Dynamic evolutionary game related to elementary large games and
Transkrypt
Dynamic evolutionary game related to elementary large games and
SUB Gfittingen 215 196 554 Krzysztof Argasinski Dynamic evolutionary game related to elementary large games and replicator dynamics * Nr 955 Warszawa, April 2003 Abstract This article contains construction of multipopulation evolutionary game based on elementary large games and replicator dynamics. For this purpose a multipopulation model with payoff depending of interspecific proportions (metasimplex concept) was developed. Article also contains . a cpmparson of classical evolutionary game theory solutions with a new theory. Keywords: evolutionary eqilibrium, evolutionary stable states, metasimplex, multipopulation models, elementary large games Dynamiczna gra ewolucyjna zwi^zana z duzymi grami i dynamik^ replikatorowq. Streszczenie Praca zawiera konstrukcje wielopopulacyjnej gry ewolucyjnej opartej o aparat elementamych duzych gier i dynamikq replikatorowq. Do tego celu wykorzystano model wielopopulacyjny uwzgledniajacy zmienaosc proporcji miedzygatunkowych (koncepcja metasympleksu). W pracy znajduje sie rowniez porownanie powstalego aparatu z rozwiazaniami klasycznej teorii gier ewolucyjnych. Siowa kluczowe: rownowaga ewolucyjna, stan ewolucyjnie stabilny, metasympleks, modele wielopopulacyjne, duze gry * RESEARCH SUPPORTED BY KBN GRANT # 5 H02B 008 20 Contents 1. Basic definitions and static characterizations of evolutionary stability 3 2. Replicator dynamics 5 3. Modifications of basic evolutionary game model >-' 7 3.1.Multipopulation models 7 3.2. Critical remarks on multipopulation models 9 3.3. Density dependent models 12 3.4. Density and interspecific proportion dependent models 13 4. Elementary large games 16 5. Replicator dynamics for large games 19 5.1. Static characterizations based on elementary large games 19 5.2. Replicator dynamics for extended large games 26 5.3.Basic differences between classical evolutionary game theory and "large games" 29 Summary, appendix, bibliography 31