Michal Kokowski, Referaty

Doc. dr hab. Michał Kokowski
Spis referatów
(A) REFERATY WYGŁASZANE NA MIĘDZYNARODOWYCH
KONFERENCJACH NAUKOWYCH:
(1) [1993a]: “On Natanson’s Attempts To Create A Thermodynamics Of Irreversible Processes”.
XIXth International Congress of History of Science, (Zaragoza (Spain) 22-29 VIII
1993).
(2) [1993b]: “On Copernicus's Correspondence Thinking. A Preliminary Study”, XIXth
International Congress of History of Science, (22-29.08.1993, Zaragoza (Spain)).
(3) [1995]: “Copernicus’ Astronomical Works - The Remarkable Case of Applying The
Correspondence Relations. In Defence of Copernicus’s Scientific Methodology”,
10th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science (1925.08.1995, Firenze (Italy)).
(4) [1996]: “To Avoid Triviality: Some Difficulties In Teaching the History and Philosophy of
Physics at the Educational Curriculum of Physics”, International Conference on
History and Philosophy of Physics in Education (21-24.08.1996, Bratislava
(Slovakia)).
(5) [1997]: “Defending Copernicus’s Scientific Method”, XXth International Congress of
History of Sciences (20-26.07.1997, Liége (Belgium)).
(6) [1998]: “How, in what sense, and why did Copernicus discover the motions of the earth?”,
International Congress on Discovery and Creativity (14-16.05. 1998, Gent,
(Belgium)).
(7) [1999]: “In Defence of the Method of Physics: The Hypothetico-Deductive Method of
Korrespondenzdenken”, 11th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and
Philosophy of Science (20-26.08.1999, Cracow (Poland)).
(8) [2002]: „Blaski i (pół)cienie Galileusza Annibale Fantollego”. Konferencja naukowa
pt. „Sprawa Galileusza – czy Kościół się pomylił?” (Kraków: Aula PAU, 14 XI
2002).
(9) [2004a]: „Nowe fundamentalne aspekty myśli Kopernika”. Sesja naukowa pt. Astronomowie,
duchowni, kolekcjonerzy, selenonauci. Kto i dlaczego czytał Kopernika? (Toruń,
Planetarium, 11. 09. 2004).
Doc. dr hab.Michał Kokowski, Spis Referatów
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(A) REFERATY WYGŁASZANE NA MIĘDZYNARODOWYCH
KONFERENCJACH NAUKOWYCH (kontynuacja):
(10) [2004b]: Nicolaus Copernicus and the interdisciplinary problem of the integration...”,
Science in Europe - Europe in Science: 1500-2000; Maastricht, 4-6 November,
2004 (Organized by Gewina: Genootschap voor de Geschiedenis van de
Geneeskunde, Wiskunde, Natuurwetenschappen en Techniek and the ESHS).
(11) [2004c]: “A Sketch of the suggested 2nd Conference of the ESHS (Cracow, September,
2006)”; referat programowy wygłoszony na General Assembly of the ESHS
(Maastricht, 6 November, 2004).
(12) [2006a]: “Nicholas Copernicus in focus of interdisciplinary research”. Referat wygłoszony
na Sympozjum “Nicholas Copernicus in Focus” na 2nd International Conference
of the European Society for the History of Science (Cracow, 6-9 September, 2006),
(13) [2006b]: “A meta-history of science and methodology of the history of science urgently
needed!”. Referat wygłoszony na Sympozjum “How to Understand and Write the
History of Science? or Methodology of the History of Science” na 2nd
International Conference of the European Society for the History of Science
(Cracow, 6-9 September, 2006).
(B) REFERATY WYGŁASZANE NA POLSKICH KONFERENCJACH
(SESJACH, SEMINARIACH, ZJAZDACH) NAUKOWYCH:
(1) [1995a]: „Uwagi nt. poglądów Kopernika, Ptolemeusza, Tycho Brahego, Keplera i
metodologii nauk zwanych ścisłymi” (głos w dyskusji). Sympozjum Popperowskie:
Racjonalność - Falsyfikowalność - Kosmologia (11-12.05.1995 Kraków).
(2) [1995b]: „Co to jest historia nauki, a szczególnie historia tzw. nauk ścisłych? Uwagi na
marginesie wykładu Prof. Giejsztora ‘Co jest historia?’ i dzieła Prof. Crombiego
The Styles of Scientific Thinking in the European Tradition (1994, London) vol. 13, s. 2456.” Referat wygłoszony na seminarium Zakładu Badań Kopernikańskich
(Warszawa: Instytut Historii Nauki Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 21. 06. 1995).
(3) [1995c]: „Przeciwko mitycznym interpretacjom tzw. nauk ścisłych: Kopernik, hipotetycznodedukcyjna metoda myślenia korespondencyjnego i kilka zasad korespondencji
łączących teorie Kopernika i Ptolemeuesza”. VI Zjazd Filozoficzny. Abstrakty.
(Toruń, 5-9 września 1995), s. 106-107.
(4) [1995d]: „Broniąc historii nauki: w poszukiwaniu historycznie realistycznej koncepcji
‘zasady granicznej’. Uwagi na marginesie wykładu Wiesława Wójcika pt. Nowe
trendy w matematyce XIX stulecia”. Referat wygłoszony na seminarium pt.
Kontekst odkrycia w historii dziedziny nauki (Warszawa: Instytut Historii Nauki
Polskiej Akademii Nauk, grudzień 1995).
Doc. dr hab.Michał Kokowski, Spis Referatów
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(B) REFERATY WYGŁASZANE NA POLSKICH KONFERENCJACH
(SESJACH, SEMINARIACH, ZJAZDACH) NAUKOWYCH (kontynuacja):
(5) [1997]: „Etyka nauki i historii nauki. Wstęp”. Referat wygłoszony na seminarium pt.
Kontekst odkrycia w historii dziedziny nauki (Warszawa: Instytut Historii Nauki
Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 23.05.1997).
(6) [1999]: „Między historią a nauką. Wstęp krytyczny do metodologii historii nauki”. Referat
wygłoszony na seminarium Komisji Historii Nauki Polskiej Akademii Umiejętności
(Kraków: Polska Akademia Umiejętności, 14.04.1999).
(7) [2000a]: „Chybiona krytyka indukcjonizmu, hipotetyzmu i antykumulatywizmu. Uwagi do
referatu dr Zenon E. Roskala ‘Kontekst odkrycia i uzasadnienia epicyklicznodeferencjalnego modelu ruchu Księżyca’ ”. Referat wygłoszony na seminarium pt.
Kontekst odkrycia w historii dziedziny nauki. (Warszawa: Instytut Historii Nauki
Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 18.02.2000).
(8) [2000b]: „Specyfika i problemy recepcji myśli Kopernika w Polsce”. Referat wygłoszony
na konferencji Recepcja w Polsce Nowych kierunków i teorii naukowych
(Kraków: Komisja Historii Nauki Polskiej Akademii Umiejętności, 2-3. 06. 2000).
(9) [2000c]: Referat w debacie pt. „Czy Ziemia się porusza?”, wygłoszony podczas sesji
naukowej z okazji stulecia opublikowania przez Akademię Umiejętności dzieła
Ludwika Antoniego Birkenmajera pt. Mikołaj Kopernik (Kraków: Aula Polskiej
Akademii Umiejętności, 14 X 2000 r.).
(10) [2000d]: „Skąd przybywasz, dokąd zmierzasz historio nauki w Polsce”. Referat wygłoszony
podczas uroczystego otwarcia nowego lokalu Instytutu Historii Nauki w Krakowie
i zarazem wznowienia działalności seminaryjnej w tej placówce (Kraków: IHN
PAN, 14 X 2000).
(11) [2000e]: „Zasada korespondencji typu Bohra a teoria Kopernika”. Referat wygłoszony na
seminarium pt. “Fizyka: Współczesność – Historia – Filozofia” (Kraków: Instytut
Historii Nauki Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 12.12.2000).
(12) [2001a]: „Żart Sokala”. Referat wygłoszony na seminarium pt. “Fizyka: Współczesność –
Historia – Filozofia” (Kraków: Instytut Historii Nauki Polskiej Akademii Nauk,
26.02.2001).
(13) [2001b]: „Mikołaj Kopernik – znany czy nie znany?” Referat wygłoszony na posiedzeniu
Komisji Historii Nauki Polskiej Akademii Umiejętności (Kraków: Polska
Akademia Umiejętności, 21. XI.2001 r.).;
(14) [2004]: „Narodziny myśli naukoznawczej T.S. Kuhna i jej aktualność. Między fizyką, teorią
i praktyką edukacji, historią i filozofią nauki a historią idei” (Kraków: Klub
Historii Idei UJ, 1.04.2004).
Doc. dr hab.Michał Kokowski, Spis Referatów
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(C) REFERATY / WYKŁADY:
(1) {1988]: „Wstęp do fizyki” – wykład wygłoszony w serii wykładów popularnonaukowych pt.
“Idee fizyki” (Sala wykładowa Zakładu Fizyki Ciała Stałego, AGH 16.03.1988).
(2) [2004]: “Nicolaus Copernicus” – wykład wygłoszony w języku angielskim w kursie
wykładów Dr Paul Wallace’a “Astronomy 120” dla studentów z Berry College w
Rome, Georgia, USA (Kraków: Instytut Historii Nauki PAN, 7.06.2004).
(3) [2005]: “Nicolaus Copernicus” – wykład w języku angielskim pt. dla grupy studentek
amerykańskich, słuchaczek kursu wykładów Dr Chrisa De Pree (Department of
Physics & Astronomy, Agnes Scott College, Georgia, USA) – Kraków: Instytut
Historii Nauki PAN, 18.05.2005.
(D) REFERATY / WYKŁADY / POPULARYZACJA:
(1) [1988]: „Wstęp do fizyki” [wykład wygłoszony w serii wykładów popularnonaukowych pt.
„Idee fizyki” (Sala wykładowa Zakładu Fizyki Ciała Stałego, AGH 16.03.1988)].
STRESZCZENIA REFERATÓW WYGŁOSZONYCH NA
KONFERENCJACH MIĘDZYNARODOWYCH:
Michal Kokowski
COPERNICUS' ASTRONOMICAL WORKS - THE REMARKABLE CASE OF APPLYING
THE CORRESPONDENCE RELATIONS. IN THE DEFENCE OF COPERNICUS'
SCIENTIFIC METHODOLOGY.
10th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of
Science (19-25.08.1995, Firenze (Italy)), Section 6: Methodology
Many eminent twentieth century historians and philosophers of the so-called exact sciences, for instance,
Duhem, Sarton, Butterfield, Dreyer, Koyre, Kuhn, Solla de Price, Neugebauer, and Swerdlow, appreciated
Copernicus's astronomical achievements and his scientific method very critically. Therefore it seemed sound
the conclusion explicated by Cohen in 1989: "If there was revolution in astronomy, that revolution was
Keplerian and Newtonian, and not in any simple or valid sense Copernican."
Appreciated methodology, history of the so-called exact sciences, epistemology, philosophy of
scientific discovery, theoretical physics, and mathematics very much, I see the considered issue in a
completely different way.
In the first place, I hold that the creative theorists, like for instance: Bohr, Einstein, Heinsenberg,
Schrodinger, who search and sometimes find the new theories of certain phenomena that preserve, in a
certain region of the modeled phenomena, the numerically adequate already predictions of the old theory,
use the same scientific method. I called it the hypothetico-deductive method of correspondence thinking
(HDMCT). Its parts there are the hypothetico-deductive method (HDM) and the method of correspondence
thinking (MCT). The core of the HDM there are the different kinds of scientific hypotheses and of
deductions. The core of the MCT there is the methodological idea of correspondence (of theoretical
magnitude and measurable one; of laws; of theories). Its parts there are the correspondence postulate (of
laws; of theories) and its a concrete realization certain correspondence relation (of laws; of theories), among
others, the real correspondence principle, and the imaginary correspondence principle. The important part in
the HDMCT is played also by the limit correspondence equivalence (of laws; of theories). Furthermore
HDMCT is the general method of the progress of the so-called exact sciences.
In the context of the HDMCT is defined the simple condition of scientific revolution. If certain
correspondence relation of theories is realised, the scientific revolution occurs. This revolution, according to
the importance of these theories, is global (the macro-revolution) or local (the micro-revolution).
Going to Copernicus issue we found on the ground of our own methodological, historical and
mathematical analyses, that Copernicus, searching for the more general theory than Ptolemy's one, used not
only HDM but also MCT in a systematic way. Hence he used HDMCT. Moreover, he do it in the same style
as, for instance, Newton, Einstein, Bohr, Heinsenberg. Why do I think ? Since it appears that Copernicus'
theory is linked with Ptolemy's one by some correspondence relations. They are the methodological heart of
Copernicus' theory. Copernicus used this method considering, for example, the place of the earth in the
Universe, the height of the firmament (that is the radius of the Universe) the planetary theory in the longitude
and, especially, the theory of the long-period motions. In this last case, analysing, for instance, the change of
the ecliptic longitude of the fixed stars (and the dependent functions) and the change of the angle created by
the earth's equator and the ecliptic (and the dependent functions) he used the real correspondence principle;
the main correspondence parameter there are t/TNUP and t/2TNUP respectively ( t - time, TNUP - the
fundamental constant equal to 1717ey (Egyptian years of 365 days)).
That is why we find the clear proof that Copernican revolution was the genuine scientific revolution. But
it was not the first scientific revolution and Copernicus was not the first scientist who used HDMCT at all.
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Michal Kokowski
TO AVOID TRIVIALITY: SOME DIFFICULTIES IN TEACHING THE HISTORY AND
PHILOSOPHY OF PHYSICS AT THE EDUCATIONAL CURRICULUM OF PHYSICS.
7th Biennial Conference "History and Philosophy of Physics in Education (August 21-24, 1996,
Bratislava (Slovakia)
Though there exists a really great need to incorporate the history and philosophy of physics at all
levels of an education of physics, nevertheless, it is not a easy task to teach them at all.
Firstly, note, that the term "physics" has different connotations during the History.
According to Aristotle, physics (theory of change, among others, of local motion) is, in principle,
deeply unmathematical. Contrary, the so called mixture sciences, that is the mathematico-physical
sciences as astronomy, optics and music (acoustics), are deeply mathematical.
Such mathematical level, statics (and hydrostatics) obtained thanks to Archimedes, and kinematics,
theory (of local) motion, thanks to Galileo. But today, optics, acoustics, theory motion and, for
instance, astrophysics and cosmology belong to the same discipline which is called physics.
Moreover, today, cosmology is an exact analog of astronomy developing since ancient Greece to
modern times. Both these disciplines discuss about the global structure of the Universe.
Secondly, though, it is truth, that physics step by step develop more exact, more general
theories, nevertheless, it does not mean at all, that modern methodological tools and methodological
conscience itself must be deeper than historical ones. It is common truth that the hypotheticodeductive method (HDM) and the correspondence principles (CP) are products of modern times.
But it is an historico-philosophical mistake.
The HDM was consciously used yet by Hellenic and Hellenistic mathematicians
(astronomers, opticians, theorists of music, mechanists). And the CP played very important part in
the Medieval and Renaissance astronomy. A great example is given by Copernicus' works
[Commentariolus (ca. 1508) and De revolutionibus (1543)]: some correspondence principles (of
sort of Bohr's ones) links Copernicus's and Ptolemy's astronomical theories.
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Michal Kokowski
DEFENDING COPERNICUS SCIENTIFIC METHOD
XXth International Congress of History of Sciences (20-26.07.1997, Liége (Belgium),
Section 7.2: Physics and Astronomy in the Classical Period (1543-1800)
The Copernicus scientific method was many times depreciated in the 20th century within the
context of different trends of the history of science (from the history of the so-called
mathematical astronomy, by the philosophico-sociologico-psychological history of science, to
the recent studies on rhetoric in science).
But, from a scientific point of view, it appears that this method was a rather well, since the
exactly same was used, for instance, by Bohr, Einstein, Planck and Schrödinger in their searches
for regularities of certain groups of considered phenomena.
This method, called, the hypothetico-deductive method of correspondence thinking (hereafter,
HDMCT), is composed of two strictly connected parts: the hypothetico-deductive method and the
method of correspondence thinking (Korrespondenzdenken). Its essence lies in framing
mathematical models of observed phenomena that “save” these phenomena. This aim is realised
by: (1) an introduction an adequate mathematical language and adequate hypothetical quasientities; (2) an generalisation theories hitherto existing by usage: (a) an correspondence postulate
and a correspondence principle (of Bohr’s type) of new and old theories; (b) a squaring of a theory
with phenomena by usage appropriate constants of models determined with measurements.
Moreover, within the context of this method is defined a simple condition of scientific revolution:
if a certain correspondence principle of theories is realised, the scientific revolution occurs.
Copernicus used the HDMCT systematically in his search for a more general astronomical
theory than Ptolemy. He made it for instance in the following cases: (1) analysing the issue of the
dimension of the Universe, and the related question of the horizon; (2) reversing Ptolemy’s critical
argumentation against the possibility of the earth’s daily rotation that used the idea of natural and
violent motions and the centrifugal force; (3) considering the question of the optical relativity of
the local motion; (4) framing the theory of the short and medium- period phenomena as, for
instance, the apparent planetary motions, especially, (as this Copernicus says) rejecting the
Ptolemy’s equant; (5) framing the theory of the long-period non-uniform phenomena as, for
instance, precession.
Considering these questions, Copernicus used systematically, among others, the
correspondence postulate and the correspondence principle (of sort of Bohr’s ones), and made
thought experiments. For such reasons, Copernicus scientific method must be highly
appreciated: especially, Copernicus’s “neoplatonism”, “poetics” and “rhetoric” are much more
scientific than it one seemed. Moreover, since Copernicus’s and Ptolemy’s theories are linked by
some correspondence principle of Bohr’s type, contrary to famous historians of the so-called
mathematical astronomy, we must state that the Copernican revolution was not only a global,
conceptual, cosmological, philosophical revolution, but also a scientific one. On the other hand,
Copernicus was not a father of the HDMCT, and the Copernican revolution was not the last or
the first global, conceptual, cosmological, philosophical and scientific revolution. Before
Copernicus, the HDMCT was used by mathematicians since at least the global Greek revolution
(that discovered the idea of cosmos) with its sub-revolutions as: Eudoxian (4th C.B.C.),
Euclidean and Archimedean (3rd C. B.C.), Ptolemean (2nd C.), Thabitean (9th C.), Alpetragian
(12th C.), Maraghian (13-14th C.) etc.
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Michal Kokowski
HOW, IN WHAT SENSE, AND WHY DID COPERNICUS
DISCOVER THE MOTIONS OF THE EARTH?
International Congress on Discovery and Creativity (14-16.05. 1998, Gent, (Belgium)
Part.1. How?
It is, to some extent, a complicated question. To answer it properly let us differentiate five stages
of the scientific development of Copernicus.
First stage: Copernicus studies at: University of Cracow (1491-1495), University of
Bologna (1496-1500), and University of Padua (1500-1503); during his stay in Bologna, he
assists Domenico Maria di Novara. Thanks to these opportunities, he knows very well the
contemporary problem-situation in astronomy (the troubles with saving phenomena by the
Ptolemy’s model of the motions of the Moon; the question of rejecting the equant by usage the
so-called „Tusi-device”; the question of: calendar reform or motions of the eighth sphere or
model of the long-period phenomena) and philosophy of nature (Averroes's critique of Ptolemy's
theory: the question of equant, and the question of existence of the epicycles in the Heavens; the
Buridanistic critique of Aristotle's physics; the Pythagorean idea of the motions of the Earth
together with the Buridanistic detailed discussion of the question of possibility of the Earth's
motions).
Second stage: He accepts some important elements of the Buridanistic critique of
Aristotle's physics including Buridanists’ new physics, and similarly as Nicholas of Cusa, he
interprets this new physics in a geometric way. Moreover, at the core of his research programme,
he assumes the hypothesis of the mobility of the Earth and discusses motions of the Earth as
„real” (in a scientific meaning of the term).
Third stage: He writes the very important page of notes in the Alphonsine Tables, and,
(circa 1510), the Commentariolus - the first sketch of his theory based on the cosmology of
mobile Earth. Considering here the questions of motions of the planets, of the sphere of fixed
stars, and of the Moon, he focuses his attention on the question of geometricizing the shortperiod phenomena (and on the question of spatial relations), and only sketches the idea of
proper solution for the long-period phenomena. Moreover, for short-period phenomena, he
accepts, in principle, data given in the Alphonsine Tables. Thus, his models of short-period
phenomena should save phenomena only for short interval of time when observations used in the
Alphonsine Tables were made. However, he is not interested in getting of the exact values of
parameters of his models. Just therefore, he approximates them. As a consequence, his models of
short-period phenomena save approximately phenomena for data given in the Alphonsine Tables.
Moreover, considering the question of the long-period phenomena, he assumes (together with
Renaissance astronomers) that there exist very long-period changes of astronomical phenomena.
So his models must be based on all known fundamental observations made from ancient to
contemporary times inclusive.
Fourth stage - the years of observation: 1512-1529. He observes carefully lunar eclipses,
altitudes in the meridian, oppositions, alignments, conjunctions, and occultations to find
parameters of models in his own times.
Fifth stage - the years of writing the De revolutionibus: 1530-1543. He develops
geometrical models to save short- and long-period phenomena and, in some degree, to fix spatial
relations of the "new" Universe. The results of these searches are given in the De revolutionibus.
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Part.2. In what sense?
The answer is easy: Copernicus discovered the motions of the Earth in the same sophisticated
way as, for instance, Albert Einstein discovered that the curvature of the space-time depends of
the matter distribution.
Part.3. Why?
The answer is clear: Copernicus used the hypothetico-deductive method of Korrespondenzdenken
(correspondence-oriented thinking), and made it in the same methodological style as the greatest
theoretical physicists, for instance Einstein.
To clarify this answer let us add what follows. The method mentioned above is a
combination of the hypothetico-deductive method (with modified, broad understanding of the
term „deduction” that, for some methodological reasons, links the terms „induction”,
„abduction”, „analogy”, and classically and narrowly understood the term „deduction”) and the
method of Korrespondenzdenken that uses the conceptions of the correspondence postulate and
the correspondence principle. This combination enables both effective mathematicizing the
regularities of phenomena (that are observed and measured in certain ways) and also explaining
them.
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Michal Kokowski
IN DEFENCE OF THE METHOD OF PHYSICS:
THE HYPOTHETICO-DEDUCTIVE METHOD OF KORRESPONDENZDENKEN
11th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy
of Science (20-26.08.1999, Cracow (Poland)), 10. Philosophy of Physical Sciences
Under the influence of T.S. Kuhn (1962) and P.K. Feyerabend (1975)1 a number of contemporary
thinkers - as they say - in advocating the interests of history of science, have became adherents
of the trends of thought named: Strong Programme of Sociology of Knowledge, Destructivism,
Rhetoric of Science, and Science in Context. All these currents assert unanimously that there is
nothing such as a scientific method and a solid scientific truth.
The scientific method and all scientific truths are historically changed and determined not
by the Nature but by social and cultural contexts: group interests, agreements and commitments.
Thus scientific activity itself and its outcomes have only a conventional character.
But careful research in the field of the so-called exact sciences [i.e. all disciplines that
create mathematical models of (observed and measured in a certain way) phenomena] which is
focused on the issue of the scientific practise and scientific discoveries, both historical and
contemporary ones’, falsifies the views mentioned above. Thus, agreeing with an opinion of
physicists such as S.Weinberg, A.Sokal, J.Bricmon, and P.Anderson2, I say there does exist the
scientific method.
Furthermore, my own philosophical thesis is that the Hypothetico-Deductive Method of
KorrespondenzDenken (correspondence-oriented thinking) - HDMKD is the method of the socalled exact sciences.3 This method is composed of two penetrating parts: the HypotheticoDeductive Method - HDM and the Method of KorrespondenzDenken - MKD.
The former is a general introduction to the scientific method. It considers, among other
things, the issue of a scientific hypothesis and a scientific realism, the question of scientific
reasoning and argumentation like the idea of deduction (as it is understood commonly),
induction and abduction, (after Kant and Planck) the idea of the absolute truth and the Nature as
regulative ideas showing the aim of researches, the idea of pictures of the Nature - unfinal
theories of phenomena, the idea of reductionism, correspondence and emergency, the issue of
theoretical change, the principle o undetermination by data, the issue of theory-ladenness of
facts, and the question of a scientific revolution.
The later specifies the scientific method of the so-called exact sciences. It concentrates on
more quantitative aspects and ponders, among other things, over the issue of a correspondence
principle and a correspondence postulate of Bohr’s type, and the question of measurement
instruments.
On this ground I say for instance. HDMKD determines the progress of physics
(understood in a broad sense as the synonym of the so-called exact sciences).
Within the context of this method, the simple condition of a scientific revolution is
defined. If a certain correspondence relation of theories is realised, a scientific revolution occurs.
This revolution, according to the importance of these theories, is global (a macro-revolution) or
local (a micro-revolution).
There are three complementary approaches in developing physics: reductionism,
correspondence and emergency. Scientists who are dreaming on a final theory - on a theory of
the Nature always frame limited, non-perfect and non-final theories - only non-perfect, mean
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pictures of Nature. But, along with the progress of physics, step by step, these theories become
deeper, more unified, and by that they better seize the Nature itself.
While using this method as a hermeneutics of a scientific text of broadly understood
physics we may precisely show, for instance, how N. Copernicus discovered the motions of the
Earth4, how S. Weinberg unified weak and electromagnetic forces, and even how theoretical
biologists framed mathematical models of biological phenomena5.
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1
T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962); P.K.Feyerabend, Against Method (1975).
S.Weiberg, Dreams of a Final Theory (1992); A. Sokal, J. Bricmon, Impostures intelectuelles (1997);
P.Anderson, ‘Historical overview of the twentieth century physics’, in: L. M. Brown, A. Pais, B. Pippard
(eds.) Twentieth century physics, (1995), vol. III p.2017 - 2032.
3
M.Kokowski, ‘Copernicus and the hypothetico-deductive method of correspondence thinking. An
introduction’, Theoria et Historia Scientiarum 5, (1996), pp.7-101.
4
See paper mentioned in fn. 3 and others my papers: ‘Copernicus' astronomical works - A remarkable
case of the applying the methodological idea of correspondence’. 10th International Congress of Logic,
Methodology and Philosophy of Science (19-25.08.1995, Florence, Italy), ‘Defending Copernicus'
Scientific Method’, XXth International Congress of History of Sciences, June 20-26, 1997, Liége
(Belgium). ‘How, in what sense, and why did Copernicus discover the motions of the Earth?’,
International Congress on Discovery and Creativity (Gent, Belgium, May 14-16 1998).
5
M.Kokowski: ‘Whether Darwinism is a Metaphysical Research Programme or Scientific Theory?’ (in
Polish), in: Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce, 1998, XXII, p.105-113.
2
Doc. dr hab.Michał Kokowski, Streszczenie Referatów ...
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Michal Kokowski
NICOLAUS COPERNICUS AND THE INTERDISCIPLINARY PROBLEM
OF INTEGRATION…
Science in Europe–Europe in Science: 1500–2000 (Maastricht, 4-6 November 2004)
NICOLAUS COPERNICUS (1473–1543), a Renaissance man, with no exaggeration may be
regarded as a leading figure in European integration understood in all possible contexts and
aspects (scientific, philosophical, political, economical, sociological, linguistic…).
He was born and lived nearly all his life in Royal Prussia, including Varmia (in those times
the remote parts of the Polish Kingdom). But, from 1490 to 1494, he studied philosophy (liberal
arts, natural philosophy, ethics, and metaphysics) in Cracow University (in those times Cracow
was the capital of the Polish Kingdom). Then, he continued his studies in Italy: from 1496 to
1499, he learned canonical law in Bologna University. In 1500 (the jubilee year proclaimed by
the pope), he was in Rome (serving his apprenticeship in canon law at the Roman Curia). From
1501 to 1503 he studied medicine in Padua University, and on 31 May 1503 he received his doctor
degree in law in Ferrara University. Then, after his arrival to Prussia, as a canon of the Varmia
Chapter, he performed various duties: he was a physician, secretary of a bishop, administrator,
economist, commander of the defense of Olsztyn in the war 1520-1521 against the Tautonic
Order... . Meanwhile, he wrote some astronomical works that rendered famous his name.
The questions sketched above are very well known, and it is easy to comprehend them
properly. In contrast, an appreciation of Copernicus’s originality—a crucial problem in
contemporary Copernican studies—is more complicated and subtile. Nevertheless, the issue
needn’t be reserved only to experts.
Two main motifs exist in this research. First are general considerations regarding the
rationality or irrationality of Copernicus’s discovery of the motion of the Earth. Second are
detailed analyses of mathematical models of astronomical phenomena provided by Copernicus in
the Commentariolus and De revolutionibus, and their comparison with analogous models invented
by medieval Islamic astronomers. The first commanded the attention of philosophers and historians
of science interested in the philosophy of scientific discovery and other scholars interested in rhetoric and dialectics. The second drew the attention of historians of mathematical astronomy. These
two groups of researchers differed on many questions. Nevertheless, it was virtually dogma for both
of them, and also for many 20th-century scientists as well as the 16th- and 17th-century Aristotelians,
that Copernicus did not formulate any (conclusive) proof for the motion of the Earth. (This is a
crucial thesis, since it makes Copernicus’s originality very dubious). In my opinion, however, this
fundamental thesis is the result of a great historical, methodological and terminological
misunderstanding. The source of the error stems from (a) an oversight of important historical
currents in the history of the ancient, medieval and Renaissance philosophy, especially theories of
knowledge, and (b) an insufficient coherence between the philosophical and mathematical
considerations mentioned above. I have a similar objection to another important thesis (that
completely deprives Copernicus of originality), namely, that the Copernican revolution was not a
genuine revolution in science, but only a simple conservative repetition and revival of old ideas.
In my new book Copernicus’s Originality: Towards Integration of Contemporary Copernic-an
Studies (Warsaw–Cracow, 2004), I review the debate in the literature over Copernicus’s orginality,
and try to show some fundamental beliefs that earlier studies shared both explicitly and implicitly.
Then, my defense of his originality is presented that is based on an integral approach to
contemporary Copernican studies.
Doc. dr hab.Michał Kokowski, Streszczenie Referatów ...
9
_____________________________________________________________________________
Michal Kokowski
NICHOLAS COPERNICUS IN FOCUS OF INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH
Symposium “Nicholas Copernicus in Focus”. 2nd International Conference of the European
Society for the History of Science (Cracow, 6-9 September, 2006).
To understand well a genesis, essence and reception of Copernicus's scientific works we must
apply an interdisciplinary approach in our research of the issue. And it is a good familiarity with
the history of Copernican studies that should be chosen as the basis of such inquiries. What is
more, we should be critically open to all possible aspects of the Copernican studies. We must
analyse with very rapt attention the issues belonged to astronomy, physics, mathematics,
methodology, philosophy of science, logic, rhetoric, theology, general philosophy, arts (with
literature, painting, ...), linguistic, politics (including the question of German-Polish quarrel
about Copernicus), ... as well as the question of patronage. And we must consider all these
matters in historically changing contexts.
Such a broad strategy was applied by the author in his own Copernican studies in last twelve
years. This strategy - at least at the author conviction and of some his careful readers - appeared
to be very fruitful. Among others, it appears that the crucial thesis of the Copernican studies of
the last 30 years - which states "the Copernican revolution is a kind of myth" - is simply wrong
and caused by a lack of integration of research.
For details of the author's approach see among others:
Michal Kokowski, "Copernicus and the Hypothetico-Deductive Method of Correspondence
Thinking. An Introduction", Theoria et Historia Scientiarum 5 (1996): 7-101.
-------, Thomas S. Kuhn (1922-1996) and the Issue of the Copernican Revolution (in Polish, with
an extensive English abstract). In Studia Copernicana, vol. 39. Warszawa: Instytut
Historii Nauki Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 2001.
-------, "The Glitters and (Semi-)Shadows of Galileo by Annibale Fantoli" (review essay; in
Polish), Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce XXXII (2003), p. 26-44.
-------, Copernicus's Originality: Towards Integration of Contemporary Copernican Studies
(Warsaw-Cracow: Wydawnictwa IHN PAN, 2004), pp. xvi + 340).
-------, "The current quests of Copernicus's grave. Reflection of advocatus diaboli" Part I-II, (in
Polish), members.chello/m.kokowski/index.pl.
-------, "Review essay and errata of best-seller 'Book that nobody read' by Owen Gingerich" (in
Polish; 28 pp.; Kwartalnik Historii Nauki i Techniki, in press).
-------, The Various Faces of Nicholas Copernicus. The Meetings with the History of
Interpretations (600-page, in Polish; in progress).
Doc. dr hab.Michał Kokowski, Streszczenie Referatów ...
10
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Michal Kokowski
A META-HISTORY OF SCIENCE
AND METHODOLOGY OF THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE URGENTLY NEEDED!
Symposium “How to Understand and Write the History of Science? or Methodology of the
History of Science”. 2nd International Conference of the European Society for the History of
Science (Cracow, 6-9 September, 2006).
In studying, researching and writing the history of science we are forced to meet many important
problems of meta-theoretical and methodological character. However, this subject-mater is, in
principle, neglected in literature of the branch. On the contrary, an analogous subject-matter (but
not the same!) is discussed by historiography or "the methodology of history", called also often
"historical methodology" (but the latter meaning is broader than the former!).
There are many examples that may illustrate an urgent need of discussion on the theme,
including the one sketched at the website of Cracow Conference: "How to understand the term
historiography?". This term is often restricted only to "the study of the way history has been and
is written" or to "the history of historical writing" or to "the study of history seen in the light of
ideological and philosophical systems". However, from a methodological point of view, this is a
regrettable limitation based finally on an illusion that the historian is able "to research history
directly" (by using of the so-called primary sources) as well as "to create purely descriptive reconstructions of history" (by using of only "hard historical facts" or "pure facts", free of any
theoretical or philosophical interpretation or generalisation).
Why should knowledge on such illusions be important for historians of science? Because its
lack creates great obstacles in research of and teaching on the most subtle and crucial questions,
including geneses of scientific discoveries and their receptions.