: “in the light of the progress in CFSP
area, which enables the Lisbon Treaty, it indicates the necessity and legitimacy of
establishing the Defence Council within the Foreign Affairs Council which consist
of Defence Ministers led by Vice-president / High Representative and which would
play a crucial role in enhancing cooperation as well as adjusting and integrating
military potential”18. A serious debate was initiated, which proved ineffective and
was a meeting subject on numerous occasions.
Presidency of the European Council
The Presidency of the EU Council is of crucial importance regarding the
elaboration and implementation of the EU foreign and security policy, especially in
the scope of the coordination and mediation between the EU Member States.
Holding this position for a period of 6 months, the country represents the EU on the
international scene. The Presidency, on behalf of the EU Council, holds a dialogue
with third world countries and presents its position on current international
problems. In this area the presiding country is allowed to make declarations on
behalf of the Council. Customarily, the Presidency undertakes actions, at least
verbal, in the case of a crisis. After the approval of the Lisbon Treaty numerous
Presidency competencies were transferred to the competencies of the High
Representative and the External Action Service of the European Union. Amongst
all Council formations only one is not subjected to the Presidency - the Foreign
Affairs Council - presided by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy, pursuant to the Lisbon Treaty.
Committee of Permanent Representatives
The Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) is not focused on
the security and defence policy, but it plays a crucial role in the elaboration
constructive decisions. It consists of permanent representatives (ambassadors) of
Member States. It is an institution where formulations and expertise are drafted in
Council meeting with the presence of Foreign Ministers. Therefore, within the
COREPER all EU issues are determined. This is the body which customarily
performed the function of a coordinator. It is of great importance, because the EU
crisis response operations can have a different character and cause financial
18
European Parliament Resolution of 10 March 2010 op. cit. punkt 16, szerzej; C. CaballeroBourdot, Le suivi interparlementaire de la Pesc : possibilités pour le futur, Occasional Paper, nr 94,
ISS, Paris, octobre 2011.
38
consequences or repercussions19. In the case where the meeting of the permanent
representatives refers to the CFSP problems, then they are treated as the COPEPER
II UE.
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy
A few months after the Amsterdam Treaty came into force on 18 October 1999,
the former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana was selected as the General
Affairs Council Secretary General, simultaneously becoming the High
Representative (or HR) of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, de
facto he was also made the highest diplomatic representative of the European
Union. Moreover, on 25 November 1999, Solana was appointed the Western
European Union Secretary General and enlarged his competencies in the military
area. Besides this, he was treated as informal defence minister. The accumulation
of so many functions performed by one person can be understood as the lack of
institutional solutions and a need for foundations necessary to form some. Just after
accepting the position of Western European Union Secretary General Solana
assumed that “The Western European Union is now in the last phase of its
evolution”. He clearly admitted that his function was to perform the liquidation of
the organisation20. Solana was in office as the High Representative for two terms,
till the end of November 2009. Under the European Council decision the
responsibilities of the High Representative were passed to Baroness Katherine
Ashton.
The tasks and responsibilities of the High Representative were described in
detail. The HR particular attributes results from the fact that, one person got rights
reserved for cooperation strategies, i.e. intergovernmental as well as community
area, so called “integration one”. It stems from the abolition of the pillar structure.
Consequently, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy gained both rights entitled to commissioners and the title of the
Vice-President of the European Commission. Vice-President plays a crucial role in
the establishment and implementation of EU foreign policy, by issuing proposals to
the Council, as well as the European Council. As a deputy of two bodies, he is the
main executor of their decisions in three policy areas: political, security and
defence. Within the Council the VP ensure coherence and fluency of actions in the
area of external relations and chairs the Foreign Affairs Council. He also monitors
the coherence of the EU's overall actions, concerning the targets and objectives of
foreign and security policy. The High Representative is appointed by the European
19
G. Bértrand, La prise de déision dans L’Union européenne, La Documentation française, Paris
2002, p. 72.
20
A. Ciupiński (red.), Dyplomacja wielostronna, Warszawa 2003, pp. 291–293.
39
ANDRZEJ CIUPIŃSKI
Council to this position, on the basis of qualified voting majority. He can be
dismissed from this position in the same procedure. The approval of the European
Commission President is required during the nomination proceedings. However,
the approval of the European Parliament is required in the case of appointing the
responsibilities of the Commission deputy President, likewise other Commission
members.
The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
in her former career did not have many occasions to get acquainted with the
European security problems, especially with military aspects. It was a surprise
when Katherine Ashton won the elections, in that the chosen candidate was
nominated by Great Britain. This country was unwilling to enlarge the EU’s
supranational competencies in the area of foreign and defence policy. Additionally,
Ashton’s first public speeches proved that her knowledge of the areas of her
responsibility needs to be enhanced.
The provisions approved by the Lisbon Treaty has broadened the scope of the
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
competencies, regarding the issues within the Common Security and Defence
Policy21. The HR presides over the Foreign Affairs Council, where he can issue
proposals. Moreover, he has the right to direct questions to other EU’s bodies in the
reference with CFSP’s problems. Under art. 27 par. 1 Lisbon Treaty the High
Representative ensures that the decision of the European Council and the Council
are followed, as well as this the HR can represent EU within the CFSP and on its
behalf cooperate with the third world countries (art. 27 par. TEU in LT version). It
concerns both countries and international organizations towards which the EU
position is presented. On the international conferences, the HR ensures the
coordination of Member States actions in order to perform uniformly according to
the EU position. The HR maintains contacts with the European Parliament, and
consults regularly regarding the most significant problems of the CFSP and the
CSDP. Furthermore, he has a crucial role in crisis management, since together with
the Council they monitor the policy control and strategic management, performed
by the Political and Defence Committee, regarding the military and civil
operations. The Lisbon Treaty gave the High Representative the right of initiative
concerning CSDP mission funding. Since then, it is possible to apply for creating
a start-up fund out of the Member States' contributions22.
Till the initial period of High Representative actions, commentators had many
objections regarding the structural cooperation and treaty mechanism enabling
greater cooperation within the CSDP. The start-up fund, serving to finance the
21
J. Rehrl, H.B.Weisserth (forewords of Catherine Ashton), Handbook on CSDP, The Common
Security and Defence Policy of The Eeuropean Union, Vienne 2010,p. 36–38, W.M. Góralski, Rozwój
i ewolucja…, op. cit., p. 74–75.
22
The interinstitutional agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the
Commission regarding the budget discipline and approriate managemnt of finance, art. 42, 43;Official
Journal of the European Union of 14.6.2006, L 139.
40
preparatory actions to EU foreign missions, did not come into force because the VP
did not submit the project of its creation and financing to the Council. The reform
on the financing principles of the European Defence Agency also failed23.
European Commission towards the EU foreign security
The European Commission remains bound with the actions of the CFSP (art. 27
TEU). On account of its responsibility of budget implementation, but also its
obligation of coordination assurance between the EU CSDP actions and its
consequences, plus the application of instruments for assistance which remain at
the disposal of EU. Under three treaties, preceding the Lisbon Treaty, the European
Commission performed strong foreign actions and had powerful instruments of
influence which remained at its disposal, with the help of the trade policy. The
research worker of the UE security issues indicates a gradual interest increase in
the Commission foreign policy issues24.
In 1994 the Directorate-General for External Political Relations was
established, however other structures also functioned alongside. In 1999 the
structures were combined into Directorate-General for External Relations - DG
RELEX chaired by Chris Patten. The foreign representatives, over one hundred till
2009, were subjected to the Directorate. When the Amsterdam Treaty came into
effect and the post of High Representative for the CFSP was established, it became
noticeable that the commissioner Chris Patten and Javier Solana were rivals25. The
European Commission protected rights, which concerns the civil aspects of human
protection. The Commission contributed enormously to the crisis response system,
by the activity of the conflict prevention unit, functioning within DG RELEX. It
was responsible for the coordination of the European Commission's actions in the
crisis zones. The conflict prevention unit cooperates with the EU's Secretariat,
especially with bodies implementing European Security and Defence Policy
missions and operations. It maintains contacts with the United Nations, the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the European Commission
and the organizations willing to support conflict prevention26. The Doctorate for
European Commission Development performs similar but wider-ranging actions,
monitoring mainly aid programs' implementation for countries included in, so
called ACP (ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, Africa Caribbean Pacific 23
D. Liszczyk, Bilans pierwszego roku urzędowania wysokiej przedstawiciel UE,,,Biuletyn”
PISM Nr 16 (765) z dn. 16 lutego 2011.
24
R. Zięba, Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna I Bezpieczeństwa…, op. cit., p. 70.
25
In 2004 Patten was taken over by Benita Ferrero – Waldner who perfomed this position till the
Lisbon Treaty came into force.
26
M.M. Martinelli, L’intégration des dimensions de paix et sécurité dans les actuelles politiques
de coopération au développement de l’Union européenne, GRAPAX Groupe de recherche en appui
aux politiques de paix, “Working Paper” Nr 4, Bruxelles 2005 p. 18–20.
41
ANDRZEJ CIUPIŃSKI
European Union; fr. Afrique, Caraïbes et Pacifique). The European Union was
bound with Cotonou, by the arrangement of development aid for 77 countries27. It
is necessary to indicate the role of a few agencies, which cooperated with the
European Commission, and strengthens security and promotes European values ECHO (Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department of the European
Commission) and EuropeAid. ECHO performed the activity in the scope of
humanitarian aid which cover over 60 countries at the beginning of XXI century.
EuropeAid is an institution established in 2001 in order to promote democracy and
human rights. EuropeAid has at its disposal funds from the EU budget, financing
the actions which promote European values and election monitoring missions
(inside and outside the EU), support non-profit organizations, bringing
humanitarian aid.
The contemporary structures of the CFSP, especially the External Action
Service of the European Union, closely cooperate in the scope of programming,
planning and implementing its actions with the Commission services. Due to the
overlap of the competencies, the coordination in the management of instruments
implemented in the area of CSDP is necessary. The most important instruments
are: the Financing Instrument for Development Cooperation, the European
Development Fund, the Financing Instrument for the Promotion of Democracy and
Human Rights in the World, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership
Instrument, the Instrument for Stability, Cooperation with Non-EU Member
Countries on Nuclear Safety, Financing Instrument for Cooperation with
Industrialized and other High-income Countries and Territories. The coordination
of the above mentioned agendas is simplified because the High Representative is
simultaneously the Vice-President of the European Commission.
The Commission does not hold any competencies in the area of CSDP, however it
has rights in multiple fields of security issues: pollution and illegal migration
prevention, security of sea and air transport, along with issues connected with the
peaceful use of outer space. Massive expenses contributed to the Development and
Technology and concern also investments not covered by security, programs such as,
Galileo and the GMES (Global Monitoring for Environment and Security). Institutions
subjected to the Commission have competencies in the scope of IT infrastructure
prevention. This area is of great importance for the CSDP and is determined as the
priority issue for NATO. It is worth indicating, that the Commission supports the
establishment of a common market for the defence industry and has a great influence
on legal regulations in this area28.
The atmosphere within the European Commission creates encouragement for
the CSDP development, and its President, José-Manuel Barroso, himself
27
R. Zięba, Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna I Bezpieczeństwa…, op. cit., p. 230–233.
M. Olejarz, Zamówienia w dziedzinie obronności i bezpieczeństwa, Wybór i opracowanie:
J. Czarnecka A.Kowalski, Warszawa 2011, L. Łukaszuk, Współpraca i rywalizacja w przestrzeni
kosmicznej. Prawo – polityka – gospodarka, Toruń 2012, pp. 231–278.
28
42
a supporter of the political union. On 12 September 2012, in the European
Parliament presenting the topic of “The Condition of the European Union” he
appealed for strengthening EU foreign policy, also in the military area. He
suggested reviewing the Member States military capabilities and to plan for
a common defence29.
External Action Service of the European Union
The new institution which had direct and indirect influence on the functioning of
the European External Action Service – EEAS. It is an EU body established under the
Lisbon Treaty. Under article 13a-III, the Treaty of Lisbon (TEU Article 27) states the
following: “In fulfilling his mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by
a European External Action Service. This service shall work in cooperation with
the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from
relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the
Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the
Member States. The organization and functioning of the European External Action
Service shall be established by a decision of the Council. The Council shall act on
a proposal from the High Representative after consulting the European Parliament
and after obtaining the consent of the Commission”30. Although the Treaty came
into force on 1 December 2009, the performance of external action officially began
a year later - 1 December 200931. Till then the management staff and the EU
Diplomatic Corps were simply complementing each other's work.
The institutionalization of the EEAS was performed under the Council decision
dated on 26 July 2012. In the light of this document the External Action Service of
the European Union is an autonomous EU body, subjected exclusively to the High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, having legal
abilities at its disposal, which allows it to represent the EU in international
relations32. It is located in Brussels. The functions and tasks of the EEAS are
29
N. Gros-Verheyde, Barroso plaide pour une « review » complète des capacités de defense,
http://www.bruxelles2.eu/defense-ue/defense-ue-droit-doctrine-politique/barroso-plaide-pour-unereview-complete-des-capacites-de-defense.html,(12.12.2012).
30
Tytuł V. Rozdział 1 Postanowienia ogólne o działaniach zewnętrznych Unii. Treaty on European
Union. Consolidated version, Official Journal of the European Union, (2008/C115/28),
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0001:0012:PL:PDF, (1.04.2013),
c.f. W. M. Góralski, Rozwój i ewolucja systemu decyzyjnego Wspólnej Polityki Zagranicznej
i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej [w:] Dyplomacja czy siła? Unia Europejska w stosunkach
międzynarodowych, pod red. Stefana Parzymiesa, Scholar, Warszawa 2009, p. 57.
31
The Council Decision of 26 July 2010 determining the organization and the functioning
principles of the European External Action Service (2010/427/UE).,,,CSDP Newsletter” no.11 winter
2010/2011.
32
The Council Decision of 26 July 2010 determining the organization and the functioning
principles of the European External Action Service (2010/427/UE). Official Journal of the European
Union of 3.8.2010, L 201/ 30.
43
ANDRZEJ CIUPIŃSKI
directly bound with the obligations imposed by the High Representative, in the area
of EU foreign policy, including the area of CSDP. Additionally, the EEAS is
obliged to give assistance to all institutions which implement its tasks in the scope
of the EU external relations, especially to the President of European Council, the
President of European Commission and to the Commission (art.2 ust.2 of the
Council Decision). The European Parliament made efforts in order not to be
excluded in this action area33.
The External Action Service of the European Union structures consist of
a central administration in Brussels and the EU delegacy established in third world
countries and international organizations. At the forefront of the EEAS central
level stands the Executive Secretary General (or the First Secretary), who is
subjected directly to the High Representative. The main goal of the Executive
Secretary General is to ensure an effective functioning of the EEAS. The First
Secretary is responsible for the actions between the central administration and the
EU’s Diplomatic Corps. Its position requires also the management of the EEAS’s
budget. There are two deputies at its disposal34.
On 25 October 2010, a French diplomat, Pierre Vimont, was appointed
Executive Secretary General35. On 29 October the duties of First Secretary’s
deputies were transferred to Helga Schmidt, responsible for political issues and
Maciej Popowski responsible for the inter-institutional issues. Within time, the
highest structures of the security area were subjected to the First Secretary: the
European Union Military Staff, Operational Centre, the Crisis Management and
Planning Directorial and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability36. Six
Geography General Directorates and Directors were appointed for the following
regions:
− Managing Director of Global and Multilateral Issues - Maria Marinaki.
− Managing Director of Russia, Eastern Neighborhood and Western BalkansMiroslav Lajcák.
− Managing Director of the Americas - Christian Leffler.
− Managing Director of Middle East and Southern Neighborhood - Hugues
Mingarelli.
− Managing Director of Africa - Nicholas Westcott.
− Managing Director of Asia - Viorel Isticioaia Budura.
33
In her letter of 18 June 2010, Catherine Ashton the High Representative, committed herself to
consult with the European Parliament regarding the most important issues of CSDP. The consultation
with Parliament could be held a priori, The Parliament will be liable to monitor the nominations of
directors’ delegacies.
34
http://eeas.europa.eu/background/organisation/index_pl.htm, D. Liszczyk, Bilans pierwszego
roku urzędowania wysokiej przedstawiciel UE,,,Biuletyn”, PISM Nr 16 (765) z dn. 16 lutego 2011.
35
,CSDP Newsletter” no.11 winter 2010/2011 p. 12.
36
H. Klavert, EU external action post-Lisbon: what place is there for development policy?,,The
Bulletin of Fridays of the Commission”, Vol. 4, No. 1, March 2011, N. Gros-Verheyde, Le SEAE
aménage son organisation politico-militaire, http://rpdefense.over-blog.com/article-le-seae-amenageson-organi-sation-politico-militaire-104100279.html, (26.04. 2012).
44
David O’Sullivan was appointed the Director-General of DG RELEX, former
Secretary General of the European Commission. Agostino Miozzo became
managing Director of the Crisis Response Department in the European External
Action Service. Hansjörg Haber was assigned to be a Director of the Civilian
Planning and Conduct Capability. Lieutenant General A.G.D. (Ton) van Osch is
currently the Director General of the European Union Military Staff.
The External Action Service of the European Union consists of a few important
institutions, where the management underwent some changes. The European
Defence Agency earned a new Managing Director - Claude-France Arnould;
Antonio Missiroli became the Director of the European Union Institute for Security
Studies and Ilkka Salmi was appointed the Director of the Situation Centre of the
European Union. Outside the EU there are 136 embassies. The employment period
can last up to 8 years, but on special occasions this term can be extended to
10 years. From the security policy point of view a significant role is assigned to the
EU representatives to the UN. The External Action Service of the European Union
was seated in New York City in the year 2010. It was enabled by the cooperation
of the Spanish Presidency in the first half-year, and the Belgian Presidency in the
term ranging from July till December. At the beginning of January 2010, the head
of the delegation became the EU’s ambassador Pedro Serrano, who represents the
EU at Security Council meetings, informing them of EU actions concerned with
peacekeeping and other undertakings. It can be freely assumed that besides the
abolition of a 3-pillar structure in the EU, the achievements in the area of external
activity constitute a long-lasting reform, which enhance the integration process.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to declare that many of the treaty records (presented in
the enclosed annex) have still not been applied.
45
ANDRZEJ CIUPIŃSKI
Anex; Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, Official Journal
of the European Union C 115/ 38 - 42, Volume 51, 9 May 2008, http://eurlex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:SOM:en:HTML
SECTION 2; PROVISIONS ON THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE
POLICY
Article 42
(ex Article 17 TEU)
1. The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the
common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational
capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on
missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and
strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United
Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using
capabilities provided by the Member States.
2. The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive
framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence,
when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case
recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance
with their respective constitutional requirements. The policy of the Union in
accordance with this Section shall not prejudice the specific character of the
security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the
obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty
and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within
that framework.
3. Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the
Union for the implementation of the common security and defence policy, to
contribute to the objectives defined by the Council. Those Member States which
together establish multinational forces may also make them available to the
common security and defence policy. Member States shall undertake progressively
to improve their military capabilities.
The Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research,
acquisition and armaments (hereinafter referred to as ‘the European Defence
Agency’) shall identify operational requirements, shall promote measures to satisfy
those requirements, shall contribute to identifying and, where appropriate,
implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological
base of the defence sector, shall participate in defining a European capabilities and
armaments policy, and shall assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of
military capabilities.
46
4. Decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including
those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the
Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative of the
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from a Member
State. The High Representative may propose the use of both national resources and
Union instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate.
5. The Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union
framework, to a group of Member States in order to protect the Union's values and
serve its interests. The execution of such a task shall be governed by Article 44.
6. Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and
which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with
a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured
cooperation within the Union framework. Such cooperation shall be governed by
Article 46. It shall not affect the provisions of Article 43.
7. If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other
Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the
means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of
certain Member States.
Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with
commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States
which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the
forum for its implementation.
Article 43
1. The tasks referred to in Article 42(1), in the course of which the Union may
use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations,
humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict
prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management,
including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may
contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in
combating terrorism in their territories.
2. The Council shall adopt decisions relating to the tasks referred to in
paragraph 1, defining their objectives and scope and the general conditions for their
implementation. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy, acting under the authority of the Council and in close and constant
contact with the Political and Security Committee, shall ensure coordination of the
civilian and military aspects of such tasks.
47
ANDRZEJ CIUPIŃSKI
Article 44
1. Within the framework of the decisions adopted in accordance with Article
43, the Council may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member
States which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task. Those
Member States, in association with the High Representative of the Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall agree among themselves on the
management of the task.
2. Member States participating in the task shall keep the Council regularly
informed of its progress on their own initiative or at the request of another Member
State. Those States shall inform the Council immediately should the completion of
the task entail major consequences or require amendment of the objective, scope
and conditions determined for the task in the decisions referred to in paragraph 1.
In such cases, the Council shall adopt the necessary decisions.
Article 45
1. The European Defence Agency referred to in Article 42(3), subject to the
authority of the Council, shall have as its task to:
(a) contribute to identifying the Member States' military capability objectives
and evaluating observance of the capability commitments given by the Member
States;
(b) promote harmonisation of operational needs and adoption of effective,
compatible procurement methods;
(c) propose multilateral projects to fulfil the objectives in terms of military
capabilities, ensure coordination of the programmes implemented by the Member
States and management of specific cooperation programmes;
(d) support defence technology research, and coordinate and plan joint research
activities and the study of technical solutions meeting future operational needs;
(e) contribute to identifying and, if necessary, implementing any useful
measure for strengthening the industrial and technological base of the defence
sector and for improving the effectiveness of military expenditure.
2. The European Defence Agency shall be open to all Member States wishing
to be part of it. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall adopt a decision
defining the Agency's statute, seat and operational rules. That decision should take
account of the level of effective participation in the Agency's activities. Specific
groups shall be set up within the Agency bringing together Member States engaged
in joint projects. The Agency shall carry out its tasks in liaison with the
Commission where necessary.
48
Article 46
1. Those Member States which wish to participate in the permanent structured
cooperation referred to in Article 42(6), which fulfil the criteria and have made the
commitments on military capabilities set out in the Protocol on permanent
structured cooperation, shall notify their intention to the Council and to the High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
2. Within three months following the notification referred to in paragraph 1 the
Council shall adopt a decision establishing permanent structured cooperation and
determining the list of participating Member States. The Council shall act by
a qualified majority after consulting the High Representative.
3. Any Member State which, at a later stage, wishes to participate in the
permanent structured cooperation shall notify its intention to the Council and to the
High Representative.
The Council shall adopt a decision confirming the participation of the Member
State concerned which fulfils the criteria and makes the commitments referred to in
Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation. The Council
shall act by a qualified majority after consulting the High Representative. Only
members of the Council representing the participating Member States shall take
part in the vote.
A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
4. If a participating Member State no longer fulfils the criteria or is no longer
able to meet the commitments referred to in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on
permanent structured cooperation, the Council may adopt a decision suspending
the participation of the Member State concerned.
The Council shall act by a qualified majority. Only members of the Council
representing the participating Member States, with the exception of the Member
State in question, shall take part in the vote.
A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
5. Any participating Member State which wishes to withdraw from permanent
structured cooperation shall notify its intention to the Council, which shall take
note that the Member State in question has ceased to participate.
6. The decisions and recommendations of the Council within the framework of
permanent structured cooperation, other than those provided for in paragraphs 2
to 5, shall be adopted by unanimity. For the purposes of this paragraph, unanimity
shall be constituted by the votes of the representatives of the participating Member
States only.
49
ANDRZEJ CIUPIŃSKI
Article 222
1. The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if
a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or manmade disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal,
including the military resources made available by the Member States, to:
(a) - prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States;
- protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist
attack;
- assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities,
in the event of a terrorist attack;
(b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political
authorities, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster.
shall regularly assess the threats facing the Union in order to enable the Union
and its Member States to take effective action
http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-the-functioningof-the-european-union-and-comments/part-5-external-action-by-the-union/title-7solidarity-clause/510-article-222.html
50
ISSN 0867–2245 „FATHERS OF EUROPE” UNITING IDEAS IN INTEGRATION PRACTICE ISSN 2353-1789
„FATHERS OF EUROPE” UNITING IDEAS
IN INTEGRATION PRACTICE
Stanisław MAKSIMIEC, Ph.D.
Abstract
The main role in the European integration process was played by prominent European
politicians called the „Fathers of Europe” or „Builders of European Unity”. The
federalists predominated among them. They dreamed of a common and strong European
state similar to the United States. The prime minister of Great Britain – Winston Churchill
in his reference to the mutual tradition of European nations – inspired the possibility of
creating a United Europe in Zurich on 19th Sept. 1946. This project was supported by
Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Paul Henri Spaak, Altiero Spinelli, and Alicide De
Gasperi.
Jean Monnet proposed a sector method when perceiving the ineffectiveness of the
original project. For this reason he suggested the concept of small steps in constructing
European structure oriented toward tightening interstate links. This way, the first stage of
this concept was implemented through linking French and German sectors of coal and
steel. This proposal was supported by French Minister of Foreign Affairs – R. Schuman on
9 May 1951 and named after his surname.
The creation of a federal structure of Europe was the ambition of the „Fathers of
Europe”. However, strong the reluctance of some states and politicians meant that
integration was mainly only in the area of the economy. The dynamic political and
economic integration occurred after creating the European Union in 1992 based upon
federalism.
At present the European Union is neither a federation nor confederation, because each
state possesses its own sovereignty and freedom in the sphere of international relations. In
essence, the European Union has an institutionalized form of cooperation between states.
Consequently, the European Union can be understood both as an international
organization and a specific union of states.
The success of the „Fathers of Europe” is the United Europe, which engulfs the
majority of European states and tends to further enlargement. Although the progress in the
integration of the European Union is significant, the process of limiting the role of national
states in favour of a European Commonwealth is yet a distant project.
Key words – European integration, Fathers of Europe, European federation, European
Union, European Community.
51
STANISŁAW MAKSIMIEC
The Second World War brought an enormous drop in Europe’s standing on the
international arena. After the war Europe was in a state of extreme economic,
political and mental poverty. Due to the total nature of the war, the continent
suffered material losses, as well as loss of life. During the war Europe lost more
than 15 million people and by 1945 its industrial production had dropped by over
50% in comparison with statistics from 1938. At the beginning of the twentieth
century, Europe was in the lead in global politics, over 80% of world’s total
investments belonged to either Great Britain, France or Germany. After the end of
the Second World War, Europe was dominated by the USA and the USSR.
The Second World War changed the balance of power between the main states
of the West. The European balance of power from the interwar years was replaced
by bloc division and the growing balance of fear. It was influenced by the decisions
of the Big Three, concerning the division of power in Europe and the arising postwar conflict between the USSR and the USA, which took the form of a „cold
war”1.
The more farseeing politicians of the main states of Western Europe reached
the conclusion that in such a difficult condition post-war Europe would be unable
to retake the lost position on the international arena while acting separately.
Through joint actions they hoped to improve conditions for the development of
particular states, as well as the safe development of the continent.
The prominent role in striving and initiating the process of European
Integration was played by leading politicians of Western Europe called „Fathers of
Europe” or „builders of European unity”. The great majority of them consisted of
federals, who dreamed of a common and strong European country, the second
United States not of America, but of Europe. On 19th September 1946 in Zurich
Winston Churchill called for this creation, referring to the common heritage of
European nations. His thoughts were seconded by others, who supported and
propagated the idea of unifying Europe: Robert Schuman, Jean Monnet, Konrad
Adenauer, Paul Henri Spaak, Altiero Spinelli and Alcide De Gasperi.
The propagators of federalism blamed European states for the recent war.
They believed that a Europe divided into sovereign states would be unable to make
an impact on global politics as well as on its own economic development.
Therefore, it was necessary to establish a federal state, based on the USA or
Switzerland, from particular sovereign nation states. It was also necessary to divide
powers, on the basis of the constitution (on internal law), between the European
federation as a whole and its members, so that the former European countries
would be divided into states, cantons or lands with autonomy limited by the
constitution. The key issues of state entities, such as foreign policy, defence and
1
K. Łastawski, Od idei do integracji europejskiej. Od najdawniejszych idei do Unii 25 państw,
II Ed, Wyd. Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej Towarzystwa Wiedzy Powszechnej, Warsaw 2004, ISBN
83-88278-55-X, p. 106.
52
„FATHERS OF EUROPE” UNITING IDEAS IN INTEGRATION PRACTICE
security, economy, and finances would have be governed by a central supranational
federal authority2.
According to supporters of the federal form of the future and new Europe, the
limitation of sovereignty in favour of supranational authorities would have helped
to avoid wars, international conflicts and economic issues. In their opinion
integration would have meant the decentralization of functions at the federal
government level and decentralization at regional, as well as at local level.
The principal source for the federal concept was the belief that nation states had
less and less power to solve the basic problems of a political, military and
economic nature within the international structure which was formed after the war
with two dominant superpowers. There was also the belief that the traditionally
perceived role of a state as a sovereign state, was no longer able to guarantee its
citizens security. In the situation when a state is unable to guarantee this security
while acting independently, it should strive after international cooperation, making
conditions for a more effective system of international security. In this case
Western Europe would have become the third, equivalent power. Moreover, it was
deemed that Western Europe, united in a supranational way, could eliminate
conflicts arising between states3.
However, J. Monnet noticed the contrary phenomenon, namely: the functions
of nation states were stronger with the post-war progress of the restoration process.
The assumption, that the function of the nation state grew weaker resulting in the
easy transferring of the fundamental powers of the nation state to supranational
bodies, did not fit the post-war reality.
Having been certain of the ineffectiveness of a total approach to the issue of the
unity, J. Monnet proposed the method of sections in economy. Instead of pushing
the traditional ideas to establish the European federation by the superiors, he had
another concept of European unity: a gradual, step-by-step process, which would
not raise so many doubts, but it would lead to the assumed aim – towards the union
state4. He reached the conclusion that the strengthening states of Western Europe
would not be likely to relinquish their common powers and the election of the
“European” parliament would not immediately change their citizenship attitude
into „European”. This is why in order to achieve this unity it was necessary to start
building the integrated „Europe” by joining particular branches of government
activity, but only to the degree necessary to solve specific problems, as well as this
activity to be adopted by the interested states. He also deemed that European unity
should be achieved by increasing the real, mainly economic links between states,
2
K. Wiaderny-Bidzińska, Polityczna integracja Europy Zachodniej, Wyd. Adam Marszałek,
Toruń 2002, ISBN 83-7322-247-2, p. 43.
3
J. Kowalski, Z. Ślusarczyk, Unia Europejska. Proces integracji europejskiej i zarys
problematyki instytucjonalno-prawnej, Polskie Wydawnictwo Prawnicze IURIS, Warsaw–Poznań
n.d., ISBN 83-89363-59-3, p. 41.
4
A. Marszałek, Z historii europejskiej idei integracji międzynarodowej, Wyd. Uniwersytetu
Łódzkiego, Łódź 1996, ISBN 83-7016-987-2, p. 190.
53
but not by federation, European parliament or other institutions. In his opinion the
economy had primacy over politics and determined its strength. Monnet also stated
that European integration should proceed slowly, step by step. The economic
cooperation between particular European states would result in the full integration
of a supranational character5. The specific results of taken actions and
achievements would lead to the development of the integration on the political
plane and lead to full integration, and then to the creation of a European federation
after the cession of sovereignty by states. This model of integration was called
functionalism.
In this way there arose the idea to join the French and German coal and steel
sector – at that time the most important resources for the development of the
economy. This proposal, supported by the French Foreign Minister, Robert
Schuman, was called the Schuman Declaration. It was announced on 9th May 1950
and was addressed to other states of Western Europe, which accepted it despite the
initial surprise and disbelief. This led to the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) in 1951, which was the beginning of European integration. At first it
consisted of six states: France, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg and Italy. J. Monnet became the president of the High Authority, the
supranational executive body of the ECSC, which would have become the main
engine of the Community. The High Authority, despite having theoretically great
powers given by the Treaty, in reality was not a fully autonomous and independent
body in the decision making process. National interests of member states, protected
by the international Council of Ministers, predominated over supranational interest.
The Parliamentary Assembly comprised of representatives of parliaments of
particular member states and had limited, mainly advisory, powers. The Treaty
establishing the ECSC assumed the formation of a federal body in the future, even
though it did not refer directly to the idea of federalism. However, an attempt to
make this model real ended in failure. In the ECSC national interests predominated,
which conflicted with J. Monnet’s idea of integration, which assumed that
particular states would cede their powers to supranational control. As a result, in
1954 Monnet resigned as President of the High Authority, but he actively
supported the process of European integration.
The sectoral integration of Western Europe would lay a foundation for military
and political integration and would be a first step towards European federation.
J. Monnet proposed not only the ECSC, but also the European Defence Community
(EDC) which had been shaped in the Pleven Plan. Its full text was officially
presented in October 1950 by the Prime Minister of France, René Pleven. The aim
of this plan was to a create European defence system, which would also include
West Germany with the intention of preventing Germany from „re-militarising”, so
that Europe would not be in danger again. The EDC assumed the establishment of
5
Ibidem, p. 147; J. Łukaszewski, Cel: Europa. Dziewięć esejów o budowniczych jedności
europejskiej, Wyd. Nor sur Blanc, Warsaw 2002, ISBN 83-88459-68-6, p. 109.
54
a pan-European military, composing inter alia of German military, which would
guarantee control over it. The joint European army would have consisted of
a common European political authority called the European Political Community.
In practice it proved that within a few years after the Second World War those
audacious ideas had met with doubts and the strong opposition of some political
and social authorities, especially French. The establishment of the EDC would
have meant the cession of partial sovereignty by its member states in such crucial
fields as defence and foreign policy. Eventually the EDC collapsed along with the
political integration6. Under these circumstances they focused on developing
economic integration, which would be less likely to be opposed. This concept was
based on a conviction, that political and military integration was not possible
without prior and complete economic integration.
As a result, under the leadership of the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Paul Henri Spaak, committee experts issued a report, including a project to
establish new communities: the European Economic Community (the EEC) and the
European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). The assumptions of this
report constituted the base for negotiations, which ended with concluding on 25th
March 1957 the Treaty of Rome, establishing these two communities. It was
another crucial step towards European unity, in line with the uniting ideas of the
„Fathers of Europe”.
The European Economic Community would play the leading role in economic
integration. The main aims of the EEC were: the harmonious development of
economic activity in the whole Community by way of the establishment of
a common market and the gradual unification of member states’ economic policy;
stable and regular development; strengthening stability; the rapid improvement of
living standards as well as the improvement of relations between member states7.
Actions for the benefit of economic integrations resulted in the establishment
of the custom union (since 1st July 1968) and common commercial policy for third
countries (since 1st January 1970). In 1969 there began cooperation as a part of
common agricultural policy. Common agreements were introduced as a part
of industrial, regional, fiscal and monetary policy.
Four Communities were established on the basis of the Rome Treaties:
Parliamentary Assembly common for three Communities, which acted as an
advisory body and control authority, but not a legislative body (since 1962 the
European Parliament); the Council of Ministers (since 1967 common for three
Communities) operating as a decisive body and vested with a right of legislative
initiative; the Commission operating as a supranational executive and legislative
body (since 1967 common for three Communities) and the Court of Justice. The
Treaty stipulated the greater supranational role of the bodies – a sign of the using
6
J. Kowalski, Z. Ślusarczyk, op. cit., p. 64.
Traktat w sprawie utworzenia Europejskiej Wspólnoty Gospodarczej, „Zbiór Dokumentów”
1957, no. 5, p. 950.
7
55
of the supermajority in the decision making process by the Council instead of
unanimous and direct election to the Parliamentary Assembly. Initially in the EEC,
intergovernmental cooperation prevailed over supranational, which was also visible
in the leading role of international bodies.
At the beginning of the 1960s, apart from stimulating and increasing the
economic integration as a part of the EEC, as well as attempts to increase powers
of supranational bodies, efforts were made to build a political union of member
states. France took the initiative, however, the states of Benelux rejected two plans
for a political union commonly called the Fouchet Plan. The name for this plan was
derived from the name of its applicant – French Foreign Minister, Christian
Fouchet. In the first place the Plan covered issues of foreign policy as well as
scientific and cultural cooperation. Their ideas referred to the concept of a „Europe
of Homelands” presented by the French President, General Charles de Gaulle.
These beliefs also expressed the idea of confederalism as a means for the further
integration and the abandoning of the political union of a supranational character8.
The Commission chaired by Attilio Cattani from Italy presented a new plan for
political union, which would have been an intermediate stage for the future
European federation. Catani proposed enhancing the role of the supranational
bodies: the European Commission and Parliament, as well as to create the office of
Secretary General. France rejected these proposals9. Under these circumstances the
creation of the European political union was postponed until years later.
Discrepancies in the form and course of integration led to the Empty Chair
Crisis in 1965–1966. It was connected, inter alia, with attempts at increasing the
role of the Commission in the Community’s institutional system. The President of
the Commission from Germany, Walter Hallstein, was a true believer of the
supranational and Atlantic character of Western European integration10. According
to the provisions of the Treaty of Rome, since the beginning of the transitional
period of the third stage on 1st January 1966, most of the Council’s decisions
should have been adopted by way of supermajority or by a simple majority vote.
The third stage of the transitional period would have given more authority to the
Commission. The purpose of these changes was to increase the role of the
Commission and enhance the supranational character of the Community and at the
same time to limit the sovereignty of member states. France strongly opposed and
withdrew its representative from the Council of Ministers, using „the empty chair”
policy. The compromise agreement was reached as a result of the Luxembourg
protocol. France agreed to resolve less important issues in the Council by
supermajority, however, issues important for further integration issues had to be
resolved unanimously. The primary role of the Council of Ministers was
8
Z.M. Doliwa-Klepacki, Integracja europejska (łącznie z uczestnictwem Polski w UE
i Konstytucją dla Europy), Wyd. Temida 2, University of Business and Enterprise in Ostrowiec
Świętokrzyski, Białystok 2005, ISBN 83-89620-09-7-X, p. 81.
9
K. Wiaderny-Bidzińska, op. cit., p. 108–110.
10
Z.M. Doliwa-Klepacki, op. cit., p. 844.
56
acknowledged in the decision making process of the Community, which
constituted representatives of the governments of the member states. However,
W. Hallstein’s federal ambitions and aspirations to increase the role of the
Commission were withheld11. The principles of EEC Treaty were majorly revised
while considering the French, i.e. the national concept of the Community12.
Achieving the goals of the Community very often entailed transferring a part of
the decision making powers from the level of the sovereign member states to the
supranational level. This issue caused (and still causes) many disagreements,
controversies and disputes. The principle of leading community policy unified in
terms of its formal, legal and objective scope required to subordinate separate
national priorities to the priority of achieving common (community) goals. Many
times member states were opposed to ceding a part of their sovereignty. One of the
triumphs was the agreement of member states that the law of the community
should prevail over internal law. It enabled states to proceed with integration in the
EEC.
A significant turnabout in the development of the EEC occurred at the end of
1960s. The Hague Summit (1st-2nd December 1969) took a decision to establish an
economic and currency union and announced the intention to coordinate mutual
policy instead of establishing political union. However, it was not possible to put
economic and currency union into effect until the 1980s. Whereas, the
establishment of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979 was a very
important step.
The scope of economic integration had been tightening and broadening since
the 1970s. In 1973 three states: Denmark, Ireland and Great Britain joined the
EEC. Greece joined the Community in 1981, followed by Spain and Portugal in
1986. Common policies were successfully implemented and the coordination of
economic policies was facilitated. A crowning achievement was the implementation
of the majority of common market principles, consisting of four freedoms: the free
movement of goods, people, capital and services. Still, the EEC was predominated
by intergovernmental cooperation, rather than supranational.
Despite the fact that economic integration focused on economic issues as a part
of the EEC, the solutions for political union were still sought. Apart from
establishing economic and currency union the Hague Summit had also decided to
continue its work on establishing political union. However, the proposals presented
in 1970 by the so-called Davignon Committee, chaired by Étienne Davignon from
Belgium, referred to the prior Fouchet plan and assumed the establishment of
political union on the basis of the cooperation of sovereign states without
supranational solutions. Following on from this, the Tindemans report (Belgian
Prime Minister, Leo Tindemans), published in 1975, assumed the gradual
11
W. Nicole, T.C. Salmon, Understanding the European Union, Pluto Press, London 2001,
p. 25; K. Łastawski, op. cit., p. 190–192.
12
K. Wiaderny-Bidzińska, op. cit., p. 126.
57
establishment of the European Union based on closer political and economic
cooperation on the basis of the existing structures and legal accomplishments of the
three Communities. An important role in political cooperation was to be played by
the highly advanced coordination of member states' foreign policy, which the basic
directions should be determined in the meetings of the European Council (an
institution comprising of the heads of states and governments, which at that time
determined directions and strategies of the EEC). Regarding the institutional issue,
the report postulated to increase the role of the EEC bodies, in particular the
European Parliament, by giving them legislative authority and to change the vote in
the Council to majority vote13. On the basis of the said report the European Council
decided to hold direct and general elections to the European Parliament, which for
the first time took place in 1979. It initiated the process of evolution to enhance the
role and importance of this body.
The next stage of the concept of creating the European Union occurred in the
1980s. The so-called London report of 1981, written by a group under the
leadership of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Peter A. Carrington, presented
a governmental stance on further political integration. It assumed the international
cooperation between sovereign member states without the transfer of power to the
supranational level. Carington also underlined that it was necessary for member
states to better agree on common stances in important issues of foreign policy and
security14.
At the European Council’s request the Commission of the Communities
prepared the so-called Thorn Report (a Luxembourg Gaston Thorn – a president of
the Commission), which was announced in June 1981. The report concerned the
creation of the European Union and took into consideration, inter alia, the low
efficiency of the institutional structure and decision making mechanism in the
EEC. Above that it copied proposals of previous reports15.
On January 1981 the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Western Germany and
Italy: Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Emilio Colombo presented proposals for further
political integration. They assumed that to create the European Union gradually it
was necessary, inter alia, to limit the principle of unanimity in the Council,
increasing the role of the European Parliament and the European Council, to
develop a common foreign policy and improve the coordination of security
policy16. In November of that year, on the basis of the proposals of GenscherColombo, the following project was presented – the European Act, however it did
not arouse the interest of member states.
A very important initiative of the European Parliament concerning the creation
of the European Union was the establishment of the Standing Committee on
13
J. Kowalski, Z. Ślusarczyk, op. cit., p. 94–96.
Ibidem, p. 97.
15
K. Wiaderny-Bidzińska, op. cit., p. 146–147.
16
D.W. Urwin, The Community of Europe. A History of European Integration since 1945,
Longman, London and New York 1995, p. 191–192; K. Łastawski, op. cit., p. 241–242.
14
58
Institutional Affairs, chaired by an Italian eurodeputy, Altiero Spinelli. The
Committee presented a draft of a treaty on the European Union. It assumed
significant changes in institutions, the division of powers between the Union and
member states, enlarging the authority of the European Parliament and the
Commission and limiting powers of member states. The draft would have been
a contribution to a future European constitution. It was adopted in 1984 by the
Parliament, but Great Britain, Denmark and Greece were opposed to its ratification,
which led to discarding this project. In 1983 at the Stuttgart Summit the European
Council passed „The Solemn Declaration on European Union” referring to the
Genscher-Colombo Plan17.
At the European Council meeting in Fontainebleau (1984) the previously
presented reports were discussed and it was decided to continue work in the
direction of integration. The Council established two working committees in order
to develop new projects: The Committee on Institutional Changes chaired by an
Irish Senator, James Dooge, and the Committee for a People’s Europe chaired by
an Italian eurodeputy, Pietro Adonnino. It also passed a resolution on the
introduction a European passport from 1985 and emphasizing the Communities’
symbols by adopting the European flag and anthem18.
At the European Council meeting in Milan (1985) reports of both Committees
were discussed. It again exposed different stances on the model of integration
between member states: those which supported federal solutions (West Germany,
Belgium, the Netherlands) and those opposed to this model (Great Britain, France,
Denmark, Greece). The reports were analyzed together with drafts of the Treaty on
the European Union submitted by West Germany and France and an agreement on
common foreign and security policy submitted by Great Britain. The European
Council decided to call an intergovernmental conference in order to choose a way
to create the European Union. The work during the conference exposed different
stances on the extent of the transformation of the Community. Due to these
discrepancies on 17th February 1986 the negotiated treaty was not signed by
Denmark, Greece and Italy. Only after further agreements did they sign the treaty
on 28th February.
The Single European Act (SEA) introduced crucial legal and institutional
modifications, inter alia, it approved the legal basis for the operations of the
European Council and the European Political Cooperation. The act enhanced the
authority of the European Parliament by vesting it with, inter alia, a procedure of
co-decision with the Council of Ministers. Moreover, it also increased the
Council’s capacity to reach decisions by qualified majority, enhanced the executive
powers of the Commission of the Communities and had an entry on creating the
common market gradually by the end of 1992. Further more it emphasized the
importance of the principle of subsidiarity, which assumed achieving the
17
18
J. Kowalski, Z. Ślusarczyk, op. cit., p. 98.
D.W. Urwin, op. cit., p. 226; K. Łastawski, op. cit., p. 244.
59
undertaken community aims based on decentralization of decisions and the use of
financial funds granted at the level of member states and regions. In addition to
that, for the first time the SEA referred to the European Political Cooperation,
which enabled transforming it into the Common Foreign and Security Policy19.
A significant step towards the creation of common a European country was the
process of the abolishment of borders in the Community, initiated by an agreement
from Schengen on14th June 1985. Without doubts, the process of creating a Europe
without borders constituted one of the federal mechanisms in a European structure.
The Single European Act became a stimulus to continue efforts into advancing
the integration processes and works concerning the European political union.
Despite a strong British opposition, a report was prepared concerning converting
the EEC into a political union. At the end of 1990 there began parallel negotiations
of economic, currency, as well as political unions. The most controversial were
issues concerning the extent to which sovereign member states would cede their
powers in favour of political union. The most prevailing problem was the stance
that bodies of the future European Union should deal with the aspects of foreign
and security policy which could not be solved by particular states. The final
agreement on the Treaty on European Union was reached at the European Council
summit in December 1991 in Maastricht20.
The Maastricht Treaty on European Union, signed on 7th February 1992, was
regarded as the next stage in the creation of European federation. However,
because of British opposition, it was finally accepted that it constitutes a stage in
the creation of a „closer union”21. By defining „Union” the Treaty gave the
Community a new direction, leading towards a system based on federalism. In
addition the Maastricht Treaty enhanced the Union's authority regarding foreign
policy, justice and international affairs. The Treaty improved relations between
member states and the process of European integration became more intensive
despite the elements of federalism in the economy. The Treaty established the
European Union based on three pillars: the economic pillar; the foreign and
security policy pillar; Justice and Home Affairs. The economic pillar comprised of
the so-called authority of the Community and reflected federal trends, while the
other two pillars concerned the intergovernmental cooperation. The new pillar
structure expressed the integration trends, beyond the cooperation prevailed
economic issues as a part of the past activities of the Communities.
On the basis of a Treaty on 1st January 1999 a currency union was established
as part of the economic and currency union and in July 2002 a common European
currency was introduced – the Euro. On 1st June 1998 the European Central Bank
was established, which had the authority to lead monetary policy, which de facto
also meant implementing one of the elements of federalism. The past and neutral
19
Ibidem, s. 245–246; J. Kowalski, Z. Ślusarczyk, op. cit., p. 105–106.
K. Łastawski, op. cit., p. 275–278.
21
K. Wiaderny-Bidzińska, op. cit., p. 179.
20
60
foreign policy was replaced by the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The
European Parliament received more powers based on the principle of co-decision,
which increased its role in the legislative process. The Committee of the Regions
was established, representing the interests of member states and regions at the level
of the EU. European Citizenship was introduced together with the European
Ombudsman. In order to provide the economically weaker states and regions with
financial support, the Treaty established the Cohesion Fund and the European
Social Fund in order to improve living standards and conditions of the labour force.
The Council of the European Union decided on more issues by qualified majority.
The implementation of the principle of subsidiarity meant that decisions at the
central level should be reached only when it is beyond the power of specific states
or local authorities. The principle of subsidiarity, inspired by a federal model,
stipulated the limits of the powers of the Community and the limits of decision
making process at supranational level22. On this basis, the principle of subsidiarity
meant progress towards the evolutionary federalization of Europe.
The next Treaty of Amsterdam signed in 1997 extended cooperation between
member states in the field of eliminating unemployment, protecting the natural
environment, consumer interest and public health. Additionally, the Treaty
expanded such fields as visa, asylum, and immigration policy and the freedom of
movement of workers. Since then the police and judicial cooperation in criminal
matters have been within the European Union's powers and under the jurisdiction
of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The Treaty enhanced the federal
character of the Union, enhanced powers of the European Parliament, appointed
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and
extended the scope of the decision making process by qualified majority in the
Council of the EU. Moreover, the Treaty established the common security policy
by introducing the so-called Petersberg tasks. They assumed humanitarian and
rescue tasks and ways to overcome crises within the Community23.
The following Treaty, the Treaty of Nice (2001), once again extended the scope
of the decision making process by a qualified majority instead of unanimity.
Regarding issues of the internal market (pillar I) the Treaty abolished the use of the
veto by one or more member states. Within the CFSP (pillar II) it allowed the
„closer cooperation” of the member states of the EU, with the reservation that it
had to serve the aims and interests of the EU as a whole. In the scope of police and
judicial cooperation (pillar III) the right of veto was abolished and a new judicial
institution was established – Eurojust. Furthermore, it introduced a new weighted
voting system after expanding the Union to the East24.
The European Union increased its territorial scope of integration. In 1995
Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU. The historical enlargement to the East
22
J. Kowalski, Z. Ślusarczyk, op. cit., p. 114–115.
Ibidem, p. 135–136.
24
Ibidem, p. 150–155.
23
61
occurred after the reforms introduced in 2001 in the EU by the Treaty of Nice. On
1st May 2004 ten countries joined the EU: Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia,
Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary. In 2007 the next
states joined the EU: Bulgaria and Romania, followed by Croatia in 2013.
The milestone in the creation of a common European state was the Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe. The draft of the Constitution Treaty,
presented by European Convention and comprising 105 parts, covered many
federal solutions. The most essential were regulations concerning the legal
personality of the Union, establishing the exclusive authority of the Union, shared
powers between the Union and member states and supporting (competitive)
competences, further expanding the scope to vote by qualified majority, regulations
concerning the Union's powers in the scope of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy, the supremacy of EU law over the law of member states,
resolutions concerning citizenship and the appointment of the President of the
European Council who would represent the Union in matters relating to the Union
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Moreover, it created the office of Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, expanded the powers of the European Parliament, replaced the
EU Council with the Council of Ministers and abolished the pillar structure of the
EU. All projects expressed the evolution towards federal solutions. Emphasis
should be put on the solidarity clause which in the event of the risk of the one of its
member states the Union may use any means to prevent terrorist threat on the
member states territory or to protect from any possible danger against the
democratic institutions and civil population25. Simultaneously the project of
including the Charter of Fundamental Rights to the Treaty enhanced axiologically
the Union bases and brought it closer to federal solutions.
After the rejection of the Constitution Treaty by French and Dutch society in
2005 it was decided to adopt a new treaty that had to include the majority of TCE
resolutions as a part of former Union treaties – the Treaty on the European Union
(TEU) and the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC).
During the European Council summit in Brussels on 21-23rd June 2007 it was
reached that the negotiating mandate for an intergovernmental conference would
propose the final project of the treaty. The text, drawn up by the conference, was
presented to member states on 18th October 2007 during the EU summit in Lisbon.
According to agreements, the Reform Treaty (RT or Treaty of Lisbon) was signed
on 13th December 2007 and entered into force on 1st January 2009, i.e. before the
next elections to the European Parliament and before the formation of the European
Commission's composition. The states had a choice whether or not to ratify the
Treaty in a national referendum or through parliamentary ratification. The
exception to that was the Republic of Ireland in which there is a constitutional duty
to hold a referendum. However, in a referendum in June 2008 the Irish electorate
rejected the Treaty. One of the reasons was the financial crisis that significantly
25
62
K. Łastawski, op. cit., p. 383–388.
affected Ireland26. Euroscepticism became smaller among Irish society after the
information campaign led by Irish politicians. In a second referendum of 2nd
October 2009 2/3 of Irish voted for the ratification of the Treaty. The result was
influenced by guarantees which Ireland received from the Union. In that situation
the presidents of Czech Republic and Poland,who had resisted the most, signed the
Treaty which finally entered into force on 1st December 2009.
Compromise solutions proposed by the Reform Treaty resulted in deviating
from a „big” amending treaty (i.e. constitutional treaty bis, adopted instead of
current treaties) and returning to a traditional amending treaty. In contrast with the
Constitutional Treaty which originally repealed and replaced all prior treaties, the
Reform Treaty solely amended Treaties that have entered into force, i.e. TEU and
TEC.
The Lisbon Treaty enhanced the powers of the European Parliament in the field
of legislative procedure, budget and international agreements. Expanding the scope
of applying co-decision procedures ensured the European Parliament an equal
position with the EU Council to adopt Union acts. The Treaty increased the
possibility for the national parliament to take part in EU activities, particularly by
the new mechanism that the EU would take action only if they achieved better
results (subsidiarity) by monitoring its activity. The increased role of the European
Parliament and national parliaments would have an influence on the enhanced
democracy and legitimization of the EU authority. Citizens have more influence on
EU legislation. By introducing the Citizens’ Initiative citizens from member states
have a right to call directly to the European Commission to propose a new legal
act. The Treaty of Lisbon provided for the first time the ability for member states to
leave the EU if they wanted to27.
The Lisbon Treaty simplified the structure of the Union, abolished the pillar
system and granted the Union the status of international organization and vested
the Union with legal personality. This put an end to the fear that the integration
process was striving to a create pan-European state at the cost of member states'
sovereignty. The Treaty enhanced its negotiable position and gained more power
on the international arena. The establishment of the High Representative of the
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and simultaneously the VicePresident of the European Commission supported by the newly appointed
European External Action Service shall assure more influence, cohesion and
effectiveness of the external activity of the Union. The Treaty underlined the role
and special character of the member states' powers in the field of the Union's
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. It introduced a new mechanism that had
influence on the field of freedom, security and justice (fight against terrorism and
26
W. Bokajło, A. Pacześniak (scientific editors), Podstawy europeistyki. Podręcznik akademicki,
Wyd. Atla 2, Wrocław 2009, ISBN 978-83-60732-16-8, p. 353–354.
27
Traktat Reformujący Unię Europejską, http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_pl.htm
(12.09.2013).
63
criminals) and in many other essential fields such as energy policy, public health,
population protection, humanitarian aid or climate change. It shall provide the
Union with more possibilities to react to the security threat of union citizens28.
An essential issue in the Lisbon Treaty is the enlargement of the field of the
decision making process in the EU Council by a qualified majority in order to
facilitate it. Since 2014 the qualified majority will be counted by double majority:
member states and citizens which will increase the legitimization of the Union's
power. The double majority will constitute at least 55% of member states
represented by at least 65% of EU population. The establishment of a permanent
President of the European Council, elected for a 2.5-year term, will create a stable
and less complicated institutional framework.
The Treaty introduced a sharing of competences between member states and
the European Union. Its clear classification will enable the explicit specification the
relation between member states and the EU. The new classification covers
competences such as exclusive competence, shared (competitive) competence and
supporting competence i.e. to support, coordinate, supplement member state
actions in. According to the regulations, the competences not granted to the Union
by the Treaties are obtained by member states. In the event of taking action in some
field, the scope of the competence of the Union is specified by an objective act of
the Union in the fact that it does not cover the whole field. A new thing is the
statement that potential amendments to the Union's resolutions in the future can be
designed not only to enhance competences, but also to limit them29.
The Lisbon Treaty lists and emphasizes values and objectives on which the
European Union is based on, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights which
underlines rights by which included rules and liberties have legally binding force.
The Treaty protects and enhances the „four freedoms” as well as political,
economic and society freedoms to which the Union's citizens are entitled. The
Treaty enhances solidarity among member states. The Union and its member states
act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a member state is the object of a terrorist attack
or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. It underlined the meaning of
solidarity in the field of energy30.
The Reform Treaty carried on enhancing the federal elements by regulations
regarding the clear division of competences, transferring about forty fields from
unanimous voting to qualified majority voting and sustaining the new formula i.e.
double majority in the EU Council. Moreover, the enlargement of the fields in
which will be applied a regular legislation procedure granting to the European
Council the institutional status. Furthermore, the treaty establishes a new post of
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; it also
28
Ibidem.
W. Bokajło, A. Pacześniak (red.), op. cit., p. 357.
30
(12.09.2013).
29
64
includes the systematization of current regulation, e.g. by introducing the same
objectives in preventing the effects of climate change under the environmental
protection or energy policy of the solidarity clause, demonstrating the slow
federalization of the European Union. It is important to mention such regulations
as: transforming the Union into single international organization, enhancing
democratic legitimacy by strengthening the role of national parliaments in the
European decision making process, and forming an institutional basis for the Union
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy development31.
It is worth noticing changes in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice,
namely the new procedures of voting that provide the European Council with
qualified majority voting in the AFSJ, excluding sensitive matters in which they
decide unanimously. Moreover, the introducing of uniform legal instruments or
new forms of enhancing cooperation or enhancing the status of Eurojust prove the
union is getting closer to federal system. The Treaty does not mention Union
symbols included in the Constitutional Treaty, i.e. flag and anthem. It also does not
include any regulations concerning the supremacy of the EU law over the national
law of member states.
The European Union's ongoing crisis favours the strengthening of the
integration, but at the same time the Union is losing the trust and support of
citizens. Establishing the banking union or strengthening control over the budget
policy of certain states (especially eurozone, sealed by the Fiscal Compact) means
a greater cession of sovereignty than assumed in the Lisbon Treaty.
The solution would be further strengthening institutions of the European
Union, especially the European Parliament – it is a mantra repeated by many
eurodeputies –as the only directly elected institution in the EU structure. However,
while many of the eurodeputies rely on democracy and the „priority of more
Europe” in enhancing the role of the European Parliament, their electors
paradoxically significantly lose appetite for „more Europe”32.
The ongoing economic crisis, since 2008, has caused an increase in the
eurosceptic mood among politicians and the societies of the many EU states. The
British Prime Minister, David Cameron, has enacted a new law regulating
a relation between Great Britain and the Union. It confirms the continuing
sovereignty of the British Parliament in legislation that decides on the content of
the sovereignty of British policy as well as in the scope of the EU activities.
Currently, the Swedish, Fins and in some point French have a similar point of
view. The British express their reluctance to the further strengthening of integration
and threaten to leave the EU. On the other hand, France put forward a project of
separating the eurozone from the remaining part of the EU which would mean
31
D. Matusik, Koncepcje federacji europejskiej a europejskie procesy integracji, PhD thesis UŚ,
Katowice 2009, Biblioteka UŚ, p. 218.
32
T. Bielecki, Czy ktoś nadal chce „więcej Europy”?, http://wyborcza.pl/1,75477,14174764,
Czy_ktos_nadal_chce__wiecej_Europy__.html#TRrelSST#ixzz2XR9eGYcG (20.09.2013).
65
establishing a close Union in the frame of the current EU, consisting of 28 member
states.
According to some politicians the answer for the dangerous European crisis
should be „more Europe”. During the Polish presidency of the EU Council, the
Polish Foreign Minister, Radosław Sikorski, in his speech at the German Council
on Foreign Relations in Berlin in November 2011 proposed a way to facilitate the
European Union and dampen the impasse in the integration process that
reverberated in the whole Union. He suggested preparing a new treaty that would
make the EU more effective, contracting the composition of the European
Commission and introducing the rotation system of the commissioners and
enhancing its effectiveness as spokesman of common European interests. Furthermore,
he suggested transferring more responsibilities to European institutions that would
enhance their legitimacy, and especially strengthen the role of the European
Parliament – the draconian powers to supervise national budgets should be wielded
only by agreement of the EP.
In the European Parliament election there should be created a European list
from which 25 of the euro deputies would be elected by people entitled to vote
from the whole Union and national lists as well as to create a seat in Parliament in
a single location. The posts of the President of the European Council and that of the
European Commission should be combined and a candidate should be elected by
direct vote. He postulated to maintain coherence between the Euro zone and the EU
as a whole by the openness of meetings and Euro summits for all EU states.
Moreover, certain prerogatives should be guaranteed „forever” for Union member
states: identity, religion, lifestyle, public morals, and rates of corporate and VAT
taxes33.
The German Foreign Minister, Guido Westerwelle, supported Minister
R. Sikorski and stated that the cause of dispute to develop integration is a lack of
a genuine European constitution. In his opinion the binding Lisbon Treaty has
many disadvantages, the decision making mechanism is too complicated and there
is a lack of transparency. It is necessary to create a common constitution decided
by citizens in a referendum. He postulated the President of the European Council
should be elected by direct vote and the European Parliament should be
transformed into a two-house legislature – in the second house there would be the
leaders of the EU states, included in composition of the European Council34.
In March 2012, Guido Westerwelle, initiated a discussion concerning the future
of the EU, to which were invited chiefs of diplomacy from Belgium, Luxemburg,
the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Portugal, France and Austria as well as R. Sikorski
within the so-called „reflection group”. Their proposals and ideas did not have any
33
R. Sikorski, Schyłek Unii nie jest przesądzony, „Gazeta Wyborcza” from 30 November 2011,
No. 278.7399.
34
M. Magierowski, Europa umiera ze strachu, PlusMinus Tygodnik „Rzeczpospolitej” from
17–18 March 2012, No. 11.
66
formal character, but they were an impulse for discussion about future of the EU
which during the economic crisis is found at a crossroads – according to Minister
G. Westerwelle – and the EU is threatened due to national resentment and
prejudices that have been revived in some states. Deeper economic and financial
integration in the EU, the European Monetary Fund, the common ministry of
finance or the direct election of the EC chief – these are some ideas of the chiefs of
diplomacy to reform and enhance the Community. In their opinion the coordination
and control mechanism over fiscal and economic policy should be enhanced – as
well as the transferring of some of the sovereign powers of the state to the Union's
structure. A permanent firewall for the eurozone (The European Stability
Mechanism – ESM) could be transformed into the European Monetary Fund in the
future. They underlined the necessity of streamlining the European institutions and
improving the decision process's efficiency, which driving force should stay the
European Commission – although smaller than at present. On the other hand, the
EU Council could more often reach decisions by qualified majority instead of
unanimity and to a greater extent use the possibility of enhancing the cooperation
of some countries e.g. in such spheres as border protection or the coordination of
economic policy. The more additional tasks and competences given to the EU, the
more democratic legitimacy European institutions need to have. It would be
possible if for example the European Parliament became more visible to the public
in the EU states; electing a pan-European leading candidate by political party to the
EP election could help it. In the long-term perspective the EU could introduce the
direct election of the President of the European Commission, appoint a European
Finance Minister and create a two-house parliamentary system. According to
minister’s opinion the EU should build up a European army and a have common
representation in international organizations, including the United Nations Security
Council35.
The German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeduble commented in the same
vein. In the interview for German weekly „Der Spiegel” in June 2012 he stated that
there is a need for clear institutional redevelopment of the EU and better
democratic legitimacy of the decision process. He underlined that union bodies
should have more powers in important fields of policy, because nowadays, nine
times out of ten, member states have the final say. The European Commission
should become a real government of the EU and union states' citizens should elect
the President of the EU by direct vote. He also supported enhancing of the
European Parliament position and creating a fiscal union which means transferring
budget competences from national countries to Brussels. The optimal solution
would be the appointing of a union finance minister who would have the power of
veto over national budgets as well as a power to approve the size of debt.
35
A. Widzyk, Kilku szefów dyplomacji proponuje reformy w UE, http://finanse.wp.pl/kat,
102634,title,Kilku-szefow-dyplomacji-proponuje-reformy-w-UE,wid,14587861,wiadomosc.html?
ticaid=1ea8c (22.09.2013).
67
According to his view, the future Europe would not be a federal state similar to the
United States or the Federal Republic of Germany, but it would create its own
political system36.
At the current stage of development the EU has a specific functioning, but still
developing structure. Progressive integration, the constant rotation of rights and
enhancing competences at a supranational level mean that the EU exceeded the
field of its rights as an international organization in its traditional meaning. As
a consequence of the multidimensional function of the EU and complicated
character of the processes that led to its establishing, the Union has both federal
and confederal features.
In the process of the gradual integration the federal factors include:
• supremacy of the community's law over the national law;
• pan-national institutions (the European Commission, the European
Parliament – established by general and direct election since 1979, Court of
Auditors, the Court of Justice EU and the Court – similar to a federal system within
its competence there is arbitration between European institutions and member
states and a statement of the community law is made and controlled to obey it);
• abolishment of boundaries (free movement of goods, capital services and
people);
• common policies of the Union, inter alia: agricultural, transport, trade,
regional, structural, monetary, research and development and still developing
energy policy;
• creation of the European National Bank and common euro currency;
• own recognition and representing member states outside;
• systematically increasing the scope of voting by majority vote instead of
unanimity;
• transparent division of competences between member states and European
Union;
• introduction of the EU citizenship and the European Ombudsman;
• existence of the Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and
Social Committee to carry out federal principle of participation;
• common Charter of Fundamental Rights.
The European Union has federal features, although it is neither federation nor
a confederation. It exists next to member states not instead of them and each
member state has sovereignty and freedom of creating international relations (it is
not a component part of the Union). The internal structure of the EU neither works
on the basis of national constitution nor any internal law. In this context euro
currency and the institution of citizenship have political and symbolic features
rather than legal.
36
Minister finansów Schaeuble za dalszą integracją w UE, http://biznes.pap.pl/en/news/
search/info/11697967,minister-finansow-niemiec-schaeuble-za-dalsza-integracja-w-ue (22.09.2013).
68
On the other hand, inside the Union there are national countries with their own
constitutions, their own public authority bodies, independent diplomacy, army,
police and distinct symbols. Apart from that, member states maintain the basic
competences in foreign policy and defence affairs. In this context it should be
noted that the legitimization of power in the EU has a completely different
character than in a democratic country. The Union, based on the agreement of each
sovereign state, derives its legitimization from each state not directly from society.
In fact, the EU constitutes an institutionalized form of state cooperation that
works in broad spectrum of traditional international organization and specific union
state.
Jean Monet laid the foundation of the European institutions system and current
institutional system of the European Union. The „Fathers of Europe” had an
ambition to create a European construction of a federal character, but in a time of
crisis and increased euroscepticism among politicians and societies, especially in
the so-called old Union, it is not a good time in Europe now. At the current stage
the attachment to national states is too strong and the distinction of constitutional
and systematic tradition is too wide to transform the EU into a federation. Apart
from that, the local interests of member states are still prevailing over pan-national
policy. However, it does not exclude the possibility to extend the scope of federal
elements inside European construction which can lead to the creation of a new
form of transnational organization37.
In fact, it is an unrealistic idea to establish the European state of a federal
character according to the „Fathers of Europe” intention and desire. The union of
countries within the European Union as far as it is a union, it would carry out
subsequent federal elements, however, the full federalization would not happen for
the next generation of Europeans. There are too strong and expressive cultural
distinctions: the views on national identity and sovereignty of the countries that
created the Union and still noticeable local and political interests. There is a greater
chance to achieve the idea of the „Fathers of Europe” to integrate the whole
European continent than establishing a European federal state. A united Europe in
the form of the European Union covers the majority of European states and there
are real conditions for its expansion to the East Europe (Ukraine, Moldova) and the
South (Balkan countries and Turkey) during the next few years.
The digression concerning the potential federal future of the Union should
consider globalization that blurs the concept of sovereignty. Moreover, the
mechanisms toward the coordinating and transferring of rights at the supranational
level and towards regionalism, that work at European integration processes,
weakens the sovereignty of member states. Economic, social challenges and
especially defence matters mean that the Union would develop in a federal
direction, because none of the current European states is able to meet those
challenges independently.
37
D. Matusik, op. cit.
69
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London 2001.
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1945, Longman, London and New York 1995.
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Marszałek, Toruń 2002.
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1,75477,14174764,Czy_ktos_nadal_chce__wiecej_Europy__.html#TRrelSST#ixzz2XR
9eGYcG
Minister finansów Schaeuble za dalszą integracją w UE, http://biznes.pap.pl/en/
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70
ISSN 0867–2245
ISSN 2353-1789
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN THE EU–RUSSIA SHARED NEIGHBOURHOOD…
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN THE
EU–RUSSIA SHARED NEIGHBOURHOOD.
BETWEEN SOFT AND HARD POWER
Assoc. Prof. Agnieszka LEGUCKA, Ph.D.
Abstract
The goal of this study is to analyse the involvement of the EU and Russia in conflict
management in their ‘shared neighbourhood’, i.e. the six East European and South
Caucasus countries (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia). Due
to the broad understanding of conflict management, which may relate to political,
economic, ethnic and armed conflicts, this analysis will focus on managing only the latter.
In the case of the discussed region, this means the conflicts in: Transnistria, NagornoKarabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including the August 2008 war between Georgia
and Russia. The comparison of the EU and Russian armed conflict managing actions
allows for determining the efficiency of soft and hard power used by these two international
actors. The European Union received the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize for having contributed to
the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights. Therefore, it
seems important to answer the following question: Can its experience benefit the EU in
managing the post-Soviet region?
Key words – conflict management, armed conflict, soft power, hard power
The shared neighbourhood of the European Union and the Russian Federation
covers an area of over 1,031,114 km2, made up of European countries: Ukraine
(603,628 km2), Belarus (207,600 km2), Moldova (33,843 km2), and Caucasus
countries: Georgia (69,700 km2)1, Armenia (29,743 km2) and Azerbaijan
(86,600 km2)2. Identification of the six countries in the ‘shared neighbourhood’ is
based on several notions. Firstly, these countries are covered by the Eastern
Partnership, i.e. a part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (2004), which is
conducted by the EU and dedicated to special relations with the eastern region. In
European Union documentation, these countries are treated as a group, and specific
1
Because of Russia’s takeover of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia has actual control over
57,250 km2 of its territory. See more A. Legucka, Geopolityczne uwarunkowania i konsekwencje
konfliktów zbrojnych na obszarze poradzieckim, Difin, Warszawa 2013, s. 87.
2
World Fact Book, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook, [13.03.2011].
71
AGNIESZKA LEGUCKA
standards of conduct towards them and mechanisms for cooperation are accepted.
Secondly, these countries will not join the EU in the near future, which means that
they will constitute the external area surrounding the EU and Russia and this, in
turn, will make the external security of both the EU and Russia dependent upon
their internal situation, and political and economic stability. Thirdly, these
countries are characterised by low stability and they generate problems and threats,
which underly the calls necessitating the need for cooperation between the EU and
Russia in the shared neighbourhood in order to eliminate dangers, among others
those related to solving ‘frozen conflicts’ in the post-Soviet area. We can make
a hypothesis that the European Union has a policy based on values and attraction,
or soft power. The Russian Federation leans more heavily towards post-Soviet hard
power, where it manages international relations by threats and payments for
governing relations between states using, amongst others, ‘frozen conflicts’ in the
region. This raises the question of the effectiveness of the foreign and security
policies of both entities and their operating strategies in the post-Soviet countries in
armed conflict management.
Conflict management – Russia and EU approach
According to a general definition, a conflict is a process in which one party
perceives that its interests are being opposed or negatively affected by another
party3. Conflict is manifested through adversarial social action, involving two or
more actors with the expression of differences often accompanied by intense
hostilities. Most significantly, protracted conflict arises from a failure to manage
the antagonistic relationship4. A special kind of conflict involves force being used
by both parties to the conflict.
Armed conflicts in the ‘shared neighbourhood’ of Russia and the EU emerged
during the disintegration of the USSR, when parts of former Soviet republics began
to claim independence. This is when Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia
and Transnistria decided to form independent states, thus infringing on the
territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova - all states with
international recognition. The parties on both sides of these conflicts (all with both
an ethnic and political nature) were trying to solve these situations by themselves,
but the management process was joined by ‘third parties’: Russia, Iran, Turkey,
3
J.A. Wall, Jr. R.R. Callister, Conflict and Its Management, “Journal of Management” 1995,
Vol. 21, No. 3, s. 517; Ho-Won Jeong, Conflict Management and Resolution. Introduction,
Routledge, New York 2010, s. 243. L. Kriesberg, B.W. Dayton, Constructive Conflicts: From
Escalation to Resolution, Rowman & Littlefield, Plymouth 2011, s. 428; B. Balcerowicz i in.,
Wydanie drugie, Akademia Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa 2002, p. 87-90; J.S. Nye, Konflikty
międzynarodowe. Wprowadzenie do teorii i historii, Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne,
Warszawa 2009, s. 6-30.
4
Ho-Won Jeong, op. cit., s. 3.
72
CIS and other international organizations such as the UN and the OSCE, and
recently also the EU. The questions that arise from this concerns the reasons for
Russia to allow the EU to participate in managing these conflicts and the
opportunities and limitations faced by a Europe which aspires to lead the security
policy in its nearest neighbourhood.
The discussed subject shall require the analysis of the conflict management
approaches adopted by Russia and the EU and their implemented strategy for the
counties - Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova - which have directly
experienced armed conflicts. Among many approaches towards conflict
management, there are also actions undertaken by third parties, in this case by
Russia and the EU5. Such actions basically mean the involvement, at every possible
stage of an armed conflict, of an external actor who works to ensure early warning,
preventive diplomacy, the limitation of military actions until the armed conflict
ends, and to prevent a renewed outbreak, which is referred to as post-conflict peace
building.
Only towards the end of the 1990s did the EU accept the responsibility for
managing armed conflicts institutionally and legally under its European Security
and Defence Policy – ESDP (since the Lisbon Treaty – the Common Security and
Defence Policy – CSDP). However, European countries have participated much
earlier in promoting peace through diplomacy and spreading values such as
democracy, the rule of law, human rights; and providing development assistance
and humanitarian aid; and supporting local governments and NGOs6. The support
of the EU in managing armed conflicts usually takes an official and transparent
form and, which is very important, it is in line with the international peacekeeping
requirements that assume neutrality and the favouring of neither of the conflicting
parties. The European Union has extensive experience in conducting peace
operations and building post-conflict stabilization, which can be somewhat
ironically referred to as ‘the Americans making the mess, the Europeans cleaning it
up.’ But in the majority of the UN, WEU, OSCE and NATO missions, the postconflict peace building was indeed done by soldiers, police officers, officials and
observers from Europe. In 2012, the European Union received the Nobel Peace
Prize for having contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, which
was supposed to be an incentive for further work in this field. The goal of the EU
in managing armed conflicts in the post-Soviet area is the creation of widely
5
K. Barseghyan, Z. Karaev, Playing Cat-and-Mouse: Conflict and Third-Party Mediation in
Post-Soviet Space, “The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution” 2004, No (6.1), s. 192-209;
L. Jonson, Keeping the Peace in the CIS. The evolution of Russian Policy, “Discussion Paper RIIA”
1999, No. 81, s. 13; D. Sagramoso, Russian peacekeeping policies [w:] J. Mackinlay, P. Cross (red.),
Regional peacekeepers: the paradox of Russian peacekeeping, United Nations University Press,
Tokyo – New York – Paris 2003, s. 117-130.
6
N. Singh, Governance Mechanisms in Divided Societies: Learning From and Using Global
Experience [w:] C.H. Grant, R.M. Kirton (red.), Governance conflict analysis and conflict resolution,
Ian Randle Publishers, Kingston 2007, s. 3-6.
73
AGNIESZKA LEGUCKA
understood stabilization in the neighbourhood in order to eliminate the dangers
associated with the prolonging of the ‘frozen conflicts’: socio-economic
degradation, growth in organized crime, refugees, illegal migration, contraband,
trafficking in arms and humans, poverty and diseases. The document concerning
the strengthening of the ENP in 2006 reads as follows: ‘These are not only our
neighbours’ problems. They risk producing major spillovers for the EU, such as
illegal immigration, unreliable energy supplies, environmental degradation and
terrorism’ and confirms that the EU is ‘being more active in addressing frozen
conflicts (…). The EU needs to be more active, and more present, in regional or
multilateral conflict-resolution mechanisms and in peace-monitoring or peacekeeping efforts”7. This is augmented by the economic interests of Europe, securing
its foreign investments and tapping into the energy potential of the Caspian Sea.
During the Soviet era the Russians did not gain the necessary experience in the
conducting of UN peace operations8. After the collapse of the USSR a new area of
armed conflict management in the form of peace-keeping missions has been called
‘mirotworciestvo’, or the creation of peace. It covers a wide range of activities –
from political mediation to military operations undertaken in order to achieve
peace by force. The most characteristic features of Russian peace missions are: the
ability to enter into the conflict zone before the cessation of hostilities, and the
inclusion of peacekeeping troops of both conflicting parties or the CIS countries,
ensuring Russia obtains greater legitimacy as a promoter of peace and avoiding
allegations of interfering in the internal affairs of post-Soviet states9. What
distinguishes the Russian conflict management concept of using peace missions
from the European one is a lack of neutrality towards the conflicting parties. The
Russians often supported the weaker - the separatists - against stronger countries in
the region: Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova. Thanks to the ‘frozen conflicts’,
Russia can influence the post-Soviet geopolitics of the region. Because of their
limited efficiency in promoting peace, the goal of Russian operations have become
not so much a solution to the armed conflicts as rather maintaining the status quo.
Russia uses both official and unofficial channels to influence the development of
the situation, making its actions less transparent. It should also be noted that in
Russia the decisions relating to conflict management have been made at various
political, administrative and military levels, which sometimes makes it difficult to
determine the clear position of Russia10. As a result, the Russian Federation has
7
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on strengthening
the European Neighbourhood Policy (2006), Brussels, 4 December 2006, COM(2006)726 final,
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com06_726_en.pdf, [12.12.2012].
8
A. Sokolov, Russian Peace-keeping Forces in the Post-Soviet Area, [w:] M. Kaldor, B. Vashee
(red.), Reconstructing the Global Military Sector, PINTER, London-Washington 1997, chapter 8.
9
K. Malak, Czynnik wojskowy w polityce zagranicznej Federacji Rosyjskiej (1991–2000).
Rozprawa habilitacyjna, „Zeszyty Naukowe AON” 2001, Dodatek specjalny, s. 99.
10
L. Jonson, op. cit., s. 3.; A. Legucka, Geopolityczne…, op. cit., s. 311-322.
74
become the most important stabilizing factor inhibiting the outbreak of hostilities
in post-Soviet countries, having at the same time its own political, military and
economic interests in the region - so it becomes a ‘party to the conflict’.
Russia conflict management
There have been several armed conflicts in the ‘shared neighbourhood’ of the
EU and Russia. At the turn of the 1980s and 1990s conflicts arose in NagornoKarabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Transnistria. They all underwent
similar phases: eruption, and then a ‘freezing’ in the form of a truce and the
creation of quasi-states that are not recognized by the international community.
Then, two of these conflicts were ‘unfrozen’: in South Ossetia and Abkhazia
which, in August 2008, were transformed into the Georgian-Russian war.
According to some, there is a considerable possibility of the conflict in NagornoKarabakh escalating into another international conflict. A renewed outbreak of
hostilities is indeed highly probable, especially when you look at the ‘arms race’ in
the South Caucasus11.
Russia had an impact on the course of each of these conflicts in the CIS area. In
the first phase of the conflict, when the military action took place, the Russians
supplied weapons and soldiers (sometimes mercenaries) and offered military
advice and support – military and diplomatic activities were conducted in parallel.
It must be stressed that, during the intensive armed operations in the early 1990s,
the decision-making process in Russia was highly distributed. Government
agencies, the president, the parliament, the ministries of foreign affairs and of
defence, the army, including officers and soldiers in units distributed throughout
the former USSR territories, all had a say in the process. Mainly owing to the
support of the latter, the separatists obtained the necessary military provisions for
conducting military operations. In Transnistria, the separatists’ success was
determined by the 14th Soviet Army; in Abkhazia and South Ossetia weapons were
obtained from local military units; and in Nagorno-Karabakh the separatists were
supported by Armenia, itself probably being armed by Russia. At the same time
Russia sought international partners to have them recognize the CIS as an
organization ensuring regional security and building peace and stabilization. Lena
Jonson claims that, in the first phase, Russia attempted to present itself as a coorganizer of regional security. The country was ready not only to participate in
peace operations all over the world, but also to transfer the responsibility for the
security of the southern frontier of the former USSR to the UN and the CSCE12. An
11
A. Legucka, Wyścig zbrojeń na Kaukazie Południowym [w:] A. Bryc, A. Legucka,
A. Włodkowska-Bagan (red.), Bezpieczeństwo obszaru poradzieckiego. Książka poświęcona pamięci
prof. Kazimierza Malaka, Difin, Warszawa 2011, s. 233-249.
12
L. Jonson, op. cit., s. 9.
75
AGNIESZKA LEGUCKA
important motive was to secure the financial support necessary for conducting
peace operations in the ‘near abroad’. But the UN and the CSCE (later OSCE)
limited themselves to supporting Russian operations, not wanting to send
peacekeeping missions into regions of conflict, but merely monitoring Russian
operations. In Abkhazia, an observer mission was undertaken by the UN
(UNOMIG), in South Ossetia and Transnistria by the CSCE/OSCE, and in
Nagorno-Karabakh the peace process was coordinated by the CSCE/OSCE Minsk
Group13. The goal laid down in the mandates of these missions that of conducting
negotiations aimed at solving the conflicts - with the parties’ interests decidedly at
odds - has not yet been achieved.
In the second phase, after the cessation of military operations, Russia took the
role of the main mediator and guarantor of the truce agreements and had success in
forcing both parties to the negotiating table. In June 1992, an agreement was signed
in Dagomys to end the South Ossetia conflict. The agreement set forth the
formation of a peacekeeping force that included the South Ossetian, North
Ossetian, Russian and Georgian battalions. In July 1992, the Transnistrian conflict
was brought to an end. As a result, a security zone was established and a Joint
Control Commission composing of three parties: Moldova, Russia, and
Transnistria. Russia was named the ‘trust guarantor’14. In 1994, Russia proposed an
initiative to send CIS peacekeeping forces to Abkhazia (in reality these were
predominantly Russian forces) to secure the truce agreed in December of the
previous year. Also, in May 1994 a truce was signed between Armenia and
Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, owing to the lack of proper agreement
between the two parties, no peace forces were sent into the region of the conflict.
After the ending of hostilities in the border region of the former Soviet Union,
Russia’s position as a regional leader was much in demand and it could shape
a required regional order promoting Russia’s soft power. However, it became clear
that Russia may gain more by using hard power, or a position of strength, by
maintaining quasi-states and not ending any conflict with a peace treaty. Between
the end of 1992 and 1996 Russia changed into an intervening military power that
maintains no guidelines or standards set forth in the UN’s system of peace
operations. Russian peace-building activity developed outside of the UN’s system
and norms. Russia was deeply involved in solving conflicts, although an
international audience highly doubted its solely peaceful intentions and questioned
the impartiality of its actions15.
In the third phase, when the ‘conflict freezing’ occurred, Russia was still using
diplomatic means and its military presence in order to guarantee the status quo of
relative stability. Simultaneously, the constant monitoring of the situation by the
13
В.Н. Казимиров, Мир Карабаху. Посредничество Росcии в урегулировании нагорнокарабахского конфликта, Международные отношения, Москва 2009, s. 30-31.
14
L. Jonson, op. cit., s. 10.
15
D. Sagramoso, op. cit., s. 13.
76
Russian Federation prevented a final solution to any given conflict. As a result, the
separatists in the CIS countries, counting on Russia’s help, hardened their
negotiating position. For many years Russia, anxious about its own areas with
separatist tendencies (Chechnya) gaining strength, had not recognized any of these
quasi-states. The ‘frozen conflicts’ provided a natural guarantee of Russia’s
influence over the situation in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova. At the
OSCE summit in Istanbul in 1999, Russia committed to withdraw its forces and
military equipment from Georgian and Moldovan territories. From 2005 to the end
of 2007, it withdrew its forces from military bases in Georgia, but most of them
were simply transferred to Armenia. However, the commitments concerning the
separatist Transnistria Republic were not kept.
The fourth phase was to ‘unfreeze’ the armed conflicts in the South Caucasus,
which was influenced by the Georgian ‘Rose Revolution’ in 2003, the bold
demands of the President of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, on the recovery of
territorial integrity, in what was supposed to help support the modernization of the
Georgian army by the Americans, and the growing military budgets of countries in
the region (mainly Azerbaijan, which proclaimed the desire to reclaim the
Nagorno-Karabakh). The support of the West, in the form of including the South
Caucasus countries in the EU's European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004 and the
announcement to invite Georgia to NATO in April 2008, was treated as a threat
towards the regional position and political, military and economic interests of
Russia. After a series of incidents and provocations, Russia (1) conducted direct
attacks on military targets in Georgia - a helicopter attack on Georgian facilities in
Kodoria and a missile strike on a radar station in 2007, involving numerous
provocations of Russian peacekeeping forces in the conflict area; (2) established
a communication and economic blockade of Georgia from 2006, (3) attempted to
play off the internal conflicts in Georgia in 2007/2008; there has been an outbreak
of a new armed conflict16. After the attacks of the Georgian forces on the South
Ossetia capital - Tskhinvali - on 7/8th August 2008, Russia stepped in to ‘protect
Russian citizens’ in South Ossetia and, then, in Abkhazia, and the Russian army
marched into Georgia, occupying strategic points and dividing this rebellious
republic from the main country. On 26th August 2008, Russia officially recognized
the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, thus confirming it is able to
‘unfreeze’ a situation of armed conflict in the Commonwealth of Independent
States region when not in its favour. However, by using force, Russia has
weakened its soft power. No CIS member has recognized the independence of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which is contrasted with the recognition given by the
West to Kosovo’s independence in February 2008.
16
K. Strachota, Gruzja na wojnie z Rosją, „Tydzień na Wschodzie OSW”, 19.08.2009.
77
AGNIESZKA LEGUCKA
European Union conflict management
The Russian involvement in the east neighbourhood area contrasts vividly with
the approach adopted by the European Union, reluctant to openly act against
Russia and internally divided. For years the EU has not been paying much attention
to solving conflicts in the area, partly because some European countries feared the
reaction of Russia and accept its special position as the peace guarantor in the
region. The importance of external security became a relevant factor only after the
enlargement of the European Union. The European Security Strategy of 13th
December 2003 reads: ‘The post-Cold War environment is one of increasingly
open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly
linked (...). The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings
the EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well-governed
countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the
Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations’17.
The European Union did not participate in any armed conflict in the eastern
neighbouring countries but it did, on several occasions, act as a mediator or
advisor. It has involved itself relatively late with managing conflicts in the CIS
region. Its role was fulfilled by Russia, Ukraine, the UN and the OSCE. This
situation changed with the enlargement of the European Union and the
establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy18. In the documents of
the EU there is defined the neighbourhood of its interests, including the
announcements of ‘the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, as well as abidance by international law and efforts to achieve
conflict resolution’19. The authors of these documents have especially studied the
recommendations of Professor Joseph Nye, who claimed that a precisely defined
national interest may be a factor attracting others through the promise of economic
help or work for peace. In order to build a contact platform with the new ‘ring of
friends’ in the neighbourhood, the EU claimed that ‘the privileged relationship with
neighbours will build on a mutual commitment to common values principally
within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights,
including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the
principles of market economy and sustainable development’ (European
Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper, 2004). But at the same time it must be
noted that, although the political values may be a strong source of attraction, it is
not enough to believe in them (Nye, 2007, p. 89). What is important is the third
17
A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu /uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf, [12.02.2010].
18
Based on the Lisbon Treaty that came into force in December 2009, the European Security and
Defence Policy was renamed as the Common Security and Defence Policy.
19
European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper, Communication from the Commission,
Brussels, 12.05.2004, COM(2004) 373 final, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_
paper_en.pdf, [23.03.2010].
78
element of soft power - that is, the conducted foreign policy. When the ideas and
values are not transferred into practice, or when double standards are used, then the
power based on values loses its attraction and becomes a subject of criticism. In the
case of the European Union, a state of self-complacency is dangerous when
concerning the setting of goals and strategies without reflecting on the efficiency of
its policies.
In 2003, the practical phase of the ESDP began. The first EU missions were
sent to the Balkans, but the ‘natural’ target area for stabilizing operations seemed to
be the post-Soviet territories20. In September 2003, the European Union was
officially invited to participate in the negotiations concerning the Transnistrian
conflict. The ‘frozen conflict’ in Transnistria was a problem for European security
because of, amongst other things, the lack of international control over this small
territory, sometimes earning the name ‘black hole’, creating perfect conditions for
the illegal trade in cigarettes, alcohol, weapons, people and organs. At the request
of the presidents of Ukraine and Moldova in June 2005, the European Union
created a special training-control border assistance mission which was tasked with
supporting the border and customs services of these countries21. The goal of this
mission was to combat smuggling, trafficking and customs fraud taking place on
the border, especially its Transnistrian part, and to conduct training and provide
support for customs. Experts from the EU provided support and advice in the
organization of the border control. The final declaration stated that ‘the EU hopes
that the mission will contribute to wider efforts to find a viable and sustainable
solution to the Transnistria conflict’22.
Since 2001 the place of the EU’s greater involvement was the South Caucasus.
the EU has upgraded its political visibility in the South Caucasus. On 7 July 2003
the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus (EUSR) was appointed. This
role was given to Heikki Talvitie (2003/496/CFSP), whose tasks were, among
other things, to contribute to the prevention of conflicts, and to prepare the return
of peace to the region and assist in conflict resolution with the OSCE and UN.
Initially, the EU supported Georgia’s efforts towards solving the Abkhazia and
South Ossetia conflicts, but only through the OSCE and the UN23. The ‘Rose
20
A. Ciupiński, Realizacja Wspólnej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony UE na obszarze
poradzieckim [in:] Bezpieczeństwo obszaru poradzieckiego. Książka poświęcona pamięci prof.
Kazimierza Malaka, op. cit., s. 233-249; D. Lynch, Russia faces Europe, “Challiot Paper” 2003, May
2003, No 60, s. 87-90; N. Popescu, A. Wilson, Polityka Unii Europejskiej i Rosji wobec wspólnych
sąsiadów, Fundacja Batorego, Warszawa 2010.
21
The inauguration ceremony took place in Odessa on 30th November 2005, but the actual start
of the operation was delayed until the 1st December 2005.
22
European Union’s Border Mission to Moldova and Ukraine - Declaration by the Presidency of the
European Union - Odessa, Ukraine, 30 November 2005, Brussels, 30 November 2005 15178/05 (Presse
334), http://www.eubam.org/files/0-99/79/Presidency_Declaration.pdf, [27.02.2008]; http://www.eubam.
org/en/, [12.01.2011].
23
Still, in 2000-2001 the EU supplied over EUR half-a-million worth of equipment for the
Georgian border guards. This help was aimed at protecting unarmed OSCE observers by the
79
AGNIESZKA LEGUCKA
Revolution’ in Georgia in November 2003, and the inclusion of Georgia,
Azerbaijan and Armenia into the European Neighbourhood Policy (2004) and
Black Sea Synergy (2007), enforced a special sensitivity towards this region24. The
EU confirmed its willingness to play a more active political role in the South
Caucasus25. Under ESDP, the EU independently conducted a mission based on the
joint action of the Council of the European Union of 28th June 2004
(2003/496/CFSP). A Rule of Law Mission, EUJUST-THEMIS, began operating on
15th July 2004 and lasted one year. It aimed at reforming the existing Soviet-type
judicial system that was generating corruption and a lack of horizontal coordination
of authorities. On 20th February 2006, the Council of the European Union
extended the work of the EU Special Representative in the South Caucasus region.
His mandate included, amongst other things, contributing to conflict prevention,
helping in conflict solution, and intensifying dialogue between the EU and the
main stakeholders in the region (2006/121/CFSP). It was Peter Semneby who
served as EUSR for the South Caucasus until 28 February 2011, then it was Pierre
Morel who served as EUSR during the crisis in Georgia until 31 August 2011 and
then Philippe Lefort who served until 30 June 2013.
The greatest challenge in the eastern neighbourhood of the EU was the
Georgian-Russian war in August 2008. The EU realized the importance of pulling
countries out of their traditional sphere of influence and into the orbit of the West
for the continent’s security. The Georgian-Russian war became a ‘catalyst’ for
cooperation with the East, speeding up the discussion on the Eastern dimension of
the ENP (Eastern Partnership). Simultaneously, the reaction to the GeorgianRussian war showed some discrepancies in the interpretation of the Georgian
events, while the unequivocal expression of support for Georgia's territorial
integrity from all European countries, in particular by Germany, made Moscow
abandon its previous practice of playing on the pro- and contra-Russian feelings
Georgians, who monitored the border between Georgia, Chechnya and the Russian Federation. The
EU’s contribution to the OSCE mission in Georgia successfully supported the functioning of
Permanent Secretariats on the Georgian and South Ossetian sides under the emblem of the OSCE and
facilitated meetings under the Joint Control Commission (JCC), which is the most important forum in
the conflict-solving process. In June 2006, the EU extended its financial support for the OSCE
mission. This support was supposed to finance the JCC meetings and conferences under the JCC
name, and to partly cover the costs of running two Secretariats for one year. The financial reference
amount was EUR 140,000. R. Zięba, Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa Unii
Europejskiej, Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne, Warszawa 2007, s. 178.
24
On 11th April 2007, the European Commission adopted the communication titled Black Sea
Synergy – a new regional cooperation initiative. This was aimed at creating a political framework for
various practical operations. The Commission set an ambitious goal – to contribute to solving
conflicts in the South Caucasus, and to ensure additional means for solving problems underlying the
‘frozen’ conflicts.
25
D. Helly, EUJUST Themis in Georgia: an ambitions bet on rule of law [w:] Nowak Agnieszka
(red.), Civilian Crisis Management – The EU Way, “Challiot Paper” June 2006, No 90, EUISS, Paris,
s. 86.
80
among the European Union members26. The differences among the Europeans did
not concern the political support for Georgia, which was expressed in solidarity,
but their response to the Russian action. Representing the then EU presidency,
President Nicolas Sarkozy travelled to Moscow on 12th August 2008. He was able
to negotiate a peace plan with the Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, under
which the parties: (1) committed to the non-use of force, (2) would permanently
end all military actions, (3) would ensure free access to humanitarian aid,
(4) would allow Georgian forces to return to their permanent points of deployment;
further more (5) Russian forces were to withdraw to the lines prior to the start of
military operations but they would be entitled to introduce ‘additional security
measures’, (6) international talks would commence concerning security in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The agreement negotiated by Nicolas Sarkozy was
brought to Tbilisi by the then American Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, and
was accepted by Mikheil Saakashvili on 15th August, and on the day after that – by
the President of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev27.
The obligations resulting from the agreement were only partly fulfilled by the
Russians; the fighting was stopped but the Russian forces were not withdrawn from
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the following days saw more military action on
the territory of Georgia proper. There were rumours of ‘cleansing’ Ossetia of
Georgian families. By this, Russia infringed on the first, second (until 2009) and
fifth point of the Sarkozy-Medvedev agreement. Also, the access of international
humanitarian aid was hampered. South Ossetia only received aid from Russia, and
for the Georgian refugees it was available only in Georgia (Germany increased its
aid to EUR 2 million)28. The fourth point concerned Georgia and was implemented.
Also, the last sub-point has not been completed as it assumed the start of
international negotiations on South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Although international
talks did begin later in Geneva, on 26th August 2008 Russia officially recognized
the independence of the two small states, announcing their support, including
military support.
On 3rd September 2008, the European Parliament issued a resolution stating
that ‘the European Neighbourhood Policy should be developed further and better
adapted to the needs of the EU’s eastern partners’29. The EU then decided to
independently send ca. 300 observers who were to control the security zones
proposed in the Medvedev-Sarkozy agreement. On 1st October 2008, the European
Union Monitoring Mission began operations, its goal being to monitor the borders
of the security zone in the Abkhazia and South Ossetia region. Unarmed observers
in light armoured vehicles labelled EUMM were to patrol their identified areas.
26
S. Żerko, Niemcy wobec konfliktu w Gruzji (sierpnień 2008), „Biuletyn Instytutu
Zachodniego” 2008, nr 1, s. 1-10.
27
R.D. Asmus, Mała wojna, która wstrząsnęła światem. Gruzja, Rosja i przeszłość Zachodu, Res
Publica Nova, Warszawa 2010, s. 340-365.
28
S. Żerko, op. cit., s. 8.
29
L. Alieva, EU and South Cauasus, “CAP Discussion Paper” December 2006, s. 10-11.
81
AGNIESZKA LEGUCKA
The EU’s observers were deployed in four locations: the capital of Georgia Tbilisi, in Gori near South Ossetia, Zugdidi near the Abkhazian border and the
Black Sea port of Poti. The financial reference amount intended to cover the
expenditure related to the mission was EUR 31 million (2008/736/CFSP)30. The
basic limitation on the fulfilment of the mission’s task was the blockade of the EU
observers’ entrance into Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Also, in June 2009, Russia
blocked the extension of the UN mission’s mandate in Abkhazia, and of the
OSCE’s in South Ossetia. In this way, the European Union became the only
international organization supervising the situation in Georgia and an important
financial aid donor for the country’s redevelopment. For this, another EUR
500 million were allocated to Georgia, which nearly equalled the sum received by
Georgia under various EU programmes from 1992 to 2005 (EUR 505 million)31.
According to the World Bank, Georgia has received much more assistance in the
years 2004–2009 - around USD 3.137 billion under the Official Development
Assistance. These data do not cover all categories of aid, as well as a large part of
the post-war aid package amounting to USD 4.5 billion32.
Through the conflict in Georgia Russia has achieved the main goal of its
foreign policy. It helped to withdraw NATO and the Americans from this country
replacing Western obligations in Georgia with EU stabilization. It has accelerated
work on the Polish-Swedish proposal to strengthen the EU’s relations with the
countries of that region33. The proposal of ‘eastern specialization’ in the framework
of the European Neighbourhood Policy was eventually adopted as the Eastern
Partnership project (EaP), officially established in May 2009.
Evaluation of the conflict management of Russia and the EU
According to Dmitry Trenin ‘the Russians perceive the EU in opposition to
NATO: good West is Europe and the EU, evil West is America and NATO’34. This
model might not fully reflect Russia’s attitude towards the EU, but after many
30
COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/736/CFSP of 15 September 2008 on the European Union
Monitoring Mission in Georgia, EUMM Georgia, “Official Journal of the European Union”,
L 248/26, 17.9.2008, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:248:0026:
0031:EN:PDF, [12.01.2012].
31
K. Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, Integracja czy imitacja? UE wobec wschodnich sąsiadów, „Prace
OSW” 2011, s. 47, Georgia Strategy Paper, 2007-2013, s. 16
32
M. Matusiak, Gruzińskie wybory. Między silnym państwem a demokracją, „Punkt Widzenia
OSW” 2012, s. 12.
33
J. Cieślińska, Partnerstwo Wschodnie – miejsce wymiaru wschodniego w Europejskiej Polityce
Sąsiedztwa, „Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej” 2009, nr 3, Wydział Nauk Politycznych
i Dziennikarstwa Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza, Poznań, s. 129-130; T. Kapuśniak Tomasz,
Wymiar Wschodni Europejskiej Polityki Sąsiedztwa Unii Europejskiej. Inkuzja bez członkostwa,
„Zeszyty Natolin” 2010, Centrum Natolińskie, Warszawa.
34
D. Trenin, Russia – EU Partnership: Grand Vision and Practical Steps, “Russia on Russia”,
Issue 1, Moscow School of Political Studies and Social Market Foundation, Moscow 2000, s. 106.
82
years of distrust Russia has learnt to deal with this organization and, especially, to
act on issues that it finds important by antagonizing individual European Union
member states. The support received by Moscow during the rule of German
chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and simultaneous anti-Russian statements by
politicians from Poland and the Baltics helped Russia successfully utilize this
strategy. The European Union can be efficient against Russia only when full
solidarity of European interests is ensured, which was exemplified by the ‘Orange
Revolution’ in Ukraine and the August war in Georgia. At the same time, the case
of Georgia makes one ponder Russian motives to join the EU peace process. For
many years Georgia has been drawing nearer and nearer to Russia’s greatest rival,
the USA. The growing position of the USA worried Moscow, especially in the
context of the proposed expansion of NATO to include the Ukraine and Georgia35.
By including the European Union in the peace talks and allowing its observers to
enter into Georgia proper, Russia managed to remove the USA from the Georgian
issue. Although the USA supported Georgia’s territorial integrity and sharply
opposed Russia, it is the European Union who took over the responsibility for
Georgia’s redevelopment and stabilization. However, the policy of fait accompli epitomized by Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s independence
and the failure to keep all points of the Sarkozy-Medvedev agreement - showed the
lack of instruments in Europe able to force compliance on Russia.
Examples of the EU’s involvement in conflict management in the shared
neighbourhood show that Georgia has become the priority country, but, as the
experts stress, ‘the idea of an ESDP missions in the former Soviet space should not
lead to increasing tensions with Russia’36. This is confirmed by the case of
Moldova, which for several years has been following the road of European
integration but, due to the Transnistrian conflict, cannot secure enough support in
the European countries which want to avoid the deterioration of their own relations
with Russia. In the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the EU has even less
instruments at its disposal to influence the situation. There is no full EC delegation
in the Azerbaijan capital, Baku, only a ‘Europa House’ information centre with one
envoy. The EU has no presence in Karabakh or the surrounding occupied
territories. Nevertheless, the EU has founded a wide range of economic and
infrastructure tools in the regions. It can be partly explained by the unwillingness
of the key parties – the government of Azerbaijan and Armenia – to seek EU
assistance. The peace negotiations held by the OSCE Minsk Group are fragile and
the opening of a new forum for discussion about the conflict could undermine this
35
This is reflected in the statement by W. Putin in the conference in Munich on 11th February
2007.
36
D. Helly, op. cit., s. 102.
83
AGNIESZKA LEGUCKA
process. Unfortunately, the status quo is preferable to most actors than settlement
of the dispute37.
What strengths does the European Union have? The biggest positive element of
attraction and attractiveness of the European Union is its experience of integration,
which stopped conflicts between Germany and France, improved the quality of life
for inhabitants and secured them against totalitarianism, authoritarianism and
extremism. The European Union is building its soft power on the values of respect,
but, as Nye warns, (2007, p. 89) ‘the political values like democracy and human
rights can be powerful sources of attraction, but it is not enough just to proclaim
them (...) Perceived hypocrisy is particularly corrosive of power that is based on
proclaimed values’38. European values strongly influence the consciousness of the
societies of Eastern Europe but this element may be wasted, however, if the
European Union does not open itself to the societies of the Eastern Partnership
countries. This includes a clear and attractive strategic communication referring not
to the concept of ‘neighbourhood’ but a united Europe, in which these countries do
not necessarily have to be invited to join the EU, but which should offer certain
European perspectives for the countries that are most advanced with their internal
reforms39. Europe, facing demographic problems, will have to open itself to an
inexpensive labour force from the East, which seems less ‘problematic’ in terms of
cultural differences. On-going negotiations on visa simplification are the first step
in this direction.
Moreover, the EU is the biggest donor of development assistance and
humanitarian aid in the world, which increases its soft power with regard to the
Eastern neighbourhood. The global economic crisis and recession which threatens
many developed countries, traditionally generous donors of development aid,
naturally stimulates the discussion concerning the quality and efficiency of
development aid. In March 2011, a document entitled A New Responses to the
Changing Neighbourhood. A Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy was
adopted, showing the EU’s will to strengthen democracy, good administration and
human rights in the Southern and Eastern Neighbourhood, and enhance the transfer
of aid through civic society organizations40. It is expected that EUR 96.2 billion,
constituting 6.8% of the total budget of the European Union, will be allocated for
external actions, including development ones, in 2014-2020. EUR 23.3 billion shall
be allocated to the Developmental Cooperation Instrument (of key importance for
global development), and EUR 18.2 billion for the new European Neighbourhood
37
E.J. Steward, EU Conflict Management in the South Caucasus: A Preliminary Analysis,
University of Nottingham, 22-23 November 2007, s. 8, http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/shared/
shared_icmcr/ Docs/stewart.pdf, [23.02.2010].
38
J.S. Nye Jr., op. cit., s. 89.
39
K. Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, op. cit., s. 6.
40
A New Responses to the Changing Neighbougrhood. A Review of the European
Neighborhood Policy, Brussels, 25 May 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com_11_303_
en.pdf, [12.01.2014].
84
Instrument. The European Development Fund continues to remain outside the
general budget of the European Union, and will amount to EUR 34.2 billion in
2014-202041. However, experts point out that it is not just about money but also
about ‘the opening up of society’ and the emphasis on grassroots democracy
(Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, 2011, p. 6). It should also be noted that development
assistance and humanitarian aid is the ‘European alibi’ that allows the authorities to
avoid deeper involvement in linking Eastern countries with Europe, which may
take the form only of supporting their reforms even at the cost of deteriorating
relations with Russia. It is essential, therefore, to create favourable conditions for
foreign investment of European companies in Eastern markets.
Summary
Armed conflicts determine the security policy of the countries in the region that
seek ‘more powerful’ external allies in order to balance the threat posed by their
neighbours. This is why Armenia expects Russia’s support, whereas Georgia relies
on the USA (NATO) and the European Union. For several years, Moldova has
been counting on European integration to balance the Russian position and solve
the conflict in Transnistria. In the EU, there was an increase in awareness of the
challenges and threats existing in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus, resulting
in a demand to prove the EU’s capability to prevent and manage armed conflicts.
The security of the ‘shared neighbourhood’ of the EU and Russia is determined
by many factors, including the influence of these two ‘strategic partners’, with the
first one - the EU - adopting the role of stabilizer, and the second one - the Russian
Federation - striving to maintain a state of controlled destabilization in order to
have a stronger influence on the six countries in the region. For the European
Union, the values such as democracy, the rule of law and civic society
development are important. This, in the long run, is to ensure the economic and
social development of these countries which in the future will eliminate negative
phenomena such as illegal migration, organized crime, terrorism, and trafficking in
arms and humans. For Russia, the priority is to maintain the countries in its sphere
of influence and ‘frozen conflicts’ remain an important tool in achieving this goal.
In the latter case, Russia maintains its military presence in six of the region’s
countries, determining the ‘unfreezing’ of armed conflicts, and has an impact on
the security policy of each of its neighbours. As an economic means, Russia uses
differentiating prices of energy resources, embargoes on oil and natural gas, and
trade sanctions (bans on imports of wine, vegetables and meat). This is
41
Raport. Polska pomoc rozwojowa, Grupa Zagranica, Warszawa 2011, s. 12, http://zagranica.
org.pl/images/stories/PublikacjeGZ/monitoring/Raport_Polska_wspolpraca_rozwojowa_2011_Grupa
_Zagranica.pdf, [10.10.2012].
85
AGNIESZKA LEGUCKA
accompanied by political pressure, which works with increased strength given the
availability of Russian TV channels and newspapers in neighbouring countries.
Russia strongly affects the area of the neighbourhood which it shares with the
European Union. The EU is internally divided and not yet ready for a coherent
policy towards the East. In a situation of economic crisis, and with European
attention focused on other regions of the world, the European Union does not want
to, and has not the means to, effectively work towards the security of the ‘shared
neighbourhood’. The stabilization of the region will, therefore, be the result of
internal factors in these countries and the influence of Russia. This region may
become a challenge for twenty-first century Europe as we can repeat, after Joseph
Nye, that ‘perceived hypocrisy is particularly corrosive of power that is based on
proclaimed values’42.
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ISSN 0867–2245
ISSN 2353-1789
BRICS – A SECURITY’S CREATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT…
BRICS – A SECURITY'S CREATOR IN THE
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT - THE
ROLE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE
CRIMEA CRISIS
Jerzy Tomasz LIMANOWSKI, Ph.D.
Abstract
In November 2001, an analyst at Goldman Sachs, economist Jim O'Neill, created the
acronym “BRIC” for the group of the four largest emerging markets with high economic
potential. These markets belong to the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Russian
Federation, the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China. In February 2011,
the group was expanded to include South Africa, causing a change in the name of the group
to “BRICS”.
According to Goldman Sachs' forecasts, the world's economies, in particular, equity
markets, will depend on the economic development of this group of countries in the near
future. In addition, in 2050 the total value of the BRICS economies will exceed the value of
the G-7 economies. Such predictions seem quite reasonable, taking into account the fact
that the BRICS countries have a significant amount of resources. For example, China is a
source of cheap labour, both Russia and South Africa have large stocks of natural
resources, the agro-industry in Brazil is very highly developed, while India has cheap
intellectual resources.
So today it is not only the BRICS group of countries that have considerable economic
potential , but also a number of general political interest , which allow members of the
BRICS to conduct a coordinated policy and act as a strong player in the international
arena. BRICS countries occupy 26 % of the territory of the world with almost 2.83 billion
population representing almost half of the total population entourage (42% ), while the
combined nominal GDP ( 15,434 trillion ) is 14.6 % of global GDP ratio.
This study refers to the facts and development forecasts for this group of countries. In
this paper, the author tries to define the directions of the economic development of the „
rising giants ,” their investment position in the world , the power supply of the „ engine of
the global economy „, their political views ,and also the most important views on
strengthening new economic and military alliances .
Due to the ensuing new military- political situation in the region of Eastern Europe
(Crimea), taking place at the time of writing, the author has tried to develop his words in a
very marginal way to show how these events will affect the configuration of the world
economy, and influence the military- economic situation of the world.
Key words – Crimea, “Big Four”, „BRICS Nations”, “eThekwini Declaration”,
Goldman Sachs’ Reports”
89
JERZY TOMASZ LIMANOWSKI
Creating a BRIC
In recent years, many of the new economical-military alliances have been
growing. One of them is the BRICS. But this acronym was not created to represent
a fresh organisation, but has taken its background from the former economic
alliance named BRIC..
The rise of a group of emerging economies is one of the most striking
phenomena in recent economic history. The creation of “diplomatic clubs”1 among
States such as BRICS highlights current evolutions in the political arena. This
group constitutes a forum of industrialised, large and fast-growing economies with
significant influence on regional and global matters. They have assumed
a proactive presence in several multilateral contexts aimed at promoting normative
and operational changes2. This effort has been primarily generated at their annual
summit for the Heads of State.
Source: WARDSAUTO. The Information Centre for and about the Global Auto Industry.
Picture 1. BRIC nations
The term BRICs was coined by the Chief Economist of Goldman Sachs in
2001, in a paper entitled “Building Better Global Economic BRICs”3 and at the
time it included Brazil, Russia, India and China. South Africa only joined the group
in 2011. The concept of “emergence” was seen essentially as a market-driven
phenomenon that reflected deep changes in the structure of the global economy, as
well as making the “right” economic policy choices. It is considered a multidimensional phenomenon, the product of economic, socio-political and identity
1
Kowitt, Beth (2009-06-17). „For Mr. BRIC, nations meeting a milestone”. CNNMoney.com.
Retrieved 2009-06-18.
2
Global Economics Paper No. 99, Dreaming with BRICs and Global Economics Paper 134,
How Solid Are the BRICs?
3
See note nr 1 and nr 2 above, and Economist's Another BRIC in the wall 2008 article.
90
elements. The grouping’s pattern of resilience would have legitimated a posteriori
their conceptual coherence
In economics, BRIC is a grouping acronym that refers to the countries of
Brazil, Russia, India and China, which are all deemed to be at a similar stage of
newly advanced economic development. It is typically rendered as „the BRICs”4 or
alternatively as the „Big Four”.
Various sources refer to a purported „original” BRIC agreement that predates
the Goldman Sachs thesis5. Some of these sources claim that President Vladimir
Putin of Russia was the driving force behind this original cooperative coalition of
developing BRIC countries. However, thus far, no text has been made public of
any formal agreement to which all four BRIC states are signatories. This does not
mean, however, that they have not reached a multitude of bilateral or even
quadrilateral agreements.
Evidence of agreements of this type is abundant and is available on the foreign
ministry websites of each of the four countries. Trilateral agreements and
frameworks made among the BRICs include the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization6 and the IBSA7 Trilateral Forum, which brings together Brazil, India,
and South Africa in annual dialogues.
Table 1
Important statistics of BRIC
Country /
Statistics
Federal
Republic of
Brazil
Russian
Federation
People's
Republic of
China
$ 11,316
$ 4,469 billion
billion
Republic of
India
Total
2011
$ 2,230
$ 20,193
billion
billion
$ 1,850
$ 8,253
GDP (nominal) $ 2,429 billion
$ 1,676 billion $ 2,298 billion
billion
billion
17,075,400
3,287,240
9,640,821
38,518,338
Area
8,514,877 km2
km2
km2
km2
km2
2,881,877,7
Population
192,787,000 141,927,297 1,210,193,422 1,336,970,000
19
Military
$ 33 billion
$ 91 billion $ 47 billion $ 166 billion $ 337 billion
expenditure
% of GDP
1,5 %
4.4%
2.5%
2,1 %
GDP (PPP)
$ 2,178 billion
% of
Global
24 %
18 %
27 %
44 %
20 %
Source: Personally developed.
4
„alternatively are used „the BRIC countries” or „the BRIC economies”.
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. is an American multinational investment banking firm that
engages in global investment banking, securities, investment management, and other financial
services primarily with institutional clients.
6
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation or SCO is a Eurasian political, economic and
military organisation which was founded in 2001 in Shanghai by the leaders of China, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Except for Uzbekistan, the other countries had been
members of the Shanghai Five, founded in 1996; after the inclusion of Uzbekistan in 2001, the
members renamed the organisation. India is an observer.
7
The IBSA Dialogue Forum (India, Brazil, South Africa) is an international tripartite grouping
for promoting international cooperation among these countries.
5
91
Also important to note is the G-208 coalition of developing states, which
includes all the BRICs. Furthermore, because of the popularity of the Goldman
Sachs thesis „BRIC”, this term has sometimes been extended whereby „BRICK”9
(K for South Korea), „BRIMC„10 (M for Mexico), „BRICA” (GCC Arab countries
– Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman and the United Arab Emirates)11
and „BRICET” (including Eastern Europe and Turkey)]12 have become more
generic marketing terms to refer to these emerging markets13.
In August 2010, Jim O'Neill of Goldman Sachs argued that Africa could be
considered the next BRIC. Analysts from rival banks have sought to move beyond
the BRIC concept, by introducing their own groupings of emerging markets.
Proposals include CIVETs14, the EAGLES15 and the 7 per cent Club (which
includes those countries which have averaged economic growth of at least 7 per
cent a year).16 Projections on the future power of the BRIC economies vary widely.
Some sources suggest that they might overtake the G7 economies by 2027.17
8
The Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (also known as the
G-20, G20, and Group of Twenty) is a group of finance ministers and central bank governors from
20 major economies. The members, shown highlighted on the map at the right include 19 individual
countries—Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy,
Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom,
United States—and the European Union (EU), with Spain participating as a „permanent guest”, and
further short-term guests named annually by the group's rotating chairperson. The EU is represented
by the President of the European Council and by the European Central Bank.
9
„The Australian Business - Emerging markets put China, India in the shade”.
Theaustralian.news.com.au. Retrieved 2010-10-15. , „IBM Targets Russian Developers: Could
overtake India, China in number of developers, says senior executive”, OutSourcing World, February
11, 2006
10
http://www.lefigaro.fr/econtreprises/20061023.FIG000000280_les_bric_tiennent_leurs_prome
sses.html.
11
Study: Energy-rich Arab countries are next emerging market”. Thestar.com.my. 2007-02-23.
12
http://www.cnhuaye.com/steel/en/news_2.asp?id=67.
13
An emerging market is a country that has some characteristics of a developed market but is
not a developed market. This includes countries that may be developed markets in the future or were
in the past.
14
CIVET – Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa.
15
EAGLES – Emerging and Growth-Leading Economies.
16
Acronym alert: the Eagles rock, beyond brics blog”. Blogs.ft.com. 2010-11-15. Retrieved
2012-06-19.
17
Rana Foroohar (2009-03-20). „BRICs Overtake G7 By 2027”. The Daily Beast. Retrieved
2012-06-19.
92
Gross Domestic Product in 2006 US$ billions
18
Table 2
Grups Countries 2006 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Brazil
Russia
BRIC
5,637 8,640 13,653 20,226 28,925 40,278 55,090 74,483 98,757 128,324
India
China
Canada
France
Germany
Italy
G7
28,005 30,437 33,414 36,781 39,858 43,745 48,281 53,617 59,475 66,039
Japan,
United
Kingdom
USA
More modestly, Goldman Sachs has argued that, although the four BRIC
countries are developing rapidly, it will only be by 2050 that their combined
economies can eclipse the combined economies of the current richest countries of
the world19 In 2010, however, while the four BRIC countries accounted for over
a quarter of the world's land area and more than 40% of the world's population20,21,
they accounted for only one quarter of the world’s gross national income.22
According to a paper published in 2005, Mexico and South Korea were the
only other countries comparable to the BRICs, but their economies were excluded
initially because they were considered already more developed, as they were
already members of the OECD. The same creator of the term „BRIC” coined the
term MIKT that includes Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey; more
recently, in 2013, he endorsed the term MINT, which replaces South Korea (now
regarded as already developed) with the growing economy of Nigeria.23
18
BRICS AND BEYOND” - Goldman Sachs study of BRIC and N11 nations, November 23,
2007.
19
Brazil, Russia, India And China (BRIC)”. Investopedia. Archived from the original on 21 May
2008. Retrieved 2008-05-11.
20
bricnation.com”. bricnation.com. Retrieved 2010-10-15.
21
http://www.investordaily.com/cps/rde/xchg/id/style/801.htm?rdeCOQ=SID-3F579BCE- 819F182C
22
http://www.prb.org/Articles/2012/brazil-russia-india-china.aspx , „How Solid are the BRICs?”
(PDF). Global Economics. Retrieved 2010-09-21.
23
BOESLER, MATTHEW (NOV. 13, 2013). „The Economist Who Invented The BRICs Just
Invented A Whole New Group Of Countries: The MINTs”. Business Insider. Retrieved 7 January
2014. , Magalhaes, Luciana (Dec 9, 2013). „O’Neill, Man Who Coined ‘BRICs,’ Still Likes BRICs,
But Likes MINTs, Too”. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 7 January 2014.
93
25
Table 3
List of Economies by Incremental Nominal GDP from 2006 to 2050
Countries
China
USA
India
Russia
Brazil
GDP from 2006
to 2020
9,448 billion
4,733 billion
1,999 billion
1,572 billion
1,130 billion
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
GDP from 2020
to 2035
21,718 billion
8,119 billion
7,666 billion
2,711 billion
2,769 billion
Rank
1
2
3
5
4
GDP from 2035
to 2050
36,362 billion
12,417 billion
27,154 billion
3,319 billion
6,103 billion
Rank
1
3
2
8
4
Several of the more developed of the N-1126 countries, in particular Turkey,
Mexico, Indonesia and South Korea, were seen as the most likely contenders to the
BRICs. Some other developing countries that have not yet reached the N-11
economic level, such as South Africa, aspired to BRIC status.
Table 4
Statistics on some categories inside the BRIC (ciphers bolded shown place)
Categories
Area
Population
Population growth rate
Labour force
GDP (nominal)
GDP (PPP)
GDP (nominal) per capita
GDP (PPP) per capita
GDP (real) growth rate
Human Development Index
Exports
Imports
Current account balance
Received FDI
Foreign exchange reserves
External debt
Public dept
Electrosity consumtpion
Renevable electrosity source
Number of mobile phones
25
Brazil
5
5
131
5
7
7
57
75
147
85
6
21
187
13
7
25
47
9
3
4
Russia
1
9
192
7
8
6
47
55
100
55
10
17
5
17
4
23
122
3
5
5
India
7
2
89
2
10
3
139
126
34
136
20
10
186
23
10
28
29
4
6
2
China
3
1
152
1
2
2
86
94
18
101
1
2
2
9
1
17
98
1
1
1
See note nr 19 above, page 5.
N - 11 The Next Eleven (known also by the numeronym N-11) are the eleven countries –
Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Turkey, South Korea,
and Vietnam – identified by Goldman Sachs investment bank and economist Jim O'Neill in a research
paper as having a high potential of becoming, along with the BRICs, the world's largest economies in
the 21st century
26
94
Categories
Number of internet users
Motor vehicle prodaction
Military expenditures
Active troops
Rail network
Road network
Brazil
5
7
11
15
10
4
Russia
6
11
3
5
2
7
India
3
6
8
3
4
3
China
1
1
2
1
3
2
Source: Personally developed
Goldman Sachs did not argue that the BRICs would organise themselves into
an economic bloc, or a formal trading association, as the European Union has
done.27 However, there are some indications that the „four BRIC countries have
been seeking to form a 'political club' or 'alliance'”, and thereby converting „their
growing economic power into greater geopolitical clout”.28 On 16 June 2009, the
leaders of the BRIC countries held their first summit in Yekaterinburg, and issued
a declaration calling for the establishment of an equitable, democratic and
multipolar world order. Since then they have met in Brasília in 2010, met in Sanya
in 2011 and in New Delhi, India in 2012.29
In recent years, the BRICs have received increasing scholarly attention.
Brazilian political economist, Marcos Troyjo, and French investment banker,
Christian Déséglise, founded the BRICLab at Columbia University, a Forum
examining the strategic, political and economic consequences of the rise of BRIC
countries, especially by analysing their projects for power, prosperity and prestige
through graduate courses, special sessions with guest speakers, Executive
Education programmes and annual conferences for policymakers, business and
academic leaders, and students.30
27
Brazil, Russia, India And China (BRIC)”. Investopedia. Archived from the original on 21 May
2008. Retrieved 2008-05-11.
28
BRICs helped by Western finance crisis: Goldman”. Reuters. 2008-06-08. , Mortished, Carl
(2008-05-16). „Russia shows its political clout by hosting BRIC summit”. The Times (London).
29
Halpin, Tony (2009-06-17). „Brazil, Russia, India and China form bloc to challenge US
dominance”. The Times, 17 June 2009. Retrieved from http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/
us_and_americas/article6514737.ece.
30
http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/news_events/announcements/BRICLab04132011.html.
95
Table 5
The ten largest economies in the world in 2050, measured in GDP
Source: Goldman Sachs study of BRIC and N11 nations, 23 November 2007.
In 2003 the BRIC thesis recognizes that Brazil, Russia, India and China31 have
changed their political systems to embrace global capitalism. Goldman Sachs
predicts that China and India, respectively, will become the dominant global
suppliers of manufactured goods and services, while Brazil and Russia will become
similarly dominant as suppliers of raw materials. Of the four countries, Brazil
remains the only polity that has the capacity to continue all elements, meaning
manufacturing, services, and resource supplying simultaneously. Cooperation is
thus hypothesised to be a logical next step among the BRICs because Brazil and
Russia together form the logical commodity suppliers.
The Goldman Sachs global economics team released a follow-up report to its
initial BRIC study in 2004.32 The report states that in BRIC nations, the number of
people with an annual income over a threshold of $3,000 will double in number
within three years and reach 800 million people within a decade. This predicts
a massive rise in the size of the middle class in these nations. In 2025, it is
calculated that the number of people in BRIC nations earning over $15,000 may
reach over 200 million. This indicates that a huge pickup in demand will not be
restricted to basic goods but impact higher-priced goods as well. According to the
report, first China and then a decade later India will begin to dominate the world
economy.
A report from 2007 reveals updated projection figures attributed to the rising
growth trends in India over the last four years. Goldman Sachs assert that „India's
influence on the world economy will be bigger and quicker than implied in our
31
Five Years of China's WTO Membership. EU and US Perspectives on China's Compliance
with Transparency Commitments and the Transitional Review Mechanism, Legal Issues of Economic
Integration, Kluwer Law International, Volume 33, Number 3, pp. 263-304, 2006. by Paolo Farah.
32
BRICs - Goldman Sachs Research Report 2004.
96
previously published BRICs research”. India has 10 of the 30 fastest-growing
urban areas in the world and, based on current trends, we estimate a massive
700 million people will move to cities by 2050. This will have significant
implications for demand for urban infrastructure, real estate, and services.
In the revised 2007 figures, based on increased and sustaining growth and more
inflows into foreign direct investment, Goldman Sachs predicts that „from 2007 to
2020, India's GDP per capita in US$ terms will quadruple”, and that the Indian
economy will surpass the United States (in US$) by 2043.33 At the same time, the
report indicated that Russia, while continuing its dominance of the European
energy market, would continue to struggle economically, as its population declines.
Picture nr 2.Gross Domestic Product per capita at 2012
According to a 2010 report from Goldman Sachs, China might surpass the US
in equity market capitalisation terms by 2030 and become the single largest equity
market in the world.34 By 2020, America's GDP might be only slightly larger than
China's GDP. Together, the four BRICs may account for 41% of the world's market
capitalisation by 2030, the report said.35 In late 2010, China surpassed Japan's GDP
33
Microsoft Word - Draft of Global Econ Paper No 152.doc” (PDF). Retrieved 2010-10-15.
http://www.dasinvestment.com/fileadmin/images/pictures/0809_Global_Econ_Paper_No__20
4_Final.pdf.
35
Goldman predicts: onwards and upwards for emerging markets, beyondbrics blog”.
Blogs.ft.com. 2010-09-08. Retrieved 2012-06-19.
34
97
for the first time, with China's GDP standing at $5.88 trillion compared to Japan's
$5.47 trillion. China thus became the world's second-largest economy after the
United States.36
Table 6
Global domestic product in 2006 US% billions
Rank
2050
1
2
3
4
5
6
Country 2006 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
China
2682 4667 8133 12630 18437
USA
13245 14535 16194 17987 20087
India
909 1256 1900 2848 4316
Brazil
1064 2087 1720 2194 2831
Mexico 851 1009 1327 1742 2303
Russia
982 1371 1900 2554 3341
25610
22817
6683
3720
3068
4265
34348
26097
10514
4963
4102
5265
45022
29823
16510
6631
5471
6320
57310
33904
25278
8740
7204
7420
70710
38514
37668
11366
9340
8580
%
increase
2536%
190%
4043%
968%
997%
773%
Source: Develop their own.
Based on a Forbes37 report released in March 2011, the BRIC countries
numbered 301 billionaires among their combined populations, exceeding the
number of billionaires in Europe, which stood at 300 in 2011.38 According to The
National Institute of Economic and Social Research39 (NIESR) based on
International Monetary Fund40 figures, in 2012 Brazil became the sixth-biggest
economy in the world by overtaking the UK with $2.52 trillion and $2.48 trillion,
respectively. In 2010, the Brazilian economy was worth $2.09 trillion and the UK
$2.25 trillion. This significant increase was caused by a Brazilian economic boom
on high food and oil prices.41
After Standard & Poor's (S&P)42 cited that India's growth outlook could
deteriorate if policymaking and governance don't improve, in June 2012 Fitch
Ratings43 cut its credit outlook to negative from stable and maintained its BBB36
Japan's Gross Domestic Product Fell 0.3% at Year's End http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/02/14/business/global/14yen.html?partner=rss&emc=rss.
37
Forbes is an American business magazine owned by Forbes, Inc. Published biweekly, it
features original articles on finance, industry, investing, and marketing topics. Forbes also reports on
related subjects such as technology, communications, science, and law.
38
BRICs becoming billionaire factory http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bc9b6d80-4a8d-11e0-82ab00144feab49a.html?ftcamp=rss#axzz1GCKIXd3V.
39
The National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) is an independent[1]
research organisation located in the City of Westminster, London, England.
40
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an international organization that was initiated
in 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference and formally created in 1945 by 29 member countries. The
IMF's stated goal was to assist in the reconstruction of the world's international payment system post–
World War II.
41
Brazil 'overtakes UK's economy'„. BBC News. 6 March, 2012.
42
Standard & Poor's Financial Services LLC (S&P) is an American financial services
company. It is a division of McGraw Hill Financial that publishes financial research and analysis on
stocks and bonds.
43
Fitch Ratings Inc. is a jointly owned subsidiary of Hearst Corporation and FIMALAC SA.
98
rating, the lowest investment grade rating. A week before Fitch released the rating,
S&P said India could become the first of the BRIC countries, to lose investmentgrade status.44 Since the global recession started, in Q3 2013 the economy of Brazil
contracted by 0.5 percent from the previous quarter, representing the first
contraction since Q1 2009.45
For the year 2013, China surpassed $4 trillion of world trade for the first time
and became the world's largest trading country, consisting of: export $2.21 trillion
and import $1.95 trillion. While the U.S. for 11 months of 2013 had a world trade
figure totalling $3.5 trillion and seemingly cannot beat China. China’s world trade
balance had a surplus of almost $260 billion in 2013, a 12.8 percent increase from
last year.46
Table 7
Gross domestic product per capita (real) US% billions
Rank
2050
12
1
17
11
7
4
Country 2006 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
China
2041 3463 5837 8829 12668
USA
44379 47014 50200 53502 57446
India
817 1061 1492 2091 2979
Brazil
5657 6882 8427 10375 12996
Mexico 7918 8972 11176 13979 17685
Russia
6909 9833 13971 19311 26061
17552
62717
4360
16694
22694
34368
23511
69019
6524
21924
29417
43800
30951
76044
9802
29026
38255
54221
39719
83489
14446
38149
49393
65708
49650
91683
20836
49759
63149
78435
%
increase
2332%
106%
2450%
779%
697%
1037%
The economic potential of Brazil, Russia, India and China is such that they
could become among the four most dominant economies by the year 2050. The
thesis was proposed by Jim O'Neill, global economist at Goldman Sachs.47 These
countries encompass over 25% of the world's land mass and 40% of the world's
population and hold a combined GDP (PPP) of 20 trillion dollars. On almost every
scale, they would be the largest entity on the global stage. These four countries are
among the biggest and fastest growing emerging markets.(Incal 2011)48
These countries have taken steps to increase political cooperation, mainly as a
way of influencing the United States position on major trade accords, or, through
the implicit threat of political cooperation, as a way of extracting political
concessions from the United States, such as the proposed nuclear cooperation with
India.
44
Fitch cuts India rating outlook to negative”. Reuters. 18 June 2012.
Brazil's economy experiences first contraction since 2009”. 4 December 2013.
46
Angela Monaghan (10 January 2014). „China surpasses US as world's largest trading nation”.
47
Ask the expert: BRICs and investor strategy from the Financial Times, Monday 2006-11-06
09:55
48
6th International Conference on Aluminium - INCAL 2011 Held on 6th to 8 th December 2011
at Hyderabad
45
99
Creating a BRICS
South Africa sought BRIC membership from 2009 and the process for formal
admission began as early as August 201049. South Africa was officially admitted as
a BRIC nation on 24 December 2010 after being invited by China and the other
BRIC countries to join the group.50 The capital “S” in BRICS stands for South
Africa. President Jacob Zuma attended the BRICS summit in Sanya in April 2011
as a full member. South Africa stands in a unique position to influence African
economic growth and investment. According to Jim O’Neill of Goldman Sachs,
who originally coined the term, states that Africa's combined current gross
domestic product is reasonably similar to that of Brazil and Russia, and slightly
above that of India51. South Africa is a „gateway” to Southern Africa and Africa in
general as the most developed African country.]52 China is South Africa’s largest
trading partner, and India wants to increase commercial ties to Africa. South Africa
is also Africa’s largest economy, but as number 31 in global GDP economies it is
far behind its new partners53.
Source: Reuters follow IMF, CIA, Factbook, Governments.
Picture nr 3. BRICS map and nations comparison
49
BRIC Becomes BRICS: Changes on the Geopolitical Chessboard | Foreign Policy Journal | 2”.
Foreign Policy Journal. Retrieved 2012-06-19.
50
51
By Jim O’Neill (2010-08-26). „How Africa can become the next Bric”. FT.com. Retrieved
2012-06-19.
52
South Africa | Economy | BRIC”. Globalpost.com. 2011-01-08. Retrieved 2012-06-19.
53
100
African credentials are important geopolitically, giving BRICS a four-continent
breadth, influence and trade opportunities.54 South Africa's addition is a deft
political move that further enhances BRICS’ power and status.55 In the original
essay that coined the term, Goldman Sachs did not argue that the BRICs would
organize themselves into an economic bloc or a formal trading association, which
this move signifies.
Source: www.CRNTT.com
Photo nr 1. The Fifth Summit of BRICS. Photo of Heads of States and Governments
South Africa was subsequently successful in joining the bloc. This was despite
economists at the Reuters 2011 Investment Outlook Summit, held on 6–7
December 2010, dismissing the prospects of South African success.56] Jim O'Neill,
for example, told the summit that South Africa, with a population of under
50 million people, was just too small an economy to join the BRIC ranks.57
However, after the BRIC countries formed a political organisation among
themselves, they later expanded to include South Africa, becoming the BRICS.58
The Fifth BRICS Summit was held on 26,27 March 2013 in Durban, South
Africa. The Summit, which brought together the heads of the emerging States of
54
BRIC Becomes BRICS: Changes on the Geopolitical Chessboard | Foreign Policy Journal | 2”.
Foreign Policy Journal. Retrieved 2012-06-19.
55
56
Reuters 2011 Investment Outlook Summit, London and New York, 6-7 December 2010”.
Live.reuters.com. Retrieved 2012-06-19.
57
Reuters 2011 Investment Outlook Summit, London and New York, 6–7 December 2010.
58
New era as South Africa joins BRICS”. SouthAfrica.info. Retrieved 2012-06-19.
101
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, took place for the first time on
African soil. The leaders expressed their opinion on the theme of “BRICS and
Africa – Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialisation”. The
objectives on the agenda were ambitious: promoting development and reforming
multilateral institutions.
The eThekwini Declaration59 reaffirmed the group’s commitment to promoting
international law and multilateralism, as well as global stability, development and
co-operation, based on an inclusive approach. The Summit brought together the
leaders of countries that, together, account for more than 40 per cent of the global
population, nearly 30 per cent of the land mass, and a share in world GDP (PPP)
that has increased from 16 per cent in 2000 to nearly 25 per cent in 201060.
Table 8
Basic statistics data of BRICS
Federal
People's
Russian
Republic of
Republic of
Republic of
Federation
India
Brazil
China
$ 2 178
$ 2 230
$ 4 469
$ 11,316
GDP (PPP)
billion
billion
billion
billion
GDP
$ 2 429
$ 1 ,850
$ 1,676
$ 2 298
(nominal)
billion
billion
billion
billion
8 514 877
17 075,400
3 287 240
9 640 821
Area
km2
km2
km2
km2
Population 192 787 000 141 927 297 1 210 193,422 1 336 970 000
Military
33,143
90,749
166,107
47,735 billion
expenditures
billion
billion
billion
% of GDP
1,5 %
4.4%
2.5%
2,1 %
Country /
Statistics
Republic
of South
Africa
Total
2012
$ 31 568
billion
$ 3 843
$ 12 096
billion
billion
38 518 338
km2
51 770 560 2 881 877 719
$ 11 375
4,60 billion 342,34 billion
1,3%
One of the main discussions during the Summit concerned the formal launch of
the negotiations for the creation of a development bank, in order to finance
infrastructures and industrialisation in BRICS and other developing countries,
particularly on the African continent61. This bank would serve as a financial
institution aligned with the way emerging countries view development, but not
really as a counterweight to the World Bank and the IMF. The leaders also decided
to constitute a financial safety net by creating a Contingent Reserve Arrangement
(CRA)62 among BRICS countries, intended to anticipate short-term liquidity
59
Declaration which was taken during Fifth BRICS Summit
BRICS a force for world peace, says China”. Business Day. 8 August 2012. Retrieved
9 November 2013.
61
Mariam, Isa. „BRICS Summit expected to establish development bank.” Business Day. 22
March 2013.
62
A Working Group was established to explore the feasibility of constituting a Contingent Reserve
Arrangement (CRA) among BRICS members. At the Durban Summit, Leaders declared that they were of
the view that the establishment of the CRA, with an initial size of US$ 100 billion is feasible and desirable;
although, it would be subject to internal legal frameworks and appropriate safeguards.
60
102
pressures and strengthen financial stability. This contingency fund, with an initial
size of 100 billion USD, as agreed by the member States, was not elaborated on
further. Moreover, they signed co-operation agreements, including the Multilateral
Agreement on Co-operation and Co-financing for Sustainable Development and
the Multilateral Agreement on Infrastructure Co-Financing for Africa63.
Table 9
201,046,886
$
2,695.9
billion
143,451,702 $
2,021.9
Russia
billion
$
1,210,193,422 1,824.8
India
billion
$
1,354,040,000 8,227.0
China
billion
Brazil
South 51,770,560
Africa
$
1,266.3
billion
$
671.6
billion
$
737.9
billion
$
1,835.3
billion
$
846.6
billion
$
414.0
billion
$
281.0
billion
$
2,031.0
billion
$ 384.3 $ 173.8 $ 95.27
billion billion billion
HDI
Life
expectancy
Literacy
rate
GDP per
capita
Imports
Exports
Governme
nt
spending
HFCE
GDP
(nominal)
Population
Country
Economic data of BRICS
93.5% 74.6
$ 256.0 $ 238.8 $
billion billion 13,623
730
(high)
99.6% 69.7
.788
(high)
$ 542.5 $ 358.1 $
$ 309.1 $ 500.3
$ 3,829 74.04% 64.2
billion billion
$
$
2,021.0 1,780.0 $ 9,161 92.2% 72.7
billion billion
$ 101.2 $ 106.8 $
86.4% 51.2
Source: Economic data is sourced from the most recent IMF figures and given in US
.554
(medium)
.699
(medium)
.629
(medium)
dollars.64
The new Chinese President, Mr Xi Jinping, took part in the BRICS Summit
which was his first major multilateral meeting, and which marked the beginning of
a long African tour. Other African countries were also present, especially during
the dialogue between the leaders of the BRICS and African countries on the
27 March. Among the Dialogue guests were the Presidents of the African Union
(AU), the AU Commission and NEPAD65, as well as various leaders representing
63
The BRICS Multilateral Cooperation and Co-Financing Agreement for Sustainable
Development sets out to explore the establishment of bilateral agreements aimed at establishing
cooperation and co-financing arrangements, specifically around sustainable development and green
economy elements.
64
World Economic Outlook”. IMF. April 2013 data. Retrieved 17 April 2013.
65
NEPAD -The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), an African Union
strategic framework for pan-African socio-economic development, is both a vision and a policy
framework for Africa in the twenty-first century. NEPAD is a radically new intervention, spearheaded
by African leaders, to address critical challenges facing the continent: poverty, development and
Africa's marginalisation internationally.
103
regional economic communities. The Dialogue helped to open discussions between
the BRICS members and other developing States and regional organisations.
These discussions were preceded by business and academic forums able to
create conditions for co-operation and business, according to Brazilian diplomacy.
Concrete results stemmed from these discussions, such as the creation of the
BRICS Think Tanks Council and the BRICS Business Council. The forums, with
the academic one in particular, aimed at formulating recommendations and a long
term vision for the Summit of the Heads of States and Governments.
The BRICS Academic Forum hosted by the Durban University of Technology
(DUT), the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET), the Department
of International Relations and Co-operation (DIRCO), and Higher Education South
Africa (HESA), contemplated increasing interactions in research circles and
formulating recommendations to be presented to the leaders during the Summit of
26-27 March 2013. Most participants were grouped into think tanks linked to the
governments of the five countries and involved in formulating public policies.
A smaller number of civil society organisations and other research institutions
integrated the non-official delegations of these countries66
The debates were organised into plenary sessions followed by parallel
discussions on five themes: the role of the BRICS in the Global Economy, the
Reform of Institutions of Global Governance, Co-operation in Africa, Education,
Research and Skills Development for Building Industrialising Economies as well
as the Peace and Security theme. The recommendations also representing the
adopted themes include:
1. BRICS AND GLOBAL ECONOMY: The BRICS should facilitate better
co-operation in the trade field, particularly goods and services. They should
undertake discussions on the feasibility of setting up privileged commercial
agreements among themselves, as well as reinforcing financial and development
co-operation by establishing a BRICS development bank, and by creating
mechanisms to manage the volatility of the global money market.
2. REFORM OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS: The
objectives of the group are to reform global multilateral institutions by making
them more democratic, representative and accountable. As such, the BRICS should
endeavour to make their voices heard and to promote the representation of
emerging economies and developing countries in multilateral forums. The BRICS
should actively explore innovative and complementary partnerships for an
equitable and sustainable development. The creation of a parliamentarian forum
could intensify political interaction.
3. CO-OPERATION with AFRICA: The BRICS should acknowledge the
value of diversity and experience found in the separate and joint histories of their
own countries and those of African countries. This should include looking for deep
66
104
http://www.safpi.org/news/article/2013/brics-academic-forum-recommendations.
co-operation with the African Union and taking into account African priorities,
with regional integration in particular.
4. TRAINING, CARRYING OUT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPING
SKILLS TO ELABORATE INDUSTRIALISED ECONOMIES: The BRICS
should intensify their support for academic collaboration. This includes enhancing
the status of local languages and cultural practices. The BRICS should consider
creating an independent agency to rate schools and universities in their countries.
Moreover, the Forum proposes the establishment of a primary data bank on the five
countries, as well as a digital platform including detailed information on the
researchers and institutions working on BRICS-related issues.
Source: BRICS to mull development bank, forex reserve pool 03-20-13 China Daily.
Picture nr 3. 11BRICS Growth and GDP
5. PEACE AND SECURITY: The BRICS should continue to promote the
importance of the United Nations, and be more active in promoting peaceful
solutions in the case of conflicts. Shared safety preoccupations such as water, diet,
the environment, health and preparedness to disasters must continue to be a focal
point. The BRICS should also promote the peaceful use of space and use their
relative power in post-conflict situations, under the aegis of the United Nations.
105
However, participants did not mention once any issues concerning, for example,
the situation in Syria.
Concretely, the meeting of the Think Tanks, which was held on the 8th and 9th
of March 2013, decided to establish a BRICS Think Tanks Council with the
intention of enhancing co-operation in research, knowledge-sharing, capacitybuilding and policy advice. This Council, made up of institutions leading the
delegations, will be in charge of organising the next academic forums. All
additional co-operation functions and methods were due to be elaborated on during
a meeting held in October 2013.
Conclusion
The emerging countries that have gained coherence as a result of their
increasing economic role in the global economy, particularly in terms of marketdriven changes, assume likewise a historical identity of being on the periphery of
the Western world and are faced with problems of poverty, inequality and
vulnerability. These countries demand status, recognition and the means to impact
the international system by working through groups or alliances and/or through
multilateral institutions. BRICS’ grouping is a result of this logic, having become a
group of power rather than only an economic grouping, intending to influence and
reform international architecture.
Within the framework of its interaction with Africa, this power bloc is
beginning to yield results, the most recent being the election of Brazilian national,
Roberto Azevêdo, as the head of the World Trade Organisation (even though
Azevêdo was not the candidate of the bloc at the beginning of the negotiations).
Yet, unlike IBSA67, which represents a slightly more homogeneous group, and
which was already able to implement a greater number of concrete initiatives, the
BRICS somewhat agree on a few guidelines for South-South co-operation68 and for
contributing to the African regional integration process. Besides, it adds major
powers like China and Russia upon the configuration of the international system.
This could be moved forward by implementing the development bank project,
which is considered a means of advancing BRICS institutionalisation under a
functional logic, although the negotiation process is on-going and vague. For the
moment, efforts are focused on increasing interactions and knowledge on the
different countries making up the BRICS. The Academic Forum initiated its
closing session with a declaration from the head of the Russian delegation, Dr
67
South–South Cooperation is a term historically used by policymakers and academics to
describe the exchange of resources, technology, and knowledge between developing countries, also
known as countries of the global South.
68
106
Vyacheslay Nikonov, who summarised the status of the group: “BRICS is now a
reality, not a virtuality. We have become more and more real”69.
The political and economic co-ordination prospects are under construction and,
to date, advocate the flexibility and autonomy of each country, only advancing the
issues under a functional basis and on which there is agreement.
First of all, it is necessary to point out that the BRICS-members share the same
views concerning several key aspects of the functioning of the present political and
business systems and ways for their reformation: these countries unanimously
confirm their devotion to the United Nations and support the idea of the restoration
of the UN taking up a regulating role in the world; furthermore, Brazil, Russia,
India, China and South Africa propose to change the international financial system
through different mechanisms, including diversification of the world basket of
reserve currencies, revision of the basic principles of world trade and through
finding solutions to the problem of food safety; besides this, the BRICS-members
also continue to adhere to the policy of the minimum intervention in internal affairs
of other states, and also express their concerns about the problems of energy
security and the deterioration of the environment.
As of now, the BRICS-members have achieved the greatest success in the
sphere of the reformation of international financial and economic systems. It goes
to show that such cooperation is very effective. In 2010, the consolidated GDP of
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa accounted for almost a quarter of the
world’s GDP. More importantly, about 50 % of the world’s GDP increased
accounts for this group of countries, even in this difficult postcrisis period. It is
estimated that the cooperation of the BRICS-members will assist in overcoming the
global financial crisis and its consequences.
With regard to political and economic spheres, it is important to notice that
BRICS-members are active participants in the work of G-20, which promotes the
establishment of a more democratic system of supervision of the global economy
and the finance system. In particular, due to the joint efforts of these countries at
the G-20 summit in Pittsburgh (September 2009), in Toronto (June 2010) and in
Seoul (November 2010) it became possible to take the decision on the
redistribution of the 5% voices at the International Monetary Fund and 3% voices
at the World Bank in favour of the developing states. As a result, the share of the
emerging markets, along with the developing countries in the World Bank, has
increased from 43.97 % to 47.19 %, whereas their share in the IMF has grown from
39.5 % to 42.29 %. Moreover, China, Russia, Brazil and India turned out to be
among the top-ten shareholders of the IMF.
Another important fact about the BRICS-members is their valuable
contribution to the strengthening of world security. The countries in this group are
convinced that the formations of the multipolar, just and democratic world order
are a necessity. States-participants of BRICS also share a commitment to the
69
http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c154/378346.html.
107
principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes through political and diplomatic
methods, instead of use of military force. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South
Africa showed strong signs of cooperation during the sessions of the United
Nations, in particular, in the work of the Security Council, where all the BRICSmembers are present this year. Such cooperation can be illustrated by an eloquent
testimony: the countries took a common stand in the Security Council when the
events in Cote d’Ivoire, Sudan and Libya were submitted for consideration; the coauthorship of the resolutions of the General Assembly concerning the nondeployment of any kind of weapon in space, the use of force or threat of the use of
force in relation to space objects; and general approaches to many questions of the
agenda of the UN Human Rights Council and ECOSOC70.
As a whole, it is possible to claim that BRICS is a reflection of the network
multi-vector diplomacy when the countries interact and cooperate in order to reach
their specified aims. Today, the main stimulus for the BRICS- members to
cooperate is their mutual interest in achievement of their purposes that are defined
by themselves as being vital. Their common purpose is to gain more weight in the
world community in accordance with the emerging alignment of forces, and then to
get access to the political and economic dividends.
Crimea Crises, In Sanctions Aftermath
Russia and China will move towards closer economic cooperation with Asia as
a result of the West's sanctions and other anti-Russian actions, according to a
Reuters' analysis71.
Russia Today also reported on 21 March that Russia will look to other
members of the BRICS group to which Russia and China belong, such as India and
Brazil, for increased trade, energy, and military cooperation. Brazil's beef and
agricultural exports to Russia could be increased to make up for reduced
agricultural exports to Russia from Western Europe resulting from sanctions72.
„The worse Russia's relations are with the West, the closer Russia will want to
be to China. If China supports you, no one can say you're isolated,” said Vasily
Kashin, a China expert at the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST)
think thank. Reuters sees it likely that the huge natural gas deal between Russia and
China that has been under discussion for a number of years will be signed during
President Putin's May trip to Beijing73
70
The United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) constitutes one of the
principal organs of the United Nations. It is responsible for coordinating the economic, social and
related work of 14 UN specialised agencies, their functional commissions and five regional
commissions.
71
Reuters 22 March 2014 • 3:56PM.
72
Russia Today 21 March 2014.
73
Reuters 24 March 2014 • 8:15 PM.
108
State-owned Russian gas firm GAZPROM hopes to pump 38 billion cubic
meters (bcm) of natural gas per year to China beginning in 2018, via the first
pipeline between the world's largest producer of conventional gas to the largest
consumer. The EU and Turkey took 182 bcm of gas from Russia last year. This
year China overtook Germany as Russia's biggest buyer of crude oil, thanks to
ROSNIEFT, Russia's biggest oil company, securing deals to boost eastward oil
supplies via the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean pipeline and another crossing
Kazakhstan.
Reuters also points out that Igor Sechin, the head of ROSNIEFT, was in Tokyo
when he said that „If Europe and the United States isolate Russia, Moscow will
look East for new business, energy deals, military contracts and political
alliances74„. Japan, which has supported the West verbally over the Crimea, but has
refrained from sanctions, is dependent on Russian gas to replace energy lost from
the closing of the Japanese nuclear sector. Sechin also included India, Vietnam,
and South Korea on his Asia trip.
Russian relations with India are also good. In a speech earlier this week, Putin
took time to thank one other country for its understanding over Ukraine and
Crimea, saying India had shown „restraint and objectivity75„ On 19 March, he
called Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to discuss the crisis, suggesting
there is room for Russia's ties to flourish with traditionally non-aligned India.
Putin's moves to assert Russian control over Crimea were seen very favourably in
the Indian establishment, N. Ram, publisher of The Hindu76 newspaper, told
Reuters. „Russia has legitimate interests,” he added.
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111
NDU
Scientific
Quarterly
4(93)
2013
Zeszyty
Naukowe
AON nrno
2(59)
2005
ISSN2353-1789
0867–2245
ISSN
SŁAWOMIR IWANOWSKI
THE ‘FRENCH WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE
AND NATIONAL SECURITY’, APRIL 29, 2013
Lt. Col. Sławomir IWANOWSKI, Ph.D.
Abstract
On 29th April, 2013, was published a new ‘French White Paper on Defence and National
Security’1. This numbering 160 pages document assumes, among others, further modernization of the
country’s defence and security (with the sustainable adaptation of measures for appointed tasks),
development of the national defence industry within the framework set by France; the goal is to
return to sustainable public finances and it indicates the course that French armed forces should take
over the next twelve years, this is until the year 20252. Furthermore, it serves as the basis for
preparing the Act on Programming Spending on Defence (the name in original, French language LPM – ‘Loi de programmation militaire’ means the ’Law of Military Programming’) for years 201420193. In addition to determining financial frames, the currant ‘White Paper’ (as the previous ones)
serves one more, very important function, namely, it is a tool allowing familiarizing citizens with the
strategy for defence and national security as well as gaining their support4.
Key words: France, white paper, strategy
Currently, the publishing of the ‘White Paper’ is also a consequence of
updating the challenges, threads and priorities of France, adjusted to the dynamism
of the globalising world and a revision of the policy objectives on security and
defence in the regular (in connection to the Act on Planning Spending on Defence),
five-year intervals. On the other hand, it takes a long-time – fifteen-yearperspective of time - with the task of „defining priorities and operational
frameworks and measures that will permanently ensure the safety of France”5.
1
See the ‘French White Paper on Defence and National Security’, [in:] http://www.livreblancdefen
seetsecurite.gouv.fr/pdf/le_livre_blanc_de_la_defense_2013.pdf (accessed: 21 October, 2013).
2
http://www.ambafrance-pl.org/Biala-Ksiega-Obrony-i,5629 (accessed: 25October, 2013).
3
J-Y Le Drian, 2013, ‘France Will Maintain the Best Army of Europe’, the interview led by.
A. Barluet, V. Guillermard, the ‘Le Figaro’, 26 November.
4
J. Pawełek-Mendez, the ‘French White Paper on Defence and Security 2013: a State of Outskirts of
Europe as One of the Poles of the World Order’, the ‘National Security’, a Quarterly of the National
Security Bureau, Issue 27, III - 2013, page 72, [in:] http://www.bbn.gov.pl/download/1/15057/71101sJPawelek-Mendez.pdf (accessed: 22December, 2013).
5
J. Pawełek-Mendez, the ‘White Paper…’, op. cit. Page 73.
112
THE ‘FRENCH WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY’
Thus, together with the Act on Planning Spending on Defence, it appoints the
strategy for defence and national security of France for the coming years6. The
previous edition of the ‘White Paper on Defence and National Security’7 was
published in 2008. It referred mainly to challenges and threads of the then
contemporary security environment and most importantly, unlike previous such
type of documents (the ‘White Paper on Defence’ of 1994 and the first „White
Paper” of 1972), it was embracing the national security in a comprehensive
manner (going for the first time outside military defence as the topic), and therefore
one in which it is shaped by a number of entities (and not only by the armed
forces). However, the previous ‘White Papers’ either adjusted the strategy for the
security of France to the security environment at the end of the last century (the
document from 1994 created an adoption of French strategy for changes, that had
occurred in the nineteen nineties, after the collapse of the Soviet Union as well as
the Warsaw Pact and included entirely issues on defence without the national
security8), or they included the strategy for the security of that State, after it had
left, in 1966, the integrated military structure of the North Atlantic Alliance in
a situation of dividing the world into opposing military and political blocks,
underlining the meaning of the nuclear deterrence (the document of 1972)9.
According to the ‘White Paper’ of 2008, the main factor influencing the
security of France was globalization and the rapidly progressing exchange of
information, and the possibility for people’s fast allocation as well as economical
and political conditions10. The event which meant that the new document had
begun to be thought of (besides the presidential election) was the financial crisis,
which highlighted the kind of economic dimension of the national security,
highlighting the fact that keeping the balance of public finances has a direct impact
on the State’s independence, because it can cause a limitation of freedom for the
benefit of creditors11. In 2012, Mr. François Hollande, when starting his
6
In the long term perspective, a fifteen year period is taken into consideration, but announced
periodically, every five year revision has, as a task, to fit the strategy to the changing international
situation, see B. Marcinkowska, the ‘White Paper on Defense and National Security of 2013, an
Announcement of Changes in the Strategy for Security of France?’, the ‘Bulletin of the Analytical
Centre
for
International
Initiatives’,
Issue
No
2/2013,
pages
15-25,
[in:]
http://centruminicjatyw.org/sites/default/files/BIULETYN_2013_2.pdf (accessed: 27October, 2013).
7
The ‘White Paper on Defence and National Security’, [in:] http://www.livreblanc
defenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/information/les_dossiers_actualites_19/livre_blanc_sur_defense_875/index.
html (accessed: 20August, 2011).
8
J. Gryz, the‘French „White Paper” – Defence and National Security’, [in:] ‘The International
Security Yearbook – 2009/2010’, the College of International Relations and Social Communication in
Chełm, Poland, page 1, [in:] http://www.rocznikbezpieczenstwa.dsw.edu.pl/fileadmin/user_
upload/wydawnictwo/RBM/RBM_artykuly/2010_7.pdf (accessed: 28 October, 2013).
9
W. Kozicki, the ‘Reforms of Armed Forces of France’ [in:] ‘The National Security’,
a ‘Quarterly of the National Security Bureau’, Issue No 19, III - 2011, page 242, [in:]
http://www.bbn.gov.pl/download/1/8595/BBN19spistrescipol.pdf (accessed: 20 October, 2013).
10
Therein.
11
J. Pawełek-Mendez, the ‘White Paper…’, op. cit. page 73.
113
SŁAWOMIR IWANOWSKI
presidential term, announced that the new international situation requires a
redefinition of the policy for the security and defence of France, so that is why
actions were taken in order to publish the new ‘White Paper’. The edition of 2013
indicates that in the world, in which there are still existing old threats, but also all
sorts of new challenges and threats, the strategic autonomy in the area of defence
and security is necessary for national independence; it ensures the protection of
French citizens, also enabling (with fulfilling international obligations) a collective
security of Europe and the Allies of France. According to French politicians
„Europe can fulfil its obligations only on the condition that it will achieve a
strategic autonomy. The point is not in agreeing on weakening the Atlantic
Alliance by a so-called drift of continents, but to make the EU a fully law-obedient
partner for the United States in constructing the security on our continent”12. The
conception assumes, among other things, to possess - at the national or European
level - a full range of equipment suited to satisfying all the needs of the entire
range, stemming out of the most likely scenarios of response to any types of
threads. Therefore, it excludes any deficiencies in this regard, which literally would
mean dependence, for instance on the USA13. So possessing (at the national and
European level) a wide range of equipment (among others things: autonomous
measures of assessing the situation, both satellite and by intelligence), which would
satisfy all needs coming out of the most likely scenarios of responding to threads,
France and other countries will become lawful owners, and not only users of the
measures serving for constructing of European security. The strategic autonomy
itself is based on maintaining the potential of the modern defensive industry, which
would be capable of integrating within the high-tech string at a time when none of
the European states is able on its own to provide for itself a full range of defence
capabilities. Cooperation in the implementation of the „Projects of Tomorrow”
among European states equipped with tools such as the European Defence Agency
and the Joint Organization for Armaments Cooperation (OCCAR), allows
optimizing costs through sustainable technological partnerships, giving also
a guarantee for being their rightful owners. That is why what is so important is, in
this context, is the consolidation of the industrial base and technology, in order to
preserve the potential of Europe’s defence industry and the possessing of advanced
technological knowledge as well as a large network of entities of different sizes14.
The main objective of the ‘White Paper’ of 2013 is the consistency of effort for
the security and defence with the priority of the reconstruction of the sustainability
of public finances15. In the preface, the French President stressed that the
challenges and risk phrases, which were identified in the last ‘White Paper’, are
currently not sufficient, as a result of significant events that have occurred since
12
P. Buhler, 2013, ‘We Count on Ourselves (Counting on Each Other)’, the interview led by
J. Dudek, the ‘Wyborcza Gazette’, 7 November, page 11.
13
Therein.
14
Therein.
15
J. Pawełek-Mendez, the ’White Paper…’, op. cit. page 73.
114
2008, both in Europe and in the world16. The most important ones can include, for
example, the financial crisis (2007) and the progressive economic and financial
integration of the European Union, a review of strategic priorities of the United
States, and the so-called the „Asian Option of the USA”, being a direct
consequence of the need for reductions in spending on defence, changing the
balance of power in the world (in this context, attention on growing power of
China is drawn), the conflict in Georgia (2008), the Arab Spring of Nations (2010)
and the uncertainty as to which way the development of the political situation in
the region is going to go. The earlier ‘White Paper’ did not recognize the situation
in the world as being more dangerous, but as less predictable or stable. The main
dangers to the security of France, but also to the whole European Union arose,
among others, from regions and countries covered by the conflict (Middle East,
Asia), and the greatest threats were: terrorism, ballistic missiles with nuclear
warheads, cyber attacks and threats to health (pandemic) and environmental
ecology, exacerbated by the degradation of the biosphere17. In both publications,
fears can be found that France does not exclude a possibility that its territory may
be attacked, so it takes into account the participation in a war of a wider range in
cooperation with European countries and (or) other Allies18. Nevertheless, current
threats showed that the formation of the ring of stable and friendly countries
around the borders of the European Union (which was the main objective of the
European Neighbourhood Policy) is difficult to achieve. Therefore, it has become
a necessity to define new threats in a globalizing world and setting targets for
security and defence policy as well as to identify military capabilities. Thus, the
need has been revealed for a redefinition (adapting to the new situation) of the
security strategy, which would be an answer to these significant changes that have
occurred within the five years since the publication of the previous “White Paper’.
The ‘White Paper’ of 29th April, 2013, like its predecessor from 2008, was
prepared by a team of experts, which was appointed by the President of France by
decree. Nevertheless, in contrast to the earlier one, the new document is the result
of discussions conducted by a commission composed of both parliamentarians and
members of government, and for the first time, with European partners, that is
independent foreign experts from the UK and Germany19. This was to ensure
a more European, common look at the issue of safety20.
16
The‘French White Paper on Defence and National Security 2013, Preface by the President of
the Republic’, page 7, [in:] http://www.gouvernement.fr/gouvernement/livre-blanc-2013-de-ladefense-et-de-la-securite-nationale (accessed: 29 October, 2013).
17
W. Kozicki, the ‘Reform…’, op. cit., page 242.
18
W. Kozicki, the ‘Reform of Armed Forces of France, [in:] The ‘National Security’ No.19, III 2011, page 242 [in:] http://www.bbn.gov.pl/download/1/8595/BBN19spistrescipol.pdf ; ‘The‘French
White Paper on Defence and the National Security’, http://www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.
gouv.fr/pdf/le_livre_blanc_de_la_defense_2013.pdf (accessed: 21 October, 2013).
19
The Commission started its work in the summer of 2012, and finished it after almost six
months.
20
The‘French White Paper on Defence and National Security - 2013, [in:] http://www.
sgdsn.gouv.fr/site_article130.html , (accessed: 21 October, 2013).
115
SŁAWOMIR IWANOWSKI
The current edition of the ‘White Paper’ contains an introduction, preceded by
a foreword by the President, seven chapters, summarizing conclusions and
annexes21. The foreword highlights three priorities for the security strategy of
France, being somewhat a keynote of the ‘White Paper’: protection, deterrence and
intervention22. Together with the introduction, it contains explanations of motives
behind the creation of the new strategy in terms of marking changes in the closer
and more distant surroundings of France23.
In the first chapter „France in the New Strategic Landscape”, the role and
position of France in the international arena is highlighted. At the beginning, there
is a provision that in the current geo-political situation, France is not threatened by
a conventional, direct attack on its territory, and thanks to, among others, its unique
location (the centre of the European Union) and the current situation (peace and
stability) on the European continent, rather far from a threat of the outbreak crises
and conflicts known in the recent past. The French Republic is defined as
a European power of global reach. Attention is drawn to the fact that, although the
French population is less than 1% of the remaining population of the world, the
French economy is the fifth largest among the largest economies in the world24. In
addition, it is stressed that despite the increase in the number of developing
countries, France remains the fifth largest global exporter of goods25. Emphasis is
placed on the position and the importance of France as a member of international
organizations (the UN, NATO, EU), increasing both its safety and imposing
responsibility for the security of others (it should continue to play an active role in
preventing or alleviating crisis, as in the past during interventions in Lebanon,
Libya, Mali and Côte d'Ivoire/Ivory Coast)26.
In the second chapter, entitled the „Foundations of the Strategy for Defence
and National Security”, fundamentals of the French strategy are presented. These
are the State’s sovereignty and legitimacy of its actions (a requirement for the legal
basis of conduct in the international arena, as well as national). It was stressed that
the State’s sovereignty is based on independence (autonomy) in decision making
and action27. It is also noted that, in the international environment, the decisions
and actions of the State must comply with the law28. Maintaining its self-reliance
and independence, and by ensuring the safe impact on a wider, international scale
21
The‘French White Paper on Defence...’, op. cit. pages 3-5.
The‘French White Paper on Defence..’., op. cit. page 7.
23
Other remaining strategic functions, i.e. knowledge and foreseeing (anticipatory), and
prevention have also got their reflection in the ‘White Paper’ of 2013, and will be presented in the
later section.
24
Taking into account the nominal Gross Domestic Product, (GDP).
25
The‘French White Paper on Defence ...’, op. cit. page 14.
26
B. Marcinkowska, the ‘White Paper on Defence and National Security of 2013 an
Announcement…’, op. cit., page 18.
27
The ‘White Paper on Defence..’., op. cit. page 19.
28
J. Pawełek-Mendez, The ‘White Paper...’, op. cit., page 76.
22
116
is for France, in this context, extremely important29. Thus, France is actively
involved in ensuring international security, by taking action legitimized
internationally and at the national level. Though the priority should be understood
as the involvement of France in missions conducted by the North Atlantic Alliance
and by the European Union, which contributes to improving the level of safety in
the world (Mali, Afghanistan, Ivory Coast and Libya)30. Similarly, in the preface
we can read that France has decided to maintain its defence capabilities at a level
enabling independent initiatives to a danger31. Thus, it retains its sovereignty by
providing the means to enable action and impact on the development of the
international situation.
In that chapter, there were also present references to the impact that the
economic and financial situations have on the State’s sovereignty. In this context, it
is also referred to a guarantee for the security of information systems. There is also
a statement that the state of sovereignty is not given for ever, so France has been
working for ages on its construction and maintenance, also through participation in
many regional and international organizations. In contrast, the nuclear deterrence is
the ultimate guarantor of the State’s sovereignty32. So, a necessity to posses the full
independence is stressed, which must ensure certain abilities to assess a situation
(among others: by means of the aforementioned autonomous measures of assessing
the situation, especially intelligence), taking decision and commencing any
action. France, in accordance with the concept of strategic autonomy, is ready to
share, with their partners from the European Union, these capabilities, because
better coordination in their acquisition at the European level, will allow to avoid
the duplicating of efforts and preventing the formation of capability gaps. Some
records included in this chapter indicate also that France is looking for a balance
between maintaining its full sovereignty and deepening cooperation with its closest
partners and developing the “European Culture of Defence”33. That is why the
European Union, which is crucial in terms of political and economic future of the
country, is the cornerstone of the security of France (though, the UN and NATO
are the main guarantors of its security and defence)34.
The third chapter of the ‘White Paper’ of 2013 contains an analysis of the
strategic environment, and the main threat to the security of the State (Table 1)35.
29
B. Marcinkowska, the ‘White Paper on Defence and National Security of 2013 an
Announcement…’, op. cit., page 20.
30
B. Marcinkowska, the ‘White Paper of 2013 – Redefinition of Security Strategy of France’,
[in:] http://blogcim.wordpress.com/2013/06/04/bialaksiegafrancia2013/ (accessed: 28 December, 2013).
31
J. Pawełek-Mendez, the ‘White Paper …’, op. cit., page 74.
32
33
34
The‘French White Paper on Defence...’, op. cit. page 16.
35
See also. M. Jean-Yves Le Drian, the Minister of Defece, the ‘Speech to Commanders of the
Military School’, Monday, 29 April 2013, page 7, [in:] http://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/
206259/2287506/file/DISCOURS%20DU%20MINISTRE%20AUX%20COMMANDEURS%20LE
%20LUNDI%2029%20AVRIL%202013%20A%20L-ECOLE%20MILITAIRE.pdf
(access:
20
November 2013).
117
SŁAWOMIR IWANOWSKI
As in the previous ‘White Paper’, globalization is mentioned here as the main
factor causing changes in the strategic environment of France. The new document
confirms its importance, while pointing to the violent and unexpected changes in
the situation and enhancing a sense of uncertainty of the changes that have
occurred since then36.
Table 1
Risks, dangers and challenges to the security of France
▪
▪
Threads
resulting from
globalization37
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
Threads
related to the
use of force
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
Weaknesses
emerging
threads
36
▪
▪
▪
▪
economic and financial crisis in the U.S. and Europe;
so-called the ”Arab Awakening”, increase instability in the Middle East (a
civil war in Syria, the lack of progress in resolving the Arab-Israeli
conflict);
reorientation of the strategic priorities of the United States („U.S. Asian
Option”);
crises in the European Union (crisis in the euro zone, negligible economic
growth, the aging of the population);
vague rules, unsuitable for the contemporary threats, constituting the basis
of the international order.
the threat of an outbreak of a conventional conflict on areas politically
unstable (source: the radicalization of national feeling that, as a result of
frustration or a sense of historical injustice, can lead to the escalation of
patriotism into nationalism, especially in politically unstable countries, i.e.
areas of the Korean Peninsula, the South and East China Seas, Kashmir and
Afghanistan);
increase the economic power of Asian countries (with the absence of
stability in the region);
increase in military spending in some regions of the world (Asia, Russia);
increase in the military power of the Russian Federation (return to a policy
of force);
threat to the energy security of Europe (Russia's ambitions towards
establishing a monopoly in the supply of energy resources);
the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Middle East
countries, North Korea and Iran);
nuclear programs of some countries;
strengthening the nuclear-missile capacity of certain countries;
threat of the usage of chemical and biological weapons in the future;
development of offensive cyber capabilities by some countries.
„Weak States” (unstable, failed, unable to maintaining their own security) –
the Sahel countries 38, Yemen, Pakistan and Afghanistan;
organized crime;
smuggling;
terrorism;
civil wars (the Sahel countries).
J. Pawełek-Mendez, the ‘White Paper…’, op. cit., page 76.
Being a major factor of changes in the strategic environment of France.
38
The geographic region in Africa covering an area along southern edges of the Sahara and
northern margins of the Sudan (that is, from Senegal to Somalia, through Mauritania, Mali, Niger,
Chad, the Sudan and Eritrea).
37
118
▪
▪
Threads of the
strength of the
impact
intensified by
globalization
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
economic (the result of a deepening in international economic dependence,
and fighting for the economic precedence/leadership);
cell phone (which can be used, for example, to initiate an explosive or to
purchase armaments);
arms trade;
media coverage of terrorist activities - the mass media;
Internet - recruitment to terrorist organizations;
geographical spread of terrorism, particularly to the territories of weak
states (countries of the Sahel and the Sahara, North of Nigeria, Somalia,
Syria, Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, the area of Afghanistan and Pakistan);
cyber terrorism;
threat of aggression in space;
natural disasters, pandemic/health and technology;
environmental hazards.
Source: Own calculations on the basis of the ”French White Paper on Defence and National Security”, April 29,
2013.
The hazard analysis contained in the third chapter of the ‘White Paper’, is
reflected in the presentation of the five main strategic priorities of France (referring
to these threats), shown in the next chapter (the fourth one)39. Priorities are ranked
hierarchically in terms of the importance of the essential security interests of the
State. Their presentation, with the reference to the reflecting, potential risks, is
presented in Table 2.
Table 2
Strategic priorities of France.
No.
1.
Priorities
Protecting the territory ▪
of the State and
citizens of France and ▪
guaranteeing the
▪
continuity of basic
functions of the State
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
2.
Common (with
partners and allies):
ensuring the security
of Europe and the
North-Atlantic space
39
▪
Threads
possibility of the attack on French territory as a result of the
rapid deterioration of the international situation;
main threat to security - terrorism (potential use of nuclear
weapons, biological, chemical or radioactive materials);
cyber attacks that could cripple the functioning of the State
(and thus constitute an act of war);
organized crime;
theft of intellectual property, scientific and technical one;
natural disasters, sanitary, technological, industrial or
accidental cases;
related to the protection of the French overseas territories
(3 million citizens, rich deposits of natural resources, the
spaceport in French Guiana), and their interests on the Pacific
(New Caledonia, French Polynesia), on the Indian Ocean (the
islands of La Reunion and Mayetta);
attacks on French citizens residing abroad (sudden evacuation
of people from areas at risk).
risks that relate to France, mostly, they also apply to its allies
in the EU and NATO. They are such as previously mentioned
119
SŁAWOMIR IWANOWSKI
No.
3.
Priorities
Common (with
partners and allies):
stabilization of
Europe’s closer
surroundings40
▪
▪
▪
4.
5.
▪
Participation in
stabilizing the situation
in the Middle East and ▪
▪
the Persian Gulf
Contributing to
ensuring peace in the
world
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
Threads
the EU's eastern neighbourhood: political instability, Europe's
dependence on energy from Russia, the Caucasus and Central
Asia;
Mediterranean area: political instability in countries belonging
to the Region of the Mediterranean Sea (Turkey), the risk to
strategic security of supplies of energy sources, terrorism,
smuggling, security for French citizens holding dual
citizenship, French investments in the region;
areas of priority concern for the safety of France (countries of
the Sahel, Mauritania, Horn of Africa and Sub-Saharan
Africa) - the loss of this space can be a strategic threat of the
first order for Europe (example - Mali): the instability of
regions, the lack of the capacity of the authorities to control
their own territory may result in a collapsed state, the
development of criminal and terrorist groups, illegal arms
flows and drugs, conflicts, terrorism, security of French
citizens holding dual citizenship.
conflict in the region with global repercussions ( Iran to
pursue nuclear weapons);
instability in the region;
threat to energy security (the transit of oil from the Persian
Gulf).
area of the Indian Ocean and Asia: the instability of countries
and regions (tensions), high probability of a conflict arising,
terrorism;
piracy;
proliferation of nuclear weapons;
energy security;
natural disasters.
Source: Own calculations on the basis of the ”French White Paper on Defence and National Security”, April 29,
2013.
The fifth chapter, concerning the involvement of France in the North Atlantic
Alliance and the European Union (benefits and liabilities), tells of the fact that the
security policy of France is embedded into the framework of these organizations. It
is the result of three dimensions: the sovereignty of the decision, full involvement
in NATO and an ambitious approach to the European Union41. After France’s
returning in 2009 to NATO's integrated command structure, the organizationaccording to the French people - should ensure them collective defence, secondlybe an instrument of the transatlantic strategic partnership and thirdly- provide
a framework for military action in the event of a common response to security
threats. France wants to strengthen the Alliance; the priority for that in the coming
40
The priority for France in this range, according to the ‘White Paper’ is the security of all the
neighbouring countries, see the‘French White Paper on Defenceand National Security’, [in:]
http://www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/pdf/le_livre_blanc_de_la_defense_2013.pdf , page 53,
(accessed: 21 October, 2013).
41
J. Pawełek-Mendez, the ‘White Paper...’, op. cit., page 86.
120
years will be to adapt attempts to reform NATO's command structure to potential
operations, and actions to improve the management of common funds targeted for
projects that will bring benefit to all allies (in the industrial field, a task of the
„Smart Defence” has to be the promotion of programs proposed by the European
Union’s military industry)42. On the other hand, it is emphasized that the European
Union is not a competition for the North Atlantic Alliance.
Subsequent chapters of the ‘White Paper’ - the sixth one: (‘Implementing the
Strategy - the Main Vectors of its Implementation’), and the seventh one: (‘The
Resources Required to Implement the Strategy’- the means of achieving the
strategy for security and defence of France) focus on the practical aspect of the
implementation of the security and defence strategies.
The chapter on the implementation of the security and defence strategies of
France, like the earlier document (of 2008), in addition to strategic risk analysis
presents also the doctrine of French defence policy, basing it on the five main
strategic functions: knowledge and prediction (anticipatory), nuclear deterrence,
protection, prevention and intervention. Some of them due to changes in the
security environment that have occurred since publication of the previous ‘White
Paper’ are detailed, but nevertheless, the main assumptions of this policy remained
unchanged.
In the ”White Paper on Defence and National Security” of 2008, it is clearly
shown that a departure from understanding the security only through the lens of the
military aspect. There is a blurring of the boundary between concepts of
‘defence’ and ‘security’ which was, among other things, a change in the nature of
the international security environment, after the terrorist attacks on the U.S. on
September 11, 2001. The publication was kind of a response to the challenges of
globalization, especially in the situation of increasing the importance of non-state
actors in the international arena43. This new approach to the evaluation of the
security policy resulting from changes in the security environment, created
a redefinition of the main strategic functions44. The national security task was to
adopt a holistic approach in the identification of threats and answering them, using
five strategic functions: knowledge and foreseeing (anticipation), prevention,
nuclear deterrence, safety and intervention45.
According to the ‘White Paper’ of 2008, the objective of the first function knowledge and prediction - was to adapt the ability of the security and defence
system to the contemporary challenges. The unpredictability of more and more
42
Therein, page 87.
The ‘White Paper, 2008: the Context, the Minister of Defence’, [in:] http://www.defense.
gouv.fr/portail-defense/enjeux2/politique-de-defense/livre-blanc-2008/contexte, (accessed: 02 October,
2013).
44
D. Jankowski, the ‘Note on the „White Paper on Defence and National Security of the Republic of
France”’, the National Security Bureau, Department of Strategic Analyses, Warsaw, 27 January 2011, [in:]
http://www.bbn.gov.pl/pl/wydarzenia/2745,dok.html , (accessed: 27October, 2013).
45
43
121
SŁAWOMIR IWANOWSKI
emerging crisis meant that the concept of „national sovereignty ”, in the case of
asymmetric threats, such as terrorism, has taken on a completely different
meaning46. Therefore, according to the experts appointed to work on the ‘White
Paper’, ”the shape of French defence and national security must be a function of
the estimated needs in this area, and not the result of habits or preconceptions
estimated in advance”47. This pillar, by the fact that, in reality, it limited the role of
the national policy of nuclear deterrence (the sole purpose of nuclear deterrence is
to prevent aggression originating from a state against the vital interests of the
French Republic) was a major innovation of the ‘White Paper’. Its efficiency
affects five factors: the special services, the chain of command at all levels,
diplomacy, the analysis of changes in the international environment (perspective
forecasting), and information management.
Similarly, in the current ‘White Paper’ the function „knowledge and
predicting (anticipatory)”, relating primarily to the actions of intelligence services
and strategic forecasting, stems from a need for an ability to self-assess a situation
as a condition of taking independent decisions, both political and operational or
economic48.
The second strategic function (according to the ‘White Paper’ of 2008), prevention - results from the belief that one of the best ways to ensure security of
the state, in the face of the risk of conflict or crisis, is to prevent their occurrence
by early response to their symptoms. So it embraces the other tools, not included in
the first pillar, necessary to prevent crises. The national security based on the
preventive strategy, besides diplomatic measures, included also the economic,
financial, military, and legal ones49.
In the present ‘White Paper’, it is emphasized that this function includes
activities both on the territory of the State as well as beyond it. Its practical
implementation is to take control of sensitive technologies, among other things,
through the development of national (and international) standards in the field of
natural (and technological) hazards, counteracting the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, in the fight against smuggling and demilitarization and the
strengthening of peace50. In practice, the function of prevention should include
measures to prevent the deepening of internal conflicts (strategy of strengthening
peace) in unstable regions of the world, aiming to restore order in countries in
crisis situations. Therefore, the primary task in this area is focusing efforts on the
restraint of the fully-fledged authority of a certain state (e.g. conducting elections)
and supporting it in controlling its own territory. Preventive actions, according to
the authors of the ‘White Paper’, must be conducted in a spirit of a global approach
and coordinated within the framework of international organizations (the UN,
46
D. Jankowski, the ‘Note on the “White Paper…”’,op. cit. page 2.
J. Gryz, the ‘French “White Paper” - Defence…’, op. cit., page 1.
48
49
J. Gryz, the ‘French „White Paper” - Defence…’, op. cit., page 96.
50
47
122
EU). This should include development aid, as well as military, police, judicial and
administrative ones. To have the actual ability in the implementation of this
function, it is assumed that forces dedicated to France are distributed in one
(or two) sea areas, at the base in the United Arab Emirates and at several bases in
Africa, where they are equipped with a flexible rapid response capability. They will
be cooperating with African forces, so that they can, in a higher degree, take
responsibility for their own safety51.
According to the ‘White Paper’ of 2008, the third strategic function - nuclear
deterrence – although it created an essential part of the strategy of France (having
a purely defensive character and being one ensuring the strategic autonomy of the
State) lost its importance in comparison with the previous ‘White Paper’. This
stemmed from the conviction that the new challenges and threats in the field of
security require a more flexible approach to security policy, where diplomacy
should play a major role52. On the other hand, although the French atomic weapons
were to in future remain under the exclusive control of the State (as well as an
industrial and technological base), it was regarded to be possible for the inclusion
of the French nuclear arsenal in the deterrence system of NATO and the EU53.
Also, the present ‘White Paper’ defines the nuclear deterrence as a strictly
defensive means (the final guarantee of the safety, security and independence of
the French nation), which could be used only for the purpose of necessary selfdefence and then in a situation of critical danger. The document stresses that the
French nuclear deterrence, held at the level of „strict sufficiency” is a contribution
to the security of NATO54.
The fourth strategic function (according to the ‘White Paper’ of 2008) protection – is related to the ability of revitalization (restoration of forces and
means) structures of the State (the public authority and society) and restoring their
normal functioning (despite the state of emergency), after the intended aggression
(an attack) on the territory of France or in the event of crisis on a large scale. This
feature was another key change in the ‘White Paper’ as that based on a flexible
approach to the issue of security and defence, it assumed the combined use and
coordination of civilian and military resources in strengthening the ability to
recreate, which was in fact one of the fundamental principles of the new strategy55.
The „ protective ” function, according to the ‘White Paper’ of 2013, is to give
a guarantee for the integrity of the territory and the defence (and security) of
French citizens (including those living in other countries) against all types of
threats, and similarly, as it was outlined in the document from 2003, it is realized
51
Therein, page 94.
D. Jankowski, the ‘Note on the “White Paper”…’, op. cit., page 2.
53
J. Gryz, the ‘French „White Paper” - Defence…’, op. cit., page 98.
54
55
D. Jankowski, the ‘Note on the „White Paper”…’,op. cit., page 2; J. Gryz, the ‘French “White
Paper” - Defence…’, op. cit., page 98.
52
123
SŁAWOMIR IWANOWSKI
both by civilian resources, and military, including the territorial administration56.
The new document states that in relation to the Treaty Clause of Solidarity, its
implementation can also include the territories of the European Union57. The
implementation of this function enforces the continuous monitoring of the security
situation both in the closer environment (proximity of Europe), as well as the
further one (security of citizens residing outside of France). Therefore, it has
a direct relationship both with the function ”to know and predict (anticipate)” and
„intervene”, its practical dimension is to prepare for a possible intervention in
emergency situations (preparation of action plans), as well as providing the means
to carry out the operation to protect the territory or citizens58.
Lastly, the fifth function - intervention - described by the ‘White Paper’ of
2008 resulted from the ability of France to prevent conflicts and it assumed
a possibility to conduct operations outside the Country. This document defined
a set of rules of intervention of the French forces abroad, noting that the decisive
factor to intervene (regardless of whether it is a national or collective assessment),
will be the risk assessment of peace and national security (or international), and the
assurance that it will be applied in accordance with the letter of international law59.
The ‘White Paper’ of 2013 confirms the possibility of the intervention of the
French armed forces (in operations conducted alone or in coalition - as the leading
State or supporting) outside the Country’s borders, in order to meet international
obligations and to ensure the protection and safety of its citizens, as well as
protecting the strategic interests of France (protecting the interests of allies is also
mentioned)60. The foundation of this kind of commitment is the principle of
strategic autonomy, which gives the right to take a sovereign decision to initiate
interventions, and by requiring that France has its own military capabilities, allows
also its implementation.
Seventh, the last chapter of the ‘White Paper’ of 2013, presents the ways and
means (from the practical and financial dimension) of implementing the strategy
for security and defence of France. As mentioned at the beginning, on the basis of
assumptions set out in the ‘White Paper’, a perennial Act on Military Programs is
being developed (the current one covers the years 2014-2019)61. And although the
previous ‘White Paper’ assumed to stabilize the defence spending, as a result of the
economic crisis, in order to restore the sustainability of public finances, the future
spending in this area has been reduced. Therefore, it has been determined, that in
56
The‘French White Paper on Defence...,’ op. cit. Page 76.
58
Therein.
59
D. Jankowski, the ‘Note on the „White Paper”…’, op. cit., page 2; J. Gryz, the ‘French „White
Paper” - Defence…’, op. cit., page 99.
60
The‘French White Paper on Defence...’, op. cit., page 82.
61
57
124
the years 2014-2025, it will amount to 364 billion euros, in the period covered by
the Act on Military Programs (2014-2019) - 179 billion62.
In connection with such financial constraints, in the ‘White Paper’ inline with
the four principles, there was presented a new approach to the implementation of
the military involvement strategy. The first principle concerns the previously
described strategic autonomy. The second principle refers to the consistency of the
model of the armed forces with potential scenarios to commit the forces. The third
principle relates to the behaviour of various types of forces capable of carrying out
strategic functions at a level enabling them to take part in the operations of various
types. Finally, the fourth principle implies the need to look for opportunities to
share placed at the disposal capacities (and the solidarity of their use) and the
means of defence, also with European partners (pooling and sharing)63.
The ‘White Paper’ also specifies the future format of the armed forces and the
so-called the „Operating Contract”, i.e. a set of their tasks to be performed,
resulting from the strategic functions of the defence policy and the security of
France64. And so, under the protective function, it could be possible for the
involvement of up to 10 thousand soldiers of the land forces and the appropriate
means of sea and air forces, supplemented by cyber defence capabilities. The
preventive function would be performed by the forces deployed in military bases
and at sea, in the United Arab Emirates and Africa. The feature” know and
predict (anticipate)” will be filled by ensuring by the 5 thousand soldiers on
standby, and appropriate measures (including unmanned aircrafts) capable within
7 days of deploying up to 3 thousand km from the French territory, or a base
located outside its borders (until the time that an immediate action is to be carried
out by the Air Force)65.
If there is a need to participate in the long-term operations (France has the
opportunity to engage in a maximum of three such ongoing operations at the same
time); it will be possible to use for this forces creating an equivalent of a common
army brigade (6 - 7 thousand soldiers), supplemented by special forces troops,
naval forces and to select about 12 combat aircraft66. If there would occur a need to
separate the military potential to participate in a larger operation with a high
intensity using special forces, then it was predicted the selection of about
15 thousand soldiers (two common military brigades of land forces), up to
45 combat aircrafts (in the naval aviation) and an impingement of marine clusters
(consisting of an aircraft carrier or universal amphibious onshore landing ships,
62
The ‘Dossier of a Topic, the Minister of Defence, the White Paper on Defence and National
Security 2013’ [in:] http://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/206200/2286715/file/Livre%
20blanc%20-Dossier%20th%C3%A9matique.pdf , page 41 (accessed: 25October, 2013).
63
64
Therein.
65
The ‘Dossier of a Topic, the Minister of Defence...’, op. cit., page 35.
66
The‘French White Paper on Defence...’, op. cit., page 92.
125
SŁAWOMIR IWANOWSKI
together with associated vessels, such as frigates, a pulsed nuclear submarine and
maritime patrol aircrafts67.
The new model of the army presented in the time horizon up until 2025 in the
‘White Paper’ gives a priority to the development of reconnaissance and
intelligence capabilities (including analysis of information and its dissemination)68.
Equally with a priority, a development of cyber capabilities (defensive and
offensive) will be treated. A quantitative strengthening and retrofitting in the most
modern measures for Special Forces commanding is also announced.
The number of ground forces is to be formed at a level of 66 thousand soldiers
(7 common military brigades). They may be equipped with 200 heavy tanks,
250 medium tanks, 2.7 thousand multi-role armoured vehicles, 140 reconnaissance
and assault helicopters, 115 multi-role helicopters and about 30 tactical unmanned
aerial vehicles69.
Naval forces as one of the two (apart from the Air Force) components
equipped with a means dedicated to nuclear deterrence (4 submarines equipped
with ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads) will also have: an aircraft carrier, six
hunting submarines (nuclear powered), 3 universal onshore landing ships,
21 frigates, 15 patrol ships, 6 light frigates and marine patrol aviation, as well as
measures to combat mines70.
The potential of the Air Force, the third kind of the armed forces of France, is
to be in the future: 225 combat aircrafts (including the marine aviation), about 50
transporting planes, 7 planes for early detection and warning, 12 multi-role
aircrafts for air-to-air refuelling, 12 reconnaissance, unmanned aircraft for the
operational level, as well as light reconnaissance aircrafts and 8 air-defence
systems and anti medium-range missiles systems71.
Regarding the gendarmerie, in the future, it has to have abilities maintained at
the current level. The ‘White Paper’ also mentions the military health service,
which will have to undergo a reform in order to use the possibility of
complementing the public service72.
The ‘White Paper’ foresees a future reduction, in the years 2014-2019, in the
number of military and civilian personnel, of 24 thousand (there is still neededadded to that- 10 thousand of the planned reduction, by 54 thousand in the years
2008-2015)73.
67
The ‘Dossier of a Topic, the Minister of Defence...’, op. cit., pages 35-36.
69
‘The French Army in the Perspective of 2020’, [in:] http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/
infographie/2013/04/29/l-armee-francaise-a-l-horizon-2020_3168245_823448.html (accessed: 27 October,
2013).
70
J. Pawełek-Mendez, the ‘Wite Paper...’, op. cit., page 97.
71
The ‘Dossier of a Topic, the Minister of Defence...’, op. cit., page 38.
72
Therein.
73
L.Watanabe, the ‘France’s New Strategy: The 2013 White Paper, CSS Analysis in Security
Policy’, No. 139, September 2013, page 3, [in:] http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/CSSAnalysis-139-EN2.pdf (accessed: 29October, 2013).
68
126
The ‘French White Paper on Defence and Security’ is a document which, on
one hand presents the main strategic directions and assumptions of the State’s
defence policy (including the protective and preventive potential, as well as the
condition of the armed forces), on the other hand- through specific provisions on
the armaments or the number of military personnel- it very precisely defines
measures that are intended to defend the country, and the amount of the budget.
This is an excellent example of an overall approach to the issue of the policy
for defence and security and the combining of the strategy with measures for its
implementation in a coherent context of the State’s policy, also in the budgetary
dimension. The records contained therein, as already mentioned, are the starting
point to develop a multi-year bill for military programs.
In view of the fact that, as it is repeatedly emphasized in the ‘White
Paper’, France is a country with ambitions not only regional but also global
(resulting, among other things, from its status in the United Nations and its
participation and position in the structures of the European Union and NATO), it
focuses its activities not only on the immediate neighbourhood, but also on other
regions of the world, relevant to its interests. This is, however, due to its
geographical conditions: having overseas territories and departments, as well as
several million citizens living around the world, France feels also responsible for
those distant neighbourhoods.
The intervention in Mali is somewhat a confirmation of its traditional ambition
to play a role as one of the leaders in global security policy, as well as of
a willingness to be militarily involved in the regions where it has its vital
interests74.
The document also strongly emphasizes the importance which France assigns
to the European cooperation including, among other things, defining strategic
priorities, developing interoperability, and the emergency management and
retrieval of joint technological capabilities (and industrial)75. Therefore, seeing the
strategic opportunity to strengthen Europe against other rising powers (including
military ones), it declares the active participation in constructing the European
dimension of policy for security and defence. On the other hand, it seems that the
effects of the crisis, that affected the announced reduction of defence capabilities,
while a desire to maintain strategic ambitions, means that France is becoming more
and more pragmatic in its cooperation, seeking more tangible military benefits (for
example, selecting initiatives that will help to fill in the gaps in its military
potential, or give benefits to the defence industry) rather than strictly political
initiatives76.
74
P. Elman, M. Terlikowski, the ‘Ambitions to Measure the Crisis? The Security Policy of
France in the Coming Years’, the ‘Bulletin of the Institute of International Affairs (PISM)’, No. 8
(984), 25January, 2013, page 1, [in:] http://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=12800 .
75
Therein, page 100.
76
P.Elman, M.Terlikowski, the ‘Ambitions…’, op. cit., page 2.
127
SŁAWOMIR IWANOWSKI
In the new ‘White Paper’, the key threats are set out (both for the State and for
the region). There is no doubt that the political context is different than the one in
2008. But the threats and challenges are mostly not „new” (the document refers
mainly to those defined in 2008). Thus, it appears that the level of changes in the
current document is not as significant as in the way of redefining the strategy in
previous years. Therefore, the present ‘White Paper’ is rather fitting the priorities
of the foreign policy and the State’s security to the conditions currently prevailing
in the international arena than their significant redefinition.
128
ISSN 0867–2245
ISSN 2353-1789
STATE DEFENCE PREPARATIONS IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM…
NATIONAL SECURITY AND STATE DEFENCE
STATE DEFENCE PREPARATIONS IN THE
NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM OF THE
REPUBLIC OF POLAND – CLASSIFICATION
AND DESCRIPTION OF DEFENCE TASKS
Marian KULICZKOWSKI, Ph.D., Eng.
Abstract
The global security environment is characterised by the long-lasting situation of low
the probability of the outbreak of an armed conflict on a large scale and the simultaneously
observed increased possibility of local conflicts. Also there have been noticed significant
changes in a typical course of an armed conflict. The dynamic phase of combat activities is
shorter and the post-conflict stage of stabilisation and rebuilding activities becomes longer.
Tasks connected with the state’s defences and the preparation of the population and
public property for war are the responsibility of all the public authorities and
administration bodies as well as business leaders; social organisations and citizens
(individuals) - in the scope defined in the laws. The basis for the state’s defence
preparations in the national security system in the course of integration are the defence
needs and the defence tasks arising from them.
In the current legal circumstances, defence tasks are considered equivalent with tasks
connected with the general defence obligation or with the tasks performed as part of the
state’s defence preparations, carried out in times of peace; in the case of an external threat
to the state’s security and in times of war. The objective scope of these tasks, fulfilled by all
subjects of the state defence system, is extremely extensive.
This study aims to systematize the subject matter of the state defence preparations in
the national security system from the point of view of the classification of defence task types
and their description.
Key words – national security system, state defence system, state defence preparations,
defence planning, defence tasks
129
MARIAN KULICZKOWSKI
Introduction – the notion and nature of defence tasks
The basis of state defence preparations in the national security system in the
course of integration are the defence needs and the defence tasks arising from
them. The scope of these tasks performed as part of the state defence preparations,
by all subjects of the state defence system, is extremely extensive. It is based on
many sources of law, as well as the administrative decisions of the authorised
public administration bodies. In order to properly understand the state defence
preparations, from the point of view of defence tasks, it is important to define the
notion of defence tasks, determine their nature and provide their classification.
The term „defence tasks”, used in applicable laws, regulations and planning
documents, is defined differently, depending on the scope of a legal act or
a planning document, which leads to ambiguity concerning its understanding. The
analysis of professional literature and legal acts in force connected with this issue
shows distinct contradictions in this respect. It seems very difficult or even
impossible to find an unambiguous definition of „defence tasks”, used both in
theory and in practice. In some legal acts the term „defence tasks” is equated with
tasks connected with the general defence obligation, and in others with the tasks
performed as part of the state defence preparations1.
An appropriate definition of defence tasks, taking into consideration the fact
that they constitute a part of tasks from the scope of national security, can be found
in the Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland in the following wording:
„Defence tasks, as a part of tasks from the scope of national security, cover
activities carried out by the executive branch of the government and other state
authorities and institutions, entrepreneurs and citizens connected with: the
preparation of the state for efficient functioning and survival in the case of an
external threat, crisis or war, carrying out particular operational undertakings in
these conditions, as well as the elimination of the effects of the obviated threat in
order to restore the normal functioning of the state2„.
The objective and subjective scope of defence tasks is a part of the field of state
defence preparations described in the regulations of the Act on General Defence
Obligations of the Republic of Poland of 21 November 19673. The scope of defence
tasks, contained in the mentioned field, carried out by the state defence system
1
Cf. M. Kuliczkowski, Przygotowania obronne w Polsce. Uwarunkowania formalnoprawne,
dylematy pojęciowe i próba systematyzacji, Wyd. AON – no AON 6181/13, Warsaw 2013, p. 52.
2
Cf. Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland. Sector strategy of the National Security
Strategy of the Republic of Poland of 23 December 2009, point 67.
3
Cf. The Act on General Defence Obligation of the Republic of Poland of 21 November 1967
(JoL of 2012, item 461 with subsequent amendments). Article 6(1) of the Act lists the tasks of the
Council of Ministers, performed „in order to ensure the external security of the state and general
management in the field of state defence”. The relevant regulation can be found in executory orders to
Article 6 (2).
130
bodies, covers in particular4: defence planning, including operational planning and
programming; preparing the national security management system, including the
state defence; maintaining constant state defence readiness and creating conditions
to improve it, including the organisation of the fixed duties system; the economy
mobilization; creating and maintaining strategic reserves; preparing transport and
national transport infrastructure for the defence needs; preparing and using medical
units for the state defence needs; preparing and using communications systems for
the state defence needs; preparing for military use the organisational units
performing defence tasks; preparing for the special protection of buildings; tasks
performed for the Polish Armed Forces and the allied troops, as well as organising
defence training and controlling the fulfilment of defence tasks.
In order to systemize and define the types of defence tasks it is necessary to
classify them, which is of significant importance for the description of these tasks.
Classification of defence tasks by type and the accomplishment stage5
After the analysis of the professional literature and having conducted research
concerning the nature and scope of defence tasks, they have been classified with
regard to the type, aim and accomplishment stage.
The classification by type is a basic division of defence tasks. The
classification, presented in the Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland,
concerning the defence tasks performed by the state defence structures, in
accordance with this criterion, differentiates their following types: tasks in the
scope of state defence management; military tasks and non-military defence
tasks. The classification of the defence tasks of the state defence system in
accordance with the criterion of type is presented in figure 1.
The above mentioned defence tasks include undertakings carried out by all
subjects of the state defence system by the Polish Armed Forces as well as by the
executive branch of the government, other state bodies and institutions, business
leaders and citizens.
Defence tasks in the sphere of the state defence management – these
concern ensuring optimal conditions for efficient decision making as well as the
constant and long-lasting coordination of activities by the public authority and
administration bodies of all levels, as well as the commanding bodies of the Polish
Armed Forces, during peace and especially in times of war.
4
Cf. M. Kuliczkowski, Przygotowania obronne w Polsce …, Wyd. AON – no AON 6181/13,
Warsaw 2013, p. 47.
5
The presented classification of defence tasks was based on the author's study contained in the
scientific research study. Cf. M. Kuliczkowski, Klasyfikacja zadań obronnych oraz ich
charakterystyka [in:] Przygotowania ochronno-obronne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Udział organów
administracji publicznej i sektora gospodarczego w przygotowaniach ochronno-obronnych
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, scientific research study under the scientific supervision of J. Wojnarowski,
Wyd. AON, Code: II.1.9.1.0, no S/8349,Warsaw 2012, p.45.
131
MARIAN KULICZKOWSKI
DEFENCE TASKS OF
THE STATE DEFENCE SYSTEM
Defence tasks in the sphere of
state defence management
Military defence tasks
Non-military defence tasks
General tasks of
preparatory character
Diplomatic
Protection of the state independence and
ensuring the security and inviolability of
its borders
Participation in the international
stabilisation process as well as the crisis
response and humanitarian operations
Supporting internal security and
providing assistance for the society
(przeciwstawienie się agresji)
Information
Economic and
defence
Protective
Source: Own work on the basis of the Defence Strategy the Republic of Poland, op. cit., chapter III and IV.
Figure 1. Classification of defence tasks of the state defence system by type
Military defence tasks - are performed by the Polish Armed Forces in order to
maintain readiness to conduct three types of missions:
1) guaranteeing the state’s defence and opposing aggression - the Polish Armed
Forces maintain readiness to carry out tasks connected with: the defence and
protection of the inviolability of the Polish borders; participation in anti-terrorist
activity in the country and outside Poland’s borders; participation in solving local
or regional military conflicts on or outside the territory of NATO responsibility as
well as participation in defence operations outside the country according to
obligations of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and also conducting strategic
defence operations on the territory of the Republic of Poland.
2) participating in the process of stabilising the international situation as well
as crisis response and humanitarian operations – this requires the Polish Armed
Forces maintaining the power and capability to realise tasks connected with:
participation in peace and crisis response operations conducted by NATO, the EU,
and the UN, as well as other operations resulting from international agreements;
participation in humanitarian operations conducted by international, nongovernmental and other organisations, and also military cooperation in the field of
the development and usage of means of building trust and security.
132
3) supporting internal security and providing assistance for society - the Polish
Armed Forces maintain the capability to perform tasks consisting of: monitoring
and protecting the air space as well as supporting the protection of the land border
and territorial waters; conducting reconnaissance and intelligence activity;
monitoring radioactive, chemical and biological contamination on the territory of
the state; clearing the land from explosive materials and dangerous objects of
a military origin; conducting search and rescue activities; assisting the state
authorities, public administration and the society in responding to threats.
It needs to be emphasised that military defence tasks have been thoroughly
analysed and subject to multifaceted research. On this basis, the needs of the Polish
Armed Forces have been defined, including the mobilization needs of military units
connected with personnel and material reserves. They are prepared by non-military
subjects of the state defence system, as part of defence tasks carried out for the
Polish Armed Forces.
Defence tasks performed by the non-military structures of the state
defence system include the above discussed defence tasks accomplished in the
area of the state defence management, and also6:
General tasks of a preparatory character allowing to create organisational
conditions for the functioning of the non-military structures in particular cases of
state defence readiness and in the case of alerts.
Diplomatic tasks aiming at minimising the risk of a threat to basic national
interests and principles of foreign and security policy, and also at providing
diplomatic support in times of armed conflict and in the course of containing such
conflict.
Information tasks helping to protect and promote Polish interests, limiting the
enemy's access to information, reinforcing the willpower, morale, defence
determination and perseverance of the society.
Economic and defence tasks aim to ensure a material basis for the
accomplishment of defence tasks, such as: maintaining the production and
renovation capacity to carry out tasks resulting from the Economy Mobilization
Program; preparing for production and services, as well as the accomplishment of
tasks included in the Economy Mobilization Program; creating and maintaining the
reserves; preparing transport for the needs of the state defence; preparing for
activity in the situation of limited supplies; using personal and material benefits;
maintaining the strategic reserves; accelerating the realization of investments of
strategic importance; introducing limitations in communications; reconstructing
destroyed infrastructure; ensuring supplies of equipment, materials and protective
means for civil defence; monitoring the economic potential in the field of industry,
agriculture, communications, transportation, power industry and forestry.
Protective tasks aim at ensuring the efficient functioning of the state as well as
the meeting and protecting the population's basic existential needs. They constitute
6
Cf.: Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland, point 69-74.
133
MARIAN KULICZKOWSKI
a very important part of defence tasks performed by all subjects of the state defence
system and include protective tasks connected with the efficient functioning of the
state as well as tasks connected with the meeting and protecting of the population's
existential needs7.
Classification of defence tasks by aim and accomplishment stage
The classification of defence tasks by aim and accomplishment stage covers the
following tasks: preparatory; intervention (operational, response) and rebuilding
(restoring peace)8. The classification of the defence tasks of the state defence
system by this criterion is presented in figure 2.
DEFENCE TASKS OF THE
STATE DEFENCE SYSTEM
Preparatory
Intervention (operational,
response)
Rebuilding
(restoring peace)
]
Source: Own work on the basis of W. Kitler, Podstawy teoretyczne przygotowań obronnych… [in:]
M. Kuliczkowski (scientific editing), Przygotowania obronne…, op. cit., p. 18.
Figure 2. Classification of defence tasks of the state defence systems by aim and
accomplishment stage
Preparatory tasks, understood as „a part of defence tasks performed in times of
normal functioning of the state (the lack of real threats) which aim to prepare the
state, public authority bodies, armed forces, fire service, services, inspection
and other state institutions, the national economy, material and cultural goods and
the whole society to function and (or) survive in the case of an external threat to the
state security, crisis or war”9, constitute a detailed specification of „general tasks
of a preparatory character” – discussed earlier among defence tasks classified by
type.
7
The analysis of defence tasks in the subjective and objective scope as well as the types and
description of defence tasks have been presented in the research work. Cf. M. Kuliczkowski,
Przygotowania ochronno-obronne państwa w kontekście zadań obronnych, [in:] Przygotowania
ochronno-obronne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej…, p.51.
8
Cf. W. Kitler, Podstawy teoretyczne przygotowań obronnych… [in:] M. Kuliczkowski
(scientific editing), Przygotowania obronne…, p.18.
9
Ibidem, p. 18.
134
Whereas, „new” types of defence tasks, in accordance with the criterion of the
aim and accomplishment stage are operational and rebuilding (restoring peace)
tasks:
Operational tasks are „a part of defence tasks performed in the case of an
external threat to the state security and in times of war”10. It needs to be noticed
that in the face of the lack of a uniform (universal) definition of defence tasks the
presented definition of operational tasks may cause some interpretation problems.
Due to that reason, operational tasks are understood as „ distinguished, in
accordance with a particular aim of an activity and expressed as operational plans,
part of defence tasks carried out by particular subjects of the state's law, in the
scope of their statutory competence, in the case of an external threat to the state's
security (and its symptoms), crisis and war, aiming at: preventing the existing
threat or its symptoms, preparing to remove it in accordance with the assessment of
the situation, and providing the necessary response”11. The presented notion,
without changing the essence of the legal definition, specifies „this part of defence
tasks” more precisely.
The character of operational tasks has been defined in the prescriptive
documents which establish the rules of operational planning. They can be divided
into: general tasks – performed in the government administration offices and other
state organisational units; technical tasks – carried out in particular departments of
the government administration by ministers and the subordinate central
government administration bodies; technical tasks – carried out by central offices
supervised by the Prime Minister and tasks performed in provinces12.
Operational tasks accomplished by the state administration and entrepreneurs
are of a confidential character and due to formal reasons cannot be the subject of
a detailed analysis in this study.
Rebuilding tasks (restoring peace) constitute the part of defence tasks which
are performed by particular subjects of the state's law, in the scope of their
statutory competence, after a threat has been removed, aiming at eliminating its
consequences and restoring the normal functioning of the state.
Taking the above into consideration, it should be noticed that the field which
integrates the state defence preparations system, including the determination of
defence tasks, is defence planning, understood as „the entirety of undertakings
aiming at ensuring the framework for the activity which enables the harmonisation
of allied planning with national planning with reference to particular planning
fields/disciplines”13. Defence planning (operational planning and defence
programming)14 constitutes the basic tool for carrying out the state defence policy
10
Cf. The Regulation of the Council of Ministers on the conditions and mode of planning…, § 2,
point 4.
11
Cf. W. Kitler, Podstawy teoretyczne przygotowań ..., p. 20.
12
Cf. The defence standard. State defence system, defence plans, classification (NO-02-A060).
13
Cf. Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego, Wyd. AON, 2008, p. 99.
14
Defence planning - deals with the ways of performing defence tasks by the government
administration and local government bodies as well as the use for that purpose of necessary powers
135
MARIAN KULICZKOWSKI
in the scope of the preparation, maintenance and development of its defence
potential and the preparation of the Polish Armed Forces, government
administration and local government bodies to act in the case of an external threat
and in times of war. Its essence is to determine the defence tasks and the ways the
government administration bodies performing them, including local government
bodies and business leaders as well as the use for that purpose of necessary powers
and measures.
Within the framework of defence planning there are defined preparatory
defence tasks and intervention tasks (operational, response). There are not,
however, any rebuilding tasks (restoring peace) envisages aiming at restoring the
state of the normal functioning of the state15 after a political and military crisis has
been dealt with.
Description of preparatory, intervention and rebuilding tasks
Preparatory tasks are realised in times of peace, as part of defence preparations,
by all subjects of the state defence system in order to ensure the efficient
functioning of the state in the case of political and military threats16. It needs to be
emphasised that state defence preparations are conducted in two interdependent
fields (spheres): the creative area and the completion area. The creative sphere is
manifested, on the one hand, in the development of the rules, assumptions and aims
of the defence policy (security policy), and on the other hand, in carrying out the
defence policy in the form of defence programmes. The sphere of completion is
mainly manifested in translating defence programmes into executive defence
plans17. This is why, it is crucial for the defence preparation process and the tasks
and measures, including operational planning and defence programming; Cf. the Regulation of the
Council of Ministers of 15 June 2004 on the conditions and mode of planning and financing of tasks
performed as part of the state defence preparations by government administration and local
government bodies (JoL of 2004 no 152, item 1599, with subsequent amendments), § 2 point 6.
Operational planning - deals with establishing the activities connected with the preparation
and activity of the government administration and local government bodies in the case of an external
threat to the state security and in times of war, presented in the form of operational task sets and also
the determination of powers and measures necessary to perform them. Ibidem, § 2 point 7.
Defence programming – deals with establishing defence tasks performed in times of peace, for
a ten-year planning period which starts in an odd year, presented in the form of material and financial
undertakings, in order to maintain and develop the state defence potential and prepare the Polish
Armed Forces, government administration and local government bodies to act in the case of an
external threat to the state security and in times of war, and also designing budgetary resources
destined for that goal. Ibidem, § 2 point 8.
15
Normal state – the state of peacetime when there are no significant threats to the state's
external security – author's footnote.
16
The objective and subjective scope of the state defence preparations and the fundamental areas
of these preparations are defined in the monograph. Cf. M. Kuliczkowski, Przygotowania obronne
w Polsce…, p. 46.
17
Cf. M. Sułek, Programowanie gospodarczo-obronne, BELLONA, Warsaw 2008, p. 5.
136
undertaken in this respect by the state to be sufficiently planned and sent to
appropriate entities participating in its completion.
The objective scope of preparatory tasks includes mainly: defence planning;
defence budgeting18; defence education, including patriotic and defence education;
teaching in the framework of the education system and teaching in universities;
defence training; scientific research and the widely understood fulfilment of the
general defence obligation19. Whereas, the objective scope of preparatory tasks
defined in the defence programming documents concerns material and financial
undertakings, such as20:
− the maintenance and improvement of the non-military state structures,
concerning in particular: the preparation of the management system, including
investments or constructions, reconstructions, renovation and equipping
management stations; programming economic mobilization; fulfilling the needs of
the Polish Armed Forces and allied troops; militarisation, including the preparation
for militarisation of organisational units performing tasks especially important for
the state defence or security; the preparation of the defence of buildings especially
important for the state security and defence, as well as the organisation of defence
training and control over the performance of defence tasks;
− the improvement of the civil defence, concerning: managing the civil
defence; stocking and maintaining equipment destined for the needs of the civil
defence and the maintenance of the civil defence equipment warehouses; the
organisation of the collective and individual protection of the population, including
the maintenance of protective buildings, the construction and maintenance of
emergency drinking water intakes; the evacuation of people and securing logistic
and medical resources for the injured; information and education activity in the
scope of population self-defence as well as training in the field of civil defence
18
Within the framework of defence programming and budgeting there are undertaken, among
other things, material and financial enterprises listed in: the Programme of Non-military Defence
Preparations of the Republic of Poland and the Economy Mobilization Programme which concern,
among other things, the maintenance and improvement of the non-military structures of the state
defence system as well as supplies and renovation of weaponry and military equipment for: the Polish
Armed Forces and allied troops, performing joint defence tasks on the territory of the Republic of
Poland, the organisational units of the Internal Security Agency, and also the organisational units
supervised by and subordinate to the minister competent in the internal affairs and the Minister of
Justice. Ibidem, § 10.
19
In accordance with the general defence obligation, Polish citizens are obliged to: do military
service, perform obligations resulting from crisis and mobilization assignments, perform work in
accordance with employee mobilization assignments, serve in the civil defence, be educated in the
field of security, participate in the population self-defence, participate in exercises in the units
destined for militarisation and serve in militarized units, render services for defence purposes - on the
basis of and in the scope defined by law . Cf. the Act of the General Defence Obligation of the
Republic of Poland…., Article 4(a) (1).
20
Cf. the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 15 June 2004 on the conditions and mode of
planning and financing of tasks…, op. cit., § 10.
137
MARIAN KULICZKOWSKI
with the participation of the civil defence formations in national and international
exercises;
− the creating, storing and maintenance of strategic reserves in case of a threat
to the state's security and defence, to the public security, order and health and in
case of a natural disaster or a crisis situation, in order to support the completion of
tasks connected with the state's security and defence, reconstructing the critical
infrastructure, reducing the disruptions in the continuity of supplies which ensure
the functioning of the economy and the fulfilment of citizens' basic needs, rescuing
their life and health and also meeting the international obligations of the Republic
of Poland21.
It needs to be emphasised that what is of key importance for the existence of
the whole state defence system are preparatory tasks connected with the broadly
defined state mobilization. Mobilization preparations of the elements of the state
defence system are „the sine qua non condition of the purposefulness of existence
of the whole defence system”22. It concerns also tasks performed as part of
economic and defence preparations which aim to create conditions for the efficient
adjustment of the economy to fulfil the material defence needs of the state, and in
particular to: ensure optimal conditions to maintain and train the armed forces
in times of peace and the preparation of the base for the army to carry out its tasks
in the case of a threat to the state's security and in times of war, and also to create
the conditions for the population's survival in extreme circumstances”23.
Taking the above into consideration, in times of peace, when there are no
significant external threats to the state security, the objective scope of
preparatory defence tasks consists of undertaking of two types of strategic
activities: maintaining efficiency and improving SOPs, integrated with the ally
security system and shaping the international environment so as to strengthen the
state's defence24.
In order to maintain efficiency and improve SOPs tasks are performed
connected with the state defence preparations which include in particular: making
analyses and assessments of challenges and threats to international and national
security; uncovering and neutralising intelligence activity against the state's
defence and security; defence planning which includes operational planning
and defence programming; improving joint (national and ally) procedures of
conduct in crisis situations and in times of war; increasing the Polish Armed Forces
capability to react fast to a direct threat to the state's security, including increasing
their ability to conduct independent activities; maintaining and improving the
integrated system of national security management, including the state's defence;
maintaining the capability to introduce, in accordance with the scale and character
21
Cf. the Strategic Reserves Act of 29 October 2010 (JoL of 2010 no 229, item 1496 with
subsequent amendments), Article 3.
22
Cf. M. Sułek, Programowanie gospodarczo-obronne, p. 239.
23
Ibidem, p. 240.
24
Cf. Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland, chapter 2.3.
138
of a threat, the state defence readiness alert; ensuring conditions to welcome on its
territory the Allied Augmentation Forces by performing tasks resulting from the
obligations of the host nation (HNS); maintaining the readiness to perform
production and service tasks defined in the Economy Mobilization Programme
(EMP); maintaining the necessary level of strategic and personnel reserves for the
needs of state defence and security; and the expansion and maintenance of the
defence infrastructure, as well as education in the field of defence and the patriotic
education of the society.
In order to shape the international environment with the purpose of
strengthening the state's defence there are tasks performed that aim at: ensuring the
strong international position of Poland and the possibility of the effective
promotion of Polish interests on the international arena; strengthening the control
mechanisms in the field of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
and dual use materials and technologies, and in the area of arms control;
participating in activities for the promotion of democracy and respect for human
rights as well as for the allotment and maintenance of powers and resources to
participate in allied crisis response operations, humanitarian operations and search
and rescue operations, and also in possible coalition and national operations, as
well as active influence on potential sources of threats connected with global
terrorism by way of conducting preventive foreign missions as well as engaging in
social and economic policy, including the readiness to participate in anti-terrorist
activities.
Intervention, response tasks (executive tasks of an operational character)
constitute a „part of defence tasks which are carried out in the situation of an
external threat to the state security and in times of war”25. It needs to be
emphasised that they are performed by public administration and business leaders,
are of a confidential character and due to formal reasons cannot be the object of
a detailed analysis in this study.
On the basis of the conducted research and available sources of law, it can be
established what these operational tasks apply to. They are the tasks defined in the
operational task sets26 for: ministers; central government administration bodies and
organisational units subordinate to and supervised by the Prime Minister and
provincial governors (wojewoda) - on the basis of the operational tasks
accomplishment tables which constitute a fundamental part of the extract from the
25
Cf. the Regulation of the Council of Ministers on the conditions and mode of planning…, § 2,
point 4.
26
Operational task set — should be understood as systematized operational tasks to be performed
by a particular minister at the head of a department of the government administration, a central
government administration body, provincial governors, managers of organisational units subordinate
to or supervised by the Prime Minister or a minister, or a defined group of these entities, assisted by
subordinate and supervised organisational units, and in the case of provincial governors also with the
assistance of province marshals, starosts, presidents, commune heads and mayors as well as
organisational units created by local government units – Cf. the Regulation of the Council of
Ministers on the conditions and mode of planning…, op. cit., § 2, point 5.
139
MARIAN KULICZKOWSKI
Defence Response Plan of the Republic of Poland27 and are sent to these
institutions by the Minister of National Defence. These tables include: the general
task sets dealing with the preparation of public administration bodies, state
organisational units' managers and business leaders to perform particular
operational tasks connected with the high-defence readiness of the state; the task
sets for the government administration departments, the task sets for central offices
supervised by the Prime Minister, and also the task sets carried out in provinces
(województwo)28.
Rebuilding tasks (restoring peace) constitute the part of defence tasks which is
performed by particular subjects of the state's law, in the scope of their statutory
competence, after a threat (a political or military crisis) has been obviated, aiming
at eliminating its effects and restoring the normal functioning of the state.
In professional literature, the period of restoring the normal functioning of the
state after a crisis has been obviated is called demilitarization, understood as „all
the enterprises connected with the transition of the state and armed forces from the
state of war to the state of peace; the opposite of mobilization. In the military
understanding, demobilization consists of dissolving units which are not useful
during peace; the sale or destruction of redundant war materials and arms and the
transition to the peace-time recruitment and training of troops”29.
The issue of the demilitarization of the state, including rebuilding tasks, has not
so far been a subject of dedicated research and studies. Few existing studies
concern solely the demobilization of the armed forces30. The author of this study
has tried to establish the objective and subjective scope of the rebuilding tasks and
their description in the research study, financed from the funds of the National
Centre for Research and Development”31. The description of rebuilding tasks
presented below is a part of the research conducted by the author in the scope of
the above mentioned project32.
27
Ibidem, § 2, point 4.
Cf. M. Kuliczkowski, Przygotowania obronne w Polsce…, p. 60.
29
Cf. Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego, p. 30.
30
Cf. Study of the General Staff of the Republic of Poland, Przejście Sił Zbrojnych ze struktury
organizacyjnej czasu „W” na strukturę organizacyjną czasu „P” (Demobilizacja), J. Małolepszy
(scientific editing), Scientific and research studies plan of the GS of 1997, Section II item 2.10;
J. Krzemiński, Demobilizacja sił zbrojnych po zakończonym konflikcie zbrojnych. Doctoral thesis,
AON, Warsaw 2001 and Z. Piątek (scientific editing), Demobilizacja sił zbrojnych po zakończonym
konflikcie zbrojnych. Scientific and research study, AON, Warsaw 2007.
31
The project concerned „The National Security System of the Republic of Poland”, project reg.
no: O ROB/0076/03/001 – Project manager: Prof. Waldemar KITLER, PhD, Eng. The contractor of
the project is the scientific and industrial consortium: National Security Faculty of the National
Defence University; Asseco Poland S.A.; Police Academy in Szczytno; Siedlce University of Natural
Sciences and Humanities and the Main School of Fire Service.
32
Cf. M. Kuliczkowski, Charakterystyka zadań obronnych (zapobiegawcze, interwencyjne
i odbudowy) realizowanych przez podmioty systemu obronnego państwa [in:] Ocena (diagnoza)
formalno-prawnych podstaw i stanu organizacji bezpieczeństwa narodowego RP w aspekcie
spełniania funkcji jednolitego i zintegrowanego systemu organizacyjnego i funkcjonalnego.
28
140
Rebuilding tasks, in their objective scope, cover all the enterprises connected
with the transition of the state and armed forces from the state of war to peacetime,
performed as part of demilitarization. Being the opposite of state mobilization,
demobilization is based on two fundamental pillars: the demobilization of the
Armed Forces and economic demilitarization.
The demobilization of the Armed Forces, is understood as disarmament, that is:
bringing the army from a state of war to the state of peace; the dissolution and
abolition of strictly military formations and consequent discharges (moving to the
reserve) of some soldiers on active duty, as well as the return of equipment
(machines, vehicles) taken from the national economy, and also the transition to the
peace-time system of the recruitment and training of troops33.
Economic demilitarization deals with restoring the relations created by war to
the peacetime norms, and in particular: cancelling military supply contracts,
readjusting production to the needs of the civil economy and also ensuring work
places for discharged soldiers. In this period, what is a great challenge is the need
to meet the existential needs of the population and its „spiritual disarmament” by
calming down hostile moods created during the war34.
The demilitarization of the national economy is connected with „a fundamental
change of the structure of production and methods of managing the economic life.
In the social and psychological meaning, demilitarization consists of the changing
of moods caused by war and adjusting the society's psyche to peaceful work. From
the point of view of legal relations, demilitarization means the cessation of military
courts' competence in the field of common offences committed by soldiers on duty
and offences not connected with the military service”35.
In the process of demilitarization, that is restoring the normal functioning of the
state after a political and military crisis has been obviated, what needs to be taken
into consideration are the needs of the national economy in the scope of securing
its functioning in respect of professional personnel, transportation and material
means. At the same time, what needs to be taken into consideration is the problem
concerning the fact that the demobilization of the armed forces will be inseparably
connected with the demilitarization of the national economy. Due to that reason the
following enterprises will have to be undertaken: developing necessary programme
documents and a legal basis; introducing peaceful social and economic relations;
changing the state's life governing methods; abolishing the war time legal and
organisational restrictions; terminating contracts for war supplies and readjusting
the industry to the peacetime needs, and also ensuring work places also for
discharged soldiers. The fundamental objective scope of the enterprises undertaken
as part of state demilitarization is presented in figure 3.
Podzadanie badawcze System obronny państwa. Code: SBN RP 1.2.3.1. Team manager Jan
Wojnarowski, AON 2013, p. 92.
33
Encyklopedia Powszechna, Wydawnictwa Gutenberga, Warsaw 1994, p. 296.
34
Ibidem, p. 297.
35
Cf.: Leksykon wiedzy wojskowej, Wyd. MON, Warsaw 1978, p. 84.
141
MARIAN KULICZKOWSKI
The result of the presented list of the main problems which require solving
after the end of a political and military crisis are particular reconstruction tasks
performed as part of the process of restoring the state's normal functioning. This
process needs to take place on the basis of a decision of the state authorities and
public administration and with their participation, in accordance with the current
legal situation. It should define the objective scope of the rebuilding tasks (restring
the normal state functioning) for those bodies, taking into consideration the
conclusions resulting from the activities connected with repelling military
aggression. The objective scope of rebuilding tasks, completed by the public
authority and administration bodies, includes in particular: medical, psychological
and social assistance for victims of military aggression; restoring the functioning of
public utility facilities and necessary critical infrastructure, as well as restoring the
full efficiency of information circulation and the full efficiency of the rescue forces
which have suffered losses as a result of military activity.
STATE DEMOBILIZATION
-
restoring normal state functioning after armed conflicts
ARMED FORCES DEMOBILIZATION
1. Legal basis for the armed forces
demobilization.
2. Armed forces demobilization plan.
3. Determining demobilization spots.
4. Register of personnel subject to
discharge.
5. Structural demobilization.
6. Personnel demobilization.
7. Material demobilization.
8. Preparing soldiers to the life outside
the army.
9. Establishing irretrievable losses
and transferring the data to the
Polish Red Cross.
10. Creating war cemeteries and
placing them under state
supervision.
NATIONAL ECONOMY
DEMILITARIZATION
1. Legal basis for demilitarization.
2. NE demilitarization plan.
3. Eliminating war time legal and
organisational restrictions.
4. Changing the state life governing
methods.
5. Introducing peacetime social relations.
6. Adjusting the war communications
system to the peacetime needs.
7. Termination of war supply contracts.
8. Readjusting the industry to the
peacetime needs.
9. Reconstruction of war damage.
10. Ensuring work places for population,
including discharged soldiers
Source: Own work on the basis of the study of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, Scientific and
research studies plan of the GS of 1997, Section II item 2.10.
Figure 3. Principle enterprises undertaken as part of the state demilitarization
142
Reconstruction is an early state of rebuilding. Activities undertaken at this
stage are limited to restoring the functioning of the critical infrastructure systems
necessary for existence, however, only to an extent which provides the aggrieved
with the minimal standards. These activities are sometimes undertaken
simultaneously with rescue activities and are of a short-term character.
Reconstruction includes: the estimation of losses; financial and material assistance;
and ensuring basic conditions of survival for the aggrieved.
In the rebuilding phase, there are performed the following tasks connected
with: analysing the effects of an event, defining the needs and possibilities of
removing them; supervising activities in the scope of ensuring living standards for
the aggrieved population; initiating and giving an opinion on repair programmes,
rebuilding, reconstruction and rebuilding of critical infrastructure, and also the
assessment of the activity of the services, of population behaviour, as well as of the
sufficiency and usefulness of the distribution of services, equipment and stores, and
also preparing conclusions and the improvement proposals of the population's
protection system.
An important role in the process of rebuilding is to be played by powers and
resources at the disposal of competent authorities, services and public
administration bodies, within the crisis management system36. It needs to be
emphasised that at every level of public administration there have been developed
„crisis management plans” including, among other things: the analysis of threats,
balance of needs, own powers and resources as well as procedures of obtaining
external assistance (including appropriate contracts, agreements and plans)37.
Whereas, the ways of responding to situations of the damage or disruption of the
critical infrastructure functioning as well as reconstructing this critical
infrastructure are defined in the National Infrastructure Protection Programme.
The programme defines the national priorities, aims and standards aiming at
ensuring the efficient functioning of critical infrastructure and indicates ministers at
the head of government administration departments and managers of central offices
responsible for critical infrastructure systems, as well as detailed criteria allowing
the identification of buildings, installations, devices and services included in the
critical infrastructure systems, taking into consideration their importance for the
state's functioning and meeting the citizens' needs38.
36
Crisis management is the activity of the public administration bodies, which constitutes an
element of the national security management, consisting in preventing crisis situations, controlling
them by way of planned actions, responding in the case of crisis situations and reconstructing
infrastructure or restoring its original shape. The structure and functioning of the crisis management
system is defined in the Crisis Management Act of 26 April 2007 (JoL no 89, item 590, with
subsequent amendments).
37
There is the National Crisis Management Plan as well as provincial, district and commune
crisis management plans, Cf. Article 5 (1) of the Act.
38
Ibidem, Article 5(b).
143
MARIAN KULICZKOWSKI
In the current legal situation, there have not been indicated any „common
tasks” for the state defence system and the crisis management system, and there
have not been established any mechanisms for the transition from the state defence
readiness in times of war to the constant state of defence readiness. The tasks
mentioned concern the rebuilding tasks performed in the period of restoring the
state's functioning after military aggression has been repelled. The appropriate
planning and preparation as well as proper coordination of powers used included in
the mentioned systems will be of significant importance for the rebuilding process.
What results from the above presented list of the main problems which require
to be solved after the end of a political and military conflict are particular
rebuilding tasks carried out in the situation of a disrupted continuity of supplies
which allows for the economy to function and meet citizens' basic needs, rescuing
their life and health. In order to limit these disruptions, the minister responsible for
the economy, by way of a decision, makes the strategic reserves immediately
available in accordance with the rules and mode defined by the regulations39.
Powers and resources as well as information contained in the Economy
Mobilization Programme are of significant importance in the process of restoring
the normal functioning of the state after a political and military crisis has been
obviated. The making use of the production and renovation capacity of business
leaders, established in this programme, is of key importance for the rebuilding
process. The potential of these business leaders should constitute the material basis
for particular rebuilding tasks. In the process of restoring the normal state
functioning, the tasks connected with meeting the basic existential needs of the
population are of key importance. In the decision making process, what needs to be
taken into consideration in the course of establishing tasks in this respect are both
the production and service capabilities of selected sectors of the economy (the
economy, agriculture, transport, environment, maritime economy and health)
defined in the Economy Mobilization Programme, as well as balanced possibilities
of the national economy to carry them out. It concerns in particular the supply of:
food; medical products and medical devices; fuel and energy as well as fossil fuels,
and also the provision of transport services40.
Conclusions
In order to properly understand the tasks performed in the process of the state
defence preparations it is important both to define the very notion as well as to
provide the classification of defence tasks together with the description of the
39
Cf. The Act on Strategic Reserves of 29October 2010 (JoL no 229, item 1496, with subsequent
amendments.).
40
The Act on General Defence Obligation of the Republic of Poland and a number of other laws,
regulations and planning documents – author's note.
144
nature and typology of defence needs. In this respect they are connected with
human resources, material and financial resources as well as service capabilities
necessary to achieve a particular level of readiness of the defence system in the
condition of the state's constant defence readiness, defence readiness in times of
crisis and defence readiness in times of war. It needs to be emphasised that defence
needs and tasks connected with them constitute the basis of the state defence
preparations.
Defence tasks presented in this study are performed by all subjects of the state
defence system, and their list is contained in the defence planning documents. The
objective scope of defence tasks includes undertakings carried out by the Polish
Armed Forces as well as the executive government bodies, other state bodies
and institutions, businesses and citizens. They are connected with preparing the
state for efficient functioning and survival in the case of an external threat to the
state's security, crisis and war, and carrying out particular operational undertakings
in these conditions, and also with removing the effects of a threat after it has been
obviated, aiming to restore the normal state functioning.
The leading role among the subjects carrying out the defence tasks within the
state defence system is played by the public administration and business leaders.
They are responsible for defence preparation in all its fields. It needs to be
emphasised that the regulations of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of
Poland and the Strategy of Development of the National Security System of the
Republic of Poland 2022, and also the White Book on National Security of the
Republic of Poland establish in a comprehensive way the state defence system with
the activities for the national security system, and also emphasis the role of public
administration and business leaders in the process of these preparations.
On the basis of available professional literature and conducted research, it
needs to be stated that the defence tasks defined in the binding legal acts and
planning documents for the government administration and local government
bodies, as well as business leaders and the Armed Forces, concern solely the tasks
which are performed in the case of an external threat to the state security and in
times of war. There have not been envisaged, however, any rebuilding tasks aiming
to restore the normal functioning of the state after a political and military crisis has
been obviated and during the demilitarization of the state. The description of
rebuilding tasks presented in this study and carried out as part of state
demilitarization should be treated as an introduction to and the basis for further
research. The aim of this research should be both the systematic, legal and
organisational regulating of the issue of state demilitarization after a military
conflict as well as defining the objective and subjective scope of rebuilding tasks
connected with restoring the normal functioning of the state.
* * *
Basing on the events from the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st
century as well as the ongoing military conflicts, it may be stated that it is true that
145
MARIAN KULICZKOWSKI
we can deal much more efficiently41 with the situations which we are prepared for,
than with those that surprise us42. One needs to be aware that „threats and
challenges of the 21st century are different from those which we grew up with
during the Cold War. Then politics was frozen and the sphere of defence static.
Threats to defence could be faced in a defensive way. Modern world does not
function in this way. Political, economic and military activities must be integrated.
Terrorists, falling regimes, weapons of mass destruction – are both political as well
as military challenges. The defence of the homeland begins abroad, and it is
necessary to always start caring about security in one's heart and mind (…) The
borderlines between the internal and external security, police and army, preventing
crises and solving them, combating crime and financial fraud, tracking terrorists
and dealing with falling regimes become artificial and vague”43.
Bibliography
Literature
Encyklopedia Powszechna Wydawnictwa Gutenberga, Warsaw 1994.
Kitler W. (project manager) System Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego RP[National Security
System of the Republic of Poland], Project registration number: O ROB/0076/03/001.
Kitler W., Podstawy teoretyczne przygotowań obronnych państwa w kontekście potrzeb
i zadań obronnych. [in:] M. Kuliczkowski (scientific editing), Przygotowania obronne
w systemie obronnym Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej Zeszyt Problemowy TWO no 1(65)
2011 ISSN 1425-8043, Warsaw 2011.
Kotarbiński T., Hasło dobrej roboty, 2nd edition, Warsaw 1975.
Krzemiński J., Demobilizacja sił zbrojnych po zakończonym konflikcie zbrojnych.
[Demobilization of the Armed Forces after a military conflict.] Doctoral thesis, AON,
Warsaw 2001 r.
Kuliczkowski M., Przygotowania obronne w Polsce. Uwarunkowania formalnoprawne,
dylematy pojęciowe i próba systematyzacji, Wyd. AON – no AON 6181/13, Warsaw
2013.
Kuliczkowski M. (scientific editing), Przygotowania obronne państwa w systemie
obronnym Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Teoria i praktyka, Zeszyt Problemowy TWO
no 1 (65) 2011, Warsaw 2011.
Kuliczkowski M., Klasyfikacja zadań obronnych oraz ich charakterystyka [in:]
Przygotowania ochronno-obronne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Udział organów
41
According to T. Kotarbiński, efficiency „…consists in doing something which is a good means
for a set target and not making mistakes in this respect”. Cf. T. Kotarbiński, Hasło dobrej roboty, 2nd
edition, Warsaw 1975, p. 3.
42
The events in the Balkans of the 1990s after the fall of Yugoslavia, the events of 11 September
2001 in the United States and terrorist attacks in Madrid (11 March 2004), Beslan (1 September 2004)
and London (7 July 2005), and also the development of the political and military situation in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, North Korea and Syria as well as in the states of North Africa cause particular
concern for the security of the state and its citizens – author's note.
43
Cf. J. Solana, Unia Europejska i NATO, strategiczne partnerstwo, www.1.gazeta.pl, [available
on the Internet: 19 November 2002]
146
administracji publicznej i sektora gospodarczego w przygotowaniach ochronnoobronnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, scientific research study under the scientific
supervision of J. Wojnarowski, Wyd. AON, Code: II.1.9.1.0, no S/8349,Warsaw 2012.
Małolepszy J. (scientific editing), Przejście Sił Zbrojnych ze struktury organizacyjnej czasu
„W” na strukturę organizacyjną czasu „P” (Demobilizacja), Scientific and research
studies plan of the GS of 1997, Section II, item 2.10.
Leksykon wiedzy wojskowej, Wyd. MON, Warsaw 1978,
Piątek Z. (scientific editing), Demobilizacja sił zbrojnych po zakończonym konflikcie
zbrojnych. Scientific research study, AON, Warsaw 2007.
Solana J., Unia Europejska i NATO, strategiczne partnerstwo, www.1.gazeta.pl, [available
on the Internet: 19 November 2002]
Sułek M., Programowanie gospodarczo-obronne, Bellona, Warsaw 2008.
Wojnarowski J., Kuliczkowski M., Olszewski M., Przygotowania obronno-ochronne
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Udział organów administracji publicznej i sektora
gospodarczego w przygotowaniach ochronno-obronnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej
(II.1.9.1.0), AON – no S/8349, Warsaw 2012.
Zdrodowski B. (scientific editing), Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa
narodowego, wyd. 6, AON, Warsaw 2008.
Legal acts
The Act on General Defence Obligation of the Republic of Poland of 21 November 1967
(JoL of 2012 item 461 with subsequent amendments).
The Crisis Management Act of 26 April 2007 (JoL no 89, item 590, with subsequent
amendments).
The Strategic Reserves Act of 29 October 2010 (JoL of 2010 no 229, item 1496 with
The Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 15 June 2004 on the conditions and mode of
planning and financing of tasks performed as part of the state defence preparations by
government administration and local government bodies (JoL of 2004 no 152, item
1599, with subsequent amendments).
Strategic documents
The White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland issued on 24 May 2013.
Strategy of Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022adopted by the Resolution no 67 of the Council of Ministers of 9 April 2013 (OJ of
2013, item 377).
National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland of 13 November 2007 .
Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland of 23 December 2009 – Sector strategy of the
National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland.
147
NDU
Scientific
Quarterly
4(93)
2013
Zeszyty
Naukowe
AON nrno
2(59)
2005
ISSN2353-1789
0867–2245
ISSN
WALDEMAR KITLER
ORGANISATION OF THE NATIONAL
SECURITY IN POLAND
IN THE CONTEXT OF A COUNTRY’S
INTERNAL ORDER PROTECTION1
Prof. Waldemar KITLER, Ph.D.
Abstract
The issue of the organisation of national security of Poland, including its management,
requires the analysis of problems related to the internal order protection in the country.
This need, among others, results from a lack of clear formulated concepts and
determination of the extent of internal security, public safety, constitutional security,
security of citizens, as well as public order in the legitimate sphere and in the security
theory. As a consequence, the stance concerning the scope of their application has not been
stabilised yet. Additionally, in the title of this article, one more term –‘internal order’ has
been introduced.
The conceptual categories mentioned above often have strong epistemological and
ontological relations and, therefore, determining their identity and distinctiveness requires
the adoption of a certain questioning attitude on the basis of the existing concepts in Polish
legal order and in the theory of the problem.
Key words – internal order, national security, internal security, public safety, public
order, national security management
The concept, nature and scope of the internal order in a country
Let us start our considerations from an understanding of the terminology and
by specifying the concept of internal order; beginning, however, with the internal
security.
1
The article includes selected content from the study titled The Process of Security Management
(organisational rules and the ways of functioning of the management system) in three states of
security [Proces kierowania bezpieczeństwem (organizacyjne zasady i sposoby funkcjonowania
systemu kierowania) w trzech stanach bezpieczeństwa] W. Kitler, a research project on National
Security System of the Republic of Poland, founded by NCBiR – contract No
DOBR/0076/R/ID1/2012/03 of 18.12.2012 r., the registration number of the project:
O ROB/0076/03/001, Project Manager: prof. dr hab. inż. Waldemar KITLER.
148
ORGANISATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY IN POLAND…
Internal security is not a substantive concept; all the more reason the legislator
himself has distinguished between internal security and public order2. It is difficult to
find an interpretation of internal security in Polish law, including administrative law.
The theory of security contains various opinions. According to one of them –
narrow, internal security is treated as a category covering constitutional security
(protection of the country and its constitutional order), public safety and general
security. Another one – the broad one – relates internal security to the issues taking
place in the territory of a country; thus, to everything that is happening in a country
and is connected to domestic goods protected by the law. Also, the scope of the
‘internal affairs’ department of the government administration does not cover all the
issues mentioned above, neither in the narrow interpretation,3 nor the broad one.
If there are no big differences in the theory for understanding external security,
there is no such a unity as far as the internal security is concerned. And this is due
to the following two reasons: historical events and a misunderstood, simplified
association of internal security with the ‘internal affairs’ department of the
government administration, and (or) the issue of ensuring internal order in the
country. Some views expand the issue of internal security slightly, subsuming
within its frame not only the matter of repressive nature4, and therefore
constitutional order and public safety, but also general security5. In this
perspective, public safety is a condition manifested in the protection of the legal
order, life and health of the citizens as well as the national wealth against illegal
activities6. General security, in turn, is a condition manifested in the protection of
the life and health of the citizens as well as the national wealth against the effects
of natural and technological disasters7. Constitutional order, according to the
authors of the referenced report, is, thus, the condition of the order and functioning
of the country in accordance with the standards set out in the basic law8.
A narrow understanding of internal security will still be working in the theory
and practice of the issue for a long time9, mainly because of determining its scope
2
See B. Banaszak, Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz, edition 2, C. H. BECK,
Warszawa 2012, s. 220 i 791.
3
Constitutional security, for obvious reasons, does not and should not belong to this chapter.
4
Among other things, Jerzy Muszyński distinguishes, within the internal function of a country,
a detailed repressive function, whose essence is to ensure safety and public order as well as
counteracting any social pathologies. See J. Muszyński, Podstawy nauki o polityce, państwie
i prawie,. „Adam Marszałek”, Toruń 2007, p. 101.
5
B. Wiśniewski, S. Zalewski, D. Podleś, K. Kozłowska, Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, AON, Warszawa 2004, p. 12.
6
Ibidem, p. 19.
7
Ibidem.
8
Ibidem, p. 29. As for the issue of constitutional order, adducing only the basic Law is not
enough - Constitutional Law covers many more regulations of a statutory nature. Without doubt, the
Constitution – if the state has one – is the basic act in this respect.
9
In National Security Strategy of Poland of 2007 (Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego RP
z 2007 r.) a narrow understanding of internal security was adopted ‘The ultimate goal of the state in
the field of internal security is to maintain the ability to react – appropriately to a certain situation- in
149
WALDEMAR KITLER
in the regulations of constitutional law. This is due both to the traditional approach
to the subject and to the fact that internal security is, in my opinion, treated
incorrectly, as a field of national security10. Such an approach, however, can be
acceptable in practice but, in theory, contradicts the essence of the definition and
scientific interpretation of certain phenomena.
For the first time in Polish law (in 2002), the legislator split state of emergency
in the field of internal security into two separate states: state of emergency and
state of emergency due to natural disasters. This means that if we take the nature of
internal security into account, we should provide for matters of constitutional
security, security of citizens and public safety as well as general security (with
which the state of emergency due to natural disaster is associated).
In the traditional approach, order is related to discipline, obedience,
submissiveness, regime, notches, compliance, respect, arranging something
according to some pattern. Order also means codification, segregation,
organisation, normalisation, standardisation and unification. It is implied from the
above, that bringing in order is associated with the arrangement, organisation and
the restoration of normalisation and regulation. The constitution has a significant
role in this respect and is an act of the highest legal force, superior to all laws,
regulating the basis of a country’s system, the basic principles of organisation and
the method of appointment of the highest authorities of the state, the fundamental
rights, freedoms as well as the duties of a man and a citizen.
If one unified stance in the terminology issues mentioned above is absent, we
assume that internal order is a set of rules and a state of things according to
which the country, its public authorities and society, including the matter of
the constitutional system of the country (constitutional security, constitutional
order) as well as public safety covering public order and security of citizens
operate.
Political system security will be associated with the issues of the state’s system
of constitutional security, that is with the protection of standards establishing: the
political system of the Republic of Poland; the principles of political pluralism; the
socio-economic system; the legal status of an individual, the freedom and duties of
citizens; the legal system and the legislative process in the country as well as legal
system protection. This is related to constitutional order, which means a
combination of the authorities, government institutions and their activities, as well
as the system of legal rules underwriting the continuity of the constitutional system
case of threats to public and general safety related to the protection of legal order, life and health of
the citizens as well as the national wealth from illegal activities and the consequences of natural
disasters and technical failures.’
10
It is difficult to accept the recognition of (according to the subjective criterion) the following
types of national security in one group: political, economic, military,, social, internal, ecological,
cultural, information and others (emphasis – W.K.). See System bezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej
Polskiej, tom IV, Koncepcja systemu bezpieczeństwa RP, Project Manager. R. Kulczycki, AON,
Warszawa 1983, p 27.
150
of the country, including the protection of the country as a legal and political
organisation, the protection of classified information, the protection of people,
facilities and equipment essential for the national security, and also the protection
of the freedom, rights and duties of citizens. A clear manifestation of the prevailing
constitutional order in the Republic of Poland includes the main rules formed on
the basis of the Constitution of 2 April 1997, which point directly to the protected
welfares in this regard, which are:
1) related to the political system: sovereignty (Article 4); the republican form of
a state of law (Article 1); democratic state of law (article 2); separation of powers
and balance of powers (Article 10); political representation; bicameral parliament
(Article 10.2); political pluralism (Article 11); the principle of decentralisation of
public authority (Article 15); the establishment of local self-government (Article
16); mutual independence and cooperation of the state and churches and religious
associations (Article 25); freedom and the rights of citizens (Chapter 2);
parliamentary form of governance; the separateness of jurisdiction and the
independence of the courts and tribunals (Article 173);
2) Unrelated to the political system but of key importance in Polish
constitutionalism: the social market economy (Article 20); private property (Article
21) and economic freedom (Article 22).
Public safety is, in turn, a process covering various activities (means) whose
principal purpose is the protection of legal order in the country against prohibited
actions and actions offending public institutions11 and public equipment12, the life
and health of people as well as social standards and customs and, what is most
important, the interests of the state protected by law. This involves ensuring the
smooth functioning of the institutions of the state and its citizens through the prism
of threats against the ‘normality’ of their functioning, according to the socioadministrative system and law and order.
Public safety is often associated with public order, bringing them under an
umbrella term – security and public order13. In the Act of 6 April 1990 on the
11
The public institutions include the whole social infrastructure, that is: hospitals, emergency
services, sanatoria, nursing homes, schools, kindergartens, cultural and sport facilities, courts, prisons
and public administration buildings.
12
Public devices include: public roads, railway networks, water networks, airports, ports,
electrical installations, water, gas and steam transmission facilities, water intakes, sewage works,
cemeteries, communication and information technologies, (telecommunication, post offices, Internet,
radio, TV); media utilities (electricity, water, sewage, heating, gas, trash removal). In this case, the
term economic infrastructure is used interchangeably.
13
See respectively: the Act of 6 April 1990 on the Police (Journal of Laws of 1990 No. 30, item.
179, as amended.), Art. 1, paragraph 1, Law of 4 September 1997 on government administration
(Journal of Laws of 1999 No. 82, item. 928, as amended.), Art. 29. Paragraph 1 point 1 to the Act of 6
June 1997, the Penal Code (Journal of Laws 1997 No. 88, item. 553, as amended.), Chapter XXXII;
the most interesting matter is in the act of 5 June 1998 on the county government (Journal of Laws of
2001 No. 142, item. 1592, as amended.), where there are terms such as public order (Article 4,
paragraph 1, point 15), security and public order (Article 7) and security and order in the name of the
Security and Order Commission.
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WALDEMAR KITLER
Police, in Article 1, paragraph 1 it is specified that this is a formation dedicated to
maintaining security and public order, among other things, without distinguishing
between the two terms. Moreover, the Act mentions separately the category of
‘human security’ referring to the task related to the protection of people’s security.
The first case regards: the protection of public safety and order, including
ensuring peace in public places and means of public transport, on roads and
waterways dedicated to public use (Article 2, paragraph 2); initialisation and
organisation of activities aimed at the prevention of crime and offences, as well as
crime-related phenomena, and cooperation in this field with state and local
agencies and social organisations (Article 2, paragraph 3); crime and offence
detection and prosecution of the perpetrators (Article 2, paragraph 4); control over
abiding order and administrative regulations related to public activities or existing
in public places (Article 2, paragraph 6) as well as collecting, processing and
passing on criminal information (Article 2, paragraph 8).
The issue of the protection of human security covers matters relating to
people’s lives and health security, as well as their property against unlawful attacks
violating goods (Article 2, paragraph 1, Act on the Police).
Further, the Act on government administration activities combines security and
public order with the ‘and’ conjunction, in which the issue of security and public
order protection is included in the internal affairs section in Article 29, Paragraph
1, Subparagraph 1. However, we have to be careful here, as security and public
order protection does not reflect the full range of security and public order, or – in
short – public safety. Probably, only the penal code refers separately to public
order, listing the offences against public order. Undoubtedly, public safety and
public order are still separate categories, although there would be nothing wrong if
they were determined by one term – public safety. The issue still requires in-depth
research and analysis and, although raised by many specialists, it has not been
completely organised yet, and neither in the legal system. In a lesser article it was
assumed that public safety is superior to public order. This results from the essence
of public order, which is related to observing the norms as well as maintaining the
efficiency of public institutions, that is e.g. from: human behaviour in accordance
to existing regulations; observing registration regulations14; regulations on
meetings, public gatherings and mass events; building, hunting, fishing, fiscal
offences regulations and water resources law; civil law acts and people’s behaviour
in public places.
There are various interpretations of public safety, ranging from a very broad
one, through its various modifications, to a narrow one. The broad interpretation
leads to the covering of the entire space of national security, treating it as
14
The Act on Government Administration Activities, excluded the issues of registration of
population, ID cards and passports from the public safety and order area.
152
a protection against all threats, regardless of their sources15. It can be especially
found among law theorists, who distinguish the terms ‘public’ and ‘private.’
A slightly narrower approach to public safety associates it with social relations,
regulated by law and moral standards as well as principles of community life,
ensuring the protection of society, individuals and property against perils related to
the violent actions of people as well as the forces of nature. In this case, almost the
entire space of narrowly understood internal security is occupied, combining the
issues of threats caused by the forces of nature and by human actions.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to translate it into the right organisation of the
security system in practice as, in fact, the matter of counteraction against the forces
of nature is different from the one against the unlawful activities of people. The
narrower approach to the issue limits its content on the protection of legal order,
internal order, and public safety, and also against all prohibited actions which
threaten people’s lives and health, their property, environment, norms and social
customs. Without denying the validity of broader interpretations, especially in
isolation from the superior national security, the narrower approach, whose main
reason is to determine the identity of the issue among other areas (types) of
national security, has been adopted in this article. The mutual relations of public
safety with other areas of security are quite complex, as they relate to political,
military, economic, social, ecological, ideological and cultural areas. In all these
cases we deal with prohibited actions, both socially harmful and reprehensive.
Consequently, the duty of the state, local authorities, businesses, social
organisations and individual citizens is to protect the institutions’ activities, legal
order, customs, to ensure public morality follows existing legal, moral and
customary norms, to protect certain goods (material and spiritual), and to pursue
the perpetrators and use certain sanctions.
At the core of such an approach lies the existence of an immense number of
activities, actions, behaviours and human attitudes, or lack of them, from which
emerges the regulation of certain legal norms or standards established in the
development of social norms of behaviour by law. Therefore, what kind of threats
or dangerous states are the basis for rational thinking and acting in the public safety
sector? There are a lot of approaches, broad and narrow ones; however, in this
article the following division will be suggested: prohibited actions (by state law) or
reprehensible actions under social evaluation (by social norms) related, among
other things, to: human life threat and health risk; road safety; security of
environment; personal freedom; freedom of conscience and religion; tradition;
honour and bodily integrity; activities of state institutions (administration, justice
department); public order (e.g. active participation in gatherings with sudden
15
See: E. Ura, Pojęcie ochrony bezpieczeństwa i porządku publicznego, „Państwo i Prawo”
1974, No 2, p. 76. A. Pakuła, Bezpieczeństwo publiczne jako dobro wspólne (kilka uwag i refleksji),
[in:] Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne w działaniach terenowej administracji publicznej, red.
A. Chajbowicz, T. Kocowski, Editorial House „Kolonia Limited”, Wrocław 2009, p. 29-35.
153
WALDEMAR KITLER
assault to a person or property; public incitement to crime, offence or
misdemeanour; taking and holding a hostage); desecration of corpses and burial
sites; public promotion of prohibited ideologies; protection of information;
property; trading; fiscal regulations; credibility of documents; labour law and
safety regulations.
Activities not included in these types of threats are war crimes, crimes against
peace, humanity, the foundations of the state political system, constitutional order –
political crimes and crimes against defence. These belong to the area of political or
military security.
Public safety in the national law has its rightful place in the contents of
constitutional law, including the Constitution of the Polish Republic; electoral
regulations for the Polish Parliament and Senate; the Act on the Election of the
President of Poland; the Act on the national referendum; electoral regulations for
the European Parliament; the Act on the direct election of the Mayor; on the
Council of Ministers; on the National Administrative Court; on the Supreme
Chamber of Control; on the Ombudsman; on the radio and television; on the
activities of government administration; acts on states of emergency; the act on
access to public information; the law on public meetings; the act on trade unions;
on public fundraisers; on guarantees of freedom, conscience and religion; and press
law.
The regulations of administrative law play an important role in the issue of
public safety due to the regulations regarding, among other things,: a governor and
government administration in a province; commune, district and provincial
authorities; the Internal Security Office and the Intelligence Office; the Military
Counterintelligence Service and the Military Intelligence Service; the State
Sanitary Inspection; technical supervision; the National Fire Service; the
Veterinary Inspection; crisis management16; fire protection; the Police; the Military
Police; and the military law enforcement authorities; the Border Guard; communal
guard17; hunting law18; railway19; the Environmental Protection Inspection; the
State Labour Inspectorate20; road transport21, as well as the competence of the
16
We have in mind the issue of the protection of critical infrastructure, which is essentially
related to public institutions and facilities.
17
The Act of 29 August 1997 on the Community Guards (Journal of Laws of 1997 No. 123,
item. 779, as amended.) . The law in Article 1 paragraph 1 states that: „ For the protection of public
order in the commune a self-government uniformed formation can be formed - a municipal guard ,
hereinafter referred to as guards.”
18
The Act of 13 October 1995 Hunting Law ( Journal of Laws of 2002 No. 42, item 372 , as
amended) . The act establishes the State Hunting Guards as a uniformed, armed and equipped in an
off-road and marked means of transportation formation subordinate to the governor. See more:
Chapter 7 Articles 36-41.
19
Under the Act, the Railway Guard was created, whose tasks involve: control of obeying the
provisions of law and order and protection of life and health of people as well as property in the area
of railways, in trains and other rail vehicles.
20
The Act of 13 April 2007 on the State Labour Inspectorate (Journal of Laws of 2007, No. 89
item. 589).
154
authorities and the regulations for the functioning of other public administration
authorities and other entities with no such status (e.g. Government Protection
Bureau).
From a public safety point of view, an important role is also played by
consumer protection law covering, among other things, the following issues:
pursuing claims in group proceedings; counteracting unfair market practices;
protection of some services supplied electronically, based on the conditional
availability; protection of some consumer rights as well as responsibility for
damage caused by dangerous products.
The criminal and misdemeanours law, in turn, mainly consists of Polish
national law acts, whose provisions are related to the following issues:
- crime, according to the Penal Code, against: life and health (Chapter XIX,
Art. 148 to 162 PC); common safety (Chapter XX. Art. 163 to 172); safety in
traffic (Chapter XXI, Art. 173 to 180); environment (Chapter XXII, Art. 181 to
188); freedom22 (Chapter XXIII, Art. 189 to 193); freedom of conscience and
religion (Chapter XXIV, Art. 194 to 196); sexual and moral freedom (Chapter
XXV, Art. 197 to 205); family and care (Chapter XXVI, Art. 206 to 211a); honour
and bodily integrity (Chapter XXVII, Art. 212 to 217a); the rights of people
performing paid work (Chapter XXVIII, Art. 218 to 221); the activities of national
institutions and local government (Chapter XXIX, Art. 222 to 231a); justice
(Chapter XXX, Art. 232 to 247a); elections and referendum (Chapter XXXI,
Art. 248 to 251); public order (Chapter XXXII, Art. 252 to 264a); protection of
information (Chapter XXXIII, Art. 265 to 269b); the credibility of documents
(Chapter XXXIV, Art. 270 to 277); property (Chapter XXXV, Art. 278 to 295);
trading (Chapter XXXVI, Art. 296 to 309); money and securities trading (Chapter
XXXVII, Art. 310 to 316);
- fiscal offences, according to the Penal and Fiscal Code which lists a total of
fiscal offences against: tax obligations and expenses on grants and subventions;
customs duties and the regulations on foreign trade in goods and services; foreign
exchange and organisation of lotteries and pari-mutuel betting 23;
21
Act of 6 September 2001 on road transport (Journal of Laws of 2001 No. 125, item. 1371). As
a consequence of the introduction of the Act, the Road Transport Inspectorate was created to monitor
compliance with the provisions of road transport and non-commercial national and international road
transport of motor vehicles, with the exception of vehicles referred to in art. 3 of the Act. See Articles
48-82. and Article 3 of the Act. 82.
22
Here, it is about crimes against freedom within the understanding of the Penal Code : unlawful
imprisonment, threatening another person with committing an offence to make harm to this person or
an immediate person, if the threat causes a well-founded fear that it will be fulfilled, violence against
a person or an unlawful threat to coerce another person to a particular action, nonfeasance or
abrogating, performing medical treatment without the patient’s permission, encroaching into
someone’s house, flat, room or fenced area, or staying in such a place against the request of the
entitled person. See Kodeks karny…, Articles 189-193.
23
See Kodeks karny skarbowy…, Articles: 54; 55; 85; 86; 97; 107 i 107a.
155
WALDEMAR KITLER
- misdemeanours: fiscal (see above) and , according to the Petty Offence
Code,24 against: public peace and order; national, local and communal institutions;
security of people and property; security and order in communication; person;
health; property; consumer interests; public decency; facilities for public use;
registry obligation, and also in the area of forest, field and garden damage25.
Among other regulations related to public safety, it is worth paying attention to
the issues on personal data protection; protection of people and property; building
law; water law; aviation law26; public roads; traffic regulations; transport / carriage
law; international shipments of wastes, and forests.
Behind the main tasks carried out in the framework of public safety (and order)
are crime fighting: organised crime; criminal offences; cross-border criminal
offences; drugs; economic crime; cybercrime; terrorism and extremism; corruption;
offences against trading and credibility of documents; offences against the interests
of the European Union; and also prevention of counterfeit, mass disruption of
public order and safety, disruption of mass events security as well as threats to
traffic27.
The tasks of public authorities in the field of public safety (and order) are set
out in relevant law acts. These are mainly: the Act of 4 September 1997 on
government administration28; the Act of 23 January 2009 on provincial governor
and government administration in provinces29; the Act of 5 June 1998 on
provincial government30; the Act of 5 June 1998 on district government 31; the Act
of 8 March 1990 on commune government32 as well as the Act of 26 April 2007 on
crisis management33.
The tasks of special services in the field of public safety and order are, in turn,
determined in: the Act of 6 April 1990 on the Police34; the Act of 12 October 1990
on the protection on the national border35; the Act of 12 October 1990 on the
24
The Act of 20 May 1971 on the Code offenses (Journal of Laws of 2007 No. 109, item. 757, as
amended)
25
See ibid, respectively: chapters VIII-XIX.
26
In chapter 3 of the Act on Rescue and Fire protection of airports, the tasks of an airport
manager were determined. They mainly deal with organising and maintaining rescue system and fire
protection of the airport within the frames of national emergency system. The tasks of the Civil
Aviation Authority include creating conditions aimed at increasing the safety of air transport;
providing protection of civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference within the respect of its
properties.
27
See Raport o stanie bezpieczeństwa w Polsce w 2010 roku, MSWiA, Warszawa 2011.
28
Journal of Laws of 1997 No. 141, item. 943, as amended, edited.
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
156
Border Guard36; the Act of 24 August 1991 on the National Fire Service37; the Act
of 27 August 2009 on Customs Service38; the Act of 24 May 2002 on the Internal
Security Office and the Intelligence Service39; the Act of 9 June 2006 on the
Central Anti-Corruption Bureau40, the Act of 16 March 2001 on the Government
Security Bureau41.
Moreover, there are local consolidated and non-consolidated administrative
authorities of an inspection and control character involved in ensuring public safety
and order42, dealing with various aspects of public safety and order as well as
communal and city guards43, persons and property protection agencies44 as well as
non-governmental organisations45. It is assumed that they are a part of a broadly
understood system of law-abiding authorities. It is worth pointing to the fact that
the acts regulating this issue – both constitutional and jurisdiction – come from
various periods during the construction of our country, have been repeatedly
changed, either directly or through the provisions in other acts, and do not always
fulfil the legislative requirements of correctness.
To sum up the issues of public safety, covering public order and the safety of
citizens, we have assumed what was agreed.
The nature of public order can be explained as being about the manner of
people’s (individuals or groups of people) behaviour in public places, and maybe
better in public than non-public space. Although the Penal Code regulates the
criminal liability of citizens of a certain country, we will probably find the best
hints for distinguishing the content of the concept of public order in its provisions.
It results from these that public order is related to the following issues:
36
38
Journal of Laws of 2009 No. 168, item. 1323, as amended. edited.
39
40
41
42
These are the complex local administration authorities, the school superintendent, Provincial
Inspector of Road Transport, Regional Pharmaceutical Inspector, Provincial Inspector of Plant Health
and Seed Inspection, Provincial Inspector of Construction Supervision, Provincial Inspector of
Geodesy and Cartography, Provincial Inspector of Environment Protection, Provincial Inspector of
Trade Inspection, Provincial Inspector of Agricultural and Food Quality, Provincial Sanitary
Inspector, Provincial Veterinary Officer. These are also non-complex local administration authorities
- art. 56 of the Act of 23 January 2009 on the palatine and government in the province (Journal of
Laws of 2009 No. 31, item. 206, as amended).
43
The Act of 29 August 1997 on the Community Guards (Journal of Laws of 1997 No. 123,
item. 779, as amended)
44
The Act of 22 August 1997 on the protection of persons and property, (Journal of Laws of
2005 No. 145, item. 1221, as amended)
45
The Act of 24 April 2003 on Public Benefit and Volunteer Work (Journal of Laws of 2003 No.
96, item. 873), the Act of April 7, 1989, the Law on Associations (Journal of Laws of 1989, No. 20
item. 104, as amended)
37
157
WALDEMAR KITLER
- taking or holding a hostage in order to force a government or local
government, an institution agency, an organisation, an individual, a legal person or
a group of people to behave in a certain way;
- taking an active part in a mass meeting, knowing that its participants will
commit a violent assault on a person or property;
- taking, damaging or making components of the following systems unusable:
water supply, heating, sewage, electricity, gas, telecommunications or railway,
tramway, trolleybus or underground, thereby causing disruptions to the operation
of the whole or a part of a network or line;
- public provocation to committing a fiscal misdemeanour or offence, a crime
or approve of an offence;
- distributing or presenting publically information likely to facilitate
commission of a terrorist offence, intending such an offence to be committed;
- public promotion of fascist or other totalitarian system of a state or exhorting
to hatred based on various differences – national, ethnic, racial, religious or due to
a lack of religious beliefs;
- public insulting of a group of people or particular individuals due to their
nationality, ethnic, racial or religious affiliations, or due to their lack of religious
beliefs, or if for such reasons, the bodily integrity of a person is violated;
- participation in an organised group or association (as well as of an armed
character) aiming at committing a crime or a fiscal offence;
- using force or an unlawful threat which foils holding a lawful meeting,
gathering or procession, or scattering such a meeting, gathering or procession;
- insulting a monument or another public place commemorating a historical
event or a person;
- profaning and fleecing human remains or burial places;
- crossing the border of the Republic of Poland with the use of force, threat,
deception or in cooperation with other persons.
For the safety of citizens everything that is related to the reality of being
a citizen of a certain country guaranteeing their legal protection, should be taken
under consideration. Guided by the provisions of the Penal Code,46 we can come to
the conclusion that it is about protection against people’s activities which threaten:
people’s life and health; general safety; security in communications; environment;
freedom; freedom of conscience and religion; sexual freedom and customs; family
and care; honour and bodily integrity; the rights of people performing paid work as
well as election and referendum, among other things.
The matters of internal order in a country, on an entity basis, are related to two
specific subjects: a country as a political institution (legal, sovereign) and a citizen.
Hence, the rule, according to which there is a confrontation between the necessity
to ensure the fulfilment of the country’s interests (read: the interests of the state
46
The issues of “civil security” were also taken in Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego RP
z 2007 r., however, in the opinion of the author they were presented cursorily.
158
authorities) and the interests of the citizens, is confirmed. It is natural that they are
not always compatible, even when the country acts to protect public safety, and
what is more – the safety of its citizens.
Management process in the area of counteraction to threats of internal
order in the country
An attribute of management and, what is more, public administration
management is having power, whose source is the right to use the resources that
determine the functioning of an organisation. Government is connected with the
relationship of the subjection of the management entity to the manager. The
competence of management is closely associated, and not without reason, with
dominative and non-dominative eligibility and forms of administrative activities.
The manager incessantly faces problems, which require continuous and recurrent
solving, and this requires having competent governmental authority, manifested in
the form of normative and administrative acts. Also, non-dominative forms of
administrative activities are worth mentioning, when at least between two entities
there is no relation of ‘managing and managed’ type, and, according to Jerzy
Paśnik, these are: administrative settlement, administrative agreements, civil-law
transactions and factual actions47.
Management is often associated with directing, which from a formal point of
view, is ill conceived. Direction is mainly based on the right to provoke a particular
behaviour from the directed. Direction is the totality of a director’s activities
involving the impact on directed entities, aimed at making them behave (operate,
function) in accordance with his will to achieve a goal and realise a certain task.
Management is a form of direction, distinguished due to the competences of the
manager to use resources (human, material, financial), which consists in
undertaking entire planning, organisational, motivational and monitoring activities
by the management in order to achieve the goal and realise the task.
In public administration, we deal both with directing and managing. However,
directing, according to Zbigniew Leoński, is related to two aspects: the dominative
impact of the superior authority on its subsidiaries in the public administration
hierarchy, as well as directing the activities of a certain group of people in a given
organisational unit48. Generally, therefore, the directing person is the one who has
the formal right to influence the behaviour of others, and indeed, the one who sets
the rules of people’s behaviour. Management, on the other hand, is when one has at
47
More: J. Paśnik, Prawne formy działania administracji publicznej, [in:] Administracja
publiczna i prawo administracyjne w zarysie, edited by M. Karpiuk, J. Kowalski, PWP „Iuris”,
Warszawa-Poznań 2013, p. 107-124.
48
See Z. Leoński, Nauka administracji, edition 6, Publishing House C.H. Beck, Warszawa 2010,
p. 93.
159
WALDEMAR KITLER
one’s disposal and wields the human, material, service, information and financial
resources in order to achieve the targeted goal, and also while performing a certain
task.
Taking the complexity of the issue of internal order in the country into account,
as well as the non-equivalence of three of its components in formal, objective and
subjective terms, it is difficult to characterise and evaluate the process of
management in this area unambiguously. Thus, it is not that easy when ensuring
security under the circumstances of threats to the state and during a war. Firstly,
this is due to the fact that an armed aggression49 has its detailed interpretation in
international law, and secondly, because the subject responsible for the initiation
and coordination of all actions in the area of management is the supreme
government administration authority (Minister, Council of Ministers) or in certain
cases, the President of the Republic of Poland. The whole management process is,
therefore without doubt, centralised and hierarchical. For the protection of internal
order in a country the situation is different.
Protection of internal order can take place under two formal states of country
state functioning, a normal state and a state of emergency. Due to the weakness of
Polish legislation of states of emergency, it could appear that it is only about the
state of emergency, but such an approach could be some kind of misunderstanding.
Both protected items in the area of internal order and insulting them will be taken
into consideration during each state of emergency, and the state of emergency will
be, of course, a special case of action in the area.
What is more, the legislator, as opposed to the external threats and the period of
war, divided the tasks in the area of the protection of internal order among
a number of entities, including the decentralisation of responsibility. This results in
a need to process the issues of internal order protection through the prism of many
protected items and objectively separated tasks, as well as many separate
contractors. This means that there is no a single, centrally coordinated management
system in this regard.
The protected items in the area of internal order protection taken into account,
excluding the divisions made so far, can be divided into the ones which are and
will be protected in a centralised and systemic way, and into the ones which will
still be subjected to a certain dissipation. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that
some of the specific protected items could be the basis for the introduction of
a state of emergency. Thus, any actions for organising the sphere of the
management of internal order protection in a country could be realised according to
a certain scheme whose essence joins the answers to the following questions: What
items are protected, and what conditions and degree (scale) of threat as well as who
and what and to what extent should take actions (including the justification of the
49
In the Polish law of the war state, an armed aggression means an external threat to the country
and an armed attack on the territory of Poland.
160
state of emergency) to make the process of internal order protection management
bring the desired results?
Where:
- protected items are these elements of the constitutional system of a state and
public safety, which in the legal area are considered as constitutive elements of
protected items;
- the condition and degree (scale of a threat) are measured in the value of the
protected item, and not in the extent of the situation of a specific threat – it is, in
other words, the seriousness of threats to valuable goods, having impact on the
survival of the entire nation (it can be measured on a scale of 1 to 5, where
number 5 means the highest degree);
- the scale of operation – it is a measure of the involved resources, costs and
participation of entities of public authorities (it can be measured on a scale of 1
to 5, where number 5 means the highest degree).
In the context of the above question, a thesis should be established that if there
is no doubt as to the significance of the introduction of a state of emergency by the
President of the Republic of Poland at the request of the Council of Ministers, in
a situation of a specific threat to the constitutional system of the country, there is
great doubt as to whether such a situation of a specific threat to the safety of
citizens and public order is possible to constitute the basis for the introduction of
such a state, in the mode above. The diagram below can be helpful (table 1).
It can be seen from that brief and subjective calculation that among the vast
number of elements influencing the protected good, which is internal order in
a country, only a few of them, being the key part of the constitutional system of the
country, should be subordinated to one management (coordination) in the areas of
planning, organising, motivating and controlling, and consequently, also in such
cases, the belief in the need to introduce a state of emergency could appear. The
author is not convinced, as far as such behaviour is concerned, in other cases from
the constitutional system area.
Due to the fact that the most important constituent elements of the
constitutional system of a country are (should be) protected in centralised and
hierarchical systems, the answer to the question whether appropriate authorities
take actions coordinating the whole spectrum of operations should be negative, and
this means there is still no systemic approach to the issues in the area, and the data
available to the author does not show that there are some planning and
organisational activities undertaken for the inference of the introduction,
proclamation and execution of the state of emergency resolutions. I think it is still
so that only a presumptive state of war has careful planning and organisational
frames50.
50
Even a possible state of emergency, due to the fact that everything in the area of people’s life
protection, protection of property in a considerable range and the environment was exposed to crisis
management, is an “orphaned” state in its own way.
161
WALDEMAR KITLER
The protection of constituent elements of public safety (safety of citizens or
security of public order) is, in turn, decentralised, and is implemented to various
degrees and at various levels of public administration. Consequently, for this state of
affairs, the process of public safety management is carried out at all levels of public
administration in general, as well as in particular services, inspections and guards as far
as their properties specified by law, basic acts and internal edicts are concerned.
Due to the fact that inference and proclamation of a state of emergency is the
responsibility of the Council of Ministers and the President of the Republic of
Poland, and during the state, the coordination of the activities aimed at reestablishing the normal state belongs to the Prime Minister or a governor, the
answer to the question whether these authorities undertake planning and
organisational activities can be only negative. In the present state of affairs, the
author does not know about any activities in this area.
Table 1
A table of assessment of the value of protected goods for determining the basis for the
management process and the need of the introduction of the state of emergency
Actions /whether it requires
a state of emergency in the
situation of a specific threat
Elements of value protected
by law
Degree/ scale of a threat of
the value protected by law
5
Pr RP;
RM
5
Public
institutions
4
Republican state
under the rule of
law
Democratic state
under the rule of
law
The division and
balance of
powers
5
5
Pr RP;
OKPiOP
RM
Pr RP;
OKPiOP
RM
5
Public facilities
3
5
People’s life and
health
2
5
Pr RP;
RM
5
Norms and
social mores
1
Political
representation
5
Pr RP;
RM
5
Environment
2
Bicameral
parliament
2
?
2
General security
2
162
RM; M;
COAR; Wa;
S; W; TOAR;
RM; M;
COAR; Wa;
S; W; TOAR;
RM; M;
COAR; Wa;
S; W; TOAR
RM; M;
COAR; Wa;
S; W; TOAR
RM; M;
COAR; Wa;
S; W; TOAR
RM; M;
COAR; Wa;
S; W; TOAR
Responsible subject
The sovereignty
of the nation
Responsible subject
Value protected by law – public safety,
including public order and safety of citizens
by law
Value protected by law – constitutional
political system
3
3
2
1
2
2
Responsible subject
by law
Political
pluralism
4
Pr RP;
RM
4
Safety in
communications
3
Decentralisation
of powers
3
Pr RP;
RM
3
Freedom
2
Self-government
3
Pr RP;
RM
3
Freedom of
conscience and
religion
2
Separation of
state and church
5
Pr RP;
RM
5
Sexual freedoms
and customs
1
Rights and
freedoms of man
and citizen
5
Pr RP;
OKPiOP
RM
5
Family and care
1
Parliamentary
form of
government
4
Pr RP;
RM
4
Honour and
bodily integrity
1
Severability and
independence of
the judiciary and
tribunals
5
Pr RP;
RM
5
Rights of people
performing paid
work
1
Social economy
market
3
?
?
Election and
referendum
2
Property
protection
4
?
?
National and
religious
symbols
3
3
?
?
others
?
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Economic
freedoms
Others
Responsible subject
Value protected by law – public safety,
including public order and safety of citizens
by law
Value protected by law – constitutional
political system
RM; M;
COAR; Wa;
S; W; TOAR
RM; M;
COAR; Wa;
S; W; TOAR
RM; M;
COAR; Wa;
S; W; TOAR
OKPiOP;RM;
M; COAR;
Wa; S; W;
TOAR
OKPiOP;RM;
M; COAR;
Wa; S; W;
TOAR
OKPiOP;RM;
M; COAR;
Wa; S; W;
TOAR
OKPiOP;RM;
M; COAR;
Wa; S; W;
TOAR
OKPiOP;RM;
M; COAR;
Wa; S; W;
TOAR
OKPiOP;RM;
M; COAR;
Wa; S; W;
TOAR
3
2
3
1
1
1
1
2
1
Agenda: Pr RP – the President RP; OKPiOP – national control and protection of law authorities; RM – the Council
of Ministers; M – minister; COAR – central government administration authority; Wa – governor ; TOAR
– local government administration authority; S – district governor; W - commune head, mayor, city mayor
163
WALDEMAR KITLER
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165
Zeszyty
Naukowe
AON nrno
2(59)
2005
NDU
Scientific
Quarterly
4(93)
2013
ISSN 0867–2245
RYSZARD CHROBAK, MAREK KUBIŃSKI
ISSN
2353-1789
STATE SECURITY THREATS
Assoc. Prof. Ryszard CHROBAK, Ph.D.
Col. Assoc. Prof. Marek KUBIŃSKI, Ph.D.
Abstract
Due to its geopolitical situation, Poland functions in a particular environment implying
constraints which can be more or less accurately forecasted. The responsibility of those
who have the state security at heart must aim at building mechanisms able to detect the
changes and mechanisms limiting threats in the future. As in any system, the state’s most
important element is its people, that is society. In this context, in order to prepare society,
in the best possible way for new situations, it seems appropriate to forecast most accurately
the challenges and threats it possibly faces.
The hostile elements existing in the environment, with their new destructive
capabilities, and in the virtual reality too, force us to analyse the motives and strategies of
their activity attentively in order not to allow situations threatening our national interests.
Key words – challenges, threats, national security, internal security, terrorism,
cyberterrorism, military threats, media, security education, transnational organised crime
The factors determining change in the national and international security
environment in the modern world indicate that it is, in fact, becoming freer from an
outbreak of a global conflict. The reduced level of risk of global conflict triggers,
to some extent, other threats, which in the bipolar world were treated as minor
problems. Nowadays, as well as in the foreseeable future, the level of state security
is not only measured by the probability of a military threat. Hence, it is considered
legitimate to address the problems of own security in different conditions of the
state functioning. The legitimacy of the above thesis results not only from the
changes in the contemporary world, but mainly from the state legal obligations in
the scope of ensuring the conditions for its survival and development in the
international arena in any circumstances. The notion of security contains the
designata connected with all spheres of social, human and state life. Threats are an
imminent part of life and cannot be eliminated. They can only be brought to
a socially accepted level or to a level of readiness allowing them to be neutralised
166
or eradicated or their negative effects opposed in an organised way. Therefore, the
state security system must be an efficient instrument of the state policy enabling it
to ensure its independence and territorial integrity, which should maintain its
readiness to oppose any threats irrespective of the estimated probability of their
occurrence.
At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s in Poland, a process
started which aimed to redefine the way threats were perceived in many areas of
state security. The political changes, known by many politicians as the revolution
of the Central- and East European states, were one of the most significant factors
contributing to the demise of powers in the world which lead to the disappearance
of its bipolarity. It did not mean, however, that the problem of state security
became less important. On the contrary, it needs to be approached in a different
way, that is to take into consideration the new geopolitical situation of Poland.
Moreover, being a NATO member, Poland should aim to be an attractive ally and
contribute to the reconstruction of the existing all-European security system.
Security can be considered as a multidimensional category. It can be discussed as
the relation of the state to its citizens and their community; in the network of the
correlation between the states; in the framework of international life factors and in
view of the overriding norms of morality and international law.
As in any system which is a state, and also in this most complex one, the most
important element is the people, that is society. In this context, in order to prepare
this society in the best possible way for new, often difficult and surprising
situations, it is necessary to verify some areas of the citizens' current state of mind.
The main areas of human activity, such as commerce, communication, culture and
finances, not to mention social plagues, such as drug addiction, crime, epidemics
and terrorism, more and more often cross national borders and national
sovereignty. Hence, what takes place in these fields is the constant globalisation of
institutions and threats. If reviving nationalism, a mighty and ruthless power, is
added to these phenomena, the challenges faced currently by security guarding
organisations can easily be perceived.
With reference to the objectives of general education, contemporary citizenship
education faces tasks consisting in equipping the society with the appropriate
knowledge and abilities allowing it to organise efficient individual and collective
protection and defence against the effects of various threats, as well as to conduct
effective rescue operations and bring help to people in danger.
When in ancient Greece, Thucydides of Athens was asked, when will there be
justice in Athens? – he said that there will be justice in Athens when those who are
not injured are as outraged as those who are. This sentence has survived a few
thousand years and nowadays is still relevant, although the notion of security
changed within the space of a few centuries. In different political systems and
historical periods it was understood in various ways. There was also an additional
167
question asked, how to act in order to ensure security for oneself and one's loved
ones. What is worth emphasising is the fact that these questions are valid today1.
Security is not a static phenomenon, but one that evolves and changes with the
development of civilisation. The analysis of objectives and the course of many
post- WW II military conflicts allow us to notice a certain regularity, which can be
summarised in the statement that threats that precede them, as a rule, have more
than one cause. Their sources are rather a coincidence of many unregulated issues
of, for example, economic, territorial, psychological ethnic, religious, political,
ecological or military character. What emerges from the above mentioned causes is
a wide range of unresolved problems which accompanied the international
community when it entered the 21st century. These are the factors that will
destabilise the international situation, turn into threats and constitute the embers of
conflicts.
Deepening developmental disproportions lead to differences. On a global scale,
an emerging difference between the rich North and the poor South can be
observed; and on a regional scale - in Europe, between the rich West and the poor
East. The growth of these disproportions may become the source of military
conflicts. Moreover, such conflicts may have different scopes and be connected
with the use of different ways of military achievement of assumed objectives. The
causes of these conflicts require attentive analysis and and the symptoms
threatening national interests need to be forecast. Hence, one of the fundamental
changes in the scope of citizenship education is new challenges and threats.
It is a frequent practice to use these terms interchangeably, which leads to
certain inaccuracies2. This problem is also indicated by B. Balcerowicz3, who
explains that a challenge is a new and difficult situation which requires
determining a response and taking appropriate action. A challenge may be
dangerous or may contain a certain type of risk, but does not have to be one.
Whereas, a threat is a situation in which there is a high probability of the
development of the state which is dangerous for a given environment4.
Threats may appear in the military and non-military fields. A particular
category of new threats is terrorist activity which requires multiple undertakings,
carried out more and more often with the participation of non-militant people (the
civilian population).
The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland5 of 2007 indicates
that it is organised international terrorism that is the threat for Europe, and
consequently for Poland. Due to that reason, Poland must take into account the
possibility of activity aimed against its security in connection with participation in
the antiterrorist campaign. Retaliatory actions are also not impossible as
1
Cf. A. Urban, Bezpieczeństwo społeczności lokalnych, Warsaw 2009, p. 11.
Cf. B. Szulc, Wpływ zagrożeń na teorię walki, p.k. Zagrożenia, AON, Warsaw 2003, p. 14.
3
B. Balcerowicz, Pokój i nie-pokój na progu XXI wieku, Warsaw 2002, p. 185.
4
Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego, BPiI MON, Warsaw 1966, p. 117.
5
The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw, November 2007.
2
168
a consequence of antiterrorist activities undertaken by NATO, the United States or
the EU. What is a particular threat to the Polish entities that perform tasks outside
the country's borders are the military activities carried out by terrorist groups in the
area of responsibility of the Polish Military Contingents.
Despite quite general agreement concerning the character of contemporary
threats, it is not easy to find consensus in military and political circles concerning
the classification of these threats. Apart from the increasingly common division
into: peacetime threats, crisis threats and wartime threats, the analysis of
professional literature allow us to distinguish two: the military and non-military
ones6. Military threats most often include: war and military aggression, local crises
and conflicts, excessive concentration of military potential, and proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction; while non-military threats cover: international
terrorism, organised crime, natural and ecological disasters, and illegal migration.
Due to the geopolitical situation of Poland and the economic problems of the
post-Soviet countries, the territory of Poland is the place through which runs the
main channels of the activity of international organised crime, including especially
the smuggling of goods of illicit origin and, for instance, drugs.
Recently uncontrolled movement of nuclear technology and fissile materials
has also become a significant threat. It is even more dangerous as they may be
reached by states connected with terrorist organisations.
According to CBOS (Centre for Public Opinion Research) Polish citizens
believe that among miseries brought to the world by the 21st century the prime
ones include terrorism, organised crime and unemployment (figure 1).
A consequence of Polish accession to the European Union is the freedom of
movement of citizens of different nationality on EU territory. Poland has already
become the seat of international institutions and agencies/posts which, in turn, may
become objects of terrorist attacks. Also, Polish diplomatic posts and citizens
abroad can be threatened by this type of activity. Although there are specially
trained and equipped police units of particular countries destined to undertake
activities preventing such threats, the increasing number of such phenomena may
lead to the necessity to reinforce these forces with military troops in rescue
operations (evacuation of Polish citizens), or the protection and defence ones (e.g.
against terrorist attacks on Polish diplomatic posts). In international relations,
terrorism7 seems to be highly attractive from the point of view of the organisers of
such activities, as the method of achieving objectives contradictory to the vital
interests of other states. Terrorism is becoming an instrument of international
confrontation and an effective „weapon” of the weaker against the stronger.
6
B. Szulc, Wpływ zagrożeń …, op. cit., p. 17.
It is worth quoting the definition of terrorism developed by the United States Department of
Defence which says that terrorism is: the unlawful usage - the threat of using - force or violence
against a person or property in order to threaten the government or society, often to achieve political,
religious or ideological goals.
7
169
genocide
nuclear weapon
environmental devastation
war
disease
unemployment
crime
terrorism
Source: own work on the basis of a CBOS opinion poll of a representative group of 2089 adult Poles, published in
2008.
Figure 1. Sources of threats to Poles' security
It needs to be emphasised that over half of victims of all terrorist attacks carried
out in recent years were civilians, and most often accidental ones.
Mass media has undoubtedly given a favourable spin to terrorist activity.
Thanks to the press, radio and above all television, an isolated act of violence
becomes a public issue8. Generalising multiple definitions of terrorism in the most
concise way, it may be said that „terrorism is an act of violence planned in such
a way so as to attract attention and by way of this publicity convey an appropriate
message”9.
The strategy of terrorism is a strategy based on communication; however, it is
necessary to be aware of the fact that the platform for this communication is not
only the official mass media but also the multiple methods available on the Internet
which can offer a worldwide range with minimal expenditure. The rapid
development of the global network, the increasingly higher bandwidth and falling
8
What often happens is the phenomenon called by Americans „CNNisation of the world”, that is
acting by politicians in the sphere of media facts and not the real ones. H. and A. Toffler emphasised
the media importance even stronger when they wrote that (...) some of the most important battles of
today will be fought in the field of the media.
9
Cf. T.R. Aleksandrowicz, Terroryzm międzynarodowy, Warsaw 2008, p. 21.
170
costs, have gradually made the Internet one of the main tools of communication for
terrorists. Thanks to the Internet, the possibility of conveying propaganda messages
and influencing society is simply unlimited. The Internet cannot be censored and,
due to the power of its message and the possibility of influencing social attitudes,
has much greater potential than television; where journalist self-censorship remains
and top-down legal regulations make it impossible to present the full scale of
a given dramatic event. Television stations often refrain from showing the most
violent events, but this is not so in the case of the Internet. Without much effort,
anybody who has access to the Internet can connect with the right portal and watch
the most drastic scenes, e.g. the execution of hostages. Other terrorist film
productions can also be found on the Internet, e.g. recordings of attacks and suicide
bombings. Many of these films are long (even up to a dozen or so minutes)
productions, with background music and propaganda or religious slogans visible to
a reader, and they remind one in their format of video clips familiar in the West.
Taking into consideration the wide range of the Internet, its widespread access and
uncontrolled content, it is clear that the possibilities it gives in the scope of
propaganda activity and the gathering of financial resources are immeasurable. It
can be assumed that the Internet is becoming a dominant form for conveying
information.10
The RFE/RL's research „The Al-Qaeda Media Nexus” focused on the relations
between the media connected with Al Qaeda and armed groups in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Daniel Kimmage, the research founder, claims that the Internet has
become a fundamental tool, used by this supranational organisation to promote its
message. In 2007, this author collected material from the net being a media bond of
al Qaeda. It turns out that this organisation forbids its followers to create the
content on their own, in order not to lose control over it and not to allow internal
differences and disputes to be uncovered. Uploaded messages have a template: at
the top of the page the logo of the group that prepared the material appears, and at
the bottom the logo of the group that produced the video. The Internet, thanks to its
flexibility and universality, has become a great world network allowing fanatics
a free discussion on an international scale.11
When analysing the internal and external environment of the state in the
context of potential threats to the state security, the authors could not omit
cyberterrorism, since any state which uses virtual space may become its victim, and
undoubtedly Poland also.
It seems appropriate to present the notion of cyberterrorism with a background
of a fairly common classification of terrorist phenomena, that is:
• classical terrorism;
• superterrorism (nuclear, biological and chemical);
• cyberterrorism.
10
11
Tomasz Goban-Klas. Media i terroryści. Kraków 2009, pp. 198-199.
Ibidem, p. 202.
171
The third category - cyberterrorism- can be divided into subcategories,
according to researchers, allowing the placing of events connected with violence
and attack in the information dimension. These include activism, hacktivism and
cyberterrorism. In order to avoid ambiguity, it has been assumed that there are
three equal problems which are a threat to the state information security and do not
possess the qualities of an international conflict due to the fact that the notion of
cyberterrorism is contained in itself:
• aktyvism: activities aiming at communicating and coordinating actions
undertaken by activist organisations. These include such subgroups as – collecting
information, publication, dialogue, coordination of activities, and lobbying;
• haktivsm: the combination of criminal activity and activism, consists in civil
disobedience referring to the Net. It includes virtual occupation, blockades, e-mail
bombs, hacking into websites and computers, computer viruses and bugs;
• cyberterrorism: the notion at the junction of cyberspace and terrorism. It is
different from haktivism as the aim of its activity is to inflict the largest possible
damage on the enemy, including human victims. The most important types of
cyberterrorist attacks are: logical bombs, Trojans, chipping, spoofing, hijacking,
sniffing, DOS, Van Eck phreaking, flooding, and spamming.12
As mentioned above, the computer network is nowadays doubtlessly a „blood
circulation system” for any modern state. It is actually the foundation of the
undisturbed activity of all spheres of state functioning, but mainly of its security.
On the basis of the above, it can be assumed, after Glenn Buchan, that there are
various reasons which might induce terrorists to carry out attacks in cyberspace:
• regular armed activity costs are incomparably higher than the costs of
activity via the Internet. Currently, most members of society have their own
computers; hence to launch a cyber-attack it is enough to have access to the
Internet and some skills;
• an attack can be carried out from any place on the planet which has access to
the Internet. The barriers between what is state, private, commercial and military
have become blurred. It is not known where the attack comes from and who is
behind it;
• actions are sudden and unpredictable, victims do not expect it, are unaware
of danger and unprepared to repulse the attack;
• anonymity undoubtedly allows information to be manipulated, causes
impediments connected with repulsing the attack by the state and the building of
the coalition;
• there is a minimal risk of uncovering the ready attack; the intentions of the
attacker are also unknown;
12
Krzysztof Liedel, Bezpieczeństwo informacyjne w dobie terrorystycznych i innych zagrożeń
bezpieczeństwa narodowego, Toruń 2005. pp. 35–40.
172
• greater propaganda effects and acknowledgement of public opinion are
gained by paralysing the system of the enemy state than by aggression towards
innocent people.13
Intensively evolving criminal cyberterrorism is directed against banks and
business; for example, during the attack on the ICT network in 1995 in Frankfurt,
the functioning of stock exchange servers was blocked. Experience shows that
nowadays it is not a problem to train an appropriate number of hackers whose aim
may be to launch a mass attack on servers supporting such areas as: finance,
transport, communication, medicine, energetics or national defence”14.
The issue strictly connected with cyberterrorism is Internet wars. This notion
refers to „(...) actions aiming to damage, destroy or disrupt the operation of
software, computers or information networks of a state or organisation, carried out
by non-public actors, as a response to a similar attack launched by other non-public
actors. Internet wars mean transferring real conflict or tension to cyberspace where
a virtual clash takes place with the participation of more or less organised groups of
hackers, but also cyberterrorists”.15 In practice, the objects of their interest are:
software, computer networks of the government, public utility organisations, army
and companies, which is why these tasks may in a decisive way contribute to
a lowering of the national security level.
To conclude, the phenomenon of cyberterrorism may always be a very
dangerous, politically inspired act of aggression towards computers, networks or IT
systems of any state aiming either to destroy its infrastructure or to terrorise the
government and extort from it the decisions or activities complying with a terrorist
organisation's wish.
Another, extremely dangerous threat, which the state needs to defy firmly and
effectively, is transnational organised crime.
International criminal groups, fighting for areas of influence and smuggling
channels, especially including mafia gangs from the East, clash precisely on the
territory of Poland which has become a transit country, and more and more often,
the destination of refugees, mainly from Asia. One of the requirements of the
European Union towards Poland is sealing the Eastern border against uncontrolled
movement of people and goods. In practice, the implementation of these
requirements is manifested in the increased number of Border Guard posts and the
introduction of the visa obligation for the neighbouring countries from the East.
These efforts should significantly limit transnational organised crime, not only on
the territory of Poland, but also in the whole of the European Union. Organised
crime is difficult to easily define and does not submit to simple schemata, which is
why it often generates problems and controversies in the research environment.
13
A. Bógdał-Brzezińska, M. Gawrycki, Cyberterroryzm
informacyjnego we współczesnym świecie, Warsaw 2003, pp.88-89.
14
Ibidem, pp. 231.
15
A. Bógdał-Brzezińska, M. Gawrycki, op.cit., p.164.
i
problemy
bezpieczeństwa
173
This is because it is a complex and diverse phenomenon changeable in form, which
covers many spheres of public life, constantly evolves and is of dynamic character.
To put it in the most concise way, transnational crime can be defined as
a criminal phenomenon occurring on an international scale which cannot be strictly
limited to an actual crime. It includes a set of particular offences, a complex form
of anti-social behaviour. It is not a phenomenon previously unknown, as it was
present in many countries, in different forms, and the objects of its interest were
various spheres of social and economic life16.
International organised crime is defined in professional literature as one of the
„new risks” or „non-traditional risks” which pose a threat to the security of citizens
as well as whole states and the international order. Threats posed by this
phenomenon are not direct and easily noticed, on the contrary, it is very difficult to
recognise its activity and evaluate the scale of its influence on the state and
international security system.17 B. Hołyst counts organised crime among the factors
which introduce chaos in a society by disturbing the balance of social systems and
their cohesion, which contributes to destabilisation. They act against the social
order in respect of the economy, law and morals18. The source of threat caused by
criminal groups comes from the very fact of undertaking illegal activity, and
consequently infringing, on a large scale, rights protected by law. Whereas, what is
even more dangerous for the state security system are the long-term effects of
organised crime cross-border activity, whose sources should be sought in the so
called secondary influence of criminal groups. Taking into consideration the fact
that, as a result of illegal activity, organised criminal groups gain particular
financial benefits, it should also be assumed that the resources obtained are used to
influence the situation of particular states, their economies, and also, consequently,
their security. So the financial resources obtained may also be used by criminal
groups, not only to enhance the efficiency of their activity (buying better weapons
and other technical equipment, paying specialised advisors), or to create
a protective umbrella (corruption of officials and officers of law enforcement
units), but also – even if these types of effects are not intended by the criminals – to
lead to the destabilisation of the economic situation (growth of consumption and
inflation caused by the inflow of illegal financial resources) as well as the political
situation of the state (the decline in the trust of citizens towards politicians and
state bodies caused by corruption and a lack of effectiveness in combating crime)19.
Cross-border organised crime also takes various forms in Poland. Its
manifestation and range of activity in particular time spans also vary. To
generalise, one can assume a thesis that this form of crime is a very dynamic
phenomenon and at the same time impossible to describe in highly general terms.
16
Cf., http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Przestępczość_zorganizowana, of 30 January 2012.
Cf. Zięba R., (ed.): Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe po zimnej wojnie, Warsaw 2008, p. 29.
18
Cf. Hołyst B.: Kryminologia, 9th extended edition, Warsaw 2007, p. 414.
19
http://przestepczosczorganizowana.pl/index.php?go=13, of 30 January 2012.
17
174
Treating the above discussed threats as real and characterised with an
extremely high probability of occurring, it cannot be ruled out that some of them,
in the presence of appropriate situational factors in the state external environment,
may turn into military threats. That is why, it seems appropriate to say that in order
to assess potential threats to the state security it is necessary to explain the causes
of military threats in Poland's external environment. The analysis of professional
literature in this respect indicates that these causes include:
• unequal economic development;
• territorial claims and ethnic issues;
• international organised crime;
• religious fundamentalism.
Special attention should be drawn, in the authors' opinion, to religious
fundamentalism20 as a source of threats, and, in particular, to the spreading in
a number of forms, so called „militant Islam”, which leads to liberation conflicts,
where membership of a religious community increases the morale of fighting sides.
The manifestation of militant Islam may be terrorism in unstable states, such as
Afghanistan or Pakistan. Also, others among those causes presented above
contribute to the existence of military as well as terrorist21 threats which lead to
armed conflicts. Military threats, as an effect of the coincidence of different causes,
may lead to armed violence22. Professional literature offers different classifications
of military threats. However, the majority of military theorists agree that armed
forces may be used in an indirect and direct way. Due to that fact, it seems
appropriate to divide them into: the threat of indirect and direct use of armed
forces23.
Threats of indirect use of armed forces include24:
• military presence;
• military demonstration;
• armed blackmail;
• provocation (incidents);
• blockades;
• military assistance or support in the case of internal destabilisation.
Threats to the indirect use of armed forces deepen the crisis in a given region,
which may, or may not, require the military response of the international
community.
20
Religious fundamentalism is an aspiration to subordinate all spheres of human life and the life
of the society to religious rules and hedge them with law enforced by state institutions, [author's
note.].
21
The notion of a military and terrorist threat quoted after S. Dworecki, T. Kęsoń, M. Kulisz,
Współczesne konflikty zbrojne (aspekt prognostyczny), Warsaw 1998, p. 114.
22
P. Sienkiewicz, Wystarczalność obronna, Warsaw, 1996, pp. 59-60.
23
B. Balcerowicz, Obronność państwa średniego, Warsaw 1997, p. 75.
24
S. Dworecki, Prognoza obronności Polski do 2010, p.k. Gamma, Warsaw, 1994.
175
Direct use of armed forces may assume the following forms:
• armed intervention;
• armed border clash;
• sabotage attack;
• armed conflict on a limited scale;
• regular offensive military operation.
Examples of direct use of armed forces are connected with two types of armed
conflicts25:
• local conflicts of low or medium intensity26;
• wars on a large scale.
As a result of the location of Poland, and mainly the fact of being the „border
state” of NATO, the most probable armed conflict in the closest environment may
be a local conflict of low and medium intensity whose aim might be the annexation
of a part of a disputed territory. The analysis of this problem to date shows that
such a conflict is the most probable both on the territory of Poland as well as in the
other areas of NATO defensive responsibility.
There are many indications that show that in a local conflict of low and
medium intensity the prerequisite of an aggressor's success is achieving the aim
before the attacked party and its allies manage to implement effective
countermeasures. It may happen when the aggressor obtains the effect of surprise
by the selection of time, direction and strength of attack, where the aim of
aggression27 determines the way of using powers and resources28.
Moreover, the capability of firing assets at the disposal of the post-USSR
states, especially Russia in the Kaliningrad region, have allowed the estimated
ranges of their influence on the territory of Poland to be defined. Their analysis
leads to another conclusion: that these states are able to launch an air rocket attack
on the territory of Poland without a physical violation of the state border.
The determination of the aim of an armed attack, the quantitative description of
powers and resources, as well as their range, allows us to sketch a probable route
for the potential aggressor's activity, which may proceed in accordance with the
following stages:
1. Causing armed military incidents29.
2. Attack and taking control of a disputed territory.
25
Ocena i prognoza zagrożeń polityczno – militarnych RP oraz właściwości przyszłych działań
wojennych [Evaluation and forecast of political and military threats of the Republic of Poland and the
characteristics of future war activities], Warsaw 1992, pp. 71–80, 115–116.
26
In western literature defined as: a „low-intensity conflict”.
27
Armed aggression –armed force used by a state against sovereignty, territorial integrity and
political independence of another country or otherwise contradictory to the United Nations Charter,
J. Marczak, J. Pawłowski, O obronie militarnej Polski przełomu XX i XXI wieku, Warsaw 1995, p. 216.
28
W. Lidwa, Współdziałanie w walce lądowej, Toruń 2000, p. 14.
29
Armed incident – intentional violation of state sovereignty (violation of borders). Cf.
R. Wróblewski, Elementy teoretyczne planowania strategicznego obrony narodowej, Warsaw 1992,
p. 17.
176
3. Holding the disputed territory.
4. Making the dispute international and „crawling” into long-lasting
negotiations.
The analysis of historical experiences and military theorists’ opinions indicates
that the development of a threat may take a few years. In this period, armed border
incidents may happen and criminal (robbing) groups may come into play to attack
the population of the borderland. Using the activity of sabotage groups, an
aggressor aims at penetrating deep into a disputed territory in order to cause
confusion and wreak havoc in the functioning of infrastructure and paralyse the
administrative system of a given region. The above, as well as an aggressor’s other
activities, are of a provocative or sabotage character.
Provocative activity aims at drawing the state into an armed conflict or
burdening it with the responsibility for causing it. These goals may be achieved by:
• terrorist attacks;
• armed uprising;
• attacks on border posts, military and administrative facilities;
• purposeful violation of the state border.
Another group of activities includes sabotage actions aimed at spreading panic,
destabilising social life and weakening the morale of the population. In order to
achieve this special actions, contracted criminal activities, smuggling, mugging or
robberies might be carried out. Also the activity of terrorist groups, special forces,
armed underworld groups or common criminal groups is possible30.
So far, the discussion has concerned possible military threats referring in
general to Poland's closest environment, that is Polish relations with its neighbours
not being NATO members. Moreover, Polish military units, mainly those marked
out for NATO response forces, may at any time be summoned to act in the defence
area of responsibility of the Atlantic Alliance, outside the territory of the country.
Using these forces within the framework of allied intervention, may have different,
often unfavourable consequences for the user, and require appropriate efforts in
order to avoid or minimise them.
Firstly, the situation should be systematically assessed and its development
forecast, irrespective of whether it is the territory of Poland or another NATO area
of responsibility.
Secondly, an allied intervention may cause different reactions on the part of
states (societies) of the territories where it takes place or on the part of the states
supporting them. Simultaneously, the possibility of political pressure towards
Poland cannot be ruled out completely, just as any attempts at retaliatory actions,
mainly by bringing into play terrorist groups to launch attacks on the territory of
30
From the point of view of the state self-defence in the face of such activity, it is important to
notice that the activity of irregular units, armed groups, gangs which carry out armed attacks against
another state, in accordance with Article 3 of the definition of aggression (Resolution no 3314/XXIX
of 14 December 1974 on Definition of Aggression), is considered as an act of aggression against
which any state has the right of self-defence.
177
Poland, which consequently may lead to an international crisis, and even to a local
armed conflict.
Thirdly, it might be necessary to use Polish response units to participate in
actions against the states that may be considered as sponsors of potential terrorists.
The selected threats and causes of conflicts presented in this article, arising
from the closer and further environment of Poland, confirm the complexity and
changeability of the problem. Both the adopted assumption that contemporary
threats do not eliminate military threats and the ones that might appear in the future
should be considered in the context of a conflict of low and medium intensity.
The picture of threats presented above constitutes the basis for defining the
directions of changes in the field of citizenship education. It seems advisable to
emphasise the significant redefining that has taken place in this respect.
In the documents of the Ministry of National Education it is stated that „the
role of education is (...) not only to give society the appropriate knowledge and
preparation for professional life on the free market, but also to change the
mentality, habits and customs by educating for democracy and explaining the
notion of integration (...). Hence, teaching should be in equal measure focused on
equipping people with practical skills as on shaping their predisposition to live and
serve in the community”31.
The assumptions of national education speak clearly of openness to the cultural
values of Europe and the world. If it is assumed that international rapprochements
lead to the averting of the threat of wars and promote peaceful coexistence and
cooperation between nations, it seems necessary to redefine the nature, aims,
content and organisation of education.
Although nowadays Poland is not facing any serious external threat and its
membership in the NATO structures seems to push such a possibility to the
background, what needs to be borne in mind are the significant dynamics of
changes taking place in Europe and in the world.
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179
Zeszyty
Naukowe
AON nrno
2(59)
2005
NDU
Scientific
Quarterly
4(93)
2013
ISSN 0867–2245
EUGENIUSZ JENDRASZCZAK
ISSN
2353-1789
DEVELOPMENT OF CONTEMPORARY
SECURITY TOOLS
Col. (ret.) Eugeniusz JENDRASZCZAK, Ph.D.
Abstract
The author pays attention to the current problems of development of collective security
tools, particularly focusing on the structures of such mechanisms, which form the basis of
the European states’ security. The article analyzes changes in perception of real threats in
order to present current directions of building adequate defence tools and mechanisms.
Dynamic and areas in which political, social and economic changes take place, bring new
assessments of contemporary threats. When the Cold War ended, the European states based
their vision of security on NATO an EU. They had a traditional approach to NATO as the
safest and the most reliable political and military structure, which was supposed to become
their refuge of safety. The European Union, on the other hand, guaranteed political and
economic development of the countries. The author analyzed the changes which took place
in this area.
Key words – The European Union, NATO, security tools
The author’s aim is to verify (analyse) the development of concepts concerning
security when it comes to contemporary threats. At the turn of the 20th and 21st
century, the Cold War period ended having lasted nearly half a century after World
War II. While discussing the changes which took place at this time, one may talk
about a wide “opening of the states to the world”. This is also connected with socalled globalisation, which became “released” on the remains of the former system,
due to the changes of contemporary political solutions when it comes to
maintaining peace order in the world. There are some factors which have
contributed to these changes. Apart from technological progress (e.g. information
technology), economic and social development of the states (in particular those
which were a positive example of social and economic development in the free
market system) determined the changes as well. On the other hand, it should be
remembered that other factors were also important, especially those which
generated new mechanisms in the face of social unrest caused by progressive
180
DEVELOPMENT OF CONTEMPORARY SECURITY TOOLS
underdevelopment of the countries (e.g. countries living on drug production and
trafficking), which survived in ineffective social and political structures. Another
factor is the culture of political systems (mainly in countries dominated by
Muslims), referring to the supremacy of religion over the values of a democratic
system. It should be remembered that the system of economic interests in
a globalised world changes the current comprehension of a state’s (economic)
security. This may be caused, for example, by the unfavourable economic
dislocation of the state’s essential economic elements outside the country.
Providing security in the contemporary world is often subject to discussion.
This is caused by the events which have disturbed it (e.g. war in the former
Yugoslavia or military interventions in Iraq or Afghanistan). Moreover, in the past,
the armed forces were used to carry out the tasks aimed at stabilisation of situations
which could result in escalation of the number of victims and the spreading of
conflicts outside their borders.
Security, which has many definitions1, is one of the fundamental dimensions on
which the existence of individuals and entire societies is based2.
Most often it is defined both as the state (a subject’s sense of security) and the
process (providing a subject with a sense of security) 3.
In talking about the subject of security, I mean the interests of particular
people, social groups, nations, states, organizations etc, whose ambition is to
pursue these interests. Thus, many fields of security, e.g. economic, social,
military, public, ecological etc., may be identified. The term “physical security” is
often used when we have in mind protection and defence against deliberately
organised destructive actions, taken by means and resources created particularly for
this purpose. This case concerns military security and civil security (non-military).
Depending on the location of the threat and risk, we may distinguish internal
and external security4. External security is related to military security, while
internal security is part of civil (non-military) security.
The traditional perception of security as a lack of external threat still
dominates; such understanding has its origins in history. This is obviously
connected with having appropriate structures of the armed forces and focusing
foreign policy on the allies’ guarantee of support in case of threat. Currently,
changes in the traditional perception of security can be observed. According to
PhD K. Winkler, the traditional approach to external security was of great
1
Przegląd definicji. Zob. np. J. Stańczyk: Współczesne pojmowanie bezpieczeństwa. ISP PAN,
Warszawa 1996; J. Czaputowicz: System czy nieład? Bezpieczeństwo europejskie u progu XXI wieku.
WNPWN, CSM, Warszawa 1998; Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego. AON,
Warszawa 2002.
2
S. Koziej: Bezpieczeństwo: istota, podstawowe kategorie i historyczna ewolucja.
„Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe”, Kwartalnik BBN, II-2011/18, Warszawa 2011.
3
Ibidem, s.20.
4
W. Kitler, Bezpieczeństwo narodowe RP. Podstawowe kategorie. Uwarunkowania. System.
Wyd.: Akademia Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa 2011, s. 59 - 72.
181
importance at the time when international connections were weaker than at the
beginning of the 21st century. He also claims that a spectrum of current challenges
is greater than in the previous century5. In this aspect he agrees with the views of
many scientists who work in the field of security. Paradoxically, the expected
changes which took place in international relations (in particular the end of the
Cold War) did not result in a smaller number of threats and a greater sense of
security. Undoubtedly, technological progress, which also encompassed
interpersonal contacts in the advancing globalization process, as well as new
political actors (non-governmental organisations, transnational corporations etc.)
significantly contributed to introducing the changes. At the same time, due to
transformation in the international arena, new areas of threats appeared, such as
various organised crimes and specialised combat training centres of organised
terrorist groups. Collective security, which meant building the balance of power,
has become a distant memory. Observation and analysis of contemporary threats in
the field of collective security clearly prove that they concern a greater number of
scientific and research disciplines than before. The most important ones include,
inter alia: political sciences, law, sociology, ecology and, finally, in the group of
social sciences ‒ security science discipline and defence science discipline6.
According to S. Koziej, contemporary threats to security are a result of:
• social changes;
• globalisation process;
• disintegration of bipolar security system;
• weakened mechanisms of functioning of states and international
organisations;
• deepening polarisation of the level of development and standard of life
between rich and poor countries, and, as a result, increasing frustration and social
unrest7.
In a lecture delivered at the National Defence University, Prof. A.D. Rotfeld
claimed that while at present a considerable decrease in the number of classical
threats (armed invasions) can be noticed, there are more untypical, asymmetrical
threats caused by difficult to define non-state actors8. Thus, it is not easy to identify
the enemy, his intentions and potential. Furthermore, in the new political order,
proper assessment of the threat to security of particular subjects, resulting from
events which are taking place in various geopolitical areas, will also prove difficult.
5
E. Jendraszczak, D. Kuziel, Wyzwania dla bezpiecznej Europy XXI wieku. Wydanie Specjalne
„Kwartalnika Bellona”, Warszawa 2011.
6
A. Lykke Jr., Towar dan Understanding of Military Strategy [w:] Military Strategy: Theory and
Application, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle 1989 [za:] U.S. Army War College Guide to National
Security and Strategy, red. J.B. Bartholomees, Jr., wyd. 2 popr. i uzup., AWC Department of National
Security and Strategy, Carlisle 2006, s. 110.
7
S. Koziej, Strategiczne problemy bezpieczeństwa globalnego i europejskiego. Warszawa 2007.
8
A.D. Rotfeld, Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego RP w nowych warunkach
międzynarodowych: nowe wyzwania, nowe zadania. „Zeszyty Naukowe AON” 2003 nr 4.
182
Undoubtedly, the approach to an assessment of threats to world security changed
after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. For most countries, including
Poland, this date became a turning point in the creation of a new political order
after the Cold War9. Globally, collective security mechanisms, which had existed
up to that time, were based on solutions implemented mainly by the United
Nations. In cases of arguments and armed conflicts near one or many countries,
special groups of experts (recognised authorities) appointed by the UN were sent to
solve them. Other measures included deploying international military units to
conduct peacekeeping missions (“Blue Helmets” or “Blue Berets”) in areas which
required supervision of meeting the commitments of the parties to the conflict, up
to the peaceful intention to end it. Together with the change of the bipolar security
order, this mechanism lost its meaning and became less useful in new conflicts.
This could be noticed, in particular, in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia (1992),
where the UNPROFOR mission conducted under UN resolution was not able to
manage all the tasks. Then, actions aimed at verification of the UN mechanisms
were taken and another international structure – the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization – was asked for help.
In this way, the Alliance used military forces to carry out tasks outside its
territory for the first time. Under the UN resolution of 199310, for the first time
NATO forces shot down four Serb aircraft in the no-fly zone over Bosnia. Since
then there has been greater demand for the use of real military structures to settle
the conflicts which became the subject of interest of international organisations
other than the UN (OSCE, NATO, EU, and African Union – AU).
NATO’s concept to engage the troops seemed the most effective, due to the
real use of troops, as well as having appropriate structures and systems of
command. In case of crises the UN could then slightly expand the mechanism of
the involvement of troops. However, in the majority of contemporary crises, it is
easier for the UN to apply to NATO for help than to solve them on their own. This
highlights the significant weaknesses of this organisation. Many crises in this
century concern the fighting of terrorism, humanitarian problems, fighting for
natural resources, the domestic unrest of states on their way to democratic
development, or sea piracy.
In such a situation the Alliance more often has to undertake measures to
counteract or liquidate trouble spots beyond the NATO Treaty area of
responsibility. The character of the new challenges sometimes requires making
fundamental changes aimed at adapting military structures and their capabilities to
actions appropriate for the new environment of conducted operations. The need to
make these changes rests on the member states, and the unpredictability of the
development of potential threats does not make this task easier. In the structures of
the military and law enforcement services – both civil and military – tendencies to
9
10
Ibidem.
Rezolucja Rady Bezpieczeństwa ONZ nr 816 z 31 marca 1993 r.
183
focus on expansion of special forces, capable of fighting with a new enemy can be
noticed in many countries. In Poland, for example, the special forces were created
as a new branch. At the same time, the Alliance deploys troops in the conflict areas
beyond its area of responsibility and in this way develops structures and command
systems which meet new needs resulting from participation in the so-called
expeditionary missions. Simultaneously, the NATO states reduce their armed
forces and implement new solutions (including e.g. Smart Defence). These
mechanisms are to guarantee security within obligations under Art. 5 of the
Washington Treaty. During combat operations conducted beyond the NATO
Treaty area the troops face the enemy using typical guerrilla tactics. The war,
called asymmetrical, does not have to be fought by the state, but for example by an
organised group (political, religious, criminal group etc.), which has precise
objectives. The threats resulting from asymmetrical operations may be connected
with11:
1. destabilisation or incapacitating the key elements of the enemy’s civil or
military infrastructure;
2. weakening political support which the enemy receives from the allies;
3. reduction of the rate of actions;
4. weakening the enemy’s military effectiveness, in particular by impeding
employment of equipment before and during combat operations.
5. increasing political costs of conducted operations and involvement of human
and material resources;
6. thwarting interoperability to hinder the coalition operations;
7. preventing the enemy’s intelligence supremacy and appropriate situation
assessment.
Development of security tools could be also noticed as the new concepts
appeared concerning political and military cooperation in the structures of an
expanding European Union. The NATO Prague summit (21–22 November 2002)
revealed the convergent endeavours of the EU major states’ politicians to transform
the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) into the European Security and
Defence Union (ESDU). These changes were aimed at the development of
cooperation of the EU states in the field of security as to12:
a) creating international forces;
b) development of defence industry;
c) human resources management;
d) development of joint defence doctrines;
e) increased concentration and rationalisation of funding for the goals of
security and defence due to majority voting;
f) acceleration of the decision-making processes.
11
Por. J. Pawłowski, Zagrożenia asymetryczne. Warszawa 2003, s. 41–62; M. Madej,
Globalizacja zagrożeń asymetrycznych. „Sprawy Międzynarodowe” 2003 nr 1.
12
E. Jendraszczak, D. Kuziel, op. cit., s.55.
184
Many EU states expected such a concept, in particular those which applied for
the status of a full member. The discrepancies in attitudes of the representatives of
some countries also appeared, e.g. France and Germany focused on building
European defence. Great Britain headed those EU states which were oriented at the
development of common security together with strengthening transatlantic ties. The
EU politicians’ official statements prove that they perceived development of the
ESDP, beside NATO, as an important tool providing Europe with common
security. Security understood in this way is based on strong transatlantic ties.
During the meeting in Brussels (17–18 June 2004) the European Council adopted
new decisions concerning the development of the ESDP. Based on the document,
Headline Goal 2010, the European Defence Agency and “planning cells”13 were set
up. As a consequence, due to the development of the EU security concept,
decisions to create the European Rapid Reaction Forces were made on November
22 2004. The forces should be capable of starting operations within 10–15 days,
conducting them on their own for 30 day, and, after reinforcement, extending this
to 120 days at a distance of up to 6,000 km from Brussels14. The decision was
made to establish 13 battlegroups with a strength of 1500 troops each. The Central
European states, which had joined the EU, supported the decision to set up the
battlegroups. Implementation of this decision was perceived as a chance for real
engagement in the creation of EU operational forces. The effectiveness of using the
EU battlegroups in crisis response operations results from the following factors15:
1. political factors which define the character of a mission, the number of
troops, rules and structure of command, the way of funding and Rules of
Engagement.
2. military factors, which define the rules of operations, area of responsibility,
equipment of troops, the way of conducting kinetic counterterrorism operations;
3. non-kinetic operations which guarantee the success of activities aimed at
providing security and winning the trust of the local population;
4. training and equipment of sub-units, which is the basis for defining
capabilities and the level of effectiveness in the multinational environment;
5. logistical factors which, in turn, determine the possibilities of supplying
troops, health care and all kinds of repairs.
Due to the variety of places where EU battlegroups conduct their operations, it
is necessary to define detailed tasks depending on changing conditions. Moreover,
the appropriate structure of the battlegroup should be provided as well as efficient
command.
Apart from execution of these tasks, the EU systematically supported the UN
and NATO initiatives aimed at stabilising the situation in the conflict areas in the
13
Headline Goal 2010, approved by General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 May
2004 endorsed by the European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004. www.europa.eu.int/.
14
European Union Battlegroup Concept. Brussels, 5 October 2006, s. 9.
15
E. Jendraszczak, D. Kuziel, op. cit.; D. Majchrzak, Przygotowanie grup bojowych Unii
Europejskiej, s. 87.
185
world. Initially, these tasks were of little significance when it comes to engaged
forces. However, at the NATO summit in Istanbul (28‒29 June 2004) the decision
was made to hand over the mission of the Alliance under the UN mandate in
Bosnia and Herzegovina to the European Union. Under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, the Security Council Resolution no. 1575 (22 November 2004), the
mandate for the EU Force (EUFOR) in operation Althea was defined. On
25 November, the European Union Council made a decision to take part a week
later in the biggest military operation in the history of the European Union16.
This case demonstrates that new tools and mechanisms for building security
were sought, such as real military cooperation of NATO and EU structures. The
important thing is that the actions were taken under the UN resolution and
mandate.
This mission was, to a certain degree, a testing ground for the EU, in particular
its organisational structures, which were gaining experience in the execution of
such tasks. The circumstances which allowed for the conduct of this military
operation cannot be underestimated. It was based on the support which NATO
provided to EUFOR troops all the time they were carrying out their tasks. Due to
the mechanism of EU – NATO agreements, called the Berlin Plus, it was possible
to prepare documents detailing the range and principles for support of the operation
by NATO. On this basis all efforts to support the EU operation by the Alliance
were subject to financial settlements between these organisations. Such experience
allowed the EU not only to understand better the cost and funding of the military
mission, but more importantly, in my opinion, to learn about issues related to the
conducting of military operations by the multinational forces.
The European Union not only engages in creating possibilities for military
involvement to settle conflicts and crises, but also develops the mechanisms of
political participation in this process. The regional cooperation between the EU and
Russia should also be mentioned. However, agreeing on a uniform attitude towards
cooperation in reaction to the conflicts faced problems. At the European Council
summit in Seville, Russia did not accept most proposals for cooperation in
response to conflicts in the common neighbourhood17. The initiatives to cooperate
as to the conflicts in Moldova and the South Caucasus were not successful either.
The Russian authorities agreed to contribute to common operations with the EU on
the condition that they would fully participate in the procedures for commanding
the operations18. It seems that appointing five Russian internal services officers to
16
EUFOR Fact Sheet. www.euforbih.org/.
Spotkanie Rady Europejskiej w Sewilli, 21–21 czerwca 2002 r. Wnioski prezydencji. Żródło URL:
http:// oide.sejm.gov.pl/oide/images/files/dokumenty/konkluzje/sewilla200206.pdf.marzec 2011/.
18
Spotkanie Rady Europejskiej w Sewilli, 21–21 czerwca 2002 r. Wnioski prezydencji. Żródło URL:
http:// oide.sejm.gov.pl/oide/images/files/dokumenty/konkluzje/sewilla200206.pdf.marzec 2011/.
17
186
the EU police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) was the only case of its
active involvement19.
However, one should still expect progress in the relations between the EU and
Russia stbefore the summit in Sochi, as announced by Herman Van Rompuy,
President of the European Council20.
One may add here that the project of the initiative undertaken at the NATO
summit in Rome in 2002, concerning close cooperation in counteracting crises and
settlement of conflicts, did not bring any noticeable results. At the meeting of the
NATO – Russia Council in Brussels (2013), the agreement on missile defence was
not achieved. Only the mechanism of regular contacts, if it were to come to
security at the level of ministries of defence between the USA and Russia, was
initiated. These contacts concern “practical cooperation” between both countries.
In spite of this, many experts see here a lot of unused potential, which gives hope
for greater successes in the future. It should be expected that the meeting in
Brussels this January, in which the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey
Lavrov, and Secretary General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen participated,
established a desire for future cooperation21. This meeting resulted in discussion on
undertaking common efforts to fight terrorism, piracy and drug trafficking, as well
as cooperation as to Afghanistan. Moreover, other topics were raised, on which
agreement had not been reached so far, including the American missile defence
system.
Conclusions
Contemporary security needs an analysis of the changes and their results which
emphasise further elements of the general definition of security. The determinants
of today’s security are:
1. Most democratic countries (including Poland) perceive security in a different
way now, and focus more on providing internal security than external security22.
2. At present, external security is perceived by many states as an active
involvement in international structures and mechanisms (UN, NATO, EU, and
OSCE etc.) which are to guarantee it. The states’ intention is not to allow
development of conflicts near their borders.
19
M. Menkiszak: Rosja wobec Unii Europejskiej: kryzys „strategicznego partnerstwa”. Prace
OSW, Warszawa, styczeń 2006, s. 14–15.
20
“Głos Rosji”, 29 stycznia 2014. UE i Rosja powinny osiągnąć postęp w stosunkach przed
szczytem w Soczi. Źródło: http://pl.delfi.it/aktualia/swiat/ue-rosja/.
21
„Głos Rosji”, 28 stycznia 2014. NATO i Rosja opowiadają się za partnerstwem strategicznym.
Źródło: http://pl.delfi.it/aktualia/swiat/nato i rosja/.
22
See: Z. Nowakowski, H. Szafran, R. Szafran, Bezpieczeństwo w XXI wieku, Rzeszów 2009,
s. 181-186.
187
3. At present, Russia plays significant role in shaping security. In this regard,
NATO and the EU will, if possible, strengthen mechanisms for maintaining good
relations with the Russian Federation. As the successor of the former USSR (due to
good knowledge of issues related to Asia) and a main supplier of energy resources
to Europe, it is an important actor in settling potential crises.
4. NATO and the EU will focus on the command systems and reaction forces
based on the most modern solutions. In a short time the reaction forces should be
capable of operating independently or in cooperation with allied forces in remote
areas of deployment.
5. NATO will base collective defence guarantees (Art. 5 of the Treaty) on
development of a complementary allied defence system within the Smart Defence
concept, at the same time reducing of the number of troops and command
structures.
6. NATO and EU operations will be based on the mechanisms of the
international law institutions (UN as the lead organization).
7. In the majority of countries (including Poland), elements of the military and
law enforcement structures – police systems – will be expanded in order to
improve security. The structures of the military forces will be reduced; moreover,
they will be refocused on development and maintaining elements essential to
conduct defence tasks under Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty – which means
special forces and expeditionary units – according to the requirements of the EU
and NATO.
188
ISSN 0867–2245
RESCUE AND CIVIL PROTECTION SUBSYSTEM
ISSN 2353-1789
RESCUE AND CIVIL PROTECTION
SUBSYSTEM
Bogdan MICHAILIIUK, Ph.D. Eng.
A wise man expects the worst and experiences the best
Chinese proverb
Abstract
Civil protection includes activities aimed at providing security to people, assets and the
environment in case of threats caused by nature itself and the development of civilization,
as well as warfare or terrorist activity.
The rescue and civil protection subsystem plays an important role in the national
security system of our country. Taking into account the specific area of activities, it is
crucial for the subordinate services to be properly coordinated and their competences to be
distributed appropriately.
Rescue and civil protection services should properly understand the nature of threats –
their types and range, as well as the types and range of their negative effects concerning
people, animals, the environment and material assets.
Key words – civil protection, rescue, civil defence
Introduction
Television screens and newspaper front pages nearly every day show images of
different types of conflicts and disasters taking place in the world. Any coverage
from a threatened place oscillates around one statement – to bring help to the needy
in the shortest possible time. Irrespective of whether a given event is the effect of
human activity or the consequence of acts of nature, it is most important to ensure
that the response is adequate, fast and effective. The „human factor” plays an
important role here. Namely, the units which perform tasks connected with rescue
and civil protection should be competent, composed and demonstrate the ability to
cooperate fast and effectively in a team. The future of people and assets in
189
BOGDAN MICHAILIUK
threatened places depends upon rescue services. In the face of these type of events,
it is important to undertake every type of activity in order for our civil protection
and rescue services not to fail when they are most needed.
The rescue and civil protection subsystem plays an important role in the Polish
national security system. Taking into account the specific area of their activities, it
is crucial for subordinate services to be properly coordinated and their competences
to be distributed appropriately so as to avoid duplication.
In the changing world, the foundation of the management of any organism,
mechanism, social structure, or enterprise is the updated, real, reliable knowledge
of a given situation. Rescue and civil protection services should be equipped with
the knowledge of threats – their type and range along with the type and range of
their consequences concerning people, animals, the environment and assets.
Contemporary challenges and threats have never affected people, assets, the
environment and infrastructure so much as they do these days.1
Threats to contemporary societies caused by catastrophes and technical
failures, natural disasters and environmental contamination are also the
consequences of wars. Apart from military power, contemporary national security
and national defence encompass, to an increasingly larger extent, the ability to
protect and rescue people, assets and the environment against non-military threats.2
The place of rescue and civil protection in the National Security System
of the Republic of Poland (NSS)
In order to ensure the national interests and strategic aims in the field of
security, Poland has formulated and developed an integrated National Security
System (NSS).3
The National Security System of the Republic of Poland of 2007 does not
present it as a uniform system, but as a collection of many different subsystems.4
The White Paper on The National Security of Poland issued in 2013 by the
National Security Bureau defines the national (state) security system as all the
powers (entities), means, resources and reserves destined by the state to perform
tasks in the field of security, which are organised properly (in subsystems and
links) to fulfil these tasks, and are maintained and prepared. It consists of the
subsystem (system) of management and a set of executory subsystems (systems),
1
A. Skrabacz, Ochrona ludności w Polsce w XXI wieku. Wyzwania, uwarunkowania,
perspektywy, Agencja Marketingowo-Wydawnicza Merkeriusz Agmarkt s.c., volume. 1, Tarnów
2006, ISBN 83-903547-7-2, p. 38.
2
M. Renner, National security. The economic and environmental dimension, ‘Worldwatch
Paper’ 5/1989, Worldwatch Institute, Washington 1989, ISBN: 0-916468-90-9, p. 19.
3
W. Kitler, Bezpieczeństwo narodowe RP. Podstawowe kategorie. Uwarunkowania. System,
Wyd. Akademii Obrony Narodowej, Warsaw 2011, ISBN 978-83-7523-159-5, p. 181.
4
The National Security System is presented in point 4 of the National Defence Strategy of 2007.
190
connected in different ways, including operational subsystems (defence and
protection) and support subsystems (social and economic).5 The above model of
the national security system is graphically presented in figure 1.
MANAGEMENT
SUBSYSTEMS
DECISION
MAKER
ADVISORY
BODY
STAFF
BODY
defence
protection
Support
subsystems
social
EXECUTORY
SUBSYSTEMS
Operational
subsystems
economic
Source: own work on the basis of the White Paper on National Security of the Republic of Poland, National
Security Bureau, Warsaw 2013, p. 36.
Figure 1. Universal model of the national security system
Currently the NSS constitutes the sum of separate subsystems which internally
are not fully logically and strictly connected by the national security management
subsystem. This is the result to a significant extent from the multiple inaccuracies
of the legal grounds, manifested in the lack of responsible bodies, which, in
extreme situations, causes a duplication of competences and the consequent
wastefulness and inefficiency of the system.
It needs to be stressed that the NSS has still not been optimally organised. In
this respect, it is a challenge to appropriately integrate its particular elements.
Where is the place of civil protection and rescue services? Well, it is the
executory subsystems that should be indicated here, and in particular, the
operational subsystems. The operational subsystems include the state defence
5
The White Paper on National Security of the Republic of Poland, National Security Bureau,
Warsaw 2013, ISBN 978-83-60846-16-2, p. 36.
191
BOGDAN MICHAILIUK
subsystem (defences, national defence, military security) and the state and civil
protection subsystems (civil, non-military security). Within the framework of the
first group, the tasks performed aim at seizing the chances, taking up challenges,
minimising risk and counteracting (preventing and opposing) external threats to
security of a political and military character. Whereas, the state and civil protection
subsystems aim at seizing the chances, taking up challenges, minimising risk and
counteracting (preventing and opposing) external and internal threats to the
security of non-military (civilian) character.6
Civil protection and rescue – notion, character and nature
The term „civil protection” is included in the set of notions which, being
intuitively understood, are commonly used in legal instruments. Civil protection is
often treated equally with civil defence, which is a mistake. Over the last few
decades, a significant evolution in this respect lead to significant differences
between these terms. Civil protection is included in the scope of the responsibility
of civil defence, although the scope of its activity significantly exceeds the field of
civil defence, hence it is wrong to equate these two.
Civil defence aims at:
– protecting people, work places, public utility facilities and cultural assets;
– rescuing people and providing help to the injured during war time;
– cooperation in combating natural disasters and environmental threats, and
also in eliminating their effects.7
The issues of civil defence, and hence also civil protection and rescue, are
regulated in Poland by two key legal instruments: the Act on General Defence
Obligation of the Republic of Poland8 and the Regulation of the Council of
Ministers on Civil Defence9.
Civil protection consists in the protection of the civilian population and civilian
people10 and includes both public administration activity as well as individual
activity aiming at ensuring the security of life and the health of people and their
possessions. It strives for maintaining favourable environmental conditions for
their survival, social and psychological help for the injured, legal protection and
educational support as well as fitness preparation in order to be able to deal with
6
Ibidem, p. 37.
Article 137 of the Act of 21 November 1967 on General Defence obligation of the Republic of
Poland (JoL of 2013, item 852).
8
The Act of 21 November 1967 on General Defence obligation of the Republic of Poland (JoL
of 2013, item 852)
9
The Regulation of the Council of Ministers on Civil Defence of 28 September 1993 (JoL of
1993, no 93, item 429 with subsequent amendments).
10
In accordance with Article 50 (2) of the Amendment Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, on Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) made in Geneva
on 8 June 1977 (JoL no 41 of 1992, item 175) civilian population means all civilian people.
7
192
various situation in case of catastrophes, natural disasters and military conflicts, as
well as directly after their cessation.11
The Geneva Convention12 defines civil protection as one of the civil defence tasks
which includes activities enabling people's survival in case of a cataclysm or war.
In accordance with the definition adopted by W. Kitler, civil protection
encompasses the all activities of all the state legal subjects, depending on their
legal status, aiming at ensuring the security of the society, property, national
heritage assets and the environment in the face of natural calamities and disasters
as well as the ones caused by human activity, including war.13
Civil protection is therefore a sphere of security which, first of all, focuses its
attention on ensuring human survival, irrespective of the type or cause of threat.
The location of civil protection in the general context of threats is depicted in
figure 2.
MAIN SOURCES (CAUSES)
OF THREATS CAUSATIVE THREATS
CONDITIONING THE DIRECTION OF
DEVELOPMENT AND DYNAMICS OF THREATS
natural threats
accidents – errors
ELEMENTS -> RESPONSE
Critical
physical
threats:
– biological,
– chemical,
– mechanical,
– geological,
– radiation,
– acoustic,
– magnetic,
– thermal...
purposeful activity
crisis inducing
Disturbances
of population
existence
Critical
psychological
threats:
– functional
disturbances,
– impediments,
– overburdening,
– conflicts,
– demoralization...
environment
Critical infrastructure effectiveness:
manufacturing infrastructure,
including: services;
– protective infrastructure
CIVIL
PROTECTION
Source: own work on the basis of the http://www.brandt.net.pl/data/Image/Ochrona_Ludnosci.jpg, issue date: 14
January 2014.
Figure. 2. Place of civil protection in the general context of threats
11
12
Ibidem, Article 61.
The Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War.
13
W. Kitler, Powszechna ochrona ludności w świetle ustaleń międzynarodowych, Zeszyt
Problemowy 1/2001, Towarzystwo Wiedzy Obronnej, Warsaw 2001, p. 19.
193
BOGDAN MICHAILIUK
The implementation of tasks aiming at ensuring security for people, assets and
the environment – in the case of threats caused both by forces of nature (natural
disasters) and civilisational development (failures, catastrophes), as well as military
and terrorist activity – includes four types of activities:
1. prevention, that is activities aiming at minimising losses – legislative works,
planning, creating stores, building organisational structures, constructing protective
buildings and systems (hiding places, shelters, flood banks), control (border and
shipping, etc.),
2. achieving readiness – constant examination, improvement of rescue services,
and equipping them, educating the society, simulations and exercises, developing
procedures;
3. responding to threats – organising means of management and coordination,
searching for the injured and providing help, eliminating the hotbeds of threats,
mobilising rescue services and volunteers, transferring information between the
services and the authorities, mass media and the society;
4. reconstruction, that is restoring the condition from the time before the event
– estimating losses, informing of rights and obligations, effective administering,
initializing the reconstruction of the damage, analysing needs and fulfilling
obligations, guaranteeing access to social aid, constructive conclusions and
proposals.
Civil protection tasks include, among other things, defining threats, preventing
them and ensuring the protection of people in times of threats, including war, and
also organising and ensuring the functioning of the crisis management system.
Essential elements of civil protection, which performs both temporary
activities, in the scope of response to threats as well as appropriate planning tasks,
are: chief and central public administration organisations, that is competent
ministers, Commandant of the State Fire Service, the Chief of State Civil
Defence and chief inspectors.
The implementation of tasks in the scope of civil protection is undertaken by
local bodies of public administration – governors [wojewoda], district councils,
municipality heads [wójt] or mayors (city presidents). The scope of activity of the
local civil protection bodies in districts [powiat] includes: defining threats and
planning preventive measures in the administered area, monitoring and alerting
people, coordinating rescue activities as well as order and protection activities,
along with management in crisis situations with the help of a district crisis
management centre. Whereas, as for the scope of the activity of local civil
protection bodies in towns and cities, it is definitely worth indicating here that they
are responsible for: defining particular locations of threats' sources, eliminating
them and their consequences as well as monitoring and alerting people. What
seems essential here is the coordination of rescue activities and rescue forces
management, as well as the evacuation of people with the help of a city/town
response team; mobilisation and preparation to spread the services in order to
194
perform tasks connected with civil protection in times of war; the organisation of a
population's training in the field of general self-defence.
To put the tasks of civil protection in order, the following areas should be
listed:
− planning and organisational works in the necessary scope;
− warning and alerting;
− rescuing people, animals and assets;
− evacuation of the threatened areas;
− preparing and organising shelters;
− operating black out devices;
− organising medical and psychological help (also religious care);
− combating natural disasters (fire, flood);
− restoring and maintaining order in the disaster areas;
− ensuring temporary accommodation and supplies for the injured;
− restoring the activity of public utility services;
− liquidation of contamination and infections, decontamination and other
protective activities;
− burials.14
The activity in the scope of civil protection is conducted in any conditions and
situations of the state's functioning15. There can be listed three conditions of the
implementation of the above mentioned tasks. The first one is vigil and immediate
response, which means everyday routine activities connected with rescuing people
and assets, and cleaning the environment and the elimination of their negative
consequences, including activities aiming at preventing and counteracting threats.
Another condition is the response in the face of a threat leading directly to a crisis
and during a crisis. The last one is civil protection in times of war, in accordance
with the international legal regulations.
Civil protection is divided into collective and individual protection. At the
collective level, it is provided by institutions and includes such activities as
evacuation, creating places of shelter, detecting threats and alerting people about
them. Whereas at the individual level, it consists of the following activities
undertaken by citizens:
− obtaining the knowledge of evacuation rules, routes and places,
− obtaining the knowledge of alarm signals and rules of conduct after hearing
them,
− possessing individual protective equipment and the ability to use it and the
consequences of using it,
14
Article 61 Protocol I… .
The Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 21 September 2004 on the state defence
readiness (JoL of 2004, no 219, item 2218) introduces 3 conditions of state defence readiness:
condition of permanent state defence readiness, condition of state defence readiness in times of crisis,
condition of state defence readiness in times of war.
15
195
BOGDAN MICHAILIUK
− obtaining the knowledge of rules concerning the preparation of flats,
buildings, water intakes and food to be protected against the consequences of
disasters and crises,
− obtaining the knowledge of rules of providing first aid,
− ensuring the ability to independently eliminate the sources of disasters, e.g.
fires.
As for the phenomenon of rescue, in the most general way it can be defined as
the organised way of providing help in the case of accidents. Currently, it appears
to be the first line of national protection and defence.
Rescue capability and the efficiency of professional and volunteer rescue
formations, led by the state and volunteer fire service, medical, chemical and sea
rescue services, supported by the rescue forces of the army constitute an unusually
significant link between contemporary national protection and defence.
The Mała Encyklopedia Wojskowa [Small Military Encyclopaedia] defines
rescue as providing help in case of emergency, especially when threatening health
and life of people; rescue operations are undertaken both in times of peace (great
catastrophes, natural disasters) as well as in times of war.16
Whereas, according to the Nowy słownik języka polskiego PWN [New Polish
Language Dictionary] rescue is an activity which aim is to rescue people or things
in danger, as well as people and means engaged in such activity. Rescue activity
consists in averting a danger, (...) especially the threat of death or destruction.17
It is also worth differentiating between the notion of rescue and rescue activity.
Rescue is understood as activity conducted at all levels of the state organisation in
its all conditions (in times of peace, crisis and war) with the use of different
methods, powers and means, which aims at rescuing human life and material
assets. Whereas, rescue activity means providing help in a difficult emergency
situation which threatens the life of victims and rescuers and may lead to the
contamination of the environment and the destruction of important elements of
material and cultural assets.
Having analysed the source and the way of financing of rescue activity, there
may be differentiated:
– state rescue – financed form the state budget and the territorial government
resources;
– social rescue – costs of organisation and maintenance are 100 percent
covered from the resources of non-governmental organisations;
– commercial rescue which functions in the category of „service”, which
means that the rescue activity is chargeable.
There is a frequently used typology of rescue which divides the phenomenon
with respect to the range of rescue activity. Namely, on this basis, there might be
16
17
196
Mała Encyklopedia Wojskowa, volume III, MON, Warsaw 1971, p.34.
Nowy słownik języka polskiego PWN, Wyd. PWN, Warsaw 2000, pp. 415-416.
differentiated: international, national, provincial [wojewódzki], district [powiatowy],
municipal [gminny] and local rescue.
The following categories may be differentiated within the state rescue:
– depending on types of rescue forces:
- medical rescue;
- military rescue;
- mining rescue;
- chemical rescue;
- rail rescue;
- veterinary rescue, etc.
– depending on types of events (natural disaster, natural, technical,
technological catastrophe, etc.) – among others:
- sea rescue;
- fire rescue;
- radiation rescue;
- aviation rescue;
- flood rescue;
- road rescue;
- rail rescue.
Rescue operations are organised and conducted in order to rescue and provide
help to people injured as a result of military activity, natural disasters and other
similar events, such as, for example, threats to the environment.18 The obligation to
organise and conduct rescue operations in times of war belongs to the heads of civil
defence and managers (owners) of work places. They have at their disposal civil
defence formations, appropriately prepared from the point of view of competence
and equipment. The commandants of these formations lead rescue operations, and
use all available powers and resources destined for that purpose.
It is impossible within the scope of this article to describe the issues connected
with the specificity of the organisation of rescue operations typical for different
types of rescue services subordinate to different ministries. This is due to the fact
that all services develop their own methodology of conduct, resulting each time
from a specific situation. Due to the long experience of the author connected with
the work in the chemical corps, the example of a chemical failure will be used to
show the set of aims and tasks performed stage by stage in the failure zone.
Additionally, the choice of this rescue operation background is justified by the fact
that this activity is uniform for all services faced with this type of threat.
Mainly, these tasks, rescue operation phases, include:
− identification of a substance, indication of contamination zones and the
range of threats;
− activation of the contamination alarm, warning and alerting systems;
18
F.R. Krynojewski, Obrona cywilna Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, Wyd. Difin, Warsaw 2012, ISBN
978-83-7641-605-2, p. 86.
197
BOGDAN MICHAILIUK
− evacuation of people from the threatened zone and providing first aid;
− elimination of emission sources as well as the destruction and neutralisation
of a released toxic substance;
− decontamination of rescue services;
− rehabilitation of the environment in the failure zone.19
The most important stage of the organisation of a rescue operation, apart from
providing medical aid, is the destruction and neutralisation of toxic industrial
chemicals20 in the failure zone.
The most important aims - stages in this field include the:
– indication of the destruction zone – division of the failure zone;
– limitation of the source of gas emission, leak of a liquid substance, spill of a
solid substance;
– limitation of the proliferation of the substance released:
- to the air by placing water curtains or lowering the intensity of evaporating;
- to surface waters by sealing the sewer system;
- to the ground and ground waters by sectioning off foil covered ditches;
4. mechanical and sorbent cleanup of toxic substances and transporting them to
the destruction zone;
5. neutralisation of a toxic substance in the failure zone or in a particular place;
6. cleanup and neutralisation of the failure zone from the remains of TIC.21
The diagram of the organisation of a rescue operation in a failure zone is
presented in figure 3.
All rescue services in a different and characteristic way divide a rescue
operation zone. In general, the division of a rescue operation zone into three zones
could be assumed as justified:
– zone I – destruction zone;
– zone II - support zone (in figure 3 marked as the distribution of rescue units
zone);
– zone III – clearance zone.
19
http://www.ratownictwo.chem.pl/meto.htm, issue date: 09.01.2014.
TIC – toxic industrial chemicals; chemical compounds of poisonous properties, used in big
amounts especially in transport and industry. They are characterised with the ability to be easily
released to the air due to the destruction or failure of installations. They have varied properties whose
specificity does not allow to classify them in accordance with the criteria of classical division of
poisons and poisonous substances. The basis of classification is here the point of view of the Civil
Defence and entities undertaking activities aiming at the protection against contamination of people
and providing aid to the injured (cf.: http://www.obronacywilna.pl/10-zarzadzanie-kryzysowe.html).
21
http://www.ratownictwo.chem.pl/meto.htm, issue date: 09 January 2014.
20
198
PPM
S II
EP
SI
R
R
katastrofa
Straż
R
R
R
R
R
R
PPM
EW
Straż
SK
Sztab
koord.
Pol.
PI
Kost.
Pol.
Amb.
Pol.
ZMM
Hosp.
Hosp.
ZMS
ZMS
ZMM
ZMS
Legend:
OE – original evacuation,
SE – secondary evacuation,
IP – information point,
MSP – medical service point,
R – rescuer,
MP – management point,
SI – destruction zone,
SII – distribution of rescue units zone,
SA – substitute accommodation,
SHP substitute hospital places.
Source: own work on the basis of the J. Konieczny, Bezpieczeństwo publiczne w nagłych i nadzwyczajnych
zagrożeniach środowiska: studium społeczno-ekologiczne w perspektywie zrównoważonego rozwoju,
Wyd. Panoptikos, Poznań 1995, p. 215.
Figure 3. Diagram of the organisation of a rescue operation in a failure zone
199
BOGDAN MICHAILIUK
Rescue and civil protection services
The fundamental task of the state is ensuring for its citizens the protection of
life and assets at any time and in any circumstances, which is clearly stressed by
the constitutional guarantee of protection against disastrous industrial threats,
natural disasters and the consequences of military activities. Government and local
administration bodies are obliged to fulfil these assurances both in times of peace
as well as in time of war.
The services destined for civil protection and the elimination of local threats in
times of peace include the regular rescue forces [the State Fire Service (SFS),
Police, medical services, sanitary and epidemiological, veterinary, environmental
protection services and others] and designated sub-units of the armed forces, and
also (in case of a large range of a threat) the civilian population. Their task is to
provide necessary help in the case of road accidents, rail accidents, and power and
gas supply failures.
Rescue activities in times of peace are managed by a designated person from
the SFS who coordinates its activity with a competent local government body
(municipality head, mayor, council leader, or governor – depending on the range of
a threat).
In times of war, extraordinary threats are dealt with by all powers and resources
at disposal in a given area, under the leadership of a locally competent body for
civil defence (commune head, mayor, district council, governor – depending on the
range of a threat). In case of the insufficient predispositions of these people,
superior bodies may designate another, substantially competent person.
Undoubtedly, it is the State Fire Service (SFS) that plays one of the most
important roles among rescue and civil protection services. It is a professional,
uniformed formation fitted with specialised equipment, destined for combating
fires, natural disasters and other local threats.22 The SFS plays a role of an
intervention force in the case of disastrous events. In the rescue and civil protection
subsystem, its activity is supported by other services, guards and state institutions
as well as by the network of non-governmental organisations.23
The ranks of the State Fire Service are composed of over 30 thousand officers,
lead by the Chief Commandant of the State Fire Service, subordinate to the
Minister of Interior.
From the moment of its establishment, the scope of the SFS's tasks has been
significantly expanded. It is not only associated any more with its original duty –
extinguishing fires, but also with organising and conducting rescue operations in
emergency situations, including among other things, disasters and road accidents,
construction accidents and those of a chemical background. The Sate Fire Service
22
Article of the Act of 24 August 1991 on the State Fire Service (JoL of 2013, item 1340 with
23
The White Paper on the National Security of the Republic of Poland, p. 66.
200
is also a work place of people supervising the observance of fire regulations,
conducting scientific research on fire protection and civil protection. The author of
this article had a chance to participate in the conference „Civil protection – past
and present” organised in 2012 by the Civil Protection and Civil Defence Bureau
as well as the International Cooperation Bureau of the National Headquarters of the
State Fire Service. Events of this type show that the issue presented in this article is
very significant. Furthermore, thanks to the participation of representatives of the
world of science, and determiners of legal and institutional conditions, as well as
people performing tasks from the scope of civil protection and rescue, an exchange
of opinions was able to take place, which results in the development of innovative
solutions, supported with concrete proposals.
The State Fire Service serves as a coordinator of rescue operations in a disaster
zone, by synchronising the cooperation of its officers with the police and
emergency service staff.
The last decade has resulted in a wave of innovative changes in the scope of the
distribution of vehicles as well as rescue and fire-fighting equipment. What is even
more important, the internal procedures have been verified and modified so as to
adjust them to the requirements of the contemporary reality.
Enterprises within the scope of civil protection are conducted in accordance
with strictly defined rules. The chief rule is based on the universality of the civil
protection system. Another one is the three-step separation of powers, where the
industry arrangement plays an auxiliary role. It is also important to ensure the
response of powers and resources adequate to the character and range of a threat.
Another rule concerns a one-person leadership and responsibility for maintaining
the readiness to protect people by municipality heads and district leaders at a
province level.
An important role in civil protection is played by central government
administration bodies and local administration bodies led by governors, district
leaders and municipality heads.
In Poland there are many organisations performing different tasks from the
scope of rescue and civil protection, in accordance with the national legal
regulations. Among them the following may be named:
• working in the emergency mode:
– the State Emergency Medical Services,
– sea rescue,
– mountain rescue,
– water rescue,
– mining rescue,
– gas rescue,
– energy rescue,
– the National Firefighting and Rescue System,
• working in the regular mode:
201
BOGDAN MICHAILIUK
– municipal services,
– welfare services,
– health service,
– sanitary and epidemiological services
– environmental protection services,
– and multiple non-governmental organisations.
A basic difficulty, making it impossible to fully use the potential of the above
mentioned institutions, is the lack of the systematic ordering of their mutual
relations, which is a prerequisite of forming, on the basis of their experience,
a formation able to provide protection on a mass scale.24
In the face of such a state of affairs, what should be acknowledged are the
efforts of the firefighting environment that at the beginning of the 1990s saw the
need to standardize the rules of cooperation between different rescue operation
participants. In recognition of the need to form an integrated system facilitating
activities aiming at rescue and civil protection, rescue organisations cooperating in
different ways, were concentrated in one point. And so, in 1995 the National
Firefighting and Rescue System was founded (NFRS) and organised on the basis of
the units of the State Fire Service. It needs to be emphasised at this point that
rescue and civil protection in Poland – in the context of the current obligations –
constitute a new field of activity for fire protection units.25 Their tasks include
activities aiming at the protection of life, health, assets or the environment by way
of: fire, technical, chemical, ecological, medical, and water rescue as well as
radiation rescue, rescue at heights, sea and harbour rescue.26
NFRS constitutes an integral link in the internal security system and its activity
is focused on the protection of life, health, assets and the environment against fires,
natural disasters or other local threats. Its unquestionable asset is the simplicity and
flexibility of the structure which enables the undertaking of activities adequate to
threats and maintaining readiness to perform tasks in any circumstances.27
Activities in the scope of civil protection are conducted in a direct way mainly
by state rescue services (State Fire Service, professional fire service, national sea
rescue, medical rescue, chemical rescue, radiation rescue and technical rescue),
rescue organisations of a social character (Mountain Volunteer Rescue Service,
Tatra Mountains Volunteer Rescue Service, Water Volunteer Rescue Service, Polish
Red Cross), and also private rescue companies. Civil protection can also be found
among the obligations of civil defence. Moreover, civil protection is dealt with by
public order and safety services, such as the Police, Municipal/Commune
Police, Railroad Guard or private security agencies. If the above entities cannot
24
http://www.brandt.net.pl/ochrona-ludnosci-obrona-cywilna/, issue date: 14 January 2014.
R. Kalinowski, Ochrona ludności – bezpieczeństwo – nauka i edukacja, Wyd. Uniwersytetu
Przyrodniczo-Humanistycznego w Siedlcach, Siedlce 2011, ISBN 978-83-7051-650-5, p. 57.
26
Ibidem, p.45.
27
K. Sienkiewicz-Małyjurek, F.R. Krynojewski, Zarządzanie kryzysowe w administracji
publicznej, Wyd. Difin, Warsaw 2010, ISBN 978-83-7641-318-1, p.74.
25
202
manage a particular crisis situation, all activities connected with civil protection are
taken over by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland.28
Civil protection includes also psychological activities. They are conducted
by the Polish Psychological Society which creates Crisis Intervention Centres and
provides help for rescuers during rescue activities.
Civil protection has also a legal dimension, manifested in the ratification of
international rules, which defend fundamental and universal citizens' interests (such
as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on
Human Rights).
Conclusions
Preparing universal and effective civil protection in places of residence, work
places and schools, as well as in public places seems to be one of the key needs of
Polish national defence. It is a serious challenge due to the enormous differences
between the organisation of civil protection in our country and the functioning of
the civil protection system in other NATO and EU countries. It requires increased
intellectual effort connected with the improvement of legislative works, the
engagement on the part of individuals experienced in the field of the discussed
issue, the ability to cooperate, and drawing on the achievements and solutions of
other countries. It is connected with the necessity of adopting the attitude of the
readiness to face on a daily basis non-military threats with consequences as
dangerous as wars.
The necessity of harmonious cooperation results from the character of new
threats and the need to respond to non-military threats, as well as the need to
undertake adequate rescue activities.29 Nowadays, civil protection enterprises are
included in a wider scope of civil defence. In this context, it is worth pointing out
that civil defence constitutes a significant part of the enterprises connected with the
so called civil planning, in the case of extraordinary situations, and with the tasks
connected with maintaining public administration readiness to undertake
appropriate activities. It also includes activities within the framework of NATO's
established strategy of „host nation support” as well as civilian and military
cooperation. Although in different countries, civil defence means different things,
its fundamental undertakings, apart from civil protection, include:
• work places and infrastructure protection;
• cultural assets' protection;
• authority structure protection;
• ensuring the state's functioning in times of peace and war;
28
http://po.tk.krakow.pl/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=48&Itemid=9, issue date:
14.01.2014.
29
R. Kalinowski, Ochrona ludności…, p. 50.
203
BOGDAN MICHAILIUK
• organisation of crisis management;
• physical protection (of people, assets and the natural environment);
• psychological protection;
• legal protection;
• education and training.
Rescue means the activity conducted at all levels of the state organisation and
in all conditions (in times of peace, crisis and war) by way of different methods,
powers and resources, which aims at rescuing human life and assets.
It is important for the Republic of Poland to have at its disposal the modern,
thriving, coordinated civil protection and rescue subsystem. Existing or potential
threats condition activities of specialised services which monitor the systems able
to detect and identify threats, and then provide data necessary for warning and
alerting the population and gauging the number of the people present in the
forecasted danger zones. It is important for such units to be able to conduct their
work and improve the achieved methods of conduct.
The sustainable development of people engaged in the formation of the civil
protection and rescue subsystem and verification of the adopted procedural
solutions is manifested in multiple trainings and exercises. The Internet
information service concerning the civil defence of our country30 shows different
undertakings which aim at improving the effectiveness of the functioning of rescue
and civil protection services. There are steps undertaken which, in their authors'
opinion, should influence the effectiveness of the civil protection and rescue
system. The functioning of entities responsible for civil protection and rescue has
become the subject of deliberations of competent ministers. One of their fruits is
the initiative called the Rescue and Civil Protection Programme for the period
2014-2020.31
The planned Rescue and Civil Protection Programme aims at:
o developing the general legal framework regulating the activity of institutions
and public services and also social organisations performing tasks in the scope of
civil protection and rescue;
o applying solutions adopted in the law on the emergency communication
system after its adoption by the lower and higher chamber of the Parliament, thanks
to which it will be possible to establish a comprehensive and compatible
mechanism of cooperation between rescue services and the emergency
communication system;
30
Available at: www.ock.gov.pl.
Draft Resolution of the Council of Ministers on adopting the Rescue and Civil Protection
Programme for the period 2014-2020. This document results from the National Development
Strategy2020 (objective I.3. Improvement of the conditions for satisfying the individual needs and
activity of citizens, developmental priority, I.3.3. Enhancing citizen security) and the Efficient State
Strategy 2020 (objective 7: Ensuring high level of security and public order). Rescue and Civil
protection Programme is a specific fulfilment of declarations contained in a detailed objective 7.4.3.
Development of Rescue and Civil Protection Programmes.
31
204
o applying organisational solutions, administrative and legal procedures, as
well as financial mechanisms guaranteeing the appropriate functioning of civil
protection and rescue. 32
The desired solutions are intended to support and develop the security
potential of the state, with the executory subsystem functioning within its
framework, and speaking more precisely –the protection potential contained in the
operational subsystems formed by, among others, the subjects performing tasks in
the scope of civil protection and rescue.
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Jakubczak R., Skrabacz A., Gąsiorek K. (ed.), Obrona narodowa w tworzeniu
bezpieczeństwa Polski w XXI w., Wyd. Bellona, Warsaw 2008.
Kalinowski R., Obrona cywilna w Polsce, Wyd. Uniwersytetu PrzyrodniczoHumanistycznego w Siedlcach, Siedlce 2011.
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Kalinowski R., Ochrona ludności – bezpieczeństwo – nauka i edukacja, Wyd. Uniwersytetu
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czasie pokoju, kryzysu i wojny, Wyd. Towarzystwa Wiedzy Obronnej, Warsaw 2010;
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Kitler W., Powszechna ochrona ludności w świetle ustaleń międzynarodowych, Zeszyt
Problemowy 1/2001, Towarzystwo Wiedzy Obronnej, Warsaw 2001.
Konieczny J., Bezpieczeństwo publiczne w nagłych i nadzwyczajnych zagrożeniach
środowiska: studium społeczno-ekologiczne w perspektywie zrównoważonego rozwoju,
Wyd. Panoptikos, Poznań 1995.
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Skrabacz A., Ochrona ludności w Polsce w XXI wieku. Wyzwania, uwarunkowania,
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Narodowej, Warsaw 2004.
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206
ISSN 0867–2245
CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION – TYPOLOGY OF THREATS
ISSN 2353-1789
CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION –
TYPOLOGY OF THREATS
Jarosław SOLARZ, Ph.D. Eng.
Abstract
Risk of contamination is a problem well known for many years. Its apogee coincided
with the Cold War, in which weapons of mass destruction, which is the main source of
potential contamination, remained constantly in the spotlight. Today, despite the threat of
use of chemical weapons, nuclear or biological weapons is negligible, the problem of
contamination still exists.
This is particularly evident in the case of chemical agents, which in some cases can
lead to major emergencies. In addition, due to the quite different characteristics of
individual agents , the type of emerging risks, generated by the contamination may be very
different.
This means that for a correct assessment of possible contamination risks we have to get
to know the type and nature of all agents, being a potential factor in the formation of
contamination.
This article is an attempt to present the essence and nature of the risks generated by
chemical agents, both those warfare, as well as other commonly used in the national
economy. For a better problem understanding, the most possible threats have been
discussed, pointing to the real danger that pose. Additionally presented the essence of the
contamination, identification of respective risks and their basic typologies .
Key words – Contamination, chemical warfare agents, toxic industrial chemicals,
chemical hazardous substances
The dynamic and increasingly widespreadprogress of modern civilisation is
undoubtedly a source of prosperity and development for each individual. From day
to day we cross other barriers that allow us to achieve what, not so long ago, we
could not even imagine. All this in the daily race for a better reason for living, to
slowly forget about the darker side of our existence, in which, independently of our
will, there remain a whole range of different threats and problems. Among them
a prominent place is occupied by cases of environmental contamination which,
207
JAROSŁAW SOLARZ
because of their size, diversity and character, have an increasing impact on the
safety and comfort of our lives.
In the literature, it is not difficult to find a definition of contamination, but not
all of the definitions are equally reliable and unambiguous. Moreover, the term
„contamination” is of little use, because its specific importance is achieved only
when combined with the determination of its kind. In this way we can deal with
environmental contamination, of soil, water, air, and man, or the contamination of
biological, radioactive or chemical substances.
The last example is usually treated as a pollution of air, water, soil, human
body, objects, etc. by toxic substances. Its source can be either a deliberate action,
for example through the use of chemical weapons, or a total coincidence, resulting
from the failure of industrial facilities or accidents during the transport of
hazardous substances.
The problem of the risks posed by chemicals, both military and industrial, has
led to numerous studies, reports and publications, which more or less reflect its
essence and character. The multiplicity of expression, their imperfection and the
weight of the problem means, however, that there is a need to create a coherent
typology of risks generated by chemical contamination.
The purpose of this article is to identify the possibilities for formation of
chemical contamination, and to diagnose the level of risk posed by chemical
warfare agents and toxic industrial chemicals. For this reason, it presents the basic
characteristics of these agents with a simultaneous analysis of the possibility of
potential hazards related to this. To assess it the following questions were
formulated: What is the nature of chemical contamination? Which agents pose
a serious threat and why? Whether the destruction potential of respective agents is
comparable? And finally - is there a clear, commonly accepted typology of these
threats?
The essence of contamination
The creation of chemical contamination usually results from the accidental
release or deliberate use of chemicals, which then, due to its nature and specific
properties, can cause significant risks to human beings, animals or the
environment. Due to the quite different characteristics of individual agents, the
type of threats generated can be very different. This means that to correct their
evaluation, it is necessary to know the exact type and nature of all chemical agents,
which in some cases can be a potential source of contamination.
The issue of risks implied by the contamination is not new. For many years,
research centres have conducted studies to develop or improve better and better
weapons, among these a prominent place is occupied by chemical weapons. Even
ignoring other destruction outputs, the extent and dangerous nature of emerging
208
contaminants clearly qualifies chemical weapons for their military use. In general,
however, such use refers almost exclusively to an armed conflict in which the use
of chemical weapons is theoretically justified. Looking at it from this point of view
it is easy to see that contamination as a result of attacks from weapons of mass
destruction is very unlikely to arise during peacetime. Does this mean that the
threat of contamination does not occur? Certainly not, because in addition to toxic
warfare agents, there is a whole range of hazardous chemical substances, which in
some cases can cause contamination. So, the question is what the essence of
contamination is and what characteristics distinguish it?
Contrary to appearances, the answer to this question is not clear, because,
depending on the interpretation, the contamination can mean different states. First
of all, it can be treated as an impurity, which, due to a particularly high
concentration or intensity or exceptional activity may result in the short term
sickness or death of human beings (and other organisms)1. In other words,
contamination could mean released into the environment ... toxic or radioactive
substances that pose a risk to the health and life of plants, animals and man ....2 In
addition, it is common to find the opinion that contamination is synonymous with
pollution, regardless of the types of contaminants. This has been said about oil
contamination of water and soil contamination with heavy metals or industrial
gases in air. Such contamination, although burdensome, is not always dangerous,
and as such should not be understood in terms of contamination.
As a result, it can be concluded that the essence of contamination is - the
undesirable presence of chemical, biological or radioactive materials which,
because of their harmful properties, could cause loss of human life or health (other
organisms). At this point it should be emphasised that this must be the undesirable
presence of these substances, not something normal, commonly found in
a particular place or area. To speak about contamination this presence must occur
in an unintended and unexpected manner, which in turn will create or increase the
risk to life or health of human beings, plants or animals.
When considering the problem of chemical contamination, in the first place
a classification of chemical agents, both combat and industrial, needs to be set. It
turns out, however, that it is not so simple, because in the literature there are
a number of different classifications, depending on the kind of criteria.
Consideration of all of them is far beyond the scope of the article; therefore, our
considerations will be limited only to the most important ones. Due to the serious
effects, first we will discuss the classification of warfare agents, and then will
consider the issues of toxic industrial typology.
1
Słownik pojęć przyrodniczych - http://przyroda.polska.pl/slownik.
Environmental contamination – Encyklopedia biologiczna tom X, Agencja PublicystycznoWydawnicza Opres, Kraków 2000, p. 18.
2
209
JAROSŁAW SOLARZ
Typology of chemical hazards - warfare chemical agents
Warfare Chemical Agents are, as the name suggests, a group of toxic agents
that have been used on the battlefield, mainly for the destruction of an opponent's
manpower. Among them we can find both those that are definitely of a mortal
nature and others that are less lethal. The basic typology of agents that are most
common is presented in Table 1. This shows that the impact of various agents on
the human body can cause choking, blistering, bleeding, irritation or effects on the
nervous system.
Another, more useful classification will arise when the division criterion accept
their physical condition, namely the physical state and the vapour pressure. The
issue of state of matter is so obvious that it needs no comment, but the vapour
pressure and its associated volatility requires a brief explanation.
Vapour pressure is the pressure of saturated steam which has a liquid on its
surface. At constant temperature it has constant value and does not depend on the
ratio of liquid and vapour. However, this depends on the type of substance and its
characteristics3. On the other hand, volatility is the ratio of a partial vapour
pressure component coupled to its mole fraction in the liquid. Volatility is
characterised by the ease of the evaporation of a substance and depends largely on
the temperature4.
Table 1
Classification of toxic agents due to the mode of action
Agent Class
CHOKING AGENTS
NERVE AGENTS
BLOOD AGENTS
BLISTER AGENTS
- VESICANTS
Name
Phosgene
Diphosgene
Chloropicrin
Nerve Agents Tabun
Sarin
Soman
Cyclosarin
Vx, VX
Hydrogen Cyanide
Cyanogen Chloride
Arsine
Distilled Mustard H/HD
Nitrogen Mustard
Mustard-T Mixture
Lewisite
Mustard-Lewisite Mixture
Phenyldichloroarsine
Ethyldichloroarsine
Symbol
CG
DP
PS
GA
GB
GD
GF
Vx, VX
AC
CK
SA
H/HD
HN-1, HN-2, HN-3
HT
L
HL
PD
ED
3
Leksykon naukowo-techniczny z suplementem, tom II, Wydawnictwa naukowo-techniczne,
Warszawa 1989, p. 734.
4
Ibidem, s. 448.
210
Agent Class
INCAPACITATING
AGENTS
RIOT
AGENTS
CONTROL
IRRITANTS
VOMITING AGENTS
Name
Methyldichloroarsine
Phosgene Oxime
3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate
Symbol
MD
CX
BZ
O-Chlorobenzylidene Malononitrile
Dibenz(b,f)-1:4-oxazepine
Capsaicin
Diphenylchloroarsine
Diphenylcyanoarsine
Adamsite
CS
CR
OC
DA
DC
DM
Source: Potential military chemical/biological agents and compounds, Fort Monroe, Quantico, Newport, Maxwell, 2005,
p. F-1.
Looking at it from the point of view of warfare agents, volatility is very crucial
because it determines the manner and extent of their use. Highly volatile agents can
be successfully used where our intention is to lead to air pollution, while those with
a low volatility are perfectly suited for contaminating the site. But that's not all the
features that interest us because, as it turns out, volatility has a direct impact on the
persistence of toxic chemicals and, thus, their ability to cause long-term impacts on
people and the environment. Interestingly, in the literature, the opinions about
persistence of respective chemical agents differ quite significantly, because very
often we have to deal with a situation in which, in one publication, the toxic agent
is treated as a non persistent, while in the other its persistency is defined as large.
Such a flagship example of non-compliance features two nerve agents - sarin and
soman, which in publications are treated interchangeably, depending on the
source5. To avoid such a problem, it is was proposed that the persistency of warfare
agents should be considered in the following way:
– persistent toxic agents: such agents, which after application are capable of
inducing shock from 24 hours to several days, or even weeks.
– non-persistent toxic agents: such agents which, after use. lose their ability to
cause shock after 10–15 minutes6.
This division seems pretty unequivocal, but it lacks information on how to treat
agents with persistency in the range of 15 minutes - 24 hours. Probably, it was
considered that this range does not really matter, because the persistency of this
same agent, depending on the meteorological and terrain conditions, can be very
different. This ensures that accurate and constant classification of chemical agents’
persistency is not possible.
The classifications presented above reflect the division warfare agents just
because of one criterion. For the planning of combat operations it is neither
5
These disparities are particularly evident when comparing the Russian publications with the
American.
6
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JP 1-02, Department of Defense, Washington
2005, p. 369, 404.
211
JAROSŁAW SOLARZ
convenient, nor useful; therefore, a military division was created, with different
qualities included, such as persistency, tactical purpose7 and the mode of action of
the toxic agent. A graphic image of this classification is shown in Figure 1.
From the information presented in the figure it can be concluded that the
usefulness of warfare agents is very different. Analysis of the reports concerning
the possession of chemical weapons, however, indicates that the basis for combat
use are toxic agents acting fatally, including organophosphorus agents, vesicant
and toxins. Other chemical agents have far less application8.
PERSISTENT
LETHAL
BLISTER
HERBICIDES
HD, HN-1, HN-2, HN-3, L,
HT, HL, PD, ED, MD, CX
DEFOLIANTS
HERBICIDES
TOKSIN
2,4,5,-t,
Picloram, 2,4,-D
XR
VX
NON PERSISTENT
NERVE AGENTS
IRRITATING
VOMITING
GA, GB, GD, GF
DA, DC, DM
TRAINING
CHOKING
CG, DP
BLOOD AGENTS
AC, CK, SA
RIOT AGENTS
LACRIMATORY
PS
CN
CS, CR
INCAPACITATING
PSYCHEDELICS
BZ
Source: J. Solarz, Prognozowanie skażeń chemicznych, AON, Warszawa 2007, p. 22.
Figure 1. Military classification of warfare agents
7
Comp. M. Krauze, I. Nowak, Broń chemiczna, MON, Warszawa 1984, p. 63.
In many countries, these agents are not considered as chemical warfare agents, so they can be
used for other purposes, e.g. in agriculture.
8
212
Typology of chemical hazards - toxic industrial chemicals
Toxic industrial chemicals (TIC) is a term that has no single, universally
accepted definition. In addition, the concept of toxic industrial chemicals are most
often treated the same as the concepts of industrial contamination or hazardous
substances. The consequence of this situation is a mess of terminology, which in
hazardous conditions does not allow for the unambiguous identification of the
problem.
To overcome this inconvenience it is worth discussing specific expressions.
The first of them - industrial pollution - a term that is rarely defined in the
literature. Perhaps the reason for this, as is quite clear, embraces the full range of
pollutants generated by industry, the public utilities sector and transport. Due to the
fact that the concept includes a very broad group of chemical substances of any
state of aggregation, different abilities to air passage, and different toxicity, we can
find here potentially toxic hazardous substances such as chlorine, ammonia,
phosgene and also many substances that are almost completely harmless.
Another term that should be considered is - dangerous substances. Normally,
we can assume that these are substances or mixtures which, because of one or more
chemical, physical or toxic properties, can pose a potential threat9. The generality
of this definition implies that almost any substance can, in certain circumstances,
pose a threat. To specify the type and level of risk an additional division was
introduced, which was categorised according to the types of risks.
At this point, the provisions of the two laws should be cited, i.e. on chemical
substances and mixtures, and on the transport of dangerous goods10.
In the first Act we find the definitions and general classification of dangerous
substances and mixtures. According to these, hazardous substances and mixtures
are classified as substances and mixtures: with explosive properties; oxidation;
extremely flammable; highly flammable; flammable; very toxic; toxic; harmful;
corrosive; irritant; sensitisation; carcinogenic; mutagenic; toxic for reproduction
and environmentally hazardous. The second Act - on the transport of dangerous
goods - is based on the provisions of the relevant regulations and international
agreements. We find there a definition of dangerous goods for which it is a material or object which, according to ADR, RID or ADN11 is not approved,
9
S. Wajda, J. Żurek, Zapobieganie nadzwyczajnym zagrożeniom środowiska, konwencje
międzynarodowe i uchwały organizacji międzynarodowych, Instytut Ochrony Środowiska, Warszawa
1995, s. 31.
10
Ustawa z dnia 25 lutego 2011 r. o substancjach chemicznych i ich mieszaninach (Acts. Laws
2011, No. 227, item. 1367), ustawa z dnia 19 sierpnia 2011 r. o przewozie towarów niebezpiecznych
(Acts. Laws 2011, No. 63, item. 322).
11
ADR – European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by
Road (ADR), done at Geneva on 30 September 1957 (Acts. Laws 2011 No. 110, item. 641), RID –
Regulations concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail (RID), as Annex C to
the Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail (COTIF), signed in Berne on 9 May 1980
(Acts. Laws 2007, No. 100, items. 674, 675, 2009 No. 167, item. 1318 and 2011, No. 137, item. 804
213
JAROSŁAW SOLARZ
respectively, for road transport, transport by rail or inland waterway, and
transport of either is allowed for such carriage under the conditions set down in
these provisions12.
The appropriate classification of hazardous materials is shown in Figure 2.
Class 5.1.
Class 1.
Oxidizing substances
Expolsives
Class 5.2.
Class 2.
Organic peroxides
Gases
Class 3.
Class 6.1.
Flammable liquids
Toxic materials
Class 4.1.
Class 6.2.
Flammable solids, self-reactive substances
and explosives, solid desensitized
Infectious substances
Class 4.2.
Class 7.
Pyrophoric materials
Radioactive materials
Class 4.3.
Class 8
Substances which, in contact with
water, emit flammable gases
Corrosive materials
Class 9.
Miscellaneous dangerous substances and articles
Source: Ustawa z dnia 25 lutego 2011 r. o substancjach chemicznych i ich mieszaninach (Acts. Laws 2011,
No. 227, item. 1367).
Figure 2. Classification of hazardous materials
and 805), ADN – European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Goods by Inland
Waterways of dangerous goods (ADN), concluded at Geneva on 26 May 2000 (Acts. Laws 2010 No.
235, item. 1537).
12
Ustawa z dnia 19 sierpnia 2011 r. o przewozie towarów niebezpiecznych, op. cit., art. 2,
point. 1, para. 4.
214
Even a cursory analysis of the data presented in the figure shows that many of
the agents, although they are dangerous, will not cause contamination. In fact, the
threat created has a completely different character. So the question is - which of
them will pose a real danger of contamination? To understand this you need to
clearly describe what really determines the contamination. To solve this problem it
would be quite useful to elaborate on the National Defence Academy definition of
toxic industrial.
According to this, toxic industrial chemicals (TIC) shall be: chemical
substances with toxic properties, manufactured and used in the national economy in
large quantities and transported for use or processing in other plants, having the
ability to be easily transferred into the atmosphere via release from tanks and
installations, and causing paralysis of soldiers13.
It is easy to note that the classification of the agents to the category of TIC
enforces on it the need to have specific properties, namely: strong toxicity, massive
use in the economy, the ability to cause paralysis and, most importantly, easing the
transition into the atmosphere. This latter property greatly reduces the number of
hazardous materials, narrowing them only for gaseous substances. And these
substances, assuming they are highly toxic, will constitute a real threat after their
release over a wide area.
Toxic industrial chemicals have very diverse toxic properties, which makes it
difficult to classify them according to traditional criteria applicable to warfare
agents. In the literature one can find such a division, the criterion used is the
dominant syndrome that occurs during acute intoxication. It is shown in Figure 3.
sulfur dioxide
nitrogen oxides
fluoride
hydrogen sulfide
Choking and blood
agents
Metabolic
toxic agents
ammonia
Choking and
Neurotrophic
agents
Neurotrophic
toxic agents
carbon
disulfide
cyanide
Agents with
a predominance
blood action
Agents with
a predominance
choking action
chlorine
phosgene
oxide
ethylene
Source: Prepared on the basis Metodyka oceny sytuacji chemicznej po skażeniach toksycznymi środkami
przemysłowymi., MON, Warszawa 1993, p. 7-8.
Figure 3. Classification of toxic industrial chemicals due to the manner of impact
13
I. Nowak, J. Solarz, Toksyczne środki przemysłowe jako źródło zagrożeń dla wojsk
prowadzących działania bojowe na obszarze kraju, AON, Warszawa 1998, p. 8.
215
JAROSŁAW SOLARZ
Characteristics of chemical warfare agents
The use of warfare agents and their typology can be very different. The manner
of using them will determine their chemical, physical and toxic properties. The
fundamental characteristics of the contaminants are depicted in Table 2
Table 2
Characteristics of basic chemical warfare agents
Persistency
Type
Nerve
Choking
Symbol
Winter
GA, GB,
10 min – 24h 2h – 3 days
GD
2 dni – 1
2 days VX
week
weeks
v. quickly
quickly
CG, DP
1 do 10 min
10 min – 1h
immediatel
y
HD, HN
3 dni – 1
week
weeks
slowly
L, HL
1 – 3 days
weeks
quickly
AC, CK
1 – 10 min
10 min – 1h
v. quickly
Blister
Blood
Summer
Speed
of action
The method of penetration
Vapor /
Liquid
aerosol
eyes, mouth,
eyes, lungs
skin
eyes, mouth,
eyes, lungs
skin
lungs
eyes
eyes, skin,
lungs
eyes, skin,
lungs
eyes, skin,
eyes, lungs
eyes, mouth,
skin
eyes, mouth,
injured skin
NOTE: Abbreviations means: GA - tabun, GB - sarin, GD - soman, CG - phosgene, DP - diphosgene, HD distilled mustard HN - nitrogen mustard, L - lewisite, HL - mustard - lewisite mixture, AC - hydrogen
cyanide,
Source: Health service support in a nuclear, biological, and chemical environment, Department of the Army,
Washington 1993, p. 2-13.
Nerve agents are organophosphorus toxic agents, derivatives of phosphoric
acid and alkylophosphonic. The standard adopted conventional division is made
into two groups - G and V. The first one includes agents which in their basic form
are relatively volatile, while the second agents meet with much greater persistency.
In military applications persistency of warfare agents has a vital importance and,
therefore, in order to increase the stability of group G all kinds of thickeners are
used.
The most important representatives of the nerve agents include: phosphoric
acid derivatives - DFP, tabun; phosphonic acid derivatives - sarin, soman, and V.
In addition, this group also includes many herbicides and insecticides that are
commonly used in the civilian economy. These are: amiton, armin, dimefox,
paraoksan, paratin, systoksy. All these substances are toxic, although much less
than those found in military applications. Actually, only sarin, soman, Vx and their
variations, such as cyklosarin (GF) and thickened soman (TGD), are of importance
today.
216
Blister agents (vesicants) are among the most well - known and the longest
used warfare agents. Their „flagship” representative - sulfur mustard (HD)
appeared on the battlefield on 12 July 1917, at Ypres. Thereafter follow: lewisite
(L) and the nitrogen mustards (HN-1, HN-2, HN-3). Apart from these, other blister
agents were also used, for example phenyldichloroarsine (PD) or
methyldichloroarsine (MD).
Besides undoubtedly good toxic properties, mustard (both sulfuric and HN-3)
has a major drawback, namely, a high freezing temperature. Below this
temperature it is a solid, thereby losing many of its useful features. Therefore, there
is a need to apply the product as a technical mustard, containing a variety of
additives which have considerably reduced solidification point. It is also used in
specially prepared mixes e.g. mustard with lewisite, where freezing temperatures
can be as low as minus 42oC.
Lewisite, in turn, is the primary toxic agent from the group of arseniccontaining compounds. Currently, its military importance is low, mainly because
with the high humidity lewisite hydrolyses so fast that it is difficult to obtain the
appropriate concentration needed to cause burns.
Choking agents are agents that next to mustard gas and chlorine were the most
frequently used during the First World War. As with nerve and vesicant agents they are a group of lethal agents. The main representatives of this category are:
phosgene (CG), diphosgene (DP) and chloropicrin (PS)14. Due to the state of matter
- gas (phosgene) and volatile liquids (diphosgene, chloropicrin) are all nonpersistent and work through the respiratory system - the nose, throat and lungs.
The relatively low toxicity of phosgene, diphosgene and chloropicrin,
compared with the toxicity of nerve agents means that their usefulness in the
modern battlefield is very slight. In addition they are disqualified because of too
much volatility, which prevents the formation of dangerous concentrations that
could lead to mass loses. Currently, a view exists that agents of this kind should be
considered only in terms of toxic industrial chemicals that may pose a local threat
to troops and civilians.
Blood agents, also known as cyano compounds (cyanides), were often used on
a massive scale during World War I15. Their advantage was their high availability
and fast performance, the downside - too great a volatility, which effectively
depreciated them16. Their general names do not accurately reflect their properties,
as some of them do not have a cyano group, and others are not poisons of the
blood. For these reasons they have been given the name - „generally toxic” agents
in Poland. Among them are mainly (CK) and hydrogen cyanide (AC) and
14
Chloropicrin has no combat appliance, but can be used for gas masks testing.
During World War II, Germany used the hydrogen cyanide (in the form of Zyklon-B - calcium
sulfate impregnated with 40% HCN) to the extermination of people in gas chambers.
16
Therefore, some attempts were performed to use various mixes, which should be then more
efficient. An example would be French Vincennite agent, consisting of: 50% HCN, 30% AsCl3, 15%
and 5% SnCl4 CCl3H (chloroform).
15
217
JAROSŁAW SOLARZ
additionally cyanogen bromide, arsine (SA) and carbon monoxide. In fact, from
these agents, only cyanogen chloride and hydrogen cyanide have some military
importance, although to a very limited extent.
Hydrogen cyanide (prussic acid) is a colourless, mobile liquid with an odour of
bitter almonds. A low boiling point ensures a high evaporation rate, and hence low
persistence in the field. Typically, in open ground, this is 5 minutes and in wooded
areas 10; in winter this does not exceed an hour. Therefore, liquid hydrogen
cyanide is not designed for wide use in the field. Nevertheless, the ease of
obtaining high levels of combat concentrations is a serious threat to human beings.
This is confirmed by the use of this agent to carry out the death penalty. Acid
vapours are well absorbed by fibres and porous materials, which poses a threat of
poisoning in confined spaces due to desorption. It is very soluble in water and
organic solvents.
Cyanogen chloride is a colourless, mobile and very volatile liquid with a
pungent odour. Sometimes the odour may be undetectable due to its strong irritant
to the eyes, nose and respiratory system. Its volatility is several times greater than
that of hydrogen cyanide, which reduces its persistency, yet allows easy production
of very high concentrations. In contrast to hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride
has very strong irritant and choking features. It is soluble in organic solvents,
mustard gas and chloropicrin.
Currently, these agents are not seen as potential chemical weapons. However,
due to their mass occurrence in the industrial sectors of many countries they still
may pose a serious threat as a significant part of toxic industrial chemicals.
Characteristic of toxic industrial chemicals (TIC)
The individual characteristics of all hazardous substances are far beyond the
scope of the article so you can simply mention that the Central Institute for Labour
Protection (CILP) has been engaged in the indexing of these substances and the
development of the so-called Safety Data Sheets (SDS) for hazardous substances
for many years, carried out in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of
the European Parliament and of the Council17.
These cards contain information on the properties of substances (chemical,
physical and toxicity) and the principles of handling during production, transport
and neutralisation. Currently, the CILP database contains 645 SDS.
The characteristics of hazardous substances can also be found in the
development of the Chief Inspectorate of Environmental Protection under the title:
17
Regulation (EC) no 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December
2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH),
establishing a European Chemicals Agency, art. 31.
218
Principles of rescue operations18, which is an implementation of the U.S.
publication: Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG).
As already mentioned, all the toxic industrial chemicals are gaseous under
normal conditions and, therefore, pose a direct threat to troops and the population
(with the exception of hydrogen cyanide). After release they may spread through
the air for long distances, while maintaining a concentration lethal to human beings
and animals. Other dangerous substances posing an indirect threat to troops are
usually liquids or solids. Furthermore, they can contaminate ground and water
reservoirs and rivers after escaping from containers, causing hard to reverse
biological effects, both for the environment and the population.
Also interesting is the fact that toxic industrial chemicals generally have
a characteristic odour and a specific colour, which can be used for visual and
olfactory identification.
The boiling and solidification temperatures are varied, which in turn affects the
stability of the agents in the environment. Similarly, the vapour density of
respective TICs relative to air is also different. If the density is less than the density
of air, the TIC will ascend to the upper layer of air; if it is the larger agent it will
hold on to the surface of the earth, penetrating to the base and all kinds of
depressions. Knowing the type of chemical agent and its vapour density relative to
air, we can predict its behaviour in the environment and use this property to protect
the population.
When considering the problem of chemical contamination we must remember
that the presence of harmful substances does not always mean immediate
contamination. To contaminate, the amount of toxic substance must be sufficiently
large to pose a threat. The point is that the concentration of the agent decides
whether it is a threat or not. The basis for determining whether a chemical
substance will pose a threat is Rozporządzenie Ministra Pracy i Polityki Społecznej
z dnia 29 listopada 2002 r. w sprawie najwyższych dopuszczalnych stężeń i natężeń
czynników szkodliwych dla zdrowia w środowisku pracy19. The regulation describes
the volume concentration limits for all hazardous substances. It specifies the
maximum acceptable concentration (NDS)20, the maximum threshold concentration
18
Zasady postępowania ratowniczego 2008, Główny Inspektorat Ochrony Środowiska,
Warszawa 2008.
19
See, Acts. Laws of 2002 No. 217, item. 1833.
20
NDS - weighted average of concentration for which the impact on the employee during the 8 hour, daily and average weekly working time laid down in the Labour Code, by the period of its
activity should not cause negative changes in his condition and the state of health of future
generations.
219
JAROSŁAW SOLARZ
(NDSP)21 and the maximum acceptable concentration for instantaneous
(NDSCh)22. The values, specified for common TIC are shown in Table 3.
Table 3
Allowable concentrations of toxic industrial chemicals (mg/m3)
0,5
0,06
0,2
14
1,5
0,3
Maximum
acceptable
concentration
for
instantaneous
(NDSCh)
28
9
-
-
18
30
11000
0,8
-
2
0,5
5
2
1000 - 1700
450
2
0,0007
0,08
10
0,16
20
100
750
1,5
0,38
1
5
3
10
111000
760 - 2660
Threshold
sensibility
Name
Ammonia
Chlorine
Hydrogen
cyanide
Carbon
disulphide
Sulfur dioxide
Hydrogen
fluoride
Phosgene
Hydrogen
sulfide
Ethylene oxide
Nitrogen oxides
Maximum
acceptable
concentration
(NDS)
Lethal
concentration
1700
200
300
Source: Prepared on the basis Rozporządzenie Ministra Pracy i Polityki Społecznej z dnia 29 listopada 2002, op. cit.
The presented data shows that the scale of the toxic effects of individual agents
is not the same. What's more, as it turns out, their value does not only depend on
the toxicity of the agent but also on the resistance of the organism, viewed as the
sum of characteristics such as gender and age of the person, species sensitivity,
racial and inter-individual, physiological state of the body, as well as current and
past illnesses.
When analysing the problem of threats posed by toxic industrial chemicals we
should pay attention to yet another aspect, namely their prevalence in the country.
It is quite obvious that the more of them there are, the more dangerous they
become. However, if we look at the numbers alone, it would appear that the whole
country is simply packed with objects in which toxic industrial agents are
produced, stored or processed. In fact, only factories that include industrial plants
21
NDSP – is concentration value, which due to the health hazard the worker may not exceed in
the work environment in no time.
22
NDSCh - is the average concentration that should not cause negative changes in the health of
the worker, if present in the work environment no longer than 15 minutes and not more than 2 times
during a shift in an interval of not less than one hour.
220
with increased risk or high risk of a major industrial accident23 pose a real
threat.According to the Major Command of the State Fire Service there are about
200/16024. In addition, a major danger is created by just two industrial toxic agents,
namely ammonia and chlorine. Statistical data also confirms this relationship,
according to which more than 75% of all industrial plants are plants with ammonia
(although the vast majority of them contain small amounts of agent), and
approximately 16% of chlorine. Other objects with TIC are found in much smaller
numbers and the threat they pose is negligible.
Conclusions
The modern risk of contamination, treated as a source of major emergencies,
can vary substantially, which is largely the result of the very essence of
contamination. This essence, as stated, will manifest itself in the undesirable
presence of chemical, biological or radioactive materials which, because of their
harmful properties, could cause loss of human life or health (other organisms).
In the case of chemical contamination a considerable variety of possible
sources of contamination (chemical agents) were found, which depending on the
destination can be deadly or just harmful. The first is, of course, chemical warfare,
which in a sense „ex officio” is designed to cause mass losses on the battlefield. At
this point, however, you can protest, noting that the production and use of chemical
weapons is legally prohibited by the Convention of 13 January 1993 on the
prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical
weapons and on their destruction25. It turns out, however, that there are still cases
of use of chemical weapons, and even their storage creates a real danger of
contamination (intentional or accidental).
The second type of threats is pollution generated by industrial toxic chemicals.
Compared to warfare agents, this threat is of a different character, exhibiting a
much lower hazard level for each substance and, for a great number of them, their
prevalence and diversity. Therefore, in most cases, contamination resulting from
toxic industrial chemicals is rarely the cause of emergencies, mainly because they
are unstable and have limited range.
As a result, it can be concluded that the risk of contamination caused by toxic
industrial chemicals will not be large, mainly due to the limitations of the low
23
For a major accident within the meaning of art. 3 pkt 23 act of 27 April 2001 Prawo Ochrony
Środowiska (Acts. Laws of 2008 No. 25, item. 150) we treat the event, in particular emission, fire or
explosion, resulting in the industrial process, during storage or transport, in which there is one or
more hazardous substances, leading to immediate of danger to life or health of human beings or the
environment or the emergence of such a threat of delay. For major industrial accidents this is
understood in accordance with Art. 3 point 24 of the above-mentioned major accident at the plant.
24
As of 5.04.2014 Year
25
see Laws. 1999, No. 63, item. 703.
221
JAROSŁAW SOLARZ
toxicity of most of them or any toxicity at all. You also need to add that
contamination arising after the release of toxic industrial chemicals is unstable and,
as such, will not cause danger for a long time. This does not mean, however, that it
can be taken lightly, since under certain conditions this can cause a real tragedy26.
Bibliography
Zieliński S., Skażenia chemiczne środowiska, Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki
Wrocławskiej, Wrocław 2007;
Solarz J. Prognozowanie skażeń chemicznych, AON, Warszawa 2007;
Marrs T. C., Maynard R. L., Sidell F. R., Chemical warfare agents, toxicology and
treatment, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, New York, 1996;
Nowak I., Solarz J., Wpływ skażeń toksycznymi środkami przemysłowymi na działania
bojowe wojsk na obszarze RP, AON, Warszawa 1997;
Metodyka oceny sytuacji chemicznej po skażeniach toksycznymi środkami przemysłowymi,
MON, Warszawa 1993;
26
In 1984, in Bhopal (India) methyl isocyanate was released, which resulted in the death of
several thousand people and many more losing their sight.
222
ISSN
0867–2245
CRIMINAL
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORTED WITH SPATIAL ANALYSIS TOOLS IN LINK APPLICATION
ISSN 2353-1789
Robert MARCJAN
AGH University
of Science and Technology
Kraków
Marek ŁAKOMY
Michał WYSOKIŃSKI
AGH University
Kraków
AGH University
Kraków
CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE
SUPPORTED WITH SPATIAL
ANALYSIS TOOLS
IN LINK APPLICATION1
Kamil PIĘTAK
Marek KISIEL-DOROHINICKI
AGH University
Kraków
AGH University
Kraków
Abstract
The aim of the paper is to present the possibilities of utilizing spatial (geographical)
information in the criminal analysis and to introduce the LINK software, which is able to
perform such analyses. LINK is a decision-support system dedicated for operational and
investigational activities of homeland security services. The paper briefly discusses issues
of criminal analysis in the Polish reality and focuses on crime mapping and spatial
analyses. It also lists available analysis methods and software tools together with their pros
and con. The description of LINK system functionality constitutes the main part of the
paper. It covers the tasks of data acquisition, processing, analysis and visualization. In
addition to that the paper also includes a description of the integration possibilities of
LINK and ESRI’s ArcGIS application stack and performing complex geospatial analyses.
Key words – decision support, criminal analysis, GIS – geographical information
system
1
Prace zostały sfinansowane z projektu: „Zaawansowane technologie informatyczne wspierające
procesy przetwarzania danych w obszarze analizy kryminalnej” Projekt rozwojowy NCBiR nr O
ROB 0008 01.
223
R. MARCJAN, M. ŁAKOMY, M. WYSOKIŃSKI, K. PIĘTAK, M. KISIEL-DOROHINICKI
Introduction
Criminal analysis is a complex process involving information gathered from
different sources, such as phone billings, bank account transactions and eyewitness
testimonies. Most of this data possesses a spatial (geographical) aspect, what
means it can be presented and analysed on maps. Because of the massive character
of this information, it is hardly possible for it to be processed without the help of
sophisticated computer systems. On the other hand, because of the crucial role of a
human expert in the process, the main role of such a system is to support dealing
with such complex data. It means that all the information has to be transformed
into a coherent and relatively simple visual form, in which key objects (suspects,
events, etc.) and their interrelations can be easily spotted.
The paper describes a system designed to facilitate complex analysis processes,
in particular those related to the operational and investigation activities of
homeland security services. It covers the most important tasks and typical analysis
steps including: initial data transformation and filtering, data integration and
structuring, graphical data representation, visualisation on maps and use of
geospatial analysis functions.
Criminal analysis
Criminal analysis [4] has been recognised as a useful support tool for over
twenty-five years and is now successfully used both within the international law
enforcement community and private sector organisations. Nowadays, INTERPOL,
Europol and the police forces of many countries have criminal analysts among their
personnel.
There are many definitions of criminal analysis in use throughout the world.
The definition agreed in June 1992 by an international group of twelve European
INTERPOL member countries and subsequently adopted by other countries is as
follows:
“The identification of and provision of insight into the relationship between
crime data and other potentially relevant data with a view to police and judicial
practice.”
The central task of criminal analysis is to help officials (law enforcers, policy
makers, and decision makers) to deal more effectively with uncertainty, so it plays
only an auxiliary role in the whole investigation process.
The analysis is usually requested by a police officer or a prosecutor who
defines the detailed goal of the analysis and conveys all potentially useful materials
(data) to the analyst.
The analyst usually starts with importing all the data (e.g. files including
telephone billings received from operators) to a database. Next, the analytical
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CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORTED WITH SPATIAL ANALYSIS TOOLS IN LINK APPLICATION
process can be started. It usually contains the following steps, which can be
repeated many times (they form a loop):
• operations on data; they can be performed both by the use of various
analytical algorithms (e.g. filtering, removing duplicates, calculating statistics,
joining or decomposing data sources) and by an analyst's operations (e.g.
annotation of data in the diagram),
• putting forward a hypothesis (based on the results of the previous step),
• the hypothesis testing.
In the above (iterative) process an analyst can request additional data at any
time. The output from the analysis usually takes the form of a report (hard copy)
which is next included in the documentation related to the investigation.
LINK2 analysis environment and its architecture overview
LINK [3],[4] is a comprehensive data analysis platform aimed at aiding
criminal analysis which, as described in previous sections, has some specific
requirements. The basic version of the system provides a set of tools for
integrating, processing and visualising data which may originate from various
sources (e.g. phone billings, bank account statements, address books, etc.). LINK is
an extensible platform, based on plug-in architecture [7]. It allows for integrating
new tools for automatic or semi-automatic data analysis as well as enhancing
existing ones. Such tools may be provided by third party vendors and combined
with others in order to extract relevant information from a large volume of data.
This approach allows for nearly unlimited ways of extending and adjusting the
system to the requirements of a particular criminal analysis domain.
Data acquisition
The first step in the process of data analysis in LINK is importing the data into
the system. Based on the experience of professional criminal investigators, it is safe
to state that there is no standardised format of analysed data. Not only can it be in
any file format (e.g. plain text, Rich
Text Format, Comma Separated Values, Microsoft Excel or Word), but it can
also be in paper form, which requires additional steps in order to digitalise it.
LINK provides an advanced data import tool. The import wizard guides the
user through the import process in an intuitive manner. During the import the data
is validated against various rules, which may be specific for a particular data
domain (Fig. 1). For example, this may include checking if a phone call record in a
billing has both caller and receiver numbers or if bank account numbers in a bank
statement are valid. The user can preview each step of the import process and
2
http://fslab.agh.edu.pl/.
225
influence it by adjusting parameters like format of time, date, etc. or defining
default values. All operations and user modifications are placed in an import log,
which is presented to the user once the import is completed.
Fig. 1. Data importer wizard
The biggest advantage of the LINK import tool is its flexibility. It comes in two
forms:
• a simplified version for importing data of a tabular nature (e.g. phone
billings) which is similar to import tools used in spreadsheet applications
• a generic import tool which is based on parsing trees and may be used to
import data in any form (e.g. bank statements)
Both versions of the import tool allow the user to specify the format and the
semantics of each portion of the data (e.g. appointing the phone call start time,
caller and receiver numbers, etc.) Moreover, they support even more sophisticated
scenarios. For example, some mobile network providers deliver billings in which
the phone call direction is specified by the caller column and receiver column,
whereas others provide two columns with numbers and an additional column with
direction information. The LINK import tool is able to handle these cases, as well
as others that are even more complicated.
Due to the flexibility of the import tool and the variety of data formats, the
whole import process is tedious and time-consuming. In order to aid this, it is
possible to define an import template which can be later reused for loading data in
the same or similar format (templates may be adjusted if needed). Templates are
226
stored as XML files and, therefore, they are easy to share with other users (via
email or centralised repository).
Data processing and analysis
The work of criminal analysts is a form of advanced, context aware, data
mining. The goal of the analysis process is to find related objects in a network of
data, which is achieved by applying a mixture of numerous algorithms which are
formalised by graph clustering [9], social network analysis and other pattern
recognition [11] fields of study. Most of these operations can be automated, at least
to some extent, and LINK is designed to facilitate that.
The basic version of LINK provides a set of essential data analysis operators
which allow for extraction of vital information from a large volume of data. The
most widely used operation is filtering, which may be based on a data type, string
pattern, and value or time range (Fig. 2).
Fig. 2 Tabular data view
227
This allows for quick removal of irrelevant data from the analysis picture. The
user can always see the summary of analysed data in the form of basic statistics,
which include the counts of all elements and their relationship occurrence as well
as average or aggregated values of their attributes. Such a summary is very useful
as it allows for quick recognition of data regularities and anomalies, such as
frequent events or extraordinary values.
In addition to the basic analysis operators, LINK provides more advanced ones.
For example, in the phone billing analysis domain users can perform operations
such as:
• detecting and removing phone number prefixes
• merging 2 or more billings into one data set
• detecting duplicate phone calls (even with time shift)
Since the LINK platform is extensible, new, even more advanced analysis
operators and tools can be provided in the future (e.g. for detecting paths in graphs
or finding frequent event patterns).
Visualisation
One of the most important features of LINK is its support for exploring and
manipulating data in a visual manner, which is in conformance with the visual data
mining [2] approach.
This is done via editors which allow for the analysis of different aspects of the
data. Editors allow the presented data to be modified as well as adding new
artificial data; therefore, they can also be used as general purpose graphical
notepads.
The basic version of the system provides two graphical data editors:
• Scheme editor, which presents the data in the form of a graph
• Timeline editor, which presents the occurrence of events with emphasis on
their chronology
Data in the scheme editor is presented as a graph which consists of nodes and
connections with properties. In order to display the graph in a readable form,
various graph layout algorithms are provided, including:
• Circle layout - nodes are evenly spaced on the border of a circle
• Group layout - main nodes (with significantly more connections) are placed
in a circle, remaining nodes are further outside
• Peacock [10] layout - main nodes are in the centre, remaining nodes are
further outside (Fig. 3)
• Grid layout - nodes are evenly spaced on a grid
Additional layout algorithms may be provided as extensions to the system.
The scheme editor provides several operators, which allow for:
• detecting leaf nodes (nodes with only one connection)
• merging selected nodes into one
• merging all nodes with the same label
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Fig. 3 Peacock layout of scheme diagram
The timeline editor displays horizontal timelines (which may represent people
or phone numbers) and events, which are presented as arrows between them. In
addition, the timeline diagram displays a horizontal time axis. This form of data
analysis is useful for investigating sequences of events between various objects, as
well as event patterns.
In addition to the above-mentioned editors, others may be provided as
extensions for the LINK system.
Operation tracking
The process of data analysis may be complicated and it may take a lot of steps.
Moreover, data may be merged, transformed or split for further analysis; therefore,
it may be difficult to describe the analysis process that led to certain outcomes. In
criminal investigation it is essential to thoroughly document the processing steps
which started from the acquired source data and resulted in the final conclusion.
LINK facilitates this process as it thoroughly tracks all the operations and
modifications that were applied to the data. The system allows the deduction graph
229
for a certain data set, or even a single data element, to be displayed. This graph will
contain information about all the operations that led from the imported data to the
current one.
LINK mapping module
Evaluation of standard LINK software data visualization tools, scheme editor
and timeline editor, has shown the need for special treatment of geographical data
visualisation. Many cases processed by analysts involve evaluation of data strictly
connected to geographical context. Mobile phone call billings, among other data,
provide information about the location and range of BTS3 stations utilised to
establish a call. Also, bank statements provide information about the addresses of
ATM machines and sales points, where the credit or debit cards were used. This
information visualisation is often crucial for understanding the whole situation and
proving analysed hypotheses. To achieve this goal, analysts often use specialised
GIS software [5], [6].
Fig. 4. LINK Map Editor
3
230
Base Transceiver Stadion.
To help continuing analysis flow and taking advantage of the LINK modular
Eclipse Plugin Architecture [1], the new Map Editor plugin has been developed
(Fig. 4). This Map Editor plugin is aimed at increasing the productivity of analyses
based on geographical data. Most operations performed on geographical data
during criminal analysis are often repeated and come down to a few simplified
functions. As most day to day analyses wouldn’t go beyond that functionality,
simple tools for most common data analysis and visualisation have been
implemented in the LINK Map Editor plugin. If that is not enough, plugin provides
tools for integration and interoperation with specialised GIS software such as ESRI
ArcGIS [5] (briefly described in the next section). The main advantage of this
approach is it provides an easy way to export pre-prepared data for further and
more sophisticated GIS analysis.
The map data is also determined separately from the other program data. In the
initial phase of Map Editor development, geographic data in LINK was continued
through the same mechanism as all the other data, in the file based SQLite
database. This solution, however, turned out to be unsatisfactorily slow and
inefficient for performing operations on this type of data. To overcome this
bottleneck a different approach was applied. In the current development version
geographical data is serialised to JSON and continued in compressed text files.
This solution has led to read/write operations on large datasets being more than
twice as fast.
Currently, research on utilising the GIS specialised database is being
conducted, especially PostGIS DB. The use of this type of database would ease the
integration of LINK with specialised GIS software. It would also allow an easier
and more efficient implementation of operations for manipulating geographic data
with its built-in set of standard functions accessed through SQL queries.
One of the most important features of every map editor is to give support for
raster basemaps. LINK software, by default, uses open access raster map data
available through an OpenStreetMap4 webservice. However, the user is not
restricted to using the default solution. In order to provide the possibility of access
to any type of basemap, LINK defines an extension point for new providers. By
utilising certain interfaces external vendors or even users can independently
develop providers of basemaps from external sources such as Eclipse Plugin
Modules. Considering the real needs of Polish criminal analysts, and realising that
they often work with internet disabled workstations, application by default comes
not only with online OpenStreetMap basemaps, but also with a set of standard
basemaps prepared on disk files.
The current functionality of Map Editor comprises tools for:
• visualisation of previously gathered data,
• manual data preparation
• object filtering tools.
4
http://www.openstreetmap.org/about.
231
Base data models available in map editor are points, tracks and ranges (such as
BTS station ranges). Apart from these, it is possible to bind metadata objects with
the map model. These can be distance measures, events’ order indicators, notes or a
map legend describing object classes placed on the map. Dedicated RCP Views
were created to manipulate the data domain and visual properties. It is also possible
to manipulate objects directly in the editor.
Apart from the possibility for importing basic geographical objects from
heterogeneous sources, specialized visualisation methods were developed for mobile
phone call billings and BTS station lists, e.g. for objects bound with BTS range data
(including mobile phone call events) it is possible to switch the display of particular
ranges’ visualisation according to the current analysis needs. There is also a tool for
data transformation between the model of BTS stations with related call events and the
model in every call event is mapped to a separate pin object (point).
Data filtering is possible via two developed tools – the “timeline dialog” and
“objects” view. The timeline visible objects to be filtered by the occurrence time of
connected events. It does not only allow the user to filter out events from the specified
timeframe, but also to investigate the sequence of events. On the other hand, the
“objects” view allows objects to be filtered by their domain properties’ values such as a
phone number or BTS station address, including the full text search.
It is worth to note, that originally map editor is more extensive and provides
many features for performing all basic operations on the map data. Currently,
maintaining these basic functions has been abandoned in favour of utilities actually
being used by the analysts on a daily basis. It significantly simplifies the interface
and shortens the learning curve for the average analyst.
Integration with ArcGIS5
Even though some geo-processing can be done using LINK, it is often
necessary to use more sophisticated analytical software, like ArcGIS. This is a set
of software tools developed by ESRI for creating, processing and analysing maps
and spatial data. The tools are available for desktop and server architecture, as well
as for mobile devices. The main platform for ArcGIS is Windows; however, ESRI
offers some limited functionality for Linux and OS X. In addition to simple
analysis methods like data filtering, ArcGIS allows for chain processing, which
connects individual geo-processing functions and creates very complex models like
hot-spot analysis or the determination of meeting probability between two suspects
(which is presented in the next section).
ArcGIS is not the only product on the market that offers complex geo-processing
capabilities. There are many alternatives in both the paid and free applications’ sectors.
However, there are several features that distinguish it from its rivals:
5
232
5http://www.esri.com/software/arcgis.
• supporting the entire chain of processing starting from creating and storing
data in databases and finishing with displaying results,
• an unprecedented variety of geographic data processing functions,
• a thorough, well-structured and easy to use documentation,
• big community and professional support.
The ArcGIS software is designed for end-users, as well as developers. It offers
COM based ArcObjects APIs in Java and C#, which can be used for creating
applications with geo-processing capabilities and extending the functionalities of
those provided by ESRI. In addition to this, geo-processing functions can also be
accessed via Python modules and put together in scripts or extensions.
To provide interoperability between LINK and ArcGIS, an intermediate layer
of data integration was developed. This layer consists of two modules, one on each
side (LINK and ArcGis). In the first approach the LINK mapping module has been
equipped with a simple export algorithm to a shapefile6 data format. On the other
hand, the ArcGIS custom Python extension was developed. It provides the tools to
help data import and for conducting common analyses. It comes with its own
graphical interface (Fig. 5). Unfortunately, this solution came out to be imperfect.
Geographical data exported from LINK software into shapefile has to be
simplified. Shapefiles have many limitations, they support only one shape
associated with an entity, only one shape type per file, and do not provide a simple
way to introduce relations between exported data. This implies many
transformations on data exported from LINK, leading to its simplification and
making it hard to import the data back after processing with ArcGIS.
Fig. 5. The LINK data import dialog extension in ArcMap
6
Esri spatial data format: http://www.esri.com/library/whitepapers/pdfs/shapefile.pdf.
233
To overcome these difficulties and provide tighter integration with ArcGIS, the
current development is conducted towards data exchange through PostGIS spatial
database extension. This would allow data to be interchanged both ways without
loss of information. It would also exclude the necessity for manual invocation of
import/export actions and allow for concurrent data access. Also, the ArcGIS
plugin for the LINK platform is being developed with ArcObjects Java API. Its
implementation, and therefore full integration of software in just one application
window, would allow continuous analysis work without having to switch between
two application contexts.
Case study – simple geographical criminal analysis
To illustrate the use of the LINK and ArcGIS software applications in criminal
analysis while considering the geographical data, let’s walk through a simple case
study.
Let’s assume that a series of three gas station robberies had taken place.
CCTVs had captured the same registration number of the robbers’ car. The car
owner has been arrested. Unluckily, he did not have the stolen money with him. He
has also claimed that his car had been stolen and he had nothing to do with the
robberies. In the meantime, another suspect with a large amount of money,
matching the stolen amount, has been arrested in another part of Poland.
The analyst has been asked to check whether one of the suspects could have
been at the crime scene. The mobile network operator has provided billings with
mobile phone calls of both suspects. The data was imported to LINK, and BTS data
was automatically complemented with UKE7 database contents. Next, a map
diagram of BTS used for calls was created and augmented with the robbed stations’
positions (Fig. 6).
The diagram showed that only the car owner’s mobile phone made calls
through BTS stations approximate to the crime scenes (BTS stations indicated by
horizontal pin series). Furthermore, he is probably lying about the car theft, as he
did not claim his phone has been stolen with it. On the other hand, a suspect
arrested with money could not possibly have been with his phone at those places
(BTS stations indicated by vertical pins series).
However, to exclude all doubt about the car owner being able to rob the stations,
the analyst had to prove that the suspect could manage to get, between phone calls, to
the crime scene and have enough time to perform the robbery (Fig. 7). Unfortunately,
this case is beyond the current LINK software capabilities. However, it is possible to
export map data to external GIS applications ,such as ArcGIS software, and continue
the analysis (Fig. 8).
7
234
Republic of Poland Office of Electronic Communications http://en.uke.gov.pl/.
Fig. 6. BTS logins diagram augmented with robbed gas stations' positions
Fig. 7. BTS login times and distance from crime scene
235
Fig. 8. LINK map diagram data exported to ArcGIS software; network-based analysis
visualisation
The ArcGIS allows for the network-based analysis, and for finding the route
that could have been taken by the suspect and comparing driving time to the
approximate BTS login time difference. The computed driving time is 1 hour 9
minutes (Fig. 9) and the actual login time difference (Fig. 7) is 1 hour 32 minutes.
Therefore, the suspect could not only get to the crime scene, but also had a spare 23
minutes to perform the robbery.
After proving it was possible for the car owner to have performed the series of
robberies, the analyst had another hypothesis to consider: “The person arrested
with the money could have met with the car owner and picked up the plunder”.
The LINK application is equipped with an easy to use tool for potential
meeting analysis. For the given case it has found two possible suspects meetings
within a 60 minute timeframe (Fig. 10). Positions of BTS stations used for phone
calls nearby to the possible meeting area can be shown on a map diagram (Fig. 11).
However, to estimate the actual meeting place, one can again export map data to
the external ArcGIS application. The network-based analysis can be performed to
form a diagram of areas possible to be reached within the defined time intervals
from BTS login (Fig. 12). In this case, intervals are set to 5 minutes
236
Fig. 9. Driving time computation
Fig. 10. Possible meeting finding tool
237
Fig. 11. Map diagram illustrating BTS logins nearby the possible meeting area
Fig. 12. Diagram of areas possible to reach within the other 5 minute intervals from BTS login
238
Examining the given diagram, supplemented with additional POI (Points of
Interest) information, one can presume that the most likely meeting points are the
gas station placed in the 5 minute distance rings from both suspects BTS logins,
and the gift shop within the 10 minute distance rings. Aided by this information it
can be easily concluded that employees of these facilities should be questioned and
the CCTVs recordings from these facilities should be captured and examined.
This is, of course. only a simple case study (fabricated for the purpose of the
paper), but it shows the possibilities of spatial data analysis and mapping with the
use of LINK and ArcGis and presents the power of these tools.
Conclusion and further research
Criminal intelligence, supported with spatial analysis tools, is a very promising
new discipline. It is slowly starting to be noticed, mainly thanks to the fact that it
significantly enhances criminal analysis capabilities. It predicts how suspects might
behave in a given environment and helps to coordinate field operations. LINK is
one of the very few tools that is made specifically for this purpose. Its big
advantage is that it’s being developed to operate on national specific data, like
phone billings, maps etc. Thanks to this, activities like importing the billing data
and, furthermore, performing various analyses (especially the spatial ones), which
are usually long and arduous processes, become effortless. All these tasks could by
easily automated with LINK based tools. Further research will focus on introducing
more types of spatial analyses (which could improve the probability of finding
suspects and evidence), together with suiting them to a convenient user interface.
Acknowledgment
The research reported in the paper was partially supported by the project No. O
ROB 0008 01 “Advanced IT techniques supporting data processing in criminal
analysis”, funded by the Polish National Centre for Research and Development.
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ISSN 0867–2245
ISSN 2353-1789
CIVIC DETERMINANTS OF SECURITY EDUCATION
EDUCATION FOR SECURITY
CIVIC DETERMINANTS OF SECURITY
EDUCATION
Marcin MAZUREK, Ph.D.
Abstract
The purpose of this article is to determine the reasons in favour of security
education based on supporting the creativity, ingenuity, activity, courage and civic
competence of the young generation. Education is of vital importance, for which the
starting point would be the suspension of traditional ethical judgments on the structure
and aims of a democratic society, with all the matters associated with them. The
usefulness of these considerations demonstrates the existence of the widely known phenomenon:
that the previous culture of western democracy has generated a civilization of permanent crisis;
a problem against which it shows pitiful helplessness in overcoming.
Key words – security education, society
The problem of education in the modern world lies in the
fact that by its very nature it can give up neither authority nor
tradition, nevertheless it must still take its place in a world
which structure is not determined by authority or any longer
bound by tradition.
H. Arendt, Between Past and Future
Both education as an integral practice of all human communities with history
and measure in the future, as well as security itself, are understood only within the
historical self-consciousness of a society. Today, however, the two concepts are
extremely problematic, they are also symptomatic. The inability of modern
Europeans to identify the aims of education, causes that equally puzzling
phenomenon of that well known lack of agreement on the nature of the security.
Both concepts have been inevitably involved in intractable theoretical disputes of
an ideological nature, acting in another arena for the struggle for understanding
social justice, development, insurmountable moral standards, the meaning of
patriotism, function, and relevance of the national state, human nature, or the
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MARCIN MAZUREK
appropriate form of economy implemented universal, or, more modest version,
national interests, which are, moreover, also identified in a number of competing
ways. In addition, the dynamics of the modern world puts people in a situation
where they must make almost hopeless efforts at understanding still emerging and
disappearing aspects of life, including the problem of security and of how
education is able to shape it, affecting the attitude of future generations.
It is not possible to consider the problem of security education beyond the
problem of what kind of values, attitudes, norms, and what knowledge, it has
affected. Is the liberal attitude of the European citizen, the “conscious” potential of
a multicultural society; a wise alternative to the classical models of education,
based on a commitment to national and historical tradition, giving less and less to
agree with the model of modern European culture? Is the traditional model of the
family and education able to effectively prepare a young person for life in a world
where the pursuit of professional success forces the reorientation of the basic
cultural norms while acting in the most effective means of achieving individual
safety materially and mentally? Is the fluent ability to take part in the modern labor
market able to ensure the existential safety, yet be guaranteed by the traditional
education?
It is impossible to answer these questions for at least a few decades, but the
crux of the matter is that decisions are invariably taken in the present. Hence, the
purpose of this reflection is to trace arguments for the inevitability of security
education, separated from upbringing, taking in parentheses standards, principles,
rules and beliefs of the world in which educators have lived longer, who for the
pupils are almost ”ancestors”. What are the reasons which militate in favour of an
expediency experiment like this? It is impossible to disagree with Hannah Arendt
in her diagnosis of the essence of education “in the nature of the human condition
is that each new generation is increasing in the old world, and therefore prepares
a new generation for a new world can only mean that it wants to knock the chance
at what is new out of the new generation's hands”1. Why, however, what is new, is
essentially competing against the lived world, not its continuation? In this lies the
essence of the problem – a world in which education was a transfer to the next
generation of irrefutable patterns for them of enchanted and sacred traditions,
a world in which the teacher could count on the position of the master and friend
who at the same time belongs to the past, much later, perhaps than is generally
assumed.
In this context, there is an instructive example of Immanuel Kant, who at the
threshold of modernity called for raising a man for a lasting peace based on human
moral autonomy and inalienable dignity, which constitutes a practical implementation
of citizenship. Civic education, the transformation of subjects into a citizen
conscious of their rights and duties, connected with the belief that the modern
1
H. Arendt, Między czasem minionym a przyszłym (original title: Between Past and Future),
Aletheia, Warszawa 2011, p. 215.
242
republican system guarantees lasting peace and security for three main reasons.
The first is to establish a Legislature out of the society which, by virtue of the fact
that they bear the entire cost of war, is in contrast to the state and the power, and
will forcibly seek conflict resolution, as well as finding them where they “do not
actually exist”. The second is the existence, inseparable from citizenship, of
a sphere of free public opinion, the emphasis on power is the most powerful
weapon against political ignorance and aggression. The third and final, is the
development, also inseparable from modern civil society, of international trade,
which requiring law and order, ultimately forces, according to Kant, peace in the
human world2.
It would be an anachronistic mistake to point out Kant's naivety, though it is
not a mystery that all three reasons mentioned by him are valid, to put it mildly,
only in a purely formal meaning. Jürgen Habermas, showing their irrelevance,
indicates the nature of social changes in Europe, that force us to think seriously
about the relevance of tradition, both as the foundation of education, as well as the
settlement of the way of understanding the criterion of providing public security.
Not much time has passed since the moment when Kant proclaimed his famous
thesis, European countries began to organize themselves on the basis of identity
and national sovereignty, and their citizens with rare enthusiasm and unwavering
conviction of the rightness of their own affairs, clashed in the two world wars
which followed shortly in the name of the struggle for national issues, leading
Europe to almost total ruin. The sphere of public opinion also does not fulfil the
tasks entrusted to it by Kant – instead of a serious and responsible exchange of
arguments between the well-educated citizens (as it was supposed to be in Kant
times), it was filled and overflowing with inconceivable and unfathomable, and
generally worthless, ideological and marketing pulp, more destabilizing than
organizing social life; not unlike the case presented in the issue of global trade,
which, as it turned out, and still turns out, is supported by a militant imperialism,
led by military and quasi-diplomatic means3. What are the conclusions from the
failure of Kant's political philosophy?
First of all, the nineteenth and twentieth century’s were dominated by the
process of the collapse of the pre-modern world of great empires, but at the same
time there existed the legal and political cultures belonging to them, as well as the
principles of social self-identification. As a child of the Enlightenment and
Romanticism, there was a new creation – the nation-state. Previous empires:
Tsarist Russia, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the German Empire ceased to
exist, blow away by the internal tensions of the beginnings of national liberation.
The principle of national identity and the desire to achieve, based on sovereignty
became an unstoppable engine of history. This new, violent and unbridled power
2
See I. Kant, Do wiecznego pokoju (original title: Zum ewigen Frieden), Antyk, Kęty, 2005.
See J. Habermas, Uwzględniając Innego (original title: Die Einbeziehung des Anderen), WN
PWN, Warszawa 2009, pp. 167-203.
3
243
MARCIN MAZUREK
has become, in a very short time, the social basis of self-identification in the whole
of Europe. The Kantian principle of cosmopolitanism creatures shattered like
a soap bubble when it came into contact with the power of nationalism.
The novelty of the principle of national identity is based on two fundamental
elements. The first is egalitarianism – that people could turn into a nation, all its
representatives must gain an equal right to a common identity, a similarly moral
status, in exclusion of the legal social hierarchy. This resulted in the practice of
progressive political mobilization of the masses, and “(...) belonging to <nation>
founded a bond of solidarity between people who were previously perceived as
alien to each other”4. The second element is an ideology that identifies the identity
of the nation and its right to self-determination. This ideology can take the form of
rationalism (France), moral-historicism (Poland) or racialism (Germany). However,
quite apart from its form it is invariably the task of defining the nation, pointing to
its uniqueness, thus distinguishing it from other nations and giving it the right
(sometimes even the obligation) to self-determination5. “Nationalism has become
a precious binder binding a centralized state and atomized society, and in fact
turned out to be the only effective method, a living link between the individuals
and the nation-state”6. This is the origin of the genetic unity of nationalism,
democracy and the nation state: “the nation state has created an infrastructure for
the legally disciplined management and existence of an area of individual and
collective action guaranteed free from state interference. It created (...) the grounds
of cultural and ethnic homogeneity, which since the late eighteenth century allowed
– at the price of oppression and restrictions on the rights of minorities – the very
essence of a democratic state. With the French Revolution, democracy and the
nation state emerged as Siamese brothers”7.
In light of the above it becomes clear that national antagonisms are by
definition inevitable. After all, nationality is inherited, and in this sense, is a good
exclusive, which can not be transferred, disseminated, internationalized; nor is it
a root beyond its natural substrate – “nations are at first communities of origin,
integrated geographically by neighbourhood resident and culturally by a common
language, custom and tradition (...)”8. Only then, when the nation gained political
sovereignty, does ethos become the basis of citizenship. However ladened by prepolitical concept it is a sensed, anticipated, constantly pulsating national interest,
which locates and identifies with the duty and the right only of the nation in it. In
4
Ibidem, p. 119.
See H. Arendt, Korzenie totalitaryzmu (original title: The Origins of Totalitarianism),
Wydawnictwa Naukowe I Profesjonalne, Warszawa 2008. Author indicate as important source of
modern anti-semitism on aspiration for obtainment of name of nation chosen, so, with nation chosen
inevitable (unavoidable) conflict exactly.
6
Ibidem, p. 327.
7
J. Habermas, Obywatelstwo a tożsamość narodowa (original title: Staatsbürgerschaft und
nationale Identität), IFiS PAN, Warszawa 1993, p. 8.
8
J. Habermas, Uwzględniając Innego, p. 117.
5
244
this sense, the national interest can not be the subject of disputes, discussions and
negotiations, it is self-evident to all who have the ethnic competence to participate.
In a very vivid way it was described by José Ortega y Gasset: “The idea of the
nation, in contrast to the ideas of other communities, includes a belief in the
possibility of a corporate body, giving that its members expect great things from it.
But the belief in these possibilities does not feed on what is visible in the nation,
but the riches believed to be hidden in the invisible national womb”9. Terms such
as “corporative body”, “national womb”, so characteristic for the national rhetoric,
discovering the pre-political but also pre-social dimension of nationality, which
characteristics are for the main ever the more credible when speaking of biology,
referring to reasons other than political – “the word <nation> is extremely wellchosen, because it obviously shows that it is something prior to the establishment
of any will of its members”10. The political will of members of the nation is useful
only for realization of the community interest as obvious, not to discover or
construct it through discussion and political negotiations.
For significant reasons, there is an undeniable tension between the democratic
principle of parliamentarianism, based on faith in discussion and compromise, in
which a lot is written to protect the rights of minorities and is constantly emerging
in the practice of social life, and the principle of national identity. Unless,
therefore, the democratic form of government is inscribed with the definition of
socio-political discourse, national ideas, regarded as a once and for all legacy data
are just completely un-discursive. To what conclusions does it lead? How can the
essence of civic education be defined? Does citizenship exclude ethnicity, opening
the field to conflicts around the un-discursive issue, so undecidable? Is security
education, on the one hand, based on traditional patterns of the nation on the other
hand, able to prepare a new generation for active and effective participation in the
modern world of multicultural communication and transnational cooperation even
conceivable? Is it possible to determine the nature and subject of security in
a situation in which national identity becomes either a folkloric additional
embroider of life or a fundamental challenge, which nature and purposes can not be
translated into the universal international language of communication? These
questions seem to lead to an otherwise sad conclusion: “the nation state was at one
time a convincing answer to the historical challenge to find a functional equivalent
to early modern forms of social integration that began to crumble. Today we are
facing the same challenges. The globalization of movement and communication,
economic production and its financing; the transfer of technology and arms, and
above all ecological and military threats confronts us with problems which can not
be solved within the framework of national states (...)”11.
9
J.O. y Gasset, Rozmyślania o Europie (original title: Mediatión de Europa), Wydawnictwa
Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 2006, p. 43.
10
Ibidem, pp. 44-45.
11
J. Habermas, Uwzględniając Innego, op. cit, p. 114.
245
MARCIN MAZUREK
For a long time there is no doubt that contemporary threats to economic,
ecological or demographic principles require effective international cooperation.
Experience shows, however, that cooperation is ineffective because of the limited
possibilities for the purposes of determining which would not be merely the sum of
individual selfishness, but the definition of the common good of the international
community. A good, that can not be determined by this or another ethos, but
worked out through the communication and negotiation of content, which are
subject to both communication and political negotiation. The actions of a state in
accordance with its national interests in the modern world is simply ineffective, but
effectiveness in ensuring its sovereignty and security is a source of the social
legitimacy of the nation state.
The outlining of the inadequacy of the horizons of the nation state actions and
the threat of an international nature is unfortunately not the only problem with
regards to the issue of determining the nature and objectives of security education,
as well as attitudes and values that would follow. In parallel, another problem
emerges, also closely associated with the democratic form of the nation state. The
point is, of course, the massification of society and politics. A nation, by giving all
of its members the right to participate in a common identity is merely another face
of the democratic principle of universal equality. In fact revolutionary ideas in the
early twentieth century testified to the scary and dark forecast of the collapse of
European civilization, from the moment of the acquisition of power by
a democratic form of social organization, that is, together with the beginnings of
the power of the masses, initially understood more as the crowds. The authors of
these forecasts were the then representatives of the old order – political,
intellectual, and ethical, including the classics: José Ortega y Gasset, Gustav Le
Bon and Elias Canetti. All three became known for their groundbreaking analysis
of the essence of massification. Gasset pointed to the rebellion as the primary
mechanism for the creation and strengthening of the mass societies – a rebellion
against classical culture, its perfectionism and purpose as the rules that have
marked western civilization standards, which developed into what was previously
the source of the success of European countries. With the development of science
and industry, and the democratic organization of societies based on human rights,
says Gasset, during the nineteenth century, not only the old continent's population
almost tripled, but the population gained the character of a claim and
uncompromising. The average man and his level of life satisfaction has become the
only reliable criterion of truth, justice, goodness and normality12. It got to
a situation where, as Arendt notes, the concept of the equality of different actors in
public life has turned into an indistinguishable sameness13, and Peter Sloterdijk
12
13
2000.
246
See J.O. y Gasset, Bunt mas (original title: La rebelión de las masas), MUZA, Warszawa 2008.
See H. Arendt, Kondycja ludzka (original title: The Human Condition), Aletheia, Warszawa
defined equality, somewhat maliciously, as “(...) a fair allocation with less-validity
that everyone can come to”14.
Society has become mass. Both Le Bon and Canetti showed how great was the
risks associated with it. Since modern democratic society is the mass, and the mass
is just a “lazy” crowd, it last to realize how dangerous a “soul” has the latter. Le
Bon, with admirable lucidity, described the immutable characteristics of the crowd
as irritability, brutality, naivety, a tendency to conservatism, variability, lack of
criticism and self-criticism, loss of sense of responsibility, arrogance, cruelty,
conformity and a lack of moderation in judgment. Above all, the crowd, absorbing
units, of which it consists likens them to each other and subjected to a common
exposure to the overwhelming need for authority. The crowd, mass, desperately
looking for leaders, historical, racial, national ideology, whatever that may be, and
give the bear, in which it can put all its enthusiasm, a sense of mission and
immortality15. Canetti further notes that the permanent features of the mass are: an
uncontrollable desire for constant expansion, an increase in density, absolute
equality and a clear course of action, which it is not itself able to set – all of these
conditions are characterized by the consistency of the mass in the sense that the
loss of any of them is associated with the disintegration of the same mass16.
Critics of mass societies invariably point to their loss, confusion, naivety, but at
the same time uncompromising and brutal recklessness. There is only a small step
to the discovery of the twentieth century's significant sources of totalitarianism.
Wilhelm Reich warned of the sources of Nazism as being an easily naive
discovery: fascism and communism in plain are unfortunate accidents, or the
effectiveness of political propaganda – in fact, he says – dictators did not create
masses but masses created dictators. Masses desperately looking for leadership that
will convince them that they represent historical, racial truth: whatever needs to be
discovered and protected. The rest is just the consequences17.
Erich Fromm has devoted much effort to showing how the mechanisms that
form the basis of the emergence of totalitarian societies have not disappeared with
the collapse of totalitarian states, but lie in the democratization of the consumption
based model18. The inherent way it is in the common illusion of individualism,
a false spontaneity and socially encoded desires, attitudes and reactions of
a conformist; accompanied by these phenomena blurring the boundary between
public and private spheres, making the society becomes one big family connected
14
P. Sloterdijk, Pogarda mas, (original title: Die Verachtung der Massen), Aletheia, Warszawa
2012, p. 144.
15
See G. Le Bon, Psychologia tłumu, (original title: Psychologie des foules), Antyk, Kęty 2004.
16
See E. Canetti, Masa i władza (original title: Masse Und Macht), Czytelnik, Warszawa1996,
pp. 32-33.
17
See W. Reich, Psychologia mas wobec faszyzmu (original title: Die Massenpsychologie des
Faschismus), Aletheia, Warszawa 2009.
18
See E. Fromm, Ucieczka od wolności, (original title: Escape from freedom), Czytelnik,
Warszawa 2001.
247
MARCIN MAZUREK
to common personal gain, not beyond reproduction and consumption. Quoting
Sloterdijk: be mass, then “(...) differ so that it did not make a difference (...). Since
everything we do, to be different, in fact, does not mean anything, we can do what
we want (...) That is the reason, we could in the past half-century change from
black compact mass in molecular color”19.
Since the common good is forever established as a set of identical selfish acts,
no public activity, political or cultural model sets a decent, happy life, but rather
the market, gaining the rank of political authority. The classic rule: “demand
shapes supply”, has significantly transformed: “commerce increases demand, the
supply is unlimited”. Success in life does not depends any longer on ours talents,
knowledge and skills, but the use of appropriate cosmetics; responsibility for the
future and safety of the next generation depends on the selection of a particular
brand of car. Commercialism has ceased to be an object of critical evaluation and
has become a way of assessing one’s place in the world. Issues of a social, moral
and cultural aspect, from the perspective of the market, have become a cost, and
from the perspective of mass society, only functions of the market. Arendt
concludes this state of things in a meaningful manner, “the disappearance of taking
up the issues simply means that we have lost response, which we usually relied
upon, not even realizing that they were originally the answers to certain
questions”20. Additionally it has become the normal inadequacy of response in
relation to the situation in which no one has additional competence questions.
In the nineteenth century the nation state fulfilled the role of the political
mobilization of the masses, the organization of collective life on the democratic
principle of equality. In the second half of the twentieth century there was a move
to the role of opposition to social cosmopolitanism and market expansion, requiring
unsealing, then a relativisation of the borders of nation states to the inevitable and
ever-increasing flow people, information, goods and capital. As noted by Michel
Foucault, the state authorities have lost a political nature, in the classic sense of the
word, and passed into the technique of effective population management, according
to the following logic of the evolution of the political culture of the West: “(...) the
state fair, linked to the feudal principle of territory and, generally speaking, the
society based on law, both customary and written, with all the conflicting issues
that arise here, and secondly – the administrative state arose in the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries, the territory surrounded by borders, not a type of feudal
territory, and referring to a society under regulations and discipline, and finally the
State governing, essentially defining not by territory, occupied space, but by a kind
of mass, the mass of the population of a certain size and density; of the population
engaged, of course, in a certain territory, but at the same time containing them in
19
20
248
P. Sloterdijk, Pogarda mas, p. 142.
H. Arendt, Między czasem minionym a przyszłym, p. 212.
itself as its part of”21. Mass as the population became the subject of policy and the
object of concern for states that since the collapse of European totalitarianism no
longer engaged in bringing up citizens, but managing the size, mobility, wealth and
health of the population. The state's international security strategy was
commissioned to spoil the blind and uncontrollable processes of the global market,
while governments have focused on cancer prevention, life expectancy, fertility,
the extent and direction of migration and on the productivity of the human
population comprised within the historical borders. Zygmunt Bauman states
explicitly that the nation state has been reduced to the role of the supervisors of the
population, which is the object of the activity of the international commercial and
capital market. This situation is presented as inevitable anyway due to the
dependence of the state administration system on market opportunities ensuring
prosperity – the only credible purpose and meaning of existence of the modern
democratic society22.
In this light, the question of an important goal for security education leads to
the conclusion that it can only be the social, civic activation of the young
generation, so that it was no longer presented with the choice between sad and
reactionary anti-system, in the sense that – pointless nationalism, and intellectual
and moral conformist consumerism. The category of citizenship is, however,
already in itself so clearly fraught with ideological stigma that it might actually
mean everything, generally not marking anything. The concept of citizenship is
linked with both the left-wing and right-wing, both conservative and progressive
ideologies, which in turn push citizenship on the course of unreflective modern
accuracy or left-wing or right-wing reactionism: nationalistic or Christian; as
indeed ultimately they do not make any significant difference in terms of the
possibility to open up intellectual and moral vistas for real social activity. Real
means operating with concrete experience of the present, not the past manipulated
and falsified, or the inadequate cognitive and axiological categories. It is not, of
course, about the promotion of the relativism of the experience of social life – after
all, the ancients already knew that the negating of the truth, is an expression of the
opinion which claims to be the truth. In fact, operating concepts, patterns of
cognition and thinking about social reality is the way to its interpretation, not to its
cognition. Interpreting consists in applying a template on reality which allows it to
perceive only what has been established as existing – existing in a pre-approved
manner. The belief in the existence of an immutable human nature, an objective
purpose of human life or the fundamental interests of society, quality or class,
always and only leads to the manipulation of social reality, in spite of similar
attempts invariably aimed at different targets and undertaken on the basis of other
evidence. Ultimately, this leads to constant conflict detached from the experience
21
M. Foucault, Bezpieczeństwo, terytorium, populacja (original title: (Sécurité, territoire,
population), WN PWN, Warszawa 2010, p. 129.
22
See Z. Bauman, Globalizacja, PIW, Warszawa 2000.
249
MARCIN MAZUREK
of real social life; a conflict where, and during which, as maintained the expert in
this matter, Thomas Hobbes, “strength and deceit are (...) the two cardinal
virtues”23.
The usual illusion would be the notion that a man is, the more a society is, able
to exist and to act otherwise than in accordance with a horizon of thought or belief
in the validity and effectiveness of the standards and attitudes. However, an equally
false belief exists in the assumption that these norms and attitudes have already
been fixed once and for all. On the contrary – their value and effectiveness of the
current human life embedded in concrete reality, is dependent upon the extent to
which they are a response to this reality, therefore, de facto, whether it and
experience its result. In this context, the comment of Albert Camus is
understandable, that rebellions are in accordance with the fundamental mechanism
of the historical changes of the last two hundred years24. Rebellion as a chief
category, which was already used by the nineteenth century intellectuals was not
simply an intellectual project, but the forecast of present. The bankruptcy of the
metaphysical horizon of human and society life, traditional categories of
upbringing and education based on outdated prominent figures, the liberation of
huge masses of people, concentrated and organized solely on the basis of the
criterion of efficiency, meant it was caricatured in its radicalism, but the realization
of the ideals of the Enlightenment – the liberation of man. Liberation consisting of
freeing man from the political, ethical or religious purposes, resulted in the fact that
at the same time he handed over the case, losing a reliable reference points for his
choices. The values have been the subject of negotiations and disputes between the
myriad of parties and movements, and the concept of the common good began to
be ideologically corrupted by the traditional countries which took by nature the
nihilistic-conservative view in the face of awareness of their own downfall. Most
importantly, however, the essence of rebellion is no objection to the order, but they
“(...) demand clarity and unity. The most elementary rebellion expresses the
paradoxical desire for order”25. Striving resulting from the lack of acceptance of the
world, which failed, the world shattered and unbelievable, claiming obedience and
acceptance of the stronger, the less it is able to provide for them. At the same time
the rebellion, leading to the liberation of the individual from the shackles of an
outdated, so incredible a social order, initially enthusiastic and hopeful for the
future, pushed the population of Europe to embrace nationalism and totalitarianism,
which promised total rebellion, directed against injustice and oppression, against
the old order. The collapse of totalitarian regimes does not mean the end of the
rebellion. The negation of the existing order in the name of the anticipated, more
23
T. Hobbes, Lewiatan (original title: Leviathan), WN PWN, Warszawa 1954, p. 122.
See A. Camus, Człowiek zbuntowany (original title: L’Homme révolté), Oficyna Literacka,
Kraków 1993.
25
Ibidem, p. 29.
24
250
transparent and credible future, has become a basic mechanism of the social
transformation of the modern world.
Understanding the anatomy of rebellion is thus a necessary condition for
noticing the potential of negation as a means of self-identification for successive
generations today. Friedrich Nietzsche, who certainly should be acknowledged
a virtuoso of rebellion, reveals not only the intellectual and moral facilities of
rebellion against tradition, but also criticises effective rebellion, showing its, in
a significant way, provisional character. Even anarchism, as he says, ultimately
boils down to “submission to arbitrary laws”26. Any ideology as such, is only the
expression and justification of the psychological position of the creator or
promoter. Behind the facade of the doctrine, political, moral or scientific, hides the
truth - the real object of valuable moral reflection. Thus, for Nietzsche, the starting
point is the observation that “in all `science of morals' hitherto the problem of
morality itself has been lacking: the suspicion was lacking that there was anything
problematic here”27. A signalled problem, that "”something” is manifested in the
fact that modern man is characterized by “(...) the formal conscience which tells:
'there is something you should definitely do, there is something you should
definitely give up', in short, 'you should'. This need tries to satisfy and fulfil its
form of some content, at the same time (...) captures very politely, as a primitive
appetite, and accepts what is it ordered by some imperative – parents, teachers,
law, state prejudices, public opinion”28.
Submissiveness, as diagnosed Nietzsche, is an expression of a higher morality,
modern morality, requiring continuous work of the intellect and conscience in the
acquisition and nurturing of learned reaction, even when they are considered as
a manifestation of critical independence and maturity, winning as an individual
achievement. Humility and submissiveness as regulation of thought and action are
manifested even in this area, which traditionally has been booked for the
charismatic actions – in the area of leadership, which is now lined with a “moral
imperative hypocrisy”. It is possible to order only when giving orders will be
presented as listening, only mediation, discovery and communication of the laws of
history, nature, ancestors, the economy, the constitution and God29.
Nietzsche reveals the essence and the potential of a modern model of morality,
by confronting it with the traditional morality, the morality of masters and rule that
modern man has seem to be extremely remote. As noted, it's “(...) hardly possible
to imagine the extent to which all mankind understood the concept of an earlier
beginning of the thick, clumsy, externally, just tight and especially un-symbolic
kind. Surely it is at first only man who washes, renounces certain foods that cause
diseases of the skin, who does not sleeping with dirty women of the mob, who has
26
See. F. Nietzsche, Poza dobrem i złem, (original title: Jenseits von Gut und Böse), Zielona
Sowa, Kraków 2005, p. 93.
27
Ibidem, pp. 91-92.
28
Ibidem, pp. 101-102.
29
Ibidem.
251
MARCIN MAZUREK
aversion to blood – nothing more, a little less!”30. It has little in common with the
modern concept of purity, burdened with Christian eschatology, “contempt”,
according to Nietzsche, to the body, physicality, sensuality and confidence in the
natural instincts. The contrast becomes apparent when we realize “that the
foundation of knightly-aristocratic ratings is powerful physicality, blooming, rich,
even overflowing health, and also what is the condition of their maintenance, so the
war, adventure, hunting, dancing, games and everything, which is a strong, free,
joyful activity”31. In contrast to the morality of lords, the spiritual foundation of
modern culture is a resentment, mental mechanism consisting of changing
weakness into virtue – cowardice, lack of charisma, the disappearance of fortitude,
determination and strength, gaining a new meaning, ceases to be defective,
disqualifying the life of the world, taking the name of humility, temperance,
charity, prudence, self-control and tolerance. Their value becomes indisputable,
obvious.
Social morality is rotated against the values hitherto respected, award-winning,
and above all “cultured”, filling the ethos by a living content (for example
chivalrous), resulting from the laying of the need for social security in the virtue of
the chosen units – honored and exalted. These values are not rejected, considered
outdated by modern society which do not need great teachers and mighty men, but
reinterpreted, then the condemned, in the name of mass morality, “herd”32, wanting
only have peace and everyday safe complacency: the pride becoming an arrogance,
mad courage – mindless bravado, tenacity – stupidity, austerity – cruelty, lust
reign – tyranny and barbarism, nobility it's just naivety. These expressions are
accompanied by some of his indignation, or indulgence, not devoid of petty
cunning.
In light of the ethics of masters, good means successful, strong, efficient,
trustworthy, and its opposite is paltry, puny, mediocre. These assessments are more
aesthetic than moral, and the starting point for them is always a self-affirmation of
good, a self-affirmation of being confident in one's strength and senses of action –
acting and action are one, life is certain of its activity. In the case of modern human
ethics, ethics of resentment, there is a reversal of the order of recognition. A man
possessed by resentment, “(...) and that is what his act, his art: concept learned 'bad
enemy', 'bad', and it is a fundamental concept, which, as a reflection and contrast,
came up with a 'good' – himself!”33. This “modern good” knows its value only as
the opposite of bad, so unpredictable and dangerous – there is the concept of the
30
F. Nietzsche, Z genealogii moralności (original title: Zur Genealogie der Moral), Zielona
Sowa, Kraków 2003, p. 20.
31
Ibidem, pp. 21-22.
32
It will read for blame “(…), that we permanently use words with reference to people of
<modern idea> <herd>, < herd instinct > and it similar. What advise! (…) It, that supposes, that it
knows, that accolade and reprimand just sanctifies itself, that calls itself good, is an instinct of
gregarious animal (…)” (F. Nietzsche, Poza dobrem i złem, p. 105).
33
F. Nietzsche, Z genealogii moralności, p. 27.
252
subject which takes the form of a secondary against reality, is being built by its
negation. Even Christian prophets, according to Nietzsche, adulterated the reality
of faith in the existence of the subject, then “(...) melted in one 'reach', 'ungodly',
'bad', 'violent', and the first time the word 'world' coined the word shame”34.
These purely ideological sources of sentimental morality are in contradiction
with the type of premodern morality which stems from life, from the ground,
confirmed by history as the sum of the deadly struggle for self-preservation, for
which the fight is sacred and the possibility of defeat is a mobilizing natural course.
Premodern ethics teaches, saying simply, that “(...) there is no existence outsidedoing, action, becoming; the doer is just a fabrication added to action – action is
everything”35. The doer, or subject, a product of modern morality, gaining a sense
of security as idle carelessness and a false innocence of society assigns to him a
fixed set of features, capabilities and weaknesses and for moral, historical,
whatever purpose. All conflicts and crises, emergencies and disasters gain a moral
and ideological character, and that by these means are resolved, so ultimately
falsified and ignored so, in principle, the greatest and most authentic desire of
modern man is calm, leisure, satiety and unity. When the modern man is forced to
act, this takes the form of ideological acts, implicated in the banal and
compromised half-truths that relate to the militant, infantile nationalism of tender
and tearful religious sentimentalism, or a grotesque and lordly complacency citizen
of a world of multicultural and free-market order. Nietzsche's predictions proved
prophetic about the effects of the social and political mobilization of the broad
masses, appealing to the egalitarian ideology of a Christian, democratic, socialist,
without distinction: “(...) a general reflection of the future Europeans will probably
be diverse, talkative, poor in will, and extremely fit labourers who master the
imperative needs like daily bread (...) the democratization of Europe is also the
unwitting preparation for breeding tyrants – in every sense of the word, also the
most spiritual”36.
But how is the philosophy of Nietzsche's characteristic, the shift from passive
nihilism to active nihilism, after all, a rebellion against oppression and the
injustices of the world of the great lords, against the terrifying social inequality and
cruelty, finally took the form of social passivity and inaction, based on an illusory
sense of accomplishment and excellence, as a reaction to the loss of faith in the
existence of objective standards and principles. Modern man not be able to rely on
God's rights, once regarded as eternal and immutable foundations of the entire
universe, he himself also aware of the fragility of human orders, and, falling into
nihilism, stopped taking himself and the universe seriously. As noted by Camus,
Nietzsche's “question: 'what to be free for?' replaces: 'be free what for?' (...) The
essential discovery of Nietzsche lies in the finding that if the eternal law is not
34
F. Nietzsche, Poza dobrem i złem, p. 100.
F. Nietzsche, Z genealogii moralności, p. 31.
36
F. Nietzsche, Poza dobrem i złem, pp. 155-156.
35
253
MARCIN MAZUREK
freedom, it is not right all the more. Since there is no truth, and the world is devoid
of rules, nor is there any prohibition, to prohibit some action, but a need for value
and purpose. At the same time, however, nothing is permitted, the values and the
need also to select a different action (...) There, where no one can no longer say
what is black and what is white, the light goes off and freedom becomes a
voluntary prison (...). If a man does not want to then suffocate in restriction then
his ties must be cut and immediately he must create his own values”37.
In light of the above a question appears fundamental to these considerations:
what does it really mean to create your own values? Is it in general possible to
create the values? How can this seemingly hopeless task, give substance to security
education as a major challenge to modern society? Nietzsche showed that subject, a
man as bearer of a specific and decisive set of characteristics and attitudes
established in advance, is a creation of a society, and that modern society had fallen
into the intellectual and moral nihilism once they were freed from the traditional
elite forms of social organization. Conformism has become a liberation from the
burden of creative social activity, freedom lost much becoming a private matter,
and everything became possible only after the choices ceased to have meaning.
Authentic commitment to life, along with the inevitable effort from him,
uncertainty, conflict and struggle, replaced apparent and reactive activity revolving
around a threadbare ideological scheme's continual reinterpretation. The ideas
gained wishful thinking – the world is understood leaves only lives to be a better or
worse copy of the ideal, which is a creation of a fantasy tired and uncertain western
man.
Authentic liberation through rebellion against social inertia, therefore, can not
come down to a choice between one and the other ideological horizon, along with
the associated “objective” standards and principles. It may take only a form of
rebellion against objectification, in the name of the genuine and adequate
inspection of reality and action, not involved in the social, quasi – scientific,
religious or historical ideologies compromised already at the starting point. Jean
Paul Sartre points to free involvement as an inevitable face action based on genuine
freedom of choice. Free involvement creates a doer, establishes dependency
relationships to others and thus themselves. In this light, relationships are in fact
mutually self-creating in a mutual recognition game. After all, according to Sartre,
“before we live, life was nothing, only up to us to give it meaning, and value is the
only sense that we selected. From this it is clear that it is possible to create a human
community”38, “(...) but it is not given in advance, but is constantly created”39.
Acting man, doer, creates himself and reality through elections, not by making
choices from a preconceived concept of himself and reality. Strictly speaking, “(...)
37
A. Camus, Człowiek zbuntowany, pp. 73-74.
J.P. Sartre, Egzystencjalizm jest humanizmem, (original title: L’existentialisme est un
humanisme), MUZA, Warszawa 1998, p. 78-79.
39
Ibidem, p. 64.
38
254
there is no other reality than the action”40. Formal morality while reliably fails in
any particular situation and ultimately leads to making decisions based on
subjective factors, but hidden under the veil of necessity, decency, universality, etc.
– that is, the decision avoids commitment and responsibility, is justified arbitrary.
It turns out that there is only a choice between an autonomous, free activity that
involves acting and imposes on him a liability for the same action, and lawlessness,
which disposes of involvement and responsibility for other people, hiding behind
the concepts of necessity, tradition, decency, custom, normality, etc. Strictly
speaking, the man is condemned to freedom, and “(...) things will be as the man
decides that they have to be”41.
The apparent, or rather distorted nature of Enlightenment's rebellion against
tradition, in the name of liberation from the repressive culture, and social injustice,
which has already been indicated by Nietzsche, and which caused twentiethcentury totalitarian movements, on the grounds of Sartre's philosophy is based on
the fact that although “the philosophers of the eighteenth century atheism removed
God, they did not remove the conviction that the essence precedes existence”42.
Intelligent, social, unsocial, irrational, the essence of man as the passive, selfish,
altruistic, etc. still setting already at the starting point is what man is and will be,
what might happen. In this sense, on the basis of tradition, essence ahead of
concrete existence, human existence. This frees man from responsibility for what it
is and can become, making life becomes reified, and the man himself becomes the
object, subject, consumer, taxpayer,follower, supporter, enemy, anything that
separates it from the authentic, creative and spontaneous activity. And conversely,
if the “(...) existence precedes essence, man is responsible for what it is”43 and what
will happen. Quoting Giorgio Agamben: a human “being is not an assumption prior
to their quality or concealing behind them. Being that it is so here, irreversibly, so
here is his, only his, own way of being”44.
In view of the above optics, human life is, or rather should be, freed from the
past and the future, in the name of present actions for which it is impossible to find
justification released from the uncertainty of choice and necessity to take
responsibility for them. Concepts such as truth, falsehood, objectivity and
normality become mere tools of oppression against an action. On the basis of
existentialism they only have the meaning which is made for them by for example
Edward Stachura: “Truth is one, and always new. Truth is alive. Life is constantly
changing, and every living thing in life, always living for the first time in life. The
truth is disposable. The truth is unique”45. Hence, a lie does not exist, because “a lie
40
Ibidem, p. 52.
Ibidem, pp. 51-52.
42
Ibidem, p. 25.
43
Ibidem, p. 28.
44
G. Agamben, Wspólnota, która nadchodzi (original title: La comunitá che viene), Sic!,
Warszawa 2008, p. 101.
45
E. Stachura, Fabula rasa, C&T, Toruń 2000, pp. 29-30.
41
255
MARCIN MAZUREK
would negate the fact. The truth is a fact. A lie would therefore negate the truth.
What would become of the truth, which could be negated! It would not be true.
Truth can not be negated. The fact you can not deny”46. “Objectivity is where there
is no centre”47.
From this perspective, the intellectual and moral defensive reaction to the
necessity of taking up the free self-determination, in an interesting way is shown by
Leszek Kołakowski. A conservative, he notes, declares nothing in the world to
mean that any positive value had already been made, so any effort to reform the
world of human relationships is worthless and harmful – the ultimate desired
practical consequence is here, as in the case of nihilism, avoiding any responsibility
to take any decision in a cowardly complacency. Officially, this attitude lies behind
the empty and well-known slogans, such as: good has been accomplished and the
evil is indelible, every change is a change for the worse, any reform is just
dangerous and fleeting news, etc. Thus, the “nihilist ultimately reduces the world to
himself while a conservative reduces himself to the existing world”48, and “the
desire to have the moral code (...) is a component of this tendency to be safe, to
escape from making decision; is the desire to live in a world where all the decisions
have already been taken once and for all”49. This problem, vey eloquently and
pointedly summed Agamben: “The starting point of any ethical discourse should be
a statement that the man has no essence, you could achieve, no historical or
spiritual vocation that could fill, no biologically determined order, which would
achieve. And this is what allows to be what we call ethics: it is a clear fact that if
man was or had to be this or that substance, had this or that purpose, which should
endeavour there would not be possible any ethical experience – there would exist
only tasks to fill50.
These tasks are already compromised, when within a single generation, private
and social housing conditions are subject to transformations so profound that they
require sometimes the total reorientation. This is why the situation of contemporary
education is essentially new. As Arendt argues, in eras of classical learning and
education was to transfer skills to cope with the tradition and its norms, and a
teacher's authority derived simply from the fact that he represented the tradition.
But authority in the modern world can not be built on the representation of the past.
The dynamics of social change and the persistent and irreversible separation of
public law and private morality, do not permit it. The role of the modern educator
is paradoxical and oscillates between two fundamental trends: the educator as a
friend of the pupil who “with him” discovers the world, this means an educator
who can not have the epistemic authority, and an educator as a representative of the
past, which can not rely on formal authority as almost ancestor – perhaps worthy of
46
Ibidem, p. 31.
Ibidem, p. 21.
48
L. Kołakowski, Kultura i fetysze, WN PWN, Warszawa 1967, pp. 153-154.
49
Ibidem, p. 168.
50
G. Agamben, Wspólnota, która nadchodzi, p. 49.
47
256
respect, but awkward in using the tools of the modern world, including language.
Therefore, it is difficult not to agree with Arendt that the role of education should
be to mediate between what is old and what is new; transfer orientation in the
present world and its culture so that the new generation was able to undermine it in
a creative and mature manner, learning the responsibility for the world and next
generations. After all, “our hope rests always on new things that bring together
every generation, but precisely because only on this can we base our hopes, we old
spoil everything, when try to spread over what new a control dictating how it
should look like. Education “(...) must protect this newness and introduce it to the
old world that no matter how revolutionary the action taken, it is always from the
perspective of the next generation of obsolete and close to destruction”51.
The adoption of the presented point of view fills often concerns about the
future of the new generations. These concerns are generally based on the
assumption that the standards are impassable and that the objective, time-honored
tradition and reasonable experience of many generations – a departure from the
norms and values, or even their alleged denial must end in disaster. An excellent
example illustrating the erroneous nature of similar concerns is the issue of
tolerance. There is a widespread belief that tolerance is the foundation of the
democratic order, hence the care of tolerance and its cultivation is one of the
important tasks of teachers with regards to their pupils. This belief implies at the
same time the inherent notion that there are limits to tolerance, determined by “the
fundamental interests of society”, “the common good”, etc. The issue of tolerance,
however, is the problem of educators, often incomprehensible to a present new
generation stepping into adulthood. In the case of tolerance, the starting point is
always the fundamental subjective inner experience of otherness. The observation
that the other is in some important aspect of his life different from me. It is a matter
quite secondary whether I take on the attitude of tolerance or intolerance. Whether
I decide to accept that in the world exists someone whose life is in some essential
terms worse than mine, or I decide to get rid of it (in the sense of physical
extermination or moral extermination, no matter) is secondary to the basic fact of
finding that there is another, existing on the side other than the good side, on the
bad side. In this sense, good creates evil – cemented by putting it in insurmountable
opposition. The crux of the matter lies in that the gain of the tolerance to endure the
existence of someone whose life is in some significant way bad; may only a man
“gifted” belief in the existence of an objective, so immutable, once and for all
established norms and rules of conduct, defining “normal”, “decent” life.
Tolerance, or the lack of it, is essentially a problem of generations of educators
who sometimes put a lot of effort in solving the problems of the young generation,
which it simply does not have. Is the so called relativism of the present young
generation the educational problem? Certainly yes, for educators. It is difficult to
get rid of the impression that the generation that will soon take over the possession
51
257
MARCIN MAZUREK
of the existing world, living under the belief that was so aptly expressed by Georg
Simmel: “(...) times of happy diversity (...) creates harmony, but even the
contradictions and struggle are not an obstacle for human activity, but call for
further manifestation of forces, to new acts of creativity”52.
Contemporary crises appearing with an increasing frequency coverage
including economy, culture and politics, inspire fears about the future primarily
due to the fact that currently available measures to prevent them are simply
ineffective. The existing culture of the developed western countries has generated
the civilization of a permanent crisis, which it is not able to control by improving,
increasing the accuracy and transparency of, its legal, political and social
procedures. Hence, the main task of security education can only be to enable a new
generation to create new, adequate forms of citizenship, through the release of its
inventiveness, ingenuity, courage and independence that it was capable of, in a
mature and creative manner, uncovering, undermining and rejecting, sometimes
brutally and ruthlessly, patterns of thought and action obvious to earlier
generations, who in the interest of subsequent generations need to understand
Arendt's admonition: “The crisis becomes a disaster only when we answer it with
the preconceived judgments, which means – prejudices. Such an attitude not only
exacerbated the crisis, but it deprives us of the opportunity of experiencing the
reality and appearing in this way, the opportunity for reflection”53.
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Kraków 1993.
Canetti E., Masa i władza (original title: Masse Und Macht), Czytelnik, Warszawa1996.
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population), WN PWN, Warszawa 2010.
Fromm E., Ucieczka od wolności, (original title: Escape from freedom), Czytelnik,
Warszawa 2001.
Gasset J.O., Bunt mas (original title: La rebelión de las masas), MUZA, Warszawa 2008.
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Kraków 2005.
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Sowa, Kraków 2003.
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Faschismus), Aletheia, Warszawa 2009.
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259
NDU
Scientific
Quarterly
4(93)
2013
Zeszyty
Naukowe
AON nrno
2(59)
2005
ISSN2353-1789
0867–2245
ISSN
ILONA URYCH
NEW CHALLENGES FOR SAFETY
EDUCATION – PHYSICAL ACTIVITY “CURE”
FOR SELECTED PEACETIME THREATS IN
THE XXI CENTURY
Ilona URYCH, Ph.D.
Abstract
In the twenty-first century there is a need to skilfully combat new threats such
as physically passive lifestyles and their consequences in terms of deteriorating
health and the spread of social pathologies. Increased and systematic physical
activity can reduce or eliminate the occurrence of many pathogens, while in itself
this is a natural human need, an elementary basis of a person's physical and mental
health, and thus the safe operation for the developed countries. Therefore, the
theoretical aspects of physical activity – as a natural cure for selected hazards of
peacetime – are the subject of a new challenge for security education.
Key words – education for safety, safety, threat, peacetime threat, physical activity,
physical inactivity
Insertion
The need for security has always accompanied man. Historically it was related
mainly to the ability to counter external threats, most often associated with military
operations. However, the development of civilization and the resulting challenges
resulted in the extension of the term security: not identifying it only with armed force1.
Today, “we can assume that it is an original, existential and guiding value and the need
of every man for the survival and development of the individual and social groups. In
order to enhance the sense of security people are united (associating) and invoke the
state as the highest form of organization to guarantee safety”2.
Thanks to the dynamic changes in all spheres of human life safety issues take
on a new meaning. In the twenty-first century, what is much more important is the
ability to cope with various threats, which do not have the characteristics of typical
1
A. Pieczywok, Bezpieczeństwo jako kategoria i wartość edukacyjna człowieka, Wyd. ZN AON,
Nr 2(83), Warszawa 2011, s. 466.
2
A. Skrabacz, Bezpieczeństwo społeczne. Podstawy teoretyczne i praktyczne, Wyd. Elipsa,
Warszawa 2012, s. 26.
260
NEW CHALLENGES FOR SAFETY EDUCATION – PHYSICAL ACTIVITY “CURE” FOR SELECTED…
external threats. The dynamic development of science, technology, civilization and
industry increases the number of factors which directly endanger human life and
health. In contrast, degradation of the environment causes serious environmental
hazards. Developing skills to cope with these difficult, changing conditions has
become a priority for authorities, institutions of national security, and the education
system, as well as individual citizens.
Taking into account the above conditions, and thus the need to revise the content of
the school curriculum - the resignation of the areas less relevant and detailed, with
a simultaneous emphasis on the areas of priority for security – the Ministry of
Education, in consultation with the Ministry of Defence introduced into the teaching
curriculum a new item – education for safety (replacing the previously run – adoption
defensive). The essence of the course is the comprehensive coverage of security issues
with a concentration of educational activities on the issues of peace hazards, and ways
of behaving in crisis situations in every place and time.
New challenges for safety education
Program content included in the curriculum for the course for safety education
is to develop the skills and behaviour in situations of various threats, such as,
among other things, fires, floods, accidents, and road accidents that could occur in
the immediate vicinity of the student, as well as skills concerning giving first aid in
these situations. Complementing these topics is the problem of the functioning of
the state defence3.
However, in the fourth stage of education, which is included in the high school
education curriculum content safety education, it includes, among others,
“Peacetime threat, its source, preventing them from occurring in the event of their
formation and after the resignation”4. These contents include, among others,
contemporary health risks – diseases of civilization5. Discussing contemporary
health risks, in addition to alcoholism, nicotine addiction, drug addiction or
aggression, we should also pay attention to the widespread, though overlooked,
threat of the drastic reduction in physical activity of children, adolescents and
adults6 and the resulting negative consequences of this fact.
3
P. Makowski, Komentarz do podstawy programowej przedmiotu edukacja dla bezpieczeństwa,
In: Podstawa programowa z komentarzami. Tom 8. Wychowanie fizyczne i edukacja dla
bezpieczeństwa w szkole podstawowej, gimnazjum i liceum, Wyd. MEN, Warszawa 2012.
4
Podstawa programowa – edukacja dla bezpieczeństwa – gimnazjum i liceum, In: Podstawa
programowa z komentarzami. Tom 8. Wychowanie fizyczne i edukacja dla bezpieczeństwa w szkole
podstawowej, gimnazjum i liceum, Wyd. MEN, Warszawa 2012.
5
Com. Textbooks for secondary schools: J. Słoma, Żyję i działam bezpiecznie.
Edukacja dla bezpieczeństwa, Nowa Era, Warszawa 2012; S. Tomaszkiewicz, A. Kaczmarek,
J. Samól, Edukacja dla bezpieczeństwa, Wyd. eMPI2, Poznań 2012.
6
It is estimated that in the century 1864-1964 was decreased physical activity a man of 93%.
Com. W. Starosta, Wybrane zagadnienia psychologii treningu i zawodów sportowych, Wyd.
International Association of Sport Kinetics, Warszawa-Białystok 2011, s. 22.
261
ILONA URYCH
Thus, in the twenty-first century there is a need to skilfully combat new threats
such as physically passive lifestyles and their consequences in terms of
deteriorating health and the spread of social pathologies. Increased and systematic
physical activity can reduce or eliminate the occurrence of many pathogens, while
in itself it is a natural human need, an elementary basis of a person's physical and
mental health, and thus the safe operation of the developed countries. Therefore,
the theoretical aspects of physical activity – as a natural cure for selected hazards
of peacetime – are the subject of a new challenge for security education. At the
same time the content is kontatybilne thematic block health education carried out
in the framework of the subject of health education.
Movement as a natural human need
“Movement is a biological need of the human body. Experts from the World
Health Organization and the United Nations determined the minimum, ie, the
necessary daily portion of movement for adult performing physical work: 10,000
steps to 15,000 – to work mentally. Whilst creating modern civilization humans
forgot about their genetic program. In spite of the needs of their body they began to
lead a sedentary lifestyle”7.
Movement is one of the basic biological needs of animals and humans, it is
a prerequisite for the mental and physical health of every man. Evidenced by,
among other things, the fact that in organisms devoid of movement there occurs
pathological processes, these organisms get sick and age faster8. “This deficiency,
together with other negative factors cause many civilizational disease (such as high
blood pressure, obesity, deformities of the spine, flattening of the foot). This build
up then leads to irreversible changes”9. W. Starosta10 called this process the death
spiral. It is a process in which a healthy and fit person as a result of, inter alia,
a long-term shortage of movement (hypokinesia), irrational nutrition, frequent use
of drugs, residing in an ecologically unfavourable environment reduces the
efficiency and capacity of the organism, organ failure, and a lack of motion of the
circulatory system, which in turn can lead to heart attack, and thus to death. The
Death spiral is graphically presented in Fig. 1.
7
W. Starosta, Motoryczne zdolności koordynacyjne, Wyd. Instytut Sportu w Warszawie,
Warszawa 2003, s. 19.
8
H. Grabowski, Teoria fizycznej edukacji, WSiP, Warszawa 1999.
9
W. Starosta, Motoryczne…., op. cit., s. 19.
10
W. Starosta, Motoryczne…., op. cit.
262
Source: W. Starosta, Motoryczne zdolności koordynacyjne, Wyd. Instytut Sportu w Warszawie, Warszawa 2003.
Fig. 1. Death spiral – the lack of a person's physical activity and its consequences for human
health
The opposite of the death spiral is a spiral of life (Fig. 2.), or the recommended
modern lifestyle, which includes, among other things, rational nutrition, healthy
lifestyle, and systematic physical activity. Increased movement and its positive
consequences for the health of youth extends the life of the biological organism,
promotes an optimistic attitude to life and results in delighting in a fully successful
and healthy life.
263
ILONA URYCH
16. Full successes and
healthy life
14. Optimistic attitude
to life
12. Properly organized
recreation
10. A high level of
psychomotor skills
8. Physical activity with
increasing intensity
6. Often used increased
physical activity on the
open air
4. Rational nutrition
2. Regular physical
activity
15. Satisfaction with life
and each other
13. Prolonged biological
"youth"
11. Maintaining a
normal body weight
9. Improving mental
health and immunity
7. Increased efficiency
and physical fitness
5. Living in an
ecologically clean
environment
3. Standardized hygienic
lifestyle
1. Healthy and fit
man
Source: W. Starosta, Motoryczne zdolności koordynacyjne, Wyd. Instytut Sportu w Warszawie, Warszawa 2003.
Fig. 2. Spiral of life – a person's increased physical activity and its consequences for human
health
Working the muscles, and thus movement is not only the factors necessary to
maintain the efficiency and capacity of psychophysical adults, but also, and
perhaps above all, an important factor in the development of a growing organism.
264
The universality of physical inactivity
A lack of physical activity is becoming increasingly a problem that affects
younger and younger age groups. Movement is a special stimulus at every stage of
development. With regards to exercise, the school plays an important role in the
proper development of the organism. Research conducted by R. Przewęda11
indicates that the twenty-first century is characterized by a decline in the physical
fitness of the young generation; despite the important functions that correct
exercise provides (adaptive stimulus, corrective and compensatory12), You can
observe this disturbing phenomenon occurring in schools. The survey conducted in
2005 shows that about 40% of girls and 19% boys use temporary exemptions from
physical education classes13. Other studies show that only 8-20% of families spend
free time actively14.
A typical result of this improper conduct, depriving the body of a physically
active lifestyle, is the phenomenon of hypokinesia i.e. the state of physical
inactivity. This phenomenon leads to disturbances in a range of systems:
cardiovascular, digestive and nervous autonomous15.
The effects of hypokinesia are huge, the human body can not function properly
without regular exercise. Hypokinesia's effects on various systems:
− muscular (hypokinesia causes the muscles to slowly begin to fade, this
primarily refers to the muscles of the lower limbs, followed by a noticeable
decrease in muscle strength as a result of these changes),
− respiratory (immobility reduces the ventilation efficiency of our body, which
affects the oxygenation of the cells of the body),
− nervous (hypokinesia affects the deterioration of hypokinesia mobility,
imbalance and gait may also occur , also our mood is dependent on physical
activity, the lack of it therefore deteriorates our mood),
− circulatory (heart volume, and its slot cardiac output to decrease, and the
body has less need to transport oxygen to tissues as a result of reducing tension of
skeletal muscle fibers and even their loss is a reduction in venous wall tension),
− gastrointestinal (decreased metabolism, as a result of a lack of exercise the
risk of obesity increases, and because fat has a greater tendency to store
carbohydrates, and therefore insulin production is impaired),
− immune (resistance is reduced, the body's ability to adapt to the new
conditions are positively correlated with immobility)16.
11
Com. M. Jarosz, Zasady prawidłowego żywienia dzieci i młodzieży oraz wskazówki dotyczące
zdrowego stylu życia, Wyd. Instytut Zywności i Żywienia, Warszawa 2008, s. 181.
12
H. Grabowski, Teoria…, op. cit.
13
F. Rochowicz, Roczniki warszawskiej szkoły zdrowia, Wyd. Stowarzyszenie Warszawska
Szkoła Zdrowia, Warszawa 2008, s. 58.
14
Ibidem, s. 60.
15
F. Rochowicz, op. cit.
16
www.fizjoterapia.com, Wpływ akinezji i hipokinezji na poszczególne układy organizmu
człowieka.
265
ILONA URYCH
A lack of physical activity has a negative effect on the development of motor skills
and physical prowess, as well as mental development. There occurs a correlation
between the lack of physical activity and the incidences of health problems17.
Meanwhile, it is estimated that about 70% of Polish children do not exercise
enough, which can have disastrous health effects. Children, like adults, should
regularly undertake increased physical exercise. It is assumed that daily physical
activity should take between 60-90 minutes. Activity undertaken by children
should be based on three types of exercises appropriate for children: aerobic
exercise, breathing, and stretching muscles18. For the purposes of the prevention of
unhealthy lifestyles, American specialists have created a pyramid depicting the
mobility needs of children (Fig. 3.).
Limit!
watching TV,
computer
games, etc.
2-3 times a week
physical
recreation
3-5 times a week
aerobic
exercise
recreational
walks
Every day
Come up the stairs instead of an elevator ride! Come
out for a walk with the dog! Ride a bike or walk around!
Come walk Instead he ride the bus! Have fun on the air!
Source: M. Jarosz, Zasady prawidłowego żywienia dzieci i młodzieży oraz wskazówki dotyczące zdrowego stylu
życia, Wyd. Instytut Żywności i Żywienia, Warszawa 2008, s. 199.
Fig. 3. Pyramid of physical activity of children
17
18
266
F. Rochowicz, op. cit., s. 60.
M. Jarosz, Zasady…, op. cit.
The mobility needs of children and young people provided their normal
development
The prevalence of physical inactivity problems should not be underestimated,
because movement is one of the components that affect the psychological and
physical development of children and youth. Physical activity has a positive effect
on the metabolism and hormonal homeostasis of the body, which helps to keep: the
corresponding figure, muscle condition, better concentration; it also allows
adaptation to a rapidly changing environment, improves motor skills, and many
other functions are dependent on, more or less indirectly, physical activity.
Physical activity affects almost all biological processes in the body. Therefore,
the abandonment and neglect of the needs of the body movement can have serious
consequences.
Physical exercise affects the development of the skeletal system in children and
young people of a school age. This translates the movement of body into bone
mass and degrees of mineralization. Physical activity also leads to the
strengthening of the muscles, which indirectly affect the protection of bone tissue,
and the lack of movement reduces bone tissue, and thus bones' susceptibility to
injury. This is confirmed by studies: bone mineralization in active children aged
12-16 years were significantly different when compared to children with
a sedentary lifestyle19.
Another beneficial impact of physical exercise on the correct functioning of the
young organism is to improve the functioning of the circulatory system. Regular
exercise-reducing pressure drop in LDL cholesterol, triglycerides and increase in
HDL, which leads to the better efficiency of the cardiovascular system.
Also, the respiratory and digestive system normalizes its functions due to
systematic physical activity. Exercise increases the vital capacity of the lungs and
increases the availability of oxygen in the exhaled air. With regard exercise, the
digestive system regulates the metabolism, stimulates peristalsis, which allows for
the faster removal of toxins from the body and helps to keep the optimum weight.
Physical exercise also has a huge impact on metabolism. Control over the
maintenance of a balance between the supply and consumption of energy supplied
in foods is exercised by the central nervous system, and precise anatomical
structures called nuclei of the hypothalamus. This is where there is a centre of
hunger and satiety. The condition of hunger is stimulated by low blood glucose
levels, giving the feeling of hunger. The satiety centre is stimulated by high
glucose in the blood, giving a lack of appetite and satiety20.
In addition, exercise relieves stress, reducing irritability and anxiety, as well as
reduces the symptoms of depression. This is so because of endorphins – hormones
19
J. Charzewska, Przegląd antropometryczny, Wydawnictwo Ankal, Łódź 1995, s. 24.
E. Holak, L. Hoppe, W. Lewiński, L. Lipka, B. Ruda-Groborz, Biologia, Wyd. OPERA,
Gdynia 2006, s.127.
20
267
ILONA URYCH
that cause well-being, self-satisfaction and euphoria – secreting, among others,
during exercise. The beneficial effect of physical exercise on children and young
people is also an improvement of their mood. With physical activity affecting us
physically and psychologically, everyone feels better21.
Functions of physical activity during youth
The effects of physical activity during youth are changes throughout the body,
mainly in the systems: muscle, bone and joints and ligament, cardio-respiratory and
nervous system. In anaphase, these changes are consistent with the natural
direction of political changes and therefore the easiest way to optimize them. This
is confirmed by the phenomenon of self-stimulation, or spontaneous nature (not
caused by other needs, but hunger movement) of physical activity of children and
adolescents, which in the period of maturity, especially ageing, expires22. In
addition, researchers have noted differences in physical activity for girls and
boys23.The role of physical activity as a factor stimulating the development of
people is also easy to tell by observing a person temporarily or permanently
immobilized (eg, paralysis, fractures) or by observing the relationship between the
asymmetry of the limbs' workloads and their construction24.
However, the consequences of the development of the somatic motor under the
influence of physical activity goes far beyond the biological needs of the body.
Physical fitness, defined as the willingness to take up and solve difficult motor
tasks in different life situations that require strength, speed, agility, flexibility and
endurance, and certain acquired and shaped motor skills and habits based on the
appropriate motor abilities and health status, allows participation in games giving
satisfaction and the joy of life25. It should also be noted that with the development
of motor skills a child becomes independent from the environment, which raises its
faith in its own strength. In childhood motor skills determine many intellectual
activities whilst playing a vital role in adapting to school. Motor skills further
enable social networking through fun movement and determine the social position
in the peer group, and the comparison of their own skills with peers is an important
criterion of self-esteem, thus exerting influence on the personality of the young
man. Studies have shown that children 9-10-year-old, who have a high level of
motor performance, are more active, creative and know how to better get along
with others, than children with low efficiency26.
21
J. Czerwiński, Aktywność fizyczna potrzebą twórczego życia, Wyd. Olsztyńska Szkoła Wyższa,
Olsztyn 2004, s. 57.
22
H. Grabowski, Teoria…, op. cit., s. 27.
23
R.J. Gerring, P.H. Zimbardo, Psychologia i życie, PWN, Warszawa 2009, s. 343.
24
H. Grabowski, Teoria…, op. cit., s. 27.
25
Z. Gilewicz, Teoria wychowania fizycznego, Wyd. Sport i Turystyka, Warszawa 1964.
26
H. Grabowski, Teoria…, op. cit.,
268
It is also worth mentioning that during youth, due to the greater plasticity and
adaptability due to the difficult to predict further vicissitudes of a young man and
the associated demands on the body on adaptation, the improvement of
mechanisms of adaptation is characterized by the greatest possible versatility.
A high tolerance system for their operation generally correlates with an increased
neuro-psychological resistance, which takes on special significance today because
of the increasing frequency of neuroses and mental illnesses27.
Therefore, the main aim of physical activity in children is their overall
development, based on a natural, spontaneous movement need. Physical activity is
one of the main sources of joy and positive emotions. Children want more and
more control over their body and to learn to coordinate their movements. In this
way, the motor behaviour habits and health needed later in adult life are developed.
Regular physical activity is hardening and strengthening for the young organism, it
increases the mobility of the joints, shaped muscular strength and endurance, and
the habit of adopting the correct posture. The child collects experience improving
the psychomotor, increases their overall mobility. Using motion also develops
creative inventiveness, and various recreational skills and sport utility vehicles. In
addition, children also learn to express their desire for meaningful action28.
A wealth of motor stimuli applied systematically and with increasing intensity
may become a factor beneficial for change adaptation. It is also part of the school
physical education program at all levels of education. Contrary to common
practice, fitness should not be limited to exercises raising tolerance or treatments
that increase resistance to mechanical or thermal stimuli. Equally important are any
exercises conducive to adapting to the different positions of the body, the amount
and the formation of habits and skills to move freely in various field conditions
(winter sports, water, climbing, etc.). Properly preserved motor habits are a factor
of biological and social adaptation. A man who knows how to ski, swim,
overcoming obstacles is not only the unit more valuable biologically, but also are
able to better find themselves in social life and culture.
During development the body is the most malleable and susceptible to actions
involving high adaptation. Also, in this period, any disturbance in the normal
development is relatively easily prevented through compensation and cure in the
course of correction. Prevention and treatment, based on predicting the impact or
recognition of the status of various developmental deviations in the structure and
posture, physical fitness and mobility, metabolism, etc., are the main tasks of the
school system of physical education in the field of compensation and corrections.
These tasks should correlate with the effects on the cognitive and emotional sphere
of the juvenile in order to prepare it for self prevention and self-therapy after the
completion of education, and in particular the consequences of the scarcity of
movement.
27
28
Ibidem, s. 29–30.
R.J. Gerring, P.H. Zimbardo, Psychologia…, op. cit.
269
ILONA URYCH
In conclusion, the exercise needs of children are essential to their proper
development. Therefore, physical activity during youth:
− supports the development of the juvenile (stimulating function);
− allows you to increase the system tolerance to the effects of any forces
generated by the external environment (adaptive function);
− prevents and treat any disorders in normal development (compensation
function and of correction)29.
Summary
Under the influence of regular physical activity tremendous changes occur in
the human body. Many of them can be seen at first glance; these are simple: slim
silhouettes, better muscled, elastic gait, no evidence of fatigue in physical work,
better mood in the days in which others feel worse. As a result of training achieved
a marked improvement in basic motor skills such as strength, speed, endurance. In
addition, practicing different sports to reduce the amount of body fat, which is
important in the prevention of obesity30.
Despite various health attributes of systematic movement, the problem of low
activity exercise is a common phenomenon. Therefore, such an important role
encourage children to take regular physical-activity rests at home with parents and
schools - for teachers, especially physical education ones. However, the effects of
a passive mobility lifestyle, which is an imperceptible threat to modern man,
should be the content of education for safety. Indeed, any daily physical activity
becomes a necessity today because:
– movement is a natural human need, conditioning our biological existence,
– a lack of exercise is becoming a common problem, and the human body can
not function properly without regular exercise,
– physical activity determines the correct psychological and physical
development of children and youth,
– during the period of youth, physical activity complies with the essential
features as stimulation, adaptation, of correction and compensation.
Physical activity may therefore help to "fight" with these threats during
peacetime in the 21st century, which are associated with a physically passive mode
of life, including the physical and mental health of a single man and entire
societies. It is vital, therefore, to popularize various forms of physical activity
among all age groups, but especially among children and young people, which is
when health habits are formed. How reasonable the words of the court physician of
29
H. Grabowski, Teoria…, op. cit.
I. Urych, Czym jest wychowanie fizyczne – moim zdaniem, „Wychowanie Fizyczne
i Zdrowotne”, 2009, nr 1.
30
270
Polish kings – Wojciech Wink (1537–1599) therefore seem – who claimed that
"Movement can replace all the medicines, but no medicine is able to replace
movement".
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NDU
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Quarterly
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2013
Zeszyty
Naukowe
AON nrno
2(59)
2005
ISSN2353-1789
0867–2245
ISSN
RYSZARD SZYNOWSKI
MILITARY ADMINISTRATION PERSONNEL
Cdre Assoc. Prof. Ryszard SZYNOWSKI, Ph.D.
Abstract
This article is dedicated to military administration personnel. The author divided
military administration personnel into professional soldiers and army employees. When
describing the issues connected with employment in military administration, special
attention was paid to the legal basis of employment of both army employees and
professional soldiers. Following this, the author discussed the problems connected with
filling military positions in military administration as well as recruitment and selection
procedures for candidates applying to be employed in military administration within the
Civil Service. Taking into consideration the proposed organisational and legal changes
concerning the Polish Armed Forces, it needs to be stressed that the presented legal
regulations concern the period up to September 2013.
Key words – Military administration, Military administration personnel, Professional
soldiers, Army employees
The challenges and expectations of a contemporary state have an influence on,
among other things, public administration which performs the state tasks.
Nowadays, the modernisation of public administration structures can be observed,
as well as the increasing specialisation of their human resources. Due to this
specialisation, on the one hand, positions created in administration should be filled
with people with appropriate qualifications and, on the other hand, these people
should be independent from current politics and private entrepreneurship
obligations.
Any employer applies a human resources management process aimed, through
systematically used procedures, at ensuring an appropriate workforce for the
existing and planned positions. This process provides the right people for the
proper positions at the right time1. In the human resources management process the
following stages exist: personnel planning, recruitment (external and internal),
1
272
J. Stoner, Ch. Wankel, Kierowanie, Wydawnictwo PWE, Warsaw 1994, p. 278.
choice of candidates (selection in terms of their predispositions and choosing the
best ones, as well as the candidate's decision to take up employment), introducing
employees to work as well as their adaptation, training, inservice courses and
professional development, motivating, appraisal, promotion, transfer, resignation
and preparing the employee's reserve.
Military administration is an element of government administration. The
Ministry of National Defence, being a public administration body, performs the
functions of the chief public administration body in the field of the defence of the
state and the armed forces, and manages all these fields, including human
resources2. Government administration employs different types of employees in the
widest understanding of this term: higher officials, that are those who make
decisions or at least prepare their merits, middle level administrative personnel,
back office/auxiliary personnel and service workers. Hence, military
administration, understood as an „employer” encompasses many organisational and
legal entities which „give work” and are employing entities. Also, the Armed
Forces of the Republic of Poland are included in the „employer” category.
In the national defence department (a department of government
administration) two basic personnel groups must be singled out, mainly:
professional soldiers and employees (military employees).
Soldiers serve and are appointed to appropriate posts, and their rights and
obligations are provided for by the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of
2 April 19973 and other regulations of law contained in the Professional Soldiers'
Military Service Act of 11 September 20034.
In accordance with the above mentioned Act, in order to become a professional
soldier an individual needs to be a Polish citizen of unblemished reputation whose
allegiance to the Republic of Poland is unquestionable, and have appropriate
qualifications as well as the physical and mental ability to serve as a professional
soldier. Professional soldiers are soldiers on active duty, serving in the form of
permanent or contract service. Professional soldiers constitute the professional
personnel of the Polish Armed Forces, which is divided into: professional officers
2
Cf. Wybrane zagadnienia ustroju Polski. Siły Zbrojne w Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, ed.
M. Mikołajczyk-Bezak, Wydawnictwo Departament Społeczno-Wychowawczy MON, Warsaw 2000,
p. 131.
3
JoL of 1997, no 78, item 483 with subsequent amendments. Apart from the mentioned Act, the
issue of the official practice concerning professional soldiers is regulated by 67 executory orders to
the quoted Act and 20 other acts, among others, the Act on General Defence Obligation, Military
Discipline Act, Military Housing Act, Act on professional soldiers and their families' retirement. The
whole of official personnel practice in the Polish Armed Forces was presented in the title:
R. Szynowski, Z. Piątek, L. Jankowiak, Pragmatyka kadrowa w Siłach Zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej
Polskiej. National Defence University, Warsaw 2007, and also R. Szynowski, Problemy zarządzania
zasobami osobowych żołnierzy zawodowych [in:] Przygotowanie i wykorzystanie potencjału ludzkiego
w tworzeniu bezpieczeństwa narodowego Polski w XXI wieku. Research work under scientific
supervision of J. Buczyński, National Defence University, Warsaw 2007.
4
JoL of 2003, no 179, item 1750, with subsequent amendments.
273
RYSZARD SZYNOWSKI
corps, professional non-commissioned officers corps, and professional privates
corps. Recruitment to professional military service takes place: to permanent
service – for an indefinite period of time, and to contract service – for the time
period defined in a contract. A permanent duty soldier's service relationship is
formed by way of recruitment based on voluntary reporting for that duty.
A contract duty soldier's service relationship is created by way of recruitment based
on a contract concluded between a person voluntarily reporting for duty and
a relevant body. The date of the commencement of professional military service
and a position of service are defined by a personal order5.
Appointment of professional soldiers to positions (including positions in
military administration) takes place by way of a decision, in accordance with the
needs of the armed forces and depending on the required professional
qualifications defined in the position’s description as well as on the grade obtained
in the evaluation report, and, in the case of a professional soldier on permanent
duty, also on an individual prognosis of the professional military service career
path. Determining an individual prognosis of the professional military service
career path for a professional soldier on permanent duty takes place on the basis of
military service career path models which, in particular corps (personnel groups),
5
Personal order is an administrative decision. Decisions and personal orders are issued in an
individual or collective form. When a decision or a personal order is issued in a collective form, an
excerpt from this decision or order is of the same validity. A soldier may file an appeal against
decisions issued by relevant bodies in cases concerning a professional military career to a supervisory
body defined in the legal instruction placed in the decision, and also after the methods of appeal have
been exhausted, file a complaint to a relevant administrative court. However, a complaint to an
administrative court may not be filed against the decision in cases concerning appointment, transfer
and dismissal from a position and transfer to the reserve forces or to remain at the disposal, promotion
to a military rank, transfer to another personnel corps or group and delegated to perform duties
outside the military unit. Cf.: Art. 8 of Professional Soldiers' Military Service Act of 11 September
2003 (JoL of 2003, no 179, item 1750) and Art. 127 of the Act of 14 June 1960 - Administrative
Procedure Code (JoL of 2000., no 98, item 1071, with subsequent amendments) and the Act of
25 July 2002 – Law of the system of administrative courts (JoL of 2002, no 153, item 1269). In
accordance with point 16 of the General Regulations the following do not constitute decisions (nor
orders): lawmaking acts of the law internally in force which often, and especially when issued by the
Minister of National Defence, are called decisions. In order to make sure of the correctness of the
above presented point of view, it is necessary, as it were per analogiam, to refer to the statements of
the doctrine where the status of an order was denied (in the meaning of Article 115 § 18 of the Polish
Penal Code.) to normative documents issued by the Polish Armed Forces, even when they were given
the name of an order. A normative act, even when entitled as a „decision”, is not a „decision” in the
meaning of point 16 of the General Regulations. More: J. Ziewiński, Rozkaz wojskowy w prawie
karnym, Wydawnictwo MON, Warsaw 1986, p. 66, S. Hoc, Rozkaz w kodeksie karnym, [in:] Aktualne
problemy prawa karnego. Księga pamiątkowa z okazji Jubileuszu 70 urodzin Profesora Andrzeja J.
Szwarca, Poznań 2009, p. 167, M. Czyżak, Odrębność polskiego prawa karnego wojskowego wobec
prawa karnego powszechnego, Warsaw 2010, p. 101, A. Barczak-Oplustil, G. Bogdan, Z. Ćwiąkalski,
M. Dąbrowska-Kardas, J. Majewski, J. Raglewski, M. Rodzynkiewicz, M. Szewczyk, W. Wróbel, A.
Zoll, Commentary to Article 343 of the Polish Penal Code, thesis 12, System Informacji Prawnej Lex
(Lex Omega). Quoted after: R. Noworyta, Wyznaczanie żołnierzy zawodowych na stanowiska
służbowe i zwalnianie z tych stanowisk, a kwestia odpowiedzialności karnej za niewykonanie
rozkazu personalnego. http://www.npw.internetdsl.pl/Dokumenty/2012-3-8.pdf /19.02.2013/
274
are developed and updated by people with qualifications relevant for a given corps
(personnel group), indicated by the Minister of National Defence. There are, in
turn, the following minimal requirements in the scope of education necessary for
an appointment to the first position in the professional personnel corps of the
Polish Armed Forces: for professional non-commissioned officers – completion of
a secondary school education; for professional officers – a higher education
diploma (in accordance with the proposed amendment, since 2014: a Master of
Arts degree (or an equivalent one)). Appointment to the next positions depends
also on the completion of a course, training, internship or specialisation, depending
on the required qualifications defined in the position’s description. A professional
soldier on permanent duty performs professional military service for a period of
time defined by the length of terms of office in a position, which range from
eighteen months to three years. A professional soldier may serve in the same
position of: a director (chief) of an organisational unit in the Ministry of National
Defence, including the ones that are part of the General Staff of the Polish Armed
Forces, as required at this position ranking from the rank of major (lieutenant
commander), where there is the attribute „commander” in the name - for not longer
than two terms of office.
Taking into consideration the above mentioned statutory regulations,
appointing professional soldiers in military administration will take place on the
basis of the rules adopted in the above quoted Professional Soldiers' Military
Service Act and the Act on General Defence Obligation of the Republic of Poland.
Pursuant to Article 76 (4) of the Act on General Defence Obligation of the
Republic of Poland of 21 November 19676, it is the President that upon the request
of the Minister of National Defence promotes soldiers to the first officer rank
(second lieutenant) and to officer ranks of generals and admirals. Article 43a and
44 of Professional Soldiers' Military Service Act defines the bodies competent to
appoint to positions in the armed forces. The Chief of the Inspectorate for Armed
Forces Support (a professional soldier) is appointed by the President of the
Republic of Poland upon the request of the Minister of National Defence (Article
43a). In accordance with this regulation (Article 44 (1) the Minister of National
Defence is competent to appoint soldiers to the positions with the required rank of
colonel; therefore it falls within his competence to appoint professional soldiers in
military administration whose required rank was classified as required at the given
position rank of Colonel, including the position of the Chief of the Provincial
Military Staff.
As for the positions of the Army Recruiting Command which are classified as
requiring the rank of Colonel, the body authorised to appoint is the Chief of the
Inspectorate for Armed Forces Support (Article 44 (2)). The Chief of the
Inspectorate for Armed Forces Support is also a body authorised to appoint
candidates to other positions in the structures of Provincial Military Staffs
6
JoL of 2004, no 241, item 2416, with subsequent amendments. Consolidated text.
275
RYSZARD SZYNOWSKI
classified as requiring the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and those requiring the rank
of Major. The Chief of the Provincial Military Staff is, in turn, the body competent
to appoint candidates to positions classified as requiring the rank of Captain in the
structures of provincial military staffs and in the subordinate Army Recruiting
Commands.
Simultaneously, it must be noted that a professional soldier, being a person
performing active military duty, is a public officer in accordance with the wording
of Article 115 § 13 of the Penal Code7. There are consequences connected with
holding public functions in the scope of observing the specific disciplinary and
ethical rules and norms as well as criminal responsibility and civil liability8.
Liability of a public officer is regulated by Article 231 of the Penal Code, which
indicates that the official who, by exceeding his authority or through negligence
acts to the detriment of public or private interest, is subject to penalty9.
In the organisational structure of the Minister's office, as well as in the structure
of provincial military staffs and army recruitment commands, some positions and
their level are detrmined occupied by civilian personnel, limited as for number and
type, and included in the unit.
With reference to employees, that is individuals employed in the bodies of
military administration the terms: „army employee” or „civilian army employee”
are used; hence, at the beginning, these terms need to be explained. Discussion
concerning the subjective scope of the notion of „army employee” and „civilian
army employee” has continued in the national defence department for many years.
This has been caused by the usage of these terms in different studies which refer to
employees. However, due to the fact that the interpretation of these terms may have
legal effects for employees (in the form, for example, of the awarding or not of
financial benefits), it has seemed necessary to interpret these notions10. According
7
JoL of 1997, no 88, item 553 with subsequent amendments.
Article 115 §19 of the Polish Penal Code A public official is a member of a local government
body, a person employed in an organisational unit having at its disposal public funds, unless this
person only performs service activity, and also a person whose authorities and duties in the scope of
public activity are defined or acknowledged by an Act or an international agreement binding for the
Republic of Poland. Cf.: A. Zoll et alli, General part. Volume I. Comment to Articles 1-116 of the
Polish Penal Code, Zakamycze 2006, comment to Article 115, thesis 4, System Informacji Prawnej
Lex (Lex Omega) 11/2008.
9
Discussion concerning constitutionality of this regulation was ended by the Constitutional
Tribunal with its Judgement of 9 June 2010 (SK 52/09) which found it as being in conformity with
Article 42 (1) of the Constitution. The Act of 20 January 2011 on financial liability of public officials
for gross breach of law (JoL of 2011, no 34 item 173) came into force on 17 May 2011. The Act
specifies the rules of financial liability of public officials, towards the State Treasury, of local
government units or other entities liable for damage caused in connection with public governance, for
activity or negligence leading to gross breach of law and the rules of conduct referring to such
liability.
10
Based on the analysis of the document of: the MOND Law Department no 300/4/96 of 05 May
1996, the MOND Personnel Department no 2554/BPW of 16 May 1996, Director General of the
Ministry of National Defence no 242 of 24 April 1997 r., MOND Personnel and Military Education
Department no 5668 of 14 October 1997. MOND Social Affairs Department no 1053/3 of 20
8
276
to the author of this article, it is the term „army employees” that may be used to
refer to employees of military administration, since they are employed in military
organisational units of the public sector – organisational units whose activity is
directly financed from the national defence department budget, and the Minister is
entitled to define the number and organisational structure of these units. The notion
„army employee” in colloquial Polish, in a situational context, increases the
comprehensibility of a text, allowing for explicit distinction in a group of all public
administration employees, those employees who are employed in military
administration. However, the use of the term „civilian army employee” seems
unjustified, since in Poland there is no distinction between civilian and non-civilian
employees11. Adding the attribute „army” to the notion „employee” to create the
term „army employee” derives from colloquial language and serves only to
indicate the connection of such an employee with the environment of the Polish
Armed Forces.
The relationship between an employer and an employee is regulated by an
employment agreement and a person performs work on the basis of one of the
types of employment defined in the Labour Code. The status of employees is
regulated by the Labour Code and other labour law regulations. The fact that there
is a category of Civil Service employees amongst employees performing state tasks
in government administration offices is a consequence of the regulations of the
Constitutional act and labour law regulations. Article 153 of the Constitution of the
Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997 concerns the Civil Service, which acts in order
February 2002, the Minister of National Defence's Plenipotentiary for Cooperation with Trade Unions
no 1601/DSS of 02 June 2008. Conclusions coming from the analysis of relevant documents are as
follows: 1. In the legal acts in force which regulate the status of public officials the notion of a
„civilian army employee”does not exist as a sectioning unit. Neither the notion „army employee” nor
„civilian army employee” are statutory notions that can be attributed any meaning, „directly as a
whole, as if it was one word” after: S. Wronkowska, M. Zieliński, Problemy i zasady redagowania
tekstów prawnych, Wydawnictwo Urzędu Rady Ministrów, Warsaw 1993, p. 18; 2. The existence of
different professional groups (e.g. academic teachers, doctors, clerks) to which different acts apply
which define their rights and obligations, may raise doubts concerning the explicate answer to the
question whether they are army employees. An army employee is a person who is employed in an
organisational unit of the national defence department, financed directly from the state budget, which
is in a public sector military organisational unit. This is a so called narrow interpretation of the notion
„army employee”. People employed by employers for whom the Minister of National Defence is a
founding body were excluded from the subjective scope of army employees; 3. Interpretations
broadening the notion „army employee” – to any person employed in any unit referred to in Annex to
the Announcement. An army employee is a colloquial term, including people employed by military
employers, that is organisational units of the National Defence department, as opposed to people
employed by non-military, civilian employers; 4. For adequate comprehensibility of regulations or
documents, the notion „army employee” needs to be supplemented with information concerning the
military organisational unit employing this person. The lack of such information means understanding
the term „army employee” as referring to all units, e.g. an army employee is also an employee of the
National Defence University or the Naval Academy.
11
A civilian - colloquially means a civilian and not a military person. Słownik języka polskiego,
ed. M. Szymczak, T. 1, Wydawnictwo PWN, Warsaw 1992, p. 325.
277
RYSZARD SZYNOWSKI
to „ensure a professional, diligent, impartial and politically neutral performance of
the State's obligations in the organs of government administration”. The Prime
Minister is the superior of the Civil Service.
The Act of 21 November 2008 on the Civil Service12 decides whether the Civil
Service is composed of employees employed as officials, both in the office of the
Minister of National Defence as well as in offices constituting a support apparatus
for local government administration bodies subordinate to the Minister, that is in
provincial military staffs and army recruiting commands, as well as the
Inspectorate for Armed Forces Support. The Civil Service, in accordance with
Article 3 of the mentioned Act, is composed of Civil Service employees and civil
servants. A Civil Service employee is a person employed on the basis of an
employment contract and in accordance with the rules of the Civil Service Act. A
civil servant is a person employed in an office on the basis of nomination, whose
rules result from the provisions of the Act.
Typical positions in the Civil Service may be divided into two groups. The first
one includes all the positions in ministers' offices, hence also in the Ministry of
National Defence, and the second the positions present only in the Ministry of
National Defence. Both groups result from the provisions of the Regulation of the
Prime Minister of 9 December 2009 on defining clerical positions, required
professional qualifications, professional ranks of civil servants, multipliers to
establish remuneration and detailed rules for the establishing and payment of other
benefits which members of the Civil Service corps are entitled to13. Annex no 1 to
the Regulation contains the table of clerical groups, clerical positions' groups, lists
of positions in particular groups and professional qualifications required at clerical
positions in ministers' offices and presidents of committees included in the Council
of Ministers. It contains the following groups of positions: higher positions in the
Civil Service, middle level positions in the Civil Service, coordinating positions in
the Civil Service, independent positions in the Civil Service, specialist and
supporting positions. Individual positions are assigned to particular groups in the
following way: higher positions in the Civil Service are positions of an office
general director, director of a department or an equivalent section and their
deputies; managerial positions in the Ministry of National Defence, defined by
organisational regulations, in accordance with the provisions of § 4 (1) of
Ordinance no 40/MON of the Minister of National Defence of 22 November 2006
on organisational regulations of the Ministry of National Defence14, are the
positions of the Minister, Secretary of State, Undersecretaries of State and Office
Director General; a middle level managerial position in the Civil Service is the
position of the department Chief Accountant; coordinating positions in the Civil
Service are the positions of: a Chief of Department, plenipotentiary for confidential
12
JoL of 2008 r., no 227, item 1505.
JoL of 2009, no 211, item 1630.
14
MOND OJ of 2006, no 21, item 270 with subsequent amendments.
13
278
information, deputy plenipotentiary and chief specialist in legislation. Whereas, in
the Ministry of National Defence there are additionally the positions of a team
(group) leader, chief of branch, deputy chief of branch and chief of division;
independent positions in the Civil Service are the positions of: a general adviser,
Minister's adviser, chief specialist, internal auditor, legal adviser, chief inspector,
classified information office manager and, additionally in the defence department,
a senior military control inspector and military control inspector; specialist
positions are: a senior specialist, senior programmer and designer, specialist, chief
inspector, senior statistician, referendary [officer in charge of a department] and
legal officer; supporting positions are: an inspector, statistician, underreferendary,
senior accountant, senior clerk, clerk and secretary.
In offices which constitute the support apparatus of local government
administration bodies subordinate to the Minister of National Defence in
accordance with the provisions of part XII of the Regulation of the prime Minister
of 9 December 2009, the coordinating positions in the Civil Service are: a chief of
branch and deputy chief of branch; independent positions in the Civil Service are: a
chief of division and district nurse. Specialist positions in the Civil Service in these
offices are the positions of a senior inspector of internal control, senior metrologist,
metrologist and internal control inspector. The group of supporting positions
includes: a senior instructor, instructor, editor, commander's (chief of institution)
secretary, and IT technician.
An important element of any position is the level of education attributed to this
position. It can be evaluated both from the angle of the sum of knowledge acquired
in a given field as well as the preparation necessary to do the job, that is
qualifications understood as education necessary to count them as belonging to a
certain category required to do the job15. Qualifications need to be certified by a
university diploma or a secondary school certificate. The requirements concerning
education are evaluated both during recruitment as well as selection of employees.
Their fulfilment is the prerequisite of being admitted to the recruitment and
selection process finalised with the conclusion of an employment agreement in the
Civil Service. In accordance with the opinion of the Supreme Administrative
Court16 the fulfilment of, among other things, conditions concerning the level of
education is necessary for admittance to the competition for higher positions in the
Civil Service. However, it is not a guarantee of entrusting a given position to a
candidate. These observations may be, by analogy, applied to all positions in the
Civil Service.
Shaping employment relationships in the Civil Service does not depend solely
on the will of these relationship subjects. Military administration, as a part of
15
Cf.: Mały słownik języka polskiego, ed. S. Skorupka, H. Anderska, Z. Łempicka, PWN,
Warsaw 1968, p. 930 and p. 330.
16
Cf.: Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 14. 02. 2001, II S.A. 2908/00,
published in Public Information Bulletin, 2001, no 3.
279
RYSZARD SZYNOWSKI
government administration, is subject to the provisions of the Civil Service Act, but
also to its executive acts. The regulation of the Prime Minister of 9 December 2009
on defining clerical positions, required professional qualifications, professional
ranks of civil servants, multipliers to establish remuneration and detailed rules for
the establishing and payment of other benefits which members of the Civil Service
corps are entitled to17; apart from types of position in the Civil Service, a level of
education is also required for each position. In accordance with Annex no 1 to this
Regulation, in the Minister of National Defence's office and in offices constituting
a support apparatus for local government administration bodies subordinate to the
Minister of National Defence, professional qualifications of employees required to
work in clerical positions, in the scope in which they are not regulated in detailed
regulations, are defined at the higher and middle level. For the following six groups
of clerical positions, further divided into detailed groups of positions, particular
levels of education were defined: higher positions in the Civil Service, middle level
management positions as well as coordination, independent and support positions.
An exception from the general rule is the provision contained in § 7 of the above
mentioned Regulation. For every civil servant employed on the day the Act comes
into force, in the currently binding wording18, who did not fulfil the requirement
concerning the required qualifications for this position, there was still a possibility
to hold this position, that is, there was no obligation to dissolve an employment
agreement with this official. If such a person wanted to change position, then his or
her qualifications are subject to the evaluation of compatibility with the conditions
provided for in the Regulation.
Planning of human resources in military administration, that is predicting the
demand on employees and professional soldiers serving in these bodies, means
planning the future needs of this administration. Sources of this planning should be
sought in the scope of tasks of the Minister of National Defence, resulting from the
provisions of the Act on the office of the Minister of National Defence of 14
December 199519 and other legal acts whose provisions translate into the
organisational structure of the office and local military administration bodies.
The Statute of the Ministry of National Defence lists organisational units
included in the Ministry. In the Restructuring and Technical Modernisation
Programme of the Polish Armed Forces in the period 2001 – 2006, the target
number of full time contracts was assumed20. Due to the above, the Minister of
17
JoL of 2009, no 211, item 1630.
The Civil Service Act of 21 November 2008, published in JoL of 2009, no 227, item 1505 in
the provisions of Article 215 revoked the Civil Service Act of 24 August 2006, published in JoL of
2006, no 170, item 1218 with subsequent amendments.
19
20
In accordance with „Development Programme of the Polish Armed Forces for period 2009 –
2018”, the process of planning has been realised in the Polish Armed Forces since 2001, within the
framework of subsequent - developed in accordance with the NATO planning procedures - six-year
development programmes. Due to the adoption of such a planning system, the armed forces
development programmes for the next 6 years are developed every two years. It is, in principle, an
18
280
National Defence with Decision no 12/MON of 22 January 2002 on defining the
number of permanently employed professional soldiers and civilian employees in
the organisational units of the Ministry of National Defence, assigned a total
number of positions to particular units, broken down into the positions for
professional soldiers and the positions destined for civilians. This Decision is the
fulfilment of the Minister of National Defence's task consisting in shaping the
organisational and regular employment structure in the national defence sector, that
is the realisation of the provisions of § 2 point 4 of the Regulation of the Council of
Ministers of 9 July 1996 on the detailed scope of the Minister of National
Defence's activity21. This decision only defines the number of positions, without an
indication of their type. The person authorised to shape the organisational structure
of the subordinate institution/unit, is a director of a given unit. The Minister of
National Defence in the Decision no 14/MON of 22 January 2002 on determining
the positions of directors and deputy directors destined for members of the Civil
Service corps in the organisational units of the Ministry of National Defence,
determined, by indicating the organisational unit and position by name, those
among the positions in the organisational units in the Ministry of National Defence
which are defined as civilian positions. Depending on the situation, the status of a
position may be changed, by a decision of the Minister of National Defence, from
the military to the civilian one and vice versa. Such a change, however, is
indirectly connected with the number of positions predicted in a given budgetary
year by The Budget Act and the amount of financial resources allotted to cover the
remuneration for particular positions, that is with the amount of the payroll fund.
The formation of organisational units included in the Ministry of National
Defence is subject to uniform rules. In accordance with the Decision no 15/MON
of the Minister of National Defence of 22 January 2002 on introducing the forming
rules for the organisational units of the Ministry of National Defence, full-time
positions in particular organisational units must fulfil the requirements contained in
the rules. As for civilian positions the decision refers to separate regulations.
Whereas, in accordance with the decision, the structure of organisational units is
update of a programme in force and an update of tasks for the next 2 years, taking into consideration
changes and conditions resulting from the state security policy and its budgetary possibilities. The
basis for the Polish Armed Forces Resources planning is the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of
21 June 2012 on defining the number of positions in particular the professional corps of the Armed
Forces of the Republic of Poland (JoL of 2012, no 0, item 757), on the basis of which the number of
positions in particular professional corps of the Polish Armed Forces was defined to amount to: in the
professional officers corps - 23 500; 2) in the professional non-commissioned officers corps - 43 200;
in the professional privates corps - 48 800. In turn, the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 18
December on defining the number of people who in 2013 may be enlisted to active military service,
compulsory military service or training in the civil defence as well as service in armed formations not
being a part of the Polish Armed Forces (JoL of 2012, item 1520), defined the number of reserve
soldiers and people, who are not reserve soldiers, transferred to the reserve forces and also the amount
of people not subject to the obligation of compulsory military service or military training who in 2013
may be enlisted to do active military service or serve as a soldier on active duty.
21
JoL of 1996, no 94, item 426.
281
RYSZARD SZYNOWSKI
formed by their internal sections and independent positions. The internal structure
of provincial military staffs and army recruiting commands, as well as the number
of positions, are determined on the basis of the provisions of point 4 subsection 3
of the Decision no 19/Org./P1 of the Minister of National Defence of 9 March
2007 on the formation rules for organisational structures of commands and other
organisational units of the national defence sector.
Article 46 (1) of the Professional Soldiers' Military Service Act of
11 September 2003 introduces the obligation to perform annual evaluation of the
employment situation. The evaluation of the employment situation is conducted in
two stages: executory reporting and analytical decision making22. The fundamental
aims of the employment situation evaluation are: assessing the implementation of
the most important undertakings constituting the human resources management
process and human resources activity in the national defence sector; evaluating
practical functioning and observance of the provisions of the Military Service Act
and its executive orders, and also the guidelines of the Minister of National
Defence, the Chief of Staff of the Polish Armed Forces and the Director of the
Personnel Department - referring to human resources activity; the evaluation
concerning the observance of the labour law regulations by military employers.
Another aim is to define undesirable phenomena and recommend appropriate
solutions: concerning organisation, permanent employment, law and personnel.
The final goal is to define the main directions of human resources activity and
recommend concrete aims for the next year. As a result of the evaluation of the
employment situation made in a particular calendar year, military bodies with
human resources competence obtain the actual state of management of the
subordinate human resources (professional soldiers and army employees) at all
levels subordinate to them. The employment situation evaluation also constitutes
the basis for defining the necessary aims and the adopting of the improvement
directions of the human resources management system in the national defence
sector. In accordance with Decision no 221/MON of the Minister of National
Defence of 5 June 2006 on the rules for the formation of organisational units of the
Ministry of National Defence23, when designing military and civilian positions in
organisational units the complexity and character of entrusted tasks, the level and
type of qualifications, permanent positions limit and the following rules are taken
into consideration: in the Ministry there are military positions destined for
professional soldiers and civilian positions destined for members of the Civil
Service corps and other employees. The number of positions for members of the
22
The Regulation of the Minister of National Defence of 15 December 2009 on the mode of
appointment and dismissal of professional soldiers to and from service positions (JoL of 2009.218.1699),
§ 27. Cf.: Wytyczne do opracowania oceny sytuacji kadrowej resorcie obrony narodowej [Guidelines for
the development of employment situation evaluation in the national defence sector], MOND Personnel
Department, Warsaw 2008. Source: http://www.dpz.wp.mil.pl/plik/file/Ocena_Sytuacji_Kadrowej/
wytyczne_do_oceny_sytuacji_kadrowej_zolnierzy.pdf /27.02.2013/
23
MOND OJ of 2006, no 15, item 191.
282
Civil Service corps and other employees in an organisational unit cannot be lower
than: 50% in organisational units, and 18% in organisational units forming the
General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces.
In organisation and competence documents, full-time positions destined for
army employees may be filled by way of recruitment and selection. The possible
causes of not filling a full-time position may include:
− reorganisation of an office and the resulting suspension of recruitment of
new employees,
− creation of a new position resulting from a change of tasks or their increased
number,
− acquisition of an employee from an office, resulting both from the fact of an
employee benefiting from provisions of Article 10 of the Labour Code, that is the
right to freely choose employment, as well as from the death of an employee or the
dissolution of an employment agreement by the military employer.
The provisions of the Civil Service Act do not use the notions of recruitment
and selection of employees to explain the procedure of filling the positions in an
office. Due to the above, differentiating recruitment and selection takes place on
the basis of notions adopted in the theory of human resources leadership and
management. The prerequisites, which need to be fulfilled by all candidates
applying to be employed in the Civil Service, hence also in military administration,
are defined in Article 4 of the Civil Service Act. The requirements for candidates
are as follows:
− being a Polish citizen,
− enjoying full public rights,
− not being sentenced with a final and binding sentence for intentional offence
or intentional tax offence,
− having qualifications required for a given position,
− unblemished opinion.
Non-fulfilment of any of the above requirements disqualifies a person as
a future Civil Service employee.
Seeking and employing workers is a difficult process, which organisations deal
with at every level of their development. The point of departure for this process,
irrespective of the chosen method of obtaining candidates for work, should be the
institution's strategy and aims. The main areas of the implementation of human
resources management strategy in the Civil Service include, among other things,
recruitment and career development24. That is why, undoubtedly, one of the most
important factors of ensuring the appropriate, high level of the Civil Service is the
24
In accordance with the Civil Service Act, the obligations of the Head of the Civil Service
include the development and implementation of the human resources management strategy. Cf. Nowa
ustawa o służbie cywilnej – najważniejsze zmiany w administracji rządowej [The new Civil Service
Act - the most important changes in government administration], Public Information Bulletin of the
Chancellery of the Prime Minister, http://bip.kprm.gov.pl/kprm/sc/.
283
RYSZARD SZYNOWSKI
appropriate recruitment of personnel. The Civil Service Act of 21 November 200825
provides for open and competitive recruitment to the Civil Service, simultaneously
shaping the mechanism of recruitment to the service, which is a complex process,
and not only a one-time activity. Recruitment concerns all positions in military
administration. Military administration institutions, just like the whole of
government administration, are to be professional, reliable, politically neutral and
impartial in order to perform state tasks entrusted to them. Impartiality, in the
author's opinion, is expressed in equal access to positions in military administration
and the conducting of recruitment in accordance with uniform rules, resulting from
the statutory provisions.
The Civil Service Act entrusts its different entities with conducting recruitment
for the Civil Service. These entities are: a General Director of every minister's
office and managers of offices in which the position of a general director does not
exist. The Civil Service Act, in the provisions of Article 25 (9), indicates that the
obligation to conduct recruitment to the Civil Service, in accordance with the
statutory rules, is the responsibility of the General Director of the Ministry of
National Defence and local executory bodies of the Minister of National Defence.
Organising recruitment to the Civil Service is both a competence and a task of
the General Director of the Office of the Ministry of National Defence, included in
his or her broader functions in the sphere of Civil Service and reflecting his or her
key role in employing members of the Civil Service corps. Article 26 of the above
mentioned Act also contains a significant provision concerning the recruitment to
the Civil Service of National School of Public Administration graduates. Including
graduates in this recruitment means that access to the Civil Service for this group is
not privileged and is conducted on the basis of general rules. Only the recruitment
of candidates to the Civil Service corps for positions connected with state defence
takes place where the priority of people dismissed from professional military
service is taken into consideration.
Article 26 (3), which provides for this priority, correlates with Article 119 (1)
of the Professional Soldiers' Military Service Act of 11 September 200326. This
provision says that professional soldiers dismissed from military service due to:
− inability to do military service pronounced by a military medical board;
− expiry of the period defined in a contract, unless a new one is concluded;
− expiry of the notice period of professional military service, given by
a professional soldier or an appropriate body;
− not being appointed to a position for the next term;
− receiving a pass mark in a general professional appraisal;
− the needs of the Polish Armed Forces – with the written consent of a soldier
who has served in the army for 10 years, due to a special type of education,
military experience and specialised knowledge,
25
26
284
JoL of 2010, no 90, item 593 with subsequent amendments
− having the right to be employed at positions connected with the state defence
in public administration, hence also in military administration.
The Regulation of the Prime Minister of 5 June 2007 on work positions
connected with the state defence in public administration27 defined what is to be
understood as positions connected with the state defence and indicated these
positions and the places where they could be found. It is the scope of activities,
which includes defence tasks, such as planning and implementation of non-military
defence preparations in the state as well as risk management tasks, that decides
whether the position is classified as connected with the state defence. Such
positions may exist in: the offices serving the members of the Council of Ministers
and offices of local government administration bodies among others. Positions
connected with the state defence include positions from a clerk (equivalent) to
a department director or a director of another organisational unit.
A general director is obliged to make the information concerning vacancies
public. This is done in two ways that are not alternative and must be used
simultaneously. The first of these is placing an announcement in the office
headquarters, which is in the Ministry of National Defence. Regulations do not
specify the technical side of the recruitment announcement in the office
headquarters, leaving these issues to practice. Legal requirements in this respect
concern only the need to place the announcement in the office headquarters and in
a place accessible for the general public (both office employees and all interested
people from outside the office). In practice, this announcement is usually put in a
place traditionally destined for the presenting of information and the orders of an
organisational unit manager, such as, for example, a noticeboard.
Another way to make public information on vacancies in the Civil Service is to
publish it in the Public Information Bulletin of the Office of the Minister of
National Defence and the Public Information Bulletin of the Chancellery of the
Prime Minister. The announcement is placed in the latter publication in electronic
form by way of a form put on its websites. Placing an announcement in the Public
Information Bulletin of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister is free of charge and
it receives a number. A recruitment announcement apart from organisational
elements such as an office name and address, date and place for filing documents,
should primarily contain information identifying the position, such as in particular:
indicating the position, defining the requirements in accordance with its
description, indicating necessary and additional (desirable) requirements, defining
the scope of tasks and duties. Establishing the above mentioned elements of an
announcement is connected with the style of recruitment to the Civil Service, since
it is not recruitment to Civil Service in general, but for a particular position. Due to
the above, the indicated elements need to be considered as binding formal
requirements which need to be fulfilled in order for the announcement to be
correct.
27
JoL of 2007, no 106, item 724.
285
RYSZARD SZYNOWSKI
The announcement needs to indicate the necessary documents required from a
candidate applying for work in the Civil Service in military administration. Filed
documents are to serve, on the one hand, as confirmation of the fulfilment of
conditions provided for in the Act (selection discipline), and, on the other hand, as
confirmation of the candidate's compliance with the requirements provided for a
given vacancy. In practice, the documents most often required are those which
confirm the necessary education and professional qualifications (higher education
diploma, legal training certificates, courses certificates), documents certifying
seniority, documents confirming Polish citizenship, a certificate of no criminal
record for intentional offences, and a confirmation of enjoying full public rights.
Candidates applying for employment in the Civil Service are also subject to the
provisions of Article 9 (1) of the Civil Service Act, which defines the scope of
employers’ access to candidates' personal information. An office, as a future
employer, has the right to demand personal information from people participating
in the recruitment process. Requirements for candidates applying for higher
positions in the Civil Service, apart from the general requirements contained in
Article 4 of the mentioned Act, are additionally defined in Article 53 of this Act. In
accordance with its regulations, a person applying for a higher position is required
to have: an MA degree or an equivalent one, managerial competence, seniority of
at least six years, including at least one year in a managerial position, but in a
public finance sector unit28 if a candidate applies for the position of an office
general director;
− seniority of at least three years, including at least one year in an independent
position in the public finance sector if a person applies for the position of manager
of a department or an equivalent unit in the Ministry of National Defence or an
office of the Minister's local executory body;
− requirements defined in the position’s description and in separate
regulations.
People disqualified from holding managerial positions in public authority
offices, or disqualified from holding such functions where they disposed of public
funds, cannot hold higher positions in the Civil Service.
A recruitment announcement, apart from the above mentioned information,
also contains requirements connected with the position resulting from the
provisions of the Civil Service Act, and also information concerning the recruitment
techniques and methods used. Apart from these elements, an announcement may
provide for an opportunity to present references with a description of the
candidate's previous professional activity. A submission deadline, defined in a
recruitment announcement, cannot be shorter than 10 days and for a recruitment
announcement for substitution of an absent member of the Civil Service corps – 5
days from the day of publication in the Public Information Bulletin of the
28
The public finance sector includes these units which are referred to in the Public Finance Act
of 27 August 2009 (JoL of 2009, no 157, item 1240 with subsequent amendments.).
286
Chancellery of the Prime Minister. The above dates are final and also called strict
time limits. The legislator, for the given activity, that is the submission of
documents, provided for a strictly defined time limit which when not observed
causes the expiry of the right29. Annexes 1 and 2 hereof contain, as a model, a
recruitment announcement for candidates for a higher position and a specialist
position in the Civil Service. Both announcements concern positions in military
administration; however, they differ as to the form.
Recruitment, which deals with finding candidates, is different from the
selection of candidates. Recruitment and selection have, however, a common goal,
which is obtaining the right people for appropriate positions. The procedure of
selection depends on the type of position. For higher positions in the Civil Service,
the statutory procedure differs from the one used for the selection of other
positions. The Minister of National Defence in § 21 of the Ordinance no 40/MON
of 12 December 2006 on the organisational rules and regulations of the Ministry of
National Defence30 decided that a unit conducting a recruitment procedure
connected with the recruitment of employees for the office, that is the Ministry of
National Defence, is the Administration Department. The types of positions
included in the competence of this Department are middle level management
positions, coordinating, independent, and specialist as well as support positions.
At the next stage of a recruitment procedure, that is selection, an
Administration Department Director of the office appoints a recruiting board,
which initially looks through all submitted offers and chooses those which fulfil the
requirements contained in the announcement. Discarded offers are collectively
destroyed. The analysis of application documents is followed by a stage of
interviews with candidates. In the case of a large number of candidates, a written
test is conducted. An interview with a candidate aims at obtaining and verifying
information concerning the candidate, from the point of view of requirements
defined for a given position. During an interview, the candidate's competence
profile is also evaluated. The tool used to verify a larger number of candidates in
the recruitment process is a knowledge test in a descriptive or a test form. It is
composed of questions from the scope of knowledge necessary for a vacant
position31.
Immediately after the end of the recruitment process, the board prepares a
report on the course of the procedure. The content of the report has been defined in
an enumerative and detailed way in Article 30 (2) the Civil Service Act, which
means that no other information than the information indicated in this regulation
may be included in the report. In accordance with the above mentioned regulation,
the report must contain:
29
Cf. E. Łętowska, Podstawy prawa cywilnego, Wydawnictwo ECOSTAR, Warsaw 1997, p. 132.
MOND OJ of 2006., no 21 item 270 with subsequent amendments.
31
Gospodarowanie zasobami osobowymi na potrzeby obronne państwa Część II Koncepcja
skutecznego gospodarowania zasobami osobowymi na potrzeby obronne państwa „ZASOB-II”, ed.
R. Szynowski, Wydawnictwo AON, Warsaw 2009, p. 185.
30
287
RYSZARD SZYNOWSKI
− name of the position for which the recruitment was conducted, the number of
candidates, names and addresses of not more than the five best candidates
presented in the order of the level of fulfilment of the requirements defined in the
recruitment announcement;
− number of submitted offers, including the number of offers which do not
fulfil formal requirements;
− information on recruitment methods and techniques;
− justification of the choice made;
− composition of the recruiting board.
By presenting in the report no more than the five best candidates, placed in
order in accordance with their level of fulfilment of the requirements, means that
the candidate for the Civil Service corps is chosen from among people listed in the
report. If, within 3 months of the date of concluding an employment agreement
with the person selected in the recruitment process, the same position needs filling
again, the General Director of the MOND Office may employ in this position the
next person from among the best candidates listed in the recruitment report. This
competence is not defined as a Director's obligation, but as his right. Alternatively,
the Director may announce a new recruitment process. A member of the recruiting
board, in accordance with the law (Article 32 of the Civil Service Act), is obliged to
keep secret information about candidates, obtained during recruitment, whereas
this does not concern data constituting public information, that is names and
surnames of candidates who fulfilled the formal requirements as well as the names
and surname of a chosen candidate together with the place of his residence.
As was demonstrated above, the information on the result of recruitment to the
Civil Service takes the character of public information and, due to this fact, the
Director General of the MOND Office makes the information public by placing it
in a public place in the office headquarters, in the office Bulletin and in the Public
Information Bulletin of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister immediately after
the recruitment procedure. Placed among the information made public should be the name and address of the office; the name of the position, as well as the name of
the chosen candidate and his place of residence in the understanding of the
regulations of the Polish Civil Code (PCC). In accordance with Article 25 PCC, the
place of residence of an individual is the town where the person lives with an
intention of permanent residence. The understood place of residence is composed
of two physical elements: staying in a place and an intention of permanent
residence. Both elements must appear simultaneously. The announcement of the
Chancellery of the Prime Minister should also include: the number of the
recruitment announcement, the date of the announcement in the Bulletin and the
date of the interview.
An individual dismissed from professional military service, in a position in the
Ministry of National Defence or in local government administration bodies
subordinate to the Minister of National Defence, as a result of the termination of a
288
service relationship of a professional soldier, benefits from privileges in
employment in the Civil Service in this organisational unit at the position created
in the place of the liquidated service position or an equivalent one. These
individuals are employed without recourse to an open and competitive recruitment
process. This is because they have already performed work at the same or
equivalent position; however, not within the framework of an employment
relationship, but a service relationship. Moreover, if superiors had doubts
concerning the competence of a former professional soldier, they would not use the
opportunity to employ this individual at a given position, but instead conduct a
recruitment procedure.
The basis of employment in the Civil Service of a former professional soldier,
despite the fact that it is this soldier's first employment in the Civil Service, is the
employment contract for an indefinite period of time or for a definite period of time
not longer than 3 years. The choice of the type of an agreement depends on a
person managing the organisational unit, where the former professional soldier is to
be employed. The superior should take into consideration the appraisal of the
service record of an individual in the liquidated service position, his or her
professional experience, as well as qualifications and predispositions. An
employment agreement should be concluded on the day following the date of
expiry of the notice period of the service relationship.
The establishment of the employment relationship of a Civil Service employee
takes the form of an employment agreement which may be concluded for an
indefinite or definite period of time. Higher positions in the Civil Service are filled
by way of a competition or transfer, on condition that statutory requirements are
fulfilled, that is meeting the requirements connected with a given position,
obtaining a positive periodic grade for the last 24 months before transfer at one of
the two highest levels in the marking scale. Additionally, the Act allows for a form
of transfer whereas the law forbids employing an individual to perform another
person's duties.
The selection of a candidate is done by a team appointed, depending on the
type of position, from among the group of higher positions in the Civil Service.
The team appointed by the Head of the Civil Service is composed of 5 members if
the selection concerns the position of a Director General of the Office of the
Minister of National Defence; and is appointed by the Director General of the
Ministry of National Defence and consists of 3 members if the choice concerns a
manager of department or an equivalent unit. The team members are required to
belong to the Civil Service corps and have the knowledge and experience which
guarantees the choice of the best candidate from among people applying for the
position. The team may decide to use the evaluation of the managerial knowledge
and competence of a candidate carried out by a person not being a member of the
team, but having the qualifications to make a reliable and objective assessment.
The team also evaluates the candidate's professional experience and knowledge
289
RYSZARD SZYNOWSKI
necessary for the position. The Head of the Civil Service is entitled to observe the
selection procedure via a representative. If, during the selection process, the Head
of the Civil Service finds irregularities in the procedure, s/he may alternatively
order elimination of these irregularities or organisation of a new selection. As a
result of the team's work, the two best candidates are chosen who are presented to
the Minister of National Defence or respectively the Director General of the
Ministry of National Defence. In this case, the requirement to prepare a report from
the selection procedure also applies. If, within 3 months of the day of filling such a
higher position, circumstances justify filling the position again, it may be filled by
a person who participated in the previous competition. The Prime Ministry's Civil
Service Board is a consultative and advisory body equipped with the competence to
observe the selection process of candidates for higher positions in the Civil
Service. If as a result of the observing activities, the representative of the above
mentioned Board found irregularities, such a procedure conducted in the Ministry
of National defence could be repeated.
Information on final recruitment results is immediately made public. It is
placed in the office, that is the Ministry of National Defence, in such a place so as
to be commonly available, as well as in the Public Information Bulletin of the
Ministry of National Defence and in the Public Information Bulletin of the of the
Chancellery of the Prime Minister. Data contained in such information includes:
the office name, position name, announcement number, date of publication in the
Public Information Bulletin of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, date of the
interview, as well as the name and surname of a chosen candidate and the town/city
of his/her residence.
When evaluating the deliberations on the circumstances of recruitment to the
Civil Service, it may be stated that legal acts in force regulate it sufficiently.
Military administration, which is a part of government administration, indicated by
the legislator as an entity where the Civil Service is created, is obliged to ensure
political impartiality and the professionally reliable performance of state tasks by
the Civil Service corps employed therein. However, there are issues which need to
be clarified. In the legislative field the challenge, in author's opinion, is to
supplement the existing legal order with new legal solutions. There are no legal
regulations which control the recruiting boards' work in the Civil Service which
conducts recruitment for positions other than the higher ones in the Civil Service.
The boards' activity constitutes an internal procedure for any employer; however,
uniform rules for the evaluation of the boards' work could contribute to avoiding
accusations being made against the boards concerning the use of subjective
evaluation of candidates and the creation of conditions for discrimination in
employment. Appeal procedures against the boards' decisions should be also
legally regulated, just like the justification of their choice.
Nowadays, openness, competitiveness and universality in employment in the
Civil Service come down to the placing of a recruitment announcement.
290
Professionalisation of this service, assumed in the Civil Service Act, should be
connected with the precise determination of professional promotion paths which
would include the ways and forms for improving employees' qualifications
allowing them to be considered for promotion connected with the transparency of a
professional career. The possibility of a transparent professional career, from the
beginning of employment in the state administration, concerning not only a civil
servant, but also an employee of the Civil Service, would contribute to the
significant elimination of the discretionary character of promotion. Such legal
regulations would have a beneficial influence on human relations in an office
which contributes to the quality of performed work.
Among proposals to supplement the existing legal solutions, it is worth paying
attention to solutions enabling individuals already employed in a given office to
move to another, vacant position in this office without the need to announce
recruitment for this position Such natural fluctuation would consequently lead to
the announcement of recruitment for positions which would not be filled as a result
of internal recruitment. Obviously, it would be necessary to observe compatibility
with the required qualifications included in the position description. Appropriate
regulations should be introduced to the Civil Service Act.
Bibliography
Gospodarowanie zasobami osobowymi na potrzeby obronne państwa Część II Koncepcja
skutecznego gospodarowania zasobami osobowymi na potrzeby obronne państwa
„ZASOB-II”, ed. R. Szynowski, Wydawnictwo AON, Warsaw 2009.
Łętowska E., Podstawy prawa cywilnego, Wydawnictwo ECOSTAR, Warsaw 1997.
Noworyta R., Wyznaczanie żołnierzy zawodowych na stanowiska służbowe i zwalnianie
z tych stanowisk, a kwestia odpowiedzialności karnej za niewykonanie rozkazu
personalnego. http://www.npw.internetdsl.pl/Dokumenty/2012-3-8.pdf /19.02.2013/.
Mały słownik języka polskiego, ed. S. Skorupka, H. Anderska, Z. Łempicka, PWN, Warsaw
1968.
Płaczek J., Zasoby obronne – zarys teorii, Zeszyty Naukowe AON, Warsaw 2006, Issue 1 (61).
Stoner J., Wankel Ch., Kierowanie, Wydawnictwo PWE, Warsaw 1994.
Słownik języka polskiego, ed. M. Szymczak, T. 1, Wydawnictwo PWN, Warsaw 1992.
The Professional Soldiers' Military Service Act of 11 September 2003 (JoL of 2003,
no 179, item 1750 with subsequent amendments.
The Act of 14 June 1960 - Administrative Procedure Code (JoL of 2000, no 98, item 1071,
with subsequent amendments).
The Act of 25 July 2002 – Law on the system of administartive courts (JoL of 2002, no 153,
item 1269).
The Act on General Defence Obligation of the Republic of Poland of 21 November 1967j
(JoL of 1967, no 44 item 220 with subsequent amendments).
The Civil Service Act of 21November 2008 (JoL of 2008, no 227 item 1505).
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Wybrane zagadnienia ustroju Polski. Siły Zbrojne w Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, ed.
M. Mikołajczyk-Bezak, Wydawnictwo Departament Społeczno-Wychowawczy MON,
Warsaw 2000.
Ziewiński J., Rozkaz wojskowy w prawie karnym, Wydawnictwo MON, Warsaw 1986.
292
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