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Ethics in Progress
Volume 5 (2014). Issue 1.
Special Issue:
Environment, ethics, and sustainability:
Crossroads of our future
Edited by:
Małgorzata Dereniowska & Jason Matzke
ISSN 2084-9257
Contents
Małgorzata)Dereniowska)&)Jason)Matzke)
Interdisciplinary! Foundations! for! Environmental! and! Sustainability! Ethics:!
An!Introduction!/!7!
!
Paul)Joosse)
Antiglobalization!and!Radical!Environmentalism:!An!Exchange!on!Ethical!Grounds!
/!33!
!
John)Mariana)
Overconsumption,!Procreation,!and!Morality!/!52!
!
Katia)Vladimirova)
The!Pure!Intergenerational!Problem!and!the!UNESCO!Decade!of!Education!for!
Sustainable!Development!/!66!
!
Troy)Paddock)
Building!Within!Space:!Thoughts!Towards!an!Environmental!Ethics!/!80!
!
Mateusz)Salwa)
Historic!Gardens!as!Places!of!Conflicting!Values!/!96!
!
Krystyna)NajderBStefaniak)
Value!of!an!Encounter!from!an!Ethical!Perspective!/!113!
!
!
Bonus&for&Polish-Speaking&Readers&/&123&
&
Małgorzata)Dereniowska,)Ewa)Nowak)
Wstęp!dla!Czytelników!polskojęzycznego!Bonusa!/!123!
!
Alicja)Dłużewicz)
Etyka!utylitarystyczna!Petera!Singera!–!szanse!i!możliwości!przekształcenia!praw!
zwierząt!/!124!
!
Honorata)Korpikiewicz)
Ontyczny!i!etyczny!aspekt!kosmoekologicznej!koncepcji!Świata!/!137!
!
!
Reviews&/&151&
&
Information&about&Authors&/&161&
Ethics in Progress (ISSN 2084-9257). Vol. 5 (2014). No. 1. 07-32. doi:10.14746/eip.2014.1.1
Interdisciplinary Foundations for
Environmental and Sustainability Ethics:
An Introduction1
Małgorzata Dereniowska (Greqam, Aix-Marseille University; Marseille, France)
Jason Matzke (University of Mary Washington; Fredericksburg, Virginia, United
States)
Introduction2
Although environmental ethics is a young and dynamically developing field
concerned with the human relationship to the non-human world, some core
concerns and questions can be identified as having shaped its broadly
pluralistic discourse. One main strand of thought has centered around the
axiology of nature, in particular around the issue of the intrinsic value of nature,
which includes questions of the ontological status of value, rights, and duties
that might apply in different ways to a variety of things. The axiological
questions are necessarily intertwined with those related to the meaning of
nature and any related or contrasting classes or concepts, such as culture or
civilization. A second set of questions relates to the status of the discipline itself,
and the role philosophers might play in addressing the problems of global
environmental change. Due to a perceived failure by some of environmentalism
as a movement for collective action, various proposals have been raised
suggesting a theoretical re-orientation of the discipline from one that focuses
on overly abstract metaphysical and metaethical questions toward real-world
problems and policy making. A third group of questions, which emerges from
the ongoing decentralization of environmental philosophy, seeks to link
This work has been carried out thanks to the support of the A*MIDEX project (no
ANR-11-IDEX-0001-02) funded by the “Investissements d’Avenir” French Government
program, managed by the French National Research Agency (ANR).
2 We extend sincere thanks to the editors and staff of Ethics in Progress, especially Ewa
Nowak for her continued support and assistance with this project.
1
Interdisciplinary Foundations for Environmental and Sustainability Ethics
concerns about economic, social, and environmental inequalities and justice
under a comprehensive theoretical framework, and seeks to address conflicts
between environmental, social, and economic values and goals. By way of
introducing the essays that make up this special issue of Ethics in Progress, we
will comment on each of these, beginning with a discussion of the evolution
and state of the discipline. A central theme in all of this is our belief that
interdisciplinary efforts are crucial to the growth of environmental ethics and
for applying it to questions of sustainability. This conviction is reflected as well
in the essays collected herein.
The importance of considering ethically and politically laden questions
from an interdisciplinary perspective3 arises primarily due to the fact that
environmental problems are so thoroughly integrated with other issues (most
notably, economic and social matters) that solving them in isolation only raises
or exacerbates problems elsewhere. For example, setting aside tillable land to
provide protected habitat for threatened ground birds might raise the cost of
food, a situation felt most sharply by those already economically marginalized.
Or similarly, turning to hydroelectric power to curb carbon emissions can
permanently destroy both aquatic systems and the means by which local people
make a living. Whatever the answers, the various issues cannot be separated,
and philosophy done with the aim of connecting to real-world problems must
take this fact into account. By drawing on a wide array of disciplines and
understandings, there is hope that we can better understand real-world issues
that are grounded in multiple cultural, historical, and social conditionings
present both in societal belief systems and scientific and analytic inquiry. A
better awareness of the conditions that underlie and constitute discourses that
are used in environmental debates is crucial for developing more meaningful
and efficacious understandings and policies that are rooted in the past yet
oriented toward the future. That a workable project of environmental ethics—
one in which philosophers participate more fully in public discourse—must be
grounded in a robust interdisciplinarity means that theorists must become
better versed in fields outside of their discipline. At a minimum, this entails
becoming more interdisciplinary as one engages in philosophy itself; but
additionally, academic philosophers have increasingly moved beyond just
acquainting themselves with the ideas of, say, ecological and economic theory,
to becoming more fully engaged in direct conversations with practitioners in
those fields and in policy making. They are co-writing articles and books,
In our use of the term “interdisciplinary,” we do not mean to exclude the related
notions of “multidisciplinarity” or “transdisciplinarity.” All three notions, although
slightly different in connotation, share in common the ideas of cooperation and
understanding issues across traditional, disciplinary perspectives. Moreover, they imply
each other in practice: multidisciplinarity is a precondition for interdisciplinary
practice, as is the understanding of the social perception of science and the social
conditioning of knowledge production.
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Małgorzata Dereniowska, Jason Matzke
attending inter- and multi-disciplinary conferences, and are serving on policy
boards and committees. The recognition that environmental ethics—like
medical or legal ethics—must not operate in a vacuum or risk becoming selfisolating and ill-informed has emerged slowly, but surely, since the founding of
the discipline.
A Brief History of Environmental Ethics and its Role in Public
Discourse
Environmental ethics as a subfield of philosophy grew out of practical concerns
about nonhuman nature in the context of the global ecological crisis and is not
much more than four decades old. This is not to say earlier philosophers had
ignored questions regarding the world we inhabit or how we are variously
related to, part of, or situated in that world. However, efforts directed toward
developing a new field of inquiry focused on expanding the moral community
to include nonhuman nature4 and were intended to counter the traditional,
individualistic, and narrow focus of classical ethical approaches that
emphasized human character and actions only as these affected other people.
Insofar as human beings were taken to have obligations toward the natural
world, these were indirect, minimal, and grounded in direct duties only to each
other (or to God) and not on any moral worth that plants, animals, or
ecosystems might have in themselves. Contemporary environmental ethics,5 in
contrast, is founded on the need to extend and take more seriously moral
responsibility toward the nonhuman world, or to put it more broadly, on the
inclusion of nonhuman nature in ethical reflection. Thus, the primary focus in
the field, especially in its early decades, has been that of coming to better
understand the moral status of, and our obligations to, the variety of nonhuman
entities from individual plants and animals to wholes such as ecosystems and
species.6
The debate regarding the human-nature dichotomy is subject itself to much debate
within the field of environmental philosophy. We use “nature” here to refer to the
nonhuman world insofar as it can be usefully distinguished from the humanized,
without implying any necessary dualism between nature and culture, the wild and
civilization, and the like.
5 We use the terms “environmental philosophy” and “environmental ethics”
interchangeably. Although the former might be taken favorably to include all
philosophical inquiry related to nature, both ethical and otherwise, we marginally
prefer the latter expression because it emphasizes that the ultimate end to work in the
field is to inform our behavior and interactions with each other and the rest of the
world, which is clearly a normative undertaking.
6 This does not mean that everyone working in the field believes that plants or
ecosystems, for example, do in fact have moral standing independent of their usefulness
to entities that do have moral standing, but rather that environmental philosophers
have long been united in attempting to better understand such issues.
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That the discipline of environmental ethics, per se, is a fairly recent
development does not deny the long tradition of writers outside of philosophy
who contributed greatly to our understandings of nature and our proper
relationship with it in ways that are more akin to what we find in
contemporary environmental ethics than in the canonical philosophical
tradition. In fact, many writers outside the mainstream of Western philosophy
are regularly cited by today’s environmental ethicists as their intellectual
forebears, and represents one way in which the discipline has always been, at
least minimally, interdisciplinary. In the American context, for example, Henry
David Thoreau (1817-1862) expressed concern with the extent of humancaused change to his native southern New England, arguing that humans are
“part and parcel” of the natural world and that only through intimate
connection with the natural can one escape the conforming—and if unchecked,
the degrading—effects of civilization (1993 [1862]). Following similarly the
Romantic movement’s reconceptualization of the human-nature relationship,
John Muir (1838-1914) believed that in nature one could be closest to the
divine. He explicitly rejected the common view that nature exists solely for
human benefit, saying, “How narrowly we selfish, conceited creatures are in
our sympathies! [H]ow blind to the rights of all the rest of creation!” (1991
[1916]). Ecologist and forester Aldo Leopold (1887-1948)—also strongly
influencing contemporary environmental philosophy, especially through the
work of J. Baird Callicott—argued for the protection of ecosystems and their
constitutive parts in an ethical sense: he expressed a need to shift from mere
economic valuations to internalizing a sense of duty to the natural world, which
begins by recognizing that we are neither distinct from nor superior to those
entities we too frequently treat as mere objects for our use (1987 [1949]). The
sense of moral responsibility toward nature (a kind of ecological conscience) is
grounded in an ecological and evolutionary perspective regarding the human
place in the world. Although often less celebrated, there were important women
thinkers too. In her influential 1962 book, Silent Spring, biologist Rachel Carson
(1907-1964) wrote about the disastrous ecological effects of the insecticide
DDT. Her work spurred wide public debate about society’s blind faith in, and
overreliance on, technology as the tool through which we interact with the
world around us.
These works strongly influenced the environmental movement as it
developed and gained strength in the later decades of the last century. As
heralded as these authors have become, however, they represented nonetheless
a minority tradition in society against which powerful interests have long
pushed. In the early twentieth century, for example, arguments to dam a pristine
California mountain valley, near to and resembling the famed Yosemite Valley,
overcame Muir’s public pleas for “higher” (and less destructive) aesthetic and
spiritual uses of the valley than as a water tank for San Francisco (Muir 1988
[1912], 197). Some fifty years later, for her position on DDT Carson was
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attacked by powerful corporate leaders who disparaged her character and
ability as a scientist.7 But by her time, public perception had begun to swing
towards greater awareness of environmental problems and the failures of
traditional ethics, the blind faith in technology, and a too often reckless public
policy with regard to the natural world.
The works of each of these authors—as well as countless other
authors, poets, artists, theologians, and scholars from around the world, wellknown and otherwise—are now taught with reverence in many grade schools
through universities. More to our point here, the contemporary field of
environmental ethics (especially as it has taken shape in the English-speaking
world), and environmentalism more broadly, owes them an enormous debt.
From them are drawn various possible alternatives to the common Western
view that nature’s value comes only from how it can be used to further
immediate, and often merely economic, human interests, and that knowledge
about the world is to further our control and effective use of it. To be sure,
environmental ethicists disagree amongst themselves on key questions
regarding the moral status and value of plants, animals, species, and
ecosystems, but their willingness to challenge traditional views and to at least
consider alternative models of the human-nature relationship (empirically,
conceptually, and ethically) grows from the ideas of their intellectual and
artistic predecessors—and, of course, from the growing cultural environmental
awareness since the 1960s and 70s.
Regardless of how much theoretical disagreement exists, the men and
women whose work created and sustains the discipline of environmental
ethics exhibit a deep, shared concern for, and an intimate connection with, the
natural world. As citizens of developed countries have become in recent decades
more conscious of what our actions are doing to the natural world around us,
academic philosophers wondered whether they could add to the growing
conversations qua philosophers. Is there a role for academic philosophy in our
efforts to address pressing ecological problems? What might philosophers
contribute to our global efforts to find solutions to the environmental crisis?
Despite the suspicion many felt from some of their traditionally-minded
colleagues that “applied” philosophy was a watered down philosophy, people
such as Holmes Rolston III, Richard Sylvan (Routley), Eugene Hargrove, and J.
Baird Callicott (to name only a few) ultimately changed—along with those
working in medical ethics, bioethics, animal liberation, and the like—how
many in the field have come to view the role of philosophers. No longer would
philosophy be limited to intellectual debates removed by several steps of
abstraction from real-world concerns; philosophers could, and would, engage in
7
For an excellent account of Carson’s work and reception, see Linda Lear (1997).
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live cultural debates regarding ethics and policy.8 As James Rachels puts it:
“Suddenly academic philosophers began to write about such matters as
abortion, racial and sexual discrimination, civil disobedience, economic
injustice, war, and even the treatment of nonhuman animals. It was a startling
about-face for thinkers who, only a few years before, had agreed that ‘A
philosopher is not a parish priest or Universal Aunt or Citizens’ Action
Bureau’” (2012, 455). That is not to say that environmental and other more
practically-oriented areas of investigation displaced other concerns in the
discipline, or that philosophy historically has not strongly influenced our
cultural beliefs and understandings—it clearly has. But the move by some in the
discipline to connect with public issues has reminded many that philosophers
could potentially make important contributions to pressing contemporary
issues.
Nevertheless, we do not wish here to overstate the case. The discipline
of environmental ethics remains focused largely on fairly abstract questions—
e.g., the meaning and proper attribution of intrinsic value to non-human
entities and the social construction of wilderness—that are not often (in
contrast to their more mundane and practical iterations) the direct concern of
activists, policy makers, or citizens more generally. The role of the philosopher
qua philosopher in society might continue to be of a fairly narrowly
circumscribed sort in this regard. It is important to note that, as Włodzimierz
Tyburski points out, one important role of the humanities is to supplement
with an axio-normative element what we learn from environmental and
economic science (1990, 9). Admittedly, a good deal of what philosophers do is
rather abstract and the ability to engage with the arguments and positions
advanced does require significant academic training. It is our view, however,
that the more the discipline can be made accessible to non-philosophers, the
more effective the discipline of philosophy can be in its participation in
democratic discourse. This being said, it would be unreasonable to judge the
value of philosophy based solely on the extent to which it has direct or
immediate impact. After all, much of the published research in the sciences and
social sciences, where practical application is more obviously likely and
This is not to say that everyone (or even most) in the larger discipline of philosophy
engages in work that connects to real-world problems, or even embraces this as an
ideal. Nonetheless, the discipline now clearly includes many who are committed to such
a project. It is important to note also that even within the more narrow field of
environmental ethics, there exists much debate about what engagement should involve.
For example (as discussed below), some who identify as environmental pragmatists
have argued that environmental philosophers continue to focus too much attention on
esoteric and abstract issues—such as intrinsic value—at the cost of being able to
influence positively public debate and policy. It would be more efficient, they argue, to
look for areas of common concern and shared goals, using the power of philosophical
analysis to provide better clarity of thought and direction (see for example the
contributions to Light and Katz (1996)).
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expected, does not directly inform public debate or policy. But this is, as with
philosophy, largely because the work of academic researchers a) depends upon
whole collections of complex models, concepts, and methods, b) is often focused
on rather narrow questions that become part of the accumulated
understanding of a discipline that then does have more practical effects, and c)
is not a final answer on a question, but one contribution that will then ideally
go through a process of being challenged, modified, and sometimes even
rejected. Often the very difficult, abstract questions about concepts and
arguments involve further matters of complex metaphysical, epistemological,
and ethical evaluation, which themselves require careful analytic analysis.
Despite the abstract and complex nature of its work, however, philosophical
inquiry does have an important and growing role to play in our global efforts to
address environmental problems: philosophy excels at sifting through difficult,
but important, concepts, models, and arguments that ultimately do have
ramifications for public debate and policy.
Axiology of Nature: The Problem of Intrinsic Value
One example of environmental ethicists engaging with an issue intimately
connected to contemporary environmentalism and social discourse is the
continuing and decades-long debate on the concept of intrinsic value
(sometimes also called “inherent value”). Axiological reflection—which seeks in
this context to better understand and describe sources and holders of value in
the natural world, as well as corresponding duties intended to protect or
advance this value—has played a crucial role in the dynamic development of
environmental ethics as a discipline from its beginnings.9 The concern over the
intrinsic value of nature has become a predominant focus of emerging nonanthropocentric environmental ethics. As John O’Neill notes, the task of
justifying and ascribing intrinsic value to nonhuman beings or entities (such as
species or ecosystems) has become the Holy Grail for many environmental
philosophers: “To hold an environmental ethics is to hold that non-human
beings and states of affairs in the natural world have intrinsic value” (1993, 8).
Many environmental philosophers will disagree with this claim due to doubts
about the usefulness or even coherence of the concept, believing the focus and
motives of the discipline to lie elsewhere. Nonetheless, a survey of the literature
makes it clear that, for better or worse, the focus on intrinsic value has
dominated the philosophical discussion since the beginning, even as
environmental ethics continues to grow more complex and diverse.
For more on the axiological foundations of environmental ethics, see for example the
collection of essays in Zimmerman et al. (1993), Light and Rolston (2003), and Pojman
and Pojman (2008).
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One reason for the focus on axiological issues is the conviction by many
that the possession of intrinsic value has serious implications for decision
making (both on the macro and micro levels): an entity that possesses intrinsic
value, it is thought, must be taken into moral and political consideration by
moral agents and policy makers in ways that go beyond purely humanoriented concerns. Although the specific language of “intrinsic value” is not
necessarily a regular part of citizens’, activists’, or policy makers’ lexica, the idea
it captures is commonplace.
The standard account of intrinsic value refers to the value something
possesses beyond its potential “instrumental value” (i.e., something’s “use” or
“extrinsic” value) to someone or something else.10 Often, conceptualizations of
intrinsic value begin with how we think about ourselves and other people—
each as valuable independently of his or her usefulness to others—and is
extended then to cover other things: individual animals (e.g., our pets, livestock,
and research animals) or plants, and perhaps collections or systems of things,
such as ecosystems, species, or even landscapes. The claim that song birds, for
instance, have value beyond their use value to us or other valuers seems to
entail that we cannot act just however we wish but somehow must consider
their well-being or interests. Questions immediately arise in public discourse
when someone makes such a claim about song birds, previously unnoticed
minnows, a lowly and rare cactus, and the like: Why should anyone agree that
this or that organism should matter in my moral deliberations? What precisely
is it about this cactus, or any cactus, that requires me to pay attention to how
my actions, and public policy more generally, affect it? After all, it seems to
have no identifiable interests in the same way that a person or other intelligent
animal does. It is not conscious; it is not sentient: it does not care what happens
to it. Further, even if it does have something like intrinsic value, it is not clear
how to consider this fact alongside or in counter position to deeply felt human
interests. Should they, for example, count for something like the same weight?
It is not clear what that could even mean when the “interests” involved—if the
word can be used coherently with regard to a cactus—seem of a quite different
sort.
The notion of, or at least the use or emphasis on, intrinsic value has also
been challenged by environmental pragmatists who argue that the focus on
overly abstract metaphysical concerns, such as the ontological status of intrinsic
It is worth noting, however, that the concept of intrinsic value goes well beyond its
usual framing within the instrumental/intrinsic dichotomy. O’Neill, for example,
distinguishes three basic meanings that the notion of intrinsic value can take: 1) “as a
synonym for non-instrumental value,” 2) as a synonym for non-referential value (in
which an object holds value “in virtue of its ‘intrinsic properties’”), and 3) as a
“synonym for ‘objective value’” (2003, 131-32). Lena Vilkka (2003) claims that there is
a necessary pluralism to intrinsic value of nature due to different, irreducible levels of its
application.
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value, has little appeal or conceptual meaning for the public, and as a result it
contributes to the failure of academic environmental philosophy to affect global
change (see Light & Katz 1996). It is not clear, however, that unfamiliarity with
the technical jargon of the philosopher prevents laypeople from having or using
some basic notion of intrinsic value—or more precisely, some basic, sometimes
conflicting, and even potentially inconsistent notion. The view that there is
something more valuable in or about nonhuman entities than can be captured
as units of utility or monetary notation to be traded against other quantifiable
human interests is commonly held (O’Neill et al. 2008). Against attempts to
quantify people’s preferences on the single scale of monetary value, Andrew
Brennon argues that “market prices do not seem to match people’s normal
perceptions of value,” which reject the idea that one sort of value (instrumental,
monetary, etc.) can be stretched to cover the whole variety of things we value
(2003, 520). In fact, laypeople value nature (and other things too) in both
instrumental and intrinsic ways (McShane 2009). In a study assessing the
extent to which intrinsic value theories of nature are accepted and
acknowledged outside of academic circles, Butler and Acott (2007) surveyed
employees of twenty landowning organizations (both conservation and nonconservation groups) in England. Their results show that 80% of those
surveyed embrace the idea that the environment possesses intrinsic value,
although their conceptualizations and understanding of what intrinsic value is,
or means, varies. Nevertheless, despite the plurality of views, two universal
imperatives were apparent in the respondents’ opinions: (1) “There ought to
be some limit to the extent to which we may justifiably modify nature and we
have a duty not to exceed that limit”; and (2) “We have a duty to have regard to
nature’s intrinsic value in our dealings with nature” (Butler & Acott 2007, 455).
The discussion of intrinsic value by philosophers is not, then, removed
from larger cultural understandings and debates; it is not a mere abstract
philosophical notion. Further, the various views developed have been,
expectedly, quite varied. As mentioned above, some thinkers have extended, in
a fairly straightforward way, moral standing (the quality of being a necessary
object of moral agents’ attention) from the paradigmatic case of human beings
to other intelligent, sentient, conscious beings. However, even here there is
disagreement on the proper grounds of extension—sentience being widely
seen as the defining mark, with more or less restrictive accounts also
advanced—and how to then weigh competing interests or Kantian-like duties
in cases of conflict.11 Laws against animal cruelty reflect general public
This particular strategy—called also moral extensionism—is most evident in
patocentric and biocentric strands of environmental thought, and is objectionable to
some due to its supposed anthropocentric implications. Wendy Donner (1996) argues,
for example, that ascribing intrinsic values to nonhuman beings on the basis of criteria
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acceptance of the notion that humans are not the only beings who have value
or standing. But it is more difficult, especially with plants and other nonsentient organisms, to extend standing to entities who share less with us than
do, say, dogs and chimpanzees. Wholes, such as ecosystems and species, pose
even more challenging questions since not only do they lack a literal center of
consciousness or sentience (thus possessing no interests in the sense that is
usually thought to be morally relevant), but worse, there are no clear or sharp
boundaries—beyond, that is, how we might carve up the world in order to
more easily pursue our scientific, aesthetic, or material interests—delineating
one ecosystem or species from another. Further, that which benefits an
ecosystem or species might work against the wellbeing of the particular
individuals within it who are more clearly objects of moral duty.
Some philosophers, such a Kenneth Goodpaster, have argued that it
does in fact make sense to attribute interests of a sort, and hence moral
standing (or value), to things such as plants since they need water and sunlight
(2008). Holmes Rolston III argues that ecosystems and the biosphere itself
have intrinsic value (2008). Others have objected that it is not possible to
extend standing or intrinsic value to things that are not sentient valuers
themselves. Obligations to things like plants or ecosystems must come, J. Baird
Callicott argues, from the perspectives of sentient valuers. Things like plants
and ecosystems have intrinsic or inherent value only in the sense that we value
them in ways not reducible to mere use-value; the value might reside in a plant,
but it originates from us (Callicott 1989, 133).
It might turn out that although the notions of interests and moral
standing are coherent and useful in our moral theory and practice, intrinsic
value (even in reference to people) is either incoherent or, at least,
unnecessary.12 One approach is to note that if it is moral standing that we are
ultimately concerned to identify in the entities and wholes around us, we could
jettison the ambiguous and unclear—the mysterious—notion of intrinsic value.
It is ontologically simpler to identify more empirically verifiable traits or
relational qualities of things that make it necessary that we moral agents pay
attention to their wellbeing when acting. There might be a variety of such traits
or qualities, but we can, without losing important substantive elements, skip the
question of whether their possession gives an entity moral standing directly or
does so by giving the entity some sort of value that then entails standing. It is
not our intent to answer this question, but to note instead that philosophers
continue to do what they do best—careful conceptual and argumentative
that we happen to consider to be important in us is far from the naturalistic ambitions
of the field to find a non-arbitrary source for moral standing.
12 Bryan Norton (2003) and Eugene Hargrove (2003) have both written about the
relationship between anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism, on the one hand,
and various types of value, on the other.
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analysis—offering a variety of approaches meant to capture the now
widespread cultural conviction that nonhuman entities (individuals and
wholes) have value that is not reducible to anthropocentric interests.
From Environmental Ethics to Sustainability
The shift in recent years to the notion of sustainability as providing the
governing conceptual framework for local, national, and international policy
making that integrates social, economic, and environmental dimensions is a
clear example of the need for interdisciplinary cooperation; it is also an
example of how environmental philosophy has broadened its scope beyond the
axiological. The concept of sustainability is anything but settled (Söderbaum
2008), though several fundamental elements appear in most accounts:
environmental protection, social justice, intra- and intergenerational
distributive justice, and democratic decision making. Such a broad concept,
with possible diverging programs and goals, makes it all the more important to
both arrive at a coherent and workable concept (or set of concepts) and to
have it grow out of a more-or-less consistent collection of understandings:
philosophical, economic, social, democratic, and environmental. At the very
least, sustainability discourse represents an attempt to create a platform in
which the tensions between different values and visions of the world are made
visible, and hence subject to negotiation about what kind of future we
collectively want (Robinson 2004). One of the ways this might occur is for
philosophers to help clarify the various structures, concepts, and schools of
thought related to ethics and decision making. This would involve developing a
more comprehensive and workable model of pluralism, where this eschews the
deep skepticism and corresponding radical relativism of postmodern
epistemologies while allowing for a certain amount of irreducible, but
reasonable, disagreement that seems inevitable as we seek definitions, goals,
and policies for a global sustainable future.
From the perspective of environmental ethics, sustainability discourse
represents both a shift in thinking and a promising way forward—a way to
bring together a whole host of concerns that have too long been talked about in
isolation from one another. Most obviously, sustainability has the potential to
overcome a rather persistent dichotomy in environmental thinking—
conservation vs. preservation—both sides of which aimed to push back against
unfettered development. The dispute between John Muir and his once close
friend, forester Gifford Pinchot (1865-1946), illustrates the difference between
these two approaches. Pinchot argued on utilitarian grounds that public
ownership and management of forests protected natural resources for longterm use while also preventing a select few from reaping the benefits that
should belong to the greater public. By keeping forests (and later grasslands,
etc.) under common, public control and management, citizens could more
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wisely use their natural resources. Muir, in contrast, argued sharply against
some of the uses proposed by Pinchot, such as grazing sheep or building dams
in public parks or forests. He cited a need to protect nature not for human use,
but from human use, or at least from the sort of use that would radically alter a
natural place. These competing approaches have together provided a
framework within which several other competing views have been (though
not by conceptual necessity) arranged. The intrinsic vs. instrumental
arguments, for example, could be lined up conveniently under preservation and
conservation, respectively. Similarly, the view that human knowledge is
superior to the unconscious unfoldings of wild nature—that we know best how
nature ought to work—matches up well with the conviction that rather than
simply letting natural events occur as they will, we should train experts to
manage wild areas. Although there is an apparent complementarity between
conservation and preservation—the former relating to the wise use of the
environment; the latter focusing on preserving wild nature from certain kinds
of human use—the results of their application are often different, as illustrated
in the Muir/Pinchot disagreement. However, if we look more closely at the
polarized dichotomy between nature and culture, we see that it is difficult to
draw a sharp line between the natural world (taken to be worthy of protection)
and the inhabited, humanized environment, seen as the source only of
problems.13 The notion of pristine nature, as unspoiled by human intervention,
has been roundly criticized, most obviously because most areas in the world
have been altered more or less by human influences.14
The promise of the sustainability concept lies in the inclusion of
ecological, social, and economic dimensions under one framework, and in its
ability to blend global concerns with the local. Nevertheless, sustainability
discourse embodies similar inherent tensions—such as between the intrinsic
and instrumental, or between anthropocentrism and ecocentrism—that have
troubled environmental philosophy since its beginnings. This recognition points
to the importance of the framing (and consequently, of the schemes organizing
human thought) of environmental matters.
Recent growth of a new subfield, climate ethics, makes even clearer the
double bind at the intersection of ethics and public deliberation. Philosopher
Donald Brown distinguishes two dimensions of the ethical challenge of climate
change: the lack of ethical scrutiny in the realm of decision making and the
inability of ethicists to seriously engage with direct problems arising from
Historically, protection efforts have been focused on the most scenic and
undeveloped areas, with the less sublime and semi-natural spaces being thought
unimportant to preserve due to their already “degraded” status.
14 For a more detailed discussion of the social construction of wilderness, see Callicott &
Nelson (1998) and Cronon (1996).
13
18
political contexts such as the limits of economic arguments informing policy
measures regarding climate change or distributive justice (Brown 2013, 235).
One of the reasons for the ethical malaise is the fact that environmental
philosophers have tended to conduct their debates within their own narrow
academic field. Consequently, the growing body of the ethical literature had
little impact on informing policy making (Brown 2013, 237). More recently,
however, work on the issue has taken a practical, applied turn, founded on a
theoretical reorientation from analyzing abstract questions of what perfect
justice requires and looking for foundations for human duties toward the
environment, to working to identify ethical issues inherent in policy debates.
Environmental ethics can contribute to improving policy making by providing
greater conceptual clarity regarding justice, what the notion of moral
responsibility includes, and how its components (e.g., intergenerational
concerns) can be reconciled with the exercise of freedom in democratic
societies. Such work, Brown points out, “help[s] policy makers and citizens
understand the limits of instrumental rationality when science and economics
are used to define environmental policy, because instrumental arguments are at
the center of public policy disputes about environmental issues” (2013, 238).
Consequently, ethical consideration must not rely only on the question of what
ethics requires in the abstract; after all, different ethical theories may lead to
different, or even conflicting, positions on particular matters. In other words,
ethics can be made more relevant by focusing on setting minimal standards that
policy proposals must meet in order to be considered legitimate options.
Despite the fact that the disagreement about particular cases will likely remain,
we can at least begin by identifying overlapping consensus on unsubstantiated
and ethically dubious positions. The demand for a practical approach is
particularly evident in the context of the limits of corrective justice to account
for existing inequalities and the distribution of environmental burdens. From
the perspective of environmental ethics, the question of the adequacy of
philosophical theories and concepts when applied to urgent global problems
like climate change is, thus, not merely a question of theoretical reorientation,
but also a question of how to use them in practice. On this view, moral practice
entails the ability to make reasonable judgments. Since climate change poses a
complex and multidimensional problem, a shift in emphasis toward proper
ethical reflection on the problem seems to be a more promising approach than
is theorizing in the abstract. Nevertheless, we maintain, theory building
remains an important task as it plays a role in the articulation and evaluation of
social values and beliefs.
The Contributions to this Special Issue
Environmental ethicists have greatly expanded the discipline’s scope, the role
of academic philosophers in public discourse, and the extent to which
19
philosophers engage with those beyond the traditional confines of the
discipline. The collection of essays in this volume illustrate the range of
perspectives and approaches being brought to bear on the complex
environmental and sustainability issues we now face. This volume includes
work that illustrates this fact while also illuminating our understandings of
particular problems, such as overpopulation and consumption, responsibility
for future generations, and the resolution of value conflict. It represents
authors from Europe and North America—five countries in total—and the
disciplines of history, aesthetics, sociology, and philosophy.
When environmental philosophers talk of how the field is shifting in
ways that better relate abstract theory with real-world considerations, they are
often talking about how their work connects to issues of policy formation. The
discipline has certainly entered more explicitly and fully into debates about
wilderness and resource management, restoration of damaged lands, and, most
obviously, sustainability and climate policy. The essay by sociologist Paul Joosse
reminds us, however, that engaging with the world of action can take us as well
into thinking about the aims, justifications, and results of activists who may or
may not be on board with much of what generally counts as defendable
philosophical positions. As he points out in “Antiglobalization and Radical
Environmentalism: An Exchange on Ethical Grounds,” a number of recent
events—from the further commodification of our lives to the further
degradation of both the environment and workable ways to enact positive
change—have converged to create a new sort of “radical environmentalism.” In
contrast to slightly older radical groups, such as Earth First!, these newer
activists—of which Earth Liberation Front (ELF) is Joosse’s primary example—
eschew the rhetoric and aims of a narrow environmentalism in favor of a
transnational anti-globalism and anti-capitalism. They are self-proclaimed
“revolutionaries” challenging the institutions of neoliberalism.
One of the worries about groups such as ELF is their willingness to use
strategies and tactics of fear. They have used arson, for example, to destroy a
206-unit apartment building under construction in San Diego, California. Of the
many important ethical questions that this raises, Joosse chooses to evaluate
the group based on three objections raised commonly against the larger antiglobalization movement, of which, he argues persuasively, ELF is a part. The
criticisms he deals with all involve essentially the issue of effectiveness. This
concern is elevated in the sense that the anti-globalization movement—and by
implication, ELF as a part—is not only ineffective, but actually
counterproductive to its aims. More specifically, it is so by dint of the fact that it
is preoccupied with the tactics of property destruction and mega-protest (e.g.,
against the WTO, World Bank, and IMF), and that it ignores national politics in
favor of the transnational. Joosse argues that ELF’s willingness to engage in
property destruction allows government and business to define
environmentalists of all sorts as dangerous radicals, even “eco-terrorists.” Media
20
similarly frames things, especially following the events of September 11, 2001.
As Joosse suggests, ELF allows, then, powerful champions of neoliberal
globalization to link the so-called war on terror with environmentalism.
It is instructive to note not just what Joosse is doing, but what he is not.
First, he is not criticizing the underlying philosophical positions of the antiglobalization or capitalism movement. Second, he is not questioning the tactics
of radical groups from the perspective of ethics, per se, but rather in terms of
effectiveness. These are quite different analytic approaches since ethics is
seemingly about more than mere effectiveness; the work Joosse has done,
however, is of significance to anyone wanting to mount a more fully ethical
evaluation of the radical environmental movement. Regardless of one’s position
on particular ethical theories, most would at least care about whether the
worrisome tactical actions (if we are to sustain a general moral proscription
against violence) result in positive ends. Finally, Joosse is very careful to
distance ELF from environmentalism more generally, and even from other socalled radical groups. The account that he puts forth of the genesis of ELF
posits the group as an spinoff of Earth First!, but as he notes, this does not
mean they ultimately share many things in common. Earth First!, for example,
is (or perhaps more accurately, was) generally focused on narrow concerns
such as wilderness protection, worked largely within a framework of national
or international politics, and has pulled back from even more moderate forms
of eco-sabotage such as tree-spiking. Even insofar as some in its membership
came to identify with more anarchistic views and saw environmental concerns
as only one set within a larger constellation of concerns (e.g., social justice,
animal rights, and antiwar), Earth First! cannot be accurately said to be a part
of the current anti-globalization movement in the way ELF is.
The essay by philosopher John Mariana, “Overconsumption,
Procreation, and Morality,” is about a whole lot more than is at first apparent.
Narrowly, it amounts to a critical appraisal of Thomas Young’s argument—
aimed at typical “mainstream environmentalists”—that procreation and
overconsumption are ethically equivalent. Mariana contends that Young’s
argument could be greatly improved, but that ultimately even then it cannot be
sustained with the limited theoretical resources at hand. More widely, the essay
challenges us to think more carefully about how ethics—or philosophy more
generally—might better inform our beliefs about population growth vis-à-vis
consumption and limited resources.
In short, Young argues, as outlined by Mariana, that the effects of
having children beyond replacement numbers has negative effects equivalent to
those of overconsumption. He defines overconsumption as consuming beyond
the current American average. Following an interesting discussion of the
difficulties of defining overconsumption, Mariana spends much of his article
evaluating Young’s replies to four criticisms that point to dissimilarities
between procreation and overconsumption. The four objections are that
21
procreation a) is the less selfish of the two, b) is a better source of happiness, c)
involves a fundamental right absent in overconsumption, and d) creates beings
of inherent worth. Young’s defense in light of these objections involves,
according to Mariana, claims difficult to maintain consistently, such as: a) many
people have children for selfish reasons, thus motivations should not count in
our evaluation of the two behaviors, b) utilitarianism cannot be defended
anyway, and c) nonetheless we should be thinking in terms of outcomes.
Mariana acknowledges Young’s desire to not embrace any particular theory as
viable, but notes that if he wants to evaluate the behaviors according to their
effects, we do need some way of making the comparison.
Mariana provides a possible defense for Young: we could acknowledge
that people tend to see higher good coming from bringing children into the
world than they do in increasing their consumption beyond that of an average
American (wherever the line of overconsumption finally gets drawn), and then
note, however, that no value exists independently of others. In this way, one can
see that even if having children beyond the number needed for maintaining a
steady population adds important value, this eventually leads us to the situation
where resources are so taxed as to lessen the quality of life for everyone.
Mariana points out, however, that even this stronger case for the equivalence of
procreation and overconsumption needs philosophical support. This support is
lacking, as he demonstrates in his discussion of what it might mean to harm
someone not yet in existence. Mariana suggests further that an adequate
account of the ethics of procreation must take into account our character. Is
one selfish for wanting children? For not wanting children? Finding no clear
way of answering these questions, Mariana closes by noting that we simply do
not have the requisite theory to make evaluations across (real and potential)
generations when we are unable to properly estimate the value and costs of
procreation relative to consumption and quality of life. But Young’s refusal to
embrace the notion of intrinsic value for individuals makes it difficult to know
how to make sense of human (and other) interests. Thus, Young’s account
ultimately fails; we are in need of continued work.
Katia Vladimirova picks up on one of the difficulties identified by
Mariana. In “The Pure Intergenerational Problem and the UNESCO Decade of
Education for Sustainable Development,” she raises the question of whether we
can develop an adequate account of future generations in moral thinking
related to problems posed by climate change. She begins with reference to the
metaphor of the perfect moral storm, introduced by Stephen Gardiner to
illustrate that temporal, spatial, and institutional attributes of climate change
constitute a setting that encourages moral corruption, indifference, and the
incapacity to undertake collective action.15 Gardiner’s use of the metaphor helps
Inspiration for Gardiner (2010) for the development of the metaphor of the perfect
moral storm comes from Sebastian Junger’s 1999 novel, The Perfect Storm: A True
15
22
identify the peculiar features and normative challenges that climate change
poses; in particular, it highlights the fact that the elements constitutive of the
climate change problem in the context of decision making render it impossible
to address the problem’s symptoms without questioning the underlying
normative and epistemological questions of climate science, policy making, and
the general functionings of society (Gardiner 2010). The intergenerational
element adds complexity to Gardiner’s perfect moral storm, since the temporal
fragmentation of agency makes it difficult for agents to unify and act as if they
were a single agent. Vladimirova considers an idealized version of the
intergenerational problem, the so-called Pure Intergenerational Problem
(PIP),16 as a situation in which standard institutional solutions do not work. She
proposes that instead of looking for an adequate institutional solution, we can
try to change the very context—the rules of the game, so to speak—by altering
the dynamics between individualism and collectivism (which in this case
includes not only existing but also future generations). For the Prisoner
Dilemma, the logic of conflict resolution rests on the assumption that choice is
fully rational. This assumption, combined with a focus on self-interest as
defining the human condition, renders any choice in favor of collective benefit
impossible. One way to change the institutional context is to promote a broad
value shift by emphasizing the moral considerability of future generations. Such
a move does not imply, however, that the interests of future generations will, or
even should, outweigh the interests of present generations. Rather, the point is
that we should include concern for future generations as a universal standard in
ethical reasoning and decision making. This new way of thinking, Vladimirova
points out, must be founded on a new, universally shared value system that
directly relates current to future people.
The requisite set of values can be found within the 2002 educational
agenda of the United Nations—the Decade of Education for Sustainable
Development (DESD)—which aims at promoting values central to sustainable
development and inducing broader behavioral and social change.17
Story of Men Against the Sea, in which the main character, a fisherman, finds himself
caught in the convergence of three bad storms that together create the “perfect storm.”
16 PIP is a variation of the Prisoner Dilemma in which generations do not overlap.
17 The question of value universalism is itself a challenge for environmental ethicists
trying to develop a context-sensitive program that accounts for historical and cultural
factors that shape socio-economic conditions of particular places. Such programs
necessarily rely on inducing collective action, which cannot be done by coercion or in
the top-down fashion too often evident in global environmental policy trends. Recourse
to universalism may pose a risk of absolutism, which is unacceptable from a social
justice perspective. However, there is growing agreement that issues of environmental
and climate justice cannot be properly addressed in a relativistic framework of a
Westphalian world (that is, a multipolar world of sovereign nations-states protected
against external influences), since moral relativism would undercut international
solidarity in fighting against global ecological problems such as climate change. Thus,
23
Mainstreaming values related to the environment and future generations can
be achieved via diverse means, of which education is one of the most
recognized. Since UNESCO is an important institution whose role is to foster
educational agendas, it is instructive to look at its DESD in order to articulate the
set of values that ought to play a crucial role in educating for a sustainable
world. These clearly articulated values, Vladimirova argues, can be seen as a
part of the solution to the PIP problem that goes beyond both technical and
structural fixes. It does so by linking the present with future-oriented concerns
about the environment and people, thereby stretching the scope of moral
consideration to include future generations and allowing a shift in the balance
of trade-offs between present and future generations away from the current
exclusive favoring of the former. However, DESD and the values it promotes
have been subjected to the criticism that it is just another modernization
project supported by a neoliberal economic and political ideology. In addition,
the necessity of nontrivial trade-offs between sustainability and development
makes the project susceptible to skepticism expressed in many academic
circles. Nevertheless, we would add here that it is important to note that a set of
values for sustainability will likely not be coherent in the sense that all moral
dilemmas related to environmental problems will be resolvable without some
compromise on what is valued. In other words, possible value conflict should
not be understated, and the question of how to deal with it and what trade-offs
are morally justified remains an important challenge as we address climate
change. Consequently, an adequate response to the perfect moral storm must
be founded on a cluster of factors that facilitates collective action, including not
only institutional settings, but also beliefs and value frameworks within which
institutions operate.
In “Building within space: Thoughts towards an Environmental Ethics,”
historian Troy Paddock reflects on the origins and development of the
anthropocentric, instrumentalist view of nature deeply embedded in the
Western system of values. Since the sustainability-oriented project of
environmental ethics needs to be founded upon a proper sensitivity to the link
between our actions and their impacts on the non-human world, Paddock
focuses on grasping the nature of human action and the experience of
environment as space in which humans act. He draws on insights from
architecture since it is fundamentally about the organization of space.
Analogically, the instrumental, anthropocentric view of nature is precisely
about the organization and rearrangement of space. Architecture is illustrative
of the characteristics of human action that shape the relationship between
human beings and their environment, as this has evolved in modern culture,
there is an urgent need to develop a global, yet context-sensitive normative framework
that would set standards for ethical scrutiny and allow for joint considerations and
negotiations on matters of environmental and climate policy.
24
which is characterized by an asymmetry that has led to the objectification of
the environment. In order to better understand the nature of this asymmetry,
Paddock draws from Bernard Tschumi, who claims that architecture is
impossible without action, events, and program. Consequently, “there is no
architecture without violence” (Paddock 2014, 83). By extension, Paddock
continues, an asymmetry exists in the relationship between human beings and
the environment, characterized by a kind of violence that is inherent in the
confrontation of the logic of objects and of people.
Paddock follows Tshumi’s recognition of the inseparability of space and
action, where the interplay between two orders is a function of our
surroundings as well as of actions and events taking place within those
surroundings. He proposes that the project of environmental ethics is basically
about balancing these two orders. A symmetrical relationship exists between
them, where the relation of dominance (and thus violence) is minimized or
possibly eradicated: “symmetry is connected to ethical action, and by extension
that symmetry is required for environmental conservation” (Paddock 2014,
84). To illustrate the point, Paddock analyses the example of the Mosel River in
order to show how the relationship of violence in the human-nature
relationship can be constructively transformed by changing the way we think of
the environment.
The taming of rivers such as the Mosel can be seen as an illustration of
human dominion over nature, where nature objectified is something to
conquer. However, when the Mosel River is considered as a space in which our
actions take place, without being objectified, it is possible to practice ecological
restoration that goes beyond techno-fixes. Such practice is grounded in a sense
of interconnection between human agency and two orders of needs—
instrumental and generative—which come into play via inter-action with the
environment. On this account, an “ethically wise person” acquires a debt via
actions that serve both orders of needs. The idea of harmony with nature is,
however, not self-sustaining. It requires a conscious effort directed to
maintaining it, which is a corner stone of symmetrical action. The tension at
the heart of our understanding of what nature is, and how to best frame our
relationship with it, is grasped by the recognition of the inherent tensions in
the human-nature relationship: “A disconnection with nature is at the heart of
this sense of nostalgia and loss” (Paddock 2014, 88).
Change in values and beliefs must be epistemologically well grounded.
Further, following John Scott’s Aristotelian account of two kinds of needs and
needs ordering, Paddock’s work makes the case for a broader framework for
analyzing policy questions regarding issues such as climate change. After all,
these questions cannot be considered merely as a matter of “pure” scientific
fact, but rather they involve questions of value. Reductionism in policy analysis
is yet another reiteration of the epistemological trap, described by Paddock via
reference to Heideggerian modern transformation of technology and its
25
relationship to nature. Actor-Network Theory is presented as an opening up of
the possibility of restoring the symmetrical relationship between the human
and nonhuman worlds.
Another perspective is offered by Mateusz Salwa in “Historic Gardens
as Places of Conflicting Values.” Salwa explores the issue of natural gardens as
an example of human creation taking control of natural forces. Nature in this
form can be contrasted and juxtaposed with wild nature, or wilderness. In some
sense, gardens can be seen to be more like a human monument than like
nature; for example, we tend to view gardens through the lens of nostalgia:
“Gardens are always human-made; they are places where the natural
environment is transformed according to a person’s aesthetic experience and
expectations” (Salwa 2014, 97). Salwa explores the inevitable conflict of values
regarding humanized nature, arguing that in order to arrive at clear answers
and actions related to ecological restoration, it is important to make
transparent the beliefs and values that underlie our thinking. This inevitably
includes the question of intrinsic value. Using the Krasinski Garden in Warsaw
as his case study, Salwa argues that abstract philosophical questions lie at the
core of disagreements regarding garden restoration and management. For
example, to what extent are the nonhuman elements of a garden, such as
plantings, “natural”? To what extent are human interventions in an ecosystem’s
dynamics justified? What kind of values are attached to a garden? Is a garden
merely a stage for human activity? Drawing on the history of art, and in
particular on Alois Riegl’s work on monuments, Salwa crosses disciplinary
boundaries to undercover patterns of value conflict and the challenges faced in
the maintenance of monuments. These patterns can be applied not only to
monuments, but also to so-called natural monuments, including, insofar as they
may be so conceptualized, gardens as humanly created living works of art.
Gardens such as the Krasinski Garden are often thought of as “historic
gardens,” and as such are defined as “timeless” in the sense that each garden
has an original shape that ought to be preserved. The most important values of
a historic garden are artistic, wherein all the nonhuman elements (e.g., plants
and animals) are subsumed under the “timeless” artistic structure. A competing
perspective sees gardens as “living areas.” The tension between the two views
illustrates well that our understanding and ways of maintaining gardens can be
quite diverse. At the heart of the conflict in the public debate about how to best
restore the Krasinski Garden, Salwa notes, lies a clash between the art-historical
and the social-ecological perspectives. His applied study and conclusions reflect
some of the deep philosophical issues related to ecological restoration in
general, such as are found in Robert Elliot’s book, Faking Nature: The Ethics of
Environmental Restoration (1997). Is a garden a purely cultural phenomenon?
A monument? Or is it an ecosystem? Should the historical or the ecological
prevail?
26
Such stark choices are not, Salwa points out, mutually exclusive, and the
dichotomies involved need not be treated antagonistically. This issue lies at the
core of any conflict resolution. In other words, the fact that we cannot fully
escape the nature/culture, intrinsic/instrumental value, subject/object, etc.,
dichotomies does not necessarily imply dualism. Salwa’s claim is consistent
with that of Val Plumwood, who points out that dichotomy, in its basic sense,
means drawing differences, which is an essential feature of human thinking
(1993). Dualism, however, includes also hierarchical relationships, or
arrangements, of dominance and even violence; this is not an inherent feature
of human thinking. Or, using terminology provided by Paddock, the
human/nature and other dualisms are forms of an asymmetrical relationship
between subject and object. In asymmetrical relationships the category of
difference is overlooked, objectified, and subsumed wrongly under mere
instrumental goals. The capacity of dealing constructively with conflicts of
values requires that difference not be treated antagonistically. The relationship
might then become more symmetrical.
The problem of attitude toward difference (that is, the Other, whether
human or environmental) is investigated in more depth from an ethical
perspective by Krystyna Najder-Stefaniak in “Value of an encounter from an
ethical perspective.” The environment is a physical site, but also, she argues,
something imagined, perceived, and experienced through schemes of
reasoning and valuing. Such space is an intermediate between the spheres of
the descriptive, the prescriptive, and praxis. It can be altered by us in two ways:
by changing the external environment and by developing or destroying the
human ability to perceive and understand the environment. Thus, “the shape of
the space depends on human capabilities and cognitive skills to a great extent”
(Najder-Stefaniak 2014, 120). Such an account is consistent with the normative
recognition that we need to think differently about nature while acknowledging
the pluralism of values and attitudes that must be accommodated in decision
making (both on the individual and institutional levels) regarding the spaces in
which we live. The twofold interpretation of the environment, when applied to
environmental ethics, shifts the emphasis of the discussion from fragmented
and separated dimensions within ethics and between ethics, to practice
oriented toward what ethical reflection is supposed to be at its roots: not just
rules and principles of conduct, but a strategy for living that advances the
development of the art of being. According to Najder-Stefaniak, one of the most
important abilities in the art of living is the ability to realize encounters. The
condition that makes an encounter possible is the existence of difference.
However, pluralism implies many possibilities for how the encounter with
difference will be contravened and what will result. The category of difference
that justifies pluralism contains nothing in itself that would imply an outcome
with no ambiguity, as in, for example, the rejection of some universally held
belief. Rather, both the process and the results of an encounter with difference
27
depend upon how difference is approached, or, to put it more directly, on the
schemes of thinking and reasoning with which we are engaged. NajderStefaniak distinguishes four types of schemes that organize our thinking and
which determine modes of encounter with difference: antagonistic thinking
(reflected in an either-or approach, resulting in the rejection of difference),
complementary thinking (embodied in mediating strategies of dealing with
paradox), dialectical thinking (allowing one to transcend the level of thesis and
antithesis to discover their synthesis), and synergistic thinking. The latter
scheme of reasoning is best suited to facilitate meta-reflection and
understanding the conditions of difference and how it is constitutive also of
ourselves. It results in creativity and enables us to go beyond identity borders
without these being threatened. This is the condition for an ethical encounter
in which difference enriches the participating parties and inspires the search
for truth.
The capacity to realize different types of encounters illuminates the
practical potential of the ecosystem metaphor insofar as it captures an
alternative relationship to that provided by modern dualism between subjects
and objects. Such a move allows us to conduct a dialogue of an I-Thou sort (in a
Buberian sense). Here, the outcome of the encounter with difference becomes
complimentary or synergistic by means of dialogue as an ethical relation. Such
a relationship takes place in an open system between two beings in dynamic
interaction that are constitutive of the whole. As Najder-Stefaniak argues, “Were
we to see relationships in keeping with the ecosystem paradigm, causality
would no longer be linear and one-sided; we would become capable of finding
new aspects of human interdependencies and of understanding our relationship
with, and links to, the environment, conversely to the modern paradigm”
(Najder-Stefaniak 2014, 119). Consequently, the scope and meaning of moral
responsibility can be extended to include also the fact that our actions, as well
as the way we construct the environment, influence the modalities of “gestalt.”
Such a perspective allows us to transcend the antagonistic patterns pervasively
framing the nature-culture relationship and discourse about it.
Conclusion
The task of presenting the developments, relevance, and challenges of the
discipline of environmental ethics is not an easy one. The plurality of
environmental discourses and the wide array of perspectives on environmental
problems makes it necessary to select some elements of the discussion at the
expense of others. Nevertheless, the goal of this collection of essays is not to
provide anything resembling a complete picture of the state of the discipline,
but to provide a sample of current work illustrating the ethical and meta-ethical
questions and tensions that have pervaded environmental ethics since its
origins. These tensions can be illustrated by James Proctor’s metaphor of the
28
solid rock and shifting sands (Proctor 2001). According to him, environmental
ethics is dealing with inevitable tension between subject and object on an
epistemological level, and between universalism and particularism on the
ontological level. Although the rise of environmental philosophy has been
marked by naturalistic attempts to provide objective grounds for moral
obligations toward the non-human world, the fact of the social situatedness of
knowledge and valuing may be seen, at least to some environmental realists, as
undercutting the promise of inducing global social change. Nevertheless, the
challenge lies in the way we think about the multidimensional aspects of the
ecological crisis. If approached non-antagonistically, we can arrive at an
environmental ethics aspiring to universality (yet avoiding absolutism) while
being explicitly context-sensitive. In other words, the project of practical
environmental ethics is, at least in some ways, that of creating a new ethics
(following Richard Sylvan’s earlier call (2003)) in a way that does not fully
break with tradition but certainly goes beyond the received notions involved in
our thinking about non-human nature and morality itself. The qualitatively new
characteristics of the global challenges we face today necessarily lead to a
rethinking of what ethics is, what it requires, and how we understand and act
in the world.
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31
Małgorzata Dereniowska (Greqam, Aix-Marseille University)
Jason Matzke (University of Mary Washington)
Interdisciplinary Foundations for Environmental and Sustainability
Ethics: An Introduction
Abstract: This article introduces the special issue for Ethics in Progress entitled
Environment, ethics, and sustainability: Crossroads of our future. Despite four
decades of intense development in the field of academic and professional
environmental ethics, environmental problems pose ever increasing ethical
challenges. The discipline continues to undergo a transition from focusing on
theoretical questions such as what kinds of beings deserve moral standing
toward greater inclusion of the multifaceted dimensions of sustainability and
environmental issues and policy formation. In this introductory paper, we
present the development, some of the key disciplinary debates, and the
continuing and emerging challenges in environmentalism as it intersects with
sustainability. We emphasize the importance of increasing the range of
interdisciplinary perspectives brought to bear on practical ethics. The papers
included in this special issue reflect both the challenges that arise as
environmental ethics continues to expand and explore new issues at the
intersection of ethics, sustainability, and environmental research, and the
interdisciplinarity required in our search to better understand matters related
to environmental history, environmental inequalities, social and environmental
value conflict, inter-generational justice, and ethical components of the human
relationship with the world.
Keywords: Environmental ethics, sustainability, intrinsic value of nature,
interdisciplinarity
Ethics in Progress (ISSN 2084-9257). Vol. 5 (2014). No. 1. pp. 07-32.
doi:10.14746/eip.2014.1.1
32
Antiglobalization and Radical
Environmentalism: An Exchange on Ethical
Grounds
Paul Joosse (University of Alberta; Edmonton, Alberta, Canada)
Introduction1
Today, a sense of futility pervades many environmentalists’ attitudes toward
traditional channels of political influence. The Bush administration’s rejection
of the Kyoto protocol and the utter lack of political will displayed at the
Copenhagen Climate Summit have been major defeats for conventional
moderate lobby groups and environmentally-conscious political parties. The
economic crisis of late 2008 and the subsequent recession became an occasion
for a further marginalization of environmentalism in the corridors of power,
evidenced recently when, with jobs being the forefront issue, both Barack
Obama and Mitt Romney competed to boast about their credentials as friends
of coal (NPR 2012; Vozzella 2012). As the political currency of
environmentalism has declined in value, corporate interests have seemed only
to get stronger, pushing to commodify ever more areas of public life (Soron and
Laxer 2006). Indeed, the advancement of corporate power has reached new
levels of insidiousness, with the advent of “greenwashing” (Vos 2009),
“aggressive mimicry” (Peeples 2005), and the “linguistic high-jacking” of
concepts such as sustainability (Johnston 2004, 1)—cynical appropriations of
the stylings of environmentalism itself. For environmentalists who take the
apocalyptic visions of ecological and climatological science seriously, these
have no doubt been bitter developments.
Thus, while there have been surges in popular enthusiasm for
environmental causes in the past—of which the success of Al Gore’s An
Inconvenient Truth is only the most prominent example—many who have held
long-standing commitments to the movement see these developments as hollow
and insubstantial. Indeed, such enthusiasms, which often manifest as calls for
Thanks must go to the guest editors and anonymous reviewers at Ethics in Progress
Quarterly for their valuable comments on this manuscript. I am also grateful to Stephen
Kent for his invaluable guidance throughout my writing, and for granting me access to
the Kent Collection on Alternative Religions, housed at the University of Alberta.
Support for this research was provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council (SSHRC) and by the University of Alberta PhD Dissertation
Fellowship.
1
Antiglobalization and Radical Environmentalism: An Exchange on Ethical Grounds
technological solutions to environmental ills, nearly always obfuscate what is
seen as the most important factor contributing to environmental decline: global
capitalism’s inherent pursuit of unfettered economic growth. Habermas (1981)
was right to characterize (traditional) environmentalism as a “defensive” social
movement because of its heritage of resistance to this expansionistic tendency.
Indeed, its historical mandate has been to defend against the erosion of the lifeworld by the ever-increasing complexity of the economic-administrative
complex, and in this vein, one of its essential qualities is a strident “critique of
growth” (Habermas 1981, 34). Thus, many see calls for “ecological
modernization,” “sustainable development,” and “wise use,” as betrayals of
environmentalism’s true character. Representing this attitude in paradigmatic
fashion is Richard Smith, who laments:
As long as [Tony] Blair, [Sir Nicholas] Stern, Al Gore, and the rest
of the corporate and political elite are committed to maintaining
and perpetuating global capitalism as their first and foremost
priority, they have no choice but to subordinate the environment
to growth and consumption, override their own environmental
targets, turn themselves into hypocrites, and doom the future of
humanity (2007, 26).
Accordingly, for many, the present era of carbon credits, “clean coal,” and slick
“corporate responsibility” campaigns promises nothing more than a
continuance of environmental depletion on a global scale. Environmental ethics
in this climate are thus an ethics in progress—a desperate striving for novel
answers to that fundamental question, ‘what is to be done?’
Increasingly, some are answering this question by taking up arms.
Existing on the “radical cusp” between political action and militancy (Beck
2007) is the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) which, since 1997, has committed
over 600 acts of sabotage and arson in North America, causing over $100
million in damages to biomedical research centres, logging companies, ski
resorts, and SUV dealerships (Joosse 2012; Rosebraugh 2004). Abandoning
traditional politics in favor of “direct action,” this group and others like it seek
to create a transnational, revolutionary challenge to neoliberal globalism.
New avenues for ethical consideration and critique are inevitably raised
by these developments, and this article will serve as a vehicle for a preliminary
airing of some of these. Specifically, in what follows I make the case that the
rise of radical environmentalism in North America is part and parcel of the
larger development of the more general anti-globalization/anti-capitalist
movement, a fact that allows for a ‘cross-pollination’ of critique between the
two phenomena. Ethical debates that take place within the antiglobalization
movement can have salience when considering radical environmentalism—and
vice versa. Following from this premise, I assess the applicability of three
major criticisms of “globalization from below” (described below) to the case of
the ELF, namely: a) that its preoccupation with the transnational sphere and
34
Paul Joosse
abandonment of national electoral politics is misguided; b) that direct actions
such as property destruction are counterproductive to the wider aims of the
movement; and c) that episodic cycles of contention, whether they be in the
form of mega-protests or direct action attacks do very little to encourage
practical, local, and sustained action in the service of global justice.
Thus, while others have sought to assess whether the actions of the ELF
can be justified morally on its own terms (Vanderheiden 2005; Brown 2007),
this article seeks to situate radical environmentalism in a wider context of
political contention, assessing the ethical and tactical feasibility ELF-style direct
action.
In
his
rebuttal
against
those
who
would
equate
2
ecotage/monkeywrenching with terrorism, Vanderheiden writes: “Defending
ecotage as distinct from terrorism need not necessarily entail endorsing it as an
effective part of a larger strategy, and more debate over its merits and perils is
needed before the former can be taken to involve the latter” (Vanderheiden
2008, 316).
I hope that this paper will contribute to the discussion by positioning
debates over ecotage and environmentally-motivated arson within the larger
discourses and ethical considerations of the anti-globalization movement.
The Anti-Globalization Movement
Variously called anti-capitalism (McNally 2002), “globalization from below”
(Falk 1993; della Porta 2005; della Porta 2006), or “alter-globalization” (Best
and Nocella 2006c, 20; Starr 2006), the anti-globalization movement seeks to
tie together a wide range of issues into a global “movement of movements”
(Harvie, Milburn, Trott and Watts 2005), which accommodates a slew of
different and sometimes conflicting struggles surrounding issues such as global
warming, human rights, nuclear proliferation, and poverty. If there is one
unifying theme for the movement, however, it seems to be an agreement on
the need to challenge the neoliberal domination of the transnational sphere,
what Richard Falk refers to as “globalization-from-above” (1993, 39).
Though the movement has had a long developmental history, with
precedents going back to the anti-slavery and international workers
movements during the era of European colonialism (Broad and Heckscher
2003), its modern formulation is widely seen to have come to a head through a
series of mega-protests at major meetings of the G8, World Bank, IMF, Summit
of the Americas, and WTO. Also important have been venues such as the World
Earth First! leader Dave Foreman defined monkeywrenching as “nonviolent resistance
to the destruction of natural diversity and wilderness. It is never directed against
human beings or other forms of life. It is aimed at inanimate machines and tools that
are destroying life. Care is always taken to minimize any possible threat to people,
including to the monkeywrenchers themselves” (Foreman and Haywood 1993, 9).
2
35
Social Forum, which have explored the possibility of a “new kind of
globalization” (Ramonet 2001). The movement had gathered so much
momentum by the turn of the century that Walden Bello went so far as to
predict that the year 2000 (in which he includes November 1999’s “Battle of
Seattle”) “would go down as one of those defining moments in the history of the
world economy, like 1929” (Bello 2001, 1).
Despite sporadic resurgences (the Occupy movements being the most
recent iteration [Gitlin 2012]), the revolutionary acceleration that Bello saw in
2001 seems to have stalled. According to Gregory Albo, a change in the
“ideological climate” since the attacks of September 11, 2001, has “sealed the
political opening that was being exploited by the anti-globalization movement”
and has “provide[d] a serious check on the freedom of assembly” (quoted in
French 2002, 3). Indeed, in the wake of the attacks on the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon, we have seen a delegitimation of protest tactics generally—
especially those that would directly and fervently challenge basic principles of
liberal democracies. The implementation of the PATRIOT Act has undoubtedly
served to stymie radical mobilizations in the US, both through the creation of
legal climes that are favorable to the counter-mobilizations of state agencies
such as the FBI, and, more generally, through the fear that it inspires in
potential anti-globalization movement adherents.
Aside from these external factors, the tactics of the anti-globalization
movement have met with considerable controversy even among those who are
generally ideologically sympathetic. For instance, some on the left are strongly
critical, claiming that the movement as it has manifested contains many
strategic deficiencies. Below, I will describe these general criticisms of antiglobalization and determine whether they are applicable to the specific case of
the ELF. First, however, I must make the case that it makes sense to regard the
ELF and its actions as being part of, or at least analogous to, the antiglobalization movement.
The
Historical
Rise
of
Anarchism
and
Anti-Globalist
Sentiments in the Radical Environmental Movement
Although direct action among workers’ movements has a history that stretches
back to the Luddites of 19th century England, direct actions motivated by “deep
ecological”3 environmental concerns first appeared only twenty-five years ago.
In 1973, Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess made a distinction between the ‘deep’
and ‘shallow’ ecological movements. The main difference that he saw between these
movements is that deep ecology is biocentric, while shallow ecology is anthropocentric.
In other words, deep ecology sees things in nature as having intrinsic worth, while
shallow ecology sees nature as having only instrumental value in that it serves
humanity’s wants and needs (Naess 1973).
3
36
Paul Joosse
At this time, radical environmentalist groups like Earth First! began employing
direct action tactics such as civil disobedience and monkeywrenching in their
efforts to halt the degradation of wilderness. Before 1992, when Earth First!
abandoned its sanctioning of illegal tactics (Taylor 1998, 20; see also Molland
2006, 48-51), treespiking, treesitting, and the sabotage of logging equipment
were hallmarks of the movement.
This development owes to a particular set of historical circumstances
that favored unconventional protest and action through two motivational
factors. First, the advent of Ronald Reagan’s presidency 1981 fostered a general
fear about his environmentally irresponsible vision for America. This was
especially so during the tenure of Reagan’s first Secretary of the Interior, James
Watt, who many saw as representing the most irresponsible form of Christian
millenarianism.4 Rothman maintained that, at this time, “mainstream
environmental organizations experienced remarkable growth in membership
as a direct result of Watt’s policies” (2000, 170). It would seem, however, that
radical groups experienced this growth as well. Prominent Earth First!er
Christopher Manes also saw an “influx of people frightened into environmental
activism by the retrograde policies of President Reagan’s maladroit and
messianic secretary of the interior, James Watt” (1990, 49).
Despite the current liberal or anarchical reputation of the radical
environmental movement, it is important to note that at this stage in its
development, Earth First! bore the indelible stamp of its most important
forbearer, Edward Abbey.5 Indeed, it initially attracted mainly those with
libertarian tendencies or, as Foreman’s supporters playfully referred to
themselves— “rednecks for wilderness” (Taylor 2005, 519). Thus, Foreman, a
supporter of the Vietnam War and former campaign manager for Barry
Goldwater (Lee 1995, 27), does not at all typify the group that Earth First!
eventually became, nor the splinter group that would lead to the ELF. Writes
Taylor:
Foreman wished to focus the movement exclusively on
conserving the earth’s biological diversity … . He did not assume
that nation-states were intractably corrupt and impossible to
influence democratically. Unlike a growing number of Earth
First!ers, Foreman did not consider himself a revolutionary at
It was widely reported that, in Congress, Watt once refuted arguments for conserving
natural resources by saying, “I do not know how many future generations we can count
on before the Lord returns” (Martin 1982, 35).
5 Edward Abbey was an American novelist, essayist, and raucously libertarian
conservative who wrote The Monkey Wrench Gang, a novel about a troupe of ecobandits who seek to preserve the American southwest from development through the
sabotage of machinery such as bulldozers and trains. The book was a major source of
inspiration for Dave Foreman and other founders of Earth First!, and the term
‘monkeywrenching’ (see note 2) entered the radical environmental vernacular through
the book’s popularity.
4
37
war with the entire industrial system or western civilization itself
(2005, 519).
Indeed, as the 1980s progressed, Foreman began to lament the
anarchical direction that the movement was taking, and he found it
increasingly necessary to point out to newer members that Earth First! did
“not emerge from the anarchist movement, or from the left. Neither were we
born of sea foam, like The Birth of Venus. Earth First! came directly out of the
public lands conservation movement” (Foreman 1991, 217). He resented those
who “wear their ‘radicalness’ as a badge ... [and who] have been attracted to
Earth First! because it represented to them a reincarnation of the style and
intensity of the New Left” (Foreman 1991, 217). In Taylor’s analysis, Foreman
led a disgruntled faction of old guard Earth First!ers who believed “that tying
environmental protection to other issues, such as social justice, antiimperialism, or workers' rights, alienates many potential wilderness
sympathizers”—Earth First!’s traditional base (1994, 199). In 1989, when it
became clear to Foreman that the anarchical turn within Earth First! would be
lasting, he left altogether and started the Wildlands Project and its affiliated
journal, Wild Earth.6
If traditional Earth First! members such as Dave Foreman were leaving
because of ideological disagreements, others, who had no qualms with the
anarchical turn, were growing disgruntled with the organization’s movement
towards abandoning illegal tactics (Taylor 1998, 20; see also Molland 2006, 4851). These newer members would not truck with the leadership’s attempts to
quell monkeywrenching and other more extreme forms of direct action.
Although it is difficult to pinpoint with certainty the moment that clandestine
groups like the ELF form, Taylor cites various Earth First! sources which claim
that the ELF began as a radical offshoot of Earth First! in England in 1992
(2005, 521). Plows, Wall, and Doherty (2004) interviewed members of Britain’s
Earth First!, and among them was Edgar (pseudonym) who recalls that at Earth
First!’s national gathering of that year it was agreed that:
Earth First! would be split into two. On the one hand there would
be an underground group the Earth Liberation Front which would
do ecotage and all the embarrassing naughtiness stuff and, on the
other hand, all the open civil disobedience kind of thing that
would retain the name Earth First! … people were insisting there
if there was going to be a split it shouldn’t be a case of
competition between units. They should be supportive so there
should be toleration by groups (Plows et al. 2004, 202).
Despite the apparent amiability of this schism as Edgar describes it, Plows et al.
go on to note that “most in EF! (UK) were hostile to the ELF, viewing it as a
6Wild
Earth ceased publication in 2004.
38
Paul Joosse
product of masculine posturing” (2004, 202). This first British wave of attacks
seems to have inspired similar developments in North America. By 1996, ELF
actions were occurring in the United States, and have continued at a
remarkable pace ever since then (Molland 2006, 53-55). James Jarboe, the
FBI’s top domestic terrorism officer, linked the ELF to 600 criminal acts
committed between 1996 and 2002, totaling $43 million in damages (Leader
and Probst 2003, 38). Most destructive of these was the arson of Vail Ski Resort
in Colorado resulting in $12 million in damages. In August 2003, the ELF
claimed responsibility for the arson of a 206-unit apartment complex that had
been under construction in San Diego, causing roughly $50 million in damages
(Ackerman 2003a, 143). In March of 2008, north of Woodinville, Washington,
four yet-to-be-inhabited multimillion dollar homes that had been advertised as
‘eco-friendly’ were burned. The banner allegedly left by ELF adherents read,
“Built green? Nope black! McMansions in RCD's [rural cluster developments] r
[are] not green. ELF.”
There are three reasons why it no longer makes sense to postulate a
necessary connection between Earth First! in the USA and what is now known
as ELF. First, similar to the British context, though the initial call for the
development of the ELF came from within Earth First!’s ranks, there are
undoubtedly many in Earth First! who are unsupportive and even hostile to the
ELF because of its tactics. Second, with the rhizomatic branching that
characterizes the way that the ELF garners recruits (Joosse 2007), the ELF has
outgrown any necessary ties with its parent organization as a simple matter of
organizational drift. Finally, the notoriety of the ELF, because of their penchant
for arson attacks, has reached a scale that far surpasses any achieved by Earth
First! in the past (Joosse 2012).
The Anti-Globalist ELF Ideology
In the pamphlet “Frequently Asked Questions” published by the North
American ELF Press Office, we can read the statement:
It is not enough to work solely on single, individual
environmental issues ... the capitalist state and its symbols of
propaganda must also be targeted... the ELF ideology maintains
that it is the very social and political ideology in operation
throughout westernized countries that is creating various
injustices on this planet and ultimately the destruction of life.
That ideology is capitalism and the mindset that allows it to exist
(quoted in Ackerman 2003b, 189).
Such proclamations are crucial to my case that we should regard the ELF and
its supporting community as a radical reticulation of the wider antiglobalization movement. While the ideological leanings of particular ELF
39
adherents may be difficult to ascertain because of their clandestine nature
(Joosse 2007), thus far much evidence seems to point in this direction.
Convicted ELF actors frequently display anti-globalist and anarchist
tendencies. Craig 'Critter' Marshall, who served a five-and-a-half year sentence
for fire-bombing a Chevrolet dealership in Eugene, Oregon, admitted to New
York Times reporter Bruce Barcott that growing up, he “held political beliefs
that weren’t so much pro-environment as anti-authority” (Barcott 2002, 58). In
an article entitled, “Attack the System,” he professes to have come to the
conclusion that “what we need to attack is the totality of the death machine that
is industrial society, AKA civilization” (2006, 195). Similarly, Jeffrey Luers, who
was sentenced to twenty-two year and eight-month years in prison for his
participation in the arson,7 remarked in an interview with Earth First! Journal
that “originally I was radicalized by anti-authoritarian, anarchist beliefs, as
well as animal rights,” and that his environmental radicalism came only in
1997.8 According to ethnographer Bron Taylor, ELF spokespersons Craig
Rosebraugh and Leslie James Pickering “were drawn to the ELF because, as
anarchists, if not anarcho-primitivists, they perceived fellow travelers behind
the anti-industrial rhetoric of some ELF statements” (2003, 177). Thus, it would
seem that the change embraced by some in the radical environmental
movement, from the relatively mild direct actions of Earth First! to the
incendiary tactics of the ELF, was the result of an influx of those who ‘greened’
their preexisting sympathies towards anarchism and anti-globalization, rather
than through an increased radicalization of long-term members.
Perhaps most instructive with regard to the green anarchist ideological
orientations of ELF actors are the communiqués that usually follow actions.
One communiqué, released after an arson attack on a United States Forest
Service research station in Irvine, Pennsylvania, on August 11, 2002, claimed
that:
This lesson in “prescribed fire” was a natural, necessary response
to the threats posed to life in the Allegheny Forest by proposed
timber sales, oil drilling, and greed-driven manipulation of
Nature... .
... These agencies continue to ignore and mislead the public, at the
bidding of their corporate masters ... the irrevocable acts of
extreme violence they perpetrate against the Earth daily are all
inexcusable, and will not be tolerated. If they persist in their
crimes against life, they will be met with maximum retaliation... .
The diverse efforts of this revolutionary force cannot be
contained, and will only continue to intensify as we are brought
face to face with the oppressor in inevitable, violent
confrontation. We will stand up and fight for our lives against this
Hi sentence was later reduced to ten years.
Interview available at <www.spiritoffreedom.org.uk/profiles/free/ef.html> accessed
October 20, 2008.
7
8
40
Paul Joosse
iniquitous civilization until its reign of TERROR is forced to an
end—by any means necessary (quoted in Best and Nocella 2006a,
413-414).
An arson at Boise Cascade’s (a multinational logging company) 8,000 squarefoot northwest headquarters was followed by the ELF communiqué below,
which professed a knowledge and outrage at the corporation’s international
operations:
Boise Cascade has been very naughty. After ravaging the forests
of the Pacific Northwest, Boise Cascade now looks toward the
virgin forests of Chile. Early Christmas morning, elves left coal in
Boise Cascade’s stocking. Four buckets of diesel and gas with
kitchen timer delay destroyed their regional headquarters in
Monmouth, Oregon.
Let this be a lesson to all greedy multinational corporations who
don’t respect their ecosystems (quoted in Rosebraugh 2004, 94).
Finally, one of the most incendiary of the communiqués was also one of the
earliest, released in 1997:
ELF works to speed up the collapse of industry, to scare the rich,
and to undermine the foundations of the state. We embrace social
and deep ecology as a practical resistance movement... . We take
inspiration from Luddites, Levellers, Diggers, the Autonome
squatter movement, the ALF, the Zapatistas, and the little
people—those mischievous elves of lore... . let’s dance as we make
ruins of the corporate money system (quoted in Rosebraugh
2004, 20).
These communiqués display many hallmark themes of the anti-globalization
movement—most notably a commitment to fighting neoliberal capitalism and a
general disdain for hierarchical authority structures.
Some publications, such as the quarterly, Green Anarchy: An AntiCivilization Journal of Theory and Action, also give signal to the general
ideological orientation of the milieu in which the ELF operates. The journal
reports on ELF actions worldwide highlight the plight of ELF prisoners, and
frequently contains articles by John Zerzan and other anarcho-primitivists who
figure heavily in the most revolutionary strains of radical environmentalism
(Best and Nocella 2006b, 18). The Spring 2006 issue of Green Anarchy contains
sections devoted to “anti-capitalist and anti-state activities,” “anarchist
resistance,” and “ecological resistance” (Anonymous 2006, 40-43, 45, 36, 30).
The theme of worldwide revolution also figures very prominently in the
discourses of ELF adherents. Best and Nocella’s book,9 which contains chapters
by ELF prisoners and ELF communiqués, is titled Igniting a Revolution: Voices
It is published by, AK Press, which is “a worker run book publisher and distributor
organized around anarchist principles.”
9
41
in Defense of the Earth, implying that ELF arsons are meant to serve as catalysts
to a wider revolutionary force. In a more aggressive tone, ELF spokesperson
Leslie James Pickering writes, “we’ve gotta prove to the people that we are
fighting to win, that revolution is possible, that we can turn this motherfucker
upside down and finally break free” (2006, 305). Many ELF proponents, when
speaking about their revolutionary role, display a penchant for aggrandizing
their struggle to near universal proportions. Best and Nocella maintain that
their effort is in solidarity with:
Earth liberationists, animal liberationists, Black liberationists,
Native Americans, ecofeminists, political prisoners, primitivists,
saboteurs, grassroots activists, and militant academics. It reaches
out to exploited workers, indigenous peoples, subsistence
farmers, tribes pushed to the brink of extinction, guerilla armies,
armed insurgents, disenfranchised youth, and to all others who
struggle against the advancing juggernaut of global capitalism,
neo-fascism, imperialism, militarism, and phony wars on
terrorism that front for attacks on dissent and democracy (2006b,
24).
Thus, within the ELF and in its surrounding group of supporters we find many
ideological linkages and cross-connections with attitudes prevalent in the wider
anti-globalization movement. A focus on the injustices of neoliberal capitalism,
a dismissive attitude towards nation-states and electoral politics, claims of
solidarity with many other social movements, and the belief that a
transnational revolution is in the making are all common themes.
Discussion: Criticisms of the Anti-Globalization Movement
and Their Applicability to the ELF
If we can regard the ELF as one extension, among many, of the larger antiglobalization movement, then we would do well to assess it on those terms.
Aside from the obvious neoliberal objections that corporate elites and some
state leaders have to the anti-globalization movement, the movement also has
endured much criticism from those on the left. These criticisms have taken
three main forms.
First, there has been much criticism against some forms of the ‘direct
action’10 prevalent in the movement, especially the property destruction carried
out by the Black Bloc (protesters who traditionally wear black face coverings to
foster anonymity and a sense of unity during protests) and other anarchical
elements. Because the media unfailingly frames these actions as “senseless
violence” and links them to “discourses of terrorism and fear” (Juris 2005,
‘Direct action’ is an umbrella term that includes acts of civil disobedience, such as sitins, as well as acts of sabotage and property destruction.
10
42
Paul Joosse
423), many feel that these actions work counter to the movement’s aims by
enabling corporate media and law enforcement to demonize activists as
anarchical parasites who seek to take advantage of the free-for-all atmosphere
created by mega-protests (Albertani 2002). The media’s often sensationalistic
gaze means that a few acts of property destruction can taint public perceptions
of an entire protest, and accordingly, many of the most vehement arguments
against property destruction have been leveled by more moderate, ‘reformist’
factions of the left (discussed by McNally 2002, 246-247; Rosebraugh 2004,
92). In sum, this first criticism argues that property destruction has had a
negative effect on the seriousness with which political leaders and the public
take the protests, and has resulted in a further legitimation of police brutality
and the militarization of protest management.
On the one hand, the ELF’s actions do not occur in conjunction with
specific protests, and it cannot, therefore, be accused of acting to sabotage
these protests’ effectiveness in any immediate way. On the other hand, despite
the best efforts of ELF spokespersons, corporate and state interests have been
very successful in shaping popular conceptions of the ELF as an “ecoterrorist”
organization (Joosse 2012; Vanderheiden 2008). As a result, discourses of
ecoterrorism have been normalized to the point where John Lewis, who is an
FBI deputy assistant director and top official in charge of domestic terrorism,
labeled ecoterrorism—along with animal liberation terrorism—as “the No. 1
domestic terrorism threat”11 in 2005 (quoted in Schuster 2005). Thus, the ELF
has unwittingly played a crucial role in furthering the capitalist interest in
frame-bridging between the “war on terror” and anti-environmentalism in
North America and promulgating the stereotypical vision of greens as antirational, potentially dangerous, ‘kooks.’ Thus, while the ELF may not be
damaging in an immediate way to the mega-protests of the anti-globalization
movement, in the wider arena of public discourse in which there is a struggle to
make environmental and radical social justice concerns legitimate, the ELF has
clearly played a similarly damaging role as the Black Bloc, which often had a
‘spoiler’ effect on the otherwise-peaceful mega-protests of the antiglobalization movement.
The second criticism comes from environmental activists and theorists
who question the effectiveness of the mega-protests themselves as a form of
resistance. Naomi Klein has criticized the mega-protest strategy, saying that it
tends to attract “meeting-stalkers, [who are intent on] following the trade
bureaucrats as if they were the Grateful Dead” (2000, 4 of 6). Similarly, Stainsby
(2003) points to a need to move beyond what he somewhat playfully and
somewhat derisively refers to as “summit-hopping.” The general thrust of these
This ‘number one’ designation had been reserved for right-wing militias that have
spawned the likes of bomber Timothy McVeigh and murderous anti-abortionists like
Eric Rudolph.
11
43
criticisms is that, while the major gatherings provide a venue for people to
profess their idealistic visions for the future and for global change, they provide
very little direction or motivation for concrete, local action in the times between
these gatherings. What is more, in the aftermath of the ‘Battle of Seattle,’ the
shifting of the 2001 Asian Development Bank meeting from Seattle to Honolulu
(Bello 2001) and the siting of the 2002 G8 summit in Kananaskis, Alberta,
show that there is nothing to prevent meeting organizers from simply moving
meetings to increasingly inaccessible locations in order to avoid uncomfortable
confrontations with protestors. Thus, the mega-protests—which are aimed at
giving a voice to those who are ‘below,’ could ironically serve as impetus for a
‘Bilderbergization’ of meetings—creating more distance between the powerful
and the powerless.
In some senses, the method of the ELF would seem to be the perfect
antidote to the highly episodic form that the anti-globalization movement has
taken thus far. Through the strategy of “leaderless resistance,” the ELF
encourages ongoing, local action in response to specific environmental
problems (Joosse 2007; 2012). By seeking to cause economic damage to
corporations with environmentally deleterious practices, the ELF strives to
make a practical difference by eliminating the profit motive from
environmental destruction. Indeed, as history has shown, and as is discussed
above, the impetus for the formation of radical groups like the ELF and, in its
time, Earth First!, was the desire to move beyond mere banner-waving in favor
of getting real results.
When one looks over the years in which the ELF has been operative,
however, the actions have proven to be not only impractical, but
counterproductive. Insurance payouts often mean that corporate operations
will continue after a brief interruption—at times even on a greater scale after
having been given the opportunity to build new facilities (as happened with the
Vail ski resort). What is more, the lack of broader organizational cooperation
among ELF adherents may foster the NIMBY (“Not in my back yard.”) effect, so
that even if actions are actually successful in driving corporate operations
away from a particular area, the problems associated with them may merely be
exported to other areas where, for whatever reason, there is a less bullish
environmental activist community. Finally, though ELF adherents intend that
their actions will serve to spark a wider revolutionary force “from below,” one
cannot help but sense that there is something elitist in the way that these small
bands of would-be heroes are seeking this catalytic role for themselves. Thus,
while (from the perspective of movement adherents) there may be some
immediate benefits to the ELF’s challenging of corporate operations in some
areas, their actions are still very different from the inclusive, continual, local,
political involvement that is sorely lacking in the anti-globalization movement
generally. This brings us to the last critique of the anti-globalization movement
that we will consider here.
44
Paul Joosse
Third and finally, some criticize the anti-globalization movement’s near
exclusive preoccupation with the transnational political sphere. Anti-globalists
often see their protests not “as acting in opposition within a particular state,
nor [in] the relation of society and the state, but … more and more [as] acting to
promote a certain kind of political consciousness transnationally that could
radiate influence in a variety of directions” (Falk 1993, 47). McNally similarly
advocates that we “overcome the horizons of nationalism” (2002, 241) and
downplays the importance of national, electoral politics though his
recommendation of “the overcoming of passive, representative ‘democracy’ by
activist, direct democracy” (2002, 240). Contrasting this view, Laxer (2003)
argues that states remain central actors in the world economy, and that
combating the U.S.—the most powerful state in the world—is an essential
component to any serious challenge of neoliberal globalism (see also Gindin
2003). In this argument, national contexts are the most effective locus of
resistance, because the U.S.’s interests are negotiated and enacted often not
directly, but rather through the governments of core state allies that are
complicit with neoliberal aims. Thus, discourses of nationalism and systems of
electoral politics have the greatest potential for mobilizing citizens to challenge
and change their governments’ complicity with the economic aims of
American-led corporate globalization.
Clearly mobilizing in this regard are grievances that stem from trade
disputes between the U.S. and its core allies. The disputes that have occurred
between Canada and the U.S. over softwood lumber and steel tariffs in recent
years are examples. Additionally, a too-close relationship with the U.S. has the
potential to be toxic for the careers of individual national political leaders. Tony
Blair, for example, endured much criticism for his government’s lock-step
following of US foreign policy (Cowell 2006), and during his tenure, it was clear
that no self-respecting British citizen wanted to be led by someone who is
portrayed as an emasculated “poodle” of George W. Bush (Hoge 2002; Hoge
2003; Stanley 2006; Tyler 2004). Other leaders who have been largely
supportive of the US’s foreign policy aspirations, such as Stephen Harper in
Canada, have had to fend off similar accusations. Thus, keeping the “poodle”
perception at bay has been a key impression-management problem for
national leadership generally.
Those who argue for nationalistic resistance to US imperialism believe
that the grievances of the core nation states that surround the US can have vast
implications—if these grievances reach a sufficient pitch. They argue that
these nations do in fact have the power (collectively, if not singularly) to
jeopardize the taken-for-granted support that the US enjoys and uses to carry
out its foreign policy aims (Canada’s refusal to support the US’s war with Iraq
is one example, the rise of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela offers another). This
decidedly nationalist strategy fittingly requires political mobilizations within
national contexts—a vastly different requirement than that of transnationalists,
45
who see the nation-state as an outmoded and therefore ineffectual political
sphere of resistance.
As we have seen, the ELF, itself a radical branch of the anti-globalization
movement, also has ignored national and international political dynamics,
comporting itself primarily to the transnational sphere. In classic Marxian
transnational fashion, its adherents seek to “ignite” a worldwide revolution, in
which the “elves” rise up to “make ruins of the corporate money system”
(quoted in Rosebraugh 2004, 20). They take no advantage of the mobilizing
potential of international trade disputes, and they have not sought to capitalize
on embarrassing national leaders who are complicit with US hegemony. Thus,
the nationalistic criticism of the anti-globalization movement would seem to be
similarly applicable to the ELF, for though political channels are often
frustrating, giving up on them may be unwise and perilous.
But in the end, debates about the need for national foci may be moot in
the case of the ELF. Even when judged on transnational terms, the ELF is open
to charges of simple failure. Though ELF actions have been occurring since
1992, thus far they have failed to produce any substantial achievements in the
transnational sphere, and have yet to spark even the beginnings of the
transnational mass-movement that adherents had envisioned.
Conclusion
This article has made a case for conceiving the ELF as at least analogous with, if
not part of, the larger anti-globalization movement. In the final analysis, it
would seem that criticisms directed against the anti-globalization movement
also provide an interesting starting point for a critique of the ELF and other
advocates of environmentally-motivated large-scale property destruction. These
criticisms have maintained that the movement’s preoccupation with the
transnational sphere and abandonment of national electoral politics is
misguided; that direct actions such as property destruction are
counterproductive to the wider aims of the movement; and that the tactics
employed, whether they be mega-protests or direct action attacks, are too
episodic and do very little to encourage practical, inclusive, local, and sustained
action in the service of global justice. Thus, whatever benefits the ELF gains
from its tactics of property destruction—either in the facilitation of radical
identity formation or in the satisfaction of financially damaging their
enemies—they do not seem to remedy the problems found in the larger antiglobalization movement that it inhabits.
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50
Paul Joosse
Paul Joosse (University of Alberta)
Antiglobalization and Radical Environmentalism: An Exchange on Ethical
Grounds
Abstract: Since 1992, clandestine radical environmentalist cells, calling
themselves the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), have carried out arson attacks in
an effort to punish corporations for environmentally deleterious practices. I
examine the radical environmental movement and find that its recent rise to
prominence and notoriety is part and parcel of the larger development of the
more general anti-globalization/anti-capitalist movement. Specifically, I
examine how, despite its libertarian conservative origins, the ideology of Earth
First! changed after an influx of new members with anti-state, anarchist
sympathies. Finally, I assess the applicability of three major criticisms of
“globalization from below” to the case of the ELF, namely: a) that its
preoccupation with the transnational sphere and abandonment of electoral
politics is misguided, b) that direct actions such as property destruction are
counterproductive to the wider aims of the movement, and, c) that its strategies
of contention are too episodic, and do very little to encourage practical,
inclusive, local, and sustained action in the service of global justice.
Key words: Radical environmentalism, ecoterrorism, anti-globalization, social
movements, environmental ethics, leaderless resistance, Earth Liberation Front
doi:10.14746/eip.2014.1.2
51
Overconsumption, Procreation, and Morality
John Mariana (College of the Canyons, Santa Clarita, California, United States)
Introduction
In an intriguing but mostly overlooked essay, Thomas Young (2001) attempts to
defend the claim that procreation and overconsumption are morally equivalent,
and thus that whatever moral judgment we believe applies to one applies to
the other. Specifically Young means to show that to the extent that one
condemns overconsumption (for any number of reasons) but finds procreation
acceptable or even laudable, then one holds an inconsistent set of moral
convictions, and in particular he targets those whom he calls “mainstream
environmentalists” as being guilty of such inconsistency (Young 2001, 183).1 So
his audience is, by his own admission, fairly narrowly specified, and indeed he
further restricts his ambitions in the essay by refusing to attempt a full defense
of any specific implication of the claim of moral equivalence. He says that his
primary interest is in the analogical argument he presents in support of the
equivalence claim – which claim, for convenience, I shall call ME – and that
though he finds refraining entirely from procreating to be “the lesser of two
evils” (the two evils being on the one hand giving up having children, and on the
other hand lowering the quality of life for all through environmental
degradation), his support of this position “will be brief, for [his] main concern
was to expose a bedrock inconsistency in mainstream environmentalism, not
to defend a particular option (that is, a particular set of consistent beliefs)”
(Young 2001, 190).
But the implications of ME are surely more sweeping than Young is
interested to acknowledge, and the modesty of his proposal seems feigned. If
ME is true, then even those who see nothing wrong in what Young calls
overconsumption must accept that procreation is morally legitimate only to the
extent that it entails the legitimate overconsumption of resources. This makes
Young’s analogy far more contentious than he makes it seem. Considering how
much importance he places on the analogy alone, it’s curious that his support of
it is so glib and hasty. I shall argue that Young’s case for ME does not succeed. I
I do not take this claim to be meant as a demographically or sociologically or politically
accurate generalization –viz., that people who would identify themselves as, or who are
(by some definition), “mainstream environmentalists” do as a rule hold such a set of
beliefs – but merely as a means of designating the people Young has in mind. Young’s
usage here is surely strategic, but whether his use of this terminology for this purpose
is fair or accurate will not be among my concerns here.
1
John Mariana
believe that his support for the equivalence claim could be much stronger than
it is, and I will suggest some ways in which Young’s claims could be more
effectively defended, as well as explain why I think they are worth serious
reflection. But I shall also argue that, in the end, this reflection leads to the
conclusion that ME cannot be supported with the kinds of moral-theoretical
resources Young deploys.
Young’s Analogy
First I should explain how Young attempts to defend ME. As I have said, his basis
for the equivalency claim is analogical. In fact, he sets up his argument with a
thought experiment involving two hypothetical families: the Greens and the
Grays. The Greens, as you’ve probably guessed, have no children and are not
planning on having any and are average Americans who consume at an average
American rate and level. The Grays have two children, or plan to, but in all other
respects are identical to the Greens in terms of resource consumption. By
having two children, the Grays will increase their total resource-consumption
footprint by two-and-a-half times. For the Greens to match the Grays without
children they would have to increase their consumption by an equivalent
amount, which would mean overconsumption. And since the motives for and
effects of both choices are essentially the same, procreation and
overconsumption are morally equivalent.
So that this isn’t all just abstract theorizing, Young refers at this point
to another intriguing paper by Hall et al. (1994), titled “The Environmental
Consequences of Having a Baby in the United States,” for hard scientific data to
quantify exactly what counts as “average” American consumption at 1990
levels, and thus what would count as overconsumption – which he defines as
any consumption that exceeds the average. On this basis he is able to cash out
the concept of overconsumption in a numerically precise way, so at least he
isn’t open to the charge of vagueness or of vacuity (that overconsumption
(excessive consumption) is simply any amount of consumption that would be
morally blameworthy). But of course this has both the advantages and the
disadvantages of exactness, and it raises is/ought problems that Young would
clearly prefer to avoid.
Even if you don’t count yourself an environmentalist, you’re probably
wondering why average American consumption isn’t itself, by definition,
overconsumption. After all, as Hall clearly shows, the average American
consumes more than 300 times the average of people in some other parts of
the world.2 But then these are places where the people – by our standards – are
either desperately poor or adhere to a pre-industrial form of life. So on what
Hall (1994) quantifies not only average American consumption, but average
consumption elsewhere in the world, to provide a basis for comparison.
2
53
basis are we to say that any group of people overconsume? Isn’t any rate of
consumption thus relative and not absolute? Ultimately the numbers game is
not just a trick to make Young’s argument sound scientific. We can say that a
group of people overconsume relative to the total availability and quantity of
resources at a given time; and, as is well known by now, Americans consume
annually more than a quarter of the energy produced worldwide, though we
represent only a small fraction of the world’s population (less than 10%)
(Assadourian et al. 2004, 11). This makes average American consumption
exceedingly demanding on global resources. From a morally neutral, numerical
point of view, however, rates of consumption are relative. We could say in a
purely numerical sense that even the average American overconsumes relative
to some baseline level of average consumption for the rest of the world, or for
the majority of its population.
But of course the question whether a rate of consumption 300 times
the average rate in say, Sri Lanka, is excessive in any moral sense depends on
both the consequences of the framework of production and consumption that
includes this disparity and on the even trickier issue of whether the average Sri
Lankan (or whoever) is capable of consuming enough to have a reasonably
high quality of life. Of course a judgment of overconsumption – what Young
rather non-neutrally calls “eco-gluttony” – also implies a moral judgment, and
not simply a metrical assessment of the relative usage of goods produced to the
size of a given population. On this point Young is content to simply stipulate:
any rate of consumption that exceeds the average American rate we shall call,
for the purposes of this argument, “overconsumption.” He is also content to
simply appeal to the moral intuitions of his target audience. If you’re inclined
to be tolerant of the average American rate of consumption, but you think that
consumption beyond (or much beyond) this level is excessive and bad (or even
wrong), then ME shows that you must apply the same judgment to procreation.
All of this will prove significant later on.
Before we move forward, there’s just one other little wrinkle to address,
which you’re probably also wondering about. Even if you’re not a
mathematician you’re probably wondering why the Grays would increase their
consumption two and a half times by having two children, and not just two
times. Two people, two units of consumption. So, four people, four units of
consumption, right? And, for that matter, how come the Gray children count
toward their parents’ consumption?
At this point Young makes a fairly obvious (though very important)
observation which will also prove significant. His observation is this: the
existence of children, and thus of the additional consumption they will
represent, is (generally) a direct result of the conscious choices of their
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John Mariana
parents.3 Thus, your rate of consumption is calculated as a combination of your
own consumption plus the total lifetime consumption of your children. (If we
wanted to really lay on the guilt and the sense of overwhelming moral
responsibility, we should note that Young’s claim here, if true, would imply that
you are also responsible for your children’s children’s consumption, or at least
for the portion of it that you will live to subsidize as grandparents and as coinhabitants of the planet.) Again for convenience, I shall call this claim that
parents are morally responsible for their children’s existence and resource
consumption MR.
From ME and MR Young derives the calculation that the Grays would
increase their consumption two and a half times by having two children. If two
30-year-olds represent 50 more years of consumption apiece, and their two
children represent 80 years apiece, or 160 years total, then that’s 100 years of
consumption plus 160 years, or 260 years, which is just over five times the
average single adult unit; hence, 2.5 times the consumption of two people (5 =
(2.5)(2)). Again Young is playing the numbers game; of course all of these are
averages. And he doesn’t seem to take the effects of co-habitation into account –
that members of the same household tend to share resources (one vacuum and
one lawnmower for four or more people, say, instead of just for two) – though
perhaps these effects would be relatively negligible.
Following his development of the analogy, Young attempts to defend it
through an assessment and rejection of a variety of potential dissimilarities
between procreation and overconsumption that would undermine the
comparison. Obviously the claim most in need of defense here is that the
motives and effects involved in both activities are really all that’s morally
relevant. On the face of it this claim doesn’t seem especially plausible. The
immediately apparent difference between procreation and overconsumption is
that the one activity results in the existence of more people and the other
results merely in the consumption of additional stuff. To say that the motives
underlying these activities and the effects that they produce are all that’s
morally relevant would seem to imply that, morally speaking, there’s no
significant difference between bringing someone into existence and buying a
couple of private jets, which over the course of a lifetime may involve about the
same quantity of resource consumption and depletion. Of course, this is
precisely the sort of objection Young anticipates.
He considers and dismisses four possible dissimilarities between
procreation and overconsumption, which he labels A through D. They’re not
Of course this claim could be challenged, and it would be worth knowing how many
children of those that are born each year are unplanned (and perhaps why and under
what circumstances). This isn’t necessarily a quibble, but I’m going to ignore it for the
remainder of my discussion. Ultimately my criticisms of Young will not in any
important way depend on the answer to this question.
3
55
entirely independent of one another, but he does what he can to separate lines
of counter-argument that might otherwise get run together. Among them they
represent what would seem to be the most obvious and the most decisive
objections to the analogy, and Young leaves few stones unturned. To
summarize, the dissimilarities are: that procreation is less selfish than
overconsumption (A); that having children is a greater source of happiness
than overconsumption (B); that procreation is a basic moral right (C); and that
procreation involves bringing into existence new beings with inherent worth
or value (D). Each of these could have received better and fuller treatment than
Young gives them, most especially C, but this is not my main concern. In
discussing some problems with Young’s handling of these dissimilarities I will
be building up to a larger criticism of Young’s argumentative strategy as a
whole.
The Analogy Defended
Young dispatches Dissimilarity A fairly quickly. He observes that “the claim that
a consumer lifestyle exceeding that of the average American is usually more
selfish than raising a family must be successfully defended, which is unlikely.
Clearly, many people have children for primarily selfish reasons: to continue
genetic lines, to gain an illusory sense of immortality, to revive a marriage, to
minimize loneliness in old age, to feel profoundly wanted, and so on” (Young
2001, 187). Young seems to have forgotten the wording of his own imagined
objection. The question is not whether procreation can or does (sometimes or
often) involve selfish motives, but whether overconsumption is more selfish
than procreation. I suppose this would be difficult to establish, but then this
reveals an ambiguity in Young’s interpretation of the objection, and suggests a
stronger formulation of it.
Though Young is ostensibly concerned with the moral dimensions of
procreation and overconsumption as activities (if you will), he shifts between
what are essentially sociological and statistical observations (which he suggests
are either imprecise or inconclusive) and dubious claims of non-quantifiability,
as it suits his argument. From what standpoint should we evaluate whether one
sort of activity involves more or less selfish motives than another? We could
begin by taking a poll, the point of which would, I suppose, be to discover
empirically, as a matter of psychological fact, whether people who
overconsume generally tend to be selfish people. But what would that show?
The moral question is whether, as a kind of activity, procreation involves more
selfishness than overconsumption. Young also notes that an overconsuming
couple “might have a dozen jet-skies, six jacuzzies [sic], three bars, and an
indoor tennis court so guests will enjoy themselves” (Young 2001, 186). But
again, the question is not whether overconsumers can be selfless in their
overconsumption, but whether overconsumption is more selfish as an activity
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John Mariana
than procreation. Ultimately Young concludes by discounting motivation as
having any substantial bearing on our moral assessment of people’s actions as
permissible or impermissible.4 His example involves two commercial
fishermen: if they both overfish, but one of them does so with the intention of
donating his surplus profit to charity, we would not and should not conclude
that his behavior is morally permissible.
This would seem to be a nice utilitarian conclusion to the matter, but
Young claims no allegiances. He seems to want to play all sides against one
another, with the point being that neither from a utilitarian nor from a
deontological nor from a virtue-ethical point of view will procreation come out
looking any different, morally speaking, from overconsumption. He says:
Notice that this attempt [Dissimilarity B] to locate a relevant
difference between [procreation and overconsumption] is not
based on an intrinsic feature which one has and the other lacks,
but on alleged differences in net utility; in other words, having
children is likely to produce more good (or less bad) than an
overconsumptive lifestyle, all things considered. In response, one
could argue that the utilitarian theory upon which it is based is
indefensible; therefore, though this may be a difference between
the two, it is not a relevant difference. Obviously that response
would satisfy non-consequentialists. Pursuing it, however, is not
possible here, nor is it necessary; we can assume that some
version of utilitarianism is defensible and still show that strategy
B fails to locate a relevant difference (Young 2001, 187).
But his treatment of happiness is just as cavalier as his treatment of selfishness.
Even assuming a utilitarian calculus, “Social scientists, as far as I know, have not
proven that couples with children are – on the average – happier over the
course of a lifetime than couples without children, or that offspring will
experience or create more joy than sorrow in their lifetimes” (ibid.). Here
Young combines the pollster’s approach with a claim of non-quantifiability. We
have not discovered that people who have children are on average happier than
those without, and how could we? What metric of happiness would we or could
we possibly use to decide such a thing? Young isn’t playing fair. He offers up the
absence of social-scientific evidence as though it had been asked for, and then
implies that there would be no way to establish the desired conclusion through
social-scientific study anyway. I suppose such evidence might seem germane to
a utilitarian calculation, but then in that case why couldn’t we assume the
availability of an objective happiness metric, if we’re being granted the
assumption of a utilitarian ethics? Young would at this point need a general
argument against the possibility of a workable utilitarian calculus, but this is
something he just got done saying he doesn’t need.
This would seem to weaken part of the basis of Young’s own argument for ME, but
never mind.
4
57
In fact, his treatment of the good or happiness produced by procreation
overlooks the obvious preference-utilitarian rejoinder that the happiness of
procreation is of a higher or better quality than the happiness of
overconsumption. In fact, given such conventional wisdom as “money can’t buy
happiness” and that children are worth more than material possessions, it’s a
wonder that Young doesn’t even consider this sort of reply. Whether people do
in fact prefer having children to having a lot of stuff could, one would think, be
empirically investigated, but I doubt the results would be in Young’s favor.
Of course it’s everyone’s right, at least in a democratic society, to decide
for themselves what they believe to be good, beyond the thin theory that
undergirds the politico-judicial edifice itself.5 This brings us to Dissimilarity C.
Young argues that the vaunted right to procreate is something that has lately
been called into question, and is hotly contested. He’s right about this, of
course; but here he had an overlooked opportunity to unify and bolster his
entire case. The problem is that doing so in the way I’m about to suggest – the
most natural way open to him given his analogical argument for ME – would
reveal a fundamental weakness in his entire argumentative strategy.
Young wants to avoid committing himself to any particular ethical
theory, which is sensible, but he also wants to locate the harms of procreation in
its effects. As he says, “we must keep in mind that the environmental impact of
the Grays’ (or any couple’s) having children will be much greater than the
Greens’ (or any childless couple’s) being excessive consumers (no matter how
outrageous); this is so because many of those children will reproduce (and
many of them, etc.), resulting in an environmental impact far greater than what
a childless couple could generate via eco-gluttony” (Young 2001, 188). There is
quite obviously a tension here which can only be addressed by some theory of
value. I will argue that the only way this could be done effectively without
appealing to any specific ethical theory is at present simply unavailable.
A Stronger Defense
Young could have unified and strengthened his entire discussion of the
dissimilarities as follows: he could have acknowledged that, in the minds of
many people, procreation produces something – some utility, some kind of
happiness, some good – that overconsumption does not and could not produce;
but he could have argued that no form of value is an island, and that even our
estimate of the value of procreation (or of consumption, or of
overconsumption) is variable relative to our other values, in that the joys of any
one of them, over the long run, produce diminishing returns.
The bottom line here is not simply the environment as such – as a
bedrock value, or a bedrock of value – but environmental resources, children
5
If we assume, for the sake of argument, a Rawlsian point of view.
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included.6 One of the harms that Young mentions arising specifically from
procreation involves “population density, producing a variety of frustrations due
to diminishing space, for example, overcrowded lakes, hiking trails, roadways,
shopping malls, and backcountry” (ibid.). His concerns here seem almost
prosaically poky (not to say liberal-bourgeois: crowded hiking trails?), but they
actually go straight to the heart of his argument: that people, even our own
children, (and hiking trails, for that matter) are not simply valuable for their
own sake, whatever we may say or may think we believe, because the
resilience of our capacity to experience anything as valuable rises and falls in
relation to what economists call the “externalities” that the enjoyment of it
produces. It’s not just a question of uniqueness. Diamonds are highly valued in
our society not because they are rare (which as a matter of fact they aren’t),
but because of what they are in our form of society. The same goes for children,
or so Young could argue.7
This would have enabled him to defend his analogy while at the same
time remaining neutral on the issue of ethical theory, and it would have
provided him with a more effective reply to the counter-arguments he
considers – from the selfishness of overconsumption relative to procreation,
right through to the questions of rights and inherent moral value. The problem
is that this strategy – though free of the taint and the limited appeal of any
particular ethical theory – would of course require a defense of its own. It’s not
just that this isn’t Young’s main interest or concern in his essay; the defense
I’ve proposed would support the analogy and would not require him to take any
more of a stand than he does on its implications. Rather, the defense I’ve
sketched implies something else: namely, that our estimate of the value of
procreation can be amplified or diminished by our estimate of the likely quality
of life of our offspring, relative to other factors.8 This seems to me to be the
most natural way of defending Young’s position, but this reveals a problem that
can’t be easily fixed.
It’s not my intention to be reductionist about this – that what makes any
environmental feature valuable is its utility or its capacity for commodification and
eventual consumption. My point is simply that, if we reject inherent value, as Young
seems to do, then the value of, say, a tree is relational, and is to be located specifically in
the relation of trees to other living and non-living things and their multifarious
movements.
7 This may sound cold. The love one has for one’s children is said to be unconditional,
though of course parents do sometimes disown their offspring. We have probably all
had the experience of disappointedly relinquishing something we deeply loved because
it became spoiled; and particularly awful are those cases in which the thing is spoiled
by the very process of enjoyment itself. One really can have too much of a good thing.
8 This seems to be borne out by actual birthrates around the world. It’s well known that
families in “developed” nations have fewer children on average, but it also seems to be
the case that birthrates generally rise and fall in relation to expectations for future
prosperity – both at the family and at the national level. See, for instance, Modena et al.
(2011); and Tendo and Meewalaarachchi (2009).
6
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The Real Problem: How Many People Should There Be?
What makes Young’s argument so intriguing, and ultimately so revealing, is
that it really just gives voice to an argument intuitively implied by the question:
“How could you think of bringing a child into a world like this?” The only
difference is that Young couches it specifically in terms of environmentalism.
But given that people do in fact ask this question of each other in all
seriousness, I find it surprising that Young’s argument – or some version of it –
has not appeared sooner in the literature. What’s useful in this argument, and
in this question, from a moral-psychological point of view at least, is that it
locates the blame for the bad effects of procreation as much in one’s character
as in the direct effect of one’s actions on others.9
I myself have no children, and I have been accused on many occasions,
sometimes by strangers, of being selfish for having no plans to have children.
I’ve reached a point where I find the charge more puzzling and thoughtprovoking than insulting. My first inclination has always been to take a logical
approach: since my children do not exist and (probably) never will, I could not
be behaving selfishly toward them. How could I be? The charge of selfishness
would seem logically to imply that I owe it to certain potential but non-actual
people to produce them, which sounds on the face of it like nonsense.10 And of
course the logical extension of this would seem also to imply that I’ve got a
moral obligation to reproduce, which just raises even more questions and
absurdities: am I morally obligated to produce as many people as I can, or only
as many as I can responsibly support?
But this prompts more reflective consideration. Perhaps the point is
that refusing to procreate implies something about me as a person; that I am
lacking in some human virtue that I would do well to cultivate. I cannot so
easily dismiss this thought.11 But then the question “How could you think of
bringing a child into a world like this?” turns the tables. It’s not just the
diminished quality of life of your (potential) children that is morally relevant,
and that the wrong of producing them lies solely in this. It also suggests
something about you, both as a (would-be) parent and as a person. In fact, it
This sounds, then, like a virtue-ethical argument; but this is just my starting point, not
the destination.
10 See Narveson (1967).
11 Of course I am well aware that all of this may be as much a matter of instinct and
conformity as anything. People see someone without children and the evolutionarily
ancient part of the brain thinks that this person is a threat to the survival of the tribe;
hence the moral outrage. But this seems to me to be too easy. Whatever may
psychologically or physiologically or evolutionarily motivate people to say that
someone without children is selfish, they are in fact expressing a moral claim about the
value of human life and one’s attitudes toward it, whether or not they realize this. And I
think this claim is worth exploring. Of course my interest in this is essentially
philosophical. I don’t plan on letting anyone talk me into having children. More on this
below.
9
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would seem to imply that thinking of having children in a world like this would
be selfish. Who would you benefit, other than yourself? This turns the
accusation back on the accuser. At this point the question would seem to come
down to who’s got the more accurate view of the current and (likely) future
state of things.12 But in fact the question of who benefits raises an even trickier
question.
Derek Parfit (1984) makes the observation that “in a report of a U.S.
Senate Commission on Population Growth and the American Economy, it is
claimed that ‘there would be no substantial benefits from the continued growth
of the U.S. population.’ This report never considers whether, if extra Americans
were born, this might benefit these Americans” (Parfit 1984, 487). Could you
benefit someone by bringing them into existence? To say that you can would
seem to involve the same sort of absurdity as saying that I am being selfish to
my non-existent children. But Parfit thinks that the claim that you can benefit
someone by causing them to exist is defensible and not clearly absurd. Parfit
claims that if we can judge parts of our lives as having or as not having been
worth living through, then surely we can make the same sort of judgment
about a whole life. And he thinks it’s reasonable to say that a good life is better
than nothing. This, he thinks, does not imply the absurd claim that if someone
had not existed, this would have been worse for them. So we can say without
absurdity that causing someone to exist can be a benefit to them, even though
if they had never existed this could not have been a harm.
As John Leslie rightly observes: “whatever duties we have towards
possible people are shrouded by philosophical mists, and the mists become
particularly thick in the cases of those possible people who won’t ever become
actual” (Leslie 1996, 177). The conceptual issues involved in coming-to-be and
going-out-of-being are deeply puzzling and would seem, at a minimum, to
require ontological commitments of a kind that make the moral questions
especially murky. If potential people can be said to have identities (in some
sense), as Leslie claims, then we can presumably have direct duties of some
sorts to these people. Leslie makes the intuitively plausible claim that
“completely detailed descriptions can in theory be given of [potential people].”13
Indeed, he could, I think, get by with the weaker claim that the indirect or
I am going to assume for the purposes of this discussion – though the assumption
may not be warranted – that whose view is more hopeful is not morally relevant. In my
view, hope itself is only warranted relative to the reasonably expected state of things.
This is essentially a prejudice, but I shall take it as a premise.
13 See Leslie (1996), ibid. If we take this claim really literally, as Jan Narveson (1967)
does, then it starts to sound a lot less plausible; but this is, I think, to overlook its
intuitive plausibility. Leslie perhaps goes too far in saying that we could give
“completely detailed” descriptions of potential people, but as Parfit points out, you could
secure a determinate reference to a non-actual person with a quite simple locution such
as “the child I would produce with my spouse if we conceived one tonight,” and this
person’s genetic identity at least could be precisely specified.
12
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indefinite identification of potential people can be quite enough to secure a
moral or psychological claim, such as that I would have duties to and a special
concern for my own children, whoever they are. This puts one in mind of the
standard criticism of both traditional utilitarian and traditional deontological
ethics to the effect that they are indifferent as to whose interests are being
considered.14 Procreation isn’t just the act of generating more people, after all.
These people will not be strangers to you, but will of course be your children, by
biological definition. And it seems reasonable to think that this carries some
sort of moral weight.
But even this doesn’t entirely remove the difficulty, or fully solve what
Parfit called the Non-Identity Problem (Parfit 1984, 378). This is because,
though it handles the identity part of the problem, it doesn’t tell us which
potential people ought to become actual (if any). Leslie thinks that the answer
is: as many as would have happy lives. At the other end of the spectrum we
have David Benatar (2006), who thinks that the answer to this question is:
none. Parfit thinks that in order to correctly answer this question we would
need what he calls Theory X (ibid.). Theory X is the theory of beneficence that
will enable us to figure out how many people there should be relative to the
prospects of a certain degree of quality of life for these people. This, in turn, will
settle the question of how many people we should produce at a given point in
time, and, indeed, ever.
One of the problems that Parfit discusses, having to do with our ability
to make decisions of this sort, is what he calls The Down Escalator Case (Parfit
1984, 382-384). We can assume that, for some population of people, adding
people over the short run will cause transitory good effects but will produce
long-run bad effects within three generations – from resource depletion,
overcrowding, and all of the other things Young mentions. The problem is that
if people of the third generation choose a replacement rate of procreation over
population growth, they will lose the transitory good effects of growth and their
quality of life will immediately drop and will remain lower than it would
otherwise have for the following three generations. But if they choose
population growth over replacement, then eventually the transitory good
effects of growth will be outweighed by the long-run bad effects and the quality
of life will decline even below the point at which it would have been if the third
generation had switched to replacement.
The real dilemma is this, however. Parfit notes that the solution to all
this seems simple: growth for three generations followed by replacement in the
fourth, when the long-run bad effects start to kick in. But, Parfit points out, no
generation will be likely to willingly sacrifice the short-run good effects of
growth and accept a lower quality of life for the sake of preventing a long-run
14
See, in particular, Bernard Williams (1981).
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decline in the quality of life, particularly since the short-run effects will make it
seem to each generation that the quality of life is just as high as it would
otherwise have been with replacement starting in the first generation. This is
therefore a choice that every generation must face, with growth as the most
likely outcome, coupled with a long-run decline in the quality of life. As Parfit
puts it, this is “an intergenerational Prisoner’s Dilemma, of a kind in which it is
least likely that those involved will achieve a solution” (Parfit 1984, 383).
This is ultimately the deepest strategic (and cognitive) problem with a
moral argument like Young’s. It’s not just that this sort of arguments is “purely
academic” and will therefore influence few people, or that even amongst those
who would be convinced by it, their tastes will override their practical
reasoning. The problem is much, much bigger than that. In fact, calling it a
Prisoner’s Dilemma as Parfit does isn’t even entirely accurate. In a classic
Prisoner’s Dilemma, the effects of my actions on me and my compatriots are
direct. The effects of procreation on quality of life are indirect and temporally
diffuse. The intergenerational problem of the bad effects of procreation is a
politico-economic sorites problem. The problem is not that I think to myself:
“how will two more kids hurt anyone?” I know perfectly well that if everyone
thought this way the effects would be worse for us all. But it’s also not simply a
straightforward Prisoner’s Dilemma in which my aim is to attempt to maximize
my own benefit, as in: “if only I could ensure that I get my two kids and that
someone else goes without.” I believe both that everyone has a right to their
two kids and that if everyone has two kids we’ll all be worse off. And I know
that this last claim is true because I know that the incremental aggregate effect
of universal procreation will be bad, though I also know that the bureaucratic
administration of the global economic and social structures designed to support
me and my two kids will spread out these effects (both spatially and
temporally) and render them mostly invisible to me. As Michael Ignatieff
(2000) and others have pointed out, it’s easier to drop bombs on people you
can’t see by pushing a button than it is to shoot them when they’re standing
right in front of you.
Conclusion
The point is this: what Parfit’s Down Escalator Case shows is that (1) our
assessment of the value of procreation is relative to the effects it causes; but (2)
our experience of these effects practically ensures that we will fail to properly
estimate the value of population growth; and (3) to solve this problem
rationally we would need a moral theory that could enable us to determine how
many people there should be. This is what Young needs if he is going to defend
his analogy effectively. No attempt to support his analogy that avoids these
problems would be effective, but to address them adequately would require a
theory we don’t have. In his discussion of Dissimilarity D, Young challenges the
63
claim that human beings have (or indeed that anything has) inherent value, but
in that case it’s hard to see how or why human interests, or really anyone’s or
anything’s interests, should even matter in our assessment of the effects of
procreation or population growth – or in our assessment of overconsumption,
for that matter – unless we have some way of weighing relational value.
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Affecting the Demand for Children: The Pervasive Sense of Crisis in
Japan”. Meijo Asian Research Journal 1 (1): 77-83.
Williams, B. 1981. “Persons, Character, and Morality”. In Wiliams, B. Moral
Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1-19.
Young, T. 2001. “Overconsumption and Procreation: Are They Morally
Equivalent?”. Journal of Applied Philosophy 18 (2): 183-192.
64
John Mariana
John Mariana (College of the Canyons)
Abstract: Thomas Young (2001) argues that overconsumption and procreation
are morally equivalent, and thus that anyone who disapproves of
overconsumption must arrive at the same normative judgment concerning
procreation (or procreation beyond a certain threshold). Young presents an
analogical argument in support of his claim, and defends it against four
varieties of objections intended to show that the analogy is weak or faulty. I
argue that Young’s defense of his argument fails, and that though a stronger
case can be made for his claim of moral equivalence between procreation and
overconsumption, a full defense of the claim would unfortunately require a
moral theory that we presently do not have (namely, Derek Parfit’s Theory X,
the theory of beneficence that would tell us how many people there should be).
This is unfortunate because in the absence of successful rational grounds for
such a claim concerning the moral value (or disvalue) of procreation relative to
resource consumption, we are likely to overlook or misjudge the moral and
other costs of population growth.
Key Words: Population, population growth, overpopulation, overconsumption,
environmentalism, procreation
doi:10.14746/eip.2014.1.3
65
The Pure Intergenerational Problem and the
UNESCO Decade of Education for Sustainable
Development
Katia Vladimirova
(PhD fellow, Erasmus Mundus Joint Doctorate “Globalization,
EU, Multilateralism” – Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali; Rome,
Italy/Université Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium)
“A decade into the 21st century, the world faces substantial,
complex and interlinked development and lifestyle challenges and
problems. The challenges arise from values that have created
unsustainable societies.”
Bonn Declaration, 2009
Introduction1
As it is now widely agreed, climate change is a challenge that cannot be
resolved within any one discipline. The complex interplay of scientific,
economic, political, and social factors that characterizes the problem calls for
an inter-disciplinary academic approach. This article is an attempt to connect
some ideas from the field of climate ethics with the domain of education and
the work of the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO).
The main issue is that of a shift in values. Many scholars from various
disciplines agree that resolving the climate problem as part of the global
environmental crisis in general should be accompanied with a substantial shift
in the values that guide our attitudes and behavior towards the environment.
Environmental problems are rooted in the exploitative practices and attitudes
that have dominated industrial societies for the past two centuries (Jamieson
1992). Current lifestyles in developed states are unsustainable and need to be
changed. As Thomas Heberlein argues, in order to achieve behavioral change it
is not enough to introduce a technical solution (called a “technical fix” in social
psychology) or impose a new set of rules, like laws or taxes (a “structural fix”).
Neither is it sufficient to “educate the public” in the sense of providing more
information about a given problem. To change the attitudes and behavior of
society it is essential to change the values that underpin this behavior, which is
I would like to thank anonymous referees for their constructive feedback on the initial
draft of this paper.
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Katia Vladimirova
a long and difficult process (Heberlein 2011). And if a sustainable future
requires behavioral changes, then we need to focus on changing the underlying
values and how to achieve these changes.
This article aims to bring together some theory—research on climate
ethics, particularly the Pure Intergenerational Problem (PIP) introduced by
Stephen Gardiner (2006)—and some practice—the new educational agenda
proposed by the United Nations in 2002 and framed as the Decade of Education
for Sustainable Development (DESD). On the one hand, it is argued in this article
that PIP can be resolved (or rather, avoided) if a value shift happens that would
change the very context of the problem. On the other hand, DESD is aimed at
promoting the values “inherent in sustainable development” and to enable
societal transformation and behavioral change. The main focus within the value
shift as discussed in this article is on a particular set of values (principles,
concerns) that relate present people to future generations in terms of moral
responsibility. This article argues that the promotion of ethical considerations
that are concerned with the distant future, and the future of humankind in
general, can provide a solution to the Pure Intergenerational Problem, and it
explores whether parts of this solution can already be traced within the
educational agenda of the UNESCO Decade of Education for Sustainable
Development.
The Pure Intergenerational Problem and Future Generations
Climate change poses a challenge to traditional moral theory, which has
difficulties assigning responsibility for climate related damage to individuals
and collective entities and dealing with the long-term consequences of climate
change. Stephen Gardiner (2006, 2011) has proposed a theoretical framework
to better understand how climate change creates obstacles to our ethical
behavior and to explain why the world did not come to an agreement on how
to resolve the problem. To explain the climate problem, Gardiner uses the
perfect storm metaphor, made popular by Sebastian Junger’s 1999 book
recounting the real-life story of the fishing vessel Andrea Gail as it was caught
up by a rare convergence of three particularly bad storms. This combination of
storms was called “the perfect storm,” which eventually destroyed the vessel.
Using this analogy, Gardiner presents the key factors that cause problems for
our ethical behavior with regard to climate change, stressing that it is the
combination of spatial, intergenerational, and theoretical aspects of climate
change that together converge and make us vulnerable to moral corruption.
Climate change, Gardiner argues, is a “Perfect Moral Storm.”
The “global storm” represents the spatial dimension of the climate
problem and includes questions of distributive justice among today’s rich and
poor people and nations. Resolving climate change requires a balance between
the interests of rich and poor states and involves developmental and historical
67
The Pure Intergenerational Problem and the UNESCO Decade of Education
for Sustainable Development
responsibility issues. The “theoretical storm” is another dimension of the
problem that is constituted by our current theoretical ineptitude. Gardiner
argues that our moral and political theories in their current state of
development are not capable of providing an informed solution to the climate
problem (Gardiner 2011, 213).
Gardiner’s most important contribution, however, is his analysis of the
intergenerational dimension of the climate problem through game theoretical
models. Global environmental problems are commonly analyzed as a Tragedy of
the Commons (Hardin 1968), which is essentially a Prisoner’s Dilemma
involving a common resource, with states (and sometimes also corporations)
as agents. In his book Gardiner applies Prisoner’s Dilemma logic to generations
as agents. It follows from his analysis that it is collectively rational for most
generations to cooperate and restrict overall emissions to avoid climate change
consequences, whereas individually for each particular generation it is rational
to continue their emissions regardless of what others do. Each generation is
tempted to postpone taking long-term action that would go against their shortterm business-as-usual interests, increasing the burden and the risk for
subsequent generations. Gardiner calls this contradiction between collectively
and individually rational choices the Pure Intergenerational Problem (PIP),
which reflects the true tragedy of the climate change challenge.
PIP is relevant to a variety of intergenerational problems; however, it “is
likely to be rarely (if ever) instantiated in a pure form” (Gardiner 2011, 164).
Despite this, Gardiner argues, “PIP remains useful as a paradigm, since the
basic structural ideas have force even under some common deviations from the
idealized conditions” (Gardiner 2011, 164). For example, an application of PIP
is less clear in situations in which there is generational overlap and issues of
reciprocity and personal attachment are raised to challenge the relevance of
PIP. However, it is far from certain that these issues automatically solve the
problem, and according to Gardiner’s analysis they do not undermine it
completely, leaving the basic structure intact.2
Even though the application of PIP is not limited exclusively to the case
of climate change, some characteristics of this particular environmental
problem complicate the picture. Climate change is a resilient, seriously backloaded, and substantially deferred phenomenon (Gardiner 2006, 91). These
characteristics arise from the nature of the greenhouse effect and bring about
serious implications for the structure of PIP. First, the results of present
emissions will not appear in the form of climate catastrophes for at least
several decades (IPCC 2007, 45). That means that the present generation can
be tempted to do business as usual and pass the burden of combating the
problem to future generations (what Gardiner calls “buck-passing”). The
For a thorough analysis of the overlapping generations issue, please see Gardiner
2011, 167-74.
2
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Katia Vladimirova
problem is, though, that the damage inflicted on future people might become
unfixable after passing a certain threshold, and no economic growth or wealth
might be enough to resolve the problem at that stage—or at least not as
effectively as it could be by the present generation.
Secondly, there is an important issue concerning the temporal
fragmentation of agency. It is already extremely difficult for our moral theories
to assign responsibility for climate change related damage (at individual or
collective levels) within the present generation due to the spatial fragmentation
of agency (e.g., emissions from driving a car in the U.S. are absorbed in the
atmosphere and could contribute to draught in Africa or floods in Asia).
The situation with temporarily dispersed agents is even more
complicated. In the intergenerational aspect of the problem it is not difficult to
identify the cause of past emissions: prior generations (before 1992) in
developed states are (unknowingly) responsible for the most of the
accumulated GHG emissions due to industrial production processes. The
responsibility can be assigned in this manner to previous generations, but it is
impossible to retroactively enforce any sanctions or change. It is left to our and
future generations to make efforts to avoid possible negative consequences of
the created climate problem.
In defining our responsibility for future generations, it is useful to look
back at the Earth Charter that calls for universal responsibility in terms of
“identifying ourselves with the whole Earth community and our local
communities,” which implies that “everyone shares the responsibility for the
present and future well-being of the human family and the larger human
world” (Earth Charter, 1). Defining our responsibility in practical terms
(reducing emissions, developing new sources of energy, protecting wild nature,
etc.) would inevitably bring us to the issue of scientific uncertainty and to some
difficult trade-offs between present and future well-being. “Care for future
generations” can help resolve those trade-offs in a way that would allow us to
avoid biases towards present people’s interests that create and obstruct
resolving climate change. Defining our responsibility for past and present
emissions to future generations is one of the key challenges that constitute the
theoretical storm.
The standard solution for situations like the Tragedy of the Commons
would be an agreement that allows parties (agents) to benefit from a broader
context of cooperation on trade or security issues. However, in the case of
climate change (viewed as PIP) and the temporal fragmentation of agency, it is
impossible to come to an agreement among generations following this logic
because the agents (generations) do not coexist in time. There is no institutional
platform where the “parties” could meet and negotiate and there is no
institution that can guarantee compliance through centuries. Standard
institutional solutions do not work for PIP, and it is not clear that the problem
has any solution at all.
69
If there is no institutional solution, we might explore other options:
instead of changing the game structure or outcomes, we could try to change its
very context to avoid playing the game in first place. Changing the context
means changing the way people think about the problem and how they
perceive their interests and pay-offs, which implies a shift in the values that
determine our choices. PIP, as any other game with a structure similar to the
Prisoner’s Dilemma, emerges in a rational choice context and unearths the
contradiction within rational thinking itself (i.e., the dilemma of individual
rational choice going against collective rational choice that in the end leaves
everyone worse off). In the case of PIP, put simply, those of us alive today tend
to think that our interests (e.g., wealth and growth) are more important to us at
the moment than are those of vague future generations (which we also care
about, though far less than our current well-being). This happens because
psychologically we value our own interests and those of our family and others
close to us more than those of distant future people we don’t know and will
never know. In this situation we tend to choose in favor of short-term benefits
that accrue to our contemporaries, thereby increasing the risks for future
people.
However, when faced with this choice in the context of climate change,
it is necessary that at least one generation stops “passing the buck” before it’s
too late: people should choose to sacrifice some of their short-term interests in
favor of the future of humankind. The balance of people’s incentives should be
shifted from the self-interested “what’s good for me” (my family and close
friends, my community and contemporaries) towards the “what’s good for the
future of human kind.” As Gardiner notes, “we will want to allow for altruistic
and other motives if the PIP is to have a practical solution” (168), and care for
the future of humanity is precisely the kind of “altruistic or other” motive that
needs to be developed to help us resolve the problem. The solution does not
require the balance to shift completely (it is unrealistic to expect people to start
caring for the future more than for the present), however, it urges us to shift
strongly in favor of future generations. The way this value is currently
embedded in our value system is not sufficient to provide a strong motivation
for collective action in the case of climate change. Concern and care for the
distant future is not currently a prevailing value that underlies our choices.
The values that relate us to future generations are not explicit in
political decision making. According to the UNESCO Report “Universalism and
Ethical Values for the Environment” (2010), the main values that are reflected
in key environmental treaties3 are human rights, sustainability, equity, common
These include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the Convention
Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (WHC), the
United Nation’s Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), The Kyoto
Protocol, The Earth Charter, The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the
3
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Katia Vladimirova
but differentiated responsibilities, precaution, participation, vulnerability, state
sovereignty, peace, and solidarity. Responsibility and care for future people are
not mentioned among them.4 As Gardiner argues, the formula for future
generations most frequently used in environmental politics refers mostly in
practice to one or two subsequent generations (the children and grandchildren
of present people). This fact has the most unfortunate implications for climate
change: the problem whose cause is shaped by present people and whose
impact would fall on future people cannot be dealt with when future
generations are taken to include only one’s children and grandchildren.
Therefore, it is necessary to develop a new way of thinking—a new
value system. And a special place in this new system should be given to the
ethical value that explains our moral relation to future people. In order to
resolve the Pure Intergenerational Problem, it is essential to define our longterm responsibility to future generations in a way that projects over an
indefinite time period, and to develop a conscious awareness for the future of
humankind as part of intergenerational justice. (For the purpose of this paper,
I shall refer to these ethical values as “care for future generations.”).
The Decade of Education for Sustainable Development and
Future Generations
A recognized way of promoting new values is education. The most prominent
international institution able to advance new educational agendas globally is
the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
In December 2002, the United Nations General Assembly proclaimed the UN
Decade of Education for Sustainable Development, 2005-2014, (DESD),
“emphasizing that education is an indispensable element for achieving
sustainable development.”5 UNESCO was assigned to be the leading agency
implementing activities during the DESD. According to UNESCO:
The overall goal of the DESD is to integrate the values inherent in
sustainable development into all aspects of learning to encourage
changes in behaviour that allow for a more sustainable and just
society for all (Implementation Scheme 2005, Executive
Summary).
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and the Universal Declaration on Bioethics
and Human Rights (UDBHR).
4 However, responsibility and care for future generations might be embedded in the
“sustainability” value: following the definition used by UNESCO, sustainable
development “seeks to meet the needs of the present without compromising those of
future generations” (UN 1987).
5 I will leave aside discussions of the weaknesses of the concepts of sustainable
development and sustainability (see Schlottman 2012 or Mula & Tilbury 2009 for more
literature), and of ways other than education to promote new values, such as legal
norms.
71
Education for Sustainable Development (ESD) is based on values
of justice, equity, tolerance, sufficiency and responsibility. It
promotes gender equality, social cohesion and poverty reduction
and emphasises care, integrity and honesty, as articulated in the
Earth Charter. ESD is underpinned by principles that support
sustainable living, democracy and human well-being (Bonn
Declaration, 2009).
ESD is fundamentally about values, with respect at the centre:
respect for others, including those of present and future
generations, for difference and diversity, for the environment, for
the resources of the planet we inhabit (Education and the Search
for a Sustainable Future, 2009, 1).
It is clear that the goals set by DESD are far reaching and are aimed at altering
the future more than the present. Some scholars question whether it is possible
to assess the progress or results of DESD, since one decade could be too short to
implement the full scope of ideas proposed by UNESCO (Pigozzi 2010, 267).
Indeed, the first ten years are now considered as a starting point in which the
initial national structures are set up and the ESD agenda is researched,
formulated, and presented. Therefore, many assessment indicators are focused
on more practical aspects of implementation, such as the “integration of
educational components into plans for sustainable development” or “growing
cooperation and mutual reinforcement among ESD initiatives” (Implementation
Scheme 2005, 43), rather than on measuring the spread of new values and
principles. The latter is, in any case, very hard to measure, particularly at the
early stages of implementation.
Academic views on DESD range from a skepticism that views the
Decade as part of a fashionable discourse of sustainable development which
hides behind a neo-liberal economic and political agenda (Sauvé & Berryman
2005, Jickling 2006) to supportive interpretations of DESD as a long-awaited
opportunity for ESD (Mula & Tilbury 2009; Calder 2005; Pigozzi 2010). These
polarized opinions are rooted in the way scholars view sustainable
development and sustainability. The amount of trade-offs and conflicts between
sustainability and development, for example, has led some scholars to suggest
that sustainable development is an oxymoron, as it is impossible to sustain
more growth (Revkin 2006).
An important suggestion here comes from Christopher Schlottmann,
who notes that the ESD and DESD frameworks do not reflect sufficiently
inevitable trade-offs and conflicting values that students of ESD might face in the
future. “If any institutionalized response to environmental degradation and
economic underdevelopment is to succeed, it must address the inevitable
conflicting values, conflicts and compromises that will arise” (Schlottmann
2012, 112). Schlottmann identifies at least two intersections where the conflict
is very likely: conflicting values in education (between educational and larger
societal aims – for example, between liberal learning and vocational training),
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Katia Vladimirova
and conflicting values and the environment (trade-offs between sustainability
and development). These conflicts are enhanced by the urgency of the climate
problem and require ESD to provide certain guidance to “help in understanding,
assessing, and … overcoming these conflicts and trade-offs” (Schlottmann 2012,
115). Therefore, Schlottmann argues further, the aims of the Decade should
focus more on the development of agency, decision-making skills, and ethical
empowerment. I will elaborate on the issue of trade-offs below, when analyzing
the ESD value structure.
There are three main documents within the DESD framework
published by UNESCO at the time of writing this piece that are important for
this analysis. The main reference source about DESD is the Implementation
Scheme published by UNESCO in 2005, at the very beginning of the Decade.
This document contains key definitions, explanations, and background
information about ESD. UNESCO also produced two important reports during
DESD, in 2009 and 2012, with the third coming out in 2014. The first report,
“Review of Contexts and Structures for Education for Sustainable Development”
presents a “succinct yet insightful overview” of the various regional and
national contexts for developing ESD (2009). The second published report,
“Shaping the Education of Tomorrow: Report on the UN Decade of Education
for Sustainable Development” (2012), focuses specifically on processes and
learning in the context of ESD, looking at new emerging learning processes and
changes since the early years of the Decade. Both reports focus on practical
aspects of DESD implementation and are aimed to assess the progress being
made. However, these two documents are still important for the analysis as they
indicate the direction that the process has taken and allow us to compare it
with the original idea outlined in the Implementation Scheme.
The Implementation Scheme contains many references to the future
and future generations. “There can be few more pressing and critical goals for
the future of humankind than to ensure steady improvement in the quality of
life for this and future generations in a way that respects our common heritage
– the planet on which we live” (8). In a way, the references to “the future of
humankind” and “heritage” resemble the language used in another UNESCO
document, the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and
Natural Heritage (WHC), which exhibits the strongest focus on future
generations among all the treaties related to environmental protection
(Universalism and Ethical Values for the Environment, 2010). In the
Implementation Scheme, a document of 53 pages, “future generations” was
referenced 10 times; “future,” in various combinations other than “future
generations,” such as “sustainable future,” “alternative futures,” and “futuresoriented,” was used 20 times. Basically, references to the future were made in
every other page of the document. In comparison, the 25 page UNFCCC
document contains only 3 references to the future, and all of these to “future
generations.” The Kyoto Protocol, a document of 21 pages, has no references to
73
the future. Clearly, the language of DESD confirms the high priority given to
future generations within the framework.
There are four key underlying values that education for sustainable
development must promote:
Respect for the dignity and human rights of all people throughout the world
and a commitment to social and economic justice for all;
Respect for the human rights of future generations and a commitment to
intergenerational responsibility;
Respect and care for the greater community of life in all its diversity, which
involves the protection and restoration of the Earth’s ecosystems;
Respect for cultural diversity and a commitment to build locally and globally
a culture of tolerance, non-violence and peace (Implementation Scheme
2005, 16).
It is significant that concerns about future generations made their way
to become the second most important value to be promoted through ESD. This
concern is introduced through the lens of a human rights approach, which is
strongly supported by some environmental philosophers (Caney 2010). The
call for intergenerational responsibility is probably the most straightforward
response to the Pure Intergenerational Problem, outlined earlier. Embedding
this value and concerns for future generations into the way present people
think could alter the very context in which we find ourselves, changing the
incentives that determine people’s behavior in a way that could help us to avoid
falling into PIP. If we care for the distant future and feel responsible for the
future of humankind to the extent that could be comparable to the care we have
for our own children and grandchildren, and we know that our present actions
threaten their very existence, we presumably would be more inclined than we
currently are to stop engaging in dangerous activities in order to prevent future
disasters.
Strengthening the “care for future generations” value is not a magic
bullet that would completely settle conflicts and trade-offs that inevitably arise
as part of any possible solution to climate change; however, it would be useful
to shift the balance away from resolving those trade-offs entirely in favor of
present people. But although this might create a better moral ground for
resolving some intergenerational problems that reach far into the future, such
as climate change, it might be less useful in other cases. For example, there
might be little need to think about the future of humankind as such when trying
to resolve a debt problem that would affect only those a couple of generations
to come; it might be enough in such a case to think in terms of two forthcoming
generations to raise concern to the appropriate level to solve the issue. In the
case of environmental degradation, and particularly climate change, two
generations is not enough because, as already mentioned, the negative
consequences of present people’s choices would fall on distant future people
who in our current system of values have much lower priority for us than do
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Katia Vladimirova
our children, grandchildren, or the present poor and disadvantaged. I support
Schlottmann’s view that ESD students need to learn about possible and
inevitable trade-offs related to sustainable development to be prepared to face
them in the future. And when trying to resolve these trade-offs, PIP could be
very useful for ESD students as a paradigm to build a stronger case for why we
should care for future generations.
However, there is still the question of time frame. It is not clear from
the document how far into the future the concept of future generations can
reach. How many future generations can we be reasonably expected to care
about? On the one hand, there are references made to the “future of
humankind.” With climate change posing threats to the very survival of the
human race, these references are understandable. Taking responsibility for the
past and acting, even against our own short-term interests, is the right thing for
present people to do and is justified on the ground of the moral motivation that
we are responsible for the future of humankind and that we must respect the
rights of future people and not compromise their needs in favor of our own.
Yet, the interpretation of “future generations” does matter. As noted by
Gardiner, often political claims that something should be done “for future
generations” are in fact referring to only one or two subsequent generations:
children and grandchildren. Quoting the Implementation Scheme, he adds: “as
people we seek positive change for ourselves, our children and grandchildren;
we must do it in ways that respect the right of all to do so … to do this we must
learn constantly – about ourselves, our potential, our limitations, our
relationships, our society, our environment, our world” (8). This is the only
reference made in the document to the time frame to which “future
generations” applies. Considering the predicted timing of at least 100 years for
the consequences of climate change (IPCC 2007, 45), promoting care for the
two subsequent generations would not make much difference since our
children and grandchildren would hardly be affected by the climate catastrophes
of the future. On the contrary, following this logic would make it more sensible
for present people to develop and employ a business-as-usual approach to
accumulate more economic wealth to pass to their children.
This means that the concept of “future generations” as part of the value
of “respect for the human rights of future generations and a commitment to
intergenerational responsibility” needs to be elaborated and analyzed more
thoroughly to give a clear message about how long into the future we should
look. Resolving PIP is only possible if we can incorporate very long-term
concerns into our thinking, more similar to the “future of humankind” than the
“future of our children and grandchildren.” Herein lies the novelty and the main
difficulty of promoting this value: concern for the future of humankind has
existed at least since the invention of nuclear weapons of mass destruction that
are able to put an end to the human race. However, there was not much that
the general public could do about this, except for civil protests. It is only now
75
that concerns for the very distant future are brought directly to each individual,
as it is often individual lifestyles and behaviors that lie at the very heart of
climate change. Individual change, in attitudes and behavior, is crucial to
overcoming the crisis, and it cannot be achieved without a deeper change and
realization that the future of humankind, not just of our children and
grandchildren, depends on our choices today.
Conclusion
Climate change as part of the global environmental crisis requires an
interdisciplinary approach. New research developments should be informed of
the progress in other disciplines in order to stay on the right track to resolve
climate change through common effort. Therefore, this article is a contribution
aimed to inform the fields of environmental, climate, and intergenerational
ethics about the developments that are happening in the field of education in
terms of promoting concerns for remote posterity. But it is also aimed to
inform the field of education about philosophical views on the importance of
the intergenerational aspect of climate change and the global environmental
crisis, and the role of future-oriented ethical considerations in resolving it. As
an interdisciplinary paper, this article attempts to address both the question of
why we need to care for future generations and the question of how ethical
considerations about future generations can be promoted.
It was argued that a shift in values, particularly the incorporation of
ethical concerns about future generations into our thinking, can be a solution
to the Pure Intergenerational Problem in a way that a new set of incentives can
change the context and help us avoid falling into PIP. I then explored how these
concerns are presented in the new ambitious educational agenda proposed by
UNESCO in the Decade of Education for Sustainable Development. The analysis
of the Implementation Scheme, the main source of reference about DESD, and
which also provides key definitions and background information, shows that
the document is highly oriented towards the future and incorporates concerns
for future generations. It is criticized for its vague use of the term “future
generations,” which does not reflect the time period that the concept is to reach
into the future, which is crucial with regards to our ethical behavior. It is
concluded that this gap can be filled in better if informed by research on the
intergenerational aspects of environmental and climate ethics.
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Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change. 1998. Retrieved from:
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php
Mulà, I. & Tilbury, D. 2009. “A United Nations Decade of Education for
Sustainable Development (2005-14): What Difference will it Make?”.
Journal of Education for Sustainable Development 3: 87.
Pigozzi, M. J. 2010. “Implementing the UN Decade of Education for Sustainable
Development (DESD): achievements, open questions and strategies for
the way forward”. International Review Education 56: 255–269.
Sauvé, L., & Berryman. T. 2005. “Challenging a “Closing Circle”: Alternative
Research Agendas for the ESD Decade”. Applied Environmental
Education and Communication 4: 229–32.
Schlottmann, C. 2008. “Educational ethics and the DESD: Considering tradeoffs”. Theory and Research in Education 6: 207.
. 2012. Conceptual Challenges for Environmental Education. Peter Lang
Publishing, New York.
UNESCO. 2005. Decade of Education for Sustainable Development:
Implementation Scheme. Retrieved from:
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001486/148654e.pdf
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. 2009. Review of Contexts and Structures for Education for Sustainable
Development. Retrieved from:
. 2009. “Education and the search for a sustainable future”. Policy dialogue:
ESD and development policy. 1 Publ., illus.; ED.2009/WS/7.
. 2010. Universalism and Ethical Values for the Environment. Retrieved from:
. 2012. Shaping the Education of Tomorrow: Report on the UN Decade of
Education for Sustainable Development. Retrieved from:
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 1992.
FCCC/INFORMAL/84. Retrieved from:
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf
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Katia Vladimirova
Katia Vladimirova
Climate Change and Future Generations: The Pure Intergenerational
Problem and the UNESCO Decade of Education for Sustainable Development
Abstract. This article aims to bring together some theory – research on climate
ethics, particularly the Pure Intergenerational Problem (PIP) introduced by
Stephen Gardiner – and some practice – the new educational agenda proposed
by the United Nations in 2002 and framed as the Decade of Education for
Sustainable Development (DESD). PIP can be resolved (or rather, avoided) if a
shift in values happens that would change the very context of the problem. On
the other hand, DESD is aimed at promoting the values “inherent in sustainable
development” and at enabling societal transformation and behavioral change.
The main focus within the value shift in this article is on a particular set of
values (principles, concerns) that relate present people to future generations in
terms of moral responsibility. It is argued that the promotion of ethical
considerations that are concerned with the distant future, and the future of
humankind in general, can be a solution to the Pure Intergenerational Problem.
The article also explores whether parts of this solution can already be found
within the educational agenda of DESD.
Key words: Future generations, pure intergenerational problem, education for
sustainable development
doi:10.14746/eip.2014.1.4
79
Building Within Space: Thoughts Towards an
Environmental Ethics
Troy Paddock
(Southern Connecticut State University; New Haven, Connecticut,
United States)
Introduction
It is exceedingly difficult to think about our natural environment clearly. It is
often challenging to get scholars to agree even on what a definition of nature or
the natural environment might entail. Part of this difficulty stems from
understanding exactly where human beings stand in relation to the natural
environment. Does “nature” include humanity? Must the concept of
“wilderness” exclude people in order for it to be authentically wild (Nash 1982)?
In order to have a functional environmental ethics that can have a meaningful
impact on the issue of sustainability, a clear understanding of the environment
or nature is a fundamental prerequisite.
For the purposes of this essay, I am employing the term “nature” in one
of its common usage forms: the totality of everything on the planet. The term
nature refers to the natural world. In his The Idea of Nature, R.G. Collingwood
identified three distinct ideas of nature that he called the Greek, the
Renaissance, and the Modern. The Greek view considered nature to be like a
living organism, closely fusing what might be called mind/spirit/soul with the
material world. The Renaissance view, marked by the Scientific Revolution,
perceived of nature as mechanical, operating according to natural laws that are
eternal and unchanging. The modern view is a merging of the two and can be
best identified in a shorthand fashion with evolution. Nature is once again
reanimated with life, but it operates according to laws that provide an
explanation for change (Collingwood 1960).
A first step in the process of developing a new environmental ethics is
changing how we think about the environment. Instead of thinking of the
environment as an object that is acted upon, it might be useful to think of the
environment as a space that human beings act within. Thinking about the
environment in terms of space rather than as an object puts both sustainability
and ethics in a different light and opens up the possibility of drawing from
different fields for fresh insights. Architecture is one such field. Architecture is
fundamentally about the organization of space. This essay will look at the
works of Christian Norberg Schultz and Bernard Tschumi in an effort to see
what their theories about architecture offer for thinking about the
environment. I will employ the Mosel River in Germany as a concrete example
Troy Paddock
that illustrates how to think anew about environmental conservation and
ethics. Finally, the essay will suggest that ideas from Aristotle and Actor
Network Theory can help provide a paradigm within which we can think about
nature in a way that offers an alternative framing to questions about the
environment.
Environment as Object vs. Environment as Space
One reason for the difficulty surrounding our understanding of the
environment is that many, at least in the West, are trapped in a nostalgic
relationship with the environment. The environmental historian Donald
Worster suggests that this nostalgia is, at least in part, a response to
industrialization—a harkening back to a simpler time. Worster indicates that
this nostalgia may be our only hope for salvation. For him, this nostalgia takes
him back to a time and place when nature was more pristine and humanity
treated its environment with more respect—Worster has in mind the Blue
Ridge Mountains during the late 18th and early 19th century (1993). But even
Worster’s characterization reveals a common limitation in how people think
and talk about the environment; nature is viewed as an object that is acted
upon and controlled by human beings. The characterization is fundamentally
anthropocentric and instrumentalist. Whether nature is reduced to an object
that must be overcome or, in Worster’s sense of nostalgia, protected, the
underlying epistemological view is similar. This characterization of nature is
most clearly illustrated in the title of a recent and deservedly well-received book
on rivers, focusing on the Rhine and Oder, simply called: The Conquest of
Nature: Water, Landscape and the Making of Modern Germany, by David
Blackbourn. The conquest of a waterway is not a view that is limited to Prussia.
In Landscape and Memory, Simon Schama offers a revealing anecdote: The first
English hydraulic engineering feat was the construction of the flood defenses of
Dagenham in the early eighteenth century.
To celebrate the achievement, the king’s commissioners of work
had, it seems, held a great whitebait dinner every spring as if
somehow the appearance of the fish were a sign that God would
indeed Save the Hanoverian King and his fisherman from the
tides of flood and war (Schama 1995, 353).
The instrumentalist view of nature is fundamentally about the
organization (and occasionally rearranging) of space by humans. Architecture
may well have some insight into thinking about nature and ways to rethink the
human relationship to nature. Fundamentally, architecture is about the
organization of space. How we organize space reflects our understanding of
reality; our understanding of space impacts how we act and has implications
for how we understand conservation and how we determine ethical action. For
example, as the Norwegian architect, architectural historian, and theorist
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Building Within Space: Thoughts Towards an Environmental Ethics
Christian Norberg-Schulz points out, during the Middle Ages reality was
understood as an ordered cosmos (Norberg-Schulz 1988, 17). Gothic
architecture reinforced this view. Elements of reality were qualitative and their
significance was determined by divine revelation (Panofsky 1976). Actions and
ethical conduct were proscribed by divine revelation. Norberg-Schulz suggests
that during the modern era humanity set itself rationally and critically opposite
from the world. By situating itself opposite the world, the world becomes
something outside that human beings act upon rather than act within.
According to Norberg-Schulz, Functionalist Architecture was the epitome of
this world view of man ordering the world. The functionalist notion of form
following function was indicative of the view that human constructions
occurred in a virtually empty geometric space in which human beings
proscribed meaning.
In Genius loci, Norberg-Schulz suggests that human-made places relate
to nature in three ways. First, human beings want to make the natural structure
more precise. This helps them to visualize an “understanding of nature”
(Norberg-Schulz 1979, 17). An individual builds what he or she has seen—an
enclosure for delimited space, a Mal for centralized space, and a path for where
nature suggests a direction. Second, built spaces can complement nature, adding
to what is lacking. This leads to the third way: architecture as a way to
symbolize humanity’s understanding of nature. While this reading of the
relationship between nature and architecture is certainly more sympathetic
than a functionalist view, the notion that it symbolizes humanity’s
understanding of nature has some epistemological difficulties (Norberg-Schulz
1979). The position outlined is fundamentally anthropocentric. For an example,
where an open field ends and a forest begins does not necessarily suggest a
boundary or enclosure. Animals pass from one to another without any concern
save perhaps bumping their head on a low-lying branch. Similarly the notion of
complementarity posited by Norberg-Schulz assumes a lack that humans need
to address; however, I would argue that the lack is not in nature, but in what
people need from a particular place.
Norberg-Schulz’s intellectual approach strongly suggests that he was
heavily influenced by the work of Martin Heidegger. In Architecture: Meaning
and Place, Norberg-Schulz writes: “Only when space becomes a system of
meaningful places, does it become alive to us. … ‘Landscape’ is structured in
advance. It contains a system of existing ways which define our possibilities of
movement” (Norberg-Schulz 1988, 24). He identifies the task of the architect as
giving the system of meaningful places form such that they can receive the
necessary content. In the chapter that explores the implications of Heidegger’s
thought on architecture, Norberg-Schulz asserts that “Being-in-the-world”
implies a man-made environment. To explore this concept further, NorbergSchulz turns to Heidegger’s discussion of the Greek temple in order to
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understand “Being-in-the world,” or how things become what they are (see
Heidegger 1971).
The Greeks called this emerging and rising in itself and in all
things is called phusis. It clears and illuminates, also, that on
which man bases his dwelling. We call this ground dwelling. We
call this ground the earth.… Earth is that whence the arising
brings back and shelters without violation. In things that arise,
earth is present as a sheltering agent (Norberg-Schulz 1988, 39).
The notion of a proper relationship between a person and a physical
structure, and between a physical structure and its natural environment, is not
limited to homes. Norberg-Schulz’s elegant excursion on the “Earth and Sky” of
Jorn Utzon’s Bagsvaerd Church reveals his Heideggarian bend in viewing
architecture. As he starts his description of the space contained by the church,
Norberg Schulz reminds the reader that a religious encounter takes places
between earth and sky, as everything else does. “It means that the church
should make an ‘understood world manifest’” (Norberg-Schulz 1988, 227).
But contrary to Heidegger’s view, and Norberg-Schulz’s, this
understanding that takes place between earth and sky does not occur without
violation. Another architect, Bernard Tschumi has some observations that
merit consideration in this problem. In Architecture and Disjunction, he writes,
Indeed, architecture constitutes the reality of experience while
this reality gets in the way of the overall vision. Architecture
constitutes the abstraction of absolute truth, while this very truth
gets in the way of feeling. We cannot both experience and think
that we experience. ‘The concept of dog does not bark,’ the
concept of space is not in space (Tschumi 1994, 48).
Tschumi posits two premises to begin a chapter entitled “Violence of
Architecture”: first, “[T]here is no architecture without action, no architecture
without events, no architecture without program”; and second “[B]y extension,
there is no architecture without violence” (1994, 121). The first of these
statements runs against the mainstream of architectural thought by refusing to
favor space at the expense of action. The second argues that although the logic
of objects and the logic of people are independent in their relations to the world,
they inevitably face one another in an intense confrontation. Any relationship
between a building and its users is one of violence, for any given use means the
intrusion of a human body into a given space, the intrusion of one order into
another. This intrusion is inherent in the idea of architecture; any reduction of
architecture to its spaces at the expense of its events is as simplistic as the
reduction of architecture to its facades.
Tschumi writes:
By ‘violence,’ I do not mean the brutality that destroys physical or
emotional integrity but a metaphor for the intensity of a
relationship between an individual and their surrounding
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spaces…. Architecture’s violence is fundamental and unavoidable,
for architecture is linked to events in the same way that the guard
is linked to the prisoner, the police to the criminal, the doctor to
the patient, order to chaos. This also suggests that actions qualify
spaces as much as spaces qualify actions; that space and action
are inseparable and that no proper interpretation of architecture,
drawing or notation can refuse to consider this fact (Tschumi
1994, 121-122).
What must first be determined is whether this relation between action
and space is symmetrical—two diverging interests (people vs. spaces) affecting
one another in a commensurable way—or asymmetrical, a relation in which
one interest, whether space or people, clearly dominates the other. If the
relationship is asymmetrical, then that would suggest that symmetry is
connected to ethical action, and by extension that symmetry is required for
environmental conservation.
Symmetrical and Asymmetrical Action in Space: The Mosel
River
What I would like to suggest is that the violence proposed by Norberg-Schulz
and Heidegger is asymmetrical and that this is most clearly demonstrated in a
discussion of rivers. Here an examination of bridges will help clarify the point.
According to Heidegger, the bridge does more than connect the banks; it is
what allows the banks of the river to emerge as banks. The river ceases to be a
boundary, and the other side of the river is brought into the sphere of
experience for those who built the bridge. “The bridge gathers the ground as
landscape around the stream” (Heidegger 1971b 152). The bridge permits the
river to continue its course but also allows mankind to go on with its necessary
business. Heidegger writes, “The bridge is a location. As such a thing, it allows a
space into which earth and heaven, divinities and mortals are admitted”
(Heidegger 1971b, 155). Human life takes place on earth and the bridge makes
that manifest. Norberg-Schulz notes that cities divided by a river use a bridge to
become a connective way (Norberg-Schulz 1988).
But the connection that Norberg-Schulz notes privileges the human
perspective. The connection was not there in nature; nor was it necessary.
Rather, the connection was a human action designed to complete nature. The
relationship is asymmetrical because a type of violence has been done to the
river. It has been viewed as an obstacle to be overcome. The river is, in a sense,
the enemy that must be conquered. It appears that the taming of rivers is a
frequent topic of discussion by environmental historians. Whether it is Richard
White’s The Organic Machine, about the damming of the Columbia River, or
Mark Cioc’s The Rhine: An Eco-biography 1815-2000, the focus of the
environmental historian tends to be on how mankind attempts to control
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nature and the consequences of those efforts. This approach reveals the
fundamental relationship between human built-spaces and nature as one of
violence and control. Cioc’s eco-biography brilliantly traces the efforts to turn
the Rhine into the perfect canal. His work reinforces the asymmetrical
relationship. Each technological attempt to tame the “wild Rhine” produces the
desired effect and an unanticipated side-effect that requires another
technological remedy. The efforts that Cioc examines betray an instrumental
and anthropocentric view of nature. Moreover, the actions inadvertently treat
rivers like the empty kind of space that Heidegger refers to as zwischenraum
(in-between space) in his discussion of highways (Heidegger 1977). Both the
river and the road are treated as empty spaces. The river itself is unimportant
except as an avenue of transportation to particular locations. Environmental
historians, who tend to be receptive to the notion of human arrogance
regarding nature, unconsciously share and perpetuate this perspective. The
works of Blackbourn, White, and Cioc have noted the damage done by people
and now recent attempts to at least halt, if they cannot restore, the damage that
has been done by the last two hundred plus years. The action in this
relationship with the environment remains asymmetrical, with one side doing
violence, both symbolic and real, to the other.
To bring this to a more concrete level, I will turn to the example of the
Mosel (Moselle) River. The largest tributary of the Rhine, the Mosel River flows
some 339 miles through northeastern France, Luxembourg, and western
Germany. It rises in the Vosges Mountains in France, in two headwaters uniting
near St-Maurice. It flows north past Metz and is canalized from Thionville to its
confluence with the Rhine at Koblenz, Germany. In France, there are a number
of important coal deposits that facilitate the mining and steel industries in the
Moselle valley; whereas in Germany it is the home of some of the best German
wines.
A quick search of the books about the Mosel River turns up Jean
Cermakian’s The Moselle: River and Canal from the Roman Empire to the
European Economic Community (1975) as yet another example of humanity’s
attempt to alter nature to fit its needs. Although literature on the Mosel is not
substantial, this does not diminish the importance of the river itself. As
Cermakian suggests, the river has quite a history and could provide a useful
test case for a study of how to think about rivers and their relationship to
human activity. The Mosel has been an important river at least since the
founding of Trier in the first century BCE as a Roman outpost in Gaul for
protection against the barbaric Germanic tribes. The earliest written
references to the Mosel that we find are in Caesar. In his Conquest of Gaul, the
final conquest of the Treveri under Labienus appears to have taken place next
to a river that may well have been the Mosel. The battle took place beside a
river with steep banks that was difficult to cross; historian Edith Mary
Wightman posits that this description matches the Mosel (1971). By the time of
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Tacitus, the economic importance of Trier made the Mosel an important river
as the Romans attempted to create a network of transportation routes on land
and water between the Rhine. The fourth-century poet Ausonius has a poem
entitled “Mosella,” which is the longest single writing from antiquity that
discusses the Mosel and offers us insight on how to think about rivers
differently.
Ostensibly about a trip from Bingen to Trier, the poem is much more. In
the first two parts, Ausonius tells the reader where he is going and praises the
river he is about to travel. The subsequent four sections praise the natural
beauty of the river and all that it has to offer, to both the human and the divine.
The section on the gods is significant in that it emphasizes the connection
between the natural and the divine. There are two quick points to make about
what Ausonius writes. First, he offers praise to the natural beauty of the Mosel
and all that it has to offer to humans and the divine as both a playground and
sanctuary. The clumsy Satyr cannot grasp the water Nymph, and is left
clutching yielding water. Even viewing the references to Satyrs and Nymphs as
poetic license rather than theological truth, the poem still posits the view of the
divine as in harmony with nature. Second, as Ausonius gets ready to embark on
his trip along the river he writes:
Go now, and with Phrygian slabs lay out smooth floors spreading
and expensive marble through thy fretted halls! But I, scorning
what wealth and riches have bestowed, will marvel at Nature’s
handiwork, and not at that wherein ruin wantons, recklessly
prodigal and delighting in her waste. Here firm sands spread the
moist shores, and the foot resting on them leaves no recording
print behind (Ausonius 1961, 229, lines 48-54).
Ausonius distinguishes between man-made wealth and the wealth of
nature. The next two sections focus on that natural wealth, the vast variety of
fishes that can be found in the Mosel and what, undoubtedly, is still the single
identifying feature of the Mosel: its vineyards.
Ausonius describes some of the villas that he sees along the river:
This one stands high upon a mass of natural rock, this rests upon
the verge of the jutting bank, this stands back and claims the river
for its own, making it prisoner in an enfolding bay. Yon occupies a
hill whose bulk looms high about the stream, claiming free
prospect o’er tilth, o’er waste, and the rich outlook enjoys the
lands about as though its own” (Ausonius 1961, 249-51, lines
320-326).
However elaborate these may sound to us, he assures the reader a few
lines later: “so great is the charm of its refinement and distinction, while its
pleasures breed no excess” (Ausonius 1961, 253, line 348).
The view of the Mosel described by Ausonius is in line with
Collingwood’s idea of the Greek view of Nature, in which there is a natural
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organic harmony connecting humanity and nature and a natural symmetry in
the relationship between the two. The description of the villas reveals an effort
to minimize the kind of violence that Tschumi discusses. The harmony
Ausonius describes is natural, but it is not necessarily self-sustaining; it must
consciously be maintained. Ausonius’s references to the excess of needless
wealth and the boundaries between humanity and nature speak to the
necessity of the individual being mindful of actions.
Some fourteen centuries after Ausonius, George Waring Jr. describes his
trip down the Mosel in The Bride of the Rhine: Two Hundred Miles in a Mosel
Row Boat (1878). Identifying it as “the pearl of German rivers,” Waring
observes that although “Metz and Trier have been touched by the railway,
which has somewhat torn the veil from over them …, even they have held out
bravely, and once beyond their gates we wander again in the charmed light of
the Middle Ages” (Waring 1878, 15). On the very next page, he writes: “I have
seen no country equal to the Mosel Valley for the peculiar charm that comes of
antiquity made real by an appropriate human life” (Waring 1878, 16). What he
might mean by this is revealed in a later chapter recounting his party’s visit to
Trier:
If the rain has wetted the country roads, one is awaked at dawn
by the clattering of sabots on the stones, and the streets are filled
in the early morning with peasant men driving wagons, drawn by
cows yoked from the horns; with broad backed peasant-women
carrying knapsack-like baskets heavily laden with potatoes, or
with grain; and one is greeted by a variety of street sights and
sounds entirely unfamiliar to the American ear (Waring 1878,
85).
Proceeding downstream from Metz, Waring notes that they go through
the last lock of the canalization of the Mosel. There will be no other man-made
stops to hinder the traveler the rest of the way to the Rhine. It will not be until
after the Second World War that the three additional existing locks are
constructed. Waring’s account is idyllic to say the least. He revels in describing
his meals and lodging and his interactions with the local inhabitants. He enjoys
recounting various legends associated with the Mosel and offers Ausonius’s
poem at the end of his own book. It is fairly clear that while his book is not in
verse, he envisions it as a modern complement to the work of “The Old Roman
Poet”—his reference to Ausonius.
Waring’s description of the Mosel valley is an interesting combination
of all three of Collingwood’s categories: the Greek, the Renaissance, and the
Modern. His phrase “made real by an appropriate human life” harkens to a time
past with people living simply and in harmony with nature. At the same time,
Waring’s pleasure at noting that the railroad was situated far enough away as
to not disturb his afternoon, illustrates the impact of the Renaissance view of
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nature—which laid the intellectual foundation for industrialization—although
he certainly does not refer to it as such.
The juxtaposition and tension between the industrial and pre-industrial
is readily apparent as he runs out of river to meander down. Waring writes:
It would seem proper to put a period to this long account of a
journey down the Mosel by describing Koblenz with some
minuteness. But Koblenz, although an extremely old town, is at
the same time, a busy modern town, and any account of it must be
pitched in a key that would throw the whole story of our idling
along the beautiful river, among its medieval towns, and through
its outlying pastoral villages, sadly into discord. Any guidebook of
the Rhine will give an account of Koblenz and its history that is
well worth reading, —but to me, its chief interest will always lie
in the fact that at the wharf above its Roman bridge one may take
a steamer to Kochem or Trier (Waring 1877, 255).
In this closing passage it is clear that our traveler views the Mosel has
being part of a different time and place than the busy modern world. Koblenz is
the gateway between the Mosel and the modern world. However, it is worth
noting that while he went down the Mosel in a row boat, he mentions taking a
steamer up the river. In spite of the fondness with which he recounts his
journey and his time spent among the medieval towns and pastoral villages,
Waring is also forward looking.
After regretting that he had not planned enough time for this trip, for
each new twist in the Mosel between Schloss Ehrenburg and Koblenz reveals a
new site that they did not have time to give due attention to, Waring writes:
There comes, also, the longing for the day when pocket
photography will be cheap and easy and when we who write shall
not have to contend against the cost of engraving. The old men
and old women of the Mosel—and the chubby little children, and
the young men and maidens are all clamoring for admission to my
pages; but alas! They and their picturesque old houses must await
the coming of the happy day when photography and the printing
press shall be really wedded. They are betrothed now, but there
are costly formalities still standing between them Waring 1877,
246-48).
The two quotations, only a few pages apart from each other, reveal a
tension that is fundamental to the modern age and humanity’s relation with
nature. On the one hand, Waring is looking forward to the inevitable
improvement in technology that will reduce the cost of image reproduction in
books. On the other hand, the images that he wants to reproduce are of areas
and people who have been minimally affected by the advances in
industrialization and technology that would make the reproduction possible.
More than a century before Worster, Waring is displaying the same sense of
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nostalgia and loss that Worster laments. A disconnection with nature is at the
heart of this sense of nostalgia and loss.
Asymmetry in Ethics and Environmentalism
In The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger argues that technology has
fundamentally altered how people think, see, and live in the world. In a fashion
that highlights Waring’s predicament, Heidegger writes, “Everywhere we
remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm or
deny it” (Heidegger 1977, 4). The asymmetrical relationship between humanity
and nature leaves mankind in control and bound to nature. The cause of this
bondage is an epistemological turn which results in human beings looking at
nature through a lens of modern science whose essence “entraps nature as a
calculable coherence of forces” (Heidegger 1977, 21). Heidegger notes that the
relationship between technology and physics is correct; but at the same time
the relationship has transformed how human beings interact with nature.
Heidegger writes:
Hence physics, in all its retreating from the representation turned
only toward objects that has alone been standard until recently,
will never be able to renounce this one thing: that nature reports
itself in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation
and that it remains orderable as a system of information
(Heidegger 1977, 23).
The consequences of this perspective are seen in modern technology.
The windmill using wind for energy does not reflect the same view of nature as
mining the earth for coal or refitting a section of the Rhine for a hydroelectric
plant. The actions for these three examples are extraordinarily dissimilar, but
nonetheless require a certain kind of knowledge about the environment. The
former requires a familiarity of weather patterns and knowing, literally, which
way the wind blows. It takes an aspect of the natural environment, in this case
the wind, as it is and uses it to produce energy without altering the source of
the energy. The latter two examples are based on modern scientific knowledge
and require a fundamental altering of the environment in order to provide
energy. Once coal is mined and used, it is gone and cannot be reused. The river
that powers the hydroelectric plant may remain a river, but it has been altered
significantly and, as the history of the Rhine confirms, requires continual
adjustments to offset the unintended consequences of human intervention.
Both kinds of technological interaction are based on an understanding or
knowledge of nature, but the former relationship is symmetrical and the latter
two are clearly asymmetrical. Heidegger traces the origin of the term
“technology” from Technikon, meaning “that which belongs to techne”
(Heidegger 1977, 12). He continues with the observation that techne has
always been linked to episteme and that both words represent a very broad
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sense of knowing, implying a sense of understanding and expertise (Heidegger
1977, 13).
In On the Soul, Aristotle writes that:
Knowledge of the essential nature of a substance is largely
promoted by an acquaintance with its properties: For when we
are able to give an account conformable to experience of all or
most of the properties of a substance, we shall be in the most
favorable position to say something worth saying about the
essential nature of a subject; in all demonstration a definition of
essence is required as a starting point, so that definitions which
do not enable us to discover the incidental properties, or which
fail to facilitate even a conjecture about them, must obviously,
one and all, be dialectical and futile (Aristotle 1984, 402b21403b2, 642).
Knowledge becomes a social process based on consensus, and in a
sense utility. From this perspective, the banks of a river do not come forth
because of the bridge; they are banks and are identified as such because they
are part of the properties that a river possesses. The river has a dynamic of its
own that is independent of humanity. Humans gain knowledge of the river (or
of nature) when they interact with it. It is a matter of action and inter-action,
not of thinking or language.
In a sense, the phronimos, Aristotle’s ethically wise person, borrows
goods from the river to sustain herself. In this process, the person acquires a
debt, which arises because of need, not due to the ephemeral. John Scott notes
that:
Aristotle’s practically wise dweller is not enabled by the mere
material possession of her dwelling in this instrumental way. The
two kinds of needs are of different orders. One need constitutes a
‘there’ or a place, a soul erotically and generatively open to any
and all possible satisfactions, any and all goods that actually
support living well. The need for the [weaving] shuttle, on the
other hand is less open. The need for the shuttle is instrumental
and hypothetical, not generative (Scott 2002, 142).
From Heidegger’s perspective, modern technology has turned
humanity’s relationship with nature into the second kind of order, merely
instrumental. In Heidegger’s language, nature has becoming nothing more than
a “standing reserve” (Heidegger 1977).
Modern environmentalists have embraced Heidegger’s thinking about
technology and its relationship to nature. However, many environmentalists
have not escaped the epistemological trap that Heidegger had identified with
modern science and technology. In “The Death of Environmentalism. Global
Warming Politics in a Post-environmental World”—an essay that created a bit
of stir when it was first presented in 2004—Michael Shellenberger and Ted
Nordhaus argued that by focusing purely on global warming policy and
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projects environmentalists have marginalized themselves from public debate
and have not been nearly as effective as they would like to be. They need to
consider the broader scope of environmental problems the global community
faces. By advocating policy measures that attempt to address environmental
issues in a purely scientific way, Nordhaus and Shellenberger suggest that
environmentalists have isolated themselves from possible political allies who,
although they might not share the same passion about the issues, could provide
valuable political support.
Shellenberger and Nordhaus argue further that “the environmental
movement’s incuriosity about the interests of potential allies depends on it
never challenging the most basic assumptions about what does and does not
get counted as ‘environmental.’ Because we define environmental problems so
narrowly, environmental leaders come up with equally narrow solutions”
(Shellenberger and Nordhaus 2004, 9-10.) The authors point out that many
environmentalists make the common mistake of “advocat[ing] technical policy
solutions as though politics didn’t matter” (Shellenberger and Nordhaus 2004,
25). Shellenberger and Nordhaus point to the New Apollo Project as a step in
the right direction since it integrates multiple political interests for a common
good. The plan to create a workable majority for environmental issues is
perhaps an improvement, but it is not enough politically or epistemologically.
Shellenberger and Nordhaus write, “Environmentalism is today more
about protecting a supposed ‘thing’—‘the environment’—than advancing the
world view articulated by Sierra Club founder John Muir, ‘When we try to pick
out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in the Universe’”
(Shellenberger and Nordhaus 2004, 9). Shellenberger and Nordhaus suggest
that thinking about “the environment” as a thing rather than as a mental
category results in environmentalists doing “their work as though these are
literal rather than figurative truths” (Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 2004 1213). They point to a blind spot in much of the modern thinking about the
environment that is fundamentally anthropocentric and instrumentalist. Nature
is thought of as a thing that can be acted upon and controlled/protected rather
than as part of the world that humans and non-humans live in and share.
A quick return to Ausonius might be helpful here. Ausonius’s poem is
ostensibly about a trip he took from Bingen to Trier. But it is much richer than
it appears. The description of the water as transparent gives the impression
that it holds no secrets, but that transparency soon gives way to the reflection of
the vineyards on the hills. There is a boundary between the super and
subaqueous realms that must not be violated. Ausonius’s playful description of
the failure of the Satyrs to grasp the elusive Nymphs was indicative of the
proper relation between the two worlds of air and water. The description of the
boys fishing on the banks reveals the violence of the transgression:
All unsuspecting, the wandering finny tribe rush upon them
agape; and when—too late! —their open gullets feel the
91
concealed barbs pierce deep within, they struggle and their
struggles are betrayed above, when the wand bends in response
to the tremulous vibrations of the quivering line (Ausonius 1961,
243 lines 250-53).
Ausonius’s almost idyllic journey down the Mosel provides an insight
into how to approach thinking about rivers in a new way. Ausonius’s
meditation is a journey, an action. And it might be in action that we find a way
to think about rivers and other built or built upon spaces differently. John Scott
argues that for Heidegger, language provides a place where mortals eternally
search for meaning as dwellers, but at the same time language conceals this
true meaning. Norberg-Schulz approvingly cites Heidegger’s comment about
language being the first art (Norberg-Schulz 1988). Scott suggests that
Aristotle’s attempt at a phenomenology of natural things that understood
“presence as accommodated in a mediated and reflective way through a
mechanism, not of production and use, but of acts based on debt and various
kinds of possession, … make[s] it possible not just to die well, but to live well”
(Scott 2002, 126).
Conclusion
Where does “action” leave us in terms of how to think about the environment
in a way that is not instrumental and overly anthropocentric? Or to rephrase
the question: Is a return to a more symmetrical relationship between human
beings and nature the key to creating an environmental policy and ethics that
is more than glorified nostalgia? I think I have the beginnings of an answer. Part
of the solution is to go from macro to micro in historical scope. Instead of
viewing the problems of getting goods from Metz to Koblenz (the two navigable
endpoints of the Mosel) and the process of how that was resolved, it may be
more fruitful and interesting to view the interaction of the places and spaces
along the way of the river. In western Germany the Mosel meanders along
numerous small villages. Exploring the histories of these villages and how they
interacted with the river, or managed their debt, to use Aristotle’s term, is a
possible way to de-instrumentalize the Mosel. A way to do this that honors the
notion of action and consensus that Scott suggests that Aristotle is aiming for is
to employ a sociological method known as Actor Network Theory, or ANT.
In Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy, Bruno
Latour offers a harsh critique of environmentalists and of “political ecology” in
a way that echoes Heidegger’s critique, as well as those of Schellenberger and
Nordhaus. Latour writes that “this nature becomes knowable through the
intermediary of the sciences; it has been formed through networks of
instruments; it is defined through the intervention of professions, disciplines,
and protocols; it is distributed via databases; it is provided with arguments
through learned societies” (Latour 2004, 4). Juxtaposed to this scientific
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concern is an aesthetic one that seeks to protect nature. These two concerns
seem to be irreconcilable. Latour notes:
Every time we seek to mix scientific facts with aesthetic, political,
economic and moral values, we find ourselves in a quandary. If
we concede too much to facts, the human element in its entirety
tilts into objectivity and becomes a countable and calculable
thing, a bottom line in terms of energy, one species among others.
If we concede too much to values, all of nature tilts into the
uncertainty of myth, into poetry or romanticism; everything
becomes soul and spirit. If we mix facts and values we go from
bad to worse, for we are depriving ourselves of both autonomous
knowledge and independent morality (Latour 2004, 4).
Latour proposes a new approach, in his words literally a new
Constitution, that will include both human and nonhuman as a way to
transcend the difficulty outlined above.
Latour’s approach is intriguing for it opens up the possibility of (re)establishing a symmetrical relationship between the human and nonhuman. If
it is possible to change the view of nature as something calculable or as a
“standing reserve,” it might be possible to arrive at a conservationist ethics that
follows Scott’s view of Aristotle’s ethics, where the individual is mindful of his
or her debt to others, both human and nonhuman, and acts accordingly. Scott
notes in Plato’s Republic that Cephalus suggests that debt plays a key role in
allowing him to be the human being that he is; the ability to repay integrates
him into the social order. Recollection, Socrates’s key to knowledge, is crucial
for a person to remember exactly what was borrowed and what is needed to
repay the debt (Scott 2002).
In terms of the environment, understanding our debt involves the
realization that human interaction with the environment is an exchange where
people who take from the environment (we all do) owe it a debt of sorts. In a
real sense, the current situation is more dire than the one that Scott discusses
in “Having a Need to Act” (2002); Scott touches upon the role of the State in
Plato’s Republic to place restrictions on the seemingly limitless skills of the
artists and technologist whose activity make the State possible. The twenty-first
century world faces a similar predicament. The skill of the artists and
technologists is virtually limitless. But limitless production is not desirable
because it causes damage—perhaps irreparable damage—to the environment.
The solution to the problem is not the philosopher-king, but rather a
functioning political system along the lines of what Latour discusses where
environmentalists, scientists, and economic interests cooperate in an effort to
manage the debt that human beings acquire. It is a call for a politics that allows
for a sustainable economy in a sustainable environment—a relationship in
which human interaction with the environment is more symmetrical and less
nostalgic.
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Literature
Aristotle. 1984. “On the Soul”. In Barnes, J. (Ed.), The Complete Works of
Aristotle. Vol.1. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Ausonius. 1961. “The Moselle”. In Loeb Classical Library: Ausonius I. Trans. H. G.
E. White. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Blackbourn, D. 2006. The Conquest of Nature. Water, Landscape, and the Making
of Modern Germany. New York: W.W. Norton.
Cermakian, J. 1975. The Moselle. River and Canal from the Roman Empire to the
European Economic Community. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Cioc, Mark. 2001. The Rhine: An Ecobiography 1815-2000. Seattle: University of
Washington Press.
Collingwood, R.G. 1960. The Idea of Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Heidegger, M. 1971a. “The Origin of the Work of Art”. In Poetry, Language,
Thought. Trans. A. Hofstadter. New York: Harper and Row Publishers.
Heidegger, M. 1971b. “Building, Dwelling, Thinking”. In Poetry, Language,
Thought. Trans. A. Hofstadter. New York: Harper and Row Publishers.
Heidegger, Martin. 1977. “The Question Concerning Technology”. In The
Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. Trans. W. Lovitt. New
York: Harper Torchbooks.
Latour, B. 2004. Politics and Nature. How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Nash, R. 1982. Wilderness and the American Mind. 3rd edition. New Haven: Yale
University Press.
Norberg-Schulz, Ch. 1979. Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of
Architecture. New York: Rizzoli.
. 1988. Architecture: Meaning and Place. Selected Essays. New York: Rizzoli.
Panofsky, E. 1976. Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism. New York: New
American Library.
Schama, S. 1995. Landscape and Memory. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
Scott, J. 2002. “Having a Need to Act.” In Backhaus, G. & Murungi, J. (Eds.),
Transformations of Urban and Suburban Landscapes. Perspectives from
Philosophy, Geography, and Architecture. Lahnam, MD: Lexington Books:
125-152.
Shellenberger, M. & Nordhaus, T. 2004. “The Death of Environmentalism. Global
Warming Politics in a Post-environmental World”. Available from:
http://heartland.org/sites/all/modules/custom/heartland_migration/fi
les/pdfs/16188.pdf [Last accessed March 28, 2013].
Tschumi, B. 1994. Architecture and Disjunction. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Waring, G. 1878. The Bride of the Rhine: Two Hundred miles in a Mosel Row Boat.
Boston: J.R. Osgood and Company.
Wightman, E. M. 1971. Roman Trier and the Treveri. Westport, CT: Praeger.
Worster, D. 1993. The Wealth of Nature. Environmental History and the
Ecological Imagination. New York: Oxford University Press.
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Troy Paddock
Troy Paddock (Southern Connecticut State University)
Building within space: Thoughts towards an Environmental Ethics
Abstract: The need for constructing an environmental ethics that keeps
sustainability in mind is the result of a collision of the realization that the
natural environment is neither limitless nor impervious to actions with a view
of nature that has been fundamentally instrumentalist and anthropocentric.
This paper will borrow from architectural theory in an effort to do two things:
First, it will point to some of the limitations of an anthropocentric view of
nature and how it impacts efforts to influence environmental policy; second, it
will suggest that ideas from Aristotle and Actor Network Theory can help to
provide a paradigm within which we can think about nature in a way that
offers an alternative framing of questions about the environment.
Key words: Environmental ethics, conservation, architecture, action in space,
Mosel River, Actor Network Theory, instrumentalism, nature
doi:10.14746/eip.2014.1.5
95
Historic Gardens as Places of Conflicting Values
Mateusz Salwa (Warsaw University; Warsaw, Poland)
Introduction1
The aim of this article is to present historical gardens as phenomena inevitably
pervaded by an ongoing clash of values that can be characterized by a theory
proposed by Austrian art historian Alois Riegl, one of the founders of the
modern theory of restoration of historical monuments. The conflict stems from
the twofold character of gardens where art (or in broader terms: culture) and
nature are combined, resulting in a tension between a tendency, pertaining to
culture, to remain static and the changeability inherent in nature. In my view,
the main theoretical and practical issues about gardens is that they tend to be
understood as embodiments of a gardener’s or a landscape architect’s
intentions, which makes us think of and treat them as possessing a fixed shape
and meaning that we should protect from any changes through time. However,
what severely undermines this perspective is the ever-changing vegetation
employed in gardens. Nature, being dynamic, makes the notion of gardens
possessing a fixed form and meaning quite dubious: do we really see in, for
instance, the Versailles Gardens, what Louis XIV or Balzac saw? Do we
experience and interpret them in the same manner they did? It is true that
whenever we go to such places we somehow tend to believe that these are the
same gardens that people from the past used to walk in. Nevertheless, we
should seek the identity of a garden somewhere other than in its shape or
meaning.
This tension, which in my view is essential to understanding and
protecting gardens, may be described in many ways. In this article I will focus
on the clash of two perspectives. The first treats historic gardens as “timeless,”
which means that each garden has an original shape that has to be conserved
and preserved. Its most important values are artistic, wherein all the nonhuman elements (e.g., plants and animals) have to be subsumed under the
“timeless” artistic structure. The second perspective sees gardens as living
areas. On the one hand, a garden’s actual shape and meaning result from its
cultural and natural history from its creation. On other hand, its natural value
This article was prepared thanks to the support of the National Science Centre
(Poland) (grant: No. 2011/01/D/HS1/01661). The author would like to express his
gratitude to the two anonymous reviewers whose comments were very inspiring and
contributed much to the text.
1
Mateusz Salwa
(arising from self-seeded plants, wild animals, natural processes, etc.) is
appreciated as the source of its social importance, even if the present
conditions of a garden fail to fit with the original plan, or even undermine the
very idea of a garden. One may object here that equating the dichotomy of
art/nature with the dichotomy of static/dynamic is not legitimate, since art
need not be static (as in, e.g., the performing arts). One can, however, reply that
what is at stake in the context of historic gardens is the “traditional” idea of
artwork (e.g., as a Baroque garden is analogous to a Baroque painting or poem).
Therefore, the first of the two perspectives treats gardens not as living
performances but very much like still paintings, classical architecture, or even
texts, in the sense that any change, even if inevitable, is unwelcomed, and as
such is external. According to the other perspective––in which toutes
proportions gardées can be called “ecological”—one should not prevent changes
resulting from natural processes, although one might seek to mitigate them.
The question arises as to whether we can maintain a garden in a way that
would strike a balance between the two opposing points of view by focusing on
the ideas acceptable to both.
Gardens are always human-made; they are places where the natural
environment is transformed according to a person’s aesthetic experience and
expectations. To a large extent, a garden embodies its creator’s aesthetic attitude
toward her environment, which, of course, does not necessarily exclude other,
such as practical or scientific, possible interests in it. On the other hand, even if
one thinks of gardens as highly humanized environments, one cannot disregard
the natural, or non-human, elements such as the soil, weeds, and insects.
The analyses of gardens should, therefore, be placed at the intersection
of aesthetics of art and aesthetics of nature, for neither of these perspectives
alone fully grasps the idea or essence of gardens. Yet gardens, it is widely
acknowledged (see Miller 1993; Ross 1998; Cooper 2006), are conceptually
precisely between art and nature—or to put it differently: they are art-andnature.
In the vast body of literature on landscapes, one comes across a variety
of definitions of the notion of landscape; nevertheless, they seem to share a
common denominator. Namely, a landscape exists only insofar as it is created
by humans either by their “material” actions shaping (intentionally or not)
their surroundings, or by their aesthetic attitude through which the
environment is experienced and appreciated as an aesthetic object.2 As
Augustin Berque states in a Kantian vein, landscape is the world itself as well as
the way it is perceived and conceived (Berque 2000). Interestingly, this duality
has been acknowledged by the European Landscape Convention: “‘Landscape’
means an area, as perceived by people, whose character is the result of the
2
For an overview of two different traditions, see Assunto 2005; Berleant 2005, 1-100.
97
action and interaction of natural and/or human factors” (ELC 2000, § I.1; see
also Antrop 2013, 18).
Given these premises, it seems reasonable to treat gardens as particular
tokens of landscape: tokens that make the latter’s double character more
tangible if for no other reason than at least because gardens—as has been
said—are the fruit of intentional human fashioning of a well-defined piece of
nature, and because they are somewhat more concrete than a landscape as
such, which is “a vague concept and in reality has fuzzy edges” (Brook 2013,
109). Consequently, one can observe at least some of the problems that are
characteristic of landscapes in general, especially when their historical or
temporal dimensions are at stake. Thus, the conflict of values within a garden
may be seen as a scaled down example of the same clash occurring at the more
general level of landscapes. These clashes are, above all, discords between
different ways of thinking about landscapes, either merely divergent or more
seriously colliding. It goes without saying that these conceptual quarrels may
have deep—sometimes irreversible—impacts on the landscapes themselves. It
is in this sense, too, that the problems that gardens pose for restoration theory
and practice may help us understand analogous topics concerned with
landscapes (Anthony 1996).
It is noteworthy that historical gardens and parks are very particular
“objects” whose restoration, conservation, or preservation raises specific
problems (see e.g., Mackellar Goulty 1993). These stem from the fact that
although gardens are thought to be artifacts, and consequently should be
managed in ways similar to how buildings or paintings (to name two fields to
which gardens are often compared) are maintained, they are, nevertheless,
nature-based. This acknowledgement makes the uniquely art-centered
perspective highly debatable. In other words, I argue that caring for historical
gardens ought to involve multiple dimensions too; in particular, it should
attempt to find answers to questions discussed in the field of art restoration
and conservation as well as that of ecological restoration. The latter is
indispensable because it can offer practical and theoretical instruments that
allow us to cope with plants and hence properly value a garden’s natural
dimension. But most importantly, it is vital because it addresses directly issues
such as the authenticity of restored ecosystems in relation to their continuity.
These interests can in turn be fruitfully extrapolated onto the field of garden
restoration or aligned with phenomenological analyses of such themes as the
sense of place and its correlates, authenticity and identity, as well as the key
category for gardens—genius loci. This is also the reason why Riegl’s theory
proves to be so thought-inspiring: it offers an interesting framework that
comprises all of these mentioned elements, while at the same time it succeeds
in maintaining a dialectical tension between them without committing gross
oversimplifications.
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Mateusz Salwa
The Krasinski Garden Debate
To illustrate my argument, I turn to the example of one of the historical public
parks situated in the heart of Warsaw: the Krasinski Garden. Its historical
importance is beyond question, even though during the centuries it underwent
so many deep changes that there is nothing left of its original form, including its
botanic elements. After a relatively long period of neglect, the municipal
authorities decided that the garden should be restored. The restoration
process—which began autumn of 2012 and was supposed to end by summer
of 2014—has become one of the most hotly debated topics in recent years in
Warsaw. For the past twenty years, Warsaw has been experiencing rapid
growth and modernization and—as is usually the case—this process has had
its ups and downs, but in very few other similar circumstances could one
witness similarly heated reactions.
Before discussing the debate it is useful to offer a short outline of the
history of the Krasinski Garden (Krasinski 2013). It was founded in the 17th
century as a Baroque palace garden belonging to one of the major Polish noble
families—the Krasinscy. During the following 250 years it was restructured
several times according to constantly changing tastes, arriving at its near final
shape at the end of 19th century. It is this form, designed by the leading Warsaw
landscape architect of that time, Franciszek Szanior, that the local authorities
and architects responsible for the restoration work intend to revive. In the
second half of the 18th century the garden was opened to the public, making it
one of the first ever public gardens in Warsaw. Over the next 100 years it was
one of the most fashionable places sought out by city dwellers. At the time of
the Second World War—in particular, during the Warsaw Uprising of 1944—
the Krasinski Garden became the backdrop of intense battles. It was severely
destroyed and partially used as a burial ground. Moreover, it was located in the
Ghetto neighborhood. After the war its area was doubled, and until recently it
was also a place where trees taken from, for example, the metro construction
sites, were moved to and planted.
It was clear from the outset that given its poor condition, the garden
was beyond doubt in need of restoration. It was in this context that the
opinions of the proponents and opponents of the restoration met; though this
is also where the accord between them ended. As already mentioned, no other
restoration project in Warsaw was as controversial as this one. Although one
would have expected such an enterprise to be heartedly welcomed by everyone
but perhaps some solitary malcontents, the project proved to be extremely
contentious. The controversies led to a series of newspaper articles, letters from
readers, public hearings, debates, petitions, and—what is even more
interesting—social activism. The latter included not only the typical hanging of
banners, but more symbolic actions as well. For example, because the first
stage of the work, the extensive clearing of vegetation, took place in proximity
of All Saints’ Day, collective action took the form of lighting candles put on the
99
resulting tree stumps—thereby keeping a kind of collective vigil over the dead
trees—and laying flowers on the spot where a dead owl was found, setting its
ephemeral cenotaph. All of this symbolism may appear dull, kitschy, or strained,
but nonetheless it had never before been utilized for non-human beings, at
least in Warsaw. Paradoxically, a badly maintained garden, seen as an
endangered “entity,” managed to create a community whose primary concern
was a sort of amateur or naïve ecology (as opposed to the art-historical issues)
in a much more effective way than many artistic projects did and will probably
ever do.3
Assuming that everyone involved in this situation has been moved by
an interest in improving the garden and enhancing its values, the core of the
conflict seems to lie in two divergent ideas as to what a garden is and should be.
To simplify, it seems that the division is between the art-historical and the
social-ecological perspectives.4 The aim here is to outline the most important
and general assumptions, which will help us better understand the conflict of
values in this case. Clearly, there exists a continuum of opinions; what is
sketched here is an attempt to clarify the heart of the disagreement, which
admittedly (though usefully) creates a pair of overly idealized extremes.
On one side of the debate were landscape architects and historians
convinced that a garden is a sort of architectural artwork—in this case one
dating back to the end of the 19th century. The proponents of such a view
usually claim that once a garden is created, a particular form of it is assumed.
This form could, in the course of time, undergo alterations external to its
“original” structure and is therefore removable (e.g., it is possible to replace
decaying plants with new ones or to get rid of those that were not included in
the architect’s project but grew up later on). A garden, then, is treated as a
purely cultural phenomenon—one could say, a monument—in which its natural
dimension is indispensable but of relatively low importance insofar as it is part
of the garden’s essential features. Those who hold this view seem to imply that
even though there can be no garden without plants, and we indeed can
It goes without saying that it would be a gross mistake to idealize this situation and
interpret it in a dichotomous way (nature vs. culture, ingenuous nature vs. cynical
politics, etc.), for there was much politicizing, obstinance, and intractability on both
sides, as well as a sheer fear of change on the opponents’ part, not to mention the
errors committed by local authorities who either arrogantly dismissed the opinion of
the local community, nature lovers, and everyday visitors or tried to persuade the
disputants in such an unskillful manner as to provoke their exaggerated discontent. I
leave aside practical issues such as questions of whether gardens should be fenced,
closed at night, or surveilled.
4 This division does not mean that local authorities who promoted the restoration
were not concerned at all with ecological issues (e.g., they stated that the garden’s
flora had to be rejuvenated and replaced by new specimen for botanical reasons). And
those who opted for leaving the garden largely untouched used aesthetic arguments
as well, stating that this is what they like about the garden.
3
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Mateusz Salwa
appreciate them as beautiful and interesting (e.g., they offer us joy, healing, and
greater biological knowledge), as soon as we move from the level of plants
themselves to the garden as a whole (as the embodiment of an architect’s idea),
we must somehow treat nature as a mere medium. Like bricks in a building or
colors in a painting, this medium can be replaced if needed without destroying
the garden’s authenticity.
On the other hand, the opponents of this approach embodied a sort of
ecoactivist’s perspective and claimed that a garden is an ecosystem, by which
they meant that nature should take precedence over the historical
considerations. They did not deny that the Krasinski Garden has historical
value, but nevertheless they opted for the present conditions that offered
possibilities for experiencing and appreciating nature, which is, they claimed,
what really counts in a garden. As a result, even if nature in a garden is not
pristine, they seemed to appreciate it as if it were in many respects wild; hence
any intervention was necessarily seen as causing damage and, as a result, as
something that should be kept to a minimum.5 The gardens, then, can be seen
in this respect to be more like “natural monuments.” This nature-centered
perspective is not totally devoid of historical concerns. However, these had
nothing to do with the concerns of the other side of the conflict.
Instead of treating the garden as a monument for the time it was
created, what was emphasized as important by those taking the naturecentered view is the fact that some of the trees that were cut down in the
process of restoration witnessed the war and survived it. In a way, the
Krasinski Garden was thus conceived of as an ecosystem that fulfills the
everyday needs of its users, while at the same time possessing a historical value
that “grew up” along with the plants, making it important to save its continuity.
Moreover, hardly anyone was of the opinion that the garden should not be
maintained at all to let nature develop as it would.
It is not, then, the artificial character of the garden that is the bone of
contention. What differentiates the two perspectives is the kind of values they
attach to the garden. In many respects, the disagreement between the two sides
of the debate is similar to that between intentionalist and anti-intentionalists in
interpretation.
The Garden as a Natural Monument
In the past decades garden studies have developed in a conspicuous manner
(see e.g., Conan 1999). The main discipline within which it originated was art
history, which together with such fields as the history of ideas defined its
direction. The garden is by and large treated as a work of art that has multiple
One may note that this kind of approach is to some extent naïve as it seems to
unreflectively assume that what is best for nature is to leave it alone.
5
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meanings and therefore can be thought of as a representation (see e.g., Hunt
2000, 76-115), which in turn can be analyzed on different levels. It is thought,
therefore, that it is possible to establish a garden’s original meaning and then
decide whether we experience the garden in conformity with its creator’s
intention. However, there is no unanimity as to the meaning of gardens (see
Treib 2011), for gardening is sometimes seen as an act of shaping nature and
not of conferring meanings to it; for instance, a tree in a garden might be just a
tree, and not necessarily a symbol of something else. What is more, doubts may
arise as to whether the original meaning—if there is one—is still perceivable
or readable, from which it follows that no comparison of meanings, such as
those assumed by the garden historians, is viable. But even if we inevitably
perceive gardens in different manners, our various perceptions cannot be
judged as less authentic. And this is due to the fact that the discursive meaning
to which garden historians allude is not the only one; we can speak of an
emotional meaning as well, understood as an atmosphere that emerges from
the interaction between a person and a garden, or rather from one’s plain being
in the garden (Cooper 2006, 47-53). None of this has much to do, if anything,
with the garden creator’s intentions.
Despite doubts about whether we can establish the proper meaning of a
garden, and what it is, it is unquestionable that there is always some meaning.
Roger Scruton (2000) is right when he poetically writes:
The garden is a surrounding space, not an open space. And that
which grows and stands in it, grows and stands around us. Trees,
for instance. A tree in a garden is not like a tree in a forest or a
field. It is not simply there, growing from some scattered seed,
accidental. It stands and watches, as I stand and watch. And
although it does not move, the tree converses, in a sense, with
those who walk beneath it ... (83).
In all likelihood, both parties of this conflict would reasonably agree that the
Krasinski Garden is meaningful, although the concept of meaning they would
employ would be quite vague and would be merely synonymous with “value.”
But whereas those opting for its restoration would claim that what counts is its
historical or original value or meaning, those standing against it would rather
defend the present-day values associated with the fact that they can spend
some time in contact with nature that witnessed the history of the past century.
Now, it seems that either of these opinions taken alone is to a large
extent untenable for they both miss something important, something that,
paradoxically, lies at the core of the other. At the same time, these approaches
are too contradictory to be flawlessly reconciled. Thus, as was mentioned with
reference to Riegl, the only plausible way to explain this conundrum is to link
the two views in a dialectical relationship that would correspond to the
art/nature dialectics so essential to gardens (Crawford 1983).
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“Garden intentionalism,” as discussed above, is partially justified.
Gardens as such, like any other human-made objects, are propelled by their
creator’s intention or purpose. They were planned to offer their owners or
visitors a place to perform specific activities or to behave in a particular way,
and they were supposed to convey different social, political, etc., meanings. In a
word, if we are to treat a piece of land as a garden, we must know (or assume)
that there was an intent to make it a garden. This is what Scruton may have
meant by stating that “a tree in a garden is not like a tree in a forest” (see also
Leddy 1999). As a consequence, one might want to ruminate on gardens
resorting solely to art-centered aesthetics. And it would in fact be possible, were
it not for nature, which is unintentional and purposeless (at best we can talk of
its “purposeless purposiveness,” a la Kant). This is what restrains “garden
intentionalism,” not only conceptually but also practically. Even if we happen to
be inclined to treat gardens as artworks, the ungovernable vegetal dimension of
gardens makes them non-standard, or non-traditional, works of art. Gardens are
not mere pieces of art for the same reasons that nature cannot be appreciated
as art (see e.g., Carlson 2009; Parsons 2008), although our art appreciation
may inform our aesthetic experience of nature (Moore 1999) and hence of
gardens. In other words, traditional comparisons of gardens and architecture,
or paintings, may be still inspiring, but they are certainly not obligatory or
better than others.
As said above, one side in the debate seemed to treat the Krasinski
Garden on par with the still remaining Baroque palace to which it once
belonged. This approach, however, turns out not to be so evident. Let us now
ponder the question of why gardens are artifacts whose artistic status is
questionable. Most of the arguments tend to place the garden’s natural aspect in
the foreground (e.g., Miller 1993). For example, gardens are not objects
standing in front of us like paintings but they surround us, which means that
we are not spectators contemplating them from a distance, but rather we enter
them and participate in them. Gardens are not stable, as they constantly change
over the years and seasons according to the circular rhythms of biological
processes of growth and decay—it is therefore difficult, if possible at all, to
decide what the original shape of the garden was. In addition, gardens have a
conspicuous phenomenal dimension for such factors as light, temperature,
weather, etc. These factors play a crucial role in gardens: they are not external
elements like lighting or temperature conditions in a museum, but are rather
internal. As a result, it is unthinkable to enter the same garden twice: not only
will the plants be older, but also our experience will be different. Moreover, it is
far from obvious who should be credited with giving a garden its meaning—is it
what was planned by the landscape architect or what came out of the
interaction between him or her and nature? Or, is it what a visitor feels
regardless of the creator’s intentions? In contrast to a painter or an architect, a
garden’s creator has little control over her “medium.”
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There are other arguments too that stem as much from considerations
of art as from the field of ecological restoration (Elliot 1997): if all the plants
are to be replaced, for example, then the continuity of a garden seems to be
broken, raising questions about its authenticity. If we are to push this argument
further, we could state that such a garden is fake.
The above observations seem to share a common base that is
important for my present argument. They all assume that a garden is temporal
and unstable—although disposing of a fixed frame—and is a dynamic “object,”
and that these characteristics stem from its biological (in the broad sense of the
term) and cultural background (see also Miller 2010). Gardens may, then, be
defined as “dynamic open aesthetic objects,” which means that they do not have
a logical structure determining their meaning and the way they should be
appreciated, and that they do not have static forms intended to endure for as
long as possible (Fenner 2006).
In other words, although we have an idea of a garden as a historical
monument that should be approached historically, we also believe that a
garden is something living in the double sense of biologically and culturally. By
adding these two concepts we can arrive at something resembling the
Romantic idea of a living work of art. We may find this in the official document
issued by the International Council on Monuments and Sites, the Florence
Charter:
A historic garden is an architectural and horticultural
composition of interest to the public from the historical or artistic
point of view. As such, it is to be considered as a monument. The
historic garden is an architectural composition whose
constituents are primarily vegetal and therefore living, which
means that they are perishable and renewable. Thus its
appearance reflects the perpetual balance between the cycle of
the seasons, the growth and decay of nature and the desire of the
artist and craftsman to keep it permanently unchanged. ... since it
is a living monument ... preservation must be governed by specific
rules. ... As the expression of the direct affinity between
civilisation and nature, and as a place of enjoyment suited to
meditation or repose, the garden thus acquires the cosmic
significance of an idealized image of the world, a “paradise” in the
etymological sense of the term, and yet a testimony to a culture, a
style, an age, and often to the originality of a creative artist
(emphasis added; 1981, § 1, 2, 3, 5).
The document clearly illustrates the major problem, without yet offering a
univocal solution. The Charter contrasts the historical value of a garden
associated with “the desire of the artist and craftsman” whose project should
be, if possible, kept “in an unchanged condition [which] requires both prompt
replacements ... and a long-term programme of periodic renewal (clear felling
and replanting with mature specimens)” (§ 11). The Charter also recommends
that the “restoration work must respect the successive stages of evolution of
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the garden concerned. In principle, no one period should be given precedence
over any other” (§ 16), and warns that “where a garden has completely
disappeared or there exists no more than conjectural evidence of its successive
stages a reconstruction could not be considered a historic garden” (§ 17). Two
other related points are worth noticing. Firstly, the document recognizes the
value of nature as such, for it states that “by reason of its nature and purpose, a
historic garden is a peaceful place conducive to human contacts, silence and
awareness of nature” (§ 19), and that interest in historical gardens should be
promoted for they help to build the “awareness of the need for due respect for
nature and the historic heritage” (§ 25). Secondly, a historic garden is “a place
of enjoyment suited to meditation or repose,” which means that its present
function or value need not correspond with its original for rarely were gardens
treated this way in the past.
Thus, the idea of a living—again, both biologically and culturally—
monument may appear to be contradictory, and it probably is. A similar trait,
but in the context of ruins and monuments in general, was discovered by Riegl,
who in 1903 published his seminal Der moderne Denkmalkultus, sein Wesen,
seine Entstehung [The Modern Cult of Monuments: Its Essence and Its
Development]. The significance of his work lies in discriminating and defining
principal values connected with monuments. Although he was not interested in
gardens, and his main examples are architectural, his remarks shed light on the
topic of gardens and landscapes.
Riegl differentiates between two main categories of monuments:
“deliberate monuments” and “unintentional monuments.” The former include
monuments that were intended by their creators to commemorate particular
events, deeds, or people. The latter are, in turn, described as follows:
Since the creators of these works, which we consider today as
historical monuments, wanted primarily to satisfy certain
practical or ideal needs … and certainly did not as a rule intend to
leave evidence of their artistic and cultural life to future
generations, then the term “'monument”, which we nevertheless
use to define these works, can only be meant subjectively, not
objectively. We modern viewers, rather than the works
themselves by virtue of their original purpose, assign meaning
and significance to a monument. In both cases—that of deliberate
and of unintentional monuments—a commemorative value exists
and for that reason we think of both as “monuments.” In both
cases, we are interested furthermore in the original, uncorrupted
form of the work as it left the hand of its maker, and this is the
state in which we prefer to see it, or to which we prefer to restore
it in thoughts, words, or images (Riegl 1996, 72).
In other words, both types of monuments (incidentally, we may state that
gardens may belong to either of these) are traces of their time, and as such they
have a historical value. However, Riegl states, there is still another reason why
105
we are interested in works produced by past generations: they make us think
of the time that has passed since they were created. In this case he speaks of an
“age value,” which is as essential as historical value even if it is, so to speak, less
discursive since it does not require knowledge, but is a matter of impression.
Basing on this scheme, Riegl writes:
The fundamental aesthetic principle of our time based on age
values may be formulated as follows: from the hand of man we
expect complete works as symbols of necessary and lawful
production; from nature working over time, on the other hand,
we expect the dissolution of completeness as a symbol of an
equally necessary and lawful decay (73).
He then adds that “modern man at the beginning of the twentieth century
particularly enjoys the perception of the purely natural cycle of growth and
decay” (73). This is also one of the sources of the modern attitude toward
landscape and of the idea of treating certain natural phenomena as monuments
(83).
Historical value and age value are to a certain extent contradictory, for
the former leads people to preserve and restore monuments whereas the latter
suggests that such activity amounts to interfering with natural laws.
Nevertheless, restoration is necessary, although for reasons other than
historical value alone. As Riegl explains it:
Without doubt, the unhampered activity of the forces of nature
will ultimately lead to a monument’s complete destruction. ... A
bare, shapeless pile of stones will not provide the viewer with a
sense of age value. For that purpose, at least a distinct trace of the
original form, of the former work of man—of the original
production—must remain, since a pile of stones represents no
more than a dead, formless fragment of the immensity of nature’s
force, without a trace of living growth (74).
For Riegl, then, the age value cannot overwhelm historical value. In other
words, in order to be what it is, a monument has to conserve, at least to a
minimum degree, its original shape and so its historical value. Otherwise, the
garden is seen merely as a product of natural, but not human, forces. It is then
more like a natural monument, which witnesses not human or cultural, but
only non-human natural history. On the other hand, the historical value that in
theory can be fully restored cannot supplant the age value because whenever
this happens—for example, when a monument is fully restored––we lose the
impression that we are looking at something coming from the past
There is, still, another type of value that is indissolubly linked with
monuments and that adds another dimension to the conundrum: present-day
values. Riegl describes them as follows:
Most monuments are also able to satisfy those sensory and
intellectual desires of man that could as well (if not better) be
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met by modern creations. … From the standpoint of present-day
value, one tends not to consider a monument as such but puts it
on a par with a recently completed modern creation, thus
requiring a monument (old) to display the same outer appearance
as any work of man (new). … The conclusion is obvious: if a
monument bearing signs of disintegration is to appeal to the
modern Kunstwollen [taste], the traces of age must be removed
first of all … and [it has to] appear once again like a newly created
work. … Wherever age value collides with newness value in a
monument of continuous use, it will seek as much as possible to
resign to newness value, not only for practical considerations …,
but also out of ideal … (78, 80).
In a way, then, present-day value goes hand in hand with historical value as it
leads to the restoration of the monument in its original form as if it were a
recent creation.
If we apply Riegl’s remarks to gardens and juxtapose them with the
content of the Florence Charter, it seems obvious that we cannot let nature
overcome the original plan or shape of a garden. If that occurs, the result would
be not a garden anymore but something like Riegl’s “shapeless pile of stones.”
A very interesting problem rises here: even if we underline a garden’s
processual and unpredictable character, the question arises as to what extent
these natural processes may remain spontaneous and undirected. To put it
simply, at what point does a garden that is unattended by a gardener cease to be
what it is, namely a garden, and turn into something else, such as an “exgarden” or a wild landscape?6
On the other hand, if we tend to dismiss the age value of a garden and
are constantly trying to maintain it as if it were new, we are forgetting
something very important.
It is true that an old building acquires its age value because of time, but
time is an external factor in the sense that the building lasts despite its
influence. This is where the difference between architecture and gardens lies:
gardens, like buildings, are influenced by the passage of time, but in this case
time is more like a factor that enables gardens to exist. In this sense the
temporal dimension is not an external feature that can be removed or whose
influence may be somehow diminished, but is an internal element. What is
more, the passage of time does not mean only that things will decay, since
growth occurs too (incidentally, we may notice that this, according to Riegl, is a
source of pleasure for us). In other words, as far as a garden is concerned, the
passage of time is not tantamount to it just moving away from its origin as it is
in the case of, say, a ruins, which if not conserved would crumble more every
A garden which is not cultivated, loses its artful character pretty quickly and turns
into “no man’s nature.” On that topic see Pollan 1991; this is what happened to a large
extent to the Krasiński Garden due to decades of neglect.
6
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year.7 Therefore, the tension between the past and the present is inherent in
the idea of a garden itself to a much greater extent than it is in the case of, say,
architecture. But at the same time it has a different character. Its age value
stems from the fact that we see that we are in an old garden (judging mainly by
the age of the trees), which means that although its original form has suffered
with the passage of time, plants have also gradually matured and even decayed.
In a word, a garden’s age value—as it is implicitly shown by the Florence
Charter—springs from the intersection of its cultural history and duration, and
of its natural history and continuity. A garden, then, is in between an
architectural and a natural monument.
Conclusions
We may notice that the fully restored Krasinski Garden, in which most of the
plants are new, would indeed possess historical value. But this would be an
early twenty-first century value that has only an indirect relationship with the
garden’s original historical value that was planned to be restored. And, no
doubt, such a restoration would be directed by present-day values, as Riegl
wrote. However, the same holds true for any other approach. If, for example, the
Krasinski Garden were not restored in this extensive manner, but left as a halfwild “city nature reserve” as the opponents to the restoration project seemed to
wish, it would be an early twenty-first century “unintentional monument” too,
likewise distantly based on its origin. But here the trap consists in letting the
garden return to unmanaged nature, which would not be wanted for its
newness but for other currently held values, such as ecological value. In the
former case, ecological continuity is sacrificed for supposedly restored
historical value, while in the latter the opposite is true—the historical value is
sacrificed for ecological continuity. One way or another, what comes to the
foreground are present-day values. This conclusion is unavoidable for both
theoretical and practical reasons. Whatever we think or do is a “monument,” so
to speak, of our age, and the debate regarding the fate of the Krasinski Garden
is no different; nonetheless, it tells us a lot about gardens in general. First, it
shows that public gardens mean a lot to people who go there to experience
nature. Second, the debate proves that gardens are much more complex “things”
than one, including garden specialists, might imagine. Moreover, the discourse
which excludes an ecological perspective—however naïvely construed—is not
socially acceptable. I would add that it cannot be accepted in theory, either.
However, reducing a garden to a nature reserve is just as unsatisfactory. The
debate has shown that the concept of garden combines inconsistent notions
(art vs. nature). In the case of the Krasinski Garden, the “ecoactivist” party was
defeated in the sense that the garden will be reopened as a restored artwork in
7
On the topic of ruins and dialectics of art and nature see also Crawford 1983.
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which—as Riegl said—the traces of age will be removed and it will “appear
once again like a newly created work.”8 However, one might wonder whether
these inconsistent notions definitely exclude each other or whether both can be
equally accepted. I would opt for the latter under one condition: we depart from
the traditional way of thinking about art based on traditional media. It is much
more fruitful to compare gardens to artworks designed to change over time,
sometimes very radically, or to live their own history recreated by their
beholders or visitors. In other words, we should look at gardens through the
experience of 20th century art where fixation and change, planning and
unpredictability, can successfully coexist. Land art, or ecological art, seems to
offer good models for how to reflect on gardens and the relationship between
art and nature, seen as “dialectical” (Crawford, 1983) in the sense that neither
nature nor art can be excluded since this would lead to the annihilation of an
important element of a garden. Moreover, opting for either of them means
reflecting upon and taking into consideration the other.
As far as the Krasinski Garden is concerned, I am not persuaded by the
implemented solution, which consists in extensive restoration aimed at
enhancing historical (and one could add, visual) values, which will dwarf not
only the ecological issues but the genius loci as well. I would rather opt for
improving the actual shape of the garden by preserving and conserving its
natural resources. This would not amount to leaving them untouched (a garden,
after all, is not a natural wildlife reserve). Simultaneously, the strategy should
include informing visitors about the history of the place and alluding to it by
rather small gardening interventions. In this way the authenticity of the place
could be maintained, although its origins would be out of sight (but not out of
mind).
To conclude, we often think of restoration as an attempt to stop time, or
at least to protect objects from the effects of time through restoration. However,
even from the perspective of art history, this approach is not as obvious as it
may at first seem. Riegl was among those who started this debate, though it has
become even more controversial as it is adapted to nature. It can be argued
that restoration, conservation, and preservation thus conceived turn natural
objects into art-like entities, depriving them of their main component: the
dimension of time, ranging from geological time to the life spans of individuals.
Gardens, being partially natural, are spatio-temporal objects, as are landscapes.
And this means the existence of constant change that precludes the possibility
of any non-arbitrary treatment of a particular phase of their history as being
the most important. As a corollary, it can be said that closing a landscape or
garden in the trap of “stasis,” and appreciating it as if it were a painting or
architecture, is a matter of a particular way of defining what a landscape or
This article was written when the restoration works were being conducted at the
Krasinski Garden, which was reopened in May 2014.
8
109
garden is. It can stem from, for example, a particular taste. Such an approach, if
imposed as the only one, eliminates other approaches as inadequate (see
Keekok 1995; Fenner 2003). This was the case with the ecological
considerations of the opponents to the project of restoring the Krasinski
Garden, which were overcome by historical discourse.
Gardens, like landscapes, endure not despite changes, but because of
them.9 This is what makes their restorability so problematic. Their restoration
is doomed to find, so to speak, the center of gravity that would allow one to find
a balance between historical, age, and present values. And this is a very difficult
task, if possible at all.
Literature
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(1): 3-7.
Antrop, M. 2013. “A Brief History of Landscape Research”. In Howard, P.,
Thompson, I. & Waterton, E. (Eds.), The Routledge Companion to
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Assunto, R. 2005. Il paesaggio e l’estetica. Palermo: Edizioni Novecento.
Berleant, A. 2012. Aesthetics beyond the Arts. New and Recent Essays.
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Berque A. 2000. Ecoumène. Introduction à l’étude des milieux humains. Paris:
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Brook, I. 2013. “Aesthetic Appreciation of Landscape. In Howard, P., Thompson,
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Carlson, A. 2009. Nature and Landscape. An Introduction to Environmental
Aesthetics. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
Conan M. (Ed.). 1999. Perspective on Garden Histories. Washington D.C.:
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Cooper, E. 2006. A Philosophy of Gardens. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Crawford D. 1983. “Nature and Art: Some Dialectical Relationships”. The Journal
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 42 (1): 49-58.
Elliot, R. 1997. Faking Nature. The Ethics of Environmental Restoration. London:
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Fenner, D. E. W. 2006. “Environmental Aesthetics and the Dynamic Object”.
Ethics and the Environment 11 (1): 1-19.
. 2003. “Aesthetic Appreciation in the Artworld and in the Natural World”.
Environmental Values 12: 3-28.
What comes to mind as an apt metaphor is the Bergsonian snowball, which rolling
down a hill gets bigger and bigger, adding subsequent layers of snow to its frozen
nucleus.
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Hunt, J.D. 2000. Greater Perfections: The Practice of Garden Theory. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press.
Keekok, L. 1995. “Beauty for Ever?”. Environmental Values 4: 213-225.
Leddy, T. (Interviewee) & R. Wittaker (Interviewer). 1999. Is This A Garden?
[Interview transcript]. Retrieved from:
http://www.conversations.org/story.php?sid=41#sthash.0VSVi3Gb.dp
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Mackellar Goulty, Sh. 1993. Heritage Gardens. Care, Conservation and
Management. London-New York: Routledge.
Miller, M. 1993. The Garden as an Art. Albany, N.Y.: Sunny Press.
. 2010. “Time and Temporality in the Garden”. In O’Brien, D. (Ed.), Gardening:
Cultivating Wisdom. Oxford: Blackwell: 178-191.
Moore, R. 2009. “Appreciating Natural Beauty as Natural”. Journal of Aesthetics
Education 33 (3): 42-60.
Parsons, G. 2008. Aesthetics and Nature. London: Continuum.
Pollan, M. 1991. Second Nature: A Gardener’s Education. New York, NY: Atlantic
Monthly Press.
Riegl, A. 1996. “The Modern Cult of Monuments: Its Essence and Its
Development”. In Stanley Price, N., Talley, N. K., & Melucco Vaccaro, A.
(Eds.), Historical and Philosophical Issues in the Conservation of Cultural
Heritage. Los Angeles: Getty Conservation Institute: 69-83.
Ross, S. 1998. What Gardens Mean?. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Scruton R. 2000. Perictione in Colophon: Reflections on the Aesthetic Way of Life.
South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine’s Press.
Treib, M. (Ed.). 2011. Meaning in Landscape Architecture and Gardens. New
York: Routledge.
ELC. 2000. European Landscape Convention. Retrieved from:
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/176.htm
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Mateusz Salwa (Warsaw University)
Abstract: The aim of the article is to present historical gardens as phenomena
inevitably pervaded by an ongoing clash of values. The conflict stems from the
twofold character of gardens where art (or in broader terms: culture) and
nature are combined, which results in a tension between the tendency to
remain static and durable that human culture seeks, and the changeability and
dynamics that are inherent in nature. This conflict can be characterized by
referring to a theory proposed by Austrian art historian Alois Riegl, one of the
founders of modern monument restoration theory who identified three types of
values associated with monuments: historical value, age value, and present-day
values. What is more, one can assume that gardens can be treated as particular
tokens of landscape. Thus, the conflict of values within a garden may be seen as
a more limited example of the same clash going on at the more general level of
landscape. The argument is illustrated by a short case study of the recent
debate over the restoration of the historic Krasinski Garden in Warsaw, Poland.
Key words: Gardens, restoration, Alois Riegl, ecology, value conflict, history of
art
doi:10.14746/eip.2014.1.6
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Ethics in Progress (ISSN 2084-9257). Vol. 5 (2014). No. 1. 113-122.
doi:10.14746/eip.2014.1.7
Value of an Encounter from an Ethical
Perspective
Krystyna Najder-Stefaniak
(Warsaw University of Life Sciences; Warszawa,
Poland)
Ethos as a Human Dwelling Place
When ethical reflection appeared in philosophy, it was directed at discovering
truths that would enable human beings to take care of themselves in a sensible
way. Such care neither hindered cheerfulness nor was based on dictates and
prohibitions. It assumed the value of life understood as active, subjective
existence in the context of an intelligible world. It was both an obligation and a
life strategy, combining the perspectives of truth and goodness. Life inspired by
the ancient concept of care was supposed to advance the “development of the
art of being.”
This art of being should consider the fact that humans can exist, live,
act, and adopt specific forms and meanings only within the surroundings with
which they interact. These interactions ought to become an object of ethical
consideration. Humans influence their surroundings, and by changing them
they gain new challenges and inspirations, which in turn can lead to the
discovery of new possibilities for existence for both people and the system in
which their surroundings are ordered.
If we, after Heidegger, follow the etymology of the word “ethos,” which
is the basis of the term introduced by Aristotle, we would learn that “Ethos
means abode, dwelling place. The word names the open region in which man
dwells. […] The designation reflects on this dwelling” (Heidegger 1977, 118119). In the original sense, ethos was the name of the place where “a plant
grows without obstacles, where it can live and fructify” (Tischner 1982, 53). In
order for human beings to “bear [their] own fruit,” they must first find the right
ethos, namely one’s environment, “home,” or sphere of life as the space that
facilitates understanding, making choices, and acting.
An inhabited area can be opened up through meetings convened by
people. Thus, an encounter constitutes a crucial element of ethos. It adds human
character to one’s surroundings and allows it to vibrate with life. Direct
encounters with someone or something appearing in the human surroundings
exist, with indirect encounters occurring through traces of some activity.
The notion of “traces” comes from ontology and points to the existence
of something not immediately accessible to us. It refers to what is missing here
and now, and it inspires us to transcend the present situation. It suggests the
Value of an Encounter from an Ethical Perspective
existence of a reality different from the one we are currently in. Thus, the
notion of traces may contain depths from which it is worth learning.
On account of our ability to notice and recognize traces, journeys
broaden the mind and store knowledge of epochs and people in books and
works of art. Additionally, this ability is beneficial for our safety, enabling us, for
example, to anticipate the possibility of coming across predators. Traces are
handy in finding water, following the way to a settlement, or in hunting. There
are also traces left by experience in our memory; they affect how we think,
value, and act. In Trace and Presence Barbara Skarga says “The whole history is
nothing else than reading traces. What is science if not an attempt to reveal the
sources of phenomena that left traces in observable events? Everything is a
trace of what has passed; everywhere we are faced with traces, since presence
escapes cognition” (Skarga 2002, 73). Traces are a form of presence in the
sense of the French être présents, or being present. Due to the traces left by
some being, it can be—to some extent—available even after it has disappeared
in the sense of il y a, or being in some place.
In order to use traces, one needs to be aware of the continuity of time
and be able to move in its three dimensions. A trace relates to a past presence;
it allows us to reveal the past. It also helps us to discover the prerequisites or
possibilities for events and encounters that might occur. In this sense, a trace
affects the shape of the future. It exists because of the links between the
present, the past, and the future. Traces can be found in architecture, books,
music, clothes, habits, principles of co-existence, festivals, and poetry. We
become parts of the living system by depicting traces that constitute it, and we
find how essential it is to our identity. Through encounters we build our
cultural identity. As embodied beings, rooted in our environment, we become
strong and gain a sense of security, which allows us to meet and dialogue with
other cultures, to become hospitable, and to creatively influence the fate of our
own culture.
The ability to realize encounters is very important in the art of being.
Through direct and indirect meetings we become aware of our surroundings.
They help us to discover our own possibilities for being. They open up our
dwelling place.
Types of Encounters
For an encounter to happen, the existence of difference is necessary; it is not,
however, sufficient. Pluralism does not always enhance the possibilities offered
by an encounter with otherness. This can be easily understood by thinking of
relationships in terms of an ecosystem paradigm. However, understanding may
not be reached when we perceive relationships in the subject-object scheme.
Jean-François Lyotard , a pro moter of plural ism, suggested that
consensus be replaced with “justice,” which centers our attention on “speaking
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out.” Understood in this way, however, justice does not yet guarantee that the
encounter will take place since this requires listening intently to a variety of
opinions. Furthermore, the greatest danger to diversity is the atomization of
differences, which leads some to reject the universalism that serves as a point
of reference for those seeking truth.
Depending on the perception of difference, we tend to contravene various
types of encounters. Comprehension of difference is conditioned by our scheme of
reasoning, which can be antagonistic, complementary, dialectic, or synergistic.
Antagonistic thinking is reflected in the “either-or” approach. In this
scheme, we assume that difference disqualifies or devalues diverging perspectives.
As a result, we either reject difference and defend our own position or become
fascinated with diversity, accepting it at the cost of our otherness. In neither case is
the encounter enriching; it can only change us. Antagonistic thinking leads to
competitive or hostile encounters. In contrast, complementary thinking can result in
“supplementary” encounters, where the outcome is a combination of what the
parties bring to the situation.
Dialectical processes lead to a synthesis from thesis and antithesis. It
produces encounters of a “common sense of loss.” Such an encounter permits a
going beyond the level of thesis and antithesis, to the discovery of dialectic
synthesis. In searching for synthesis, a dialectic encounter advances development
and is characterized by open reasoning. Synthesis enriches the thesis by exploiting
its potential.
Another outcome of the encounter with difference can be achieved via
synergistic thinking. It facilitates a move to the level of meta-reflection, helping us
to reveal and understand the conditioning of the otherness of both ourselves and
what we come across. Synergistic thinking helps us to recognize and better
comprehend the implications of difference and allows for creative activity. It lies at
the foundation of culture and civilization. In synergistic encounters we can
transcend the borders of our own identity without forsaking it. The encounters
based on synergistic thinking enrich our otherness without jeopardizing it with
uniformity or conflict.
Synergistic thinking requires respect for the otherness of those we meet, as
well as an interest in the truth established by them (emet) and disclosed by them
(aletheia). It involves ideas not yet set definitionally. Conflict inevitably results
from the juxtaposition of terms referring to the same object with imposed closed
meanings suggesting various interpretations.
Difference includes a whole range of characteristics that potentially
distinguish, antagonize, justify falsehoods and errors, and enrich encounters. It
does not determine the outcome definitively; it is we who decide how difference
is handled. Thus, it can be a source of antagonism, conflict, aggression, and
destruction. How can we prevent the disruptive effects of difference? Justice, in
the sense proposed by Lyotard, may presuppose indifference that results in
justification of evil and error. An Aristotelian middle ground between
antagonism and indifference could be identified as “hospitality.” Hospitality
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allows us to sincerely play host to guests in our home without allowing them to
vandalize it. A hospitable encounter supports a deeper, wiser understanding of
both what is ours and what we identify with, as well as what is different and
what we are hospitably open to. Both parties benefit from this type of the
encounter. The guests too, entering into “our otherness” without the intention
of destroying it, can begin a dialogue with it.
Value of Dialogue
The value of dialogue has been unfolded by various philosophers. The oldest
paradigm, proposed by Socrates, ordered the course of encounters to better
arrive at truth. In his framework for encounters, Socrates provided that they
initiate the search for truth without necessarily leading to a final conclusion
enclosed within what we have revealed, named, or defined. This scheme of
encounter managed to protect cognition from stagnating under the influence of
rigid definitions; it maintained the balance between the two types of truth: emet
and aletheia. From an ethical perspective, both notions of truth are valuable not
so much because they provide us with knowledge, but because they make
people realize their ignorance and inspire them to look for the truth.
Martin Buber’s writing about encounters is particularly interesting
here from the perspective of ethics. He observed that human life is led among
objects and other people. It means experiencing the otherness we feel in bodies
and things and that we witness in someone else. However, the difference
between experiencing objects (bodies and things) and experiencing subjects
(other people) is significant. An object meets another object, but objects do not
cross their borders (for Buber, each object remains an “it”). In contrast, “I” and
“You” function as subjects in the encounter; they do not border anything, for
they exist in a relationship (Buber 1974, 292). In Buber’s concept of
encounters we can find inspiration to realize how great an influence we can
have on both the process and effects of our encounters with otherness.
Buber distinguished three spheres in which humans encounter the
world. In the first, the “technical,” the relation of existential-objective “I-it” takes
place. The second is seen as a disguised monologue: “You” is brought to “I” and
the “encountered” subject is treated as an aspect of one’s own ego. Buber
deems the third way in which a person encounters the world as the genuine
dialogue. Here we have the direct, encounter I-You, which is anti-instrumental.
In the technical approach we face the modern subject-object paradigm.
These relations are linear and unilateral. Here it is the “I” that is active. It
influences even the perception of “it” as an object to exploit. The existentialobjective attitude adopted in the “technical” perspective excludes dialogue.
Similarly, the disguised monologue does not provide any chance for dialogue: “I”
is so self-oriented that it fails to perceive anything apart from itself. It is unable
to dialogue with any “You.”
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According to Buber, participants in dialogue must engage
authentically—i.e., they must reveal to one another the entire truth of their
existence. The successful dialogue requires of them a sufficient degree of
involvement in the encounter. They must be sincere and open. The proper
starting point is not a priori agreement with the interlocutor, but acceptance of
her otherness. Instead of being threating, otherness begins to arouse interest.
Buber’s notion of dialogue aims to give encounters the potential for
discovering truth—the emet of “You.” This begs the question of whether such
encounters can happen by means of “traces” left by a “You.”
According to Emmanuel Levinas’s interpretation, engaging in a
dialogical encounter means entering an ethical sphere. In the beginning, he
understood this to include liberation from loneliness, though ultimately he
suggested that it involved an “opening to infinity.” The Other leaves a trace in
the encountered. Never is the encounter with the Other neutral. It always has a
meaning: it can produce goodness and truth, it calls for responsibility towards
and for the Other, and it provides the chance to discover oneself. The “face” of
the Other is the key to the infinite. It shows the trace of God. For Levinas, the
encounter with the other becomes an ethical and religious act. By directing
individuals towards transcendence, it creates their bond with both people and
God.
The meeting with the Other is neither easy nor automatic. It
presupposes will and effort, which not everyone is able to undertake. According
to Levinas, the encounter with others always takes place in an ethical
dimension. In the dialogical encounter one learns being towards others to
discover oneself. Dialogue is, thus, an ethical relation.
Levinas, who experienced the birth of two totalitarian systems—
communism and fascism—remarked that members of mass societies are
characterized by anonymity and the lack of social bonds. These features trigger
indifference towards the other that results in helplessness in people and a
susceptibility to evil. Levinas’s call for the recognition of the other’s face in
order for there to be an encounter in which dialogue enables one to bear
responsibility suggests how to avoid the pitfalls of the human-unfriendly
atomized sphere, how to break with selfishness and indifference, and how to
protect oneself from the temptation to disconnect and become isolated.
The ethical value of dialogue was presented differently by Józef
Tischner, whose philosophy of dialogue is often called the philosophy of drama.
It sees the beginning of the entire enterprise of the philosophical search in
interpersonal dialogue. Tischner points to two kinds of relationships: that
existing between humans and the world, and that between people. There is a
difference between how humans approach the world (the scene) and other
people. When describing the human-world relation, Tischner sees the space of
human life as the scene in which the drama of everyday struggles with the
world is played out. In the case of the relationship between human beings, he
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emphasizes dialogical reciprocity. In the dialogical relationship, the “Asker” and
the “Asked” stand face to face. The former makes the latter a participant in the
situation. A human can surely be treated as an element of the scene, but then
an encounter in the relation of human-human cannot occur.
Tischner’s interpretation of the encounter discovers the Asker who
expects an answer. Awareness of the necessity to provide an answer enables us
to feel the presence of other people (Tischner 1982, 12-21). In the encounter
one learns that there is also another world apart from one’s own—the world of
the other. Thus, the encounter induces thinking. Moreover, it has an
agathological dimension; it is an ethical situation, the primary source of an
ethical experience.
Encounter in the Ecosystem Paradigm
In the new paradigm of reasoning inspired by environmentalism, a human
being is perceived as an element of functional systems constituted by
relationships. The modern scheme of thinking about relationships (subjectobject) is being supplanted by the ecosystem paradigm. The meaning of this
new approach for the development of contemporary perception and
interpretation of reality was emphasized by historian and sociologist Edgar
Morin, who explored the origins of ecological awareness that changes our
world view. He points to what he sees as the fundamental conclusion of one of
the pioneers of biological revolution, Erwin Schrodinger: ecosystems coorganize and participate in programming the organisms that belong to them
(Morin 1977, 46). Morin, accentuating the theoretical outcomes of this
assumption as extraordinarily significant, writes: “The ecosystem relationship
is not an external relation of two closed beings, but an interactive correlation
between two open systems, each constituting both a whole and a part of the
other one” (Morin 1977, 46). Morin appreciates the consequences of the
introduction of a new scheme of relationships based on the ecosystem
paradigm. Here the account of relationships differs from the unilateral, linear
subject-object relationship that has framed understandings in modern science.
In the linear, unilateral scheme of interdependencies the notion of determinacy,
contrasted with the sovereignty of the subject, is crucial. Thus, the disjunction
of “either freedom or determinacy” becomes obvious, and concern for
subjectivity begins to be identified with avoiding any determinants. Modern,
autonomous human beings withdraw into themselves in order to be free. They
do not notice that encounters with others could broaden the range of
possibilities, thus making them freer.
The modern paradigm contains another trap. By stressing human
subjectivity in the subject-object framework, contemporary humanism
simultaneously involves the threat of objectifying people. Thinking in
accordance with this paradigm implies seeing others and even ourselves as
118
objects of our acts and consideration. It is not then difficult to treat an
objectified other, or even ourselves, as a means to our ends, contrary to
Immanuel Kant’s requirement.
The ecosystem paradigm thus allows us to avoid identified modern
dangers. Humans want to enter relationships in order to discover possibilities
in their surroundings and their own potential for activity. In such relationships
they do not feel threatened by the deprivation of subjectivity or by the deficit of
freedom. They appreciate the value of encounters and of togetherness, as
opposed to living in separation from others. When alienated, we do not become
a part of the whole that could be an enriching part of us.
Were we to see relationships in keeping with the ecosystem paradigm,
causality would no longer be linear and one-sided; we would become capable of
finding new aspects of human interdependencies and of understanding our
relationship with, and links to, the environment, conversely to the modern
paradigm. This new understanding implies a sense of responsibility bound to
the awareness that our “gestalt” and that of others is affected by our activities
and through the construction of the environment and interactions we initiate.
Reflections on our surroundings trigger the recognition of their two
dimensions: the first might be called the “environment,” the second “space.”
The former refers to the objective existence of our surroundings, whereas
“space” indicates the way it is imagined, perceived, and experienced through
the schemes of reasoning and valuing. Both of these notions aid in our
comprehension of the human situation and our recognition of the relationships
in which we are involved. They imply an understanding of human beings in
their physical and spiritual dimensions, inducing considerations of the
relationships between these dimensions.
What surrounds us is essential as it encourages or provokes us to
respond to opportunities that it creates. It impacts what we can achieve in our
human potentiality, but it does not automatically determine us. Human beings
take advantage of the chances offered by our surroundings according to our
will and ability. We are, after all, ethical subjects—i.e., “relatively isolated
systems”—with inner centers of activity.1 We are responsible2 for the outcomes
Roman Ingarden introduced the notion of “system” to reflections on responsibility.
The idea of relatively isolated systems proved advantageous in the discussion
concerning conditions that must be fulfilled by a subject of responsibility. The basic
requirement to become a subject of responsibility is having “a centre of action that
enables [us] to [...] undertake initiative.” According to Ingarden, “an acting person (an
entity that constitutes unity together with the body) must form a system relatively
isolated, a system of a quite particular kind, one that is not possible in lifeless things and
cannot even realize itself in all living beings” (See: Ingarden 1972, 133-134).
2 It is worth distinguishing between “responsibility for” and “responsibility towards.”
The former can be understood as the awareness that our activities have effects and that
we create them even when we do not realize it. “Responsibility towards” comes as a
result of our obligations towards the environment.
1
119
of what we do, or leave undone. The scope of human responsibility is apparent
in light of our ability to change, choose, construct consciously, and even create
our surroundings. We change the environment by determining what is external
to us, while we modify the space in two ways: by developing or destroying our
ability to perceive and understand the environment, and by altering it. The
shape of the space greatly depends on our human capabilities and cognitive
skills.
Before we can state that human beings can be creative in the area set
by the value of truth, and that we are capable of creative reflection, we must
think more carefully about basic understandings of the connection between
reality and its representations—environment and human space—which can be
boiled down to a confrontation between “original” and “copy.” We need to
realize that representation is not a mere copy of existence. It establishes itself
within the framework of reasoning of which it is a part. Creative thinking
initiates new systems of understanding that enable new possibilities of
perception to be realized. Consequently, we discover new aspects of the
manifestations of reality, are encouraged to raise new questions, and while
searching for answers we can initiate new phenomena of being. In this context,
it becomes imperative to ask: “How should it be?”; a praxeological perspective
ought to be complemented with an ethical one. An ethics of creativity that looks
for universal axiological truths is necessary, enabling us to verify values
proposed by further systems of the profane. The universal axiological truths
discovered in synergistic thinking, at the meta-level of diverse actualized
systems of being, allow us to notice goals other than those implied by these
systems. As a result, they are indispensable for people to be able and willing to
act innovatively.
While preparing to creatively exist in the world, we must facilitate
comprehensive human development that is versatile enough to enable us to
have synergistic encounters and experiences of the enchantment of the world.
Through disenchantment we had reduced the world to its current character of
the profane and we had disconnected it from mystery and transcendence. The
transcendent dimension is essential for thinking about the possibility of going
beyond the borders of the here and now. In order to handle life creatively,
modern people should “break the spell” that fossilizes the world and humans in
their current form and replace it with enchantment inducing the search for
truth that has not yet been “touched.” In contrast to the epistemologically
dominant ocular-centric metaphor in which clear vision is linked with
knowledge, the metaphor of “touch” is helpful here for thinking about
cognition. We owe it to physicists who acknowledge that the truths revealed by
their research are responses to a way of touching reality, which corresponds
well with reflections concerning human creative skills. It helps to recognize
that people can be creative also in the sphere of cognitive activity. We must be
able to use our creative capacities when looking for both ethical and
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praxeological dimensions of our space, and to realize its openness actualized
through encounters with otherness.
References
Buber, M. 1974. “Słowa-Zasady [Words-Rules]”. Znak 3 (237): 291-310.
Heidegger, M. 1977. “Letter on Humanism”. In Building Dwelling Thinking.
Selected Essays. Warsaw: Czytelnik Publishing House.
von Hildebrand, D., Kłoczowski, J.A., & Paściak J. (Eds.). 1982, Wobec wartości
[Facing values]. Poznań: W Drodze Publishing House.
Ingarden, R. 1972. “O odpowiedzialności i jej podstawach ontycznych [On
Responsibility: Its Ontic Foundations]”. In Książeczka o człowieku [Little
Book About Man]. Cracow: Literary Press: 133-134.
Morin, E. 1977. Zaginiony paradygmat – natura ludzka [The Lost Paradigm:
Human Nature]. Warsaw: PIW.
Skarga, B. 2002. Ślad i obecność [Trace and Presence]. Warsaw: Polish
Scientific Publishers PWN.
Tischner, J. 1982. “Etyka wartości i nadziei [The Ethics of Values and Hope]”. In
von Hildebrand, D., Kłoczowski, J.A., & PaściaK, J. (Eds.), Wobec wartości
[Facing Values]. Poznań: W Drodze Publishing House.
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Krystyna Najder-Stefaniak (Warsaw University of Life Sciences)
Value of an encounter from an ethical perspective
Abstract: This article investigates the relationship between the possibilities of
actualizing our encounters and the openness of human space. It describes
various types of encounters and shows the correlations between the
perception of difference and the inclination to contravene certain encounters.
The effects of encounters based on antagonistic, complementary, dialectic, and
synergistic thinking are explored in a way that helps to better understand the
aims and consequences of encounters actualized in diverse frameworks of
dialogue. Further, the impact of paradigms of reasoning on how the value of
meetings is understood is described. The results of the modern perception of
relationships in the subject-object scheme and in the ecosystem paradigm are
presented. The latter allows for recognition that encounters can facilitate
creative activity by expanding human space.
Keywords: Antagonistic encounter, complementary encounter, dialectic
encounter, difference, ethos, synergistic encounter
doi:10.14746/eip.2014.1.7
122
Ethics in Progress (ISSN 2084-9257). Vol. 5 (2014). No. 1. 123. doi:10.14746/eip.2014.1.10
Wstęp dla Czytelników polskojęzycznego
Bonusa
Małgorzata Dereniowska (Greqam, AMSE, Aix-Marseille University, France)
Ewa Nowak (Adam Mickiewicz University, Poland)
Etyka srodowiskowa jest dynamicznie rozwijającą się młodą dyscypliną filozofii
na swiecie i w Polsce. W literaturze polskojęzycznej istnieje szereg publikacji
wprowadzających w genezę, rozwoj, i problematykę tej dziedziny. Wsrod nich
wymienic nalezy prace takich autorow jak Włodzimierz Tyburski, Zdzisława
Piątek, Krzysztof Łastowski, Andrzej Papuzinski, Anna Ganowicz-Bączyk, i
wielu innych. W niniejszym opracowaniu znajdują się dwie prace. Pierwsza,
autorstwa młodej badaczki i magistrantki Alicji Dłuzewicz, przedstawia
historyczny rys rozwoju etyki zwierząt przed Petera Singera połączony z
oryginalną aplikacją filozoficznej dyskusji w kontekscie prawnego statusu i
ochrony samoswiadomych istot pozaludzkich. Autorka traktuje o prawach
zwierząt z perspektywy filozoficznej i prawnej oraz mozliwosciach ich
przekształcenia w kontekscie zarowno zmieniających się warunkow społecznoekonomicznych wywierających negatywną antropopresję na dobrobyt istot
pozaludzkich, jak i w odniesieniu do poszerzenia moralnego rozumowania. Głos
autorki odzwierciedla ducha inter- i transdysciplinarnosci, ktore stanowią o
specyfice etyki srodowiskowej, i wskazuje na rosnące zainteresowanie
problematyką etyki srodowiskowej na styku filozofii i innych dyscyplin
naukowych, oraz na styku teorii i praktyki.
Z kolei drugi tekst autorstwa Honoraty Korpikiewicz jest oryginalnym
interdyscyplinarnym poszerzeniem obszaru przedmiotowego etyki
srodowiskowej nie tylko na ziemską biosferę, ale i otoczenie kosmiczne.
Implikuje okresloną wizję swiata i miejsce człowieka w tym swiecie. Czerpiąc z
dyscyplin takich jak fizyka, astronomia, ekologia, rosyjska mysl holistycznosrodowiskowa oraz hipoteza Gai Jamesa Lovelock’a, autorka rozwaza etyczne
oraz ontyczne aspekty tak skonstruowanej kosmoekologicznej wizji swiata.
Proponowany zestaw oferuje czytelnikowi z jednej strony wieloaspektowe
ujęcie klasycznej problematyki dyscyplinarnej nad prawami zwierząt,
a z drugiej strony oryginalne rozszerzenia klasycznych rozwazan, inspirowane
wglądami w inne dyscypliny wiedzy. Tym samym bonus ten wpisuje się w kanon
polskojęzycznej literatury przedmiotowej z zakresu etyki srodowiskowej i
promuje rozwoj tej waznej badawczo i praktycznie dyscypliny.
123
doi:10.14746/eip.2014.1.11
Etyka utylitarystyczna Petera Singera – szanse
i możliwości przekształcenia praw zwierząt
Alicja Dłużewicż (Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickewicża, Pożnan)
Rownosc jest podstawową żasadą etycżną,
Nie żas stwierdżeniem faktu (Singer 2007, 43)
Walka o prawa i użnanie tocży się od samych pocżątkow cywiliżacji. Zależnie
od cżasu i kultury, dotycży ona rożnych grup społecżnych, ktore starały się
żdobyc pełnię praw obywatelskich. Zwalcżanie nierownosci żwiążanych ż rasą,
płcią, pochodżeniem, statusem społecżnym – to jedne ż najważniejsżych
procesow ksżtałtujących społecżenstwa i prowadżących do ich rożwoju.
Po latach staran i prob, protestow i nieżgody na obowiążujący, silnie
żhierarchiżowany, porżądek społecżny, rożnym grupom udało się osiągnąc
status obywateli, mogących korżystac że wsżystkich wolnosci
gwarantowanych prżeż prawo, beż wżględu na to kim są i skąd pochodżą.
W dobie kryżysu humaniżmu i żwiążanym ż nim osłabieniem
antropocentryżmu należy skupic się na sytuacji tych, ktorży nie mają
możliwosci dojscia do głosu w debacie publicżnej. W swietle coraż bardżiej
rożwijających się badan nad żwierżętami, ktore dostarcżają swiadectw
na żłożonosc i niepowtarżalnosc życia stworżen pożaludżkich1, posiadających
swoje interesy oraż potrżeby, ktore powinny byc realiżowane. Ludżie
i stanowione prżeż nich prawo niejednokrotnie uniemożliwia żwierżętom nie
tylko sżcżęsliwe życie, ale życie w ogole. Sżcżęscie możemy tutaj pojmowac
w sposob całosciowy, a więc biorąc pod uwagę życie stworżenia nie-ludżkiego
od dnia narodżin aż do smierci. Prżyglądając się bliżej hodowlom
prżemysłowym oraż innym praktykom eksploatacji żwierżąt, można oceniac
ich warunki bytowe, ktore ogranicżają się tylko do utrżymania żwierżęcia prży
życiu, pożbawiając je niejednokrotnie możliwosci żaspokojenia podstawowych
potrżeb, o cżym Singer pisże sżeroko w Wyzwoleniu zwierząt. Nadużycia, brak
stosownej opieki weterynaryjnej, żwięksżanie dochodu ż użyskiwanego
od osobnika mięsa, co żwiążane jest ż patologicżnym wręcż prżyrostem masy
ciała żwierżąt prżeżnacżonych na uboj – to tylko niektore ż żarżutow, jakie
Terminu tego używac będę żamiennie ż terminem nie-ludżie (ang. non-human).
Warto żwrocic uwagę na antropocentrycżnych, ktory wyrożnia cżłowieka oraż całą
resżtę stworżen, stawiając je poniekąd w opożycji do istoty ludżkiej.
1
Alicja Dłużewicz
można postawic wielu hodowcom istot, ktore są wykorżystywane prżeż
cżłowieka. Taki obraż prżemysłu mięsnego wydaje się jesżcże bardżiej
niepokojący, jesli uwżględnimy coraż więksżą produkcję mięsa oraż
powstawanie kolejnych hodowli prżemysłowych, ktore są prżyżwoleniem
na bestialskie i niehumanitarne traktowanie Innego, ktorym jest żwierżę.
Zwierżęta w życiu ludżi, pochodżących ż krajow rożwiniętych2,
najcżęsciej pojawiają się w roli gotowego do nabycia produktu. Nieżwykle
rżadko żjadacża wieprżowiny lub drobiu nachodżi refleksja dotycżąca życia,
hodowli i warunkow, w jakich musiał egżystowac ich obiad. Mięso
otrżymywane jako prżetworżony produkt, ktory trudno jest rżecżywiscie
utożsamiac na podstawie podobienstwa, ż istotą żyjącą, pomaga budowac
dyskurs żwiążany ż uprżedmiotowieniem oraż wyklucżeniem żwierżąt
że sfery stworżen wrażliwych i odcżuwających nie tylko bol, ale rownież
emocje. Zwierżę jawi się jako Inny, ktorego użnac jest trudniej niż cżłowieka,
że wżględu na ocżywiste rożnice gatunkowe. Kultura żbudowana dookoła
antropocentrycżnego jądra podporżądkowuje sobie wsżystkich, ktorży
odbiegają od okreslonych w danym cżasie i miejscu, sżeroko rożumianych
norm. Osadżani w więżieniach byli już bowiem sżalency, homoseksualisci,
odmiency i mysliciele o innych poglądach niż te, ktore obowiążywały. Inny jest
wyklucżony ż prawa - jesli nie całkowicie, to w tej mierże, iż jego ochrona jest
bardżo ogranicżona. Ocżywiscie linia demarkacyjna międży wyklucżającymi
i wyklucżanymi społecżnie bądż permanentnie pożbawionymi akceptacji
i użnania podmiotowego prżesuwa się na prżestrżeni wiekow i rownież
w XXI wieku jestesmy swiadkami takich prżesunięc.
Zrodeł prżedmiotowego traktowania istot pożaludżkich jest wiele.
Można żwrocic tu sżcżegolną uwagę na strategie wytwarżania dyskursu
o żwierżętach. Kulturowo żakorżenione jest myslenie o stworżeniach
pożaludżkich jako podporżądkowanych cżłowiekowi i stworżonych gwoli
żaspokajania potrżeb istot doskonalsżych od nich, a nawet najdoskonalsżych.
Ten sposob myslenia sięga cżasow starożytnych, a jego fundamentem jest
arystoteliżm. Stagiryta nie tylko dokonuje podżiału na bios i dzoē, gdżie
pierwsże ż tych pojęc ożnacża życie jednostkowe, typowo ludżkie, a drugie żas
własciwe i wspolne jest wsżystkim istotom żywym (Kożak 2009, 96). Podżiał
ten wiąże się ż osobliwym wartosciowaniem, ktore spycha dzoē do sfery
prywatnej, bios natomiast użnaje ża życie wyjątkowe, bo wypełnione
dżiałaniem i polityką, ktore nadają mu uprżywilejowaną pożycję. Dodatkowe
hierarchiżacje utrwalone prżeż Arystotelesa obejmują m.in. podżiał na dusżę
wegetatywną, sensorycżną oraż rożumną. Najbardżiej rożwiniętym rodżajem
dusży obdarżony jest cżłowiek, żatem jako istota najdoskonalsża ma on prawo
żarżądżac nie tylko innymi ludżmi, ale prżede wsżystkim żwierżętami, ktore
może eksploatowac wedle potrżeb.
Choc nie tylko, w krajach afrykanskich na sżeroką skalę handluje się mięsem małp
nacżelnych, żob. Jameson 2011.
2
125
Etyka utylitarystyczna Petera Singera
Podobny dyskurs umacnia religia chrżescijanska, opierająca się
na wierże w wyżsżosc cżłowieka że wżględu na posiadaną prżeż niego dusżę,
cżyli podobienstwo do istoty boskiej. Odwołując się do tych dwoch
prżykładow, ktore są najmocniejsżymi filarami europejskiego dyskursu
o żwierżętach, trżeba żwrocic uwagę na wprowadżanie rożnicy jakosciowej,
a nie ilosciowej, pomiędży istotami ludżkimi oraż pożaludżkimi. Sżcżegolny
status, jaki nadawał sobie cżłowiek, wynika ż pewnej immanentnej jego istocie
cżąstki boskiej lub - jak stwierdżił już Platon - rożumnej, ktora umożliwia mu
posługiwanie się Logosem, tworżenie praw oraż panowanie nad prżyrodą
i rownież własną prżyrodżoną naturą, chocby w pewnym stopniu.
Owo panowanie obejmuje sżcżegolnie żwierżęta i realiżuje się w dżiałalnosci
ludżkiej żwiążanej najpierw ż udomawianiem dżikich gatunkow, a pożniej
i także wspołcżesnie - że strategiami biopolitycżnymi, ktorych egżemplifikację
odnajdujemy m.in. w ogrodach żoologicżnych.
Inną strategią budowania dyskursu dotycżącego żwierżąt
hodowlanych jest prżekonywanie klienta o tym, że są one sżcżęsliwe, a ich
życie niemalże nie rożni się od tego, ktore wiodłyby na wolnosci lub
w mniejsżym gospodarstwie. Odnosi się to sżcżegolnie do kur niosek oraż
krow, bowiem trudno byłoby mowic o sżcżęsliwych żwierżętach idących
na rżeż. Wykorżystywane dla pożyskiwania mleka i jaj żwierżęta są najcżęsciej
opisywane jako żadowolone, sżcżęsliwe i wolne. Wiżualne prżedstawienia tych
żwierżąt (należy żażnacżyc, że są to głownie krowy) odwołują się do poetyki
malarstwa sielankowego; istota nie-ludżka ukażana jest najcżęsciej
na pastwisku podcżas błogiego prżeżuwania trawy. Cżęsto podkresla się
społecżnych charakter jej trybu życia i prżedstawia się krowy w stadżie. Celem
tych żabiegow jest prżekonanie konsumenta o wysokiej jakosci życia
żwierżęcia. Posługiwanie się poetyką sielanki ma prżekonac potencjalnych
nabywcow, że dokonując żakupu mleka lub jaj nie dokonują cżynu nagannego
moralnie, ponieważ hodowca dobrże traktuje każde stworżenie żnajdujące się
pod jego opieką. Dla odmiany, opisy Singera, dotycżące hodowli krow
mlecżnych, prżedstawiają pożyskiwanie produktow odżwierżęcych w sposob
realistycżny, pożbawiony idealistycżnej nadwyżki żnacżeniowej:
Cykl produkcyjny u krowy żacżyna się po żabraniu jej pierwsżego
cielęcia. Prżeż dżiesięć miesięcy doi się ją dwa, a cżasem trży raży
dziennie. Po trżech miesiącach jest ponownie żapładniana. Doić
się ją będżie aż do ósmego lub sżóstego tygodnia prżed
następnym porodem i potem żnowu, żaraż po dostawieniu
cielaka. Ta intensywna sekwencja ciąż i hiperlaktacji trwa żwykle
około pięciu lat, po cżym „żużytą” krowę wysyła się do rżeźni
(Singer 2004, 85)
Wpływ na prżedmiotowe traktowanie pożaludżkiego Innego miała
ż całą pewnoscią żmiana sposobu hodowania żwierżąt ż gospodarstwa
domowego na hodowlę prżemysłową. Takie prżesunięcie dotycżące hodowli,
126
Alicja Dłużewicz
a nawet fiżycżna iżolacja żwierżąt utrżymywanych w celach konsumpcyjnych
od tych, ktorży je spożywają, sprawiły, że żmiana ta niejednokrotnie pomijana
jest prżeż jakąkolwiek refleksję natury etycżnej. Interesująca w tej kwestii
może byc uwaga Michela Foucaulta, ktory w Nadzorować i karać opisuje
podobną tendencję w wykonywaniu wyrokow na skażancach, prżenosżonym
ż cżasem poża obręb więżiennych murow. W ten sposob władża ukrywa prżed
sżeroką publicżnoscią wyrok smierci i charakter pracy kata, ktora może budżic
żastrżeżenia natury moralnej, a także wrażliwosc, wspołcżucie i litosc dla
skażanca wsrod publicżnosci (Foucault 1998, 11-13); to żas mogłoby osłabic
autorytet władży.
Obowiążujące prawo mogłoby osiągnąc satysfakcjonujące rożwiążania
korżystając ż koncepcji etyki utylitarystycżnej Petera Singera oraż
żaproponowanych prżeż niego żmian, dotycżących jężyka i postrżegania
żwierżąt. Zastosowanie żasady rownego rożważania interesow mogłoby
wprowadżic realne żmiany w traktowaniu żwierżąt i umożliwic odejscie od ich
prżedmiotowego traktowania. W postrżeganiu rżecżywistosci sżcżegolny
nacisk należy położyc na nieżaprżecżalny fakt – żwierżęta odcżuwają bol,
cierpienie, strach i nudę, cierpią rownież, kiedy matki i dżieci są rożdżielane.
Choc trudno jest opisac stany emocjonalne istot pożaludżkich, obserwacje
prowadżone na osobnikach trżymanych w niewoli, w nieodpowiednich
warunkach, jednożnacżnie dowodżą, że żwierżęta te cierpią na apatię, stają
się agresywne ż powodu braku możliwosci utworżenia hierarchicżnej
struktury w grupie, że wżględu na brak żajęc lub narastające napięcie,
żwiążane że żbyt małą prżestrżenią życiową, prżypadającą na jednego
osobnika.
Pierwsżą żnacżącą żmianą, ktorą proponuje Singer, jest prżyżnanie
żwierżętom statusu osobowego. Wcżesniej prżywilej bycia osobą (a więc
możliwosc podjęcia walki o użnanie) prżysługiwał wyłącżnie istotom ludżkim.
Był on jednak wyposażony w pewne wyżnacżniki, ktore jednostka musiała
spełniac, aby otrżymac ten status. John Locke twierdżił, że osobę należy
definiowac poprżeż samoswiadomosc oraż racjonalnosc (Singer 2004, 94),
Joseph Fletcher natomiast stworżył całą listę „wyżnacżnikow
cżłowiecżenstwa”, na ktorą składały się samoswiadomosc, samokontrola,
pocżucie prżesżłosci oraż prżysżłosci, żdolnosc odniesienia się do innych,
troska o innych, komunikacja oraż ciekawosc (Singer 2004, 91). Singer,
podając ża prżykład małpy nacżelne, pokażuje, że mogą one żostac użnane
ża osoby w obu tych rożumieniach. Dokonuje on żatem prżełomu w mysleniu
i wyżwala pojęcie osoby ż okowow antropocentryżmu. Autor Wyzwolenia
zwierząt uważa, że nie tylko małpy żasługują na miano osoby i dopisuje
do listy wiele innych istot pożaludżkich, takich, jak swinie, słonie i psy.
Zmiana myslenia o pojęciu osoby i tym, kogo termin ten obejmuje,
pobudża do prżemyslenia obowiążującego prawa i tego, cży w sposob
wystarcżający chroni ono osoby nie będące ludżmi. Jednakże prawo nie
127
prżejęło proponowanej prżeż Singera żmiany na pożiomie jężykowym.
Niemożnosc pokonania tej bariery sprawia, że nadal istnieje pewien myslowy
status quo, ktory nie dopusżcża do żrownania ludżi ż niektorymi żwierżętami
chocby na pożiomie pojęciowym. Warto żwrocic uwagę na polską ustawę,
regulującą kwestie żwiążane że żwierżętami:
Art. 1.1. Zwierżę, jako istota żyjąca, żdolna do odcżuwania
cierpienia, nie jest rżecżą. Cżłowiek jest mu winien
posżanowanie, ochronę i opiekę.
2. W sprawach nieuregulowanych w ustawie do żwierżąt stosuje
się odpowiednio prżepisy dotycżące rżecży 3
Nietrudno dosżukac się tutaj swego rodżaju niespojnosci w mysleniu
o stworżeniach żywych. To, co żostaje podkreslone w Art. 1. 1, cżyli
stwierdżenie, iż żwierżę nie jest rżecżą, żostaje zanegowane w punkcie
drugim, gdżie w pewnych, nieokreslonych prżypadkach dożwala się
na traktowanie odcżuwającego bol i cierpienie stworżenia jak rżecży.
Ocżywiscie, najważniejsże prawa żostały uwżględnione w ustawie
i odpowiednio uregulowane, chodżi jednak o sam pożiom żnacżen. Jesli osoba
pożaludżka nie jest rżecżą, to w takim rażie w żadnym wypadku nie może byc
traktowana jak prżedmiot. Pomimo żapewnionej prawnie ochrony, sam jężyk
lub sformułowanie dotycżące postępowania wobec żwierżąt w prżypadkach,
ktore mogły żostac pominięte, pożwala na odstępowanie od podmiotowego
pojmowania i traktowania istoty żywej żdolnej do odcżuwania. Takie
prżesunięcie może okażac się wyjątkowo niebeżpiecżne, ponieważ wprowadża
dysonans w samym sposobie myslenia o istotach pożaludżkich.
Status osoby, choc ż pewnoscią nobilitujący, prowadżi rownież
do wyklucżenia żnacżnej cżęsci gatunkow, ktore nie spełniają chocby
najważniejsżych wyżnacżnikow (acżkolwiek nie możemy jesżcże stwierdżic
tego jednożnacżnie w swietle wspołcżesnego stanu badan naukowych). Choc
żwierżę jest samoswiadome, może nie posiadac ciągłosci „ja”, co cżęsto
uniemożliwiałoby nadanie tego statusu pewnym gatunkom. David DeGrażia
proponuje prżyżnac najbardżiej „ucżłowiecżonym” stworżeniom status osoby,
a innym prżedstawicielom tych gatunkow nadac miano osob granicżnych.
Wyżnacżnikiem „osoby” mają byc nie tylko prżejawy samoswiadomosci, lecż
także umiejętnosc posługiwania się jężykiem rożumianym jako jężyk ludżki.
Niebeżpiecżenstwo kryje się w antropocentrycżnej perspektywie tego
stanowiska. Użnanie mogą użyskac tylko te gatunki, ktore potrafią posługiwac
się ludżkim jężykiem. Implikacją takiego stanowiska jest umacnianie
centralnej i nadrżędnej pożycji cżłowieka w swiecie, ponieważ tylko
te stworżenia, ktore są najbardżiej podobne do homo sapiens, mogą byc
Dżiennik Ustaw Rżecżypospolitej Polskiej, Warsżawa 30.07.3013,
http://isap.sejm.gov.pl
3
s. 5,
128
Alicja Dłużewicz
chronione prżeż prawo w inny, pełniejsży lub skutecżniejsży sposob,
żapewniający im więksżą ochronę (DeGrażia 2011).
Bardżiej egalitarną koncepcję proponują Andrżej Elżanowski oraż
Tomasż Pietrżykowski, wskażując na możliwosc skonstruowania dla żwierżąt
nieosobowego prawa podmiotowego (Elżanowski, Pietrżykowski 2011, 26).
Eliminuje to problem żmiany jężykowej na pewnym pożiomie oraż osłabia
wewnętrżny podżiału w grupie stworżen nie-ludżkich na te, ktorym
prżysługuje więcej praw niż innym. Autorży artykułu żwracają uwagę
na podmiotowy charakter tego prawa. Jak pisżą:
Brakuje pojęciowego pomostu, który umożliwiłby prżełożenie
dobrże użasadnionych naukowo postulatów filożoficżnych (…)
na prawodawstwo i tym samym praktykę żarżądżania. Nasżym,
żdaniem podmiotowość jest właśnie takim centralnym pojęciem
pożwalającym na prżełożenie postępu nauki i etyki na prawo oraz
praktykę społecżną (Elżanowski, Pietrżykowski 2011, 19)
W rżecżywistosci istoty pożaludżkie nadal traktowane są
instrumentalnie, jako srodek (używam licżby pojedyncżej że wżględu
na traktowanie żwierżąt hodowlanych jako jednej „masy”, pożbawionej
indywidualnosci) do osiągnięcia ludżkich celow. W Polsce trudne staje się
egżekwowanie prawa żwierżąt; można stąd wnioskowac, że jego żmiany
na pożiomie ustawy nie mają wpływu na rżecżywistosc, cżyli praktykę
traktowania żwierżąt. Autorży, prżywołując prżykład Sżwajcarii, proponują
utworżenie odpowiednich organow prawnych, ktore pełniłyby funkcje
„repreżentantow” żwierżęcego interesu (Elżanowski, Pietrżykowski 2011, 27).
W prżypadku tej propożycji żmiana jężykowa żachodżi na pożiomie dokonania
wyboru terminu. Binarna opożycja podmiot/prżedmiot na pożiomie prawnym
nie stanowi problemu, ożnacża to jedynie tyle, że żwierżę jako podmiot
posiada pewne nieżbywalne prawa, jak np. prawo do życia i wolnosci. Niestety
i ta propożycja wyżnacża granice, ktore wyklucżają pewne gatunki żwierżąt,
cżyniąc ż nich tym samym prżedmioty i pożbawiając je ochrony prawnej.
John Rawls w Teorii sprawiedliwości odmawia stworżeniom
nienależącym do nasżego gatunku statusu osoby że wżględu na ich
nieżdolnosc do wejscia w żakres żasady sprawiedliwosci (Singer 2004, 32).
Amerykanski filożof stwierdża, że mianem tym mogą żostac objęte jedynie
jednostki moralne, ktore dysponują własną definicją dobra oraż posiadają
żmysł moralny (Rawls 2009, 712); jest to rożumowanie prżypominające
kryterium Kantowskie, wedle ktorego osobą jest wyłącżnie istota żdolna
do autonomicżnego prawodawstwa i samookreslenia. Singer ocżywiscie
żaatakowałby taki pogląd, odwołując się do niejednokrotnie prżeż siebie
prżywoływanych prżypadkow granicżnych lub skrajnych – ukażujących
niemowlęta oraż ludżi żnacżnie uposledżonych intelektualnie jako istoty, ktore
nie mogłyby byc użnane ża osoby w oparciu o taką definicję. Rawls uważa
jednak, że dżieci potencjalnie będą kiedys dysponowały takimi narżędżiami
129
i żdolnosciami, a żatem - uprżedżając te etapy rożwoju, w ktorych nabędą one
nieżbędnego dla osoby moralnej wyposażenia - prżyżnaje się im ten status.
Tylko takie jednostki [tj. posiadające żmysł moralny i własną definicję dobra]
mogą byc objęte tym, co filożof nażywa rowną sprawiedliwoscią. W Teorii
sprawiedliwości to wżajemnosc warunkuje nie tylko użnanie kogos ża osobę,
ale rownież możliwosc sprawiedliwego traktowania. Jesli bowiem nie możemy
ocżekiwac wżajemnosci w posżanowaniu praw i obowiążkow, ktora powinna
dotycżyc wsżystkich cżłonkow danej wspolnoty, nie jestesmy rownież
żobowiążani do prżestrżegania reguł sprawiedliwosci. Umowa pomiędży
osobami nie żostaje żawiążana.
Pojęcie sprawiedliwosci powinno żostac skojarżone ż żapreżentowaną
prżeż Petera Singera koncepcją interesu. Każde stworżenie posiada bowiem
swoj własny interes, ktorym jest dożnawanie prżyjemnosci i możliwe unikanie
cierpienia. Ocżywiscie, żaspokojenie tych potrżeb posiada odrębny żakres dla
cżłowieka i osob pożaludżkich posiada, wymaga też żastosowania innych
srodkow, dżięki ktorym można taki cel osiągnąc. Na sżcżęscie w rożumieniu
ludżkim składa się bowiem żnacżnie więcej cżynnikow niż na prżyjemnosc,
ktorej mogą dożnawac krowa cży pies. Wraż ż rożbudowaną swiadomoscią
i umiejętnoscią tworżenia narracji biograficżnej, obejmującej nawet bardżo
odległy w prżysżłosci okres cżasu4, żwięksżają się możliwosci realiżowania
tego, co można nażwac sżcżęsciem. Pomijanie interesu innych jednostek jest
jednak poważnym wykrocżeniem prżeciwko ich dobru, nieważne cży jest
to cżłowiek, cży jakiekolwiek żwierżę. Autor podkresla, że prżynależnosc
żwierżąt do innego gatunku nie upoważnia nas do ich wykorżystywania, ani
nieuwżględniania ich interesow życiowych (Singer 2004, 66). Należy bowiem
pamiętac, że interes ten obejmuje możliwosc egżystencji, bytowania
w dogodnych dla każdego gatunku warunkach, możliwosc kontaktu
ż potomstwem i innymi prżedstawicielami swojego gatunku. W prżypadku
hodowli prżemysłowych żwierżęta niejednokrotnie pobawione są możliwosci
żrealiżowania tych najbardżiej podstawowych potrżeb. W Wyzwoleniu
zwierząt Singer nieustannie odnosi się do ludżkich nadużyc, wydających się
byc nieodłącżną cżęscią hodowli masowej, w prżypadku ktorej, niemożliwym
jest żapewnienie opieki każdemu stworżeniu indywidualnie. Zmechaniżowane
systemy, pomiesżcżenia nieprżystosowane do naturalnych potrżeb żwierżąt
hodowlanych, cżynią krotkie życie prżysżłego „mięsa” nie tylko
niesżcżęsliwym, ale wręcż niegodnym istoty żyjącej.
Australijski etyk twierdżi, że w prżypadku konfliktu, jaki żachodżi
pomiędży jednostkami lub grupami (a także, w tym prżypadku – gatunkami)
należy posłużyc się żasadą rownosci, ktora gwarantuje rowne rożważenie
interesow każdej że stron (Singer 2004, 34). Zastosowanie takiej reguły
pociąga ża sobą sżereg konsekwencji, sżcżegolnie w kwestii eksploatowania
4
Tżw. interes żależny od cżasu, por. (McMahan 2013, 303).
130
Alicja Dłużewicz
żwierżąt. Interes spożycia mięsa jest żdecydowanie mniej ważny
do żrealiżowania dla cżłowieka niż interes dalsżego prowadżenia życia prżeż
jakiekolwiek żwierżę. Z punktu widżenia klasycżnego utylitaryżmu,
stwierdżenie takie nie jest ocżywiste. Skutki smierci żwierżęcia mogą sprawic
więksżej licżbie jednostek więcej prżyjemnosci niż cierpienia żabijanej istocie.
Smierc żwierżęcia jest bowiem ogolnym brakiem odcżuwania cżegokolwiek,
a jesli istota pożaludżka nie jest żdolna do układania planow na prżysżłosc
i dożnawania cierpien żwiążanych że stratą w rożumieniu 'interesu żależnego
od cżasu', nie jest to żwiążane ż cierpieniem psychicżnym, ktore mogłoby
wywołac u niej ocżekiwanie na uboj cży egżystencjalna bliskosc smierci. Jesli
ża schematem rożumowania moralnego Hare’a (Singer 2004, 97) dokonamy
tutaj kalkulacji, okażuje się, że istnieją jednak prżesłanki do tego, by nie
użnawac żabijania żwierżąt ża nieetycżne.
Rożważenie interesow osob pożaludżkich spotkac się może
ż sżeregiem problemow. Ocżywiscie, nie chodżi o to, by żwierżęta posiadały
prawa, ż ktorych nie byłyby w stanie korżystac. Celem żmian prawnych nie jest
w tym prżypadku tworżenie absurdalnych prżepisow, ale umożliwienie
na pożiomie ustawodawcżym, a co ża tym idżie, rownież w praktyce,
realiżowania podstawowych interesow żwierżąt. Jak podkresla w artykule
o szechicie Ewa Nowak, spożywanie mięsa jest, nawet dla Zydow, kwestią
dokonania wyboru pomiędży dietą roslinną i żawierającą mięso (Nowak 2013,
76). Cżłowiek jako jednostka autonomicżna ma żatem możliwosc „chcenia”
i realiżowania owych chęci. Wraż jednak ż podjęciem wyboru dotycżącego
diety, opowiadamy się ża okreslonymi wartosciami. Pojawia się tutaj poważny
problem, na ktory żwraca uwagę rownież Singer – musimy ustanowic
hierarchię wartosci i ustawic w odpowiedniej kolejnosci życie innych stworżen
oraż żaspokojenie własnych pragnien i potrżeb. Pociąga to ża sobą rownież
odpowiedżialnosc, nie tylko ża życie, ale także ża cierpienie w stanie
agonalnym, ktorego dożnaje żwierżę prżed smiercią. Minimaliżacja bolu cży
strachu żwierżęcia jest sżcżegolnie istotna w szechicie; żwierżę usmiercone
w nieodpowiedni sposob nie może żostac spożyte (Nowak 2013, 65); żabijanie
jest żatem nierożerwalnie żwiążane ż etycżnym obowiążkiem.
Wolnosc wyboru, ktora objawia się w prżypadku wyboru diety
i wartosci, ktore są pod nią ukryte, stoi jednakże w jawnym konflikcie
ż prawem żwierżęcia do życia, co więcej rownież ż jego wolnoscią, rożumianą
tutaj w sposob fiżycżny – jako żamknięcie w boksie lub hali hodowlanej, choc
ma ona rownież inny wymiar. Warto prżytocżyc tu słowa Wiesława Langa:
Zasada minimalizacji przymusu fiżycżnego jest ściśle żwiążana
z żasadą wolności. Wolność jest bowiem prżede wsżystkim
wolnością od prżymusu fiżycżnego. Cżęsto określa się tę żasadę
jako żasadę minimaliżacji prżemocy lub nawet formułuje się
ogólny żakaż stosowania prżemocy jako żasadę moralną (Lang
1989, 170)
131
Autor książki mowi jednak w tym prżypadku o wolnosci jako pewnym
stanie okreslonej jednostki, żdolnej do interakcji ż innymi jednostkami
ludżkimi. Wolnosc ta odnosi się do sżeregu cżynnosci, ktore są uregulowane
prawnie, jak rożporżądżenie mieniem, żawiążywanie umow, itd. Co ważne,
Lang wielokrotnie podkresla żwiążek moralnosci i prawa, ktore żmienia się
wraż ż ewolucją ludżkich postaw. Zwiążane jest to np. ż rożsżerżaniem
ochrony życia prżedstawicieli homo sapiens – pocżątkowo żasada żabraniająca
żabijania odnosiła się jedynie do cżłonkow własnego rodu lub grupy
społecżnej (Lang 1989, 159). Wraż ż możliwoscią uznawania innych jednostek,
obowiążek ochrony życia, żacżął obejmowac coraż więcej grup społecżnych.
Biorąc pod uwagę dżisiejsżą wiedżę na temat żwierżęcego układu nerwowego,
należy żastanowic się nad stworżeniem nowej hierarchii wartosci, a także nad
pojęciem wolnosci proponowanym w Prawie i moralności. Owa wolnosc
od prżemocy, cży prżymusu fiżycżnego, ktory niewątpliwie wpisany jest
w system hodowli prżemysłowych, powinna żostac rożsżerżona i stopniowo
obejmowac stworżenia pożaludżkie.
Koniecżnosc redefinicji pewnych pojęc prawnych żwiążana jest
ż rożwojem moralnym Wspolnoty Europejskiej, co w dłużsżej perspektywie
cżasowej i rożwojowej pociąga ża sobą całkowitą reżygnację że spożywania
mięsa wyrażoną w odnosnym żakażie oraż ogranicżenie spożycia innych
produktow odżwierżęcych, takich jak jaja cży mleko. Jak wykażałam wyżej,
problem hodowli, ktora eksploatuje i wynisżcża żwierżęta psychicżnie
i fiżycżnie, dotycży bowiem rownież krow mlecżnych oraż kur niosek.
Niemożliwosc żrealiżowania podstawowych potrżeb, nie tylko fiżjologicżnych
(jak potrżeba ruchu) ale także społecżnych oraż traktowanie żwierżąt jako
masżyn do produkcji kolejnych porcji mięsa, jest doskonale widocżna
na prżykładżie swin, ktory prżedstawiony jest w Wyzwoleniu zwierząt:
Więksżość hodowców stosujących klatki dla prosiąt pożwala
jednak maciorom prżynajmniej prżeż tydżień opiekować się
młodymi, żanim je żabierże. Doktor J. Frank Hurnick, kanadyjski
naukowiec żootechnik, wymyślił niedawno coś lepsżego:
mechanicżną maciorę. Według jednego ż raportów „wynalażek
Hurnicka może pożwolić ukierunkować intensywną hodowlę
na żwięksżanie licżebności miotu. Dotychcżas ogranicżały ją
biologicżne możliwości wykarmienia prżeż maciorę.” Naukowcy
prżewidują, że połącżenie mechanicżnych metod karmienia
i innych nowatorskich technik, takich jak superowulacja, czyli
żwięksżenie licżby wytwarżanych prżeż maciorę komórek
jajowych, umożliwi powstanie wysoce żautomatyżowanego
systemu produkcji, w którym będżie można osiągnąć wydajność
średnio cżterdżiestu pięciu prosiąt na maciorę rocżnie żamiast
dzisiejszych szesnastu (Singer 2004, 77)
Pomysły na żwięksżanie płodnosci swin prży niemalże całkowitym
pożbawieniu ich kontaktu ż własnym potomstwem oraż innymi swiniami
132
Alicja Dłużewicz
sprawiają, że żwierżęta te żapadają na choroby psychicżne oraż inne
schorżenia żwiążane ż takim systemem hodowli.
Choc prawo nieustannie ulega prżemianom, a ustawodawcy
dostrżegają w żwierżętach istoty cierpiące, ktorym, pod grożbą kary, nie
należy żadawac cierpien, nadal istnieje realny problem ż egżekwowaniem
prżepisow lub poprawą życia żwierżąt hodowlanych. Brak miejsca
i możliwosci prowadżenia życia społecżnego, jak w prżypadku krow cży kur,
ktory dla każdego ż gatunkow okażuje się nieżwykle dokucżliwy, to tylko
niektore ż problemow żwiążanych ż hodowlą prżemysłową. Jesli ustawodawcy
żacżęliby posługiwac się żasadą rownego rożważania interesow, ktora, jak
okresla Singer „żachowuje się jak waga, ważąca interesy beżstronnie” (Singer
2007, 35), bylibysmy w stanie osiągnąc cos, co można byłoby nażwac stanem
rownosci lub realnie osiągniętą sprawiedliwoscią, choc nie pojmowaną
na sposob Rawlsa. Sprawiedliwosc rożumiec powinnismy jako rownosc sżans
i możliwosci samostanowienia i samorealiżacji. Ocżywiscie, należy prżyjąc
pewną skalę, ponieważ, jak już wspominałam, osoby pożaludżkie nie mają
takich samych potrżeb w realiżacji interesow, a ich sżcżęscie lub prżyjemnosc
odnosżą się tylko do pożiomu podstawowego u cżłowieka. Chodżi jednak
o to, by wsżystkim stworżeniom, ktore jednak byc może powinnismy włącżyc
do wspolnoty, należy dac możliwosc życia i prżebywania w srodowisku, ktore
jest dla nich odpowiednie. Prżygotowywanie ustaw, ktore mają ucżynic
żwierżęcą Treblinkę bardżiej żnosną, żdaje się byc jednak ignorancją
dotycżącą potrżeb każdego żywego stworżenia, sżcżegolnie samoswiadomego
i swiadomego.
Postulat posżanowania życia, lub też uwżględnienia najbardżiej
podstawowego interesu osoby (cży też, ża Elżanowskim i Pietrżykowskim,
nieosobowego podmiotu prawa), jest ocżywiscie radykalny i aktualnie
prżynajmniej, niemożliwy do żrealiżowania. Opor, ż ktorym spotyka się
wegetarianiżm i weganiżm jest probą uniknięcia ważnej dla wsżystkich
żmiany, bowiem konsekwencje takiego prżeformułowania prawa dotkną
w najbolesniejsży sposob ludżi. Zmiana ta ocżywiscie musi następowac
stopniowo i powoli, powinna ona byc ewolucją prawa, ponieważ żwiążana jest
ona także ż poważnymi żmianami ekonomicżnymi. Wyżwolenie żwierżąt spod
noża sprawi, że swiat żacżnie się realnie żmieniac, dopiero wtedy etycżny
postulat rownosci wsżystkich istot, ktore mogą życ i ktorym na to pożwalamy,
będżie mogł żostac urżecżywistniony. Aktualnie możemy jednak tylko
stwierdżic fakt, ktorym jest postępująca w prawie i swiadomosci ludżkiej
żmiana stosunku do żwierżąt, coraż cżęstsże myslenie o istotach pożaludżkich
w kategorii podmiotowej lub nawet osobowej. Jednak nadal można żabijac
żwierżęta dla luksusu spożywania mięsa. W pojęciu Platona, budujemy żatem
panstwa żbytku, w ktorych spożywamy żwierżęce ciała, choc osiągnięcia
w rolnictwie i umiejętnosc prżetwarżania roslin pożwalają nam wybrac
to, co etycżnie słusżniejsże. Jesli w ujęciu platonskim sprawiedliwosc ma
133
miejsce wtedy, gdy każdy robi to, cżym potrafi żając się najlepiej, to prżecież
żajęciem swini cży krowy nie jest spędżenie całego życia w ciasnym boksie ani
rosnięcie po to, by pojawic się na cżyims talerżu. Jesli żajęcia te utożsamimy
ż interesem żwierżęcym, sżybko dostrżeżemy, jak niesprawiedliwa jest wobec
żwierżąt hodowla prżemysłowa. Owa platonska sprawiedliwosc jest rownież
stanem swoistej harmonii, żatem biorąc pod uwagę aktualną eksploatację nie
tylko żwierżąt, ale srodowiska naturalnego w ogole, trudno jest skłaniac się
ku stwierdżeniom o prowadżeniu prżeż cżłowieka polityki rownowagi.
Choc całkowita lub chocby cżęsciowa likwidacja hodowli żwierżęcych
wydaje się niemożliwa, należy upomniec się o prawa osobowe żwierżąt,
w prżypadku ktorych byłoby nam to najłatwiej żaakceptowac. Z pewnoscią
prawami takimi powinny byc objęte małpy oraż walenie. Zapewne byłby
to ogromny krok ku posżerżeniu żakresu praw ochronnych, ktore
obejmowałyby pożostałe gatunki żwierżąt. Takie posunięcie sprawiłoby,
że Inny mogłby żostac oswojony prżeż prawo i włącżony do niego. W żadnym
prżypadku stworżenie takie nie powinno byc traktowane jak prżedmiot,
nawet, jesli istnieją luki prawne nieuwżględniające wielu potencjalnych
sytuacji.
Prżed nami, jako wspolnotą istot należących do tego samego gatunku,
jest jesżcże wiele lekcji do odrobienia, sżcżegolnie tych dotycżących
sprawiedliwosci. Powinnismy żawsże pamiętac, że prawo stanowi w pewnej
cżęsci rownież wyraż moralnych i etycżnych postaw i prżekonan okreslonych
wspolnot w danym cżasie. Aby wżmacniac ten filar, żawsże powinnismy
żastanawiac się nad sytuacją Innego w nasżej wspolnocie. Nie dotycży to tylko
żwierżąt, ale rownież ludżi wyklucżonych że wżględu na status społecżny lub
ekonomicżny, chorobę lub dysfunkcje. To własnie prawo powinno sprawowac
opiekę nad Innym i nie pożwalac na wyklucżenia. Jesli mamy żgodżic się
na jakąkolwiek formę koloniżacji, to niech będżie to skoloniżowanie prawa
prżeż Innego własnie, po to, by jego interes i dobro były beżwyjątkowo
uwżględniane, a jego integralnosc osobowa i cielesna - chronione. Prawo jest
także elementem edukacji, cżyms, co mowi nam, jak powinno byc i jakie
konsekwencje spotkają nas ża cżyny ż nim nieżgodne. Niech żatem prawo
rownież edukuje społecżenstwa w kwestii osobowego użnania żwierżąt.
Zwierżęcy Inny nie może dojsc do głosu samodżielnie, dlatego też to my, jako
cżłonkowie wspolnoty i beneficjenci umowy społecżnej, ktora pożwala nam
żrożumiec cżym jest sprawiedliwosc i daje nam możliwosc stworżenia własnej
definicji dobra (cżyli bycia istotami moralnymi), powinnismy prżemawiac
w jego imieniu. Każda historycżnie wyklucżona grupa powinna sprżeciwic się
temu wyklucżeniu i prżemocy, a każda wyklucżająca lub prżyglądająca się
wyklucżeniu grupa - upomniec się o prawa wyklucżonych. Powinnismy więc
walcżyc o użnanie żwierżąt ża osoby.
134
Alicja Dłużewicz
Bibliografia
DeGrażia, D. 2011. „O byciu osobą poża gatunkiem «homo sapiens»”.
W: P. Singer (red.). 2011. W obronie zwierząt. Tłum. M. Betley.
Warsżawa: Cżarna Owca.
Elżanowski, A., & Pietrżykowski, T. 2013. „Zwierżęta jako nieosobowe
podmioty prawa”. Forum Prawnicze, nr 1 (15). Warsżawa: Utriusque
Iuris, ss. 18–27.
Foucault, M. 1998. Nadżorowac i karac. Narodżiny więżienia. Tłum.
T. Komendant. Warsżawa: Wydawnictwo Aletheia.
Jameson, D. 2011. „Jedżąc smiejące się żwierżę”. W: P. Singer (red.). 2011. W
obronie zwierząt. Tłum. M. Betley. Warsżawa: Cżarna Owca.
Kożak, P. 2009. „Teologia biopolitycżna Giorgio Agambena”. Diametros (21):
96–113.
Lang, W. 1989. Prawo i moralność. Warsżawa: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo
Naukowe.
McMahan, J. 2012. Etyka zabijania. Tłum. J. Bednarek, K. Kus. Warsżawa:
Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.
Nowak, E. 2013. „Sżechita. Studium ż genealogii, praktyki i transgatunkowej
etyki żabijania”.
Edukacja
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Dostęp:
http://www.edukacjaetycżna.pl/images/pdffiles_articles/Sżechita._Stu
dium_ż_geneal ogii,_praktyki_i_transgatunkowej_etyki_żabijania.pdf,
30.03.2014.
Rawls, J. 2009. Teoria sprawiedliwości. Wyd. 2, żmienione. Tłum. M. Panucik,
J. Pasek, A. Romaniuk. Warsżawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.
Singer, P. 2004. Wyzwolenie zwierząt. Tłum. A. Alichniewicż, A. Sżcżęsna.
Warsżawa: Panstwowy Instytut Wydawnicży.
Singer, P. 2007. Etyka praktyczna. Wyd. 2. Tłum. A. Sagan. Warsżawa:
Wydawnictwo Książka i Wiedża.
Singer, P. (red.) 2011. W obronie zwierząt. Tłum. M. Betley. Warsżawa: Cżarna
Owca.
135
Alicja Dłużewicż (Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicża, Pożnan)
Etyka utylitarystyczna Petera Singera – szanse i możliwości
przekształcenia praw zwierząt
Abstrakt: W artykule tym autorka podejmuje się proby prżedefiniowania
i posżerżenia podstawowych terminow prawnych, takich jak osoba
i sprawiedliwosc, na samoswiadome żwierżęta pożaludżkie, włącżając je we
wspolnotę moralną. Potrżeba ta jest powodowana ewolucją moralnosci,
żwiążaną ż procesem użnania. Ochrona prawna żwierżąt jako prżedmiotow
prawa może byc ugruntowana na żastosowaniu etyki utylitarystycżnej Petera
Singera, ktora pokażuje jak ważne jest posżanowanie interesow innych, oraż
danie im możliwosci życie w miarę dobrych/porżądnych warunkach.
Słowa kluczowe: Peter Singer, utylitaryżm, sprawiedliwosc, osoba, użnanie
Utilitarian ethics of Peter Singer:
– Prospects and possibilities of transforming animal rights in law
Abstract: This article is an attempt to redefine and extend basic terms of law,
such as “person” or “justice,” to include self-conscious, non-human animals in
the moral community. This need arises due to the evolution of our moral
thinking, which is related to the process of recognition. Support for animals
coming under the protection of law can be provided by Peter Singer’s
utilitarian ethics, which shows the importance of respecting other’s interests
and giving them the possibility of living under decent conditions.
Keywords: Peter Singer, utilitarianism, justice, person, recognition.
doi:10.14746/eip.2014.1.11
136
doi:10.14746/eip.2014.1.12
Ontyczny i etyczny aspekt kosmoekologicznej
koncepcji Świata
Honorata Korpikiewicz (Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza, Poznan)
Wstęp: Kosmoekologia i hipoteza Gai-Uranosa
Kosmoekologia, ktorą traktuję jako wiedzę o wpływie czynnikow kosmicznych
na Ziemię i zycie na niej – człowieka, innych zwierząt i roslin, zwrociła uwagę
na związki istniejące pomiędzy ziemskim i kosmicznym srodowiskiem
(Korpikiewicz 2002). Człowiek najwczesniej zauwazył zaleznosc swego zycia
i całej ziemskiej biosfery od Słonca, przy czym najpierw doceniono wpływ jego
promieniowania widzialnego i podczerwonego (cieplnego). Dopiero w l. 60.
poznano promieniowanie korpuskularne (wiatr słoneczny) przybywający ze
Słonca i uswiadomiono sobie istnienie ziemskiej magnetosfery osłaniającej
nas nie tylko przed tymze wiatrem (pasy van Allena), ale takze wraz
z heliosferą, przed wysokoenergetycznym promieniowaniem kosmicznym.
Promieniowanie korpuskularne i niektore zakresy promieniowania
elektromagnetycznego zwiększają swe natęzenie w zaleznosci od aktywnosci
słonecznej, co na Ziemi objawia się ogromną iloscią zjawisk: burz
magnetycznych, zakłocen radiowych i zorz polarnych, zmianami pogody
i klimatu, zmianami w wegetacji roslin i migracjami zwierząt, a takze
zwiększonym natęzeniem wielu chorob, m.in. zakaznych i układu krązenia.
Słonce i Księzyc mają zasadniczy wpływ na pogodę, co pociąga za sobą
szereg zjawisk i wpływa na wszystkie organizmy. Oba te ciała przez swe
działanie grawitacyjne wywołują zjawisko pływow, i to zarowno wod (co jest
procesem najbardziej znanym) jak rowniez pływow litosfery, mogących byc
przyczyną uwalniania się energii w trzęsieniach ziemi czy wybuchach
wulkanow. Powodują tez pływy atmosfery modyfikujące pogodę, a więc
wpływające posrednio na wegetację roslin i zycie zwierząt. Rzadko bowiem
zdajemy sobie sprawę, ze to własnie Słonce jest przyczyną zjawisk
meteorologicznych na Ziemi (ruchy cząsteczek powietrza odbywają się pod
wpływem energii kinetycznej udzielonej im przez Słonce), jak rowniez,
ze zjawiska denudacji (erozji, wietrzenia) są wynikiem posredniego lub
bezposredniego działania promieniowania Słonca (nagrzewanie skał, wiatry
i deszcze), a takze sił grawitacji.
Zycie ziemskie powstało w wodzie, dlatego tez u wszystkich
organizmow morskich w ogromnym stopniu (w mniejszym – u lądowych)
zauwaza się organizację zycia według pływow oceanow. Zwierzęta morskie
rozmnazają się w scisłej zaleznosci od rytmu pływow.
Ontyczny i etyczny aspekt kosmoekologicznej koncepcji Świata
Od chwili powstania Ziemi opadał na nią pył kosmiczny jak rowniez
większe bryły ciał meteorowych. Obecnie w ciągu kazdej doby spada 50-20
ton; w czasach początkow Ziemi gęstosc mgławicy protoplanetarnej była
znacznie większa. Ciała meteorowe są przyczyną zmian stanu atmosfery (jej
warstwy ozonowej) i zakłocen w propagacji fal radiowych, a nawet katastrof
na kosmiczną skalę. Do takich nalezały wielkie zderzenia, pozostawiające
po sobie slady w postaci ogromnych, wielokilometrowej srednicy kraterow.
Liczne hipotezy łączą wypadki "wielkiego wymierania" zwierząt dawnych
epok (m.in. 65 milionow lat temu) z masywnym zderzeniem Ziemi
z kosmicznym ciałem. Pył pochodzący z rozpadu takiego ciała moze
zahamowac dochodzące do Ziemi promieniowanie słoneczne, co odbija się
w tragiczny sposob na biosferze. Rowniez pył z obłokow pyłowych Galaktyki
(mgławic ciemnych) moze, podczas wędrowki Słonca wokoł jądra Galaktyki,
spowodowac nadejscie epoki lodowej.
Nie obojętne dla zycia są takze odleglejsze od Ziemi obiekty i pola
siłowe. Promieniowanie widzialne wysyłane przez gwiazdy było podstawą
nawigacji ludzi i zwierząt. Promieniowanie jonizujące wybuchających
w poblizu Słonca gwiazd supernowych moze byc niszczące dla ziemskiego
zycia szczegolnie wtedy, gdy wydarzenie takie zbiegnie się w czasie
ze zniknięciem pola magnetycznego Ziemi i pozbawieniem biosfery ochronnej
otoczki magnetosfery.
Pole elektryczne atmosfery okazało się wręcz niezbędne do zycia.
Zwierzęta pozbawione jonow ujemnych umierają nawet wtedy, gdy skład
powietrza jest własciwy do oddychania (podobnie kosmonauci w statkach
kosmicznych). Pole elektryczne atmosfery powstaje głownie za sprawą
kosmicznej jonizacji gornych warstw atmosfery i utrzymuje okreslony stan
ładunkow elektrycznych powierzchni Ziemi, a takze i tych, ktore płyną pod jej
skorupą w postaci prądow wytwarzając pole magnetyczne naszej planety.
Wszelkie zmiany pola magnetycznego, zarowno drastyczne (inwersja
biegunow) jak i o słabszym natęzeniu (burze magnetyczne, przebiegające
w rytm aktywnosci Słonca) wpływają na organizmy roslin i zwierząt.
Najdłuzej nie doceniano wpływu pola grawitacyjnego na rozwoj
organizmow, choc przeciez w srodowiskach, gdzie siła wyporu zmniejsza
działanie siły grawitacji (np. w wodzie) organizmy charakteryzują się inną
anatomią i fizjologią - np. innymi osrodkami wytwarzania krwi. Badania
eksperymentalne na Ziemi, jak rowniez kosmiczne pokazują, ze umiarkowanie
zwiększona siła grawitacji moze działac na organizmy pozytywnie, szczegolnie
na rozrost tkanki mięsniowej i kostnej, natomiast dłuzsze przebywanie
w stanie niewazkosci jest niesprzyjające.
Wszechswiat jest pełen zjawisk przebiegających rytmicznie; większosc
z nich zachodzi pod wpływem ruchow ciał po orbitach i ruchu wirowego
wokoł osi. Kosmiczne rytmy nie tylko modyfikują warunki zycia na Ziemi, one
są z nimi splecione od początku istnienia zycia, a co więcej – są dla ich
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Honorata Korpikiewicz
istnienia konieczne. Uwarunkowania te sięgają tak daleko, ze bez pewnych
grawitacyjnych rytmow – istnienia Księzyca i jego ruchu, nie byłyby spełnione
podstawowe warunki dla zycia na Ziemi, do jakich nalezy stabilnosc orbity.
Zycie nie mogłoby zaistniec nawet wtedy, gdyby odpowiednia była odległosc
planety od Słonca, jej nachylenie do ekliptyki i obroty (Laskar, Joutel, Boudin
1982, 361).
Kosmiczne periody ruchu Ziemi wokoł osi, dookoła Słonca, obiegu
Księzyca wokoł Ziemi oraz inne okresy obiegu i rezonanse – spowodowały
w trakcie filogenezy powstanie u ziemskich organizmow szeregu rytmow,
regulujących przebieg fizjologicznych reakcji organizmu w zaleznosci
od rytmow kosmicznych. Zajmuje się nimi chronobiologia, ktora jak gdyby
wychodzi na przeciw kosmoekologii i wskazuje na odpowiedz adaptacyjną
ziemskich organizmow na rytmy kosmiczne, jaką są własnie rytmy
biologiczne.
Ziemia dla człowieka?
Nie wiadomo, czy zycie narodziło się we Wszechswiecie w materii
meteorytowej (w jądrach komet), czy w oceanach pra-Ziemi. Jednakowy kod
genetyczny organizmow wskazuje na to, ze ziemskie zycie powstało z jednej
jedynej pierwotnej komorki. Ale jednoczesnie uswiadamiamy sobie, jak mało
prawdopodobny był "przypadek" utworzenia okreslonej sekwencji białek
w budowie ziemskiego zycia. Kontrowersyjne załozenie o zyciu przenoszącym
się z planety na planetę, zwiększa obszar czasoprzestrzeni dla tego
eksperymentu wszechczasow, jednoczesnie zwiększając kosmiczne
prawdopodobienstwo jego powstania. Choc wydaje się logiczne, ze zycie
mogło powstac na wielu planetach innych słonc, to dotąd jego poszukiwanie
nie przyniosło rezultatow. Moze to wynikac z wielu przyczyn i nie przesądza,
ze zycie we Wszechswiecie istnieje tylko na Ziemi.
Z drugiej strony kłopoty interpretacyjne stwarzają implikacje idei
antropicznej: nie tylko nasz zakątek Wszechswiata, ale cały ogromny Kosmos,
i to od początkow jego powstania, od Wielkiego Wybuchu, posiadał scisle
okreslone parametry, bez ktorych w dalekiej przyszłosci zycie białkowe nie
mogłoby się narodzic (Barrow 1986). Czy więc zycie jest atrybutem
Wszechswiata? I czy tylko uprzywilejowane zostało zycie ludzkie, zgodnie
z antropocentryczną interpretacją zasady oraz jej nazwą: „antropiczna”, czy
raczej wszelkie zycie, zrodzone z pierwszego ziemskiego organizmu,
co postulują biocentrycznie nastawieni badacze, nazywając zasadę
antropiczną – zasadą złozonosci?1
Niektore eksperymenty kwantowe wskazują na mozliwosc, ze zyjemy
we Wszechswiecie nielokalnym (Barrow 1998), tj., ze wszystkie elementy
1
Autorka nazywa ją zasadą kosmoekologiczną.
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Swiata są ze sobą powiązane i to, co uczynimy w jednym jego zakątku wpłynie
na odległe w czasie i przestrzeni wydarzenia. Czyzbysmy musieli uznac,
ze istnieje jakas pierwotna korelacja, ktorej istoty nie rozumiemy, a ktora jest
zupełnie inna i głębsza od omawianych związkow (wszechzwiązku) materii
ziemskiej i materii kosmicznej?
Zaleznosci kosmoekologiczne, pokazujące głębię powiązan pomiędzy
poszczegolnymi elementami Ziemi i Nieba, pozwalają widziec w nich
nierozerwalną całosc, ktorej częsci składowych nie sposob rozpatrywac
oddzielnie bez istotnego naruszenia rozumienia ich wzajemnego
funkcjonowania. Pojęcie superorganizmu Gai Lynn Margulis i Jamesa
Lovelocka (Lovelock 2003) jest niepełne bez uwzględnienia jej związkow
z Niebem, w ktore Gaja jest wpleciona nie tylko w chwili obecnej, nawet nie
w chwili powstawania, ale jeszcze wczesniej, od pierwszej chwili rodzącego się
Wszechswiata, gdy istniała jedynie w sferze potencjalnych wszechswiatowych
mozliwosci. Nie jest prawdą, ze tylko człowiek, i to w ostatnich wiekach, zaczął
kształtowac swoje srodowisko zycia; to własnie rodzące się zycie od samego
początku stwarzało i rozwijało coraz bardziej sprzyjające sobie srodowisko.
Obecny stan wiedzy naukowej uzasadnia sformułowanie twierdzenia,
ze jestesmy nie tylko zalezni od pozostałych elementow ziemskiej biosfery, nie
tylko wpisani w rytm zjawisk kosmicznych, ktore ukształtowały nas w taki,
a nie inny sposob, ale nawet, ze wszystkie te zaleznosci były "zakodowane"
w rodzącym się Wszechswiecie od początku jego powstania. Pozwala
to na objęcie wspolną nazwą srodowiska spajającego nierozerwalnie Ziemię
i Niebo, w ktorym wszystkie zjawiska są ze sobą powiązane. Hipotezę
tę nazywam przez analogię do hipotezy Gai podwojnym imieniem greckich
bostw Ziemi i Nieba: hipotezą Gai-Uranosa (Korpikiewicz 2002; Korpikiewicz
2006).
Wszechswiat, w ktorym narodziło się zycie, musiał wprowadzic
materię w okreslony sposob istnienia. Greccy filozofowie zauwazyli,
ze w Swiecie panuje symetria, proporcjonalnosc i harmonia. Widzieli
ją w ruchu ciał niebieskich, ktore miały byc jednostajne i odbywac się
po orbitach kołowych, wyobrazali ją sobie w harmonijnych dzwiękach, jakie
miały wydawac te ciała przy obrocie. Swiat ziemski, odbicie swiata platonskich
idei, jako nasladownictwo, nie był tak doskonały, jednak i w nim odnalezc
mozna było harmonię w symetrycznej i proporcjonalnej budowie istot zywych,
w budowlach wzniesionych ludzką ręką, w liczbach i konstrukcjach
geometrycznych. Harmonią ze Swiatem miała byc rowniez swiadoma
egzystencja człowieka w srodowisku, polegająca na koegzystencji z Naturą
i zyciu w zgodzie z samym sobą, w zdrowiu i poszanowaniu innych istot, jak
to było w opisanym przez Owidiusza wieku złotym.
Postulowana doskonałosc Swiata, kryła w sobie wszak pewne
niebezpieczenstwo: o ile Swiat byłby w istocie doskonały (dokonały, czyli
w rozumieniu Arystotelesa skonczony, taki, ktory osiągnął swoj cel), to nie
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mogłby się rozwijac. Zauwazył to Empedokles, postulując przyjęcie,
ze doskonałosc polega na niedoskonałosci, czyli mozliwosci rozwoju.
Na przykładzie harmonii: symetrii, proporcjonalnosci, a takze odkrytych
wspołczesnie innych struktur w pewnym sensie doskonałych,
bo symetrycznych, samopowielających się, nieskonczonych, jak pitagorejski
pentagram, przejawiających się w istnieniu tworow Przyrody – np. fraktali,
widac, ze Natura nie realizuje do konca swoich mozliwosci. Ciała zwierząt
i roslin nie są doskonale symetryczne, a płatki sniegu i linie brzegowe – nie są
doskonale fraktalne. Takze ciała niebieskie, ktore miały byc zbudowane
z doskonałej „piątej substancji” nie są dokładnie kuliste i poruszają się
po krzywych stozkowych, a nie po okręgach. Nawet prawa Przyrody, ktore są
w większosci symetryczne, manifestują się nam poprzez łamanie symetrii. Czy
w istocie Przyroda jest „niemal symetryczna”, jak to okreslił Richard Feynman
(Feynman et al. 1969), a łamanie symetrii to jej sposob na rozwiązanie
dylematu pomiędzy unifikacją a roznorodnoscią? Roznorodnoscią, ktora była
konieczna dla rozwoju i mozolnego wspinania się na kolejne szczeble
złozonosci?
Koniecznosc istnienia w ewoluującym Swiecie termodynamicznej
nierownowagi została dostrzezona w związku z rozwojem termodynamiki
i problemem domniemanej smierci cieplnej Wszechswiata. Ale rownowaga
Wszechswiata – to nie tylko rownowaga termodynamiczna, to takze tworzenie
struktur trwałych. Z punktu widzenia sił jądrowych – są nimi atomy zelaza.
Biorąc pod uwagę grawitację – to czarne dziury, maksymalna kumulacja
materii i maksimum entropii. Dlaczego jednak siły Wszechswiata nie dokonują
swego dzieła, a raczej z rzadka dochodzą do struktur trwałych, jak wtedy, gdy
tworzą atomy zelaza w koncowym etapie ewolucji gwiazdy czy czarną dziurę –
w przypadku gwiazdy masywnej? Dlaczego nie uczyniły tego krotko
po Wielkim Wybuchu? Nie dokonało się to, co mogło się dokonac, ale przeciez
Wszechswiat „doskonały”, rownowagowy, nie mogłby się rozwijac. Rozwoj
trwałby jedynie tak krotko, jak mogłaby zaistniec boltzmannowska fluktuacja.
Procesy rownowagi i nierownowagi przeplatają się we Wszechswiecie
ze sobą, rywalizują zarowno w ewolucji gwiazdy, czarnej dziury, jak i ewolucji
organizmow zywych (Korpikiewicz 1998). Obserwując stany nierownowagi
mozemy byc jednak pewni, ze układ się rozwija. Nierownowaga zwiastuje
rozwoj Wszechswiata jako całosci, jak rowniez rozwoj jego elementow
składowych – gwiazd, planet, zywych organizmow.
Istnienie substancji Wszechswiata w roznorodnosci jej form, co więcej
– wręcz koniecznosc takiego własnie urozmaiconego, roznorodnego Swiata –
dosc długo umykała uwadze filozofow. Starozytni Grecy widzieli Swiat
„uładzonym”, raczej jednolitym. Ich przekonania zawazyły na rozwoju
europejskiej wiedzy po dzien dzisiejszy. Ale istniały takze inne intuicje w tym
względzie. W mysli prahinduskiej pojawił się pogląd o nieskonczenie
roznorodnej formie kosmicznej boga Kriszny, co zaowocowało wspołczesnie
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prahinduską zasadą kosmologiczną, sformułowaną przez Konrada
Rudnickiego i Michała Hellera (Rudnicki 1995). Tym samym rozwazania
na temat cech dalekiego Kosmosu, koniecznosci istnienia jego roznorodnosci,
wyprzedziły zauwazenie roznorodnosci biologicznej – bioroznorodnosci.
Zwracał na nią wprawdzie uwagę juz Karol Darwin, ale doceniono jej wartosc
dopiero w ostatnim połwieczu.
Koniecznosc istnienia roznorodnosci (urozmaicenia), potrzebnej
zarowno dla istnienia i ewolucji elementow Swiata, jak rowniez dla opisu jego
zjawisk, podnosił w swej relacyjnej teorii czasu i przestrzeni Leibniz (Leibniz
1991). Jego przekonanie o nieistnieniu absolutnej przestrzeni i czasu oraz
własnosciach elementow Swiata, ktore takze nie są absolutne, dane na stałe,
ale zalezą od ich relacji z innymi elementami, zostały potwierdzone przez
teorię względnosci oraz chromodynamikę kwantową. U podstaw teorii
kwarkow – podstawowych cząstek Wszechswiata – lezy fundamentalne prawo
Natury, ze własnosci ciał nie mają znaczenia absolutnego, tylko są wypadkowa
związkow zachodzących pomiędzy nimi.
We Wszechswiecie zdarza się więc obserwowac symetrię, rownowagę,
proporcjonalnosc. Jednak zawsze pozostaje pewien niewykonany do konca
krok, wąski margines dla działan ewolucyjnych, ktory okazał się warunkiem
koniecznym dla rozwoju, pomnazania roznorodnosci i złozonosci,
a w konsekwencji takze dla ewolucji biologicznej. Wszechswiat doskonale
symetryczny pod względem ciał, wytworow nieozywionych i praw,
pozostający w trwałej rownowadze, pod kazdym względem dokończony,
doskonały, jak doskonała jest rzecz, ktora osiągnęła granice swego rozwoju,
nie mogłby się rozwijac, nie mogłaby w nim przebiegac ewolucja materii ani
na poziomie biologicznym ani na poziomie materii nieozywionej. Musi więc
pozostawac nierownowagowy, nie do konca harmonijny, roznorodny i złozony,
ale i rytmiczny, zeby stworzyc warunki dla kosmicznej ewolucji. I to zarowno
ewolucji gwiazdy, mgławicy, jak i człowieka, psa czy ryby trzonopłetwej.
Etyka holistyczna i patocentryczna
Przyjęcie hipotezy Gai-Uranosa ma oprocz aspektu ontycznego takze
aspekt etyczny.
Etyki naturalistyczne (aksjologie naturalistyczne) normy
etyczne wywodzą z Natury: dobre jest to, co jest zgodne z przyrodniczą naturą
człowieka. Bywa, ze ich zwolennicy koncentrują się na wywodzeniu zasad
etycznych z niezwykle zawęzonego spojrzenia na naturę ludzką, mającą się
jakoby sprowadzac głownie do dawania i zachowania zycia, jako
najwazniejszej potrzeby biologicznej. Stąd koncentracja na problemach
związanych z rozmnazaniem się człowieka, podczas gdy mniej wazne stają się
inne podstawowe potrzeby biologiczne (np. bezpieczenstwa, zachowania
zdrowia, zaspokojenia głodu, ogrzania ciała czy zaspokojenia seksualnego),
albo potrzeby wyzsze – np. rozwoju tworczego, ktore często stoją w opozycji
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do potrzeby rozmnazania. Takie podejscie prowadzi prostą drogą do krolującej
od wiekow etyki antropocentrycznej.
Nie zauwaza się przy tym, ze natura ludzka rozwinęła się w trakcie
długiej filogenezy i dziedziczy swe cechy po zwierzęcych przodkach.
To od nich wywodzi się podstawowe dązenie – do zachowania zycia – instynkt
samozachowawczy, choc tez nie zawsze jest ono wartoscią naczelną. Zarowno
wsrod ludzi jak i wsrod zwierząt obserwuje się poswięcanie swojego zycia czy
samookalecznia.
Wizja Swiata według kosmoekologii prowadzi nas prostą drogą
do etyki holistycznej (ολος – cały, /gr./), najszerzej pojętej etyki
srodowiskowej, obejmującej nie tylko ziemskie ale takze kosmiczne
srodowisko, wraz ze wszystkimi jego elementami zarowno zywymi jak
i nieozywionymi. Podstawową zasadą jest poszanowanie Natury w kazdym jej
przejawie.
Przyjęło się uwazac, ze Natura i zachodzące w niej procesy są
aksjologicznie obojętne, bo tylko człowiek jest podmiotem wartosciującym
i tylko w stosunku do niego (jego dobrostanu, zdrowia czy zycia) mozna
oceniac zachodzące wokoł niego zdarzenia. Dawny człowiek tworzył swe
etyczne postawy w sposob intuicyjny i twierdzę, ze wzorował się przy tym
na obserwacji Natury. Jednakze nie na „rozrzutnej” Przyrodzie
z „zakrwawionymi zębami i pazurami”, jak to dobitnie i ironicznie okreslił
pisarz John Wyndham, ale na bardziej podstawowej obserwacji: kierunku
przebiegu wszystkich procesow fizycznych, ktoremu probował się
przeciwstawiac. Obserwacji takiej musiały dokonac takze zwierzęta wyzsze,
ktore wykształciły w swych społecznosciach zasady hamowania agresji i jej
rytualizacji w stosunku do członkow swojego gatunku, a więc, jak je nazwał
Konrad Lorenz, „zbiezne z moralnoscią”.
Jak uzasadniam, istnieją w Naturze czynniki immanentne, ktore
sprawiły, ze pewne czyny i wydarzenia uzyskiwały w oczach człowieka
aprobatę jako "dobre", a inne traktowane były jako "złe" (Korpikiewicz 1998).
Nieoczekiwanie wiąze się to z pytaniem etyki holistycznej, nazywanym
umownie "problemem wydmy": czy mamy prawo naruszac stan materii
nieozywionej, ktora nie czuje i nie zyje?
Jednym z podstawowych praw fizyki, rządzących zarowno na Ziemi jak
i w kazdym zakątku Wszechswiata, jest prawo wzrostu entropii, ktorą mozna
w pewnym uproszczeniu przedstawic następująco: w procesach
przebiegających we Wszechświecie entropia stale wzrasta. Wielkosc fizyczna,
zwana entropią, ktora ma scisły sens matematyczny, przyblizana jest często
pojęciami "rozpadu", "rozproszenia", "degeneracji, "zmniejszonego porządku"
itp.
Kazda zywa istota w trakcie swego rozwoju styka się bez przerwy
ze zjawiskiem rozsypki, rozpadu. Gniją szczątki martwych organizmow, skały
ulegają denudacji, rozpadają się budowle wzniesione ręką człowieka.
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Obserwowane na kazdym kroku, w kazdej chwili, procesy wzrostu entropii są
tak nieodłączne naszemu zyciu, ze ich sobie w ogole nie uswiadamiamy, jak
przez wieki człowiek nie uswiadamiał sobie istnienia powietrza czy wpływu
grawitacji na organizm. Jednak to własnie zjawisko, zakodowane w naszym
umysle od początku jego rozwoju daje odpowiedz na odwieczne pytanie
o niezwykłą siłę zła w stosunku do sił dobra: dlaczego tak łatwo cos zniszczyc
albo zycie unicestwic, podczas gdy proces odwrotny jest bądz niezmiernie
trudny bądz wręcz niemozliwy do przeprowadzenia.
Obserwując przez miliony lat nieodwołalne zniszczenia związane
z podmywaniem brzegow rzek, osypywaniem się piargow na dno doliny,
zawalaniem się scian skalnych, pozarami stepow czy domostw, człowiek zaczął
te własnie zjawiska traktowac jako "złe". Odwrotnie - prace związane z trudem
budowy, tworzenia, odtwarzania zniszczonych struktur, były "dobre" – ale
o wiele trudniejsze do wykonania. Człowiek prędko zrozumiał, ze smierc
wspołplemienca stanowic moze o zagrozeniu grupy, a zniszczenie domostw
przez powodz czy lawinę prowadzi do pogorszenia warunkow bytowania,
a nawet moze wiesc do utraty zycia. Z uswiadomienia sobie tego faktu wyrosł
pierwszy moralny obowiązek prowadzący do proby przywrocenia rownowagi,
zaburzonej przez kataklizmy czy innych ludzi lub zwierzęta. Stąd, jak sądzę,
wspołczesne intuicje moralne wyrazające podstawową zasadę etyki
holistycznej: nie naruszania stanu naturalnego. Człowiek probował wrocic
zyciu zabitą istotę; to jednak było niemozliwe. Sposobem na przywrocenie
rownowagi były narodziny kolejnych dzieci; stąd pochodzenie magii i kultu
płodnosci, występujących we wszystkich chyba kulturach; w dalekiej
przyszłosci miały one przekształcic się w poszanowanie ludzkiego zycia,
a w wysublimowanej postaci - w szacunek dla wszelkiego zycia.
Chociaz przywracanie rownowagi w zakresie usuwania materialnych
zniszczen po niszczycielskiej działalnosci ludzi lub zywiołow było mozliwe
(odbudowa domostw), to było ono o wiele trudniejsze od dokonywania
zniszczen.
Unoszenie
przedmiotow
ponad
powierzchnię
Ziemi
(przeciwdziałanie sile grawitacji) jest jednoczesnie przeciwdziałaniem siłom
entropii, dązącym do osiągnięcia maksymalnej wartosci i sprowadzenia
kazdego nie podtrzymywanego przedmiotu mozliwie jak najblizej srodka
Ziemi. Przeciwdziałanie spontanicznej dąznosci do wzrostu entropii było
znacznie trudniejsze, jednak miało dla człowieka ogromną wartosc, jako
budujące, tworzące, konsolidujące. Stawało się dobre, w przeciwienstwie
do degradującego i sprzyjającego rozpadowi zła.
Dla istot (ludzkich i zwierzęcych) zyjących w społeczenstwach,
zachowanie pierwotnego porządku i nienaruszanie stanu naturalnego, wiązało
się za wspołodczuwaniem. W ludzkim rozumieniu dobra i zła osobnik
"dobry" dla społeczenstwa to taki, ktory wspołodczuwa z innymi jednostkami
ludzkimi i przyczynia się do ich przetrwania. Tak samo jest u zwierząt – bez
wspołodczuwania wspolnych potrzeb grupa, stado, społecznosc – nie byłaby
144
w stanie przetrwac. Koniecznosc wspołpracy a nie konkurencji i walki
podkreslał wybitnie m.in. Piotr Kropotkim, pisząc o „pomocy wzajemnej”,
a wspołczesnie Lynn Margulis. Kazda komorka w organizmie zywym
wspołpracuje z innymi komorkami w tkance, poniewaz w jakis sposob
odczuwa ich potrzeby. Gdyby nie wspołodczuwała i/lub nie chciała
wspołpracowac, organizm uległby zniszczeniu (tak jest np. w przypadku
rozwoju komorek rakowych). Analogicznie – mozna by więc uznac, ze komorki
wspołpracujące (empatyczne) są dobre. Zaczątkow wspołczucia nalezałoby
więc poszukiwac nie u człowieka i nawet nie u zwierząt wyzszych, ale wsrod
organizujących się komorek. “Miłosierdzie, wspołczucie i zyczliwosc nie są
przymiotami uczuc wyłącznie człowieka. Rozwinęły się z powszechnych
tendencji w naturze, zgodnie z procesem ewolucji” (Chopra 1994, 129).
Więc to nie redukcjonizm teorii „samolubnego genu” prowadzący
do przekonania, ze rozwoj następuje przez ochronę i rozprzestrzenianie
własnych
genow,
ale
szerzej
pojęta
wspołpraca,
altruizm,
wspołodczuwanie/wspołczucie, jest istotnym motorem rozwoju. Mozna dojsc
do wniosku, ze własnie wspołodczuwanie powinno stanowic podstawę
wartosciowania, przynajmniej ludzkich uczynkow, choc większosc zwierząt
wyzszych takze jest zdolna do empatii (Korpikiewicz 2011). Jednakze
paradoksalne, ze zarowno etyki jak i religie ze swoimi kanonami przykazan,
rzadko zajmują się wspołodczuwaniem, wspołczuciem, cierpieniem. Wyjątki
to m.in.: dzinizm i buddyzm z zasadą ahinsy – nie czynienia krzywdy zadnej
zywej istocie, nie stosowania przemocy.
Etyka patocentryczna (παϑος - namiętnosc, pasja, cierpienie, bol /gr./)
- ktorej naczelną zasada jest nie zadawanie cierpienia – wypływa z intuicji
Wschodu, ale ma tez swe zrodła zarowno w ludzkiej wrazliwosci i empatii jak
i wiedzy naukowej – fizjologii, psychologii, etologii, pouczających nas,
ze procesy zyciowe i zachowania zwierząt nie roznią się w sposob istotny
od naszych. Zasada niekrzywdzenia
nie jest bezposrednio związana
z zachowaniem zycia ani gatunku, przekracza więc zarowno zachowania
naturalne (instynkt samozachowawczy) jak i normy etyki biocentrycznej
(ochrony zycia istot nieludzkich), a tym bardziej zasadę ochrony gatunkowej,
ktora ingeruje w zachowanie i rozwoj gatunkow nie licząc się z cierpieniem
i utratą zycia, np. przez odławianie zwierząt i trzymanie ich w nienaturalnych
warunkach w ogrodach zoologicznych. Takiej wrazliwosci patocentrycznej
zabrakło dyrektorowi kopenhaskiego zoo, ktory wydał decyzję
o zamordowaniu 9 II 2014 młodej, zdrowej zyrafy o imieniu Marius,
bo pochodziła ze związku kazirodczego, a więc miała „niewłasciwy genotyp”.
Pomijam okrucienstwo wobec dzieci, ktore oglądały to barbarzynskie
widowisko, i metodologiczny fałsz oraz hipokryzję, polegające na wmawianiu
opinii publicznej, ze „demonstrowane są prawa przyrody”, a więc – domyslnie
– jesli Przyroda „ma zakrwawione zęby i pazury”, to i człowiek moze
zachowywac się tak samo. Jednakze trudno rownac koniecznosc zyciową
145
upolowania kopytnych na sawannie przez drapieznika z zamordowaniem
przez człowieka młodego, zdrowego zwierzęcia, będącego pod jego opieką.
Ten uczynek pokazał, ze okrutna jest nie Przyroda, ale swiat ludzi, nie
kierujący się wspołodczuwaniem, tylko normami unijnymi, i mogł u osob
wrazliwych pozostawic traumę na całe zycie, a u osobnikow psychopatycznych
byc zachętą do zabijania innych stworzen. Najwyzszy czas wrocic
do zapomnianej dyskusji o sensownosci utrzymywania ogrodow
zoologicznych, instytucji nieetycznych, przetrzymujących zwierzęta
w warunkach więziennych i uzurpujących sobie prawo do kierowania ich
ewolucją2.
Niestety, kazda hodowla niesie podobne zagrozenia, choc na ogoł
rzadziej nagłasniane. Wybor zwierząt domowych do hodowli wiąze się
w najlepszym przypadku ze sterylizacją i kastracją, w najgorszym – z zabiciem
zwierzęcia, nie odpowiadającego kanonom np. kynologicznym. Zwrocę uwagę
na niezwykłą ambiwalencję ludzkich dązen: z jednej strony człowiek docenia
bioroznorodnosc. Z drugiej – kastruje wszystkie nierasowe (jakze
roznorodne!) psy i koty. (I nie toleruje chwastow na trawniku). Przyczyna jest
jasna: ludzie chcą kupowac zwierzęta rasowe...
W stronę wspólnego Świata
Posiadanie przez Homo sapiens swiadomosci i zdolnosci do myslenia
jest zgodne z zasadą ewolucyjnej ciągłosci – odziedziczylismy nasz umysł
po zwierzęcych przodkach, rozwijając i sublimując go w ciągu milionow lat.
Wraz z nim wysublimowalismy swoje zasady etyczne. Nasze ciała i układ
nerwowy rozwijały się w powiązaniu z innymi gatunkami, a na nas wszystkich
w podobnym stopniu wpływały i nadal wpływają, czynniki kosmiczne.
Zarowno hipoteza Gai jak i rozszerzona Hipoteza Gai-Uranosa pokazuje siec
związkow ziemskich i kosmicznych, w ktorą są wplecione wszystkie ziemskie
organizmy, bez wyjątku. Nie ma pomiędzy nimi/nami zadnych roznic
jakosciowych – są natomiast roznice ilosciowe w poziomie rozwoju zarowno
budowy anatomicznej ciał jak rozwoju umysłu. Jednak dla wszystkich
najcenniejsze jest ich zycie, wszystkie odruchowo lub swiadomie unikają
cierpienia i smierci.
Człowiek „antropocentryczny”, podnoszący wartosc swojego zycia,
swojego cierpienia i dobrostanu, nie zauwazający cierpienia innych istot, jest
juz przezytkiem jakkolwiek nie miło by to dla nas nie zabrzmiało. Nie ma
zadnego uzasadnienia (ewolucyjnego, naukowego czy religijnego)
Nie wszystkie ogrody zoologiczne zabijają zwierzęta w imię „własciwego” (?)
rozwoju gatunku. Są tez głownie nastawione na komunikację – bliski kontakt
z człowiekiem, ktory moze je karmic i się z nimi bawic. Znam jednak tylko dwa takie
miejsca na swiecie: Lujan ZOO koło Buenos Aires (Argentyna) oraz klasztor buddyjski
- Swiątynia Tygrysow Luangta Bua Yansampanno, (Tajlandia) gdzie mnisi opiekują się
m.in. dzikimi tygrysami.
2
146
na lekcewazenie, pomijanie czy pomniejszanie cierpienia innych istot, przez
niewiedzę, hipokryzję czy pseudonaukowe albo religijne teorie (behawioryzm,
kartezjanizm i in.), uzurpujące sobie prawo do czynienia im krzywdy.
O wrazliwosci, emocjach, uczuciach wyzszych zwierząt napisano wiele prac
i nie ma naukowych podstaw podwazac tej wiedzy. Jednak tym wrazliwym,
czującym, tak do nas podobnym w swym odczuwaniu, naszym „braciom
mniejszym” człowiek wciąz urządza piekło na Ziemi, jakiego powinna się
wstydzic istota rozumna.
Noblista Isaac Bashevis Singer, więzien hitlerowskiego obozu
koncentracyjnego w Treblince, napisał: “Dla zwierząt wszyscy ludzie to nazisci
a ich zycie to wieczna Treblinka”. Doskonale zdawał sobie sprawę z tego, jak
się czuje istota zaszczuta, ponizana, zadręczona, katowana, pozbawiona
jakiejkolwiek nadziei, i to niezaleznie od jej przynaleznosci gatunkowej.
Wspolny swiat istnieje, jednak wciąz nie zdajemy sobie z tego sprawy.
Nie przezyjemy bez tlenu wytwarzanego przez rosliny, bez bakterii
zasiedlających nasze jelita, bez owadow zapylających rosliny i innych
gatunkow, powiązanych z nami niezbadaną jeszcze do konca siecią powiązan.
Jednak nie dla naszych egoistycznych pragnien przezycia powinnismy te istoty
szanowac. Są takimi samymi jak my mieszkancami planety Ziemia i tak samo
jak my mają prawo do zycia w dobrostanie i bez cierpienia. Taka postawa –
to zrozumienie naszego miejsca w swiecie i odrobina pokory wobec wielkiego
Wszechswiata, ktory nas wszystkich zrodził.
Bibliografia
Barrow, J.D. & Tipler F.J. 1986. The Anthropic Cosmological Principle. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Barrow, J.D. 1998. Wszechświat a sztuka. Tłum. J. Skolimowski. Warszawa:
Amber.
Chopra, D. 1994. Twórzmy zdrowie. Przez profilaktykę do doskonałości. Tłum.
E.M. Skweres. Warszawa: PWN.
Feynman, R., Leighton, R., & Sands, M. 1969. Feynmana wykłady z fizyki. Tom. 1.
cz.2. Tłum. A. Jurewicz, M. Grynberg, M. Kozłowski, & T. Butler.
Warszawa: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe.
Korpikiewicz, H. 1998. Koncepcja wzrostu entropii a rozwój Świata. Poznan:
Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM.
Korpikiewicz, H. 2002. Kosmoekologia z elementami etyki holistycznej. Hipoteza
Gai-Uranosa. Poznan: Prodruk.
Korpikiewicz, H. 2006. Kosmoekologia. Obraz zjawisk. Poznan: Wydawnictwo
Naukowe UAM.
Korpikiewicz, H. 2011. Biokomunikacja. Jak zwierzęta porozumiewają sie ze
światem. Poznan: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM.
147
Laskar, J., Joutel, F. & Boudin, F. 1982. „Stabilization of the Earth`s obliquity by
the Moon”, Nature (361): 615 – 617.
Leibniz, G.W. 1991. Monadologia. Tłum. H. Elzenberg. Torun: Uniwersytet
Mikołaja Kopernika.
Lovelock, J. 2003. Gaja. Nowe spojrzenie na życie na Ziemi. Warszawa:
Proszynski i S-ka.
Rudnicki, K. 1995. The Cosmological Principles. Krakow: Jagiellonian University.
148
Honorata Korpikiewicz (Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza, Poznan)
Abstrakt: W artykule krotko podsumowałam swoje dotychczasowe
rozwazania nt. rozwijanej przeze mnie dziedziny kosmoekologii. Wskazałam
więc na najwazniejsze wpływy kosmicznego srodowiska na ziemskie zycie, co
uzasadnia hipotezę Gai-Uranosa. Rozwazyłam takze pokrotce, jakie cechy
musiały charakteryzowac kosmiczne srodowisko, zeby w naszym zakątku
Wszechswiata powstało i ewoluowało zycie. Problem fizycznych parametrow
srodowiska kosmicznego, koniecznych dla zaistnienia zycia, był zauwazany od
wiekow; rozwazania te znalazły swe apogeum w zasadzie antropicznej. Tutaj
wymieniam najogolniejsze cechy, jakie musiało posiadac srodowisko
kosmiczne: harmonię, roznorodnosc, nierownowagę i rytmikę zjawisk. Takie
spojrzenie na rozwoj zycia na Ziemi wpływa na rozumienie miejsca człowieka
w swiecie, posrod innych wytworow Natury, poprzez postawę etyki
holistycznej i patocentrycznej.
Słowa kluczowe: Kosmoekologia, hipoteza Gai-Uranosa, roznorodnosc, etyka
holistyczna i patocentryczna
149
Honorata Korpikiewicz (Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan)
Ontic and ethical aspects of the cosmoecological concept of the world
Abstract: In this article I provide a summary of insights on the discipline of
cosmoecology. I point out the most important cosmic influences on life on
Earth, which justifies the hypothesis of Gaia-Uranos. I consider what kind of
features must have characterized the cosmic environment in order for life to
evolve in this part of the Universe. The problem of physical parameters of the
cosmic environment, necessary for the existence of life, has been recognized
for centuries; these considerations find their apogeum in the anthropic
principle. Here, I discuss the general features of the cosmic universe: harmony,
diversity, non-balance, and the rhythms of phenomena. This perspective on the
development of the life on Earth influences the understanding of the human
place in the universe, among others creations of nature, through the lens of
holistic and pathocentric ethics.
Keywords: Cosmoecology, Gaia-Uranos hypothesis, diversity, holistic and
patocentric ethics
doi:10.14746/eip.2014.1.12
150
doi:10.14746/eip.2014.1.8
Climate Change Ethics: Navigating the Perfect
Moral Storm, by Donald A. Brown. London and
New York: Earthscann from Routledge, 20131
Małgorzata Dereniowska (Greqam, AMSE, Aix-Marseille University)
Climate change poses one of the most serious challenges for humanity due to
the increasing complexity of both factual and ethical dimensions. Although the
debate over climate change is usually framed as a debate about scientific facts,
climate change is also fundamentally an ethical issue; the challenges that
climate change poses cannot be addressed simply by accumulating more
factual knowledge since it also refers to the meaning we make out of the world
and the values we identify as important. Among climate ethicists, there are no
doubts that even in the face of uncertainty regarding the severity, scope, and
form of climate change impacts, the moral problems it poses are real. For
example, future generations are subjected to severe harms and risk, and there
exists a great deal of conflict in international climate negotiations. There is
general agreement that actions undertaken to deal with the problem of global
climate change are not sufficient. Addressing climate issues is usually
conceived in terms of political decision making, with adaptation and
mitigation as the primary goals. The fact of scientific uncertainty regarding the
severity and scope of the problem fuels general disagreement about the
appropriate actions to undertake. As a result, the persistent tendency to
polarize the discourse often undermines the moral importance of human
action, especially that which relates to the global commons and future
generations.
A notable element of climate change is the fact that both benefits and
harms are immensely disaggregated: the climate change problem is caused by
people concentrated in one part of the globe who benefit from actions that
induce environmental harms (mostly in economic terms), whereas the people
most vulnerable to the effects of climate change are isolated both spatially
(mostly in the South) and temporally (future generations). This feature of
climate change makes it susceptible to the problem of moral corruption by
institutions and the people facing it – expressed by Stephen Gardiner in the
metaphor of a perfect moral storm. In the midst of this difficulty, and in light of
This work has been carried out thanks to the support of the A*MIDEX project (no
ANR-11-IDEX-0001-02) funded by the “Investissements d’Avenir” French Government
program, managed by the French National Research Agency (ANR).
1
Ethics and the Climate Change – Donald Brown on Environmental Ethics
the overwhelming inertia of climate change policy in general, there is a need
not so much for new concepts, but for competences and skills that can enable
us to cope with transformation. What is needed is increased capacity to
navigate the moral storm of climate change. Such competences, combined with
scientific literacy, are necessary to appropriately situate and perform the
moral reasoning required in public discourse. Thus, bridging the gap between
new scientific findings and an adequate policy response needs to be
supplemented and supported by ethical reasoning.
Consequently, one of the lessons from the growing field of climate
ethics is the necessity of bridging the gap between the scientific, political, and
moral realms, especially when thinking about climate policy. There is an
urgent need to base political discussions on social and ethical argumentation
and reasoning. Donald A. Brown’s book, Climate Change Ethics: Navigating the
Perfect Moral Storm, aims at filling this gap. Climatic changes and disruptions
require human intervention on the global level, and “there is little hope of
achieving a just solution to climate change unless moral arguments are made”
(4). Brown also emphasizes the indispensability of persuasive moral
arguments in pushing needed social change in prosperous social movements
(5). A relevant climate ethics cannot be abstracted from the pressing reality of
environmental problems and social inequalities. Brown’s underlying argument
resembles Amartya Sen’s motivation to develop a pragmatic, comparative
approach to justice instead of searching for the ideal; the criticism being that
focusing primarily on ideal requirements of justice by ethicists is a practical
mistake (10). The urgency of climate change raises the practical requirement
for action, which both demands ethical scrutiny in public and political
discourse on climate policies and mitigation and adaptation goals, and
requires ethicists to adopt a more pragmatic, practical approach to the moral
analysis of pressing global problems. Brown searches to deliver an
“overlapping consensus” regarding ethical conclusions for climate change
policy that would be supported by most, if not all, major ethical theories.
Importantly, even if the result of ethical issue-spotting is disagreement
regarding what ethics requires, an equally important outcome is agreement as
to what is ethically condemnable (14).
The argument of the book is outlined in three parts. The first is a
historical overview of the scientific and public debate about climate change.
The second articulates and justifies the most important ethical issues in the
climate change policy debate. The third part, by emphasizing the crucial role of
ethics in policy making on climate matters, deals with the reasons for the
failure of ethics to seriously impact climate change policy, and offers guidance
as to how we can navigate the perfect moral storm. The structure of the
arguments is built on the careful synthesis and critical analysis of climate
science and economics, combined with a rigorous ethical issue-spotting of
relevant problems arising at the science/policy interface. Each part concludes
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Małgorzata Dereniowska
with practical guidance as to how to navigate the perfect moral storm of
climate change. This includes lists of ethical issues, related duties (founded
firmly on the overlapping consensus of mainstream moral theories), and
recommendations.
There are two main points in Brown’s diagnosis. First, climate change
“triggers duties, obligations, and responsibilities of high-emitting countries
and individuals to the poor victims of climate change around the world” (13).
Second, opposing climate policies on the basis of costs, uncertainty arguments,
and national interest is a morally untenable position. To illustrate this point,
moral conflict arises between using cost-benefit analysis as a policy guide and
the ethical obligation to prevent harm caused by climate change that is owed
to all people (61). First, the economic opportunity costs (the costs of choosing
one option over another that is equally desirable) that are assigned to the
policy alternative that generates greater benefits does not work in the
situation where costs and benefits are disaggregated in time and space.
Second, the problem of the disaggregation of benefits and burdens challenges
reliance on cost-benefit analysis (CBA) as the guide for climate policy since the
costs fall on different people from those benefiting from the policies of climate
change adaptation and mitigation (60). One of the main ethical problems with
the use of CBA in this context is that it is often used to look at the harms and
benefits only within one country. Brown forcefully makes the case for how the
(mis)use of CBA by the Clinton administration led to the legitimization of
ignoring negative consequences beyond the borders of the U.S.
These conclusions, if taken with due respect and paired with societal
action, would in consequence change the tapestry of climate change
negotiations and policy making. The problem of the moral austerity in climate
change decision making and policy formation is twofold. First, “there has been
a 35 years debate about what should be done to reduce climate change’s
immense threat […] that has utterly failed to recognize the ethical dimensions
of human-induced global warming” (3). Second, ethical analysis needs to be
made more relevant to actual moral issues in searching for solutions to climate
change. Thus, the challenge of navigating the perfect moral storm is to make
sure that ethical reflection is an important consideration in the climate change
debate, and that ethical analysis is sensitive to issues inherent in policy
making. The strategy of integrating ethics with policy-making is not without
difficulties, however. Brown points out that one of the most serious challenges
lies with connecting ethical arguments with social action: “Ethicists educating
people about the ethical dimensions of climate change are not likely to make
much significant difference in the failure of national governments and other
entities to take their responsibilities seriously. The world needs widespread
and rapid social change, particularly in high-emitting countries, which
establishes widely held norms” (249). Such a systemic change is possible, in
other words, only when social action is able to communicate the position that
153
climate change, as a moral problem, must be resolved collectively based on the
acceptance of global responsibilities.
Brown develops an account of climate ethics aimed at navigating the
moral storm of climate change consisting of the following parts. He combines
concerns of distributive justice with a global ethics framework that is
pluralistic (where necessarily various considerations are taken into account:
consequentialist, rights-based, and justice-based approaches), and ethical
issue-spotting in climate change discourse in the public sphere. Important
features of climate ethics are its cosmopolitan character (“People have duties
to other people regardless of where they are situated” (62) and a commitment
to global citizenship. Brown’s approach is practical in the sense that although
he clearly acknowledges and thoroughly discusses the challenges that climate
change poses to moral categories, theories, and thinking, he also points out
that in order to have an ethically legitimate framework it is not necessary to
build a new climate ethic from scratch. Mainstream ethical theories provide
enough grounds for conducting ethical analysis and deriving the needed
principles and duties: “All mainstream ethical theories assume that people
have responsibilities to all human beings regardless of where they are located
to do no harm” (63). The principle of non-harm, which is justified in diverse
moral traditions, can be thus considered to be the basic universal standard of
climate ethics. Brown further discusses various proposals for the stabilization
of greenhouse gases at levels thought to be safe, and an allocation framework
of greenhouse gas emissions between nations in light of principles of
substantive, procedural, and distributive justice. These must, according to
Brown, pass the test of ethical scrutiny and take equity into account:
“atmospheric greenhouse concentration levels will determine who dies, whose
ecological systems on which life depends will survive, and even which nations
endure” (147); every nation has a duty to keep its national emission levels
below its fair share of global emissions.
The strength of Brown’s argument consists of the following
components: a deep knowledge and rigorous synthesis of climate science
(both historical and current); a careful ethical issue-spotting and moral
analysis that employs the main moral theories (deontology and
consequentialism) in evaluating the relevant ethical questions, problems, and
dilemmas; and finally, a down-to-earth and sophisticated ethical analysis in
the form of practical guidance. The combination of these components makes
his contribution to navigating the moral storm of climate change unique. From
the methodological point of view, the book involves not only a blending of
multidisciplinary perspectives on climate change (from climate sciences,
political theory, and moral philosophy), but also interdisciplinary practice in
thinking across disciplinary boundaries and proficiently maneuvering
between the contested facts and moral analysis.
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Małgorzata Dereniowska
One of the things Brown’s book does not do, however, is provide much
ethical guidance for the individual reader in terms of what he or she might do
to navigate the moral storm of climate change since it is cast at the level of
larger social inequalities. Brown’s discussion of individual duties and
obligations are offered, for example, in the context of the conventional framing
that juxtaposes the North and the South, with the South being justified in
keeping to their current emissions levels due to historical inequalities and
rights to development. Brown points out that in contrast to the usual NorthSouth framing of the climate conflict by the international community, the real
dichotomy is between the rich and the poor in both hemispheres. From within
this context, there are different levels of discussion about duties and
obligations: the international (where the distinction between luxury emissions
versus survival emissions of the poor applies) (199), and the smaller levels of
organization, from sub-national governments to organizations, businesses,
and finally individuals.
Yet, there is room for further exploration of the ethical issues involved
in the individual consumption of energy and emissions. For example, the
themes that may arise upon reflection from the point of view of individualistic
ethics touch upon the question of the grounding of a sense of responsibility in
individuals that stretches the classical and historically categories of moral
agency and moral duty. Another issue is how to combine the requirement of
setting the emission targets on the basis of “equal per capita emissions level
necessary to prevent dangerous climate change or other relevant morally
acceptable considerations that would justify moving away from global per
capita allocations” (210) with individual and group participation and
empowerment. On the one hand, this distributive approach to individual
duties hinders the difference between individual capabilities, diverse goals,
and life situations. On the other hand, an individual who accepts her moral
duty to address climate change in her actions, and searches for guidance and
recommendations for maneuvering through the ambiguity of its moral
analysis, might be left with few details. This gap, however, offers an excellent
opportunity for further work on the individual dimension of navigating the
moral storm of climate change.
To conclude, Brown’s book is a masterpiece of ethical analysis adjusted
to the moral challenges of climate change. As he points out, “There is not just
one central issue raised by climate change, but different civilisationchallenging ethical issues that raise diverse ethical questions which should be
considered in global warming policy formation” (7). Brown succeeds not only
in distinguishing the multifaceted issues and asking the relevant ethical
questions (with regard to national and other relevant levels), but also in
providing carefully reasoned conclusions and a detailed prescriptive guide for
practitioners involved in the climate change debate, negotiations, and decision
making. Consequently, Brown succeeds in delivering what he calls for at the
155
beginning of his book: practically relevant prospective ethical analysis
accessible to practitioners that can serve as a basis for developing responsible
and morally legitimate climate policy.
Donald Brown offers a practical ethical guide to analyzing questions of
climate change policy making, which also happens to represent a growing
trend in moral philosophy that focuses not so much on abstract theoretical
questions, but on the real world. His book should be of interest to students,
scholars, practitioners, and anybody else genuinely interested in making
progress on climate change policy.
doi:10.14746/eip.2014.1.8
156
doi:10.14746/eip.2014.1.9
Animal rights – a philosophical inquiry
Marta Szopka (Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan, Poland)
Review of: Dorota Probucka (2013). Filozoficzne podstawy idei praw zwierząt
[Philosophical foundations of the animal rights concept], pp. 352, Cracow:
Universitas
When discussing the issue of animal rights, a burdening lack of comprehensive
textbooks becomes quickly visible. A comprehensive introduction to both the
historical development of different conceptions of animal rights, as well as
their philosophical and ethical backgrounds would be a highly valuable
addition to the persisting discussion. That is the reason why the book by
Dorota Probucka, entitled Philosophical foundations of the animal rights
concept, deserves particular attention of both students and researchers, who
place their interest in discussing animal rights.
In her monographic work, Dorota Probucka introduces in the first
chapter the notion of animal rights through a historical analysis of the
development of the discussed issue, emphasizing the link between the antipositivist stand in modern philosophy of law and the notion of animal rights.
As the authoress points out: “Basic rights theory is one of the modern, antipositivist schools of philosophy of law, which is widely evoked by the
proponents of animal rights” (Probucka 2013, 40). As it is pointed out, the
sympathy, expressed by the supporters of animal rights towards the basic
rights theory, is due to the affirmation of existence of certain, basic, rights,
which may be both human, as well as non-human. Thus, such an empowering
and expanding notion grants the possibility to talk not only of animal rights as
a human obligation towards non-human animals, but as an elementary aspect
of a wider theory of justice.
Discussing animal rights as a feature of the basic rights theory
presents, however, certain limitations. Probucka asserts that the notion of
basic rights had been fruitfully employed by different social movements,
focused on eradicating legal and social inequalities, i.e. the suffragist
movement, children rights movement, African-American Civil Rights
Movement, and others. As Dorota Probucka points out: “What would be
common for all these ideological struggles? Their first step should be to
change the social perception of the issue” (Probucka 2013, 47). Still, these
changes do not happen overnight; as shown by all of the aforementioned social
Animal Rights – A Philosophical Inquiry
movements, their struggle proved to be prolonged and – often – susceptible to
uncompassionate rhetoric of the status quo. Thus, the issue of animal rights,
despite a vast philosophical and intellectual support, is still to be perceived as
far from achieved.
While discussing the general issues concerning the concept of animal
rights, Probucka reconstructs – following certain proponents of animal rights
– some analogies between human and non-human rights. One of the
mentioned authors – Tom Regan – suggests that: “Both in case of humans, as
well as non-human animals, basic rights should act as an analogy to a no-entry
sign in traffic regulations” (Probucka 2013, 53). Probucka supports such
claims, as she points to certain analogies between the historical development
of human rights and the modern reasons for animal rights. Those analogies
include i.e. confirming that both notions are „established on an indispensable
link between ethics and lawmaking” (Probucka 2013, 58), as well as on
assuming the teleological nature of both human and nonhuman animals. These
analogies may be understood – as the authoress suggests, following some
proponents of animal rights – as a proof that the notion of animal rights is the
conclusive step in the historical development of basic rights inclusion of all
those, who: “Fall under the category of weak and powerless” (Probucka 2013,
63). This view, supported by Probucka, is not as evident as it may seem. The
development of human rights – from the first to the third generation – is
questioned by several philosophers and researchers, who suggest that the
second and third generation of human rights constitute legal duties that
promote an ever-growing impact of central, governmental factors rather than
basic rights (see: Rahe 2010). The notion of an expanding role of political
institutions is contradictory to what basic rights theories (including animal
rights theory) assume is their pivotal point. The concept of rights is
concentrated – as explained by Probucka – in: “Recognizing the primacy of the
individual over the interests of the majority and upholding the integrity of its
moral status” (Probucka 2013, 61). In consequence, the basic rights theory –
as well as animal rights proponents – assumes a protective role towards the
individual in his or her relations with other individuals, as well as the
government. Thus, it would be a logical and practical inconsistency to affirm
the expanding the role of political and governmental institutions towards the
individual in order to protect him or her from possible abuse of power. This
issue remains undiscussed by Probucka, who rather assumes that it is possible
to perceive the animal rights movement as an expansion to the solidarity with
those in need.
A valuable addition to the issue discussed above may be found in the
concluding part of the first chapter, which discusses the important difference
between animal rights and animal welfare. As Probucka points out, the
difference lies in the definition what is the main injustice, that non-human
animals may suffer from humans. Jeremy Bentham and Peter Singer – who are
158
Marta Szopka
evoked by Probucka as the most influential thinkers of the animal welfare
movement – perceive suffering as the “fundamental evil” (Probucka 2013, 73).
In consequence, protecting non-human animals from unnecessary pain and
suffering would be the main goal of the animal welfare movement, achievable
through modification of the current legal system. In opposition to the animal
welfare proponents, the animal rights movement aims at wider and deeper
change of both law and social mentality. Such philosophers as Tom Regan,
Gary Francionce, and others, describe their position as “radical-abolitionist
and compare their action towards liberating animals to the historical
movement against slavery” (Probucka 2013, 71). The notion of animal slavery
is widely discussed, suggesting that not only legal, but also moral changes are
required in order to eliminate injustice. Probucka assumes the latter
perspective, widely discussing possible critiques of ethical conceptions of both
aforementioned utilitarian thinkers. The consequentialist orientation of both
Bentham and Singer does not notice – as Probucka points out – the inherent
value of any individual, be it human or non-human. In consequence, the
utilitarian perspective leaves open the possibility to inflict pain or cause death
to an individual, if his or her pain would be beneficial to the remaining
majority. Furthermore, utilitarianism does not provide an unanimous view on
such animals rights issues as, i.e. veganism. As emphasized by Probucka:
According to Singer, the consequences of abandoning the
consumption of meat would be globally better than humanity
persisting on a carnivorous diet. On the other hand, utilitarian
thinker and opponent of vegetarianism, R. G. Frey, assumes that
such a change would not be beneficial to the majority and thus
would not be recommended (Probucka 2013, 77).
In conclusion, Probucka dismisses the notion of animal welfare in favor of the
more radical notion of animal rights.
The pivotal and most important part of the book is aimed at
reconstructing and analyzing different modern concepts and theories of
animal rights. In her analysis, Probucka refers to a multitude of different
authors, including Tom Regan, Gary L. Francione, Bernard E. Rollin, Mark
Rowlands, David DeGrazia, Steve Sapontzis, and others. What is clearly the
goal of the second chapter, is to introduce different philosophical, legal and
ethical approaches towards the notion of animal rights. The presented analysis
prove what is the major value of the book – its comprehensiveness, while
remaining thorough. While discussing each of the mentioned conceptions of
animal rights, Probucka does not only resume its main assumptions, but also
offers a profound insight on the justifications given in favor of different
concepts and ideas, as well as attempts to discover its general philosophical
alignment. The almost-encyclopedic effort proves that the work of Dorota
Probucka does not only verbalize an interesting and inspiring concept on
159
Animal Rights – A Philosophical Inquiry
animal rights, developed by Probucka, but also proves to be a balanced and
unbiased textbook on modern conceptions of animal rights in general.
The third chapter offers a brief discussion with possible critiques and
allegations against the notion of animal rights. Probucka reconstructs the
counterarguments used by Peter Carruthers, Carl Cohen, Raymond Frey, Roger
Scruton, and others, and tries to reveal their principal points. It is visible,
however, that the analysis presented in the last chapter lack some profundity:
Probucka concentrates rather on discovering fallibilities in reasoning of each
mentioned author, neglecting a more favorable insight in the philosophical
background of each of the ideas. What is the strong point of the middle part of
the book: a balanced and thorough analysis, seems to be less present in the
final chapter, although the general quality of the analysis conducted by
Probucka remains of highest approval.
An interesting addition to the analysis, presented in the book, is the
appendix, consisting of several important legal and philosophical documents
in favor of animal rights, i.e. UNESCO Universal Declaration of Animal Rights,
Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness, and other. the presence of
aforementioned documents deepens the general value of the book and proves
that the discussed issue is not purely theoretical.
In conclusion, it is worth emphasizing that Philosophical foundations
of the animal rights concept by Dorota Probucka has two aims: one would be
to present an interesting voice, added into the discussion on animal rights,
second to offer a comprehensive guidebook on different concepts of animal
rights. It should be noted that the authoress achieves a positive result in both
appointed tasks. Comprehensiveness and thoroughness, accompanied with
passionate narrative, prove that Dorota Probucka elaborated a difficult and
vast theme in an impartial and profound manner. Thus, it is possible to say
that the book by Dorota Probucka will remain an exemplary study in animal
rights in the Polish philosophical literature.
References
Probucka, D. 2013. Filozoficzne podstawy idei praw zwierząt. Cracow:
Universitas.
Rahe, P.A. 2010. Soft Despotism, Democracy's Drift: Montesquieu, Rousseau,
Tocqueville, and the Modern Prospect. New Haven: Yale University
Press.
doi:10.14746/eip.2014.1.9
160
doi:10.14746/eip.2014.1.10
Information about Authors
Malgorzata Dereniowska is a Postdoctoral Fellow for the project Dynamics of
Inequalities and Their Perception (DynIPer) at Greqam, AMSE, Aix-Marseille
University, France. She obtained a doctoral degree in Philosophy from the
Institute of Philosophy, Adam Mickewicz University, Poznan, Poland. The title
of her 2012 dissertation is “On Values of Nature from the Perspective of
Pluralistic Environmental Ethics.” Her training is in ecology, resource
management, and philosophy. Currently she is working on socialenvironmental inequalities, environmental justice, and sustainability. Her
research interests include environmental ethics, economic philosophy,
theories of justice, pluralism in ethics and in social sciences, and sustainability
economics. She has published several articles and book chapters on a variety
of topics in environmental ethics and sustainable development.
Alicja Dłużewicz (1989) is a graduate of Polish Philology. Currently she
studies philosophy at Adam Mickiewicz University. Her interests cover
ecophilosophy and animal studies. She works on the problem of symbolic
violence, in particular in relation to constructing of cultural and social images
of non-human animals.
Paul Joosse is a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of Sociology at the
University of Alberta where he teaches in the areas of criminology and
deviance. His terrorism research focuses primarily on the topic of ‘leaderless
resistance’ or lone wolves, as well as the foreign fighter phenomenon. Besides
the radical environmental movement, he is involved in research projects on
the Somali and Tamil diasporas in Canada, and is beginning a research project
on the Freeman-on-the-Land movement in Western Canada. He is a qualitative
ethnographic researcher whose interests span the realms of social movement
studies, the sociology of religion, and social theory. His publications have
appeared in such venues as Crime, Media, Culture, Terrorism and Political
Violence; Journal of Classical Sociology; Sociology of Religion; and The Journal of
Contemporary Religion. Paul Joosse can be reached for correspondence at: Paul
Joosse; Department of Sociology; 5-21 Tory Building; University of Alberta;
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada; T6G 2H4. Email: [email protected].
Honorata Korpikiewicz is a Professor at the Institute of Philosophy, Adam
Mickiewicz University, Poznan, Poland. She is an astronomer, physicist,
philosopher, cultural studies scholar, and also traveller, photographer, and
writer (popular-science, science-fiction, and travel books). Her research
interests are philosophy of nature, patocentric ethics, animal studies,
biocommunication, cosmoecology, etiology, cosmology, and philosophy of
science. Her latest books include: Biokomunikacja. Jak zwierzęta
porozumiewają się ze światem [Biocomunication: How animals communicate
with the world] (Poznan 2011), Kosmoekologia. Obraz Zjawisk [Cosmoecology:
The Image of Phenomena] (Poznan 2006), and Kosmoekologia z Elementami
Etyki Holistycznej. Hipoteza Gai-Uranosa [Cosmoecology with elements of
holistic ethics: Gaia-Uranos Hypothesis] (Poznan 2002). She recently
published a memoir of travels from the 1970’s with her mother, a sociologist,
poet, and social activist Maria Korpikiewicz, entitled Szalona załoga. Podróże z
Marią [An Unbelievable Crew: Travels with Maria] (Wrocław 2014).
John Mariana currently teaches philosophy at College of the Canyons in Santa
Clarita, California. His research interests primarily involve issues in
metaphysical realism and rationalist epistemologies, but also include
philosophy of mind and special problems of rationality in socio-political
philosophy (particularly: Intelligent Design Theory, conspiracy theory, and
population theory).
Jason Matzke is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Mary
Washington in Fredericksburg, Virginia. He works and teaches primarily in
environmental ethics, medical ethics, twentieth century ethical theory, socialpolitical philosophy, and philosophy of law. In medical ethics, his focus is
largely on technologies and how their emergence affects our moral thinking
and decision making in a diverse community, with practical application
emerging with his service on a local hospital ethics committee. In
environmental ethics he works on historical figures (e.g., John Muir, Henry
David Thoreau, and Aldo Leopold), moral pluralism, and environmental
activism and decision making. He has published, jointly and individually,
papers on topics ranging from environmental education to sustainability.
Krystyna Najder-Stefaniak is a Professor at Warsaw University of Life
Sciences (SGGW) and the head of the Division of Philosophy. She is a Founder
and Vice-President of the Foundation “New Education,” and Vice-President of
the Polish Society of Universalism. Her fields of research include aesthetics,
ethics, eco-philosophy, philosophy of dialogue, philosophy of pedagogy, and
philosophy of security. Key publications include the following books: Bergsona
idea piękna i problemy heurystyki [Bergson’s idea of Beauty and Problems of
Heuristics] (Warszawa 1997); Wstęp do etyki biznesu [Introduction to Business
Ethics ] (Warszawa 2007); Piękno jako moment twórczości w ujęciu myślenia
ekologicznego [Beauty as the Moment of Creativity in the Ecological Thinking
Approach] (Warszawa 2007); O komunikowaniu z perspektywy etyki
[Communication from the Perspective of Ethics] (Warszawa 2009); Wstęp do
innowatyki, [Induction to innovatics] (Warszawa 2010); Estetyka Edwarda
162
Abramowskiego [Edward Abramowski’s Aesthetics] (Krakow 2011);
Wprowadzenie do ekofilozofii, [Introduction to Eco-Philosophy] (Warszawa,
2013); (Ed.) Filozoficzne projekty rozumienia świata i człowieka [The
philosophical projects of understanding the world and human] (Warszawa
2011); and the e-book (Ed.) Philosophy and Practice of Sustainable
Development (Warszawa 2013).
Troy R.E. Paddock is a Professor of Modern European History and
Chairperson of the Department of History at Southern Connecticut State
University. He received his B.A. in History and Philosophy at Pepperdine
University and his M.A. and Ph.D. at the University of California at Berkeley.
Paddock’s research interests focus on modern German cultural and
intellectual history. He has a book, Creating the Russian Peril: Education, the
Public Sphere, and National Identity in Imperial Germany, 1890-1914 (Camden
House, 2010) and two edited volumes, World War I and Propaganda (Brill,
2014) and A Call to Arms: Propaganda, Public Opinion, and Newspapers in the
Great War (Praeger, 2004). He has had articles published in German History,
Central European History, Re-thinking History, Philosophy and Geography,
Internationale Schulbuchforshung, and Environment, Space, Place. He has been
co-editor of Environment, Space, Place since 2013.
Mateusz Salwa, PhD, is an Assistant Professor in the Department of
Aesthetics, Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw. His fields of interest
include: garden aesthetics and theory; environmental aesthetics; and
aesthetics of landscape. He has published the essay “The Garden as a
Performance” (in Estetika. The Central European Journal of Aesthetics), and a
book entitled Iluzja w malarstwie. Próba filozoficznej interpretacji (Krakow:
Universitas, 2010), which also appeared in English as Illusion in Art: An
Attempt at Philosophical Interpretation, translated by K. Pisarek (Frankfurt am
Mein: Peter Lang, 2013). His email is [email protected].
Ekaterina (Katia) Vladimirova is finishing a PhD in environmental politics
and ethics as part of the Erasmus Mundus Joint Doctorate, “Globalization, EU,
Multilateralism” at University LUISS Guido Carli (Rome) and ULB (Brussels).
Her interdisciplinary work focuses on the process of societal transformation
as a response to the global environmental crisis and climate change,
particularly on the question of a value shift towards sustainability. She is also
interested in global climate change politics and social movements.
163

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