The Geopolitics of the European Frontiers

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Journal of the Institute for Euroregional Studies
“Jean Monnet” European Centre of Excellence
University of Oradea
University of Debrecen
Volume 10
Edited by
Dorin I. DOLGHI, Alexandru ILIEŞ, Savvas KATSIKIDES & István SÜLI-ZAKAR
References by
Roberto FARNETI & Selcuk COLAKOGLU
Autumn 2010
Eurolimes
Editors-in-chief: Ioan HORGA (Oradea) and István SÜLI-ZAKAR (Debrecen)
Autumn 2010
Volume 10
edited by Dorin I. DOLGHI, Alexandru ILIEŞ, Savvas KATSIKIDES & István SÜLI-ZAKAR
Honorary Members
Paul Allies (Montpellier), Peter Antes (Hanover), Enrique Banús (Barcelona), Robert Bideleux (Swansea), Erhard Busek
(Wien), Jean Pierre Colin (Reims), George Contogeorgis (Athene), Gerard Delanty (Sussex), György Enyedi (Budapest), Sharif
Gemie (Glamorgan), Richard Griffiths, Chris G. Quispel (Leiden), Moshe Idel (Jerulalem), Jaroslaw Kundera (Wroclaw),
Ariane Landuyt (Siena), Thomas Lunden (Stockholm), Kalypso Nicolaidis (Oxford), Gheorghe Măhăra (Oradea), Adrian
Miroiu, (Bucureşti), Frank Pfetsch (Heidelberg), Andrei Marga, Ioan Aurel Pop, Vasile Puşcaş, Vasile Vesa (Cluj-Napoca),
Mercedes Samaniego Boneau (Salamanca), Angelo Santagostino (Brescia), Rudolf Rezsohazy (Leuven), Maria Manuela Tavares
Ribeiro (Coimbra), Dusan Sidjanski (Geneve), Maurice Vaïsse (Paris)
Advisory Committee
Josef Abrham (Prag), Iordan Bărbulescu, Mihai Răzvan Ungureanu (Bucureşti), Teresa Pinheiro (Chemnitz) Cristina Blanco SioLopez (Luxembourg) Czimre Klára, Kozma Gábor, Teperics Károly, Varnay Ernő (Debrecen), Rozália Biró, Antonio Faur,
Alexandru Ilieş, Rodica Petrea, Sorin Şipoş, Barbu Ştefănescu, Ion Zainea (Oradea), Maria Crăciun, Ovidiu Ghitta, Adrian Ivan,
Nicoale Păun, Radu Preda, Şerban Turcuş (Cluj-Napoca), Margarita Chabanna (Kiev), Serge Dufoulon (Grenoble), Juan Manuel
de Faramiňán Gilbert (Jaen), Didier Francfort (Nancy), Tamara Gella (Orel), Ion Gumenâi, Alla Roşca, Octavian Tîcu
(Chişinău), Karoly Kocsis (Miskolc), Iolanda Aixela Cabre, Cătălina Iliescu (Alicante), Savvas Katsikides (Nicosia), Anatoly
Kruglashov (Chernivtsi), Renaud de La Brosse, Gilles Rouet (Reims), Giuliana Laschi (Bologna), Stephan Malovic (Zagreb),
Maria Marczewska-Rytko, Bogumiła Mucha-Leszko (Lublin), Fabienne Maron (Brussels), Ivan Nacev, (Sofia), Carlos Eduardo
Pacheco do Amaral (Asores), Alexandru-Florin Platon (Iaşi), Mykola Palinchak, Viktoriya Bokoch, Svitlana Mytryayeva
(Uzhgorod), Stanislaw Sagan (Rzeszow), Grigore Silaşi (Timişoara), Lavinia Stan (Halifax), George Tsurvakas (Tessalonik),
Peter Terem (Banska Bystrica), Esther Gimeno Ugalde (Wien), Jan Wendt (Gdansk), Gianfranco Giraudo (Venice)
Editorial Committee
Ioana Albu, Ambrus Attila, Mircea Brie, Mariana Buda, Carmen Buran, Florentina Chirodea, Lia Derecichei, Cristina Dogot, Dorin
Dolghi, Diana Gal, (Oradea), Olha Yehorova (Uzhgorod ) Natalia Cuglesan, Dacian Duna (Cluj-Napoca) Fulias Soroulla
Michaela Maria (Nicosia), Andreas Blomquist (Stockholm), Nicolae Dandis (Cahul), Molnar Ernő, Penzes Janos, Radics Zsolt,
Tőmőri Mihály (Debrecen), Bohdana Dimitrovova (Belfast), Mariana Cojoc (Constanţa), Sinem Kokamaz (Izmir), George
Lazaroiu, Florin Lupescu, Simona Miculescu, Adrian Niculescu (Bucureşti), Anca Oltean, Dana Pantea, Istvan Polgar, Irina Pop,
Adrian Popoviciu, Alina Stoica, Luminiţa Şoproni, Marcu Staşac, Constantin Ţoca (Oradea), Laura Sicilione (Siena), Viktoryia
Serzhanova (Rzeszow)
The full responsibility regarding the content of the papers belongs exclusively to the authors.
Address: University of Oradea
1, Universitatii st.
410087-Oradea/Romania
Tel/fax: +40.259.467.642
e-mail: [email protected]
www.iser.rdsor.ro
Image: KNAPP, F.X. „Ansicht von Cernovitz”, XIXth Century, „Lucian Blaga” University Library Cluj-Napoca, Special Collection, Stampe, Quota XVII/81
Eurolimes is a half-yearly journal. Articles and book reviews may be sent to the above mentioned address. The journal may
be acquired by contacting the editors.
Journal of the Institute for Euroregional Studies (IERS) is issued
with the support of the Action Jean Monnet of the European Commission and in the Co- Edition with Bruylant (Brussels)
Proofreading: Daniela BLAGA (Oradea); Editorial Assistance: Elena ZIERLER (Oradea)
Oradea University Press
ISSN: 1841-9259
Cuprins ◊ Contents ◊ Sommaire ◊ Inhalt ◊ Tartalom
Ioan HORGA (Oradea) ◄► Eurolimes, where to?.......................................................................
……5
1. Security dynamics of the European Space …………………………………………….……
…..17
Dacian DUNA (Cluj-Napoca) ◄► Defining the European Union as a global security
actor………...…………………….…………………………………………....………….
..........19
Yiannos CHARALAMBIDES (Nicosia) ◄► Turkey as a key player in the architecture ..
of the European Security and Defence System ……...…………………………………....
…..…33
Nicolae TOBOŞARU (Oradea) ◄►Romania‟s geopolitical position in the Ponto-Baltic…
Isthmus. Reflections upon the strategic partnership between Romania and US…………
..……46
Zsuzsa M. CSÁSZÁR (Pecs) ◄► The political, social and cultural aspects of the Islam…
in the Balkans……………………...….…..………………………………...……………..
……..62
2. Approaches of cross-border cooperation and territorial systems ………………..…...…..
……..77
Alexandru ILIEŞ (Oradea), Olivier DEHOORNE (Guadalupe), Dorina Camelia
ILIEŞ (Oradea), Vasile GRAMA (Oradea) ◄► Romanian- Serbian Cross-Border
territorial system. Elements and mechanisms generating systemic functionality
(natural and administrative context)………………………………………..…………….
……..79
Constantin-Vasile ŢOCA (Oradea), Adrian-Claudiu POPOVICIU (Oradea) ◄► The
European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC), Instrument of Cross-border
Cooperation. Case Study Romania – Hungary..................................................................
……..89
Jan WENDT (Gdansk), Tomasz WISKULSKI (Gdansk) ◄► „SoNorA” as a factor of
developing Adriatic - Baltic co-operation………………….…….……..............................…103
Gennady FEDOROV (Kaliningrad), Valentin KORNEEVETS (Kaliningrad) ◄►
Trans-border regionalisation under globalisation ……...………………………………
…....111
3. Challenges for the next European Frontiers ……………………….……....………………
…121
James WESLEY SCOTT (Jouensuu) ◄► Cross-Border Cooperation in the Periphery
of the European Union: Reinterpreting the Finnish-Russian Borderland ………………
....123
Josef ABRHÁM (Prague) ◄► Demographic changes as a challenge for the geoeconomy a geo-policy of the European Union………………………..…...……………...
…....139
Angelo SANTAGOSTINO, Andrea FORNARI, Luisa BRAVO (Brascia) ◄►
L‟Union Européenne e le Mexique: l‟Accord régional de partenariat comme
instrument géopolitique face à l‟Aléna et à la globalisation…………...…………...……
……150
Bogumiła MUCHA-LESZKO, Magdalena KAKOL (Lublin) ◄► EU economic
frontiers determined by its international trade position and trade policy…………….….
……160
4. Focus ........................................................................................................................................
……179
Dorin I. DOLGHI (Oradea) ◄► Geopolitics and security in the European….
Neighbourhood………………………………………………………………………....…
....181
5. Book Reviews ............................................................................................................................
…....191
Annamária KURILLA (Pecs) ◄► The meeting of classical geopolitics and modern
geography……………………………………………………………………………...….
…....193
Dana PANTEA (Oradea) ◄► Building the European Identity ………….…………………
….195
Alina STOICA (Oradea) ◄► Constructions and Imperial Strategies in the Romanian
Space…………………………………………………………………………………...….
….199
Constantin-Vasile ŢOCA (Oradea) ◄► Romanian-Hungarian-Ukrainian Cross-border
Cooperation ..............................................................................................................................
….204
6. About the Authors ....................................................................................................................
…..207
ISSN: 1841-9259
Eurolimes, where to?
Ioan HORGA
Abstract: Now that we publish the 10th issue of Eurolimes, the editors of the journal
intend to sum up the contribution of Eurolimes to the examination of the notion of boundary
corresponding to the border-limit in correlation with the notion of border as state boundary. Our
journal also aims at showing the way in which the meaning of internal frontiers changes evolving
from the national perspective to the community one. On the other hand, we seek to define the future
editorial initiatives of the journal towards more punctual topics through the question “Eurolimes,
where to?”: EU position in an international context with strong mutations after 2010; the impact
of policy on the construction of a formal or informal border; the impact of different types of
borders on identities; the process of evolution of social borders within the EU Member States, etc.
Keywords: border, boundary, frontier, identity, Eurolimes
Five years ago, when we released the Eurolimes journal on the scientific market, a
balanced optimism broke through in the opening article entitled Why Eurolimes?, when
justifying the need for such a debate forum: “Nowadays, to dedicate a journal to the issue of
borders in Europe – as Eurolimes is – seems to be an outdated question from both the point
of view of the process of European integration, or enlargement, and from the point of view
of the expectations of the Europeans, who wish to circulate, work, and live wherever they
want to. But the issue of the border is much more complex than we assume from the
viewpoint of its essence and of the different experiences of Europe as a whole. This
scepticism envisages the complexity of the interpretations given to the notion of European
border and its evolution in the context of phenomena of globalisation and integration.
1. Europe between boundary and border
At the time, we saw some complex elements of the border related issues that have
come true; others only partly became a reality, while others are still a waiting to come true
within the following five years. One of them was the examination of the notion of
boundary, corresponding to the border as a limit in correlation with the notion of border
as state boundary. This enterprise has been achieved in Eurolimes first from the
perspective of Europe‟s limits as political entity during its different stages of expansion.
From the point of view of Europe‟s political integration, Ernst Haas traces the coordinates
of this political entity as the aim of the process of integration: “a new political community
superimposed on the pre-existing ones” (Haas 1968: 16) with a new conception on the
significance of the borders. Thomas Diez draws the attention on the identification of the
European integration with the phenomenon of overcoming the borders-whether territorial
or not, as this process has a reverse: establishing new borders, whether political (borders
of the newly established body), economic (relation between internal market and third
parties), or societal (building a new European identity would mean defining a new nonEuropean alter). To him, the paradox of establishing new borders and abolishing the
former borders is a reality that cannot be avoided. Yet acknowledging the existence of
these borders does not have a negative aspect, as new governing areas are “constitutive for
political action, that is they define political stakeholders and confer specific rights and
obligations” (Diez, 2006: 236, 249; Ion 2010: 25-26). Following the same pattern, Etienne
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Balibar speaks about Europe as a borderland (Balibar, 2004). Under such theoretical
circumstances, Eurolimes aims at bringing to the foreground the action of different
stakeholders in social construction of the European boundaries (Eder, 2006): Regions and
Ethnonations in Europe (Gimeno Ugalde 2006/2); Cross-border Identity in Building a
Regional Brand (Soproni, 2006/2); The Use of Cross-border Cooperation and Border
Location in Place Marketing (Kozma, 2006/2; Komadi 2006/2); La politique
eurorégionale au sein des nouveaux Etats membres (Hinfray, 2006/2); The Role of the
Mass-media in Cross-border Cooperation (Soproni, 2007/3; Baranyi 2007/3); Workforce –
Market Cooperation (Csapo, 2007/4); The Construction of Models of Cross-border
Economic Cooperation: Euroregions, Eurometropolis (Penzes and Molnar, 2007/4; SuliZaakr 2009/8; Gualyas and Sisak, 2009/8); The Role of Educational Cooperations in
Cross-border Cooperation (Teperics, 2007/4); The Role of Danube Region in the
Transnational Cooperation as a Playground of the European Integration (Gal, 2009/7); The
Construction of the Methods of the Analysis of Integration Effects on Border Areas
(Czimre, 2007/4; Tagai, Penzes and Molnar, 2008/6). The role of actors in social
construction of boundaries has been underlined in the case of important segments of the
European Union eastern border: Cross-border Cooperation – a Strategic Dimension of
European Neighbourhood Policy at the Eastern Border of the EU (Leuca 2006/2; Sturza,
2006/2; Dandis 2009/7); Investment Attractiveness of Special Legal Regimes of
Economic Activity in Border Regions between Ukraine and the EU (Yehorova, 2009/8);
The EU Relations with the Trans-Caucasian Countries with the Scope of the ENP
(Kokamaz, 2009/7).
The optimistic dimension of the surveys mentioned above referring to boundaries
or border is amended in the journal especially in the context of the economic crisis
occurring worldwide and particularly in Europe as of 2008 and of worldwide geopolitical
mutations repositioning EU on a more defensive and less dynamic place as compared to
the period previous to the latest enlargement in 2007. The fact that in 2007 we dedicated
an issue of the journal to Europe from Exclusive Borders to Inclusive Frontiers expressing
a clear positioning in point of confidence in a progressive change of the European borders
into an eurolimes (Nikolaidis, 2007; Horga and Pantea, 2007/4) bridging neighbouring
areas has never excluded a certain reserve that things would not evolve in a simple and
predictable manner. At the time, we had not experienced economic crisis (Soproni and
Horga, 2009/8) or lectures on the possible European disintegration (Vollaard, 2008).
Nevertheless, as early as the first issues of the Eurolimes, some authors expressed their
reserve concerning the “European triumphal march” and showed the limits of Europe
(Bideleux, 2006/1); or the fact that EU neighbourhood policy actions at its eastern borders
would accommodate the Near Abroad Policy of the Russian Federation (Tacu, 2008/6);
The Limits of Europeanness. Can Europeanness Stand Alone as the Only Guiding
Criterion for Deciding Turkey‟s EU Membership? (Paun and Ciceo, 2010/9; Sumer,
2009/7). There are also the papers discussing on Europeanising a Border Problem
(Griffiths and Quispel, 2006/1); Borders: Cause or Conflict or Catalyst for Peace (Pfetsch,
2007/4), Peripheries and Borders in a Post-Western Europe (Delanty, 2007/4) already
foreseeing gaps in the European stability due to the issue of the borders. Other papers
express their reserve concerning border optimism from the point of view of security
(Balogh, 2006/2; Edelstam, 2007/4); Trafficking Human Beings in South-Eastern Europe
(Gavrila, 2007/4); Legal and Illegal Migration (Quispel, 2007/4); Key Regions at the EU
Eastern Border – the Case of Transcarpathia (Dimitrova, 2007/3).
7
2. Europe: “the new frontiers” versus identity
On the one hand, our journal aims at showing a way in which the changing
meaning of internal frontiers occurs by evolving from the national perspective to the
community one. Jacques Rupnik speaks not only about Europe‟s frontiers, but also about
the new frontiers “inside Europe” (Rupnik, 2003; Rupnik, 2007). On the other hand,
Eurolimes aims at seizing the way in which the meaning of EU‟s external frontier changes
from an exclusive community perspective to a flexible inclusive one. Such a perspective is
according to Thomas Christiansen who writes about fluid frontiers (Christiansen and all,
2000) or Olli Rehn, to whom the notion next frontier is more suitable than border for
testing ground for the EU soft power (Rehn, 2006).
Should Europe stop before or beyond its margins which “are traditionally oriented
more towards the exterior than towards the interior and are inhabited by peoples who have
an incomplete feeling of belonging to the empire”? (Nicolaides, 2007: 287). Within the
pages of the Eurolimes journal one can find different answers to the new meaning of the
borders. The role of the economic factor in the dynamics of the EU internal borders
changes and the relations with the EU neighbouring areas is brought to the foreground by
surveys such as: EU – Western Balkans Economic Relations – Experience Useful for New
EU “Neighbours” (Trajkova, 2006/2); L‟Europe élargie sans frontière monétaire
(Kundera, 2007/4); The Role of the Tourism in the Intercultural Dialogue (Michalko and
Illes, 2008/6); The Economic Frontiers of Europe (Soproni and Horga, 2009/8);
L‟évolution de la zone euro à travers de la plasticité de ses frontières (Burrinet, 2009/8);
European Ecological Borders (Scichilone, 2009/8); The EU‟s Mediterranean Policy. An
Assessment over a Decade (1995-2005) (Santagostino and Fornari, 2009/8); Will the
Financial-Economic Crisis of 2008–2009 Accelerate Monetary Integration in the EU
(Mucha-Leszko and Kakol, 2009/8); État, marché et société. La question de l‟équilibre
dans la relation entre société et politique (Contogeorgis, 2009/8). The role of EU‟s
political role model in neighbouring countries has been stressed by authors in the
Eurolimes journal: Approaching the Northern and Southern Neighbours of the European
Union (Duna, 2009/7); The Assessment of the European Neighbourhood Policy in the
South Caucasus: What the European Union can do? (Pop, 2009/7); L‟Union européenne et
ses voisins: une affaire de citoyens (Rouet, 2009/7).
Several editors have been concerned with borders from the point of view of
identity elements. Consequently, they have suggested that seven out of the nine issues of
the Eurolimes journal should be dedicated to these elements. For instance, the historical
basis of the perception on the border has had special contributors in the first two issues
and was a topic item in the following issues: Borders in a Changing Europe: Dynamics of
Openness and Closure (Delanty, 2006/1); One City – Two Images – Two Communities:
The Case of the Romanian Hungarian City of Satu Mare/ Szatmárnémeti (Blomquist,
2006/2); Jewish Inhabitants of the Pokuttya and Carpathian Region, as Seen by Their
Neighbours Based on the Folklore Collection of Oskar Kolberg (Kutzreba, 2006/2); (Idel
2008/5, Sipos 2006/1, Nuzzille 2006/1); Problems of the Hungarian Minorities in Ukraine
(Savchur, 2006/2); „In the State of Walachia, Near the Border” or: Was the Besht Indeed
Born in Okopy? (Idel, 2008/5); The Romanians as a Border People during the Middle
Ages. Between Slavonianism and Latinity (Pop, 2008/5); Narrative Fiction as a means of
Crossing Borders (Istvanfoya, 2009/7).
The media impact on borders is a less frequent issue in topic literature, yet it has a
special place in the journal: The Role of the Media in Changing the Meaning of Borders
(Horga 2007/3); Médias et minorités en Slovaquie (Follrichova and Rouet, 2007/3); Media
and Interculturalism (Malovic, 2007/3); Mass Media Impact on the Democratization
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Processes in Society Case of the Republic of Moldova (Rosca, 2007/3); Médias européens
et la non-mention des racines chrétiennes dans la Constitution européenne (Bazin,
2007/3); Ignoring Radical Media in Communication Studies in Turkey (Koker and
Doganay, 2007/3); Médias, dialogue interculturel et nouvelles frontières de l‟Union
Européenne (Maron, 2007/3).
There are several surveys on religious borders, such as: Religious Policy of the
Russian Empire as Concerns the Confessional Minorities from Bessarabia in the 19 th
Century (Gumenai, 2008/5); Privatisation or Publicising of Religion in the Modern World
(Marczewska –Rytko, 2008/5); Contemporary Religious Patterns in the Carpatho-Pannonian
Area (Kocsis, 2008/5); Religion and Politics in the Nation State and the European Union
(Contogeorgis, 2008/5); Considérations sur les frontières religieuses de l‟Europe Centrale et
de Sud-Est (Horga and Sipos, 2008/5); How Europe Can Dialogue with Islam ?
(Santagostino, 2008/5); The Interreligious Dialogue in the Context of the New Europe: The
European Ecumenical Movement (Brie and all, 2008/5); Religious Borders in
Decomposition (Antes 2008/5); Mental Religious Borders in Europe (Banus, 2008/6).
Cultural borders as considered from the point of view of diversity have been the
most present in the pages of the journal, as each issue has surveys relevant to the topic,
even when debating economic borders. On the one hand, the pages of the journal discuss
the multiple cultural borders: EU Enlargements and Its Linguistic Borders (Ferrando and
Ugalde, 2006/1); The Cultural Relevance of the Borders (Banus, 2006/2); Why Was the
20th Century Warlike (Pfetsch, 2007/3); La culture de l‟autrui dans la pensée de Denis de
Rougemont (Dogot, 2008/6) ; Erasmus et la mobilité en Europe, vers un dépassement des
frontières (Come, 2009/7); The Cultural Frontiers of Europe (Stoica and Brie, 2010/9);
Rural Cultural Border (Stefanescu, 2010/9); Nourritures et territoires en Europe. La
gastronomietcomme frontière culturelle (Saillard, 2010/9); Klezmer “Revivalisms” to the
Test of Real or Supposed Cultural Borders: the Stakes of Memory and Objects of
Misunderstanding (Noel 2010/9). On the other hand, the active dimension of culture and
intercultural dialogue have enjoyed attention not only through a special issue (Eurolimes
6), but also through pertinent studies published in other issues: Dialogue interculturel,
diversité culturelle et régulation des médias (de La Brosse, 2007/3); Emigration,
Immigration and Interculturality: The Meaning of the European Year of Intercultural
Dialogue in Portugal (Pinheiro, 2008/6); The First Step towards Intercultural Dialogue:
Acknowledging the “Other” (Non)-stereotypical Representation of Migrants versus Ethnic
Minorities Before and After the 2007 European Union Enlargement (Saptefrati, 2008/6);
The Promotion of Intercultural Dialogue in the Carpathian Euroregion States
(Involvement of Civil Society in the Implementation of a Cultural Policy) (Chabanna,
2008/6); Intercultural Dialogue and Diversity within the EU (Swiebel, 2008/6); The Roma
Population in Slovakia: The Study Case of the Intercultural Dialogue (Moravkova,
2008/6); Re-defining Refugees: Nations, Borders and Globalization (Gemie, 2010/9); From
the East-West Major Project (1957) to the Convention on Cultural Diversity (2007): UNESCO
and Cultural Borders (Murel, 2010/9).
The image of the European culture is provided by the association of the concepts
people – culture – history – territory. They confer a certain local specificity due to their
features. From this point of view, we can identify besides a European culture, a cultural
area of local, regional and national specifics. Thus, we identify at least two cultural
identity constructions on the European level: a culture of cultures, that is a cultural area
with a strong identity on the particular, local, regional, or national levels, or a cultural
archipelago, that is a joint yet disrupted cultural area (Horga and Brie 2010/1: 157). Other
authors who have published in the journal share the same opinion when speaking of: Les
9
nouvelles frontières de l‟Europe: repenser les concepts (Maron 2007/4); Images of
Openness - Images of Closeness (Banus 2007/4); De l‟histoire des frontières cultures à
l‟histoire culturelle des frontières et à l‟histoire des cultures frontalières. Pour une rupture
de perspective et de nouvelles approches (Francfort 2010/9).
The European identity seen as a “house with many rooms” does not exclude the
existence of the “house” or the “rooms”. The natural question arising from this perspective
is as follows: are specific identities completely integrated in the general European
identity? The answer seems natural. Our European identities refer to shared
representations of a collective self as refelected public debate, political symbols, collective
memories, and elite compettion for power (Checkel and Katzenstein 2010: 4). Besides, the
particularity of the European culture is provided by diversity and multiculturalism as
means of expression on the local, regional or national levels. Consequently, in the pages
of the Eurolimes journal, this perspective has been present through the Image and Identity
of the Frontiers of the New Europe: Multilingualism as a new EU-strategy and the Impact
of European Political Border Shifts on Languages (Gimeno-Ugalde 2007/4); Cross –
Border Politics and Its Image in the European Union (Pantea 2007/4); Psychological
Preconditions of Totalitarianism and Their Effect on Democratic Transformations in
European States (Chabana 2007/4); The Cultural Frontiers of Europe: Our Common
Values (Reszohazy 2007/4).
Another analysis perspective on the values of the European identity is comparing
these values with the values of “the other”: L‟Europe et les religions (Dufulon, 2008/5);
Muslims in Spain. The Case of Maghrebis in Alicante (Cabre, 2008/5); Christianity and
the Limits of Europe. A Social - Theological Approach (Preda, 2008/5); New Spatial
Theories and Their Influence on Intercultural Dialogue Observing Relational Space in
Oradea (Hoffman, 2008/6); Culture et civilisation. Images et représentation des concepts
(Contogeorgis, 2008/6); Islam and Islamism in Europe. Representations of Identity and
Projects of Action (Lazar, 2009/7); Europe: Utopia and Reality. Essence, Meaning and
Value of an Idea (Pacheco Amaral, 2009/7); The Migration of Poles to the European
Single Market (Kundera, 2009/8); Turkey and the European Union: a Never-Ending Story
or an Irrevocable Membership (Ozkale, 2009/8); Democracy as Form of Life (Marga,
2009/8); Cultural Europe and Geopolitics (Contogeorgis, 2010/9); Europe of Cultural
Unity andtDiversity (Tavares Ribeiro, 2010/9); Georgia and Europe in the Context of
Cultural Communications (Vekua, 2010/9).
3. Eurolimes, where to?
From this brief analysis of the background, we can try to formulate certain ideas
which represent the consensus of the editors and contributors to Eurolimes.
In the current context of economic-financial crisis, many European societies
develop a strong “self-protection” feeling not only of economic origin. There is also a
kind of preservation of their own identity, including the cultural one. Crisis or exaltation
moments can easily lead to nationalist feelings diluting the “Europeanist” perception of
the border. This dilution occurs at the same time with strengthening identity-community
and the feeling of ethno-cultural appurtenance to a nation. There is a time when many
European peoples come to the foreground and “re-find their identity” by turning to the
national trend despite the “unity” and solidarity stated by the Member States officials at
European institutions (Horga and Brie, 2010/9: 158).
From this point of view, as of the 10th issue, the editorial policy of Eurolimes
focuses more and more on punctual topics. In the context of contesting globalisation and
debating supranational forms of organisation, such as the European Union, dedicating an
10
issue to the Geopolitics of the European Frontiers is more than a need to ponder more
coherently on the limits of Europe and its repositioning in an international context with
strong mutations. The appearance of the emergent powers (BRIC = Brazil, Russia, India,
China) in 2008, South Africa‟s interest in this power centre, as well as a change of position
from Turkey in the security strategy places Europe in a situation to reconsider its place on
the international scene. There is a need to strengthen the reactive ability of EU‟s hard core
(outlined more and more around Germany leaving to the background the French-German
couple on which the European community has been built), as well as a reconsideration of the
countries at the limits of the EU in point of territoriality in close connection with the idea of
sovereignty and the idea of border (Berezin and Schain, 2003: 5).
The second direction of the Eurolimes editorial policy relates to the impact of
policy on the construction of formal or informal borders. Considering the statement that
EU “is not a future state”, yet “the most ambitious and successful multilateral
organisation” (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 84), we will start the series with
the paper entitled Leaders of the Borders. Borders of the Leaders. Here, the authors will
make reference to the role of the “toxic” and/or the “charismatic” leaders in the
transformation of the borders. This section proposes the challenge concentrated on the
potential possibility of the “charismatic” leaders being “toxic” leaders simultaneously. We
will proceed with issues focusing on the impact of certain border regions on the stability
or instability of the European borders.
In the third place, attention will be paid to phenomena with impact on the future
European borders and identity. On the one hand, this development of ideas is necessary
since the concept of the identity of Europe is dominated by “ambiguous territoriality”,
where the quality of being an EU member is based on nation-state, and where European
citizenship necessarily passes through the quality of being a citizen of a European State,
where trans-European mobility for work does not always find a common language within
the Schengen agreements. On the other hand, Europe as a cultural space is dominated by
an “emotional attachment” (Berezin and Schain, 2003: 5). There still are a lot of obstacles
to the effective development of a European public area, because there are many
Communicational frontiers in Europe. Therefore, there still are several discourses to be
resolved before we can bring ourselves to establish a solid coherence over the internal
borders of the EU and a closure of its external borders.
Finally, Eurolimes considers that there are trends contradictory to the process of
evolution of the social frontiers inside of Member States of EU. Also with the demographic
decline within the EU, the migrational frontiers will be preserved yet much relieved.
The European nation-states are obliged to ensure the replacement of the population
that has left the labour market in order to support the need to maintain a constant labour
force, as well as to contribute to the pension funds for aged population. Certain politicians
have a desire to create the image that the borders still work on our continent. This seems to
turn Europe into an area where the regime of public and private freedoms are a subjective
factor solely dependent on a decision-making political group, and which might look in a few
years from a historical point of view to be a new form of deportation.
This shows that there is a crisis of communication and information between
political leaders and public opinion, which works as a new type of border within the EU.
This border is determined on the one hand by the level of expectations of political leaders
who wish to pass quickly to a transnational perception of European realities and the
population where public opinion wishes to preserve national political mechanisms within
the European area. On the other hand, the barrier is determined by the level of
understanding of the EU political area as a new type of transnational community that no
11
longer guarantees (and often is in contradiction with) the ideas of the national public body.
The EU is a vast area which includes the citizens of the Member States and European and
non-European immigrants. The emergence of the European area is related to multiple and
complex interactions between States and collective identities expressed through groups of
immigrants. Likewise, other transnational participants (such as leaders of volunteer
associations, businesspersons, or activists in development strategy) expand their activities
outside the nation-state.
At the same time, Eurolimes will show an open interest – due to the reviews
carried out by the members of the editorial committee and other collaborators – in
individual and collective opinions in the field of borders and cross-border cooperation
present in books and magazines in the Eurolimes library. Scientific meetings in the field
of borders and cross-border cooperation to which the members of the board of Eurolimes
participate will also be presented.
Of course, this is the result of a teamwork of the editorial staff of Eurolimes and
especially of the people who have decided to lay the bases for an Institute for
Euroregional Studies as a Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence oriented towards
the study and research of the issue of the European borders, both internal and external, and
to train specialists in the border-related issues.
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1. Security dynamics of the European Space
Dacian DUNA (Cluj-Napoca) ◄► Defining the European Union as a
global security actor
Yiannos CHARALAMBIDES (Nicosia) ◄► Turkey as a key player
in the architecture of the European Security and Defence System
Nicolae TOBOŞARU (Oradea) ◄► Romania‟s geopolitical position
in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus. Reflections upon the strategic
partnership between Romania and US
Zsuzsa M. CSÁSZÁR (Pecs) ◄► The political, social and cultural
aspects of the Islam in the Balkans
Defining the European Union as a global security actor
Dacian DUNA
Abstract: This paper evaluates the European Union‟s actorness in international relations
and especially in the field of global security. It approaches three core documents for the
development of a European security culture: the European Security Strategy, the Constitutional
Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon. The European Security Strategy provided the normative
substratum for engaging European Union into the global governance of the 21 st century after the
terrorist attacks of 9/11. The Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty were not as revolutionary
as the security strategy. They in fact showed the limits of the institutional compromise and the
political sclerosis of which the EU suffers. However, as this paper demonstrates, the norms and
institutions are created for better or worse. What still misses is the political will of the Member
States and EU officials to advance further the objective set out in the security strategy.
Keywords: security, defence, EU, reform, strategy
Introduction
The question this paper addresses “What future for the EU as a global security
actor?” is intimately linked with a more general one: “What future for Europe?” This final
question is especially relevant in the current international agenda dominated by fear and
uncertainties about the future of the economy and by the rise of emergent global powers,
like China, India, Russia or Brazil. Of course, it is not actually a question whether the EU
has a future, but what kind of future.
Security and especially societal security is at the core of any entity‟s identity and
interests. The EU must cope with the bewildering complexity of today‟s global politics,
including a wide range of hard and soft security threats (from WMDs to global diseases or
cyber-crime etc.). A mixture of actors, institutions and policies, forming what can be
understood as security governance, has to provide safety for the EU citizens. They have to
address both the widened and deepened security agendas. This security governance must
be proactive. Metaphorically speaking, „wars‟ could be fought and won beyond the
frontiers of the Union, unless it will become part of our daily lives. At least this is the
rhetoric of such documents as the European Security Strategy.
This paper focuses on three documents relevant for the future of the EU as a
security actor and more generally speaking, as a global power: the EU Security Strategy
Paper (the Solana document), the failed „Constitution pour l‟Europe‟ (the „Constitutional
Treaty‟) and the Treaty of Lisbon (the „Reform Treaty‟). It evaluates the possible
implications of these documents for the future of Europe as a global security actor. It
stresses the importance of the global context and setting.
The EU global „actorness‟
Since security is just a part of international politics, the first question we have to
address is: What does it take to be an actor in international relations? The realist scholars
argue that only the state has the necessary attributes to qualify for this. The state is, for
better or worse, the single, unitary, cohesive, coherent voice representing a political
society on the world stage. Such regional entities as the EU would not be entitled for
being labelled international actors, using this logic. The liberal school of international
relations believes in the plurality of actors, from individuals, states, to international
20
organizations, corporations, NGOs etc. In this regard, the EU can be considered a global
actor. If one considers the empirical evidence, today‟s globalised world is so diverse and
complex that the genuine actors of the global political arena are all those entities capable
to set, define, and solve the agenda of the international community in both positive and
negative ways. Clearly, the „Westphalian‟ state remains one of the most important players,
but not the only one. The emergent powers are not always state-centric.
However, one must add that in order to claim the global actorness, even the state
has to be acknowledged by the international community (of states). In fact, the
international recognition is more important than the self-recognition. In this regard, since
the establishment of such community institutions as the High-Representative for the
CFSP, and recently the President of the EU or the EU Foreign Minister, the EU is now
represented at the global diplomatic level. The EU has developed since Maastricht the
functions of international representation. And “form follows function”, as we know from
modern architecture and even from the functionalism promoted by David Mitrany in the
early 20th century. In my view, this is the case of the European Security Strategy adopted
by the European Council in 2003.
A true classical realist like Henry Kissinger was reported to have once asked:
“Who do I call if I want to call Europe?” Of course, this was a metaphor of Europe‟s not
being a unitary actor in international relations. Nevertheless, not long ago, the same
Kissinger acknowledged the EU as an international actor into two separate interviews:
“Nation-states have not just given up part of their sovereignty to the European Union but
also part of their vision for their own future. Their future is now tied to the European
Union, and the EU has not yet achieved a vision and loyalty comparable to the nationstate. So, there is a vacuum between Europe's past and Europe's future.” (Der Spiegel
interview with Henry Kissinger, 18 February 2008). “It is of course a very difficult task to
design a political entity that extends from Bulgaria to Denmark and to get a common
policy. But at the time that I was Secretary of State, there was no point of organisational
identity, with which we could deal. (…) But now, not only do we have a telephone number
but it is getting better and better organised and it isn‟t as it used to be that every
individual step had to be approved by ministers. Now, Solana has a greater flexibility. So,
I think the European Union is moving in a positive direction.” (Euronews interview with
Henry Kissinger, 31 March 2007)
The actual question is not whether the European Union is a global security actor
but what kind. Simply putting, a security actor could be a provider (active actor) or
consumer of security (passive actor). If this definition applies, than one must notice that
the united Europe acted more as a security consumer than as a provider throughout its
relatively short history. However, today the EU is claiming a new global status
„measuring‟ its economic capabilities. And with power comes greater responsibility, as the
EU Security Strategy clearly underlined. This responsibility rests also in the security field.
To a greater extent, the EC and later the EU have depended on the American
security and defence lead. Protected by the NATO shield, the Western Europeans enjoyed
an unparalleled period of prosperity and were able to design the single best economic
integration design the world has ever knew. At his dawn, the EU was already an economic
superpower, one of the few poles of economic and social development in the world. This
status, plus the global concerns of the 1990s, pushed the European leaders to advance a
European agenda on common foreign policy, security, and defence. Moreover, the US
21
officials kept on suggesting the need to share the transatlantic security burden with the
Europeans, inviting the latter to develop the ESDI.1
The Agenda 2000 drafted by the European Commission defined the European
Union‟s actorness at global level:
“The Union must increase its influence in world affairs, promote values such
as peace and security, democracy and human rights, provide aid for the least
developed countries, defend its social model and establish its presence on the
world markets… prevent major damage to the environment and ensure
sustainable growth with an optimum use of world resources. Collective action
by the European Union is an ever increasing necessity if these interests are to
be defended, if full advantage is to be taken of the benefits of globalization and
if the constraints it imposes are to be faced successfully. Europe‟s partners…
expect it to carry out fully its responsibilities.” (quoted in Bretherton 1999:15
and Beyer)
The „actorness‟ of the European Union in security and defence is still debated.
Though the results achieved so far may look encouraging, the CFSP-CSDP2 record is not
impressive. The European project is clearly an unfinished business with or without the
Treaty of Lisbon. To these terms, one must add the harshness of the economic depression
affecting since 2008 the EU Member States. Nevertheless, the difficult economic
prospects must not inhibit the development of a comprehensive security policy of the
European Union.
Many scholars identify the European Union as a civilian power with soft
capabilities, while disposing of very limited military assets. The Union is still highly
dependent on NATO and US military power, being able, at best, to intervene in the final
phases of conflict management, like peace-keeping or post-conflict recovery and
reconstruction. Lacking strategic means and political will to develop a „grand strategy‟
comparable to the US one, the EU attempted at least to advance a new approach on
security and in this regard it was successful. With the development of the “European
Battle Groups”, the EU is heading into another direction, covering the requirements
necessary for becoming not also a civilian power, but also a military one, capable to
intervene in the whole spectrum of conflict management activities. This trend could be
further advanced after the current economic crisis.
Today it is clear that the European Union is perceived, at least publicly, as an
emergent actor in world affairs. However, there are some signs that this status is
questioned even by the Europeans themselves. The question here is: Do the Europeans
consider Europe a global actor or believe in it?
Recently, the WikiLeaks phenomenon has pointed out the abyss between what we
know about European politics and what seems to be behind the curtain. The recent
„cables‟ published by WikiLeaks indicate that behind the diplomatic scene the mutual
perceptions of the political figures are totally different from what they pretend. WikiLeaks
recently presented a conversation between former UE external relations commissioner
Chris Patten and Rockwell Schnabel, the US Ambassador to the EU in 2004 in which the
European official explained why the EU will never be a „real power‟:
“there is always someone in the room who is overly cautious, and will insist
on looking at matters 'sensibly',… To be a real power, Patten said, a country
must be ready and able to adopt and implement a policy, even if the rest of the
1
2
The European Security and Defence Initiative within the NATO framework.
Initially called ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy).
22
world considers it unwise. Europeans may agree or disagree with US policy,
but they admire that the US is ready to carry out the policies it thinks best, no
matter what the rest of the world thinks.” (Pop, 2 December 2010).
This „leak‟ of information, published by a European online newspaper,
Euobserver, shows why the evolution of the political union has been so slow until now,
since at least some of the European leaders themselves do not intimately believe in the
prospects of the European Union to become a global power, even though they were
supposed to have championed it. The European leaders themselves are not always as
Euro-optimistic as they want us to believe. At the same time, there are many indications of
a return to power politics all across the global political scene, with players such as Russia
or China already applying concepts reminding of classical geopolitics or Real-Politik.
They seem to have learned how to use globalization against globalization. The propensity
showed lately by the big Member States of the EU to negotiate between them and
sometimes with external powers in a concert-of-power like setting is inscribed in this
pattern. This may lead to the dismissal of the EU from a status that is still not recognized
by everybody, that of global actor.
The European Security Strategy
The European Security Strategy (“the Solana document”) was adopted by the
European Council in December 2003. The document, entitled A Secure Europe in a Better
World, is the first significant attempt to codify a strategy concerning the EU‟s global
stance. First of all, it is significant by its multilateral nature. Secondly, the strategy is not
an emanation from the will of the Member States. Instead, it reflects the growing
importance of the community institutions in the design of the CFSP – especially the case
of the Secretary-General of the Council, High Representative for the CFSP, Mr. Javier
Solana. It sets (not only) the security agenda for the Union. Above all, the European
Security Strategy (ESS) readdresses the important issues of principles, norms, and values identity, in other words. And finally, the ESS is a short, clear, well written document, with
a profound message for the European leaders.
The ESS is divided into three sections. The first one identifies the „new threats‟ to
the European security emerged since the Cold War. The second one deals with the
strategic objectives of the Union. The last part refers to the possible implications of this
security strategy.
The text of the ESS puzzles any European studies scholar. It has practically no
correspondence in the European community acquis. Martin Ortega described it as an
emanation from a hybrid (Ortega, 2003).3 The document itself is a hybrid: it contains ideas
closed to the European „hawk‟ states, some shared by European „pigeon‟ states and some
depicted from the European community‟s foreign policy tradition (Ortega, 2003). To these
one must add, as Ortega also noted, ideas taken from the American security agenda. In
fact, the ESS is a late reply to the US invocation of Article 5 from the North-Atlantic
Treaty after 9/11, a request that was translated until then in hesitation, lack of reaction and
even critical remarks targeting Washington‟s policy in the Middle East.
3
Martin Ortega notices the hybrid nature of the European Union and of its common foreign and
security policy. In his view, the EU‟s security strategy should be based both on
integovernmentalism (because of the multiplicity of national strategic concepts and the
participation of the Member States in other organizations with different strategic concepts) and
supranationalism (based on the established principles and norms for the CFSP and the principles
of the community acquis.
23
Even though profoundly humanitarian in language, the ESS is as pragmatic as it
gets. The „introduction‟ emphasizes the importance of the EU in establishing an era of
prosperity and peace on the European continent. The EU:
“has transformed the relations between our states, and the lives of our
citizens. European countries are committed to dealing peacefully with disputes
and to co-operating through common institutions. Over this period, the
progressive spread of the rule of law and democracy has seen authoritarian
regimes change into secure, stable and dynamic democracies. Successive
enlargements are making a reality of the vision of a united and peaceful
continent”.
The language used in this text, as well as the fact that it stresses the critical role
played by the US and NATO over the European political construction, tell much about the
personality of those behind the drafting of the ESS. Javier Solana was NATO‟s Secretary
General before taking the office of EU High Representative for the CFSP. The ESS was
inspired and perhaps even drafted by Robert Cooper, the adviser of Javier Solana and
former adviser of Tony Blair. They apparently share the same belief in neoliberalism as a
paradigm of today‟s global politics.
Robert Cooper promoted what he termed the doctrine of „New Liberal
Imperialism‟4 in his work The Post-Modern State and the World Order (Demos, 2000)
later developed in The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century
(Atlantic Press, 2003). He described the world as composed of failed, modern, and postmodern states. Cooper argued that if Europe wants to cope with the new security threats, it
should make „long term commitments‟ in order to influence foreign governments. His
approach is based on the human security approach developed by the liberal school of
international relations. Not surprisingly, the ESS acknowledges the mutual dependence
between security and development, as well as the need to solve the basic causes of the
conflict with effective early preventive measures (Dodds and Pippard, 2005:18). Peter van
Ham argues that the influence of Cooper and his „new liberal imperialism‟ has shifted the
European security strategy from „soft power‟ to a more „hard power‟ focus: “Cooper
believes that Europe can no longer wait and hope that the rest of the world will soon
recognize and emulate the bliss of its own oft-heralded model of Kantian peace and
prosperity. Instead, the EU has to become an active and, if necessary, forceful global
player prepared to fight for its own interests” (van Ham, 2004).
The ESS identifies some global threats and challenges reflecting a wider
(comprehensive) concept of security. They relate both to the positive and the negative
aspects of globalization. The document stresses that frustration caused by this
phenomenon in certain areas have led some non-state groups to play a growing role in
international affairs. Moreover, these groups have increased Europe‟s dependency (and
vulnerability) on an interconnected infrastructure of transport, energy, information etc. It
also notes the fact that the majority of victims killed in the post-Cold War wars is civilian,
4
This neoliberal doctrine is a reminiscence of the late Cold War period. It was developed as a
counter-measure to the state-led development, inspired by Keynes, which flourished especially in
the communist camp. Since the 1980s the neoliberal project with its emphasis on free markets
and open societies has pretended to become the current orthodoxy not only in economics, but also
in political science and international relations. Neoliberalism claimed the victory over
communism (see F. Fukuyama‟s ideas). Some authors identify it with „neoliberal globalization‟.
Robert Cooper pushed even further the neoliberal project, insisting more on its geopolitical
dimension: if it wants to survive the post-modern state has to deal with the „pre-modern chaos‟
and this might be done using the old policy of colonization (defensive imperialism).
24
identifying poverty and diseases as potential sources of strategic concern and the security
as a „precondition of development‟. The discourse is obviously academic, inspired by the
security studies prevalent in the 1990s. Nevertheless, even though the text is vague in
certain sections, the document puts order in the European strategic thinking, identifying
real, not imaginary challenges, often based on statistics questioning the future of the
European Union and of the mankind. The competition for resources and Europe‟s
increasing dependency on energy are clearly defined and anticipated elements by analysts
from more than a decade.
The Solana document identifies certain „key‟ threats, vulnerabilities and risks.
However, it does not adopt the term vulnerability, as it was pointed out by a report of the
Aspen institute of Italy (Aspen Institute Italia, 2003). Instead, it uses an apparently similar
term in content -„challenge‟, easily convertible into another concept – „threat‟. The Italian
report state it correctly that vulnerabilities come from economic, demographic,
technological developments, not necessarily aimed against a country. They do not
automatically originate from an identifiable international actor. They need to be solved
with the help of “vulnerability based strategies”, essentially preventive and defensive,
designated in the ESS as “conflict and threat prevention”. They imply the long-run. On the
other hand, “threat based strategies” are linear, reflecting a much faster timetable (shortrun). The focus on threats is specific to military powers, while the focus on vulnerabilities
is specific to civilian powers (Aspen Institute Italia, 2003).
Starting from the conclusions of the Aspen Institute Italia, one can argue that the
„Solana document‟ favours a type of strategic thinking specific to military powers –threats
are more clearly emphasized than vulnerabilities. Hence, the ESS implicitly proposes that
the EU should become a military power, an objective which is far from being
accomplished.
The document presents also a hierarchy of threats. This reminds of the realist
thinking and practice. In what concerns threat evaluation, the ESS sharply resembles with
the US National Security Strategy issued after 9/11. In a monograph comparing the two
documents, Torsten Gersdorf argues: “Both documents are remarkably similar in the
analyses of threats to the United States and the EU respectively. Both strategies are
following a threat based approach. Confirming the NSS threat assessment can be
interpreted as a political message from the EU to Washington, that the EU shares the US
concerns on the threats posed by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, without
necessarily implying that the EU will adopt the same approach to deal with these
threats”(Gersdorf, 2005:19). The hierarchy of threats is also remarkably similar in both
documents: terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, regional conflicts, failed states, and
organised crime.
The ESS does not approach threats to the European security by isolating them,
even though it acknowledges there are differences in level of violence. Instead, it treats
them in interconnected manner. Their causes are essentially the same and usually a threat
is causing the next one. Though seen as distant, they must not be ignored:
“In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those
that are near at hand. … Our traditional concept of self- defence – up to and
including the Cold War – was based on the threat of invasion. With the new
threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad. The new threats are
dynamic. The risks of proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist
networks will become ever more dangerous. State failure and organised crime
spread if they are neglected – as we have seen in West Africa. This implies that
25
we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat
prevention cannot start too early” (ESS, 2003).
The above statement is specific to a postmodern military power. It shares many
elements with the American neoconservative vision regarding the role of pre-emptive action.
The preventive action is specific to a civilian power. But, for the first time, an EU official
presents a strategic option: to combat the causes of these „key threats‟, while these causes
are „abroad‟. In fact, as Gerard Quille once noted, the Solana strategy directly addressed the
American priorities concerning the international terrorism and weapons of mass-destruction,
proposing concrete steps in a wider context, representing a crucial moment in the US-EU
strategic partnership (Quille, 2003). Actually, Quille‟s prediction was far from accurate, due
to the different views inside the Union regarding the war on terror.
The ESS presented three strategic objectives of the European Union: (1)
addressing threats; (2) building security in the European Union‟s neighbourhood; (3) an
international order based on effective multilateralism. What is interesting is that by setting
these strategic objectives, the ESS acknowledged the possibility of a composite security
policy of the EU. In fact, one might better call it „security policies‟. The first objective can
be tackled by the two intergovernmental pillars of the EU: the CFSP, and the JHA (Justice
and Home Affairs). The 2nd objective was put into practice by setting the European
Neighbourhood Policy as an alternative policy for enlargement governing the EU‟s
relations with the neighbours from South and East. The 3 rd objective regards the relations
with the partners, most notably with the USA.
The EUSS is inspired from the EU‟s successes of the last decade, especially the
stabilization of the Western Balkans. “Building security in our neighbourhood” has often taken
the form of national building with European assistance. It is an idea suggested since the 1990s
by NATO officials that securing the „East‟ will in turn strengthen the security of Western
Europe. A very effective solution was and still is promoting „good governance‟. The Solana
document clearly stress the importance of the EU enlargement for not only strengthening the
security of the Union but also bringing closer to it new sources of risk, vulnerability and threat.
The solution that the EUSS promotes is vaguely imperial, probably inspired from the ideas of
Robert Cooper: “Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the
European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and
cooperative relations” (EUSS, 2003:8). This clearly reminds the idea of a “ring of friends”
presented in the The Wider Europe Neighbourhood document released by the European
Commission that was to be the basis of the ENP.
The essence of „effective multilateralism‟ promoted in the European Union‟s
Security Strategy is supported by another topical subject that virtually obsessed the
European officials since the drafting of the White Paper on European Governance. It is not
at all surprising that the Solana document emphasizes the virtues of good governance from
the local to the global layers. But the document lacks the practical solutions by which the
global governance could be improved (e.g. regarding UN activity). As regarding the
international security regimes, the EUSS has a traditional, realist approach, starting from
an observation taken from the Europeans‟ experience: confidence building measures and
armaments control regimes can increase security. The document focuses on the fields in
which the Union had already excelled, such as assistance programmes (the EU has the
greatest contribution to global development), conditionality (see the Copenhagen criteria),
or trade aimed measures. As for the relations with states that are outside the international
community, the Solana document argues for the necessity of their return and for
punishments for those who systematically violate the international norms. The language is
once again evasive, living a lot of room for interpretations.
26
The EUSS has clearly been a challenge launched by its author(s) for the European
leaders. A proof may be identified in the third part of the document, entitled “Policy
implications for Europe”.
First of all, the document requested for the European Union to become „more
active‟ in advancing its interests, starting from the whole spectrum of instruments for
crisis and conflict prevention management, including political, diplomatic, military and
civilian, as well as trade and development activities. Its stresses the need for developing a
strategic culture, that is clearly the attribute of a security actor. Moreover, it suggests that
a defence budget of over 160 billion Euros will suffice for covering the expenses of both
military and civilian operations. Nevertheless, the target of a so-called European Stand-By
Force which was stated in the “Headline Goal 2003” was far from being accomplished.
The objective was later transformed into a less ambitious one: the European Battle Groups
which became active in 2007.
The EUSS set another goal: the Union should become „more capable‟, in
accordance with its potential. Originally, the text presented by Javier Solana, comprised
references to the so-called credibility gap.5 A 2nd seminar of European Union‟s Institute
for Security Studies approaching the EUSS noticed that if the document will be more
consensual and more seriously taken by the Member States, the EU‟s credibility will
depend on its application. After this strategy will be adopted, it will be impossible for the
Union to maintain the gap between declaration and concrete action. (Gnesotto, 2003). In
other words, once the EUSS adopted, the EU was forced to action or to irrelevance in the
field of global security.
The document holds in high regard the transatlantic relationship, consistent with
its multilateral and even multi-polar vision. It stresses that without the maintaining of this
vital alliance, it will be virtually impossible to advance the strategic objective of the EU:
“Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for
good in the world” (EUSS, 2003:13). It also emphasises the partneships with other global
strategic players like Russia, China, Japan, Canada, India. It is clearly a manifesto for the
EU to assume its global position corresponding to its demographical, political and
economic weight in the global politics.
The document ends in the same manner as it begins: „This is a world of new
dangers but also of new opportunities” (EUSS, 2003:14). In order to face these challenges,
the EU should become more active and capable to define the line between „Cosmos‟ and
„Chaos‟. While it certainly can be interpreted in many ways, the EUSS sends a very clear
message: an effective European security policy should start from some principles that will
achieve the consensus of all the participant actors.
The optimistic vision of the EUSS was adopted by Javier Solana, the former High
Representative for the CFSP. Solana, an enthusiastic supporter of the European idea, made
a statement in 2004 entitled “The Future of the European Union as an International
Actor”. Almost similarly to the EUSS, Solana described the historical role played by the
EU and updated the EUSS in accordance to the political reality of the EU. 6 This reality
was not only political, but also geopolitical, the Union obtaining the status of a global
power. Solana wanted this power to be proactive when referring to the opportunities that
5
The difference between political statements and political actions, meaning that the first are not
backed by the latter. Hence, the political actor may eventually suffer by a lack of credibility when
it is judged by the international community or its own public.
6
The statement followed the EU enlargement that led to the Europe of the 25 in 2004. Also, Solana
supports the idea embodied by the European Constitution.
27
stood in front of the EU: “It is clear that a self-confident and capable EU has a real
contribution to make in building a safer neighbourhood and a better world. Both our
citizens and our international partners want and expect a stronger European presence on
the international stage. If we seize the opportunities that present themselves, we can heed
this call and deliver an EU foreign policy which is pro-active, coherent and hence
effective. And if we did, both the citizens of Europe and the rest of the world be better off
as a result” (Solana, 2004). Solana suggests the final aim of the EU Balkan policies, which
have failed often during the 1990s: the European integration. In his short analysis, he
identified the main characteristics of the European security method: building an area of
cooperative security (possibly the real aim of the ENP); criticized the (American)
approach relying entirely on crisis management, not security building, through regional
cooperation; creating free societies and markets. The High Representative also stressed the
importance of developing military capabilities of the Union, saluting the build-up of the
first of the 13 battle groups specified in the Headline Goal 2010, as well as the creation of
the European Defence Agency and of the „civilian-military cell‟. This step-by-step
approach, as Javier Solana nicknamed it, seems to be a functionalist one.
A report carried out by the European Union‟s Institute for Security Studies from
Paris (2008) pointed out that some of the conditions upon which the EUSS was based
changed in the interval 2003-2008. The power shift between the West and the emergent
powers of the East and South is one of the challenges the EU has to cope with. The need to
play simultaneously at different levels, such as “interest-based bargaining and multilateral
cooperation” (Vasconcelos, 2009: 27) noticed by the EUISS analysts partly suggests that we
are entering a phase in which effective multilateralism is more and more cornered by power
politics among the global players. The once-called „modern states‟ challenging the postmodern European Union (as depicted by the neoliberal imperialists) have become postmodern but not in the way Europe is. It is a crisis post-modernity. The problem, well noticed
in the report, is the lack of correlation among the EU policies and institutions.
Clearly, the EUSS was a landmark for the development of a coherent security and
defence policy within the EU, so that the Union might become a genuine security actor in
world affairs. However, this security strategy should be understood in correlation to the
political dilemmas faced at that time by the Convention for the Future of Europe, such as
the problems of political coordination, effectiveness, and solidarity (Howorth, 2005:196).
They were partly solved in two political compromises: one failed (the Constitutional
Treaty) and one successful (the Reform Treaty).
The Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty
This section approaches the provisions on matters regarding the common foreign,
security, and defence policies of the European Union from the “Treaty establishing a
Constitution for Europe” and the initially called “Reform Treaty”, also known as the
Treaty of Lisbon.7 The two treatises are substantially similar and therefore are treated
together in this section. In fact, according to Valérie Giscard d‟Estaing, the President of
the European Convention that drafted the Constitutional Treaty, “The Treaty of Lisbon is
the same as the rejected constitution. Only the format has been changed to avoid
referendums.”8 What is different is the form, not the content, as d‟Estaing also noted.
7
Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the
European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007.
8
This is quoted from several European newspapers of 27 October 2007.
28
The suppleness of the Solana Strategy reminds the Anglo-Saxon constitutional
style, addressing issues in a universalistic, common-sense, cross-historical manner.
However, the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (from here onward named
Constitutional Treaty in this paper) does not have the virtues of a slender, pocket
constitution that can be read and understood by any citizen of the EU. The hybrid
character of the EU made the project of a “Constitution for Europe” to be also a hybrid,
but one standing on the “shoulders of giants”, the Member States as Masters of the
Treaties. Hence, the Constitutional Treaty was not a constitution in the right sense, but a
treaty negotiated and signed by the European leaders. However, the Constitutional Treaty
had a greater juridical force. It was supposed to replace the existent treaties, excepting the
Euratom Treaty. It also provided the Union with a legal personality under the internal and
international laws.
The Constitutional Treaty reaffirms the objectives of the European Union inserted
in the Treaties beginning with the TEU9 (they are present in Article I-3). It describes the
contribution of the Union as an international actor to the security, peace and sustainable
development of the Earth etc. These ideas are reflected also within the European Security
Strategy approached in the previous section of this paper.
The project enounced the replacement of the pillar system as a working method
within the EU, even though it kept the distinctiveness of the foreign, security, and defence
policies. Hence, the CFSP-ESDP became community policies, extending the EU
competencies in all their matters: “The Union's competence in matters of common foreign
and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the
Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might
lead to a common defence.” (Title III, art. I-16: 1). Moreover, the CFSP has become
compulsory for the Member States. Hence, the Member State “in a spirit of loyalty and
mutual solidarity… shall comply with the Union's action in this area” (Title III, art. I-16: 2).
One of the main innovations of the Constitutional Treaty was the
communitarization of the European Council. Its President was going to be elected for 2.5
years and could be re-elected once. He/she was going to ensure the external representation
of the EU in problems of common foreign and security policy, “without prejudice to the
powers of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs” (Title IV, art. I-22: 2 (d)). The Article
25 provided that the external representation of the Union is ensured also by the European
Commission, but not on matters referring to the CFSP. This emphasises the unique
character of the CFSP within the EU, as an intergovernmental policy. In this matter,
change is not what the Member States wanted. This is suggested also by the maintenance
of the consensus rule in the decision-making of the European Council, even though the
QMV rule is re-emphasised: “Except where the Constitution provides otherwise, decisions
of the European Council shall be taken by consensus” (Title IV, art. I-21: 4)
The Constitutional Treaty brought a new institution, that of the “Union Minister
for Foreign Affairs” (Title IV, art. I-28), combining the roles, attributions, and resources
of the High Representative for the CFSP and those of the Commissioner for External
Affairs, in order to concentrate the authority and unity of command in cases of crisis
management (Missiroli, 2004: 145). The External Minister is appointed by qualified
majority, with the agreement of the President of the Commission, by the European
Council. His or her role is to lead the CFSP-ESDP. The Minister has the right of initiative
in what concerns the CFSP and of implementation when he or she is mandated by the
European Council. In attempting to ensure the coherence and communication between the
9
The Treaty of Maastricht establishing a European Union.
29
European institutions, the Constitutional Treaty provides another function for the Minister
for Foreign Affairs, that of “Vice-President of the European Commission”. Hence, he or she
was supposed to link the European Council and the Commission, the factor that ensures the
unity of vision necessary for the dual external representation of the European Union.
Article I-40 and I-41 are both entitled “Specific provisions relating to common
security and defence policy”. They define the institutional-decisional framework under
which the CFSP is functioning: the European Council identifies the strategic interests of
the Union and establishes the objectives of its common foreign and security policy; the
European Council and the Council of the EU adopt the necessary European decisions,
while the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union and the Member States apply these
decisions “using national and Union resources” (Art. I-40:4).
Even though the Constitutional Treaty communitarizes the CFSP, it maintains
elements of national sovereignty, emphasizing that the usual compromise between
supranationalists and intergovernamentalists was used once as always in the European
Treaties. Moreover, this compromise can be partly understood as a translation of the
subsidiarity principle in all the matters concerning the CFSP (the inferior level
corresponds here to the national level). The intergovernmental character is sustained even
more clearly in the paragraph 5 of the same article:
“Member States shall consult one another within the European Council and
the Council on any foreign and security policy issue which is of general interest
in order to determine a common approach. Before undertaking any action on
the international scene or any commitment which could affect the Union‟s
interests, each Member State shall consult the others within the European
Council or the Council. Member States shall ensure, through the convergence of
their actions, that the Union is able to assert its interests and values on the
international scene. Member States shall show mutual solidarity.” (The Treaty
Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Art. I-40: 5).
One may notice that in matters related to common foreign, security, and defence,
the Constitutional Treaty and also the Reform Treaty (see bellow) do not bring significant
transformations as compared to the earlier treaties. For instance, the European Parliament
has the same consultative role in the framework of the CFSP (Art. I-40:6). The
Constitutional and the Reform Treaties are mostly updated versions of the Nice Treaty.
Concerning the voting rules, the Constitutional Treaty generalizes the unanimity
procedures on matters regarding the CFSP, except the cases provided in chapter III. Such
a case is the enhanced cooperation, by which a group of Member States can make use of
the qualified majority procedure. This procedure can be invoked only after the Council
decided by unanimity to accept the enhanced cooperation in a matter concerning the CFSP
or CSDP, usually when there are military issues at stake. 10 Also, the European Council can
decide in unanimity in other cases than those provided in chapter III that the Council can
take decisions by qualified majority. The policy initiative is shared between the Member
States and the Union Foreign Minister, which signalizes that a community institution will
be involved in what was initially an intergovernmental process.
Article I-41 approaches the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU as an
integral part of the CFSP. The article provides for the European Union “an operational
capacity drawing on ivil and military assets”. The spectrum of missions outside the Union
is displayed: “peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security
10
In fact, the Constitutional Treaty provided that all the matters concerning the CSDP will be
considered part of the CFSP.
30
in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.” The text is vaguely
ambiguous, since it does not provide any definition of what it means “strengthening
international security”. The fact that the performance of these tasks is left in the care of
the Member States emphasises the failure to develop a European army and European
military capabilities.
Echoes of the Saint-Malô Declaration of 1998 can be heard in the 2nd paragraph
of article I-41. The common security and defence policy continues to be framed
progressively in an intergovernmental setting: “The common security and defence policy
shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to
a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall
in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in
accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.” Other international
engagements of the Member States (e.g. NATO) are fully respected. The old compromise
achieved between the Member States regarding the ESDP/CSDP has not been replaced
yet, nor moved on. However, the Constitutional Treaty provides a clear engagement of the
Member States towards the fulfillment of a common defence policy. In order to ensure
this, the treaty provides the establishment of a European Defence Agency.
The provisions on the CSDP are not different from those on the CFSP. Even so,
one can remark that the Council of the EU “may entrust the execution of a task, within the
Union framework, to a group of Member States in order to protect the Union's values and
serve its interests. The execution of such a task shall be governed by Article III-310.” (Art.
I-41: 5). However, the participation to these mission remains voluntary (the proverbial adhoc principle specific to intergovernmental organizations).
The 6th and 7th paragraphs of Article I-41 are significant. They emphasize the
possibility for the states willing to advance further than others the objectives of the CFSPCSDP to do that: “Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria
and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view
to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within
the Union framework.” Moreover, one can notice that the „alliances‟ established between
the Member States in this field will become part of the EU framework. The 7th paragraph
introduces the clause for collective defence in case one Member State becomes the victim
of external aggression. This resembles the 5th article of the North-Atlantic Treaty. In fact,
the treaty stresses that the problems of mutual defence will be realised in cooperation with
NATO especially for those states which are members of both organizations.
The final paragraph of the Constitutional Treaty on the matters regarding the
CFSP and CSDP reafirms the consultative role of the European Parliament “on the main
aspects and basic choices of the common security and defence policy” (Art. I-41: 8).
The “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe” never established what was
supposed to do. It was rejected by the French Assembly, just like the case of another
constitutional attempt, the EDC of early 1950s. However, the EU officials managed to
negotiate and advance another text, almost similar to the Constitutional Treaty in most
respects, the Treaty of Lisbon, also known initially as the Reform Treaty.
The Treaty of Lisbon does not replaces the early Treaties of the EU, notably the
TEU and the TEC. It amends them. The Lisbon Treaty replaces in fact only the Treaty on
the European Union (TEU), being a consolidated version of it. The Treaty establishing a
European Community is renamed “The Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union”.11
11
It now has a consolidated version since 2008.
31
The differences between the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty on
matters concerning the CFSP-CSDP are the following:
The Union Foreign Minister for Foreign Affairs is replaced in the Lisbon Treaty
by the “High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”
with the same attributions;
The numbering of the articles is different in the two texts;
The qualified majority voting established in the Lisbon Treaty without the
derrogations present in the Constitutional Treaty;
Chapter 2 of the Lisbon Treaty regarding the CFSP corresponds to Article III of
the Constitutional Treaty but introduces a text which is not comprised in the later:
“The common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and
procedures. It shall be defined and implemented by the European Council and
the Council acting unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise.
The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded. The common foreign and
security policy shall be put into effect by the High Representative of the Union
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and by Member States, in accordance
with the Treaties. The specific role of the European Parliament and of the
Commission in this area is defined by the Treaties.”
The above text indicates that the CFSP is not governed by the same rules and
procedures as other policy areas of the European Union. “In procedural matters, the
Council shall act on the majority of its members” – this stipulation is from Article 31 of
the Lisbon Treaty and cannot be found in the Constitutional Treaty. The consultation of
the European Parliament by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy is much better emphasized in the Lisbon Treaty than in the Constitutional
Treaty: “The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
shall regularly consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices
of the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy
and inform it of how those policies evolve. He shall ensure that the views of the European
Parliament are duly taken into consideration. Special representatives may be involved in
briefing the European Parliament.” (Article 36 [21])
Conclusion
Both treaties define in the same manner institutions that have already been
established before, such as the Political and Security Committee so necessary for the EU
involvement into crisis management, or the European Defence Agency. They are clearly
not revolutionary in the field of foreign, security, and defence. They reflect an evolution
since the Maastricht Treaty which has not been completed yet, even though the global
circumstances would have required it. But for the Member States security and defence are
still what remains from their old national sovereignty and it is why they are so reluctant to
renounce to it. Nevertheless, the emergence of community institutions such as the
President of the European Council elected for 2.5 years with the possibility to be reelected once, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy, the involvement of the European Commission in the CFSP framework and the
consultation of the EP show that the EU is moving into the right direction in order to
become a global security actor.
The principles laid down into the European Security Strategy and the institutions
re-inforced by the Lisbon Treaty are necessary steps. Europe has a telephone number that
responds to the question once put by Henry Kissinger. However, apart from these
technicalities, the EU needs political willingness from its leadership and Member States.
32
The temptation to return to power politics is a great danger for the European integration,
especially in a time of globalization and crisis.
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17 December, 2007.
Turkey as a key player in the architecture of the
European Security and Defence System
Yiannos CHARALAMBIDES
Abstract: The article evaluates the geopolitical and strategic position of Turkey in the
European security system, both through NATO and EU perspectives. The particularities of Turkey
relations with other organizations and powers, underlines the need for a deeper consideration of
the security environment and security potential of Europe. There are clear indications that Turkey
is strengthening its power and influence and became one of the most important actors able to
influence the geopolitics both in Europe and in the Middle East.
Keywords: Turkey, security, Europe, defence,
Introduction
Turkish accession to the EU constitutes a prevailing issue in the European affairs,
classified at the top of the European agenda. In this respect, Turkish European course
should be also seen through the lens of the European Security and Defence system as
Ankara presents itself one of the most important military powers in NATO. Therefore,
Turkish accession to the EU is a strategic process, which is connected to the architecture of
the European Defence System, to the EU cohesion (Charalmbides 2010, pp. 33-34), to the
next Enlargements, to the role of the USA in the European affairs and to the conflicting and
convergent1 national interests as they are met in the European arena (Morgenthau 1978,
p.13; Haas cited in Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1992a, p. 69, Lindberg 1971 p. 45).
The European Defence System stands on two feet. One is NATO, which plays a
global catalytic role in security issues due to the experiences and prestigious character that it
gained during the Cold War. The other is that of the Common Security and Defence
Policy (CSDP)2. NATO and the EU have established a structural dialogue with the aim to
find a formula for a constructive coexistence. Pursuant to the conclusions of the European
Council, held in Bussels on December 11-12, 2008, the EU created a new impetus
regarding the relations between the ESDP – (CSDP) and NATO. Such an impetus should
be found «in full complementarity with NATO in the framework of their strategic
partnership» (Europe Council 2008).
Throughout the years NATO and Europe have established many concrete links of
interdependences, which have been transformed to links of dependence, mostly favouring
American national interests. Turkey was a devoted ally of the US and an important NATO
state, especially during the Cold War era (Ifestos 1999 pp. 23 -24). Even in the current
period Turkey still asserts a leading role within the European Defence System, especially
in the case of Turkish membership in the EU. Therefore, in this article I examine the
Turkish importance in the European Defence System in conjunction with Turkish
accession to the EU, taking also into consideration the role of the USA and that of NATO.
1
I consider that common European interest resulting from a minimum code of convergent national
interests.
2
After Treaty of Lisbon was ratified, the “European Security and Defence Policy” bears the name:
Common Security and Defence Policy. The Treaty of Lisbon, which was ratified by the Irish
referendum on October 2, came into force on December 1,2009
34
Traditional Power
Turkey could be considered a traditional military power. During the Cold War, it
acquired an essential role within NATO as a result of its pivotal geo-strategic and
geopolitical location. Thereafter, Turkey built a strong and reliable army and employed it
as a methodological tool for achieving the following goals:
Becoming an indispensable ally of the US during the Cold War era and beyond,
continuing into the current period, in which a volatile political environment still
exists, especially in the sensitive Caucasus region3 and elsewhere (Larrabee &
Lesser 2003 pp. 162-163). Its military strength and strategic location offer Turkey
the opportunity to play a key role in the diplomatic arena. In the current period,
Turkey aspires to restore its historic role in a new version of the silk-road, by
presenting itself as the bridge between Asia and Europe and a crucial geopolitical
oil crossroad (Larrabee & Lesser 2003, pp. 99-108; Turkish Foreign Ministry
2007d; Robertson 2001).
Confirming that the Turkish army is the guarantor of the territorial integrity and
the depositary of the Turkish secular state (Charalambides 2010, p. 98-103).
Using its military forces to participate in international operations organised by
NATO, the ESDP (CSDP) and others operations under the auspices of the UN and
within the context of peace-keeping missions (Turkish Foreign Ministry 2008).
Turkey is a member state of NATO and a candidate state of the EU, as the
Turkish accession negotiation opened on 3 October 2005 (European Council 2005,
European Council 2005a, p.7). Official figures from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, distributed during a presentation of the Turkish delegation at the European
Commission in Brussels on October 6, 2006,4 give an idea of the army‟s spending
allowance. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008), the entire
Turkish National Defence budget is 6.406.436 billion euros. This amount represents
6.81% of the entire national budget, one of the highest in Europe. These figures show that for
the Turkish political system, investments in the army sector are of great importance.
Indeed, Turkey uses its army in order to serve both domestic and external interests and
needs. Such interests and needs are focused on Turkey‟s aspiration to play a key role in
the international field and consolidate itself as a regional power (Turkish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs 2008a).
NATO and ESDP - (CSDP)
The end of the Cold War created a new momentum. At the same time, as
Europeans took further steps towards European integration, they also undertook to
establish a more independent and reliable European Security and Defence System. The
ESDP (European Security System) and then the ESDP, is an EU Institution responding to
the needs of the new era. However, Turkey does not belong to the EU and thereby Ankara
was concerned that the ESDP would progressively replace NATO and that Turkey would
be excluded from the European (Common) Security and Defence Policy. According to
Ambassador Marc Otte, former Head of ESDP Task Forces in the Council Secretariat of
the EU, the time has come for the EU to “develop its own security needs and the means to
defend itself” (Gerry 2001, p. 26). Meanwhile, the US gave the green light to the
3 See the crisis in Georgia (8-12 August 2008).
4 The presentation took place in the context of the screening of Chapter 31 on Turkey‟s
participation in CFSP/ CSDP]. Turkey needs to fulfil 35 Chapters in order to become full
member-state of the EU.
35
restructuring of the European security system in the context of the ESDP. The former
Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson, stated the following:
Strengthening the EU does not mean that NATO will lose its central role in
European security, nor will the transatlantic security link will be weakened. On the
contrary, when the long-sought European security identity comes to fruit, Europe
and North America will still be working together, only through more flexible
arrangements and with more capability at hand (Robertson 2001a, p. 30).
On January 1, 2007 the EU, in the framework of the ESDP and responding to the
Petersburg5 tasks, established „battle groups‟ 6 with full operational capacity to promote
the following aims:
To undertake military and civilian operations, either autonomously or in the event
of joint action between EU and NATO (Terzi 2002, pp. 44-46).
To prevent conflicts, to manage crises, including humanitarian operations,
peacemaking and joint disarmament operations, and to combat terrorism with the
support and participation of third countries (Sanberk 2001; Council of the EU
2006a). The ESDP (and the now the CSDP) takes action by using NATO
capabilities and strategic planning in situations, which NATO has no intention of
engaging in (Terzi 2002, p.46).
In practice, the EU and the ESDP - CSDP have no full and adequate capacity,
infrastructure and political independence in order to carry out their military, civil and
humanitarian missions in the framework of led operations and „battle groups‟ (Council of
the EU 1999). Thus, should the EU wish to conduct its operations successfully, two
conditions are required. First, it is obliged in some cases to get the green light from
NATO, of which Turkey is a member state with the right of veto. Second, it may need to
invite third countries and especially its candidate states to participate and contribute to the
operations (Terzi 2001, p. 47; Council of the EU 2001, NATO IMS Press Release
2001).According to a military attaché in Brussels (cited Charalampidies 2010 p. 112)7:
In the case of a military operation falling within the military operation of
the EU and more precisely in the „battle groups,‟ not only the Member states but
also Third states can be invited and contribute to the military operation. The
decisions are taken by the European Council and the invited Third state has no vote
on the decisions and on the implementation of the schedule and the operation
5The Petersberg tasks are those military tasks of humanitarian peacekeeping nature that both the EU
and Western European Union (WEU) are empowered to follow. They were created in June 1992 at
Hotel Petersberg near Bon in Germany. The Petersberg tasks constitute a list of military and
security priorities of the EU Security and Defence policy.
6The idea of establishing „battle groups‟ within the EU was launched at the European Council summit
on 10-11 of December 1999 in Helsinki. This issue was also touched upon during the Franco – British
Summit in February 2003 in „Le Touquet‟. At that summit the EU considered as priority the need to
improve its rapid response capabilities in order to have the opportunity to deploy land, sea and air
forces within 5-10 days. In the framework of the next Franco – Brutish summit, which took place in
November 2003, the member states decided that the EU should be able to deploy forces within 15
days in responding to a UN request. In February, 10 2004 France, Germany and the United
Kingdom drafted a document proposing a number of „battle groups‟ consisting of about 1500
personnel and able to be deployed within 15 days. The whole plan was approved in November
2004 and the first thirteen „battle groups‟ were pledged.
7Because of his position this military attaché only agreed to give a confidential interview, without
mentioning his name. For reliability purposes, his testimony was crossed-checked with other
sources in order to examine if what he stated was in line with legal documents of the EU.
36
(Terzi 2002, p. 47; Council of the EU 2001). Theoretically and practically it has
no vote (Terzi 2002, p. 54). However, beyond typical and legal aspect, there is the
political aspect too. Turkey and any other invited countries can enjoy the support
of friendly member-states that take into account the Turkish interests (Council of
the EU 2001, Terzi 2002, pp. 47-50, 55). Besides, although Turkey has legally no
right of vote, the Council should take on board its views and interests under the
status of the invited country. Thus, Turkey has a political say through member
states whose national interests are in line with its own. Since member states invite
Turkey or any other Third country to participate in the „battle groups‟, this
initiative means that the member states of the EU -or at least some of themshould respect Turkey and its interest if they do not contradict those of the EU or
of its member states.
Turkey is not a member-state of the EU. However, it is a member-state of NATO
with the right of veto. In this context, should Turkish interests impose it, Ankara can use
its right of veto (Terzi 2002, p. 56). Certainly, the use of the Turkish veto is not only
related to the Turkish national interests but, also, to the American ones. In any case,
Turkey has two options: Either block the allowance of NATO assets to the EU or get
involved in a diplomatic process of „trading off,‟ predicting that by threatening to use its
veto it will get an „equivalent exchange‟. Turkey has already proven that it knows the
„trade off‟ game very well. In 2002, “in order to voice its concerns, Turkey chose to veto
the EU‟s use of strategic NATO assets” (Terzi 2002, p. 53). At the end, NATO and the
EU reached an agreement reflected in a document bearing the title, „ESDP:
Implementation of the Nice Provisions on the involvement of the non-EU European
Allies‟. This document paved the way to the North Atlantic Council of the December 13,
2002 where EU- NATO cooperation was decided upon, and to the EU-NATO joint
Declaration of December 13, 2002 (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008c). During
that period, Turkey‟s “contribution to the EU‟s Headline Goal stands as the sixth largest
contribution in total” (Hurriyet cited in Terzi 2002, p. 53). In the current period, Turkish
contributions remain important and thus there is no reason for Turkey to exercise its veto.
After the opening of the Turkish accession negotiation on October 3, 2005 Turkey is a
quasi equal member state in the EU Security Structure and missions. According to the
Turkish Foreign Ministry (2008b):
Turkey is making a significant contribution to EUFOR-ALTHEA, including to its
civilian aspect. In total, its contribution to EUFOR-ALTHEA comes to nearly 255
personnel. Furthermore, Turkey has 4 police officers deployed to the EU Police
Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Turkey also contributed one police officer to the EU
Police Mission in Kinshasa, plans to send one police officer to the EUPOL-COPPS
Mission in Palestine and is also considering participating in the EU Border
Assistance Mission in Rafah/Palestine. Turkey has also participated in the EU‟s
EUFOR RD Kongo mission aimed at assisting the UN in the Democratic Republic
of Kongo, with one Turkish C-130 aircraft and its crew deployed in Gabon.
Turkey declared her readiness to contribute to the EU Battle Groups in November
2004. Turkey will provide both troops and capabilities to the Italian led Battle
group which will be assigned to the EU for the second half of 2010.
Due to its crucial contribution, Turkey‟s influence over the ESDP and henceforth
the CSDP is not trivial. Certainly, the Turkish impact on ESDP (CSDP) should be seen
within the spectrum of Turkish military contribution globally, including its role in
International Peace-Keeping Activities through: 1) UN Operations, 2) NATO, 3) Led
37
Operations in the Balkans, 4) International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, and
5) NATO Training Mission in Iraq (Turkish Foreign Ministry 2008).
Turkey and the US
By definition, Turkish accession to the EU is relevant to Turkish participation in
the common European Security Policy and European Institutions as a full and equal
member enjoying the right to vote. The US wants Turkey to join the EU for its own
national interests. As the former President of the EU- Turkey Joint Parliamentary
Committee, Joost Lagendijk (cited Charalambides 2010, pp. 113, 237,238), stated:
The US is strongly in favour of the Turkish entry as a full member of the EU.
The Prime Ministers of Italy and Spain, Berlusconi and Aznar, who were then in
power (2004) said publicly that they did not like this US pressure… So they made
clear to the Americans: “do not push us too much…”
On this point Mr Lagendijk (cited Chralambides 2010, p. 113) explained why the
US supports the Turkish accession to the EU: It argues that since Turkey is already a
member of NATO, why should it not become a member of the EU? and it wants to see a
democratic and stable Turkey. Certainly there is another side of the coin. One view
alleges that the US may use Turkey as its „Fifth Phalanx‟ or „Trojan Horse‟ within the EU
(Kalin and Gerras 2005, p.17). Other political views articulate that Turkey is an important
actor for regional, even global security and as such, it is indispensable for the fulfilment of
EU‟s ambition to play a global role in foreign and security affairs (Kalin and Gerras 2005,
pp. 5-6; Rubin, 2005, p. 1). Indeed, this is Joost Lagendijk‟s (Charalambides 2010, p. 113)
point: since Turkey is indispensable for NATO, why can it not be indispensable for the EU?
However, the strategic game is not so simple. The US supports the Turkish accession
to the EU but, at the same time, creates fertile ground for the upgrading of the Kurdish role
in the region. In northern Iraq, the Kurds have established their own autonomous region
with American blessings. Turkey considers this region as a basis of Kurdish military
operations and as a permanent threat to its soft belly (de Benderm 2008). On the one hand,
the US pushes Turkey to the EU, and on the other it puts a Kurdish stiletto into the
Turkish back.
Turkey is an important country for the Common European Security and Defence
Policy for the following reasons:
Turkey has the second largest army in NATO and the largest army in the EU (The
Economist 2006).
Turkey has an army with sufficient war experience and is always ready to take
action (Obama 2009).
Turkey has a very crucial and dominant geopolitical and geo-strategic location in
the region of Eurasia (Obama 2009).
Turkey is a big contributor to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP
and NATO) and to UN led operations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey
2008b).
„Trojan Horse‟ and American „wedges‟
The political games which develop within the EU having Turkish accession as
their epicentre, are closely connected to the serving of national and common interests. In
other words, decisions result from a combination of common and national interests. The
process of decision-making is a matter of interaction between policies and interests of EU
38
member-states. The EU functions as an international landscape where national interests
are met. It is not a „closed club‟. Rather, it is part of the international system.
American engagement in European affairs and the influence that the US exercises
on the decisions of the EU regarding Turkish accession to the EU have been testified by
Joost Lagendijk (cited Charalambides 2010, p. 239; Larrabee & Lesser 2003, pp. 68-69).
As Lagendijk stated, two years before the EU summit of December 16, 2004 – in 2002 –
the US had begun exerting pressure on EU governments in order to push EU leaders to
give the green light to the commencement of Turkish accession negotiations
(Charalambides 2010 p. 239-240). On the other hand, US support for Turkish accession to
the EU provides evidence for the allegation that Turkey will turn into a „Fifth Phalanx‟ of
the US (Laçiner, Őzcan and Bal 2005, p.71). In other words, support for Turkish accession
to the EU is a political position bearing a serious risk. In particular, one risk is that Turkey
might serve American rather than common EU interests. Whether this is true or not,
depends on the extent of the convergence or the divergence between:
1. Turkish national interests on the one hand and common European interests on the
other.
2. Turkish national interests on the one hand, and EU member-states national interests
on the other, especially the interest of leading EU countries.
3. Turkish national interests on the one hand and US interests on the other.
In the post- Cold War era, a new political and strategic web of relations has been
created within the Caucasus region and Iraq, thereby affecting US-Turkish affairs. The
alliance between the US and Turkey still exists, albeit Ankara flirts with Iran and its
relations with Israel passes through political turbulences 8. In any case, Turkey is a
member of NATO and a reliable US ally. The political tendency within the EU of
recognising the role of Turkey as an important geo-strategic ally is becoming more and
more obvious for two main reasons (Oomen- Ruitjen 2008). One is the role that Turkey
usually plays in military crises and the other is the role that it can play on the energy issue,
as in the case of Nabucco pipeline. Turkey‟s geopolitical importance is also acknowledged
even by the French government that opposes Turkey‟s EU membership9. On the one hand,
such a geo-strategic and geopolitical importance is an advantage for Turkey. On the other
hand, it is a drawback in the context of „power games‟ and conflicting national interests,
especially in the case that EU leading countries have not yet shown sufficient political
intention to integrate Turkey as an equal partner, legally and institutionally; in other
words, as a full member-state.
The pivotal Turkish geo-strategic is connected to the new EU Enlargements and the
Turkish role as a close ally of the US. The assertion can therefore be made that after a further
EU Enlargement, which will include Turkey, the pro-American block within the EU will
become stronger, respectively or irrespectively of the strategic conception of the „three
American wedges on the European back‟. In analysing this strategic concept, we mark the
following: Britain is a traditional ally of the US, and its policy vis-à-vis the EU is imbued
with scepticism. For the British, NATO has the primary role. At the same time, the
safeguarding of their sovereignty within the EU is also of utmost importance. The views
8
1 June 2010, „nine people, mostly Turkish activists, died when Israeli troops stormed a ship trying
to break Israel's blockade of Gaza on Monday‟ (BBC 2010).
9
In the framework of the activities of the EU- Turkey JPC, which took place in Ankara in November,
26-28, the French Presidency, although it maintained its reservations about Turkish membership, it
acknowledged Turkey‟s pivotal geo-strategic and geopolitical role, which became more obvious
during the crisis in Georgia.
39
and interests of the British regarding issues of security and foreign affairs are mostly in
line with those of the US. In addition, they have refused to participate in the Euro zone,
but they appointed Baroness Catherine Ashton as High Representative of the European
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (European Commission 2010). Such an
appointment constitutes a clear political action as Landon wants to have the upper hand in
the areas of the EU defence and foreign affairs.
Inspired by their lost Imperial identity, the British are supporters of „Real Politic.‟
Their geographical position situates them as an American „wedge‟ located in the
northwest. After the EU Enlargement of May 1, 2004, there has been a tendency of central
European countries to function as American „wedges‟ in the heart of Europe. As a result
of agreements signed between Poland and the US on the deployment of antiballistic
missile systems, Polish security has been placed under the American shield (MFA of
Republic of Poland 2008; Hildreth & Ek 2008, pp. 6-8) The Obama Administration
reformed its defence strategy and therefore intents to deploy a system with SM-3
interceptors in Poland that target low and medium-range missiles (Trevelyan and
Fullerton, 2009). This American decision does not change the US dominant role in
European affairs. It is connected to the US-Russian relations and to the US-policy, which
pursues the Moscow‟s support in the war against terrorism. In the case of Turkish
accession to the EU, a third American „wedge‟ will appear at the European soft belly, on
the south-eastern side. Although the puzzle is incomplete, this is a scenario which is not so
far from reality. Such a situation is relevant to US efforts during the NATO Summit in
Bucharest on April 3, 2008 to establish a roadmap for incorporating Ukraine and Georgia
into NATO and therefore isolating Russia geo-strategically. In other words, this American
policy tends to justify the position of Richard Holbrook, former US Assistant Secretary of
State for European and Canadian Affairs, as set forth in his 1995 article „America, a
European Power‟.
In light of these, it does not, therefore, come as a surprise that in response to
question, „According to your opinion which are the reasons behind the stance of some
Europeans, who do not wish to see Turkey joining the EU as a full member state?‟, the
majority (53%) of MEPs answered that Turkey will become the „Fifth Phalanx‟ of the US
(Charalambides 2010 p. 137). This view of Turkey as a „Trojan Horse‟ results from US
influence on EU decision-making and from the American position towards and support for
Turkish accession to the EU. In addition, there is yet another reason: that of the
historically close relations between the US and Turkey, and the inclination of new
member states towards the US, many of which follow a pro-American policy, especially
on security issues. This pro-American political position is reflected, among other ways, in
the installation of American antiballistic missile systems in the Czech Republic and
Poland10 (US Today 2007; Russianforces.org 2006; APF 2007).
„Babylonian state‟
Turkish accession to the EU is a primary goal of the US. It must be seen through
the lens of its potential impact on the cohesion of the EU and political and strategic
bilateral relations between the US and EU member-states. Considering that these relations
10
The political intention of the US to establish missile systems on the territories of both the Czech
Republic and Poland aims at preventing possible terrorist threats from looming over Europe and
the world in general. However, Russia fears that these missiles might be turned against it in the
future. At the same time, missile systems will consolidate and enhance the American geostrategic presence in Europe despite the end of the Cold War and the absence of the Soviet threat.
40
are ruled by conflicting and convergent national interests, one may conclude that regional
integration of the EU might run the risk of being trapped in a „Babylonian situation‟ 11. The
creation of a „Babylonian state‟ may threaten the EU cohesion. Why? According to the
„theory of Babylon‟, the more new states join the EU, the less is the possibility for
regional EU integration. The problem becomes severe in the case that a state, which is
characterised by „democratic deficit‟12, different system of values and economic problems,
joins the EU. This is why the argument of the „Babylonian situation‟ may be used by those
who do not support Turkish accession to the EU. How is Turkey related to the
„Babylonian state‟? Turkey has a large territorial size and population (Turkstat cited in
European Commission 2008, p 35) and suffers from economic and other structural
problems (Cizmek 2008, European Commission 2007 European Commission 2006, pp.
28, 29, 38), which are reflected in its democratic deficit. According to a European
Parliament research (2006), Turkish accession to the EU will cause problems on cohesion
policy and consequently, on EU cohesion (Charalambides 2010, pp 90-96). At the same
time, the creation of a „Babylonian state‟ is further encouraged through the existence of
conflicting national interests. Therefore, such a situation would hamper the formation of
the common European interest and regional integration, and would prevent the EU from
creating one common voice on sensitive and important issues. In light of this, the
weakness of not having a European common policy on important issues places EU
political cohesion at risk.
Conclusions and Crucial questions
Turkish accession to the EU falls under the question of whether Turkey can bring
structural changes to the Common Security and Defence Policy. If one considers that the
11
Babylonian situation: chaotic, incomprehensible situation. On July 10, 2008, during the EP
Plenary Session, MEP Jean Marie Le Pen stated that the EU is becoming “a new Babylonian state
found on the ruins of the national identities of the member states”. Le Pen alleged that the EU cannot
function in such a situation, and strongly criticised French President Nikolas Sarkozy, holder of
the EU Presidency since July 1, 2008. President Sarkozy responded that France is lucky to have
gotten rid of Le Pen (!).
12
The first use of the term „democratic deficit‟ can be found in the German publication JEF
Manifesto in 1977. The phrase, however, has been attributed to British MEP Bill Newton Dunn
who used the term in a pamphlet in the 1980s (Wikipedia). According to Sanford Levinson “a
„democratic deficit‟ occurs when ostensibly democratic organisations or Institutions in fact fall short
of fulfilling what are believed to be the principles of democracy” (cited in Wikipedia). The term
„democratic deficit‟ is employed by the US in the context of addressing gaps within the American
democratic system and avoiding problems in the functioning of this political system. It is also used in
reference to the UN, an organisation that has no directly elected representatives (Moravcsik 2004;
Follesdal & Hix 2005). In the context of this article, the term „democratic deficit‟ is understood as the
existing gap between the reality of EU institutional functioning and decision-making processes on
the one hand, and beliefs about or understanding of these Institutions and decisions by EU citizens on
the other. That is, it refers to a lack of communication between European public opinion and the elite
on how EU Institutions and processes actually function. The „democratic deficit‟ reflects a lack of
political and even legal legitimacy. For example, the only institution of the EU directly elected by the
European citizens is the European Parliament, whose authority, competence and effectiveness is
much less than those of the national parliaments. Therefore, the „democratic deficit‟ is also
connected to the full respect of democratic principles and values. For this reason, the term is not
limited to the EU and regional European integration, but concerns as well the degree of
democracy within a state. Furthermore, the term „democratic deficit‟ is used in order to illustrate
the democratic problems that Turkey faces.
41
political word of a member state is defined by its strength and contribution to the CSDP,
then if Turkey becomes a full member state of the EU, it could play a leading role within
the CSDP and therefore to the EU as such. Should Turkey have a strong say on defence
and security issues, then Ankara will also have a strong political say on issues of foreign
affairs, since defence and foreign policy are the two sides of the same coin. The main
issue is that should Turkey join the EU as a full member-state, redistribution of power will
occur and a new balance of power will be shaped. Turkey has a strong, powerful army
(„hard power‟), while the EU has developed a „soft power‟ identity 13.
2
3
4
5
People‟s
Republic of
China
United States
India
North Korea
Russia
6
South Korea
687,000 4,500,000
7
8
9
Pakistan
Iran
Turkey
619,000
545,000
514,850
1
Active troops
per thousand
citizens
Total
Paramilitary
Reserve
Force
Table 1
Active
Service
Personnel
Nation
Flag
Rank
Biggest military countries
2,255,000
800,000 3,969,000 7,024,000 1.71
1,426,026
1,325,000
1,106,000
1,037,000
1,458,500
53,000 2,937,526 4.76
1,155,000 1,293,300 3,773,300 1.20
4,700,000 189,000 5,995,000 49.03
2,400,000 359,100 3,796,100 7.24
22,000 5,209,000 14.20
528,000 302,000 1,449,000 3.72
350,000 11,390,000 12,285,000 11.74
380,000 148,700 1,043,550 7.03
Source: (Wikipedia- List of countries by number of active troops)
In this table, one can observe that indeed, Turkey possesses the ninth biggest army
globally, the second biggest in NATO after the US, the biggest army in the EU in the
context of the Western Security Institutions and the second largest in the Old Continent
after Russia. Therefore Turkey is a pivotal country for European and international
security issues because of its geo-strategic and geopolitical position and the large size of
its army.
13
It is substantial to examine what is the real concept of „hard power‟ and „soft power‟. Klaus
Knorr in his 1973 book „Power and Wealth‟, attempted to describe the difference between influence
that was coercive and influence that was non-coercive. Harvard University professor Joseph Nye
took an additional step by translating „non-coercive influence‟ into „soft power‟ (1990). Prof. Nye
further penetrated into the concept in his 2004 book, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World
Politics. In short, it can be noted that „soft power‟ is a term being used to distinguish the subtle
effects of culture, values, and ideas on others‟ behavior. This is the opposite, let‟s say, the „other
side of the coin‟ of what we call „hard power„, which mainly comprises military actions and
economic sanctions or/and measures and corresponds, in fact, to the norms of Realism
(www.wikipedia.org). Therefore, I mark that EU is a „soft power‟ while Turkey presents itself as
a „hard power‟.
42
In light of this, the big bet is whether both sides could find a way to couple their
different types of military strength and mentality. At the same time, relevant questions
must be raised: are the leading countries of the EU ready to share European power with
Turkey? Is the cohesion of the EU under threat as a result of the prospective redistribution
of power? Will Turkey become a real Trojan Horse serving the US rather than the
European interests or any negative political and strategic approach and views on the
Turkish accession to the EU result from the fear of the leading and other European
countries to share with Turkey their EU political, legal institutional economic and military
power? In other words, what is the reference to the Trojan Horse: a real threat or a well
sound excuse of excluding Turkish membership?
Map 1: Major Pipeline System and Projects CEYHAN TERMINAL
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affaires of Turkey 2008d
This map demonstrates the importance of the Turkish geopolitical and geo-strategic
position on regional and global levels. It explains why Turkey positions itself as a regional
power, a geopolitical bridge between Europe and Asia and an energy crossroad. At the
same time, it shows why advocates of Turkish accession to the EU consider Turkey as an
indispensable actor, should the EU wish to play a global role. This would play to Turkey‟s
great advantage within the context of accession to the EU. However, it also stands as a
disadvantage, if we take into account that leading countries of the EU are not ready to
share the power they enjoy in the EU with Turkey.
43
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cite_note-Bahamas-226
Romania‟s geopolitical position in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus.
Reflections upon the Strategic Partnership between Romania and the US
Nicolae TOBOŞARU
Abstract: The relation of strategic partnership with USA has helped not only the
hastening of Romania‟s modernization, but also the invitation to NATO‟s membership in 2002.
Moreover, through the Access Agreement of US Army in facilities located on the Romanian
territory, since 2005, the future installation of the American anti-missile elements and the support
for the Black Sea Strategy of the Bǎsescu administration, the bilateral strategic partnership has
consolidated the geopolitical position of Romania, as an operator in the southern flank of the
Ponto-Baltic Isthmus.
Keywords: pivotal state, buffer state, limes, pontic-baltic isthmus, Romanian-American
strategic partnership
The geopolitics of Eastern border of Europe – an historical overview
One of the most complex issues that the European civilization is confronting with,
since the dawn of its existence, is the identification of the Eastern frontiers of the
extensive peninsular space of Heartland¸ often known as the European continent. A part,
along with Asia, of Eurasia, the so-called World Island, theoretically approached by
Halford Makinder at the beginning of the 20th Century, Europe has built its own
civilization which gradually defied any geographical benchmark and affected globally and
decisively the human destiny.
If toward West, the Atlantic Ocean represents the geographical landmark of
Europe, in the East, the dimension, nature and the alignment of the frontier have known
significant evolutions by the historical amplitude of their consequences. Beyond being just
a geographical limit, this frontier has represented a geopolitical and strategic isobar among
great empires, European and Eurasian spaces, geopolitical blocks and ideologies. The
history emphasized, in a normal geopolitical logic, the fact that frequently, the route of
Eastern frontier was situated on the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus, defined on the alignment of
Vistula- Dniester Rivers. By the inclusion within its southern flank of the CarpathianDanube-Pontic space, the isthmus and the history build around it have influenced
decisively the destiny of the Romanian people as well.
The Roman Empire was in search of a natural border, of stability, identified as
normal limes, toward the isthmus. Rome never attained this alignment and therefore, its
military and cultural frontier proved to be vulnerable alongside a dark East and a
continuously aggressive barbarian pressure. Diluted in the center and in north by the
Russian imperial expansion, and occupied in the south more than three centuries by the
Ottoman Empire, the geopolitical significance of the isthmus becomes active starting with
the second half of the 17th Century, by the so-called the Oriental Question. The changes
within the continental balance of power in the second half of the 19th Century have
marked also the geopolitical stance of the isthmus. Therefore, in its Baltic flank, the
repetitively dissolutions of the Polish state, emphasized the zero sum game played by
Prussia, Austria and Russia. In the Danube-Black Sea flank, the process of dissolution of
the Ottoman Empire led to the emergence of several independent and autonomous states,
which played a balancing role in the South Eastern Europe geopolitical tectonics and
represented also buffer states at the Danube Mouths and Pontic straits, related to a Russian
47
Empire, firmly positioned between Baltic Sea and the Pontic space and with ambitions to
Constantinople and Aegean Sea.
The emergence of USSR in 1917, along with national and federative independent
states rose from the ash of Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of the First World War
have opened a new chapter in the destiny of the Black Sea-Baltic space. The appearance
of Soviet Russian Empire and the fierceness of the Bolshevik spreading have determined
the winning Great European Powers, to reactivate the Ponto-Baltic isthmus, as a an
Eastern frontier with explicit ideological connotations and to operate with a new
geopolitical concept. We refer to the cordon sanitaire or barrière de l`Est. The concept
was set apart by the Marshall Ferdinand Foch at 27 March 1919, the cordon having the
role to separate “the Bolshevik Russia from Europe” (Leuştean, 2002: 62, 72). The new
concept, whose paternity was revendicated also by the Romanian General Dumitru Iliescu
(Leuştean, 2002: 62), was rejected at that time by the United States 1, but later was
consecrated with a different terminology by the Decision of the Supreme Council of the
Peace Conference, adopted at the meeting of 12-13 December 1919. Through this
decision, England and France intended to round Russia with “barb wire”, in order to
prevent its expansion. This role was designed to be given to Baltic States, Poland,
Czechoslovakia and Romania (Leuştean, 2002:153).
The end of the Second World War and the communist instauration in Central and
Eastern Europe have devalued for almost half a century the geopolitical frontier meanings
of the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus. This space became a simple geographical alignment within
the European Communist Block. Through the speech of the British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill, from 5th of March 1946, it was set the replacement of cordon sanitaire
with an Iron Curtain, as an emphasized metaphorical expression of the limes. The role of
the isthmus was taken accordingly, for more than forty years, by the so-called Fulda Line,
shaped in the German space. Simultaneously, the appearance of NATO, with a consistent
and protective American involvement, from the geopolitical and strategic perspective, the
Western European frontier is moved on the Pacific coastline of the North-American
continent. In the East, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon administrations were those
who shift attention toward the Central and Eastern European space within the logic of new
strategic concepts such as the politics of bridge building and, later on, the concept of
linkage, the improvement of the relationships with the states from the communist block
and the encouragement of their independent attitudes.
The 1989 Revolutions and the crash of the entire communist system, generated
confuse evolutions, contradictory and difficult to predict within the former states of the
European communist block and reopened the issue of the geopolitical definition of the
European area. The geopolitical significance of the Ponto - Baltic Isthmus was suddenly
and extremely visibly reactivated. Starting with this year, on the background of Mikhail
Gorbatchev‟s efforts to save the USSR through the perestroika and glasnost processes,
The Central and Eastern Europe became the manifestation space of a unique historical
process, the transition from communism to capitalism. For multiple geopolitical reasons,
the main Western European governments sustained the efforts of the soviet leader despite
his politics and the new fracture lines become obvious. The lack of strong political
visions, integrated and innovative in the Western European democratic system in relation
with the new geopolitical context from the Central and Eastern European area place a
mark on the last decade of the twentieth century. It is the area for whose inclusion in the
1
At the end of the Second World War, US have launched and sustained for several decades the
Truman Doctrine and the foreign policy of containment of the communist space.
48
structure of the European Community, François Mitterrand appreciated it would take a few
decades of accommodation (Mitterrand, 1991), stopping this way the enthusiasm of the new
emergent European democracies. Finally, it is the area in which France and Great Britain, in
the wave of the geopolitical tectonics of German reunification, found themselves between the
American expectative and the Russian imponderable. In this context the western efforts,
including the American ones, of sustaining the transition processes, of identity affirmation
going through the state independency and Euro-Atlantic integration, have been focused in the
early 1990 on Poland and Hungary, and later on the so-called Visegrad group. Romania, due
to its confuse policies and evolutions was outside of this processes.
The geopolitical positioning of the Carpathian-Danubian -Pontic space, the
Southern flank of the isthmus
We believe that a brief overview on the historical aspects of the geopolitical
positioning of the Carpathian- Danube-Pontic space connected to the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus
can complete our analysis. Always, this space has represented an interest for the great
powers. The consequence was the shaping of its historical destiny and consequently of its
role, taking into consideration the interactions between the geopolitical conceptions and
political, economical and military gestures of those dominant powers, as well as the
indigenous populations and state structures.
For the Roman Empire, the Getae-Dacian territory, beyond its economic value
had an important strategic role to play, of frontier – limes at the confluence with the great
unknown and disobedient Eastern spaces. This role has grounded the birth of the
Romanian people, C.C. Giurescu mentioning that: “To defend the Eastern Europe, to
guard facing the Asian world is, without a doubt, one of our meanings. Accomplishing
this meaning was in direct correspondence with the times of greatness and glory of the
nation. And every time when we forgot the call of the historical destiny, the call that is
drowned from the four fortresses from Hotin to the seashore, symbolically guarding the
shoreline of Dniester, we failed and we were disconsidered (Pop, 1999: 227).
The role and the concept of the limes came periodically into the actuality once
with the entrance of this area of the migratory people and later, of the Russian and
Ottoman empires. The limes came back, invariably, with every effort to draw the
geographical limits and geopolitical delimitations of the European continent from the
Asian space, as an effort that, with few exceptions, contributed to the profile of the PontoBaltic Isthmus. The limes role of the Romanian medieval state formations was effective,
invoked by some Romanian rulers recognized by the European powers of those times.
Later on, for more than 300 years, the Ottoman occupation neutralized the geopolitical
relevance of those state entities.
The positioning within this isthmus-frontier of Europe has determined a
continuously relationship of the Romanian space both with the Western powers and with
the Russian and Ottoman Empires in the East. This relationship has known, since ht 19 th
Century, a complex and dynamic progress. Its expression consists in a deeper involvement
and with significant political and economical consequences to assume this space to the
West. We refer to the moments of 1829, with the consequences of the Adrianopol and the
presence of the Anglo-Saxons to the mouths of the Danube, the moment of 1848, with the
revolutionary movements and their ideas, the unification of the Romanian Principalities in
1859 and the direct and pragmatic involvement of France in 1877 and the increasing
influence of Germany at the lower Danube. This is the moment that, after a long Ottoman
occupation, Romania has a direct access to the Black Sea. With the purpose to assume this
space and to limit the expansion of the Eastern and Asian powers on the continent and in
49
the area of the Pontic straits, those evolutions were favorable to the emergence of the
Romanian state. This context ensured to Romania a new, complex and alternative role – as
a buffer state, or, in the expression of Nicolae Iorga, the role of “a European necessity
state”. Later on and successively, the Romanian state had a function either of limes, either
of buffer zone on the Eastern dimension of Europe, both expressions generating and
strengthening for the Romanian nation the position of operator in the Southern flank of
the geopolitical Ponto-Baltic Isthmus.
Beyond definitions more or less accepted, we will try several reflections. Therefore,
the function of the limes supposes the defined, assumed and recognized belonging to a
political, military and/or cultural, to a community of values, interests and will. It is a belonging
that assumes the access to an articulated and stable system of security.
The concept of buffer state, has been formulated by Rudolf Kjellen at the end of
th
19 Century with reference to the role of the sates situated on the long street of Danube
people and Hungarian Plain (Bǎdescu, 2002: 16). For Romania this role was instituted and
materialized by the imperial powers since the beginning of the 19 th Century.
The installation of bolshevism in the Russian space and the need to block its way
toward West expressed through the strategy of cordon sanitaire has strengthened the limes
role of Romania. The most visible and efficient role was the military campaign in
Hungary in 1919, finalized with the occupation of Budapest and the removal from power
of Bela Kun soviet regime. It was the expression of Romania‟s new geopolitical role and
later, the function as bridgehead for European policy toward East until the World War II,
initiated by the Romanian prime-minister Ion I. C. Brǎtianu in 1919 (Leuştean, 2002:53)
In the first half of the 20th Century, Karl Haushofer, through the conception of
geopolitical blocks and Carl Schmitt, through the one of great spaces, have been invoked
and ensured ideological support for the Germans who placed the European civilization
under two major conflicts. The German geopolitical vision was counterbalanced by the
Anglo-Saxon approach of heartland and rimland, expressed by Halford Mackinder. The
confrontation between the two visions had historical consequences: it offered the Soviet
Empire a space of development for more than 7 decades; it consecrated the present role of
US in the world; it generated the state remodeling of the entire Central and Eastern Europe
and determined after 1945 the polarization of Europe and the entire world.
The period from 1990 to 1997 did not brought any change to Romania‟s position
as a buffer state (Toboşaru, 2009:15) even if major geopolitical and strategic changes
occurred in this time: the fall of the communist regimes, the dissolution of USSR and
Warsaw Pact. There have been events that underlined this posture. A first event was the
launch by NATO of the Partnership for Peace program and the signing by Romania of the
adhesion protocol in 26 of January 1994. One of the main objectives was the prevention of
power vacuum deepening in the Central and Eastern Europe (Paşcu, 2007: 46). A second
event was the nomination of Romania, within the NATO Summit in Madrid in July 1997,
on the first eligible position for the second enlargement wave (NATO, 1997). The
enlargement of NATO in 1997 has marked the move of the Eastern Euro-Atlantic limes to
the northern flank of the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus, emphasizing the Romania‟s role as a buffer
state in the southern flank.
The impact of Romania-US Strategic Partnership on the Romania‟s
geopolitical posture in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus
At 11 of July 1997, in Bucharest, Emil Constantinescu and Bill Clinton have
launched the strategic partnership between Romania and US, as a novel political act both
in the history of bi-lateral relations and within the political and strategic sub-regional
50
context, with deep implications in the redefinition of Romania‟s posture. Several
explanations are necessary.
From methodological viewpoint there seems to be difficult to make obvious
distinctions between the effects of the summed programs of the strategic partnership and
the overall transition process of Romania after 1997. The causes are multiple. Therefore,
the US influences, directly or indirectly, the main geopolitical influences in the EuroAtlantic space and beyond. Consequently, Central and Eastern Europe, after 1990, has
been an area of American direct and complex involvement which influenced the subregional and national processes.
Then, certain historical evidence and data led us to say that the Romanian
proposal for a bi-lateral strategic partnership has constitute one of the support tools of the
policy developed by the US for the entire South East European and Balkan Space. At the
beginning of 1997, from different reasons and beyond the decision to invite the Visegrad
Group countries to join NATO, US did not have a consolidated strategy in this space
(Toboşaru, 2009: 14-15). In the American vision, Romania and Slovenia were not
sufficiently qualified for the integration in the Alliance and the acceptance of the French
pressures for the inclusion of these states would have compromised the chances for future
admissions of the Baltic states (Asmus, 2008: A21). Moreover, it has been desired what in
2002 has been expressed by the president G.W. Bush at the Warsaw University: the
inclusion in the Alliance of all democracies between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. In
the South-Eastern Europe, the geopolitical evolutions were marked by the Yugoslav
conflict and the dissolution of this state, the uncertainty of Ukraine positioning and stronf
divergences regarding territories and ethnicity. In this context, the stability of Romania,
one of the most important actors with pro-western orientation, has been a necessity for the
US policy to redefine the political and strategic potential of the region.
Finally, we propose to analize this issue on three different significant temporal
pillars: the period of 1997-2004, marked by the start of the relationship and the Romania‟s
integration into NATO; the period of 2004-2008, as a sustained relationship of Romania‟s
quality as an US ally within NATO and starting with 1 st of January 2007, marked by the
Romania‟s membership within EU and finally, the period after 2008, marked by the new
geopolitical vision of President Barak Obama.
The 1997-2004 period
The strategic partnership relation between Romania and US in this period has
influenced the defining of a new geopolitical position of Romania. For emphasizing this
parameters we will analyse the forms of expression of this influence.
The acceptance by US of the arguments used by the Romanian leaders in the
support for bilateral strategic partnership has favourized an American political strategy for
South Eastern Europe and North European (Baltic). From the American viewpoint, the
strategic level of corelation expressed: „The recognition by the US of the role of potential
leader (of Romania) in South Eastern Europe (Asmus, 2002: 228), in the context where, in
the formula of Stephen Flanagan, the special assistant of President Clinton for Central and
Eastern Europe within the National Security Council: “Romania remains an island of
stability in the tumultuous South Eastern European space, representing an important
contributor and supporter of the Alliance and other initiatives to strengthen security in
Europe” (Flanagan, 1998). This strategy has been concluded by the launch, at 10 th of
February 1998, of the US Action Plan for South Eastern Europe. The similar version
projected by the US for the European Baltic Flank is structured under the name of “US
initiative for Northern Europe” (Asmus, 2002: 276) and the signing, at 16 of January 1998
51
of the US Baltic Charter (A Charter of Partnership among the United States of America
and the Republic of Estonia, Republic of Latvia and the Republic of Lithuania). Another
element that suggest the importance of Romania in the geopolitical American and Ally
plans with regard of the Southern issues of the Ponto-Baltic alignment is represented by
the common declaration form 16th of July 1998 of the presidents Clinton and
Constantinescu. It is the declaration that states the key role of the bi-lateral strategic
partnership within the US Action Plan for South Eastern Europe as well as for overall
stability of Central and Eastern Europe (White House, 1998).
Taking into account the informal security support of Romania as a member of PfP
and strategic partner of US, the national political factors from 1997-2004 have engaged
the military forces in different missions from former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq,
the Romanian state acting de facto as a member of NATO. This happened without asking
or getting the security guarantees mentioned in the 5 th article of the North Atlantic Treaty
or formal guarantees from US. The decision represents an exceptional unilateral political
attitude which determined exceptional military and strategic gestures. For the Yugoslav
issue, this attitude was adopted and affirmed through the Appeal from 14th of October
1998, addressed by the Romanian Parliament and other NATO states parliaments, which
express the interest that Romania is willing to participate within the OSCE verification
mechanism (Official Monitor, 1998:1). In accordance with attitude, Romania has accepted
the use by NATO Forces of its air space and the terrestrial transit for the support, in 1999,
of the “Allied Force” Operation in Yugoslavia.
At 15th of June 2001, President G. W. Bush had a speech at the Warsaw
University, where he announced the new geopolitical philosophy for Europe of its
administration. The central element was the recognition that all new democracies of
Europe, from Baltic Sea to Black Sea, and everything that is among them should benefit
from the same chance of security and liberty. 2 Therefore, NATO has opened for this grey
area, including Romania too. Then, shortly after it happened the disastrous terrorist
attacks over US.
The tragedy of 9/11 2001 determined a rapid and firm reaction of Romanian
Presidency, formalized within the CSAT decision, that the Romanian state, as a strategic
partner of US, to act as a de facto member of the Alliance. Through the Decision no. 21 of
19th of September 2001, the Romanian Parliament has confirmed the Presidency position.
Within the 1st Article it is stipulated the basis for this attitude: “Romania, as a strategic
partner of US and member of Partnership for Peace, will participate as an de facto ally of
NATO … in combating international terrorism by all means, including military” (Official
Monitor, 2001:1). Moreover, within the 3rd paragraph it is mentioned that Romania will
coordinate its actions with US and NATO. It followed the adoption by the Parliament in
12 of February 2003 of the Decision No.2, regarding the participation with troops within
the “Iraqi Freedom” Operation.
We notice that in the support of the adopted decisions, the documents from
October 1998 and September 2001 explicitly invoke the Strategic Partnership between
Romania and US. In this context, through the bi-lateral relationship, the Romanian state
has been placed in two simultaneously situations: as a strategic partner of US and as a de
facto member of NATO, involving the assuming of a complex set of obligations. In the
same context of consequences, we consider that the repositioning of Romania from a
buffer state in a non-integrated grey area of the European continent toward the Eastern
Euro-Atlantic limes and potential bridgehead toward the Russian geopolitical space has
2
To see: www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010615-1.html
52
been a consequence of the decisions based on the strategic partnership with US. This
process was finalized de jure at 29th of March 2004 at the NATO Summit in Washington.
Within the issue of Romania‟s shift from buffer state we underline two related
aspects with significant geopolitical values. We refer to the transformation of Romanian
borders from state borders with local and bi-lateral significance in direct frontiers of
European and Euro-Atlantic economic, political and security organizations – EU and
NATO, as geopolitical frontiers. For example, from geopolitical and strategic viewpoint,
the state frontier between Romania and the Republic of Moldova in the period of 19922002, reach a major importance after 29th of March 2004, becoming a frontier between
two regional structures and the Republic of Moldova, with a complex bilateral subregional and regional implications. The tragic paradox of the new situation is represented
by the fact that Romania discards its geopolitical status of buffer state while other
Romanian territory - Republic of Moldova - has taken this status, in the same Black Sea
Area context and within the confluence of the Russian Space with Ukraine and NATO.
Another important aspect is the repositioning of Romania as an operator in the
Southern flank of the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus. This posture is relevant within the space of
political and military analysis and indicates a state which is geographically situated in a
determinant position for the stability of this alignment, either as a whole, and either as an
important segment of it. It is a status whose geopolitical importance, as a composed
structure involving geographical, economic, demographic, military and other data, allows
the operator to influence the evolutions in this space, and Romania has this role,
recognized by the governmental American elites (Asmus, 2003:239). It was the main
argument in the support of the Romania‟s invitation to join NATO in the first wave,
support given also by the southern flank members of the Alliance (Asmus, 2003: 215). It
was a southern flank sensitive to the prolonged and violent instability from the Balkans
and the historical tensions between Turkey and Greece. It was a flank whose absence from
the enlargement plans of the Alliance had the risk to generate the danger of emergency of
a new geopolitical division of Europe, on the North-South axis. We recall the plans of
Serbia and Russian Federation from 1996-1999 for the constituency of a Pan-Slav
Brotherhood Union and the creation of a Slavic geopolitical axis in Europe.
The concept of operator in the southern flank in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus request
several commentaries in relation with another geopolitical category – the pivot-state. The
US, as an actor with global presence, objectives and resources, lays down special strategies
and policies dedicated to some states only in case of great relevance for American interests.
We refer to nuclear powers and the so-called pivot-states. Starting with the 70‟s from the
last century, as long as the American interest advanced and structured in different parts of
the world, the American geopolitics started to operate with this concept and category of
state. There are states that, through intrinsic geopolitical features and capacity to influence
the adjacent regional space, occupy a privileged place in the formulation and support of the
American policies. Some American analysts identify for the US policy, at global scale and
on the long term, nine of such pivot-states: Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, South
Africa, Brazil, Algeria and Mexico (Chase, Hill, Kennedy, 1998:8). Of course, the list is not
closed and it can be changed in time, either if some of these states become great powers,
either new states emerge in this position.
It is necessary to make a distinction between the two concepts used by the
American geopolitics: strategic partner and pivot state. Therefore, in the American vision,
the pivot-states plays their role independently from the interests and policies of the US,
and this role is assumed not within a particular context but within a temporal historical
scale. In this matter, some authors invoke the case of Turkey, placed for more than 150 years
53
in the center of the so-called Oriental Question. In exchange, the status of strategic partner is
a conjuncture at historical scale and it is related with a bilateral relation and a specific political
context where the partners are following their common interest within a doctrinaire political
and strategic spectrum. The distinction emphasizes the level of engagement of the partners in
the relationship, a level which is dependent by the degree of interests‟ and involvement reality.
South Korea or Israel are strategic partners of US, as well as Egypt or India, but there are not
pivot states. Romania is not a explicit pivot state because its economic and demographic
parameters did not sustain this position, even though the Romanian space has regional
geopolitical signification as a pivot, expressed at historical scale.
After 1990, the American political and military establishment has given a special
attention, at the level of strategic partnership, to Poland and Ukraine. Romania is not a
pivot state in the American perspective, but together with Poland and Ukraine, is fixing
the geographical milestones of a significant space in the American and European
geopolitics – the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus.
It is necessary to emphasize an important aspect of the US-Romanian relationship.
If in the period of 1997-2001 the implications of the bilateral strategic partnership aimed
the support and acceleration of internal reforms and preparation of Romania to join
NATO, the 9/11 has modified this context. The tragedy offered to Romania the
opportunity to demonstrate its ability to notice and use the historical opportunities.
The independent decision to act, in the virtue of the strategic partnership with US,
as a de facto member of NATO, has suddenly widened the space of Romanian-American
cooperation and the propagation of the effects of this relationship at a regional and global
scale. Romania passed from the phase of absolute beneficiary of the partnership to the
phase of contributor of the relationship in terms of services for its partner. The application
and generation space of benefits for US was not exclusively Romania, but the global
geopolitical American interest space.
The period of 2004-2008
Starting with 2004 and the integration in NATO, Romania returned in the great
family of European and Euro-Atlantic democracies. The new status as allied state, as well
as the strategic relationship with US had substantial consequences over the Romanian
behavior and attitudes in the international arena especially on our interest area.
A constant concern of the Romanian political environment has been focused on
the use of Romanian geopolitical positioning in the Black Sea Area, as an operator in the
southern flank of the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus. Mentioning the five geopolitical features that
are relevant for the Romanian space, the geographer Simion Mehedinţi included the Black
Sea and its straights among the Carpathians, Danube and the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus.
Moreover, he insisted on the reality of foreign interests on the Romanian seashores: “in
any case, the grounds of indigenous elements to the maritime periphery of Dacia are a fact
prior to the so-called discovery and it was made slowly”. (Mehedinţi, 1967: 261).
Gheorghe I Brǎtianu said in his course at the War Superior School in February 1942:
“Free sea and the mountains in our hands are not only a vital space but vital conditions, or
otherwise, the elements of our existence” (Brǎtianu, 1988: 105). Brǎtianu concluded: “In
our security space enters…the issue of the Straights, the Danube Mouths and Iron Gates,
that regulates its course, as well as air and naval bases [soviet] from Crimea. It is not
indifferent to us who control them”. (Brǎtianu, 1988: 105-106)
The fall of the communist block in 1989 was the beginning of a fast and
continuous reconfiguration process of the Black Sea geopolitical profile. The process was
accelerated by three events of historical magnitude: the 9/11 attack, the launch of a global
54
war against terrorism and the redefinition of American political and strategic doctrinaire
basis; the NATO enlargement to the Black Sea and the integration of Romania and
Bulgaria and the Orange Revolutions from Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan.
Black Sea became the limes of the Euro-Atlantic political and economic space and
the interface of Europe with Central Asia and Middle East, accomplishing the reality of a
“Common European Maritime Space”. In the same time, the Black Sea represents an area
of democratic deficit, of non-democratic practices and frozen conflicts in the former soviet
space. It represents an area of unconventional threats and an area where the European
history acquires, at the beginning of the 21st Century, a unique and dramatic geopolitical
reality – the existence of two Romanian states.
It is also an important area for the European energy security with deep
geopolitical implications. These dimensions are consolidated through the involvement of
US, for the first time, in the space and problems of the Black Sea (Toboşaru, 2009:165). A
direct, systemic and long term involvement within its implications the EU articulates
visions, policies and actions in official strategic structures.
The 2004 NATO enlargement represents the milestone when the European peninsula
integrates and assumes the Black Sea shores. In this context, after a century, Russia realize the
diminishing of its preeminent strategic position in the Black Sea, since was forced to share its
influence with Turkey, Ukraine and other shore states members of EU and NATO.
After December 1989, on the ground of its grey area positioning, Romania didn‟t
manage to manifest directly its political and strategic interests and the loss of its
commercial maritime fleet constitutes an unfortunate example. After 1997, the process of
geopolitical redefinition of Romania, launched in 1994 will be tight connected with its
positioning in the Black Sea area.
Once with the installation, at the end of 2004, of Bǎsescu Presidency, the strategic
partnership with US has known a significant intensity. Romania‟s followed objectives
were addressed to the involvement of US in the transformation of the strategic Black Sea
space. Romania has historical interest in this area and the Bǎsescu administration placed
the Black Sea issue in the center of its foreign and security policy, among with the
objective of EU integration at 1st of January 2007.
Starting from the perception of a clear connection between the Euro-Atlantic
community, the former soviet states and the Middle East, the presidential opinion consider
Romania as a “bridgehead for the Trans-Atlantic community in the Black Sea Area”
(Bǎsescu, 2005) and in this context, the assurance of an American military presence on the
Romanian soil, was one of the debated solutions. In the effort to became “a platform for
promoting the values of liberty and democracy in the Black Sea Area” (Bǎsescu, 2005)
and with the strong believe that “a powerful Romania at the Black Sea means more
security for EU and NATO” (Bǎsescu, 2005). In the presidential opinion, Romania is
based on the Strategic Partnership with US and on the active role of NATO in the Wider
Black Sea Region. We believe that through this behavior Romania surpass its condition of
a simple state at the Black Sea shores and becomes an active and significant actor, who
assign its own strategic visions, policies and resources for the geopolitical modeling of the
Black Sea Region.
We propose to identify the geopolitical and strategic effects and meanings of this
evolution after 2004, and in this purpose the analysis will be focused on the Romania‟s
integration within the US global security system, through the permanent presence of US
military forces on Romania‟s territory, at the Black Sea shore.
One of the major consequences of the 9/11 2001 was the shift of the American
perception about the security concept and policy and the starting of a extensive process of
55
3
repositioning of the American basis. The American analyst Thomas Donnely said that it is
configuring what it might represent, at global level, the American security perimeter, a space
that has been extended after 1990. In Europe, the battlefield line did not follow the Fulda
Gap, but it moved toward East, and more significantly toward South, along the shores of
Black Sea, the Mediterranean Sea and the Eastern borders of Turkey (Donelly, 2003).
There is a multitude of reasons that determined the American global repositioning,
including in the European space and with implications on the Romanian space4, including
the geographical elements with a strategic impact: “With Romania we have a special
relation. The Bulgarians are our ally but President Bush considers that the signing of this
agreement with Romania is the most reasonable from geographical viewpoint” (Rice, 2005).
The inclusion of Romania in the overall strategy regarding the repositioning of the
global military capabilities of US - Global Defense Positioning Posture – announced by
the President Bush at 16th of August 2004 has been a process whose foundation was laid
down by the Iliescu Administration in the mandate of 1992-1996 and culminated with the
signing, at 6th of December 2005 of the Agreement between Romania and the USA
regarding the activities of the US military forces on the Romanian territory. The state
secretary Condoleezza Rice appreciated the document as a “historical agreement” (Rice,
2005). The Agreement was ratified by the Romanian Parliament through the Law 268
from June 29th 2006 and it represents a document with political character that allows the
setting of the first US military bases in a former state of the Warsaw Pact. Certainly, the
event represents an exceptional moment in the development of the bilateral strategic
partnership both on mutual relations and on the regional implications. It was an event that
expresses the high level of mutual trust, the quality of bilateral cooperation and the
perspectives of the partnership development.
We will develop an analysis of the geopolitical implications of the Agreement
which implies three levels of interest: (a) national, (b) sub-regional and regional and (c)
global, due to the global character of the American partner.
At national level we appreciate that the presence of American forces leads to the
strengthening of security guarantees that Romania acquired through the NATO
membership and since 2007 the EU membership (within the European Security and
Defense Policy). It was a guarantee that allows the prevention of possible attempts of
regional or sub-regional hegemony of some regional actors. The American presence
contributes to the drawing of a new geopolitical and strategic profile of Romania at the
beginning of the 21st Century and the increasing of the Romania‟s visibility within the
American political elites and the mass-media. This fact represents a certain gain of image,
offering and added value to Romania‟s international prestige and support for global
political and economic positions. This position offers an argument for the approach of the
energy corridors from the Caspian Area toward Europe, by crossing the Romanian territory.
The existence of these facilities ensures Romania a greater openness for American capital
3
The chef of Pentagon, Donald Rumsfeld said: „There will be the biggest changes in American
Army since the end of Second World War. It is a kind of movement from a defensive, static
conception specific of the Cold War toward a dynamic and active one”. Interview, in Evenimentul
Zilei, 9 February 2004, electronic edition: www.evz.ro/articole/detalii-articol/641395/DonaldRumsfeld-Nu-regret-ca-am-spus-vechea-si-noua-Europa/
4
Among these reasons we mention: the major difficulties of US in march 2003 ragarding the use of
military bases placed on the Turkish territory, an NATO member state and a special ally of US;
criminality and terrorist potential in the ex-soviet space and withn the „frozen conflicts” of Black
Sea and South Caucasus areas; the need of implementation of energy security strategies related to
the resources and transit conditions in the Caspian Area.
56
flow economic investments as well as for other economies connected with the US. In this
context, Paul Hanarahan, the CEO of AES Corporation USA considered that: „The
American investors, but not only Americans, have the tendency to get involved in states
with [US] military bases”. 5 In the same time, the US military presence in Romania
determine more firmly attitudes from Russia6 in bi-lateral relations and in matters of energy.
We consider that the connection between the foreign policy and security strategy of Bǎsescu
Administration, the Washington-London-Bucharest Axis, oriented on the Pontic space and
the US decision to acceed to facilities from Romania is obvious.
Certainly, the American military presence in Romania it is not a gift but an
expression of regional interest of USA and a confirmation of the Atlanticist attitude of
Romania and the value of its geographical position (Rice, 2005). The Agreement, signed
for a period of ten years, places Romania in a political and strategic position both strong
and sensitive, obliging the Romanian political elites toward foreign policy and security
attitudes with deep geopolitical meanings. In the same time, we believe in the honest
appreciation of US military presence in Romania as it was set in the US National Security
Strategy in 2002: “The presence of American forces overseas is one of the most profound
symbols of the U.S. commitments to allies and friends. Through our willingness to use
force in our own defense and in defense of others, the United States demonstrates its
resolve to maintain a balance of power that favors freedom” (NSS, 2002:29). The
presence of military forces has lead to the strengthening of the national security status,
through the direct engagement of US in the preservation of Romania‟s security. 7 This was
an engagement assumed beyond the NATO framework and explicitly affirmed for the
second time by the American president, after his speech from 23rd of November 2002 in
the Revolution Square of Bucharest.
From a sub-regional Pontic perspective, the presence of American bases in
Romania, related with the presence in Bulgaria, has relevance in the Wider Black Sea
Area. This fact confirms the emergence of this space as a significant strategic, geopolitical
and geo-economic area for the beginning of the 21st Century. Moreover, it favors the
efforts of political and strategic “greening” of the area. One of the American initiators of
the decision and a promoter of an integrated US strategy for Black Sea, Bruce L. Jackson,
underlinded this connection within the US Senate Comittee for International Relations. 8
The permanent presence of US forces implicitly modifies the sub-regional balance of
5
To see Mioriţa US Army at: www.expres.ro/articole/detalii-articol/700641/Miorita-US-Army/
Serghei Mironov, the President of superior chamber of Duma ,,Question – Does Russia considers
that the American bases and anti-missile project are threats to its security? Answer – No doubt! If
we have to name things, the installation of anti-missile shield elements in Czech Republic and
Poland is nothing but the placement in Europe, at minutes of rocket flight from Russia, of some
American offensive army components”. Interview, in Evenimentul Zilei (Bucharest), 15 October
2007, p. 5
7
G.W. Bush: „I was there [in Bucharest] to ensure the Romanian people that we are an ally and
the Romanian people should not worry about its security, and the US, through NATO and
bilateral relations, has engaged to ensure the security of its friends”, in Common Press
Conference of the presidents Bush and Bǎsescu from April 2nd 2008 in Neptun. To see:
http://www.presidency.ro
8
Bruce Jackson: ,, The US Defense Department should take the decision to reposition its bases
from Europe in the locations offered by Romania... Will be the best gesture that the US truly
share the opinion... that the security and stability of the Black Sea are essential for the EuroAtlantic security”. See: Observatorul Militar (Bucharest), No. 11, 17- 23 March 2005, electronic
edition.
6
57
power (Spencer, Hulsman, 2003) and not only in this area, representing a clear step
toward the internationalization of the Black Sea and its transformation in an open sea,
contributing to the discouraging of conflict tendencies. In the same time we notice that
these military facilities did not influenced the events from Georgia in the summer of 2008,
respectively did not inhibited the Russian invasion operations. It is a fact that indicates
certain limits within the actual strategic importance dimension of facilities, significant for
the sub-regional actors but with low relevance for an actor as Russia. The relevance of the
facilities resides in their symbolism and potential 9 and moreover, this American
repositioning is not on short term.
We consider that the facilities are a confirmation of Romania‟s role as a key ally
of US, needed for strengthening their influence in this area, a confirmation of Romania‟s
role as a stable bridgehead on the Eastern Euro-Atlantic limes. Traian Bǎsescu said at the
signing of the Agreement: “…Washington‟s choice to install bases on the territory of our
country demonstrates political credibility from the Romania‟s viewpoint. Romania will
become a serious pillar of stability in the area” (Bǎsescu, 2005).
Allowing the US access to military facilities in Romania and later in Bulgaria did
not represented a surprise for the Russian decision makers.10 Even though, the Russian
military environment did not considered US military presence in Romania, and other
Eastern European countries, as a sudden deterioration of Russia‟s geopolitical positioning.
It was appreciated that under the new circumstances the entire European part of Russian
territory is now accessible to NATO‟s offensive tactical capabilities, not only the strategic
ones. This perception of American policy has determined the Russian Federation to
strengthen its relations with China and the former Soviet states form Central Asia.
The presence of American forces in the Black Sea Area certifies a continuing and
certain diminishing process of sub-regional Russian influence and an increasingly US
influence. The blockage, in April 2008, by some western allies of Alliance‟ consensus
regarding the MAP offer for the Ukraine and Georgia did not dilute the US determination
to involve in this space. This fact was pointless regarding the US will to maintain a visible
presence and an explicit influence in Europe. It was, in the same time, a confirmation of
the move of American interest center weight in the space of Eastern Europe, in the area of
the new emergent democracies called by Donald Rumsfeld as the New Europe. It was a
signal of US long term consistent support of new European democracies.
In the same time, the new American facilities from Romania and Bulgaria can
compensate some uncertain maritime communication lines from this space, becoming a
message for Turkey and its Pontic policy – a close one in line with Russian policy – in the
main political and strategic dossiers. It might be considered also as an answer to the
Turkish unpredictable attitudes toward the US requests and interests. 11 In the words of the
9
Col. John Ingham, the Cheif of US Office for Security Cooperation in Bucharest said: „The idea
is that the troops in Romania to come for training. This does not mean that in five years, to say, a
certain brigade cannot be deployed in a mission somewhere in Central Asia or South-East Asia”.
See the Interview in Evenimentul zilei (Bucharest), 30 November 2006, p. 10.
10
Serghei Lavrov said ,,... We knew these plans from the American leadership. Russia is closely
watching the reconfiguration of the American military presence in Europe and maintains a
constant dialogue with Washington in this matter” in Ziua (Bucharest), 9 December 2005,
electronic edition.
11
We refer, for instance, to the refuse of Ankara to allow access in its bases of US forces in the
eventuality of future American engagements in the Middle East. In February 2003, more than 40
ships with American troops and equipment have waited for weeks the Turkish decision of
landing. The approval did not came and it determined major changes in the operations plans.
58
former deputy secretary of Pentagon, Paul Wolfowitz, „the functioning of this bases can be
more political than military, by sending to anyone a certain message” (Johnson, 2005: 131).
At a regional-European level, the Black Sea Area is recognized as been “the most
sensitive part of European construction and of regional security construction” (Bǎsescu,
2007), representing the area from where it propagates the main security threats for
Romania. The Black Sea became a part of the space within Romania has the mission to
secure 2070 Km of Community frontier and about 7% from the Pontic seashore.
The Wider Black Sea Area has become the major transit corridor of Caspian
hydrocarbon resources to Europe and the supplier of 50% of the EU gas and oil necessities,
with the perspective of increasing these needs to 70% in the next 10 years. In this context we
consider that the US military facilities on the Romanian territory constitutes either a
favoring, either a modeling or generator of divergent political and strategic processes. We
refer to the fact that the Russian Federation has notified NATO with regard on the decision
to suspend, starting with 14th of July 2007, of its participation within the Conventional
Forces in Europe Treaty12, Russia initially warned that will not tolerate the military
extension of US and NATO in the proximity of Russian borders. Besides, the decree
mentions within the reasons of this decision the US military bases in Romania and Bulgaria.
On the other hand, we consider that these facilities favor processes as NATO enlargements
toward East. They strongly express the American interest in this space and the
determination to consolidate it, this option making possible the prolonging of geopolitical
meanings and implications of the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus toward the Caspian space.
Four months after the NATO Summit in Bucharest and the refuse by a group of
allied states to offer the MAP (Membership Action Plan) to Ukraine and Georgia, an event
occurred and significantly compromised the regional security and stability. In August
2008 Georgia, a sovereign state was invaded by the troops of Russian Federation. It was a
conflict with strong relevance for the geopolitical particularity of the region, defined by
realities as: Russia, within an imperial type policy has invaded a neighboring sovereign
state, a former USSR one and a candidate for NATO membership; the attack is produced
on the background of the existence of a separatist region and of a long “frozen conflict”;
the invocation by Russia of a necessity to defend the collective rights of an ethnic
minority; the attacked state has a major importance in the realization of the southern
corridor for EU gas and oil supply, other than Russian resources. We notice that the US
has signed, later, a strategic partnership with Ukraine, at 19 th of December 2008 and with
Georgia, at 9th of January 2009, a reality that maintains the perspective of a Ponto-BalticCaspian geopolitical isthmus.
From a global perspective, even if are placed in the Pontic space, the US military
facilities aim to sustain the American global interests. The executive director of German
Marshall Fund of US, Ronald Asmus confirms the assertion: “The decision to have
military bases on the Romanian territory is based on several factors. The one related to the
securitization of the Black Sea is only one of them. I believe that US should have bases
there, independently from the issue of the Black Sea. At a certain moment, Romania was
situated at the periphery of a stable and democratic Europe. Now is situated close to the
center of this map, if we think about a third wave of Euro-Atlantic integration. Romania
becomes an increasingly important ally and is in the middle of more and more thinks we
intend to do (Asmus, 2005: 8). No doubt, the facilities consolidate the role of US and
implicitly NATO in the Black Sea Region, Caucasus and Central Asia and ensures the
12
The CFE Treaty was signed by the NATO and Warsaw Pact member states after the end of Cold
War, in Paris at 19th of November 1990.
59
development of the US capability to project its power toward the extended Middle East
and Central Asia.
The period after 2008
By the instauration, at 20th of January 2009, of the new US president Barak H.
Obama, the bilateral strategic relation knows new dimensions and generates new evolutions
regarding the Romania‟s geopolitical positioning in the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus. Within the
framework of the Access Agreement, the Iranian issue and the reset of the US policy toward
Russian Federation, Washington decides the repositioning of key elements of the antimissile shield from Poland and Czech Republic to Romania. The invitation addressed to
Romania to participate in this program – with a deadline set for 2015 – was accepted by the
Romania‟s Superior Council of Country Defense al 4th of February 2010, a decision from
Parliament been expected. The major consequences of a predictable parliamentary approval
are connected with our investigation and we will briefly analyze them.
From national perspective Romania gains more security, without supplementary
spending, because the old defense system cannot entirely cover the national territory
against medium and range missiles. The decision consolidates the strategic relation with
US not only on mutual trust but also on solidarity and strengthens Romania‟s role as an
operator at the southern flank of the isthmus. A problem that requires its long term
monitoring is related to the impact of Romanian decision on the bilateral relations with
Russia. Significant consequences will be at a sub-regional level too. US consolidate its
presence in the Black Sea Area with strategic security elements but implicitly, determine
the fastening of Russian military strength in the region, by the extension of its fleet in
Crimea and the acquisition of high-tech French military ships.
In European regional plan, the anti-missile project has a double and a new
meaning. It consolidates the limes geopolitical role of the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus, oriented
this time toward the threats from the Middle East. On the other hand, through the offer for
cooperation with Russia for the shield development, it might represent a bridge to get
closer Moscow and the Euro-Atlantic space.
Beyond the Romanian-American bilateral relationship, two political decisions
assumed in 2010 by the president of Ukraine, Victor Ianukovic, have a deep impact on the
Romania‟s positioning in the South Eastern Europe. We refer to the delay of Ukraine efforts
to integrate in NATO and the decision to accept the Russian military fleet in the Sevastopol
base until 2042. These evolutions, among other elements such as the treatment of NATO as
one of the main foreign threats toward Russia within the new Russian military doctrine,
amplify the geopolitical relevance of Romania‟s position as Eastern frontier of NATO, EU
and as a part of American security perimeter on the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus.
Conclusion
As an important geographical reality, the alignment between Baltic Sea and the
Black Sea has been introduced in the political and strategic plan by the rulers of Imperial
Rome, as an Eastern cultural and geopolitical limit of the European civilization. Its
position was consolidated, deactivated or reactivated repeatedly, but always confirmed in
the past two millenniums and the identity geographical data will ensure an obvious
intrinsic geopolitical meaning. Its importance will be amplified in the Eurasian power
game any time where this alignment will delimitate two or more civilization or
geopolitical spheres of influence – religious or ideological. Inherently, these evolutions
engage Romania, as a part of this isthmus, and its survival and development depends by
the role – assumed or imposed in this alignment.
60
Within a strong connection with its capacity to influence or align to the Poland
and Bulgaria attitudes, the Romania posture in the isthmus will be either consolidated
either eroded which imposes the elaboration and implementation of a long term durable
cooperation policy with both states. An attitude of autonomous affirmed autonomy and the
passive policies, individual or not accommodated with those of ally or partner regional
powers cannot be sustained or accepted as ways for promoting national interests on
medium and long term. In this perspective, Romania has a proven capacity to produce
initiatives and to attract the interest and support of the significant regional actors, even the
global ones, and the strategic relation with US is a powerful argument.
To maintain and fully exploit the meaning of “state of European necessity” and of
the “state of culture” at Danube Mouths, Romania must search to avoid the different
geopolitical positioning of the two Romanian states crossed by the Prut river. Also, a
special attention shall be given to the realization of the talasocratic potential of Romania, a
potential emasculated by the prolonged Ottoman domination, inhibited on the military
segment within the Warsaw Treaty and doctrine dominant conceptions and neutralized on
its economic segment by the disappearance of the Commercial fleet in the last decade of
20th Century. We consider that any diminishing of talasocratic attributes of Romania
deeply affects its position on the Ponto-Baltic alignments and restrict the national effort
for development.
The future of Romania will depend by its geopolitical posture in the isthmus and
the membership of EU and NATO, as well as a US strategic partner represent the
favorable parameters for the projection of an optimistic future.
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The political, social and cultural aspects of the Islam in the Balkans
Zsuzsa M. CSÁSZÁR
Abstract: Activities of the Islam have been present in the Balkan region almost since the
beginnings of the region‟s history, although with varying intensities. The Ottoman Empire played a
determining role in forming the life of the Balkan for an extremely long period of nearly half a
millennium. Nowadays in few countries of the Balkan region the Islam remained an important
factor. Moreover, an Islamic expansion can be identified since the second half of the 20 th century,
represented by the demographic boom of the Albanians.
Keywords: Islam, Muslims, Balkan, Islamic expansion
Introduction
The co-existence of cultures and its significance is undoubtedly an acute issue in the
globalising world of the 20th-21st centuries. This is particularly important with a view to the
powerful expansion and European appearance of the Islam which are experienced today.
According to Huntington‟s civilisation paradigm theory, the fight between
superpowers will be replaced after the cold war era by the struggle of civilisations, and any
conflict in the future will be based on, instead of political ideologies, cultural (mostly
religious) differences. With its demographic power and reviving religious fundamentalism,
the Islam is threatening the western civilisations with an inter-civilisational superpower war,
in the form of so-called fracture-line wars. The author uses crisp wording in connection with
the Islam, saying that “it is not the Islamic fundamentalism that means a problem for the
West, but the Islam itself” (Huntington, 1996: 652).
It is probably well known that today more than 16 million Muslims live in
Europe, of which about 8 million – or even much more, according to some authors – are
concentrated in the Balkan. As a result of their birth rates being higher than average, their
numbers are increasing. Their presence in the region is mostly associated with the
Ottoman-Turkish invasion in Medieval times.
The Islam is today in its renaissance; a number of Islamic schools were inaugurated
after the cold war, and Islamic political parties have also appeared. All this means that the
Islam has become an important factor again in the Southeast-European space.
Among the followers of the Islam the four most important ethnic-linguistic
Muslim groups recognised in the Balkan are the Slavs (including, most of all, Bosnians),
Albanians, Turks and Gypsies 1. Among ethnic groups speaking Slavic languages, the
Pomaks must also be mentioned, their majority living in the area what is today Bulgaria,
and also smaller Muslim peoples located in Western-Macedonia and Southeast-Kosovo,
such as the Torbese, Vlachs, Gorans, etc. The status of these ethnic groups varies from
one country to the other, some of them living in majority, whereas others are part of a
multi-ethnic community or minority. Some regions inhabited by them are located in the
border zone of two separate countries such as the Sanjak between Serbia and Montenegro.
1
A proportion of Gypsies are followers of the Islam. Their proportions in the Balkan are
increasing; the number of people following the Islam – such as Balkanian Egyptians, Askhalis –
exceeding 300000 according to information from 1990. Due to length restrictions, we are not
dealing with Muslim Gypsy groups in our study.
63
The Balkan is known to be a place where ethnic and religious factors are strongly
interwoven, with national identity having been determined by, instead of common ethnic
origin, identical religion for centuries. This is particularly true for the period of the
Turkish-Ottoman expansion when the major differentiating feature between peoples of the
region was religion. The relationship between religion and ethnic identity is well
illustrated by the situation of Bosnians who differentiate themselves from their orthodox
or catholic fellows also speaking a Slavic dialect based on their religion. On the contrary,
in the case of Albanians, it is not religion but language that counts as the basis of identity.
From the second half of the 20th century, the identity-forming role of religion has be reevaluated, as is clearly seen from the South-Slavic crisis and its consequences.
The Islam in the Balkan became a focal global issue when there were conflicts
and wars within the territory of Yugoslavia (e.g. Bosnian war, Albanian issue,
independence of Kosovo), all of which had problems of ethnic and religious minorities
standing in the background. After the events of the 19 th and early 20th century, the region
became exciting once again for the great powers – again, indirectly through the Muslims –
, but the situation had in it a peculiar dichotomy and a touch of contradiction as well. It is
well known that there has been a sort of general fear of the strengthening Islamic world
since 11 September 2001. Through states or other entities following Islamic orientation in
the Balkan area, this could theoretically be real threat, because support from Islamic
countries is quite strong in an economic as well as ideological sense. At the same time,
countries acting for the defence of democracy, such as the USA, have made steps for the
protection of minority rights which have assisted particularly the Albanians to gain
strength and eventually to create a new Muslim country in the Balkan. Thus, the awkward
situation is that despite the general fear from the Islamic world, the Western powers
appear as defenders of Islamic Albanians.
It is important to note that today the Balkan is the only region of Europe where
demographic growth is considerable, and this is associated with the Muslim population in
the region. With such a growth rate, even if some slowing down is anticipated due to
modernisation, the numbers of Muslim people can significantly increase in some countries
of the region, e.g. Albanians can become the majority in Macedonia by the turn of the
21st/22nd centuries.
In today‟s highly secular world, it might appear unusual to talk about religion
having a role in everyday life. Yet, the majority of the population in Europe‟s southeastern pocket – despite the recent communist interval – declare themselves to be
religious. With the meeting point of the three major religions (eastern and western
Christianity and the Islam that became widespread in the Ottoman era), the Balkan can be
considered to be Europe‟s most variable area regarding religion.
1. Historic periods
1.1. The Islam’s first meeting with the Balkan, and the period of the OttomanTurkish conquest
Following the great historic separation of religions, the majority of people living
in the Balkan belonged to the Orthodox religious determination, the only exception being
the Croatians and Slovenians living in the north-western parts of the region, and some
proportion of Albanians and Bosnians who were followers of the Catholic religion. The
Islam, the third great religious trend of the region became an important factor only after
the 15th century. Historic science – particularly, Hungarian scientists – identify the
presence of the Islam in the area with the appearance of Ottomans. Although it is not
64
widely known, Muslims had lived in the area what is today the Balkan quite long before
the Ottoman conquest.
Some researchers claim that the Islam was present in the region as early as in the
7th-8th centuries, and had considerable impact on peoples living there. As early as that, the
inhabitants of the Balkan were in strong commercial, political and military contact with
Muslims. Through the activity of Arabian tradesmen, we can talk about Muslim presence,
although at a low scale at that time. In the 9th century, the Arabians were aiming at, in
addition to conquering Southern Italy, occupying Dalmatian seaside cities: they were
trying hard for 15 years to conquer the town known today as Dubrovnik, but they did not
succeed. Sea ports along the Adriatic – called today Ulcinj, Tivat, Durres – served as
centres of trading, besides Greek and South Italian towns. The physical reminders of
Arabic presence in the region include a relief near the Trogir cathedral, showing an
Arabian man wearing turban, and two Arabic burial memorials in the same town.
The Muslim groups appeared in the Carpathian basin, along the northern fringes
of the region, in the 12th century, and their territory was physically adjacent to the Balkan,
the focus of our study. Ibrahim Nexhat, too, mentions this spatial contact; he believes that
part of the Muslims living in the south-eastern part of the Hungarian Kingdom migrated to
the Balkan peninsula to settle down as early as in the 13 th century. Other regions, too,
were sources of Muslims arriving in the Balkan, such as the Al-Aga dynasty moving in
from Syria and building the first mosque in Kosovo. The Muslims in Vardar-valley, called
“Turks” arrived in the Balkan from Asia Minor. When looking at the presence of Islamic
people in the Balkan in historic times one must not overlook the invasion of the Muslim
Pecheneg tribes, belonging to the Ismaelits, arriving in the area around the 8th-10th
centuries. Another source is also worth mentioning: the Turks near Razgrad are
descendants of Krimian Tatars, Gagause and Siite Kazulbashi who went under Turkish
influence during the Ottoman era (Zhelyazkova, 1996) Based on all these, it can be
assumed that there were some Islamic communities in the Balkan that survived until the
Ottoman-Turkish invasion, although this probably did not significantly influence the
success of the Turkish invasion and the successive process of Islamisation.
The Ottoman conquest in the Balkan started in the last third of the 14 th century. As
a result of the expansion lead by the talented sultans (Murad I, Bajazid, Mehmed I, Murad
II, Mehmed II.), by the late 15th century the entire Balkan region became dominated by the
Ottomans. The empire flourished during the reign of Suleiman I, respected as the “Law
Maker”, and the majority of the Carpathian-Balkan region became either subordinated to
the Turks or had tributary dependence from the Empire. The Porta operated on the
fundamentals of Islamic rules and laws. The population was categorised based on
religious identities. Only Muslims were considered to be full-value “citizens”. Earlier
lords and the local higher society had vanished – they could continue to have their
privileges in Bosnia only –, and the population of the Balkan was governed during the
Turkish dominance by local communities and church principals (Jelavich, 1996).
Thus, the Ottomans did not have a primary aim of converting people to the Islam, as
is justified by economic and financial considerations, because, by doing that, a tax taken from
people with different religions would have been wiped out. It must be added, though, that the
spreading of the Islam was initially related with the expansion of the political importance of
Muslim states, and because this served the integrity of religion and state, there were cases
when the states themselves were the initiators of their conversion, or at least did not obstruct
the conversion of their people. Besides, the Ottoman government aimed at settling Muslims
into strategically important territories (e.g. the frontier zones of the Empire), moreover, such
re-settlings were sometimes done forcefully (Csüllög, 2007: 334-343).
65
Owing to such re-settling politics, considerable numbers of Turks were moved to
areas in the Balkan. Such citizens in the towns were government officials, soldiers and
manufacture craftsmen. Many arrived as members of public administration, too, although
these officials were translocated from time to time during their life, owing to specialities in
state organisation. People in rural areas were made up mostly by peasants having been moved
in from Anatolia. Land owners – spahi or tsiftlik owners – belonged to the ruling class.
The expansion of the Islam could be motivated by the followings: if entire
villages or communities converted themselves to the Muslim religion, they did not have to
pay taxes, being “true believers”. Moreover, in some cases people migrated into Ottoman
territory in an escape from the prevailing serf peasantry system, as the status of peasants
was somewhat better under the Turks. Generally, Muslims paid less tax, this meaning
considerable attraction to people living in towns, too. Christian slaves, upon taking up
Muslim religion, could become serfs. The institution of “devsirme” were used (between
the 14th-18th centuries) for collecting Christian male children, training them as janissaries,
and educating them according to the principles of the Islam.
Sometimes certain forms of forced religious conversion also occurred, e.g.
Christians living in strategically important areas such along as the military route leading to
Vienna, were forcefully Islamised at certain regular intervals, and the converted people
were thereafter called “potur”. Many of these people continued to insist on Christian
religion and life for quite long (Niederhauser, 2001). In the case of Albanians, Bosnians
and Pomaks, Islamisation propaganda and forcefulness were applied quite frequently.
Taking up the Muslim religion was a much less radical change than Christians would
think; in several cases only the men in the family changed their religion. But also, cryptic
Christianity did occur, especially in Kosovo and Albania where families only showed that
they were converted but in fact continued at home to practice Christian religion, often
with the assistance of local religious leaders. The Porta actually did not care about the
population‟s religious life, but instead, it was the Orthodox church that controlled mostly
the peasantry in the Balkan, through the so-called millet-system
As a result of the voluntary religious conversion and the re-settling of Turkish
people into the Balkan, the proportion of those following the Islam grew considerably.
Probably, it would be difficult to establish exactly what percentage of the original
population of the Balkan became Muslims. It is estimated that about 75% of the
population of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 17th century were Muslims, although the
ratios of Muslims vs. Christians turned around later on (Mancsev, 1992). According to
then resources, the highest number of people, among all of the countries of the Balkan,
changing their religion under the reign of the Turks occurred in Bosnia and Albania. The
most precise resource about statistics on changing religion were the defters. The first
Bosnian defter from 1468/9 reports only 1500 Muslims as opposed to 185000 Christians.
By 1520, however, about 84.000 Muslims were recorded besides 190.000 Christians, and
a report from 1624 mentions 225.000 Christians and 450.000 Muslims; the continuous
growth is a result of Islamisation (Malcom, 1994).
The expansion of the Islam – as we have already mentioned – is associated mostly
with towns, more particularly to administrative and military centres. Within the then town
structure of the Balkan, larger Muslim communities lived in Sarajevo, Saloniki, Beograd,
Monastir, Janina and Vidin. Towns are also the most important scenes of Islamic culture,
in both intellectual and material sense. Mosques, medresses, dervish monasteries, bazaars,
caravan serais, haans were built, serving the everyday life of Muslim communities.
Reaching beyond being only a religion, the Islam reformed everyday life, too.
66
A typical feature of the Islam in the studied period is the world of dervish and
sufi. Their groups (tarikat, dervish order) were established around charismatic, “saint
men”, and they offered their members high-intensity spiritual life, playing an important
role in spreading the Islamic religion2. One of their orders, popular among soldiers of the
Ottoman army, was that of the bektashi.
1.2. The withdrawal of the Islam
The Islamic history of the Balkan had a significant turning point starting in the 18 th
century. The succession of liberation movements and wars had lead to the weakening of the
Ottoman reign. Evoked by European revolutionary events, peoples of the Balkan region
started to formulate their desire for freedom with increasing emphasis, and this was
associated with nation-forming processes. The empire which used to be an expansive power
was forced into defence. The Orthodox Church, a continuous reminder of peoples‟ ethnic
identities, played an important role in national revival, and tried to increase the number of its
believers by re-baptising people. The decreasing numbers of Islamic followers is mostly
associated with the fact that Muslims were emigrating – lot of them left their earlier homes
and fled to Turkey –, nevertheless there was no drastic change in religions or shifting of
proportions. In Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time of Austro-Hungarian occupation, the 1879
census revealed that the proportion of Muslims in the population dropped from nearly 50%
(as estimated in the middle of the 18th century) to 38,7%, still remaining the second largest
religion besides the increasing orthodox population and the pool of Catholic people, the
latter religion supported by the state (Mancsev, 1992). The proportion of Bosnian Muslims
decreased due to emigrations, to become the largest religious-ethnic community once again
as late as only in the middle of the 20th century.
Based on mother-tongue and religion data collected at a settlement level as part of
the 1910 census3 it can be stated that people with Muslim religion were concentrated, as a
result of earlier, purposeful re-settling and voluntary religious conversion, in areas
connecting the late empire seat Istanbul with Bosina (i.e. in Thrakia, Eastern-Macedonia,
Kosovo, Central Albania, Sanjak, Eastern-Bosnia and the Bihac district, NorthernBulgaria, Dobrudja) (Kocsik, 2005: 22-29). Their proportions, however, kept decreasing,
as we have already pointed out.
When the peace treaties terminating World War I were signed, new states and state
formations were born in the Balkan region. According to the statistical analysis of census
data from 1921, the weakening of the Islam can be felt, as reflected by political changes,
their proportions in the population ranging around 8,7% (Kocsik, 2005: 22-29). Greater
proportions of Muslims within the region occurred in the newly established SerboCroatian-Slovenian Kingdom, due to Bosnians, Albanians and smaller Islamised ethnic
groups (Goran, Vlach, Torbes, etc.) integrated to the state formation. In Macedonia, Novi
Pazari Sanjak, Kosovo, Metohija, all belonging to the Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian
Kingdom, nearly 50% of the population are Muslims, not to mention the Bosnians, the
Muslim population of Bosnia.
After the disappearance of the Ottoman Empire and World War I, serious minority
problems were caused by the re-organisation of the Balkan space. To draw ethnic state
borders seemed to be highly problematic: it was impossible to create any countries that
2
3
Besides dervish orders, religious foundations (vakuf) also played a role in popularising the
Islamic religion, Muslim culture and life.
Census data analysed in the present study (1910, 1921, 1991, 2001) regard the countries of
Southeast-Europe, excluding data for Greece and European Turkey.
67
lacked populations with different religion and nationality from the host nation, therefore
strong intentions could be felt from the side of the political leaders to achieve ethnic and
religious homogenisation. There are several examples illustrating the forceful removal of
Muslims from areas of the Balkan, as well as indicating aggressive assimilation politics.
Serbia was applying the latter method against the Muslim population annexed to the
country from the south-eastern direction during the wars. The situation was not better in
Bulgaria either, where people leaved the areas voluntarily so as to escape from chauvinist
insults and attempts for assimilation. All this was further fortified by the nationalist
politics practised by Kemal‟s Turkey: instead of minority peoples from the Balkan already
living in the area they were open to receiving Romanian, Bulgarian, Serb, etc. Muslims.
The period between the two World Wars was the time of a great migrational
rearrangement of peoples. A total of 217.000 Turkish Muslims left their home in Bulgaria,
and also many Pomaks re-settled from Western-Thrakia attached to Greece to Bulgaria.
Also, as part of the Greek-Turkish exchange of populations, many Muslims had to move
from Greece to Turkey. The migrations and re-arrangement of peoples provided only
apparent solution to the problem of Muslims, because many states in the Balkan continued
to be sending off people having different ethnic identity, affecting especially the Muslims.
From the 1930s, though, a certain degree of change was observed in Yugoslavia‟s official
politics in that Yugoslavia recognised the Islamic religion to have more or less equal
position as the Orthodox and the Catholic religion. The transformation of minority politics
in Bulgaria has different reasons (Mancsev, 1992).4
During World War II and in the successive years there was no considerable
Muslim migration; it was only in Bulgaria that the Turks continued to emigrate (about
182.000 Turks left the country at that time) (Kocsik, 2005: 22-29). The entire region,
except for Greece, came under communist influence, meaning that ethnic and religious
problems were often totally ignored. Moreover, practising religious life was totally banned
in Albania, which had a serious effect on Islamic people making up nearly 70% of
Albania‟s population. In countries where religion remained an important element of
national identity, like in Yugoslavia, the intensity of religious identification showed a
tendency of growth. The percentages and ethnic space of Muslim Bosnians and Albanians,
characterised with higher reproduction rates, grew constantly both in Bosnia and Kosovo
from 1921 on. It is partly due to this that the new constitution of Tito‟s Yugoslavia,
enacted in 1974, recognised the Muslims as a separate nationality 5, codifying them as a
nation or state-forming community. The same constitution broadened the independence of
the Kosovo autonomous province inhabited mostly by Albanian Muslims.
1.3. The Islam today
The censuses carried out in the early 1990s in the majority of the Balkan countries
draws a picture of the space occupied by Muslim inhabitants. As a result of the ethnic and
religious homogenisation in the 20th century, the earlier heterogeneous presence of Islamic
people in the Balkan was replaced by a number of spatially continuous areas occupied by them
(in Bulgaria it was focused around two centres, whereas Kosovo, Northwestern-Macedonia,
and the central, majority part of Albania, as well as the Sanjak can be regarded as a single,
compact area). It was only in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 1990s that Muslims were
4
5
Several compact Bulgarian populations persisted beyond Bulgaria‟s borders, therefore the politics of
the 1920s and 1930s strongly emphasised, besides peaceful revisionism, the protection of minorities.
In Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1971 the Muslims were the largest religious community, with a
representation percentage of 39,6% (JELAVICS, B. 1996).
68
mixing considerably with the two other religious communities. One hardly finds any regions at
all with any of the nations (or religions) being in absolute majority. In Yugoslavia of those
times, the expansion of Islam was apparent in numbers. The proportion of Muslim population
– especially in areas populated by Albanians – was increasing; according to official data on
Kosovo the figures changed from 65,8% in 1921 to 82,2 % in 1991, but such changes are
clearly seen in the case of Bosnia, too: from 31,1% to 43,5.
The disintegration of Yugoslavia started in 1991, with the republics aiming at
independence leaving the federation one after the other. In the Bosnian war (1992-1995)
that broke out after/beside the Serbian-Croatian war, the greatest losses were suffered by
Muslims. As a result of ethnic (religious) “purification” activities, the country‟s religiousethnic spatial structure was re-arranged, meaning that the mosaic pattern variability of
ethnic and religious communities that had persisted since the Ottoman occupation,
vanished forever (Kocsik, 2005: 22-29). According to the 1995 estimation, the proportion
of Bosnians or “Muslimans”6 was 44%, (or 43% based on other sources), and if the
refugees having returned since the end of the war are included, the figure will be still
bigger, by some decimal degrees.
Figure 1. The spatial distribution of the Muslims in the Balkans
Source: Kocsis, K. (2007) ed. Kovács, G.
As revealed by the census of 2001, the proportion of Muslims in the SoutheastEuropean population is beyond 13%. For our study, it is also important to know how the
numbers are distributed spatially. As it has been mentioned earlier, today there is a
concentration of Muslim populations, and the number of such concentration centres have
6
Bosnian Muslims.
69
increased as a result of the ethnic re-arrangements in the Bosnian war that caused the ethnicreligious spatial structure of the country to transform and two spatially well-defined, compact
Islamic blocks to appear within the state structure7. The other two population concentrations
other than Bosnia (the one in Bulgaria and the block associated with the Albanians) are the
same as the regions touched upon earlier when discussing the 1991 census, the only difference
being the growth of population size due to Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia.
The understanding of the role of Islamic religion in the Balkan is quite
contradictory today. As we have mentioned, the Muslim population here follows the
Sunnite stream out of the two major trends. However, some other, minor religious trends
are also present, related with the late Ottoman period, such as the order of the bektashis,
which is quite popular among Albanians. Groups belonging to this trend number several
dozens. There are also few alevites among the Turkish Muslims.
The appearance of fundamentalism in the region is associated with the support of
Bosnian Muslims fighting in the Bosnian war. Owing to broad co-operation among the
Islamic world, humanitarian, military and economic assistance arrived from states of the
Near East, especially from Saudi-Arabia and Iran. This all proved that the war was
considered to be of religious nature, and Bosnia was thrown into the focus of global
attention. This also rises the danger of radical trends becoming naturalised in the region.
Foreign groups associated with terrorism, including Afghan, Irani, Saudi and Turkish
Mudjahedin troops were involved in fights for the Bosnian brothers. The Dayton
agreement that was signed in 1995 ordered these formations to leave the country. In
relation with fundamentalism, the presence of another radical stream, i.e. that of the
Vahabitism, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but more recently in Kosovo, too.
Vahabits are financed by radical Arab religious circles, mostly from Saudi-Arabian
sources. It is thought by many specialists that Vahabits are not dangerous because they
have religious purposes but no political commitments, and it was only because of the
fights for power among church leaders that attention was directed to this group. However,
even moderate political circles are worried to see how intensively the Islam‟s visually
apparent expression, i.e. dressing according to religious rules, spreads. Vahabits consider
older members of their community as their religious control, i.e. what they say cannot be
disregarded or violated without serious consequences. Earlier, this was known from
smaller Muslim villages only, but it has reached larger towns as well, including Sarajevo.
It has now been confirmed that “visibly” practising the religion has become a source of
living in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Increasing numbers of families undertake to dress
according to religious regulations, register their children in primary schools operated by
Islamic religious institutions, for which the family receives in return 400 KM (cca. 200
EUR), complete boarding for each children and another 100 KM from an Islamic NGO
responsible for the operation of the religious institution.
According to some political specialists, the expansion of fundamentalism has to
be expected in other areas as well. Publications with warnings about the danger of Islam
radicalism were produced as early as in the 1990s but some have been published recently
as well. The authors believe such radicalism can flare up from the direction of Albania or
Turkey i.e. where national intentions and objectives can most easily show up in a religious
context. As early as in the 1990s Albania turned openly towards Turkey, relying on the
Islam, their common religious inclination. It is not without reason that Albania became a
7
One is the westernmost Muslim concentration near Bihac. The other is the overwhelmingly
Muslim block stretching in a northeast-southwest direction from the Tuzla region through
Sarajevo to Mostar.
70
member of the Islam Conference organisation (in 1992). Moreover, Osama bin Laden
visited Tirana in 1994, and later the Al-Khaida was performing military training in the
north-eastern Albanian region, near the Kosovo border. According to some sources,
Albania actually provided assistance to the UCK8, although this has been denied by the
Albanian leaders of Kosovo9 Official Albanian politics supports democratic
transformation, and finds it impossible to allow any influence from foreign Islamic
organisations, and acts, together with the US, against military organisations. For a better
look, Albanians even modified their involvement in the Islam Conference from
membership to observer status.
Researchers into the Balkan, too, find true risks in the modern revival of the
Islam. As early as in the 1990s they called the attention to movements on a religious basis
among the Muslim minorities of Bulgaria and Greece, especially among Muslim
Bulgarians (Pomaks and Turks), predominantly in the Rodope Mountains and less in the
central parts of the country. It is raised that most probably, Muslims in Macedonia will not
remain outside the reach of the Islamic propaganda either. This is exactly what is feared in
certain parts of the societies in the Balkan, namely the formation of a Muslim axis
reaching from the Bosporus to the Adriatic (Todorov, 1995).
Without neglecting the weight of the dangers mentioned above, we must
nevertheless add that the majority of Muslims want peace and tolerant co-existence with
ethnic groups of other religions. Their way of thinking is West-friendly; they dress and
behave like Europeans. Religion has an extremely important role in the region, as
compared to European countries, and the Islam is not an exception either. The number of
religious institutions keeps growing, schools are established and mosques are built.
2. Regional types
The 8 million Muslim people can be differentiated based on their areas of
residence and language. According to the latter, the followers of the Islam can be
categorised into three groups 10.
Number and propotion of Muslims in the Balkans
Country
Albánia
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Greece
Croatia
Kosovo
Macedonia
Montenegro
Romania
Serbia
Table 1
Number of Muslims
Proportion of Muslims %
2 287 000
68,5
1 275 000
44
966 978
12,2
139 396
1,3
56 777
1,3
1 450 000
92,7
674 015
33,3
110 034
17,7
67 566
0,3
325 089
3,2
Source: Kocsis K. (2009), CIA Factbook 2008
Muslims in the Balkan – as is shown in Table 1 – live in 10 countries. The highest
numbers (and the largest number of countries) are associated with the Albanians, followed
by the Bosnians, predominantly in the area of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Among people
speaking Slav languages, we cannot forget about the Macedonian Torbese (living near the
8
UCK: Kosovo Liberation Army
http://www.rieas.gr
10
The fourth largest Muslim group, i.e. that of the Gypsies, is not dealt with in our study.
9
71
Albanians), the Vlachs whose origins are debated until today, the Gorans and Pomaks (the
latter found in Bulgaria mostly, and fewer in Greece11). Among Turkish-speaking people,
notable are, in addition to those living in Bulgarian areas, Turks known as the third largest
ethnic group in Macedonia12, and Romanian13 Muslims.
In the present study we are dealing with Albanians, Bosnians in detail.
2.1. West –Balkan
Due to their rapid demographic growth, Albanians declaring themselves to have
Illyrian origin are the largest Muslim population living in the Balkan. Predominantly, they
are concentrated in three countries: Albania, Kosovo, north-western Macedonia, but they
are found in the territory of the Sanjak14 as well.
As early a sin the 15th century, the Ottoman Empire occupied the area inhabited
by Albanians, but the process of Islamisation among the otherwise Orthodox and Catholic
population started only during the 17th century. This is when populating Kosovo and
present-day Macedonia was started15, eventually leading to the strengthening of the
Albanian ethnic group and the Islam. The presence of Bektashism has been very
pronounced among Muslim Albanians from the 16th 17th century until today. After the
withdrawal of the Turkish Empire and the Balkan wars, the Albanian population became
one of the newly born state formations. Besides the sovereign Albania having won its
independence in 1912, Albanians became residents also of the Serbo-Croat-Slovenian
Kingdom, later becoming Yugoslavia. Muslim Albanians of Kosovo and Sanjak living
here were subject to violent oppression by the Serbs, moreover, forced re-settlings of
Serbs were initiated by the governing power in order to loosen up the forming Albanian
ethnic blocks.
In areas populated by Albanian Islamic people (Kosovo, the north-west of
Macedonia, Albania) primary level education institutions were becoming widespread
since the time of the Ottoman occupation. Such institutions for example were the mejteps
that were run with a religious ideology, most often near mosque buildings and lead by the
local imam. Children aged 6-16 were co-educated in these institutions, being taught
specifically religious Islamic subjects in Arabian and Albanian language: the Koran is
memorised, interpreted, mathematics and sometimes other subjects, too, are taught. In
secondary schools called merdesses, students were taught – in addition to theology –
11
After the Turkish Empire had withdrawn from Greece, the Muslim population started to
emigrate. The Turkish-Greek population exchange meant that 350.000 people left their country in
masses. Today there are about 120.000 people with Islamic religion in the area of Western
Thrakia, of which 50% are Turks, 35% are Pomaks, and 15% are Gypsies. The Pomaks speak
Bulgarian as a mother tongue, but they were declared to be Turks because of their Muslim
religion, which has actually lead to their transformation into being Turks, despite that their
majority preserved their Bulgarian language.
12
The proportion of Macedonian Greeks is 3, 85% as revealed by the 2001 census.
13
Today almost 1% of the population (around 70 000) are Muslims, the majority being Turks and
Tartars living in the area of Dobrudja.
14
The area found along the border of present-time Montenegro and Serbia, belonging to both
countries, are populated mostly by Muslims (Bosnians and Albanians)
15
Serbian emigration from the region that started in the 15th century lasted until the end of the 17th
century, and the areas that consequently became vacant have been populated by mountain Vlach
and Slav groups, as well as masses of Albanians (the latter until the end of the 18 th century).
Because of Kosovo‟s strategic importance, the Ottoman authorities speeded up the process of
Islamisation.
72
Islamic law, Persian-Arabian languages, mathematics and geometry, rethorics and
philosophy, but the major function of such schools was to forward the Islam‟s ideology.
These schools are flourishing once again, laying emphasis on religious subjects mostly.
Today the Albanian population faces new problems, especially in Kosovo and
Macedonia. A new state with Muslim majority was born (Kosovo), and even there are
scenarios visualised that the two largest Albanian communities – i.e. that of Albania and
Kosovo – may become united. Although Tirana supported the refugees and the Kosovo
Liberation Army during the Kosovo war, it was nevertheless declared after February 2008
that the re-arrangement of political borders is unwanted.
Albania:
Muslim Albanians make up nearly two third of the country‟s population, their
residential space being concentrated in the central area of the country. After the atheism of
the Enver Hodja period, religion is practised again, and new mosques are built where the
former ones were destroyed or used for different purposes. As of the 1990s, the very poor
and backward country has received significant degree of assistance from Muslim
organisations and countries through financial support and investments, and these
donations made Albanians forget about the fear of being forced to practise religion.
Nevertheless, Islamic mission work has an immense importance.
As we have already mentioned, several specialist authors dealing with the region
foresee some degree of danger in the relationships maintained by Albania with Islamic
countries. However, we must note that the leaders of Albanian Muslims maintain strong
relationship with western countries, especially the US, not only in Albania but in Kosovo
and Macedonia too, this serving as some sort of a guarantee against Islamic danger.
Kosovo:
Despite the effect of Serbian population translocation actions, the demographic
boom of the 1970s-1980s caused that the shifting of ethnic proportions for the benefit of
Albanians became even more pronounced. The proportion of the dominating Albanian
ethnic group was revealed by the most recent census (1991)16 to be 84% of the total
population, together with the 6% of Muslims with different ethnic identity. Kosovo was
given an autonomous province status as early as during Tito‟s Yugoslavia, and in 1974 it
received equal status with the other federal states. The disintegration of Yugoslavia and
the strengthening Serbian hegemony aspirations, however, lead to the discontinuation of
such autonomy. The reaction of Kosovo Albanians was total isolation and opposition,
followed by a civil war which was terminated by the intervention of the NATO in 1999.
The Albanian province was brought under international protectorate and in 2008 it
declared its independence. Through that act, the third state with Muslim majority was born
in the region, besides Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
About 95% of the Albanian population follow the Islam, whereas the remaining
5% are Catholics. Religious radicalism is unknown among them, and they cannot be
considered to be obsessed believers, despite their religious uniformity (Zsebok, 2004: 2532). Any co-operation with Islamic terrorist formations is continuously denied by the
official leaders of Kosovo. But few groups of wahabits appeared in the country, who are
especially popular around the unemployed youth.
16
The Albanian population boycotted the census, thus the above data are based on estimations.
73
Macedonia
The largest population of Muslim Albanian minority is concentrated in
Macedonia‟s north-western region, quite near the Albanian region of Kosovo which has
recently become independent. Official data about their population size determine their
proportion to be around 25%, but Albanians claim that they make up 35-40% of the
population. This is most probably an exaggerated figure, but it is a fact that the census
considered only people who were present in the country with a legal status, meaning that
the actual proportion of Albanians may be higher. If other Muslims are also considered,
including Turks, Gypsies and Muslims with Slavic mother tongue, the result can be that
about 40% of Macedonia‟s population are followers of the Islam.
Due to their demographic growth in the recent decades in present-day
Macedonia‟s territory, Albanians have become the largest ethnic minority, a factor with
considerable influence on politics. Even at a European scale, they have a broad range of
minority and language use rights which have even been broadened by the Ohrid
Framework Agreement putting an end to the armed conflict in 2001. As a consequence of
the agreement, Tetovo State University was established in 2004, educating almost
exclusively Albanian students. However, because their language, religion and way of life
are different from those of the majority, and due to the facts that the Albanian society is
isolated and is based on a system of clans, as well as there is a lack of trust and cohesion
between different ethnic groups, there is a persisting possibility of ethnic tensions
developing (Hary, Csaczar, 2008: 62-71).
According to traditional views, Sunnite Muslim Albanians living in Macedonia
are stronger believing Muslims than the rest of the Albanians. They managed to achieve
that their religious community is recognised equally with all the other churches. As
compared to Bosnia and Kosovo there are fewer Islamic organisations present in the
country, yet it is believed by extreme Macedonian political circles that these organisations
maintain connection with Islamic armed networks (Zsebök, 2004).
Bosnia-Herzegovina:
The largest Muslim population after the one in Albania is found in BosniaHerzegovina. The last official census was carried out before the wars, revealing a Muslim
proportion of 43,5%. Estimations made at the time of the Dayton peace agreement,
however, mention higher values (see above). Their overwhelming majority lives within
the territory of the Bosnian-Croatian Federation; the numbers of Muslims in Serbia have
dropped to an almost negligible rate of representation, due to the ethnic “purification”
activities done in te Serb Republic during the war, and as a result of emigration later on.
Bosnians are found, in addition to Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the territory of the Sanjak
(Montenegro and Serbia), in Macedonia, and their presence is very limited in Croatia.
It was the ethnic group of Muslim Bosnians speaking a Slav language that was
Islamised first in the Ottoman Empire. There has been much research into why they took
up the religion of their invaders during the Turkish reign. Some claim that the Bosnian
aristocracy became Muslim so as to be able to preserve their own economic privileges and
properties. According to other opinions, it was conflicts between the Catholic Church and
the Bosnian Church that eventually lead to the Islamisation of this group. For a long time,
it was a general concept in history that the reason for Islamisation has to do with
74
Bogumilism17, but more recent studies having been performed currently deny such
concept. Nevertheless, as a result of pronounced Islamisation, many among Bosnian
Muslims gained high positions in the Ottoman Empire.
At the time of the weakening of the Turks and the onset of national revival in the
19th century, national identification is observed, in addition to the other two ethnic groups,
in the case of the Muslims as well, with religion being the key factor in marking the
differences from other ethnic groups. The process of becoming a nation was particularly
supported by the governor Benjámin Kállay who was appointed by the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy occupying Bosnia-Herzegovina. The first Muslim party was established in
1906 (MNO), and in 1909 the Muslims were successful in winning religious autonomy. In
contrast with the other two ethnic groups – Croatians and Serbs – they often referred to
themselves as Islamic nation or Muslimans.
Political conditions between the two world wars were not in favour of the
autonomy aspirations of Bosnians; they were regarded as a religious group only. They
became treated as a nation only later when Tito was in charge of Yugoslavian politics:
they were initially defined as ethnic Muslims, and later on recognised as a separate nation.
The support of Islamic Bosnians by political party leaders was absolutely in line with the
friendly political attitude shown towards uncommitted countries, mostly Islamic ones. The
growth of their population and their official recognition together resulted in a certain type
of Islamic renaissance, although this was not quite appreciated by Serbians.
The disintegration of Yugoslavia had positive impact on Bosnian political
activities. The role of religion, instead of decreasing, boosted up at the time of
confrontations with Serbs and Croats and during the wars. As it has been already touched
upon, foreign Islamic organisations, sometimes radical groups, did support the fight of the
Bosnians. The great coherence and collaboration among local Islamic communities was
strongly seen during the war, these organisations still meaning a great deal of help in the
living of Bosnian people. The role of religion is becoming more pronounced in education
as well: religious secondary schools (medresse) are operated in the cities. The Islamic
University in Sarajevo has a considerable nework of connections to the Arabic world. The
major religious organisation (having been operated under the name “Bosnian Islamic
Community” since 1993) connects and co-ordinates between Muslims in Bosnia, Sandjak,
Croatia, Slovenia and even with diasporic Bosnian Muslims. The Rijaset is a collective
religious body lead by the principal religious personality, Reisu-I- Ulema. This function is
elected every 5-7 years by representatives of the Sabor, head imams and imams, muftis
and directors of religious schools. The cabinet of the major religious leader deals also with
foreign affairs, whereas the directorate supervises the daily activities. Since the war,
strong relationship has been maintained between the Islamic Community and SDA, the
nationalist Bosnian party. With the Dayton agreement the Community declared that they
were leaving politics, but reality sometimes shows a different picture. For the
reconstruction of Islamic religious institutions, mosques, churches and minarets, financial
assistance is arriving from Muslim countries. Accordingly, it is the Islamic community,
i.e. The “Church” that has the most significant financial background and power to achieve
its objectives throughout the country. Among Islamic countries, Bosnian Muslims tend to
turn more towards Turkey, and is hoping to receive funds from the Arab countries.
17
Bogumilian heretic movements were widespread in the Balkan after the 11th century, especially
in Bosnia. Some researches claim that masses of Bogumilians converted themselves to the Islam
after the Ottoman invasion.
75
Summary
Activities of the Islam have been present in the Balkan region almost since the
beginnings of the region‟s history, although with varying intensities. The Islam first
appeared along the southern-southwestern margin of our area, represented by Arabic
tradesmen, then the centre of their activities shifted further to the north, into the Hungarian
Kingdom. The Ottoman Empire played a determining role in forming the life of the
Balkan for an extremely long period of nearly half a millennium. The presence of the
Porta in the Balkan was naturally accompanied by conversions to the Islam. After the
withdrawal of the Turks, two spatial units with different religious-ethnic structure can be
differentiated in the region, regarding the effects of the Islam. One is composed of the
countries which we categorise as part of the Balkan such as Croatia and Romania (the
latter was affected by the Turkish invasion in its periphery only) but the degree of
Islamisation is low, and because Muslims left the country together with the leaving of the
Turks, the presence of the Islam is insignificant. On the contrary, in other countries of the
Balkan region the Islam remained an important factor, even if some proportion of the
Muslims withdrew together with the Ottomans, or moved, was translocated or assimilated.
The borderline between the two areas is defined by Islamisation in the Turkish era and its
intensity, meaning that the line runs more or less along the 45 degree northern latitude line
bisecting the Balkan peninsula. In other words it can be said that in areas to the south-east
from Bihac, the effect of the Islam can be traced back to the 14 th century and has more or
less remained a factor that determines politics. Moreover, an Islamic expansion can be
identified since the second half of the 20th century, represented by the demographic boom
of the Albanians.
What consequences, thus, can be expected from the Islam being present in the
region? Because of the low number of Muslims to the north of the borderline, the
expansion of the Islam is not likely there. To the south, however, we are witnessing the
birth of Muslim entities and state formations, which all attract the attention of the Muslim
world, and increase the influence of the Islam in the region. It is the responsibility of the
local Muslim political elite how intense will be the economic and ideological expansion of
the Islam in their countries and communities in the region.
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2. Approaches of cross-border cooperation
and territorial systems
Alexandru ILIEŞ (Oradea), Olivier DEHOORNE (Guadalupe),
Dorina Camelia ILIEŞ (Oradea), Vasile GRAMA (Oradea)
◄► Romanian-Serbian Cross-Border territorial system.
Elements and mechanisms generating systemic functionality
(natural and administrative context)
Constantin-Vasile ŢOCA (Oradea), Adrian-Claudiu POPOVICIU
(Oradea) ◄► The European Grouping of Territorial
Cooperation (EGTC), Instrument of Cross-border Cooperation.
Case Study Romania – Hungary
Jan WENDT (Gdansk), Tomasz WISKULSKI (Gdansk) ◄►
„SoNorA” as a factor of developing Adriatic - Baltic cooperation
Gennady FEDOROV (Kaliningrad), Valentin KORNEEVETS
(Kaliningrad) ◄► Trans-border regionalisation under
globalisation
Romanian-Serbian Cross-Border Territorial System. Elements and Mechanisms
Generating Systemic Functionality (Natural and Administrative Context)
Alexandru ILIEŞ, Olivier DEHOORNE,
Dorina Camelia ILIEŞ, Vasile GRAMA
Abstract: The following study analyses on the Romanian-Serbian border sector which is
considered to be relict. Stretching on 546,4 km (256,8 km terrestrial; 289,6 fluvial), this area
dominated by plains in the north and south (approximately 70% of the total surface) and by
mountains in its central-south half (30%) inherits the morphologic characteristics of the
Romanian-Yugoslavian border. The main objective of this study is to identify, quantify and
integrate the elements and mechanisms which generate the functionality of the cross-border
territorial systems and subsystems. By combining these according to the morphological and
anthropic characteristics of the landform, the study proposes the remodelling of contiguous border
systems and the modelling of the cross-border system obtained. Thus, by means of instruments and
methods attested by specialized literature and based on the border line as well as on the
morphological characteristics of natural contiguous border systems, we can identify the factors
which determine and the elements which compose the functioning mechanisms of contiguous
Romanian and Serbian border areas, using qualitative, quantitative and functional-systemic
criteria. The understanding of these elements from a morphofunctional and morphodynamic point
of view is the key to this study which will represent the starting point for the creation of a highly
functional cross-border territorial system model.
Keywords: territorial system, Romanian-Serbian border, functional system, natural system
Introduction
The political context, a support in the development of a spatial order (Forster,
2000, 11), has radically changed and diversified during the last 20 years on the European
continent and therefore, also in the area of study. This is obvious especially for the eastern
half of the continent, due to the disappearance of the socialist regime. The politicaleconomic dynamics as well as the structural-spatial order of this geographical region are
apparent for the regions occupied/cleared by the “expansion” of the EU and the
“contraction” of non-EU territories. These new conditions were created by a rapid
succession of events, in a context “divided” between globalization and cultural heritage,
between centralization and regionalization (Ilieş & all, 2009) and influenced by the
perpetual shift in the importance of the functions of the national borderline which have
amplified the process of differentiating/unifying the delays of the development process.
Due to this situation, the border regions are in need of new models and applicable
strategies which, once implemented, would transform them into highly functional crossborder territorial systems (Ilieş, 2003, 2004; Ilieş & all., 2010a), generating development.
The Romania-Serbia border sector stretching on 546,4 km (256,8 km terrestrial; 289,6
fluvial), can be considered of a relict type, inheriting the characteristics of the RomanianYugoslavian state border, established in 10 April, 1924. Romania‟s geographical position
(absolute and relative) viewed in the European political context has determined important
changes concerning the status of borders. Consequent to the fall of the communist regime,
the perception of borders in this area (Romania and its neighbouring countries) has
radically changed. Thus, due to the relative position of Romania and Serbia in the
territorial-political architecture of the European continent (EU, non-EU and NATO areas),
80
it is possible to transform divergent border areas covering military purposes and meeting
the need to control the human cross-border flow into convergent areas favouring crossborder cooperation. Starting from the idea that “a territorial system is essential in defining
a certain category of territorial development, which envisages the contingence of socialeconomical and cultural purposes” (Cunha, 1988, 181-198; Ianoş, 2000, 21), this study‟s
main objective is that of identifying the degree in which the natural component influences
the anthropic in a cross-border territorial system.
Analysis background. The natural background (fig. 1), supporting all elements,
mechanisms and activities which sustain the functionality of a territorial system are
superposed to complex morphological landform diversity, varying in altitude due to the
alternation of low and high areas.
Figure 1. Romanian-Serbian Borderland and its physical-geographical peculiarities
(landscape, rivers, natural parks)
The morphology of the landforms, the morphologic characteristics of lacustrine
surfaces, riverbeds and their transversal and longitudinal profiles, the variety of the
landscape, demographical, economical and political aspects, these are elements of analysis
specific to a geographical study. From west to east, the natural units (morphofunctional
systems) corresponding to the Romanian-Serbian border region are: the Banat Plain (mostly
Timiş Plain), Banat Mountains (Dognecei Mountains, Oraviţa Depression; Locvei
Mountains, Aninei, Semenic and Almăj), Mehedinţi Mountains and the western section of
the Romanian Plain represented by Blahniţa Plain. The mountain area presents a diversified
landscape, valuable due to the variety and the richness of the elements it comprises:
depressions (Oraviţa) and valleys (the Danube‟s valley and the Timiş-Cerna corridor).
81
From an administrative point of view, the 546.4 km border is surrounded by
equivalent administrative-territorial divisions of the two countries (NUTS 3-5 and the
Serbian equivalents): counties/municipalities, cities and communes in Romania and
districts/municipalities in Serbia (fig. 2). Defined at the level of counties and districts from
an administrative perspective, the Romanian-Serbian cross-border territorial system
stretches over 39.351,3 km2 and counts a population of approximately 2.371.851
inhabitants as follows: it covers a surface of 22.149,3 km2 (56,3 % of the total) and
numbers 1.336.523 inhabitants (56,3 % in 2010) on the territory of 3 Romanian counties
(Timiş, Caraş-Severin and Mehedinţi), while in the case of the 5 Serbian districts (North
Banat, Central Banatul, South Banat, Branicevo and Bor), the surface covered is of 17.202
km2 (43,7 % of the total) and the population numbers 1.035.328 inhabitants (43,7 %).
Methods. The study at hand is based on a number of relevant activities which
follow several purposes. The first stage is that of identifying the factors that have
generated and generate a certain structure, dynamic and functionality of territorial border
systems and the subsystems which they comprise. This is followed by a quantitative,
qualitative and morphofunctional evaluation as well as by a remodelling of the elements
and mechanism composing these types pf territorial structures. Once these two stages have
been accomplished, the final purpose is that of using the identified elements and
mechanisms in order to establish a highly functional cross-border territorial system, be it
unitary or differentiated. The diagnostic analysis is conducted both in the case of natural
and anthropic systems regarded as entities as in the case of complex systems generated by
reciprocal influences in areas of a natural (landforms) or anthropical (administrativeterritorial units) nature. Finally, depending on the criteria used, one is able to clarify the
advantages/disadvantages and the opportunities/ limitations which determine this type of
cross-border system generated by a peripheral and marginalizing position specific to a
certain (geo) politic context.
The data base used in this study is based on a thorough bibliographical research
from official sources (such as statistical institutes and other institutions etc.) as well as on
information gathered through the direct observations of Romanian and Serbian authors.
The usage of instruments and models which have been applied in the case of other areas
and the identification of the elements and mechanism underlying their functioning
represent the key of this approach centered on the external border of E.U., “redrawn”
within an area that inherits some characteristics of the ex-socialist System. Promoting the
idea of functional cross-border territorial systems (Ianoş, 2000, Ilieş & all., 2009) viewed
as nuclei of regional development in peripheral areas by means of principles, methods and
instruments verified in specialized literature (Martinez, 1994; Tenhiala, 1994; Timothy,
2001, 2002; Ianoş, 2000; Bufon, 2002, 2004; Ilieş, 2003; Ilies & all., 2008; Ilies D.& all.
2010 etc), represents the structure of a scientific approach meant to answer three basic
questions: “where?” “why?” and “how”? The diagnostic analysis, as a research method
and as an instrument of organization and management to be used by decisional actors in
territorial planning, allows the identification and the highlighting of factors which
encourage and/or restrict the development of a territorial system integrated in a
determined area. According to certain morphological characteristics of the natural
background which influence the spatial development of administrative-territorial
structures, we will analyze their degree of peripheralization and of favourability and the
insertion of these structures a highly functional cross-border territorial system.
82
Figure 2. Romanian-Serbian Borderland and its administrative-territorial peculiarities
(administrative units and its compatibilities, 2010)
Diagnostic analysis. Elements, instruments, mechanisms and structures
generating the premises of an integrated cross-border territorial system
favourable to tourist activities.
The first step in identifying the degree of functionality of such a cross-border
territorial system is establishing its internal structure by identifying its main components
and the part they play in its definition (Ianoş, 2000, 21). Thus, we will analyze the specific
elements, instruments and mechanisms of the natural background which may contribute to
the development of integrated systems and generate a continuous functional space
superposed tot the Romanian-Serbian cross-border territorial system. The analysis focuses
on the importance of the borderline in determining the functionality of certain border
systems and of generated cross-border systems. The models are resulted are generated by
the superposition of natural systems and anthropic territorial systems, thus highlighting the
degree of functionality in a cross-border context.
Another important aspect is that of establishing the optimal functioning
parameters of an organized territorial system according to the elements characteristic to
the concept of territorial planning (Ciangă, Dezsi, 2007, 32-33): modelling the territory
taking into account the particularities of the genetic factors; the complexity of the action
regardless of the taxonomic status; implementing a systemic vision; creating
83
transformable and multifunctional systems; a realistic quantitative and qualitative
evaluation of the attractive resources; a professional evaluation of the natural limitations
which, once disregarded, would unbalance the system and lead to the destruction of its
functioning mechanisms.
The structure of a territorial system implies the interdependence, the superposition
and the conditioning of the natural and the anthropic environment in defining the system
of connections which generates its functionality. In the case of a natural macro-system, the
connections are of mutual determination (Ianoş, 2000, 23). Thus, we will try to identify
the conditions in which these connections influence the functionality of the anthropic
(socio-economic) system limited by a state border. We keep in mind that the role and the
functions of the border are permanently shifting, thus defining the degree of willingness to
cooperate of the two contiguous border systems, according to each state‟s political system,
the relations between contiguous states and the regional political context.
Beside the characteristics of the natural background, other important elements in
the analysis of cross-border areas are: the density of the cross border points (Ilieş & all,
2009), the support of the border state trajectory (Ilieş & Grama, 2006), the 3, 4 and 5
NUTS density of these areas (Bufon, 2004), the average distance between the capital city
decisional centers of an inferior level, the ethnical and confessional component (Kocsis,
2007) etc. The administrative-territorial organization human resources evaluated
quantitatively and qualitatively, associated with efficient communication and
transportation systems, are fundamental in modelling systems functional due to efficiently
applied geographical management (Ilies & all., 2009, 168). The typology of border and
cross-border systems (Topaloglou & all., 2009), as opposed to the external border of E.U.,
also plays also an important part in defining the functionality of the determined crossborder areas. In order to highlight the importance of these structural elements for crossborder territorial systems we will further present their most relevant features, determined
for establishing the degree of systemic functionality
The natural background plays an important part in determining the functionality
of contiguous border systems due to its morphology, orientation and morphologic
characteristics (fig. 1). In this case, the relations between the components of the natural
environment are diverse but always of mutual determination (Ianoş, 2000, 22). This
supports the idea that when it comes to the conditioning of the functionality of a territorial
system, the geographical determinism is apparent. While for a territorial system “its inner
structural and functional organization determines the maintenance of the same order under
different external aggressions” manifests a great resistance to the change (Ianoş, 2000,
25), the introduction of a barrier such as a state border or any other apparent
administrative limits can greatly disturb its functioning mechanism, particularly in the
case of homogeneous natural units.
Even though, morphologically, the landform of the border area is longitudinally
asymmetrical (rising from 100 m to over 1200 m), the borderline is relatively regular from
this point of view. This situation is due to the superposing of the border‟s trajectory to the
Danube‟s course which creates a valley transversally sectioning the Carpathian mountain
unit (fig. 1).
In the case of mountainous units partially included in the states‟ administrative
territory, the determined border areas have a cross-border interconnection potential
depending on the position of the state border trajectory related to the mountainous range
exposure. We have thus identified 3 major categories (Ilieş & Grama, 2010a): juxtaposedcharacterized by a low degree of interconnection influenced by the morphology, the
structure and the altitude of the landform; the support of the state border coincides with
84
the limit of highest altitudes or with the hydrographical limits; morphofunctional – with a
high interconnection potential, determined by the natural background morphology. The
state border trajectory transversely divides mountain units, valleys and depression areas
and the barriers which stand in the way of communication are generally of political and
legal nature; complex: resulted from the combination of the two previous categories and
which may have multiple successive segments: high potential segments- when
morphofunctional systems are dominant; low potential systems – when juxtaposed systems
are dominant and equilibrated potential systems – when the two categories are relatively
equal. Moreover, depending on their position within cross border interstate systems, they
can also be: balanced – with a unitary arrangement of the morphofunctional ones along
system‟s border and disproportionate – presenting a chaotic arrangement of those
favourable to communication, reflected in the landscape by the conditioned arrangement
of communications ways, human settlements and economic activities. In the case of the
montane Banat region, the morphology of the natural background and especially the
transversal character of the Danube valley generate a morphofunctional, high potential,
and balanced system, especially in the central sector. The interconnection potential is high
since the main obstacles are of a political or military nature, being generated by the statute
of EU and NATO external border. To these, we may add the economic and strategic
factors which influence the creation of connections in the Banat region. From a strategic
point of view, the “Iron Gates” (“Porţile de Fier” in Romanian) dam plays an important
part for both states, not only as an energy supply but also by being the only connection
between two natural montane contiguous systems. The lack of other connections in this
sector of the Romanian-Serbian border indicates that neither of these states is financially
capable of such an investment. This aspect determines a morphofunctional system
presenting “an interconnection potential”.
In the case of the border sector dominated by plains and lacking morphological
accidents, the interconnection potential is extremely high, especially due to a shared
history. The economic projects implemented in the Banat Plain have transformed it in one
of the most important agricultural areas both for the Romanian and the Serbian side
Natural Parks. Another significant advantage generated by the peripheral
disposition of the border between the two states, specific to montane areas, is the
localization of the two contiguous border areas in natural areas, untouched by man
(Timothy, 2001, 2), which favours the development of cross-border natural parks (Ilieş,
2008; Ilies & all., 2010). Many of the frontier zones of the former Iron Curtain, which are
essentially zones of untouched vegetation and wildlife, have now been designated as
nature preserves (Timothy, 2000, 2001). This area is home to two natural parks: the
Romanian “Iron Gates” (“Porţile de Fier”) Natural Park (fig. 1) and the Serbian
“Djerdap” Natural Park (Ilieş & all, 2010, 134-135, 136). Unfortunately, these two parks
are specific to a cross-border juxtaposed system, without sharing connections and without
a shared management, especially in the case of the Danube sector (which they both
include theoretically). Other three natural parks which are included by the Romanian
border system can be mentioned: „Cheile Nerei - Beuşniţa”, „Domogled - Valea Cernei”
and „Semenic - Cheile Caraşului”.
The drainage basin. In the case of the montane area, the drainage of hydrographical
arteries and the drainage basins which result follow the natural flow of the direct tributaries of
the Danube. The north-western sector, dominated by plains, transversally sections the drainage
basins of the Aranca, Bega, Timiş, Caraş and Nera rivers (Table 1, fig. 1). These, in turn, due
to their geographical positioning, generate a relation of “subordination” between the inferior
basin and the superior basin. As opposed to the plain sector, in this case all border systems
85
fully manage their hydrographical systems. From the total border, 53 % (289,6 km) of the
Romanian-Serbian border is of a hydrographical nature, of which 238,6 km (43,6 %) (table 1)
represent the Danube. Depending on the position of the hydrographical artery as opposed to
that of the borderline of the two possible trajectories (Ilieş, 2003, 34), the drainage basin of the
studied area is mostly transversal (11 sections), presenting only one total sectioning (table 1).
To the longitudinal profile which follows the Danube‟s flow over 235,5 km, one can add, in
the case of reduced areas, Nera and Caraş.
The
morphology
of
the
Table. 1. The rivers border state support according
determined cross-border system and its
with Romanian-Serbian border. (Sursa: Stamate, 1997;
degree of cross-border interconnectivity
www.politiadefrontiera.ro; topographic maps)
can be highlighted, along with the
LENGTH NR. SECTIONS
morphologic profile of the state
N0 SECTOR
RIVER
(KM)
Total Partially
borderline, by the analysis of the profiles
1
Dunărea
238,600
1
of the internal lines which delimitate the
2
Nera
21,900
1
3
Naidăş
2,800
1
width of 25 km of the contiguous border
4
Obârşia
1,800
1
areas. These two contiguous border strips
5
Caraş
2,300
1
of land measure 25 km in width, a
6
Boruga
0,600
1
Romanianrelevant number in the identification of
7
Fizeş
3,600
1
Serbian
8
Crivoaia
6,500
1
the elements and mechanism specific to a
9
Moraviţa
0,700
1
border area (13.660 sqkm each). The
10
Bârzava
3,800
1
contiguous border territorial systems
11
Timiş
3,300
1
12
Bega
1,900
1
delimitated by a 25 km strip of land
13
Bega Veche
1,800
1
generate a cross-border system measuring
Total
289,6
a total surface of 27.320 sqkm, a value
which comes close to that determined by
the border systems defined according to the width of the contiguous administrativeterritorial equivalent units (NUTS 3), covering 39.351,3 sqkm. As opposed to this, the
Serbian system thus determined covers a larger surface than that which is determined by
the expansion of border districts, situation contrary to that present in the Romanian region.
This case also exemplifies the asymmetry of the cross-border system which is caused by
an incompatibility between the Romanian and Serbian administrative-territorial systems
and their management of territorial expansions.
Crossing border point on the Romanian-Serbian border
no
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Crossing border point
Vălcani - Mokrin/Mocrin
Lunga - Nakovo
Jimbolia – Kikinda Crnja
Foieni I – Jasa Tomic/Modoş
Foieni II – Jasa Tomic/Modoş
Stamora Moraviţa – Vrsac Vatin
Naidăş - Kaluderevo
Moldova Veche - Derdap
Orşova / Tekija sau Milanovac
Porţile de Fier I – Derdap I
Drobeta Turnu-Severin - Kladovo
Porţile de Fier II (Ostrovu Mare)-Derdap II
Timisoara
Administrative Unit (NUTS III)
Timiş – North Banatul
Timiş – Central Banat
Caraş-Severin – South Banat
Caraş-Severin - Branicevo
Mehedinţi – Bor
Timis
Table 2.
Type
Local Traffic
Local Traffic
Internaţional: road and railway
Local Traffic
Local Traffic
Internaţional: road and railway
Internaţional: road
Internaţional: portuar
Internaţional: road
Internaţional: auto
Internaţional: airport
(Source: Romania, Poliţia de Frontieră, 2010)
86
The administrative-territorial background, viewed both from the perspective of
territorial expansion as well as that of its demographic potential, determines a slightly
asymmetrical cross-border territorial system, presenting a more expanded and more
populated Romanian sector because of the incompatibility of the two states‟ administrativeterritorial systems (fig. 2).
The Serbian administrative-territorial units stretch over smaller surfaces of land and
are disposed in a more balanced way along the borderline due to their almost geometrical
shape (similar to that of a square), whereas the Romanian counties are shaped irregularly, be
they stretching “towards the interior” (such as Timiş), somewhat “regularly” shaped (CaraşSeverin) or stretching along the borderline (Mehedinţi). The foundations of the
development of highly functional relations between cross-border systems are the freedom
of movement and the effortless penetration of state borders. Therefore, the analyzed area
can be identified with one of the 4 types of cross-border relations between contiguous
states which Martinez (1994, 3-4) proposes: lacking connections; minimal favourability;
interdependent and integrated. The Romanian-Serbian border ensures the connections
between the two contiguous border systems by 13 border checkpoints as follows (table 2):
9 for international traffic and 4 for light border traffic (Border Guard Agency, 2010; table
2). Depending on the means of transportation used they are: 8 for cars, 2 for trains, 3 for
boats and one for plain. The ratio between the lengths of the border and the density of its
checkpoints is of 1/81 km, an extremely low value as opposed to the European average.
An important part in the positioning of these checkpoints is played by the natural
background which influences the value of this index due to its morphology and to
population spread.
Figure 3. Peculiarities borderland systems in the Romanian-Serbian Borderland according with
NUTS 3 extension (source: Ilieş & Grama, 2010b)
87
Other indices calculated in order to highlight the degree of compatibility between
the two contiguous border systems are (Ilieş & Grama, 2010b; figure 3): the Dependency
border ratio; the Border asymmetry index and the Cross-border compatibilization indicator.
Conclusions
The analysis of these elements represents the foundation in elaborating strategies of
territorial planning in the case of cross-border systems. Each component of the territorial
system can be analyzed, interpreted and applied at the level of existing territorial structures.
However, one must keep in mind that an application of the general criteria of regionalization
(Cocean, 2005) and identification of the mechanism which ensure the defining and
functioning of territorial systems (Ianoş, 2000) may group the identified structures into
highly functional territorial units, generating economical development. Thus, the models of
cross-border territorial systems determined by the morphological characteristics of the
natural background as exemplified in the case of the Romanian-Serbian cross-border
territorial system as well as the role and the functions of the border may constitute important
references in defining the cross-border cooperation strategies and especially those for the
external EU border. Therefore, we are entitled to ask: “which is the optimal width of a
border subsystem?” And “at what point towards the interior of the country can one feel the
social and economic influence of the border?” one the one hand, and “what is the maximal
distance from the border at which the implication of decisional actors may still directly
influence the modelling of cross-border territorial systems?” on the other hand. From a
qualitative and quantitative point of view, the three indices which have been calculated (the
Dependency border ratio; the Border asymmetry index and the Cross-border
compatibilization indicator) highlight the necessity of finding common administrativeterritorial guidelines in order to increase the compatibility of the two contiguous border
systems at the level of NUTS 3, despite the favourable potential of the natural background.
These three indices emphasize the asymmetry of the Romanian-Serbian cross-border system
from an administrative-territorial point of view and implicitly concerning the number of
“actors” involved in the elaboration of such a development strategy.
We can state that the size (territorial extension and population number), shape
(elongated or compact) and position (outside / inside the EU) of the state in relation to the
external border of the EU plays an important role in this type of analysis, these features
generating advantages / disadvantages in terms of cross-border cooperation at the level of
corresponding trans-boundary systems. Thus, we can assert that border systems play an
important part in the social and economical integration as well as in the elimination of the
traditional border functions which generate juxtaposed territorial structures.
Acknowledgement. This contribution presents results from research projects: PN II
751/2007; Cultureg, Modul III-Partnership Romania/Slovenia 2010, PNII 667/2007. The
authors acknowledge to anonymous reviewer for their thoughtful suggestion and
comments.
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***,
(2010),
Politia
de
frontiera
(Police
Guard
Office),
Romania
(www.politiadefrontiera.ro)
The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC), Instrument
of Cross-border Cooperation. Case Study: Romania - Hungary
Constantin-Vasile ŢOCA, Adrian-Claudiu POPOVICIU
Abstract: The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC), as an
instrument of cross-border cooperation does not create an intermediary administrative
level and its members do not totally transfer their competences to a group, only those
necessary for applying the assumed mission. Also, the EGTC has the goal of eliminating a
discriminatory reality inside the European Union on the Internal Market, defined threw
the diverse report of facilitating the cooperation betwen two partners from different
countries, towards the cooperation between two partners from the same country. EGTC
does not eliminate all the exixting legal cooperation forms, but comes with a new
alternative, truly more consolidated. Besides the lack of law protection of the concept of
Euro-region, the EGTC one is officially recognized by the European Commission as
“label”, protected by the European Union.
Keywords: The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC), cross
border cooperation, EGTC Oradea-Debrecen
EGTS, institutional formula of cross border cooperation.
The philosophy of border cooperation is based on the idea that if two or more
central border regions believe they can solve some problems better than if they would tackle
unilaterally. Cross-border cooperation is based on principles of partnership, subsidiary and
that of the existence of a concept or a cross-border development strategy. The partnership
principle implies the existence of two types of partnerships: vertically partnerships between
the national, regional and local levels on each side of the border and horizontal partnership
established between the two sides located on both sides of the border.
The fields which can cause the development of cross-border partnerships are, for
example, the following: environment, agriculture, urban planning, transport,
communications, economy, jobs, tourism, education and culture. Therefore, the following
actions can be taken: studies on pollution and/or treat various types of waste and
production of network facilities to treat their waste1; protection programs and management
environment and framework for life, building high-voltage lines, the composition of
common computer database on flora and fauna of the region; the composition of
interregional and transnational infrastructure, global studies on the socioeconomic
structure and urban networks of cross-border area, studies on the common transport needs
in general and particularly border transport; the development of intermodal transportation
projects together; common interventions for certain road and rail routes and studies on
how to optimize the operation of railway lines or public transport; definition of the legal
and financial structure of cross-border public transport; Interregional traffic studies
1
A permanent cooperation was established between the cities Szentgotthard (Hungary) and
Jennersdorf (Burgenland, Austria) for evacuation and treatment of sewage and household waste
disposal by a private company registered in the system and established companies in Hungary
with the Austrian capital. City of Sopron (Hungary) and Province of Burgenland (Austria) study a
possible joint cooperation in the maintenance of road network.
90
(transport and communication). Among the many cross-border activities in the fields of
economy and jobs, can be mentioned: coordination and regular exchange of information in
socio-economic statistics, common economic diagnostics, joint, legal guides containing
practical possibilities of cross-border cooperation (Diana Cârmaciu and others, 2009);
border investment and market innovation, cooperation in energy (energy supply network);
articulation and complementarily in terms of training and continuous; the publishing of
frontier worker guides to all rights and obligations of such Community worker in both the
home country and working against the country; meetings between employers and business
associations, cross-border agreements among companies to attract investment; the creation
of permanent cross-border relations between business and technology research centers,
among chambers of commerce, trade unions; cross-border and interregional cooperation in
industrial innovation.
From this presentation of the concept of cross-border cooperation and favorite
areas in which this transnational relationship can solve the communities' problems in a
much more efficient measure, we will also analyze the institutional arrangements under
which national state creates the legal framework conducive to conduct cross-border
relations. The Framework Convention does not have the ambition to cover situations of
cross-border cooperation. Even provides specifically that its provisions "to not affect the
possibility for Contracting Parties to use commonly other forms of cross-border
cooperation"2. This leaves an open door to future developments, thus contributing to the
successful implementation of the Convention, both in terms of ratification by the states
and its use by the local border. The first observation we can make concerns the link
between the Framework Convention makes all cross-border cooperation and neighborly
relations in general. Secondly, the provisions outlined in the Framework Convention are
less restrictive, with a particular structure of a short agreement, subject to common rules
laid down by general international law of treaties, and a number of annexes in the form of
"models and drawings of agreements, statutes and contracts" which "is likely indicative,
do not have a conventional value"3.
At the Community level, an unreasonably high period was characterized by the
lack of an adequate legal framework for the establishment of such joint management
structure. But this problem has been corrected by the Community institutions for the
current budget year, threw the proposals made in the EU cohesion policy. Therefore, the
need to create a suitable tool to pressure the European Commission to propose, on July 14,
2004, a regulation to achieve the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC).
EGTC Regulation4 refers to a legal instrument, although the validity is not limited to the
2007-2013 programming period is meant to be used for: should be able to act, either for
the purpose of implementing territorial cooperation programs or projects co-financed by
the Community, notably under the Structural Funds in conformity with Regulation (EC)
No 1083/2006 and Regulation (EC) No 1080/2006 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 5 July 2006 on the European Regional Development Fund, or for the purpose
of carrying out actions of territorial cooperation which are at the sole initiative of the
Member States and their regional and local authorities with or without a financial
2
Article 3, point 3 out of the Convention
Article 3, point 1 out of the Convention
4
Regulation (EC) No 1082/2006 of The European Parliament and of The Council of 5 July 2006 on
a European grouping of territorial cooperation (EGTC)
3
91
5
contribution from the Community . Another reason for creating this common mechanism
for integrated management refers to the principle of non-cooperation that should not be
more difficult between two partners from different Member States, only between partners
in the same Member State6.
The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) is like the Euro
regions a border entity, but unlike the latter, the group has legal personality recognized
both at EU Member State and EU level. According to Article 4, paragraph 4 of the
Regulation, an EGTC has in all Member States the most extensive legal capacity accorded
to legal persons of the Member State law. In particular, EGTC may acquire or dispose of
tangible or intangible immobilizations can hire staff and may sue and be sued.
On a synthetic view, we can say that EGTC is a legal instrument under
Community law, not under international law as the Madrid Framework Convention. Like
other regulations, do not require ratification or negotiating bilateral or multilateral treaties,
it is binding and directly applicable in all Member States. As a result, the self-regulation
allows local and regional authorities in different Member States and certain bodies
governed by public law authorities or associations of all these groups to establish common
legal personality to implement programs and projects of cooperation. Another aspect of
the above analysis concerns the legal personality of the group, which can be private or
public, depending on the applicable national law (this possibility was left open by
regulation). In particular, the EGTC has the most extensive legal capacity accorded to
legal entities within Member States through national legislation 7.
The Oradea-Debrecen agglomeration, a possible EGTS Oradea-Debrecen
precursor?
Remigio Ratti provides a typology of cross-border cooperation which identifies
four key dimensions (Istvan Suli-Zakar, 2003: 443): Institutional borders; Geo-politic
borders; Social territorial borders; and Social cultural borders.
As we noted, to exist, or to implement integration mechanisms in the scheme
above we can see that the contemporary period must have a cross-border cooperation to be
reflected at the boundary between the border and stable border, where we find border
socio-cultural type.
Viewed from the perspective of the social dimension of globalization "means the
geographical expansion of social interaction and reflexivity, uniform style of consumption
(Life Style), increased with increasing population mobility of immigration, development
of transnational social movements and, in general, the compression of time and space
5
Argument no. 11 of Regulation (EC). 1082/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of 5
July 2006 regarding a European grouping of territorial cooperation (EGTC)
8
The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC), What Use for European Territorial
Cooperation Programmes And Projects?, Wien, 2008 p. 8
9
Art. 18, al 2 "The Regulation shall apply until August 1, 2007, except Article 16 which shall
apply from 1 August 2006." from the Regulation (EC) no. 1082/2006 of the European Parliament
and the Council of 5 July 2006 regarding a European grouping of territorial cooperation (EGTC)
10
Art.17 of Regulation EGTC
6
The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC), What Use for European Territorial
Cooperation Programmes And Projects?, Wien, 2008 p. 8
7
Article 1, paragraph 4, Regulation (EC) No 1082/2006 „An EGTC shall have in each Member
State the most extensive legal capacity accorded to legal persons under that Member State's
national law. It may, in particular, acquire or dispose of movable and immovable property and
employ staff and may be a party to legal proceedings.”
92
from the point terms of social implications, in a symbolic end, if not history, then at least
of geography" (I. Apahideanu, 2006: 307).
The interpretation of boundaries should be considered in four large: political
geography, economic geography, cultural geography and regional geography dimensions
(Klara Czimre, 2005: 9).
Starting From this scheme we can say that at the Euro regional level we must
have into account when we start a detailed analysis, the political geography, economic
geography, cultural geography, regional geography and not least the components of these
four dimensions. Also the subcomponents of the four large dimensions can become a
priority direction of each research that contributes to their understanding and provide
solutions for Euro-regional development. “The cultural dimension concerns the process of
diffusion and hybridization of symbols, meanings, cultural values towards the progressive
development of something like a culture or at least agreed to a global consciousness
around a minimum set of globally shared cultural values” (I. Apahideanu, 2006: 307).
The sociological research conducted in the cities of Debrecen and Oradea (Toca,
Horga, 2008: 73-74) method was based on the "sociological survey" and as a research tool,
data collection was based on the questionnaire. The method chosen is a type which allowed
quantitative questioning of a representative number of people in the two areas on which
turned our project. A total of 1,000 questionnaires were applied by each of the two selected
cities. For a database management after completing the questionnaires we used the SPSS
(statistical program social), with which we have developed questionnaires and data
interpretation. Sociological survey of target groups was: a) students who have applied 50%
of questionnaires (500 copies each in each subject area of research); b) public opinion or
people older than 25 years, 40% of questionnaires (400 questionnaires in each city);
c) persons employed in various institutions that have a close relationship with regional
space, regional cooperation 10% of questionnaires (100 questionnaires for each area).
The questionnaire consists of a variety of questions through which we tried to
emphasize the following elements: a) links the two cities with population of:visits that were
made in the neighboring country and in neighboring city, purpose for which it was made visit,
means of transport by which interconnects the two neighboring cities in the country; b) aspects
of social life facing the two communities; c) classification of major fields, d) performing trust
in the city administration; e) the project‟s importance for the harmonious development of the
two communities; f) actions should be implemented for sustainable movement congestion;
g) SWOT analysis, h) socio-demographic data of respondents.
Fig.1 Visiting the neighboring country, Hungary, Romania;
Source: Own elaboration
93
From this question we can note that people which are living in Oradea visited in a
much larger proportion the neighbor country in comparison with neighboring townspeople
neighbor who came to a much lesser extent in the neighboring country, their percentage is
below 50% and among students we can see that it manifests the slightest interest for this
indicator. This is due to the status of Romania of EU member country, a country acceding to
the great European family, which has led to more frequent visits to a member country of the
European Union, Hungary various reasons, goals (goals visits find them to question. 4).
The most used means of transport, if the target group of students, to link the two
areas both for the people of Oradea (33.3%) and for the people of Debrecen (25.8%) is the
private car. Another means used to a lesser extent bus or coach is to Oradea (16.2%),
Debrecen (5%). The rest train and other modes are used in a very small proportion, not
exceeding 5% percent. Lower rates for coaches, coach, train is due to much weaker ties
between the two cities, here we remember that there are regular flights between the two
municipalities, and to train option, there is a part of the railway between the two localities
which makes the transport mode much easier compared to the relatively small distance
between the two cities, because the train travels a circuitous route.
The last response option, is not the case, is the percentage of people who were not
in the neighboring country once and for Debrecen percentage is considerably higher than
for travel to the neighboring country.
Fig. 2. The number of visits in the city of Debrecen and Oradea in the last year.
As we can see in the question on the visit of neighboring (target group: students)
the number of visits ranges from one visit where the percentage is higher, Oradea (30.2%)
and Debrecen (25%), 30 visits but a very small percentage, less than 1%. The Debrecen
population visited the neighboring city of Oradea in a much smaller proportion (64% of
citizens have visited Oradea, Debrecen), but the Romanian citizens visit the city ever more
often (47% of them visited the neighboring town). The other types of visits categories play
an increasingly smaller percentage as the number of visits to the neighboring city grows,
we can say that category between 1-3 visits combined occupy the largest percentage,
44.8% for Oradea and a much smaller percentage to 32.1 Debrecen %.
If we look at the percentages for the two target groups still see that store large
amounts among the visits made by the neighboring city of Oradea in Debrecen, but the
similarities in the institutional balance is kept (the only discrepancy being the indicator
two visits), here can say that visits to the two communities are mutual, which shows a
close cooperation.
94
Fig. 3 The purpose of the visits in the neighbouring city (in Debrecen)
With this question we can identify that there are links between the inhabitants of
two towns just by the number of visits that were made by citizens of both cities, the
neighboring town, and prevails in a considerable number of visits that start in Oradea,
meaning Romanian citizens to the Hungarian space respectively Debrecen.
Fig. 4 The purpose of the visits in the neighbouring city (in Oradea)
Other purposes: cultural - entertainment events, medical, competitions, school
projects, conferences, international seminars
The purposes: tourism, transit, shopping are the most important goals, in terms of
the identified percentages. Travel is an affinity for one side of the citizens of both
countries to visit the neighboring country, there are attractions, traditions, customs and
cuisine of different regions, all in one place an attraction develops, there are stations at
both the Hajdu Szabolszlo Hungarian and Romanian side Baile Felix.
The purpose of business is also represented by the existence of many companies
as there are the two cities and the Bihor - Hajdu-Bihar Euro-region which includes the two
cities, which are developed partnerships, international cooperation, even multinational
companies with some involvement and across borders.
The Romanian border - is full of Hungarian history, there were a number of
historical moments that led to the cultural influences of various kinds and therefore the
definitive demarcation of the border brought the two neighboring countries rise and
populations of the two states separated by drawing a border state, thus leaving a wide
border and part of citizens which have various degrees of relationship and for the visits in
neighboring takes to visit relatives.
95
“In the two decades after the events of 1989-1990 we have witnessed not only a
shaping of the geographical border in terms of boosting the cross-border traffic flow or the
cross-border cooperation, but also a mutation from the ethno-national mentalities to a
cosmopolitan mentality. In fact, actually speaking, it is not only a revelation of a culture of
cohabitation, but a rediscovery of a coexistence pattern previous to drawing national
borders” (Horga I., Suli –Zakar I, 2010: 170 ).
Besides this pre-coded answer options there it was also an opened answer option
from which came many answers from which we can see that there are co-operations at an
institutional level which are transformed in conferences, international seminars, school
projects, even competitions, all the answers identifying the existence of a cross-border cooperation in the past as well as in the present, but also a perspective for the near future
here identifying the possibility of accessing structural funds that action in the direction of
the cross-border co-operation development.
From the medical point of view we can say that both cities have one university
medical specialists in this area forming centers that will appeal to students from all over
Europe and other continents.
For the question “How do you appreciate on a 1 to 5 scale that in Oradea are
issues connected to the following social life aspects?”(1= very big issues; 2= big issues;
3= medium issues; 4= little issues; 5= no issues), we presented in following due to the big
amount of information resulted from the analysis of statistics, the target group that sees
the students, another justification being the fact that on this target group it is based the
construction of the future crowd, concerning that they will be the beneficiaries of the
results of the proposed project at the level of cross-border co-operation which concern the
Oradea and Debrecen municipalities.
Nr
crt
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
Nr
crt
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
Students - Oradea:
Aspects of the social life
The quality of buildings
Public lighting
Assurance of labor places
Sewerage
Solving the citizens‟ issues
Central heating
Hot water
Cold water
Roads
Cleaning
Transport
Students - Debrecen:
Aspects of the social life
The quality of buildings
Public lighting
Assurance of labor places
Sewerage
Solving the citizens‟ issues
Central heating
Hot water
Cold water
Roads
Cleaning
Transport
Very big
8
3.8
27.1
18.4
20
8.4
7.3
6.9
48.4
34
12.9
Very big
5
3.3
14.2
4.2
6.7
10.8
3.3
7.1
17.1
17.1
17.9
Big
19.8
17.8
31.6
32
30.9
16.9
9.6
7.1
22.2
30.4
20.4
Big
16.7
8.8
34.2
12.6
26.7
20
7.1
12.9
29.6
29.6
16.7
Medium
54
41.3
26.9
33.1
36.7
39.1
32.2
22.7
18.9
23.8
36
Medium
62.9
30.4
44.2
48.8
49.2
31.3
22.9
27.5
37.5
40.8
36.3
Low
15.6
29.1
12.4
13.1
11.1
28.2
37.3
40.9
8
9.6
22.2
Low
13.3
44.2
6.7
26.7
12.9
28.3
43.3
32.5
12.9
10.8
22.9
No issues
2.7
8
2
3.3
1.3
7.3
13.6
22.4
2.4
2.2
8.4
No issues
2.1
13.3
0.8
5.8
4.6
9.6
23.3
20
2.9
1.7
6.3
96
The most frequent issues (summing the answers that identify big and very big
issues from the indicators in discussion), which appear at the level of the two communities
are: elements of infrastructure, solving the citizens' problems and a sign that keeps the first
place for both communities refers to the assurance of labor places, although there are
recognized academic centers, there is not a sufficient economic power to cover the entire
human resource specialist.
Fig. 5. The most important activity fields in Oradea and Debrecen / students
Fig. 6. The most important activity fields in Oradea and Debrecen / Public opinión
Fig. 7. The most important activity fields in Oradea and Debrecen / institutions
The results obtained for the 7 big activity fields that exist at the level of the two
neighbor cities, it was made after summing the realized elections for the respondents for
the first three places, for each field in part.
The question regarding the degree of confidence on institutions operating in the
range of the two cities where the research was done we tried to capture the views of
citizens of both communities reported to the main public institutions that manage the city,
recalling here: the City Hall, Prefect Institution, Local Council, County council as well as
confidence: religious institutions, educational institutions, media - not least the NGOs.
97
The biggest confidence at an institutional level was given to the Church and the
University (here we used a scale with four degrees of intensity: very large, large and small
and have accumulated the most important degrees of intensity that can capture public
confidence in the institutions put analysis, very high grades and gaining greater
confidence in institutions as church and educational institution to institution, the
University of Oradea and Debrecen) two basic institutions of the society, a religious
institution and secondly an educational one, having as an important also the clear
principles of training a religious culture, fair and a general one and in time of specialty for
every member of the society according to his desire for orientation in various fields.
A significant confidence far from the two above-mentioned also ranges the NGOs,
a side of the civil society which can play an important role at both companies towards an
effective and lasting consolidation at the level of the Romanian-Hungarian border.
One of the central dimensions of the research focused on the surprise of the draft
opinion on the project with the theme "to prepare a common future: Agglommeration of
Communities Debrecen-Oradea 700 000 (2020)", for joint development of cities of
Oradea and Debrecen, here building a question with three types of response.
Fig. 8. The interest rate of the citizens concerning the Project regarding the
Agglommeration of Communities Debrecen-Oradea
From the answers given by respondents we can notice that at the level of the
students in Oradea the proposed project is considered and wanted for a joint development
between the two communities that can be transformed into a functional and efficient
congestion, since it works very well across Europe border conurbations such as:
Lille / FR - Roubaix - Tournai - Tourcoing - Kortijk / BE which brings together more than
2.2 million inhabitants, Agglomeration Basel - Mulhouse 600 000 inhabitants, has
developed joint projects, of which the best known is the common international airport.
The higher percentage for Oradea which resulted in comparison with Debrecen
may be due to the fact that the project at the city of Oradea was also made a campaign that
attempted through public information forums and the nature of the decision in order to
implement a long term project which could have numerous benefits as well as they can be
also viewed at the existing cross-border congestions at the level of the border of Europe.
In order to see the priority items in helping the streamline city of Oradea and
Debrecen, it was built a closed-choice question, existing in final the possibility of an
additional response beyond those listed, and the followed directions were: a) the opening
of new border crossing points - building new roads to Debrecen; b) realizing of
conducting Points (economic, tourist, administrative, Euro-regional, transportation, etc.);
c) daily flights Oradea - Debrecen (Bus, Train); d) regular meetings between officials of
two cities; e) training courses of managers, experts, employees in Oradea (those of
Debrecen) and Debrecen (those of Oradea); f) the organization of mobility (exchange),
teachers, students and schoolchildren; g)the development of joint projects; h) the
organization of job fairs; i) the organization of common projects; j) organizing of
98
meetings between experts from different fields of activities; k) other activities you think
would be important for collaboration to be implemented.
In following of the answers is noted that for a harmonious development of the two
neighboring cities of student arise three essential elements that have a representative
percentage of over 50% and we think they are relevant to this positive outlook on the
future, these being: information points, exchange programs, joint projects which can be
obtained through all sorts of local funds, euro regional, regional, national, and not least the
EU structural funds can be an essential element for building a harmonious congestion of
Debrecen - Oradea communities.
There are already-or currently under establishment- workgroups that intend to
help to harmonize human resource development, to improve accessibility, to develop joint
infrastructure, to harmonize tourism and health, to develop inter-ethnic connections and
common economy (Istvan Suli – Zakar, 2009: 144)
Another central element of research was the SWOT analysis through which we
wanted to capture the views of three target groups for internal and external elements of the
City of Oradea and Debrecen.
The SWOT analysis of Oradea reflected 52 indicators and at the Debrecen level
were identified 37 indicators, very diverse that are re-found as internal factors (strong
points, low points), or external factors (opportunities, threats)
After the SWOT analysis, few conclusions can be drawn referring to Oradea and
Debrecen cities.
For both cities, can be drawn as strong points the following dimensions:
The cultural dimension where we can integrate the following answers: cultural
objectives, the building‟s architecture, churches, religious centers (143 answers)
The educational dimension, here we can highlight the Oradea academic environment as
well as that of Debrecen, being represented by the two big state universities (148
answers), and in forming the cross – border innovative cluster of Debrecen – Oradea
Eurometropolis the co-operating universities of the two cities will have an important
role (Istvan Suli – Zakar, 2009: 144)
Commercial centers, commerce (84 answers), Geographical position, neighborhood
(71 answers), Tourism (73 answers), Infrastructure, transport (72 answers), Institutions
(63 answers)
As low points of the two communities we identified the following dimensions:
Infrastructure, transport (213 answers), Institutions (35 answers), Working places (78 answers)
Opportunities: Tourism (94 answers), Projects (55 answers), Development
possibilities of the cities, investors (97 answers), Labor places in the EU (31 answers)
Near the dimensions mentioned above as opportunities at the level of Oradea and
Debrecen, there have also been identified other indicators, as followings: relations,
highway, education, regional point, culture, sport, geographic position.
Threats: Labor places (36 answers), together with other indicators threw which we
find: green spaces, old buildings, public administration, policy, migration, etc.
The stages of a cross-border strategy (N. Boar, 2005: 53): SWOT analysis, general
vision, objectives and priorities, projects and measurements, implementing,
monitorisation, evaluation.
As we see, for realizing a strategy of effective cross-border cooperation and
developing a mechanism for integration closer to European requirements should be met
six major conditions representing the Euro-regional success. Any Euro-region must
undertake a SWOT analysis (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) to represent
a basic starting point for future construction plans and Euro-regional sustainable
99
development strategies. After the SWOT analysis the specialists must build an overview
of the Euro-region and think about action plans. Any structure of Euro-regional
cooperation since its inception must start off with a range of objectives and priorities to be
adjusted in time to the Euro regional demands and needs.
In order to be implemented, the plans and ideas of experts have called on EU funded,
national, regional, local projects and must be found and called on those measures that will
benefit in areas of Euro-regional interest. There should not be forgotten the projects that
access financial funds, calling the neighboring country as partners together to achieve goals
and objectives of projects proposed for funding and approved for implementation.
Once approved, a project must be passed to the next phase, namely the
implementation phase, where through various activities planned under the project to
achieve the indicators referred to in the writing project.
3. EGTS Oradea-Debrecen – a possible choice
As it can be seen from the SWOT analysis of section 2 or from the one realized by
the European Commission, the official document of appointment, the issue of transport
infrastructure and jobs are on the agenda between the two communities in Bihar - Hajdu
Bihar cross-border area. Without a tool, as is the European grouping of territorial
cooperation in the border area Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai, the authorities carried out mirror
projects in Oradea and Debrecen on various funding programs, but which can not always
sync, especially when only one of the two projects are financed. Next we will present an
example of good practice on upgrading the transport infrastructure through cooperation,
Oradea Metropolitan Area (project leader) with the mayor of Debrecen (partner). The two
public entities implemented in the period December 1, 2009 to November 30, 2010, inside
the Cross-border Cooperation Program Hungary-Romania from 2007 to 2013, the project
"Preparation of strategic investment for the development of integrated road transport
infrastructure in the urban poles Oradea-Debrecen"8, acronym - INFRASTRAT.
Through its functions, the transport activity is, with communications and banking
system, the "backbone" of the economic circuit, both at international, national, local and cross
border level. The single European market, but also the global economy and globalization are
accompanied by new relations of exchange, involving new trends transport much wider areas
than those traditionally known. At least at European level, the new vision of East-West
relations and the center-periphery, an efficient transport system is vital to trade and promote
competition and productivity in all economic field but also growth in lagging regions. The
transport policy must be integrated with other sectorial policies, particularly planning policy,
environmental policy, and energy policy and with the telecoms. The "key" in this area is
connected to the trans-European road network, air and railway transport sector by allowing
higher valorization of the metropolitan territory and borders9.
Regarding the transport infrastructure, common problems of border communities
still generate a form of partnership inarticulately and less coherent without an
institutionalized form to coordinate the function that responds to this problem, current
approaches do not think that will achieve the major goal, a modern transport
8
9
Perseus Code HURO/0801/154, the total budget of this project is 164.175 Euro, of which EU
funding is 85% state financing, 11.5% and partners' contribution amounts to 3.5%.
Oradea Metropolitan Area Cadrul strategic al dezvoltării durabile 2007 -2026, 22 of November
2006, p. 43, http://www.zmo.ro/romana/Documente/Cadrul-strategic.html, accessed on 8 of
February 2010
100
infrastructure, developed, branched throughout the border area and related to European
transport arteries.
From the researches we have done on the problem of employment as a priority
common policy in the Romanian-Hungarian border counties of Bihor - Hajdu Bihar, we
concluded that this is a major interest in inter-institutional level, although it has the same
valences in both areas of the border, that is a common acute need. We substantiate the
claim also on the research carried out by the Oradea Metropolitan Area under the project
"Identification and cluster development in Euro-region Bihor - Hajdu Bihar"10 and also on
direct and objective conditioning of economic development and job application.
According to the functionalist "philosophy" this problem should be treated jointly
for a more rapid and more ample result. At the level of the areal border Bihor - Hajdu
Bihar there have already identified several clusters or other formats that have potential for
training, all for a more emphasized development of cross-border business. Why is the
"cluster"11 an effective way to growth in the border area of Bihor - Hajdu Bihar? We
believe that for two reasons. The first reason concerns the sustainable competitive
advantage which creates an economic cluster is the result "economies of agglomeration
and proximity", that economies of scale and scope achieved by grouping the firms in the
cluster, derivative, or very low cost / further investment, using only the existing resources
of the cluster members.
The second reason is based on the advantage of the Hungarian work zone in the
activity of identifying and accrediting of emerging clusters of at least two years from the
Romanian border12. In addition, the already formed cluster in Hajdu Bihar need both
Romanian business environment correspondent, and the expansion of sales of products
generated in a neighboring district, Bihor. In this respect, as a result of data analyzed in
the body of this work, we believe that space Hajdu Bihar - Bihor must, in a short future, as
soon as possible (one or two years), constitute a European grouping of territorial
cooperation. In this respect, at the level of the Metropolitan Area of Oradea a first step
was made towards creating the group, setting up Oradea Metropolitan Development
10
Phare CBC 2005 Project Ro 2005/017-536.01.01.01.21, more accessible documents at
http://www.zmo.ro/romana/Proiecte/Identificarea-si-dezvoltarea-de-clustere-in-euroregiuneaBihor-~-Hajdu-Bihar.html
11
In advanced economies, the layer most dynamic regional economies is composed of a mixture of
"economic clusters". "Cluster" in the denotative sense means "group" and in the economic sense,
clusters are groups of companies and associated institutions acting in a specific area or joint,
located in relative geographic proximity, including both producers / manufacturers / service
providers, and related service providers (bankers and insurance specialist, etc..) suppliers,
universities and professional associations. Classic examples of clusters are electronics industry in
Silicon Valley in California, watch industry in Switzerland, etc. A cluster acts as an area of
expertise, a pool of resources and contribute to all the companies involved and supplies.
Typically, clusters also contain, in addition to a group of related industries, other important
entities in terms of competition. These include, for example, suppliers of specialized inputs such
as components, machinery and services, or providers of specialized infrastructure. Often, clusters
extend to different downstream channels and customers and laterally to manufacturers of
complementary products and the industries related by skills, technologies or common inputs.
(Studiu Economic Având ca Obiect Identificarea de Clustere Emergente, realizat în cadrul
proiectului Identificarea şi dezvoltarea de clustere în Euroregiunea Bihor - Hajdu Bihar, p. 5,
http://www.zmo.ro/content/editor/File/Clustere/1_%20Studiu%20Economic%20identitificare%20
Clustere. pdf, accessed on 8 February 2010
12
Ibidem, p. 41
101
13
14
Committee . Under Article 1 of the Protocol of collaboration , the Oradea Metropolitan
Development Committee is an institutional building, unincorporated advising, which
relies on three "pillars" of development of the metropolitan area: a) Education; b) Business
environment; c) Public administration.
The GECT name
Acronym
Implementing statute
Implicate states
Teritory
Members
Duration
Objectives
Euro-metropolis Oradea – Debrecen
EMOD
Project proposal
România (RO)
Ungaria (HU)
The Romanian and Hungarian border area, represented by the space
of the Bihor county from the North-West Development Region, at
the East of the border and the space of the Hajdu-Bihar county from
the Great Plains region of North (Észak-Alföldi Régió) at the West of
the border.
16 local authorities:
10 in Bihor County: the city of Oradea and the near villages Biharia,
Borş, Cetariu, Girişu de Criş, Nojorid, Oşorhei, Paleu, Sânmartin si
Sântandrei
6 in the Hajdu-Bihar County: the city of Debrecen, cities of
Berettyóújfalu, Biharkeresztes, Derecske, Hajdúszoboszló,
Püspökladány,
Undefined
Creating an area of welfare, employment and sustainable
development;
The consolidation of cross-border cooperation;
The synchronization of the cross-border policies by harmonizing the
inter-institutional eurometropolitan dialogue;
Realizing a single development strategy for two peoples with
common history and future;
This committee promotes administrative efficiency within local authorities,
environmental protection, research and innovation, promoting education academic
performance, linked to European educational standards and increase economic
competitiveness by attracting and supporting investments involving high value added, low
unemployment, the stimulating of the qualification process continues. Also, the Oradea
Metropolitan Development Committee contributes to achieving the development goals of
the metropolitan area and serves to link the projects financed or publicly funded partners.
In the meetings held in the Committee were developed several drafts of European
grouping Oradea - Debrecen, based on the existing consensus on the need for setting up
such a legal instrument, but not yet completed a version.
13
Project initiated by the working group consisting of: Adrian Foghiş (Oradea Metropolitan Area),
Lucian Hungarians (Local Council of Small and Medium Oradea) and Adrian Popoviciu-Claudiu
(University of Oradea)
14
Cooperation protocol signed between the University of Oradea, Oradea Metropolitan Area, Bihar
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Local Council of Small and Medium Employers Federation
Bihor Oradea for development and promotion of Oradea Metropolitan Area as an area of welfare,
employment and development sustainable, signed on September 24, 2008, accessible at
http://www.zmo.ro/content/editor/File/CDMO/Protocol%20final%2024%20sept%202008.pdf
102
Considering that the common needs of both communities from both sides of the
Romanian-Hungarian border could be better handled by creating a European Grouping of
Territorial Cooperation between the two poles of urban development Oradea - Debrecen, we
propose below some elements that we consider indicative of a potential project of this kind.
Referring to the organization of the Oradea-Debrecen Euro-Metropolis we think
that it should be composed of four structures: The Euro-Metropolis Oradea - Debrecen
Assembly (legislative role), the Board (composed of one representative of each member of
that group, with the role of manager, which ensures the enforcement of judgments
Assembly), the Secretariat of the Oradea - Debrecen Euro-Metropolis (current business
structure association with permanent staff) and Advisory Committee (involved in studies
and analysis on key areas of intervention of the organization, or to define the multi-annual
actions program.
The fundamental objective of cross-border cooperation in the European Union is
to integrate separate areas of national borders, but face the common problems that must be
answered with common solutions. We believe that the European Grouping of Territorial
Cooperation is necessary solution in the border area, which constitutes a legal crucible of
common solutions hairpin populations for which the past dividing border today became an
element of cohesion. Cross-border cooperation is the central priority of raising the
competitiveness of border regions, further contributes to economic and social integration
of adjacent border areas. Although significant differences exist between border
populations, their desire to live a better life creates the critical mass for determining the
authorities in implementing this new Community legal instrument.
Biblography:
Apahideanu I. (2006), „Globalizarea între concept şi realitatea desemnată”, in Manual de
Relaţii Internaţionale, coord. Andrei Miroiu, Radu - Sebastian Ungureanu, Editura
Polirom, Iaşi,
Boar N. (2005), Regiunea transfrontalieră româno – ucraineană a Maramureşului, Presa
Universitară Clujeană, Cluj – Napoca
Cârmaciu Diana şi alţii (2009), Stadiul actual al reglementărilor naţionale şi comunitare
în domeniul cooperării transfrontaliere, Oradea, Editura Primus
Czimre K. (2005), Studia Geografica. Euroregionalis fejlodes az EU csatlakozas
kuszoben kulonos tekintettel Magyororszag euroregioira, Debreceni Egyetem
Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadoja, Debrecen
Ţoca C., Horga I., Sociological research.Thinking the future together the Debrecen –
Oradea cross – border agglomeration, in Neighbours and Partners: On The Two
Sides Of The Border, 2008, Debrecen, Published by the Debreceni Egyetem
Kossuth Egyetemi Kiado, Edited by István SÜLI-ZAKAR
Suli – Zakar I. (2003), Tarsadalomfoldrajz – teruletfejlesztes II, Debreceni Egyetem
Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadoja, Debrecen, 2003
Suli – Zakar I., The Role of the Euroregions and Eurometropolises in the Etheralisation of
the Borders in the Eastern Periphery of the European Union, in Eurolimes, vol 7,
Oradea University Press, 2009, Edited byDorin Dolghi, Gilles Rouet, Zsolt Radics
HORGA I., SÜLI-ZAKAR I., Contributions of Institute for Euroregional Studies OradeaDebrecen to Shaping the Border Into a Space for Knowledgeand Development,in
Analele RISE, vol II, Oradea University Press, 2010, Editor in Chief Brie Mircea.
„SoNorA” as a factor of developing Adriatic - Baltic co-operation
Jan WENDT, Tomasz WISKULSK
Abstract: Our presentation has been concentrated at the scientific description and
analysis of “SoNorA” potential. The aim of “South – North – Axis” project has been development
of transport and services infrastructure at Central Europe. The main transport corridor, know as
well as “Adriatic – Baltic Landbridge” will connecting Polish and Germans ports with Italian,
Croatian and Slovenian once. Realization and developing transport net between the Baltic Sea
Region and Adriatic Basin let develop stream of good not only between Baltic and Adriatic ports
but as well between South Part of Europe, even North Africa and Scandinavia. Developing this
transport and transit corridors will give a possibility to create a great number of private
enterprise, a green field ones as well as at the service sector. Additionally between aims of Project
“SoNorA” are developing activity of logistic and transport services, helping at the preparing and
coordinating plans for international cooperation and support of regional development.
Keywords: Baltic, Adriatic, co-operation, corridor, transport, landbridge
Introduction
The project "Sonora" was launched in November 2008 and provided for the
implementation by February 2012. "SoNorA ” as one of the projects based on
international cooperation is funded under the priority of priority "Accessibility ” from
Operational Programme "Central Europe". One of his main aims is succour for Central
Europe regions to increase transportation accessibility along the north - south axis
between Adriatic and Baltic Sea.
Motorway of the Sea Gdynia – Karlskrona
Extension of the eastern corridor of "SoNorA" project in the north is motorway of
the sea between Karlskrona and Gdynia. This project was aimed to achieve for the period
2009-2011. It provides the realisation of infrastructural investments in sea ports of
motorway particurally from TEN-T budget to height about 50% of eligible costs.
Fig. 1. Map of motorway of the sea Gdynia – Karlskrona
Source: Own elaboration based on Portal Morski: www.portalmorski.pl
These investments include:
 building of intermodal terminal and logistic centre in Alcesta, Sweden;
104
 modernization of railway line Karlskrona - Goteborg in system Coast-to-Coast;
 extension of ferry terminal in Karlskrona with investments combined with
improvement of the transportation accessibility;
 building the port infrastructure for handling ferries with improvement of the
transportation accessibility in Gdynia.
The development of the sea motorway Gdynia – Karlskrona will cause many
positive results for economy and environment in Poland and all EU. These include:
 the consolidation of Polish position in forming transport policy in EU;
 it will realize the idea of sustainable development in region of Baltic Sea
across development of Short Sea Shipping, development of intermodal
transportation as well as logistics;
 to increase cohesion and interoperability for freight and passanger;
 the possibility of runing a new logistic chain in the north-south relation by
Chech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Austria, Italia, Slovenia and Croatia;
 decrease of negative influences on environment by limitation of predominant
position of Germany, Denmark and Netherlands in service of loads for Poland
and transported by roads;
 generalization
of intermodal transportation by increasing of railway
transportation and decreasing of road transportation;
 improvement the safety of transports, mainly because of decrease the road
accidents;
 relief highways in Netherlands - Germany - Poland;
 decrease the emission of carbon dioxide;
 the intensification of trade exchange in region of the Baltic Sea.
Port of Gdynia
The geographical extreme point for eastern route of project (agreeing with VI
Transportation Corridor) in Poland is the port in Gdynia. This port specialises in service of
package cargos, containers and ro-ro transports. It possesses wide participation in creating
international trade. Gdynia has regular shipping routes to Scandinavia, Great Britain,
Germany, to harbours of North and South America. The total volume of cargo transported
via the port of Gdynia is described in the tabl. 1.
Tabl. 1. Goods loaded and unloaded in Gdynia in years 2005-2009 (thous. tonnes)
Year
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Quantity
12 230
14 199
17 025
15 467
13 257
Source: Own elaboration based on „Gospodarka Morska – Statistical Yearbook”, 2006-2010.
Noticeable increase in the volume of transported cargo in 2007, when the port has
reached the best result during the period compared to 2005 by over 39% (fig. 1.). It was
result of accession Poland to EU and facilitation export and import of cargos from the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria by port of Gdynia. Decrease of transported cargos by
105
port in Gdynia was caused by economical crisis and general decrease od import and export
in all EU. Recipients have limited their imports of goods due to the inability to sell the
goods in their own markets and significant currency fluctuations. But it is a common
phenomenon throughout the world and it should not be considered only in terms of the
port of Gdynia.
In view of the structure and size of cargo handling and a high degree of
containerisation, the port of Gdynia should develop distribution and logistics function.
That's way next to the port is arising Logistics Centre in the Port of Gdynia (fig. 2.).
General usage the principle "just in time” in logistics and more and more larger
specialisation in production, trade and services mobilizes to creating new technologies in
transportation and storage. The role of logiscics centre should depend on attendance of
loadings which are reloaded in port, increasing their value and realizing demands of
customers.
18000
16000
in thous. t .
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
years
Fig. 2. Goods loaded and unloaded in Gdynia in years 2005-2009
Source: Own elaboration based on tabl. 1.
Fig. 3. Planned Logistics Centre in the Port of Gdynia
Source: Port of Gdynia - www.port.gdynia.pl
106
In order to the correct development of logistic functions for "Adriatic - Baltic
Landbridge" it is necessary to establish the base scenario. It provides:
 investments in the development of current networks container trains;
 the creation of co-ordination Landbridge Agency;
 to develop a concept of the project;
 create a network of container terminals;
 a network of logistics centers;
 creating innovative handling technology.
The Logistics Centre will be developed on 30 ha ground. It will be localized in
close neighbourhood of partly developed area, which is used by operators who are dealing
logistics on terrain of West Port. This terrain contiguous with the container terminal and
it's surrounded by railroads, which will be used in close future for logistics.
Railroad Gdańsk – Adriatic
The main railway elements in the eastern corridor of project Landbridge is line
Gdynia/Gdańsk - Tczew - Warszawa - Katowice - Zebrzydowice/Bohumin - Vienna Graz - Klagenfurt - Villach - Udine with three branches: Villach - Rijeka, Udine - Venice,
Udine - the Koper. On the terrain of Poland, except exchanged sections, exist altermative
sections: Tczew - Inowrocław - Katowice and Zduńska Wola - Łódź – Warszawa.
Fig. 4. Map of railroad Gdańsk – Adriatic
Source: Own elaboration based on Sonora Project: www.sonoraproject.eu
107
In mayority in Poland are unadjusted lines to achieve high speeds. Only in the
south section Zebrzydowice - Bohumin are admissible speeds 121-160 km/h. In the rest
part of rail corridor in Poland trains can achieve speed about 50-120 km/h, which is
enough good speed for cargo trains, but not for passangers.
Much more better sittuation is in the Czech Republic. Trains on whole section
from Bohumina to Breclav can achieve the crossing speeds 100 km/h, and mostly they can
achieve speed about 145-160 km/h. Also Austria hasn't got any problems with railways.
This country possesses one of the best developed trackage in Europe. It causes the
development of transports by railway. In years 2005-2008 intermodal transportation
growed up from 1416 to 1783 millions tkm, which lets almost 26% growth in whole
period scale.
Highway Baltic – Adriatic
Highway from Baltic Sea to Adriatic Sea is the main road element of project
Landbridge. In each country make it:
 in Poland by planned A1 highway as international road E75;
 in the Czech Republic as D1 highway from Bohumin to Brno as international
road E462 and expressway R52 from Brno to border with Austria in Mikulov
as international road E461;
 in Austria by planned A5 highway from the Czech Republic border to Vienna
as international road E461 and from Vienna to italian border as highway A2 as
international roads E59, E66 and E55;
 in Italy by highway A23 and A4 as international roads E55 and E70 to Venice;
 in Slovenia by A2 highway (E61) from border with Austria to Ljubljana and
the highway A1 (E59, E57, E61) to port of Koper;
 in Croatia by highway A2 from border of Slovenia to Zagrzeb as road E59,
further as highway A1 (E65) to Bosiljeva and the highway A6 (E65) from
Bosiljeva to port of Rijeka.
Polish A1 highway in whole length is in borders of Adriatic - Balic Landbridge.
This project connect Tricity with the Czech border in Bohumin. Till the September 2010
devoted to use was only 156,4 km of 568 km of whole highway, which give the degree of
feasibility like 27,5 %. Whilst remaining 411,6 km are in building or on the geodesical
investigations of soils.
In the case of the Czech section of the corridor in September 2010 was performed
with the planned 167.7 km about 229.2 km, which gives a result over 73%. The unfinished
fragment of highway D1 is located between Kroměřìž and Lipnìk over Bečvou and a
fragment of expressway R52 from Pohořelice to border with Austria.
In case of Austrian highway A5 connected Vienna with the Czech Republic in
September 2010 was executed 23,5 km of 57,5 km and whole highway A2 from Vienna to
border of Italy with length about 371 km. It gives the result about 92%.
However roads included in Adriatic - Baltic Landbridge in Italy, Slovenia and
Croatia are on present day fully exploited.
The lowest level od realised road investments is in Poland and it is about 27,5%.
As a main causes od delays in building transportation network should be included
mistakes of transport policy:
 changeability the programmes of transportation development;
 distracted investment outlays;
 the lack of consequence in construction of roads.
108
Fig. 5. Highway Baltic - Adriatic
Source: SMAB: www.smab.pl
Frequent changes of development programmes and lack of consequence in their
realization brought to creating a model of delayed development of transportation. In spite
of expenses from state budget on the development of infrastructure on level 2% of GDP
with required 1,5 % the progress of realization the investment is still discontent. On this
basis is possible to concluded that level od expenditures in not only one or basic obstacle
in development of infrastructure. Additional barriers are result of market surroundings and
they are:
 significant increase in prices of building materials called "boom" in building;
 the shortages of qualified personnel having qualifications in civil engineering
infrastructure;
 limited capacity building materials manufacturing sector through the limited
choice of technology.
The additionaly reasons of non-efficient realization of investment are complicated
legal procedures which regulate preparing, funding and realisation of investment projects.
Because of more and more complicated legal system administration which is responsible
for realisation of projects in not able to create procedures and the risk of making mistakes
is growing up.
Ports of Adriatic
Extreme points for Adriatic - Baltic Landbridge in the southern Europe are sea
ports in Venice (Italy), Koper (Slovenia) and Rijeka (Croatia). As is apparent from the
data (tabl. 2.) measures port of Venice is characterized by stagnation in the volume of
transshipped cargo (fig. 3.).
109
Goods loaded and unloaded in Venice, Koper and Rijeka in years 2005-2008 (thous. ton)
Tabl. 2.
Year
Venice
Koper
Rijeka
2005
33 082
12 540
X
2006
34 886
15 391
X
2007
34 933
15 805
13 212
2008
32 985
16 499
12 391
Source: Eurostat Statistics – http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat
The size of transported goods fell down from 33 082 thous. Tonnes in year 2005
to 32 985 thous. tonnes in year 2008. This is decrease of 0.03% volume, is quite small for
such a large center port (the largest in the Adriatic - Baltic Landbridge).
40000
in thous. t
.
35000
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
2005
2006
2007
2008
years
Fig. 6. Goods loaded and unloaded in Venice in years 2005-2008
18000
16000
.
14000
in thous. t
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
2005
2006
2007
2008
years
Fig. 7. Goods loaded and unloaded in Koper in years 2005-2008
Much better is the situation in the port of Koper. The volume od cargo at this port
increased in 2005-2008 from 12 540 thous. Tonnes to 16 499 thous. Tonnes - 31,6% (fig.
4.). Such a large increase in cargo transported may be caused by:
 Slovenia's accession in 2004 to a group of ERM II countries;
110
 The introduction of the Euro on 1 January 2007;
 The development of a national network of expressways and highways.
The last of the ports of the eastern part of corridor Adriatic - Baltic Landbridge is the
port of Rijeka. As the only reported is outside the borders of EU. The available statistics
for the port concern the years 2007-2008 (fig. 5.).
14000
12000
in thous. t .
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
2007
2008
ye ars
Fig. 8. Goods loaded and unloaded in Rijeka in years 2007-2008
We can see only a slight decrease in the loaded cargo from 13 212 thous. tones to
12 391 thous. Tones - a decrease of 6.2%. Because of lack of data from the earlier period
it is impossible to establish whether it is a general downward trend or a temporary result
of economic crisis.
Summary
Sea ports in the Adriatic - Baltic - Corridor offers a very favorable competitive
conditions and load handling. That allows their logistical potential and getting betterdeveloped network of road and rail transport. In the coming years, capacity will be further
increased through the development of logistics centers.
Practice has shown that we can‟t wait for the next years to improve the
competitiveness of the Polish part of the corridor. It becomes necessary therefore to
develop multimodal transport rail-sea using the existing infrastructure.
Despite of a temporary reducing in the materials transported by ports, it is
estimated that the Adriatic - Baltic - Corridor will happen in the future the largest in
Europe transport corridor.
Bibliography:
“Gospodarka Morska: Statistical Yearbook”, Institute of Marine, Gdańsk, 2006
Eurostat Statistics – http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat
Port of Gdynia – http://port.gdynia.pl
Trans-border regionalisation under globalisation
Gennady FEDOROV, Valentin KORNEEVETS
Abstract: Trans-border regions are formed active in the conditions of globalisation. They
have macro-, meso- and micro-level forms and different functional types. The authors consider the
Baltic macroregion as a positive example of cross-border regionalisation.
Keywords: regionalisation, globalisation, cross-border cooperation, trans-border region,
hierarchy of regions, Baltic Sea region, EU-Russia co-operation
Introduction
Today, the study of regionalisation in the conditions of globalisation is very
topical. Cross-border regionalisation is a peculiar part of the general regionalisation
process. Thus, before addressing cross-border regionalisation, it is worth defining the
regional paradigm, within which the problem will be considered.
It is generally acknowledged that globalisation facilitates regionalisation by
enhancing communication. Both spontaneously and deliberately formed regions try to
gain (and do gain) additional competitive advantages, which stimulate faster complex
development of the economy and social sphere, the introduction of innovations, and the
sustainable development of the territory. As a result, the world becomes more polarised:
the regions that use most efficiently the existent resources develop more rapidly than the
others. Regarding regionalisation in the conditions of globalisation, one can put forward
three hypotheses, which have been supported both by theoretical analysis and analytical
practice and, thus, can be considered axioms:
1) globalisation facilitates regionalisation,
2) regionalisation leads to polarisation,
3) globalisation increases polarisation.
The increasing polarisation does not mean the formation of new growth poles
(according to the Kondratiev-Wallerstein hypothesis on the cycles of civilization
development and inevitability of changes in the world leadership). This hypothesis can be
also applied to the assessment of the regional competition development.
The principal question is how the above-mentioned axioms should (if they should)
be used by the authorities of countries, regions, and municipalities in the regional
development planning (which is implemented in many countries, including the EU states
and Russia).
The national authorities can:
a) encourage polarisation by stimulating the development of the “poles and centres
of growth”;
b) seek for cohesion by supporting depressed regions, developing agricultural-urban
partnership, encouraging cooperation between regions with different levels of
development;
c) ignore the regional differentiation.
We believe that the task of geographers is to create a scientific framework and
produce practical recommendations for the implementation of effective regional policy
including the one in the sphere of transborder region formation.
112
From the political point of view, one can speak of cross-border regionalisation
provided there is recognition of interdependence of interests astride the border and active
cooperation between the authorities of neighbouring states.
The development of cross-border regionalism owes much to the processes of
economic globalisation, which require the market enlargement and new approaches to the
spatial organisation of economy. However, to a great extent, regionalism is a reaction to
the incapability of states and international organisations to solve global problems. The
organisation of joint activities aimed to support peaceful co-existence and promote
economic development requires new forms and new actors, i.e. regions. At the same time,
despite prospective substantial benefits for both parties resulting from the expansion of
cooperation, a common obstacle to a more intensive integration is political factors
(sometimes quite unpredictable) at both sides of the border.
The thesis about the development of regionalisation under globalisation can be
supplemented with the following statements. Firstly, it considers the facilitation of the
formation of not homogeneous, but coherent regions, which are connected by increasingly
close internal links. Secondly, the transborder regions, which were sluggish at the primary
stage, are entering a phase of their intensive formation. Most of them were homogeneous
regions distinguished by the similarity of certain indicators. Now, the connections between
the national regions of the countries situated astride the border are actively developing,
which leads to the formation of coherent rather than homogeneous transborder regions.
Thirdly, the process of transborder formation involves authorities of neighbouring countries,
their administrative-territorial entities and municipalities. International agreements aimed at
a more active cooperation and the formation of transborder regions are being concluded;
international organisations are being established to coordinate their development.
The place of transborder regions in the overall hierarchical system of coherent
regions now forming in the world can be defined as follows (table 1).
Regional hierarchy
Hierarchy level
International regions
Global level
Megaregions
International macroregions
Transborder mesoregions
Transborder microregions
National regions
Macroregions
Mesoregions
Microregions
II (higher) level
I (lower) level
Local level
Table 1
Examples
World political system
EU, CIS, OAS, the African Union, the
Arab League, etc.
The Union State of Russia and Belarus,
the Baltic region, Benelux, the Baltics,
etc.
Euroregions
The territories of two cooperating
municipalities
Federal districts
Administrative-territorial entities
Municipalities
Municipal districts and urban districts
Cities, towns, and rural settlements
City/town/ rural settlement
Source: Own studies
113
Cross-border cooperation development has the following stages:
local cross-border contacts;
the interaction of the administrative-territorial entities, municipal formations of
the countries (in the framework of town twinning, interregional cooperation
agreements, etc);
the implementation of various cross-border projects by the international partners,
which results in the development of connections between the project participants;
- Network cross-border cooperation, which implies cooperation between actors of
different levels astride the border; at this stage, transborder regions are formed.
The development of joint projects as a phase of cross-border network formation is of
greatest importance for cross-border regionalisation, which is not a result of natural factors
(such as national or historical and cultural integrity, developed economic ties, etc) but rather a
product of pursuing ambitious aims formulated at different political levels. Such aims are
safety, socioeconomic development of peripheral border regions, environmental protection,
and the increase in the competitiveness of the territory on a global scale.
-
International cooperation in transborder regions
Cooperation
Cooperation targets
Cooperation types
agents
Exchange of
experience;
Joint target committees;
Regional bodies
attraction of investors; joint events (conferences,
of state
support to connections workshops, consultations,
authorities
between legal and
meetings)
natural persons
Use of international
Joint events (workshops,
Municipalities experience; attraction
consultations, meetings)
of investors
Trade; investment; joint
Economic
Economic benefits
enterprises; exchange of
entities
experience
Joint events (conferences,
Exchange of
exchange programmes,
Social
experience;
competitions, concerts);
establishments stimulation of public
research projects,
interest
education programmes
NonDissemination of ideas
Workshops, meetings;
governmental
in accordance with the
joint events
organisations
aims of NGOs
Organisation and support
Religious
Spread of religious
to religious communities
organisations
views
in neighbouring countries
Informal
Discussion of
Meetings
communities
common interests
Table 2.
Spatial forms of
cooperation
Territorial
networks;
Euroregions;
growth triangles
Territorial
networks;
Euroregions
Territorial clusters
and complexes
Territorial
networks
Territorial
networks
Territorial
networks
None
Source: Own studies
This logic dominates the architecture of the regional programmes, the most important
of which in the context of cross-border regionalisation is the EU Interreg programme
developed for the financing and development of cross-border cooperation between the
114
regions of two or more EU member states. An example of a programme aimed at the
development of cross-border cooperation at the external border of the European Union is
the Tacis cross-border cooperation programme, which has transformed by now into the
Partnership and Neighbourhood programme.
The formation of transborder regions (table 2) involves industrial, transport, trade,
and other enterprises as well as education, research, and culture institutions, which
develop multiple links. It creates favourable conditions for the cooperation of enterprises
situated astride the border.
The most general feature of developed transborder regions, which regularly
implies a number of other features, is the legal framework of the relations between
administrative-territorial and municipal units of the neighbouring countries. It is
manifested in the conclusion of international cooperation agreements. The most advanced
cases involve the establishment of associations, which are sometimes granted the status of
a legal person and have permanent governing bodies.
Fig. 1. The tripolar system: Tricity: Gdansk, Gdynia, Sopot (Poland) – Kaliningrad
(Russia) – Klaipeda (Lithuania)
Sourse: Own studies
Cross-border regionalisation is one of the priorities of the current policy of the
European Union. Network structures are being established to facilitate the formation of
cross-border cooperation schemes. The European Union implements a number of
ambitious programmes aimed to support cross-border cooperation and integration
processes at internal and external borders of the European Union.
Firstly, cross-border cooperation is considered as a promising instrument of
accelerating the development of peripheral territories situated at the borders of national
states. At the same time, integration and development cohesion throughout the territory of
the European Union is regarded as the major aim.
Secondly, local authorities and economic actors make active attempts to form new
regional associations (which can receive funding from EU programmes and, moreover,
acquire additional political power through participating in strategic network partnership).
115
Thirdly, the diversity of natural, cultural, and economic features of different
regions is expected to enhance the development of various spheres of social life.
For the theory of transborder regions, which explains causes, factors, and patterns
of their development, several key concepts are of greatest importance. Most significant
ones are the well-known concepts of growth triangles and tripolar systems, as well as the
concept of transborder regions – development corridors, which was put forward by the
authors of the article. All these concepts are being tested in the Baltic transnational region.
Finnish professor Kivikari reflected on the formation of 'growth triangles' bringing
together countries with traditional market economies, Russia, and other post socialist
states in the South-East and East of the Baltic Sea region.
Our idea of the establishment of the Tricity (Gdansk-Gdynia-Sopot) – Kaliningrad
– Klaipeda transborder tripolar region – development corridor (fig.1) was a result of
developing the proposals of the Polish geographer Tadeusz Palmowski [5] who framed the
concept of the Tricity-Kaliningrad bipolar system.
When transborder regions are located between two core regions of the
neighbouring countries, they can evolve into peculiar regions - development corridors
extending the well-known region classification drawn up by John Friedmann1 [ 3] (fig. 2).
Transition types:
Resourcefrontier regions
Upward
transition
regions
Downward
transition
regions
European Union
Transition
types:
Development
Core
regions
Core
regions
corridor
Kaliningrad region
Upward
transition
regions
Resourcefrontier
regions
Downward
transition
regions
Russian Federation
Fig.2. The Kaliningrad region, a prospective development corridor
Source: [4 ,P.21]
Applying the concept of national regions - development corridors to the Kaliningrad
region, in 2003, we developed a strategy for the latter's development as a region of cooperation
between Russia and the EU. This strategy was adopted for implementation by the regional
authorities. Some of its elements were used in the strategy developed in 2006 by Moscow
experts and will definitely be taken into account in the future.
The European Union has gained a wide experience of cross-border cooperation,
which employs the development of cross-border connections in order to facilitate and give
an additional boost to integration processes. The EU developed and tested various
mechanisms of the formation of new spatial forms of international economic integration –
Euroregions, 'large regions', 'growth triangles'. The creation of transborder regions is
facilitated by the EU regional policy, which contributes to the development of links
between border regions of different, including non-EU, countries, for example, Russia.
1
But J.Friedmann classification covers to national regions.
116
The sketch map given below reflects the wide spread of Euroregions and similar
structures, which, to date, are amounting to 200.
Economic cooperation and integration in particular increase the competitiveness
of their participants. The mechanism of formation of economically well integrated
transborder territories is described by François Perroux [6] who considered determined
actions of "active units", or "growth poles" surrounded by corresponding "areas of
influence", the basis of world economy. Such units are large companies, industrial
complexes and even whole industries. The interaction of "growth poles" and their
environment is accompanied by the agglomeration effect and leads to the development of
"growth poles", which are far from being isolated elements of the economic mechanism.
The economic interaction between the "growth pole" results in the formation of
"development zones" and "development axes". According to Perroux [6], development
axes are the systems of growth poles, whose formation and introduction are facilitated by
physical and non-physical communication axes. The mutual attraction of development
zones and axes leads to the formation of a complex mutually beneficial economic system,
which transcends national interests and embraces whole regions. Perroux refers to such
systems as "integration zones"; at the same time, the "development poles" evolve into
"integration poles".
Contemporary experts on cross-border cooperation in the EU distinguish new spatial
forms of international integration – spatial formations of subnational level, which include
regions of several states and are characterised by active cross-border and interregional
cooperation as well as the constantly increasing level of socioeconomic integration:
Macro-level spatial forms: Large regions, Growth triangles, Mega-corridors,
Coastal cross-border areas;
Meso-level spatial forms: Euroregions, Scandinavian groups, Development corridors;
Micro-level forms: Transborder industrial districts, Transborder clusters,
Polycentric trans-border bridge regions.
All types of new spatial forms of international integration are largely represented
in the EU states. Another region of their formation as, first of all, transborder industrial
districts and transborder clusters, whose main driving force is transnational corporations,
is territories at both northern – Canadian – and southern – Mexican – border of the USA.
Attempts at establishing growth triangles were made in South East Asia (with the
participation of Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia).
The development of integration process in Europe leads to the emergence of new
forms of international integration, which are not included into the table above. It concerns
the establishment of joint enterprises on both sides of the border. An example is the port
of Copenhagen-Malmo situated not at a land border but astride the Øresund strait, in the
Sweden-Danish Øresund transborder region with a population of 4 million people, which
is characterised by active and intensive process of cooperation between the two countries.
However, concrete spatial forms of mutually beneficial cooperation between
Russia and the EU have a weak theoretical and methodological framework both in western
and eastern Europe, particularly, in terms of economy. Thus, there is a need for the
development of a theory of spatial forms of international economic integration aimed at
the improvement of regional policy and introduction of propitious forms of international
economic integration.
A positive example of cross-border regionalisation is the Baltic macroregion,
which serves as a ground for the formation of numerous transborder meso- and
microregions. On the basis of the analysis of connections between international regions,
we distinguished the following transborder mesoregions: (fig. 3, table 3).
117
Fig. 3. The meso-regions of cross-border cooperation in the Baltic Sea macroregion
Source: Own studies
Russian regions situated on the Baltic Sea are the most active participants of
cross-border cooperation among all regions of the Russian Federation. In this relation, a
favourable factor is the EU policy towards the involvement of eastern neighbours. The
European type of cross-border cooperation is the most comprehensive one, since it
encompasses the political, economic, social, and environmental spheres. It is supported by
the bodies of the European Union, many EU member-states and regions. Most propitious
interaction forms and methods are being tested at the moment; substantial funds are
allocated to encourage cooperation.
Russia expresses interest in the development of cross-border cooperation with EU
regions but still does not have a clear strategy for such cooperation. Moreover, the long
discussed law on cross-border cooperation, which is expected to confer more extensive
rights on Russian regions as to the independent development of cross-border connections,
has not been adopted yet.
Russian participation in the neighbourhood programmes initiated by the European
Union also plays a positive role. Particularly, Russia‟s interest in this form of cooperation
is manifested in a more substantial funding of the neighbourhood programmes. So, the
Lithuania-Poland-the Kaliningrad region of the Russian Federation neighbourhood
118
programme, which is being developed at the moment, receives a 132 million euro funding
from the European Union, initially, it stipulated 10% co-financing from the Russia.
However, Russia has allocated 44 million Euro (more than 30%).
The meso-regions of cross-border cooperation in the Baltic Sea region, 2008
The mesoregions of crossNo.
border cooperation
I
Iа
Ib
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
IX
X
XI
XII
XIII
XIV
XV
XVI
XVII
Russian-Lith.-Polish- Swedish
South-East Baltic
South-eastern Sweden
German-Danish-Swedish-Polish
German-Danish
Danish-Swedish- Norwegian
Norwegian-Swedish (1)
Norwegian-Swedish (2)
Swedish-Finnish
Norwegian-Finnish -Swedish
Russian-Finnish (1)
Russian-Finnish (2)
Estonian-Finnish
Swedish-Finnish (2)
Swedish- Estonian
Russian-Latvian-Estonian
Latvian-Lithuanian- Belorussian
Lithuanian-Latvian
Lithuanian-Belorussian-Polish
Area,
thousand
sq. km
95,9
71,7
24,2
78,5
12,9
110,5
46,7
118,5
123,8
317,9
263,7
116,9
29,8
27,7
7,1
25,1
25,1
10,2
42,9
Populat GRP,
ion, mln bln euro
5,8
5 ,3
0,5
8,0
1,6
6,0
0,5
0,8
1,1
1,1
1,3
6,7
2,4
2,8
0,1
0,65
0,8
0,45
1,7
52,0
33, 8
18,2
210,0
57,8
250,0
14,7
28,1
32,6
31,0
21,0
55,0
84,5
122,3
2,0
3,4
4,2
2,7
10,75
Table 3
GPP per
capita,
thousand
euro
9,0
6,4
32,1
26,4
35,0
42,0
32,0
35,5
30,2
27,0
15,8
8,2
34,0
43,8
19,4
5,3
5,3
6,0
6,2
Source: Own studies based on [1, 2, 7, 8].
A more active participation of Russian regions in the cross-border cooperation on
the Baltic Sea requires:
 the adoption of a law on cross-border cooperation;
 more active research on cooperation and the dissemination of experience;
 the reduction of customs barriers (a prerequisite is the accession of Russia to the
WTO);
 the approximation of Russian and EU laws and standards;
 the simplification and subsequent removal of the visa regime with the EU states.
The visa regime is a major obstacle to the development of cross-border
connections. As is well-known, Regulation No 1931/2006 allows the EU members to ease
border crossing at the borders with third countries within the "local border traffic" areas.
Permanent residents of the territories, extending no more than 30 (50 – in exceptional cases)
kilometres from the border, can visit the corresponding territories of the neighbouring
countries with a local border traffic permit issued for 2-5 years. In the East of the EU, such
areas were established at the Ukrainian borders with Hungary (December 2007), Slovakia
119
(September 2008), and Poland (July 2009). The agreements on the creation of such areas at the
Belarusian-Polish and Lithuanian borders were signed in 2010.
Such measures are mostly aimed not at the development of industrial cooperation,
tourism, and family and cultural connection, but rather at border trade, which allows
'shuttle-traders' to take advantage of price differences in the contiguous countries. It is
attractive, first of all, for the residents of non-EU countries. So, over the first six months
after the conclusion of the Ukrainian-Polish agreement, Ukrainian citizens obtained 35
thousand permits, while only two permits were issued for the Polish.
However, any cross-border contacts raise hope for the further development of
cooperation in the spheres of culture, education, economy, and environment protection. A
good example is the evolution of cross-border links of the Kaliningrad region. These links
originally emerged as a result of 'shuttle trade' in the first half of the 1990s, when residents
of the region and citizens of Lithuania could cross the border having their national
passport only. To cross the Russian-Polish border, it was sufficient to purchase the socalled 'voucher' for a moderate fee. Annually, tens of thousands of 'shuttle traders' crossed
the border millions of times.
Later, the requirements became stricter and, in 2010, the visa regime is in effect at
the Russia-Polish and Lithuanian borders. However, the previous cross-border
connections had dramatically changed by then. 'Shuttle' trade was replaced by the
interaction between trade and manufacturing companies. Around a thousand of joint
enterprises with the participation of Polish and Lithuanian capital have been established in
the Kaliningrad region. The border territories of Poland accommodate numerous
enterprises, which manufacture semi-finished products (particularly, furniture parts) to be
exported to the Kaliningrad region under the customs free zone regime, where they are
assembled and exported to other regions of Russia. Cross-border links have developed in
the field of tourism. The cooperation between authorities, social establishments, and
NGOs is becoming more active. The developed links allow us to speak of the formation of
a trans-border region of the south-eastern Baltic. The Kaliningrad region, alongside
manifold bilateral contacts with the neighbours, participates in cooperation within five
Euroregions – together with the regions of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Belarus, and
Sweden. The Kaliningrad region becomes an example of active cross-border cooperation
for other Russian constituent entities.
Therefore, the evolution of connections within the developing cross-border
cooperation between the EU countries and their eastern neighbours follows the pattern:
from 'shuttle trade' – through the development of links by manufacturing and trading
companies and the emergence of educational and recreational tourism – to industrial
cooperation and multifarious connections between social establishments, Nongovernmental organisations, and authorities. At the final stage, the local border traffic
areas may become a palliative to the visa regime.
Conclusion
Cross-border regionalisation is an objective process, which actively develops in
the conditions of globalisation. It successfully advances in Europe solving three crucial
problems:
1) the increase in the competitiveness of cross-border cooperation participants;
2) contribution to the cohesion of the development conditions of different European
countries;
3) the creation of preconditions for the formation of a well integrated European
(including Russia) economic, cultural, research, and education space.
120
Bibliography:
Friedmann J. (1968), Regional development policy. Cambridge.
Klemeshev A., Fedorov G. (2005), From an isolated exclave – to a “development
corridor”. Alternative development strategies of the Russian exclave on the Baltic
Sea. Kaliningrad: Kaliningrad State University.
Palmovski T. (ed.) (2007), Problemy wspolpracy transgraniczney z obwodem
Kaliningradzkim, Gdynia – Peplin.
Perroux F. (1950), The Domination Effect and Modern Economic Theory, Social Research.
Central Statistical Office of Poland. URL: http://www.stat.gov.pl (10.12.2009).
Eurostat: news release. 2008. 11 нояб. URL: http://ec.europa. eu/eurostat (28.12.2009).
Statistics Lithuania. URL: http://www.std.lt/web/main.php (11.12.2009).
Российский статистический ежегодник. 2009. М.: Госкомстат, 2009.
3. Challenges for the next European Frontiers
James WESLEY SCOTT (Jouensuu) ◄► Cross-Border
Cooperation in the Periphery of the European Union:
Reinterpreting the Finnish-Russian Borderland
Josef ABRHÁM (Prague) ◄► Demographic changes as a challenge
for the geo-economy a geo-policy of the European Union
Angelo SANTAGOSTINO (Brescia), Andrea FORNARI (Brescia),
Luisa BRAVO (Brescia) ◄► L‟Union Européenne e le
Mexique: l‟Accord régional de partenariat comme instrument
géopolitique face à l‟Aléna et à la globalisation
Bogumiła MUCHA-LESZKO (Lublin), Magdalena KAKOL
(Lublin) ◄► EU economic frontiers determined by its
international trade position and trade policy
Cross-Border Cooperation in the Periphery of the European Union:
Reinterpreting the Finnish-Russian Borderland
James WESLEY SCOTT
Abstract: The profound socio-spatial transformations that have occurred in Post ColdWar Europe are becoming visible in border regions in terms of the influence of civil society cooperation, intermarriage, business networks, the increasing mobility of labour, local cross-border
trade and tourism, etc. These processes suggest an acceleration of rapidly re-territorializing (e.g.
„post-national‟) dynamics in Europe. The Finnish-Russian case of „Karelia‟ highlights the
complexity of re-territorialisation in „emerging‟ European Borderlands. Karelia is, on the one
hand, a regional idea – part of an attempt to selectively use history, geographical representations
and discourses of regional integration in order to create a sense of common purpose. This paper
will present evidence of regionalisation processes taking shape in „Finnish-Russian‟ Karelia based
on the construction of „familiarity‟ This region-building strategy harks back to the well-known
Euroregion model developed within the context of European integration. However, if Euroregions
can be seen as largely public sector projects of „place-making‟ the construction of familiarity is a
much more socially grounded process. In concluding I will speculate to what extent this European
Borderland can be seen as a laboratory of post-national identity-formation and development
practices.
Keywords: border, cooperation, Finland, Russia, Karelia region
Introduction
In this essay, the author will focus on the issue of cross-border „region building‟
as the (re)construction of familiarity between Finnish and Russian Karelia. As is the case
with many areas situated at the new frontiers of the European Union, Finnish-Russian
border regions are characterized by new patterns of interaction and changes in local
perceptions of borders, neighbours and regions. These processes are partly specific to the
post-Soviet context but also due to the increasing impact of the European Union beyond
its borders. Finnish-Russian border regions are, in fact, a microcosm of regional
transformations that are occurring in Central and Eastern Europe; new nation-building
projects are taking place at the same time that demands for greater regional autonomy and
community rights as well as attempts at local cross-border co-operation are increasing.
Post-Soviet and new EU (Schengen) border regimes have reconditioned political and
economic orientations – disrupting interaction in some cases and creating new incentives
for cross-border networking in others.
In this essay I will apply the concept of borderland. In traditional academic debate,
the term „borderlands‟ has generally referred to a space of transition between (national)
societies (Rumley and Minghi 1991) and hence a zone of indeterminacy in terms of
allegiances, citizenship and belonging. However, as Newman (2006a/b) points out, the
indeterminacy – and hybridity – of the borderland is dependent upon the nature of the border
itself, its functions, its history and its symbolism. The Finnish-Russian border, and thus the
borderland, is an emblematic case of political change in Post Cold War Europe. Of rather
recent creation after Finnish independence in 1917, this border has been shaped as a
consequence of wars, several territorial shifts and decades of closure. Despite friendly and
stable relations between the Soviet Union and Finland after WWII projects and a number of
industrial co-operation projects, very little interaction took place across the border.
124
Since 1991, the border has been open and accessible to citizens on both sides.
Directly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, nostalgia, curiosity and the search for new
opportunities generated new cross-border flows of people. Contacts between universities
intensified and representatives of local and regional governments sought to develop
working relationships. Despite this opening, Finnish-Russian and EU-Russian relations in
particular have not promoted a radical liberalization of border and visa regimes As a
result, there has not been cross-cultural interaction here in the same measure as at other
former Soviet borders; the bazaar economies, labour flows and border trade visible in the
Polish-Ukrainian, Romanian-Moldovan and Hungarian-Ukrainian cases have not
materialized to similar extents between Russia and Finland. Furthermore, with Finland‟s
accession to the EU in 1995, bilateral relations changed as the political (although not
military) neutrality of Finland was partly suspended by community policies. The EURussian relationship since 1991 has thus been one of cautious, perhaps uneasy,
interaction; driven by pragmatism and the recognition of interdependence but yet
informed by historical (mis)apprehensions. As a result, the Finnish-Russian border has
remained in many ways a hard, separating border, albeit definitely more permeable since
the elimination of Soviet-era travel restrictions.
Within this restrictive environment, I argue that processes of Russian-Finnish
borderlands formation are taking place in several ways. This essay will therefore explore
different aspects of „region-building‟ between Finland and Russia that reflect political and
socio-cultural change and the reconstruction of a sense of familiarity across the border.
Politically and economically motivated cross-border co-operation (partly supported by the
EU) is one aspect of this process. Equally as important are the uses of history and
landscape and townscape symbolism in creating narratives of cross-border „regionness‟.
Thus, at one level, we can understand the Finnish-Russian borderlands as a product of
„place-making‟ in the intentional sense of regional identity politics capitalizing on border
locations, cross-border co-operation and a historical notion of cross-border region
(Karelia). At another level, these borderlands are characterized by more subtle and
unguided process of intercultural dialogue. Finally, the borderlands can be understood as a
state of mind in which local and regional identities reflect life on borders and where
changes in the political, functional and symbolic meanings of historical landscapes have
had deep impacts on local communities and consciousness. It is important to emphasize,
furthermore, that broader political and geopolitical contexts are at work here. FinnishRussian cross-border interaction is strongly influenced both by Russia‟s post-socialist
modernization project, the changing nature of Finnish-Russian relations and the increasing
role of the EU as agenda-setter of regional co-operation. In concluding, the author will
speculate on the potential significance of this borderland in terms of creating a sense of
familiarity and common regionness within a historically difficult context. While scenarios
of a future „post-national‟ space are certainly exaggerated, I suggest that the borderland
could remain an important strategy of local development and an important frame of
reference for cultural dialogue.
Borderlands and Socio-Spatial Transformations
The collapse of state socialism, the Soviet Union and geopolitical logics of bloc
confrontation in Europe have subjected the continent to a profound reconfiguration of
state-society relationships and deep processes of social change (see Hamilton et.al. 2005
and Kostecki, Zukrowska and Goralcyk 2000). More that twenty years after the „Fall of
the Wall‟, these processes are far from having taken their full course. Moreover, it now
appears more than evident that the relative stability of the Cold War was an interlude –
125
albeit a very important one – in European history. The current political struggles within
the European Union and in many neighbouring countries remind us that territorial
relationships, the roles of borders and the quality of interstate relations are rarely „fixed‟ in
time and space. Within this context of change, questions of identity play a central role. In
terms of everyday life-worlds and personal identities, post-Socialism has brought with it
an individualization of life choices and risks but has also opened new opportunities for
self-realization. At the same time, group identities and ethnic-cultural tensions „frozen‟
during the Cold War have now resurfaced in many regions of Central and Eastern Europe.
Language and national identities have re-emerged as controversial and divisive elements
and thus at the centre of „culture wars‟ both within the EU (as the Hungarian-Slovakian
case reminds us) and at the external borders of the EU (for example, in the case of Estonia
and Russia or between Romania and Moldova).
By the same token, the reassessment of common historical experiences and
relationships has served in several cases to develop a new sense of „neighbourliness‟.
Russian-Finnish and Polish-Ukrainian relations are but two examples where this is
(cautiously) taking place (Belokurova 2010, Sagan 2010). Identity issues are by no means
limited to national belonging and politics of national memory. Processes of regional
transformation have highlighted the existence and potentialities of multilevel identities
(i.e. local, regional, national) within states as well as emerging transnational identities at
the local and European level (Enyedi 1998, Kennedy 2002, Popescu 2008).
Borderlands can be seen as microcosms of these regional transformations. While
borderlands experiences cannot be easily generalized – they are historically contingent
and context-specific – local cases all reflect in their own specific ways more general
processes of „re-territorialization‟ (see Newman 2006a) and shifting state-society relations
in Europe. The term „Borderland‟ does not describe an objective spatial category in and of
itself. Similar to the notion of „region‟, it is fundamentally relational and can be
interpreted in several ways. In more traditional schools of human geography,
„borderlands‟ have been typically understood as frontiers between nations in the process
of „becoming‟, as zones of transition between societies and their emerging nationhood
(see Rumley and Minghi 1993, House 1980, 1982). In Ladis Kristof‟s (1959, p. 281)
famous formulation: “the frontier (as borderland) is characteristic of rudimentary sociopolitical relations; relations marked by rebelliousness, lawlessness and/or absence of
laws”. 1 A much more flexible understanding of borderlands is offered by the social
anthropology of Barth (1969) and others who implicitly understand borderlands as
permeable frontiers between ethnic groups; these can act as catalysts for change and
hybridization, and not necessarily the „nationalization‟, of group identities. The concept of
borderland is thus cartographically ambiguous and describes a fluid rather than static
social space (Newman 2006b, Rumley and Minghi 1991). Unlike classical notions of
„frontier‟ as a regional situation that precedes the consolidation of state territoriality within
formal borders, a borderland can also describe an area that closely reflects the physical,
political and social impacts of state borders. There is generally, but not of necessity, a
cross-border dynamic involved. Borderlands and borderlands communities often engage in
cross-border trade, work, co-operation and other forms of interaction. However, even in
situations of closed borders and limited interaction, borderlands societies and mentalities
can be identified. As Alexander Izotov (2011) reminds us, Soviet-era Sortavala had no
cross-border ties to Finnish counterparts or even a concept of what might be on the other
1
Word in italics inserted by the author.
126
side of the border, but the identity of a garrison town at the border, protecting the
motherland from foreign enemies, had a powerful influence on local consciousness.
Borderlands thus reflect historical memories of life at borders and how lifeworlds
of borderlanders are characterized by a cognitive engagement with changing border
symbolisms (see Meinhof 2003). This is not to suggest, however, a unilateral dependence
of borderlands development upon the characteristics of state borders. Indeed, any
temptation of deterministic explanation must be avoided. The processes that contribute to
borderland „formation‟ operate at different levels and involve a dialectic relationship
between local societies and territorial spaces defined by borders. Borderlands are thus
formed through processes of cross-border regionalization at different levels and in
different realms of agency: cross-border co-operation, political projects of „place-making‟
as well as everyday economic, social, family and cultural practices of transnationalism.
Cross-border regionalization implies a shift in the political geography of the state.
It involves institutional change in state-local relationships and is defined by multilevel
interaction within specific political contexts. It is, in effect a „production of space‟ through
the promotion of a regional idea and by linking actors, developing agendas and
negotiating regional coalitions. Both the definition of a „region‟ and of its „identity‟ are, as
Paasi (2001) argues, subject to very different interpretations, often influenced by national
and local experience. Jones and MacLeod (2004, p. 433) write that: “…the formation of
any given regional map is reflective – and indeed constitutive – of an unevenly
developing, often overlapping and superimposing mosaic of economic practices, political
mobilizations, cultural performances and institutional accomplishments”. Furthermore, as
Michele Byers (2003, p.36) argues: “our ideas about spaces are mediated by the myths
through which they have been anchored to our social reality”.
Borderlands formation reflects a socio-spatial dialectic between rules and
practices than underlie bordering processes. Similarly, Giddens (1984), through his notion
of regionalization, supports a relational notion of region-building in term of a permanent
process of spatial signification and bounding (boundary-formation). Regionalization as
understood in this abstract fashion is a complex process of space-time zonation that is
place and group-specific and that is subject to multilevel influences. Political institutions,
governance principles, attitudes, local experiences, and regional identity-formation all
contribute to spatial bounding and signification. Therefore, to quote Paasi (2001, p. 16):
(…) the region should not be regarded merely as a passive medium in which social
action takes place. Neither should it be understood as an entity that operates
autonomously above human beings. Regions are always part of this action and
hence they are social constructs that are created in political, economic, cultural and
administrative practices and discourses. Further, in these practices and discourses,
regions may become crucial instruments of power that manifest themselves in
shaping the spaces of governance, economy and culture.
At one level, a borderland can emerge in terms of an intentional project that seeks
to extract benefit from border proximity and notions of a common cross-border region.
This is often supported by uses of symbols and historical narratives that give substance to
claims of a unique cross-national heritage. In the case of (Finnish-Russian) Karelia, we
see a partial downplaying of strictly national perspectives, both in terms of historical
interpretations of Karelia and place-making practices that reference natural and cultural
landscapes. At a more everyday level, borderlands can emerge cognitively, as elements of
local consciousness and identity, and as webs of social interaction between communities
and groups. The increasing complexity of societal interaction, politically, economically,
culturally and socially has in fact transformed Karelia from a static borderland of national
127
histories to a more „lived‟ space of Finnish-Russian relations As Alexander Izotov (2011)
argues in the case of Sortavala, a border city within Russian Karelia, a process of
individual and group „repositioning‟ has taken place in which the new openness of the
border has elicited a cognitive remapping of the world and Russian-Finnish relations.
Karelia as a Finnish-Russian Borderland
Historical Background
The Finnish-Russian border acquired its present form in the aftermath of the Second
World War. In geographical terms, this 1340-kilometre border does not follow any clear-cut
natural barriers to human interaction. For the most part it runs through forests and sparsely
populated rural areas. In a cultural and political sense, this region has formed a historical
demarcation zone shaped by „East-West‟ rivalries. These rivalries have been prompted by
tensions between eastern and western Christianity, the rise of the Swedish and Russian
empires, the ideals of nation-state and Communist revolution, and most recently by
European integration and post-Soviet change and the gradual shaping of relations between
the European Union and the Russian Federation.2 Between the two world wars, a hostile
military border was established between Finland and Soviet Russia. Between 1939 and
1945, two wars were fought here, with Finland losing about one-tenth of its territory,
including a large part of what is known as „Karelia‟. The population of the ceded areas
moved to Finland while new settlers came from various parts of the Soviet Union. This
created a clear-cut ethnic and cultural border. During the Cold War years, the FinnishRussian border marked a dividing line between two rivalling political and economic
systems; the border was thoroughly militarized and heavily guarded on both sides.
This at first glance straightforward story of border closure and alienation is rather
complex. From a local and regional perspective, the border was sealed off. Yet the two
countries did establish broad bilateral agreements, and the volume of trade between the two
countries was large. In the aftermath of World War II, Finland and Russia were considered
to enjoy a special relationship nurtured by the Soviet leadership and by Finnish presidents
such as Paasikivi and Kekkonen who religiously maintained Finland‟s status as a nonaligned country. The Finnish political elite believed that political neutrality and good
personal contacts with the Soviet leadership were a necessary condition for maintaining state
sovereignty, a market economy and democracy. In return, Finland enjoyed access to almost
unlimited purchases of fuel and raw materials and to an enormous Soviet market ready to
absorb any Finnish goods. About a quarter of all Finnish exports were in fact delivered to
the Soviet Union. Certainly, a relatively high dependence on the undemanding Soviet
market decreased the overall competitiveness of Finnish goods. The collapse of the Soviet
Union and the economic crisis in the 1990s also heavily affected neighbouring Finland.
Nevertheless, for several decades „special‟ relations with the Soviet Union were a tool to
develop Finland‟s national economy and to maintain social stability.
The fundamental condition for friendly bilateral relations was the „defusing‟ of
territorial issues. As stipulated by the Treaty of Paris, Finland ceded to the Soviet Union
the Karelian Isthmus (with the city of Vyborg), a strip of land along the eastern boundary
know as White Sea Karelia (with the city of Sortavala), and Pechenga (Petsamo) in the
north, which between 1920 and 1944 was the only Finnish port on the Barents Sea.3 At
the level of interstate relations, the Soviet Union always denied the existence of territorial
2
3
For a thorough analysis of the Finnish-Russian border: see Paasi (1996).
Within the Russian empire, Petsamo was part of the Russian Arkhangelsk province. It is now
within the Murmansk Region.
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issues with regard to Finland, as well as with any other neighbouring country. In order to
maintain „special relations‟ with the Soviet Union, the Finnish government carefully
avoided raising territorial claims. In 1975 Finland signed the founding document of the
OCSE, confirming the integrity of post-war boundaries in Europe.
After the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia continued to deny the existence of
territorial issues. Indeed, it was feared that their recognition could lead to a total revision
of Russia‟s boundaries as all its neighbours, from Ukraine to China, could potentially
stake border claims. Indeed, by the early 1990s Estonia, Latvia and Japan had already
done so. Having opted for the membership in the EU, the government of Finland was
opposed to any official discourse which could provoke a conflict in the relations with
Russia. It clearly preferred integration and co-operation to traditional geopolitical logics of
zero-sum games. This fundamental geopolitical factor contributes to regionalization of
border areas and to the creation of favorable social perceptions. In the Finnish-Russian
case, common histories and politics of memory are not as emotionally loaded as they are
in the case with Poland or the Baltic States. In these countries we see continuous battles
with Russia for self-assertive identities at the national level, and these have a direct impact
on peripheral border areas and cross-border co-operation (Davydova 2008, Kolossov
2006). In addition, Finland, unlike the Baltic countries, did not apply for NATO
membership after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The Emergence of Regional Finnish-Russian Cross-Border Co-operation
Before 1991, cross-border co-operation between Finland and the Soviet Union
was largely limited to specific industrial sectors, such as mining, wood products and paper
pulp. This economic co-operation was particularly important for Northwest Russia and
Eastern Finland as the locus of industrial activities was „twin towns‟ on the border such as
Svetogorsk/Imatra and Kostmuksha/Kuhmo (see Zimin, Kotilainen and Prokhorova 2011).
However, the movement of persons across the border was severely restricted. In addition,
political co-operation was largely of a symbolic nature, largely instrumentalized as
gestures of peaceful co-existence and friendship. The border was only opened in any real
practical sense towards the end of the Soviet Union, as Perestroika gradually succeeded in
liberalizing the political system.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, interaction between the two countries has
been conditioned by deepening European integration and globalization, as well as by the
effects of Post-Soviet transformation on the Russian side. Hence, relations between
Finland and Russia have been reconstituted as part of the wider geopolitical shifts in
Europe. Concrete indications of the new situation include, for instance, new border
crossing points and logistical infrastructure, the abolition of travel restrictions on the
Russian side and co-operation programmes aiming at strengthening cross-border links.
Finnish membership in the European Union in 1995 increased these border-spanning
activities in various forms and at various spatial levels.
Relations between Russian and Finnish border regions are considered by both
sides as a laboratory of co-operation between Russia and EU at the regional level 4. New
actors, economic enterprises and civic organizations, have entered the field that was
earlier controlled by bilateral agreements between the states. In an administrative sense,
the regional councils (formed as confederations of municipalities in 1994) have been
granted a major role in implementing EU programmes and administrating EU funds (see
4
See, for example, Eskelinen, Liikanen and Oksa (1999), Laine and Demidov (2011), Liikanen
(2004) and Shliamin (2002).
129
Kettunen and Kungla 2005). EU funded programmes such as INTERREG (aimed at crossborder regional development within the EU) and TACIS (a programme earmarked for
comprehensive development projects in post-Soviet sates) have thus become an important
part of promoting cross-border interaction on the regional level. In institutional terms,
Finnish-Russian cross-border co-operation at the regional level has become part of policy
frameworks and administrative structures that originally served regional development and
co-operation within the European Union. The adaptation of EU administrative practices in
Finland and the constitution of new democratic and administrative institutions in the
Russian Federation have led to a continuous restructuring of administration on both sides,
and in the Russian case to sharp political and administrative discontinuities. Since 1995,
Finnish EU membership has led to a manifold „Europeanization‟ of the border and
systems of European multi-level governance have been introduced on the Finnish side as
part of the structural fund policies that condition CBC (Eskelinen 2000, Laine 2007). The
implementation, for example, of INTERREG programmes has been institutionally linked
to the integration of European and Finnish regional development policies.
These developments have also impacted on Finnish administrative structures
which traditionally have been characterized by a combination of strong central power and
broad local self-government. It is important to mention that the strengthening of the
intermediate level – in this case of the regional administrations of Finnish Karelia – in the
management of EU funds and programmes occurred outside the confined of traditional
Finnish politics. As a result, the agenda of local and regional-level CBC projects has been
strongly affected by regional level administrative organizations, regional councils and
intermediate-level state administration, which together administer and allocate funding
from EU instruments of CBC. Indeed, new EU instruments have, however, opened
opportunities for new kinds of regional level co-operation in the field of education, health
care, social work and environmental protection. In public-sector co-operation projects,
state level agreements and strategies have also played a vital role in shaping the CBC
mechanisms. At the municipal level, there were some, highly regulated CBC contacts with
a para-diplomatic exchange of official delegations even in the Soviet times (Varkaus and
Petrozavodsk were twin towns, Kuhmo and Kostamuksa developed links on the basis of a
major construction project). These relations have continued, grown in number, become
less formal, and started to utilize EU support. 5 On the regional level, the challenges of
new cross-border co-operation opportunities were thus directly affected by the
introduction of new European policy frames and instruments available to local civic and
economic actors. Similarly, the inclusion of Russian regional actors in co-operation
projects increased the complexity of coordinating projects between the INTERREG
programmes on the Finnish side and the TACIS initiative on the Russian side.
Although the Russian federal government has considerably liberalized its border
regime, it has not been active in the field of CBC per se. In practice, the Russian federal
government has been rather restrictive with respect to cross-border initiatives of Russian
regions and municipalities. 6 At best, the government has provided financial guarantees to
5
6
Still, in today‟s Finland, there seems to be both positive and negative views on using municipal
tax income to support CBC projects: “why to give money to the other side, we have already paid
the war indemnity”. On the Russian side, given the lack of financial resources at the municipal
level, the question of funding CBC from municipal sources is not even raised.
In summer 2005, the Russian Parliament adopted a Law on Special Economic Zones, and the
federal Ministry for Economic Development and Trade has begun to develop plans for setting up
Free Trade Zones. It can be expected that a few of them will be set up in Russian border regions.
130
regions participating in CBC projects that have invested in Russian infrastructure. In
addition, the government has supported the construction of new international bordercrossing checkpoints (usually funded by the EU) and roads leading to checkpoints.
However, despite difficulties in Russia-EU relations and in particular, the lack of a general
treaty on their strategic partnership, the Russian federal government has recently expressed
its desire to become a full-fledged participant in CBC programmes. CBC was one of the
central themes of Russia-EU summit in May 2007 near Samara and both sides agreed on cofunding of joint CBC projects within the ENPI.7 New programmes are focused on the
improvement of borders‟ infrastructure, transport and transit, the creation of logistics‟
systems and terminals, economic development along transit corridors, telecommunications,
and energy and environment protection.8 Since 2010, the Russian Federation has in fact
begun to devise a CBC strategy. It thus appears that regional cross-border co-operation may
enjoy greater political priority within the Russian government‟s foreign policy agenda.
Karelia as a „Region-Building‟ Project
With increasing cross-border interaction of a political, economic and socio-cultural
nature, Karelia, a historical region that straddles the Finnish-Russian border, has become the
focus of new processes of „region-building‟ that mirror more general socio-spatial
transformations taking place in Europe. As suggested above, Karelia has become a regional
idea that both „Europeanizes‟ and „localizes‟ identities in a transnational context. This of
course does not mean that a new regional identity has been created that transcends national
loyalties or the mental barriers that exist between many Russians and Finns. What this
„regional idea‟ implies is a selective reframing of local structural and political conditions as
well as of personal everyday activity spaces. The „selectivity‟ of this phenomenon is of
critical importance; we by no means even suggest that a majority of Finns and Russians
living in Karelia would actively subscribe to the idea that they share an emerging
transnational space. Karelia is, rather, a transnational space for those political actors,
businesspeople, civil society organizations and „ordinary citizens‟ who understand it as a
resource and a specific place within Europe with common issues. In the following, Karelia
will be discussed as a region-building project which is on the one hand politically motivated
and closely tied to projects of cross-border co-operation between Russia and Finland but, on
the other hand, is also a product of shifting local perceptions of regionness and the border.
Karelia: The Role of Historical Symbolism and Historical Memory
In terms of its historical development, Karelia can be understood as a zone of
transition, politico-religious division and, most recently, of a Finnish-Russian
rapprochement and re-evaluation of common experience. The case of Karelia also reminds
us that borderlands are often rich in historical memory and the nationally symbolic. In the
past, Karelia has referred to an indeterminate territorial but very symbolic space that has
7
8
About 600 Million euros have been earmarked for EU-Russian CBC during 2008-2013. EU and
Russian federal budgets will contribute 122 Million euros, EU countries will provide 360 Million
(see http://www.utrade.ru/about/news_prime.html?ELEMENT_ID=20492).
Still, Russia needs to create a legal basis which can allow co-funding of border regions CBC
programmes and harmonize norms of financial reports and auditing. In particular, Russian
regions have no specialized funds and institutions which could consider the projects submitted by
local authorities or private companies. For many years the State Duma has not been able to adopt
a law on CBC - a number of bills were declined or postponed. This law would facilitate easier the
coordination of different federal institutions‟ policy regulating cross-boundary flows and
relations. This is a reason why seven joint programs worked out by Russian and European experts
were not really launched yet.
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been charged with meaning for the formation of Finnish national identity. Karelia is the
source of the sagas and songs that form the basis of Finnish (mythic) folk culture as well
as the landscapes, the villages and vernacular architectures with which Finland and
Finnishness have been popularly associated.
As John Lind (2004) has convincingly described, Karelia, the Karelian Isthmus in
particular, was historically situated on a vital East-West trade route and bore the brunt of
competition between the Swedish Empire and the expanding State of Novgorod. This
competition was also reflected in the politico-religious landscape and confrontation
between Catholicism (and later Protestantism) and Eastern Orthodoxy. In a way similar to
Rob Shields‟ (1991) notion of liminal spaces, Häyrynen (2004) has described Karelia as a
periphery within the Finnish national landscape imagery but also as a place of powerful
nostalgic significance. In the Finnish national imagination, Karelia has been understood as
the birthplace of the Ur-Finnish peasant, surviving in a land of dense forests and lakes
(Härynen 2008) – and as documented during the late 19th Century by the photographer
Konrad Inha. Similarly, Böök (2004) describes the significance of Karelia (particularly the
areas ceded to the Soviet Union after the war) as a past „heartland‟ of Finnish Orthodoxy
and the mythical last reserve of the „original Finnish‟ Kalevala culture.
Attempts to convert this indeterminate space into a more a cartographically fixed
territory were encouraged by the emergence of Finnish nationalism and the achievement
of Finnish independence in 1917. Finnish national definitions of Karelia were promoted,
furthermore, by the wars with the Soviet Union in 1939/1944 and organizations such as
the Karelian Association, founded in 1940 (Prozorov 2004). Supporters of the Karelian
Association argued that Russia should respect the „historical division‟ between Swedish
and Russian Karelia as well as the rights of the Finnic population which dominated there
before World War II. After 1945 and the closure of the border, landscape images were
idealized as constitutive of Finnishness and Finnish cultural identity itself before and
during the Cold War period. In essence, an ambiguous politics of memory was played out
in which war memorials, lost territories, borders, battlegrounds, sites of conflict,
abandoned homes, settlements, etc. served to construct national identities – evoking
notions of „dark tourism‟ (see Foley and Lennon 2007). Thus, in post-war Finland, the lost
territories of Karelia were idealized as prototypically Finnish, while the Soviet (Russian)
attitude towards the territories was largely determined by ideologies of Soviet nationalism.
Isachenko (2009) argues that during the last one hundred years, there have been
three main stages in the development of Karelian cultural landscapes: Finnish, Soviet, and
Russian (post-Soviet) all of which affected the development of settlement systems,
townscapes, vernacular and public architecture and land use. All three phases are visible
today, although to different degrees, and now form a mosaic border landscape that is being
recast as a common historical (and hence „familiar‟) heritage. More recently, wartime
experiences, expulsions and annexations have been mixed with more positive historical
associations with Czarist Russia in which Finland enjoyed a “pre-national” autonomy
(Jukarainen 2009). As Pashkov (2004) points out, the Vyborg Karelia area and the area
around Lake Ladoga (popularly known as „Old Finland‟) were popular tourist destinations
for middle-class Russians before Finnish independence.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Karelian regional imagery has become
more complex and contradictory; much of this has to with the increased transitional
function of the Karelian Isthmus (i.e. the routes from Finland through Vyborg and onto St.
Petersburg) between Russia and the European Union. Indeed, Isachenko (2009) argues
that emerging transboundary cultural landscape of Karelia is indicative of a cultural and
historical bridge between Russia, Finland and the European Union as a whole. This is
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substantiated by a rediscovery of the Karelian past on the Russian side as well with an
increasing interest among Russian inhabitants to uncover, rehabilitate and make present
the history and pre-war reality of the region. (Böök 2004). In present-day Russian Karelia,
remnants of pre-war cultural landscapes, villages and buildings are still evident even
though often ghostly in their state of disrepair and neglect (Nuikko 2009). As Raivo
(2004) explains: “memories of Finnish Karelia have been erased, transformed and brought
to life again (...) The more recent revival of Finnish memories has been brought about not
only by the Finns but also by Russians who have wished to tell the present-day inhabitants
of Karelia about the forgotten and suppressed details of its more recent history”.
While the Karelian historical landscape has changed, intercultural dialogue (as a
result of nostalgic tourism and greater general interaction) has now contributed to a shared
notion of Karelia, with different discourses of region possible; post Soviet images are
now cognizant of the political reality and the multicultural nature of Karelia (Niukko
2009). The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the opening of Russia in the early 1990s
allowed Finns to re-discover Karelia. This did stimulate discourse about the re-unification
of Karelia, though it has been never clear where the boundaries of Karelia are. But at the
same time, the re-discovery of Eastern (Russian) Karelia offered the best evidence that it
was an illusion, in particular, because of the loss of Finnish symbols and landscapes.
Cross-border contacts have allowed both sides to gain basic knowledge about the
living conditions of their neighbours thus fostering mutual understanding (Laine and
Demidov 2011). Although the memories of Finnish-Russian confrontation during the
WWII are still alive amongst the older generations of Finns, Russia is no longer perceived
as an enemy, but rather as a needy neighbour and in this context, cross-border cooperation is seen to serve as a channel of assistance contributing to a peaceful FinnishRussian neighbourhood. If, as Häyrynen (2009) argues, the present-day Karelian
landscape is a nostalgic construction, it is one informed by political, social, economic and
cultural motivations. To an important degree, cross-border co-operation involves re-telling
the history of Karelia through tourism, media representations, cityscapes, etc.
Cross-Border Co-operation and the Euroregion Karelia
Cross-border co-operation has been promoted as a way of breaking down
differences between societies – at least in the sense that administrative and mental borders
no longer create obstacles to addressing everyday problems and issues that affect
communities on either side of state boundaries. When Finland joined the EU in 1995,
conditions governing CBC faced a significant transformation. On the one hand, the
previously bilaterally-governed co-operation across the border became part of the broader
dynamics of international politics and EU-Russia relations. However, on the other hand,
regional and local actors also have taken a more active role in “international affairs” by
co-operating directly across the border. In addition, EU funding via the Tacis and Interreg
Programmes and, most recently, the ENP-Instrument to which Russia has become a
partner, has made cross-border co-operation increasingly project-based. A number of
regions participate in recently created Euroregions along the former Soviet boundary and
the boundary of Russia with its western neighbours (Kolossov, 2006).
To a major extent, the Finnish-Russian Karelian regional development agenda has
been shaped by the problems experienced by the Russian side. The study has revealed that
the most common problems for Russian border communities have been the following: (1)
crisis of municipal services and infrastructure, (2) unemployment and poverty, (3)
alcoholism and drug abuse, (4) crime and lack of security, and (5) poor investment
climate. Correspondingly, a significant number of CBC projects have addressed these
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problems with a varying degree of success. Amongst the most serious obstacles to CBC in
the field of human contacts, the respondents have noted cultural and linguistic differences,
high costs of Schengen visas and the lengthy procedure of obtaining them, lack of public
cross-border transport links, and security problems on the Russian side. Problems
connected to these issues have led to attempts to build coordinated regionally based
institutional structures in the Karelian context.
The Euregion Karelia, established in 2000, covers 700 km of land border between
the EU and Russia, and it consists of four regions: the provinces of North Karelia, Kainuu
and North Ostrobothnia on the Finnish side and the Republic of Karelia on the Russian
side. Since Euregio Karelia was the first Euregio on land borders between the EU and the
Russian Federation, the key figures behind the venture willingly promoted it from the
beginning as a European model (Liikanen, 2008a). It was seen as a pilot project for future
joint administrative structures between the EU and Russian regional authorities (Shliamin
2001). The idea was that the structures developed in the Euregio Karelia region would
with time gain broader European significance. From the Finnish perspective, the
institutional forms adopted on the Russian border were seen as exporting „border knowhow‟: they would generate a model or at least a set of experiences that could be useful for
the elaboration of European border policies after the eastern enlargement (Cronberg 2000,
Eskelinen 2000). With the adaptation of the European Neighbourhood Policy framework,
a crucial future question remains as to how to adapt regional perspectives of external
relations to existing institutional models and how to bring Russian regional actors into the
implementation and targeting of new policy instruments. In this setting, it is interesting to
see if the concept of „Euregions‟ can be further elaborated as an arena of adjusting
regional, national and supranational interests, policy frames and instruments.
Correspondingly, Finnish-Russian CBC in Karelia has developed in areas such as
environmental protection, forest management, environmental tourism, agriculture and the
alleviation of unemployment. After Finnish EU-membership, the promotion of democracy
and civil society in Russia and humanitarian assistance to Russian social welfare
institutions, as well as cultural and educational exchange gained importance as well.
Within the Finnish private sector and among the Finnish civil society organizations, local
and individual initiatives play an important role.9 At the level of CBC coordinated by the
Euregio Karelia, CBC funds (for the period 2001-2006) were focused on business activity,
transport and communication, as well as upgrading expertise and regional co-operation.
The Finnish project design has been perceived in the first place as part of the structural
funds administration of the EU.
Co-operation between cultural associations, as well as education and research
organizations has been very active in the border regions. On the regional level the role of
humanitarian aid associations is also seen important in everyday co-operation. Their
priorities derive from local level initiatives and from specific needs on the Russian side. In
public discussion, humanitarian aid is accepted on both sides: in the conditions prevailing on
the Russian side, people accept the help with gratitude, and on the Finnish side public
opinion is keen to promote a national image of selfless benefactor. However, Finnish and
Russian priorities do not necessarily coincide. Russian partners are usually interested in
either long-term administrative co-operation or direct implementation of particular
9
Obtaining EU support for local initiatives tends to be, however, difficult for groups and
organizations not familiar with the workings of regional administration. Most successful actors
are those involved in organizations, which have enough social and cultural capital to successfully
apply for and utilize EU funds and CBC instruments.
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investment projects, while the EU and the Finnish partners prefer to provide assistance in the
form of educational projects, consulting, research and advice on the implementation of
reforms on the level of regional public sector. In the Leningrad region these negotiations are
carried out through the special Joint Finnish-Russian CBC Commission, while in Russian
Karelia they are channelled through the Euregio Karelia and sectoral ministries of the
Republican government. In most cases the European and Finnish approach prevails for
obvious reasons.
Civil society actors have a vision of Karelia as a „pilot region‟ in developing
different and transferable practices of cross-border co-operation (Liikanen 2008b, Laine
and Demidov 2011). This is closely connected with the overall positive evaluation of CSO
development in Karelia. CSOs are viewed as channels through which cross-border cooperation can actually grow dynamically. The desire to co-operate among Russian
Karelian CSOs goes beyond working with traditional partners and neighbours (Finland
and Sweden) and there is a clear willingness to work with CSOs operating in Baltic
countries, Norway, the USA and other EU countries outside the Baltic Sea or Northern
European regions. Some of the CSO, such as the Red Cross as an example have been
actively working with CSOs from the UK and the Netherlands.
Furthermore, cross-border co-operation between CSOs was assessed as an activity
that has helped develop social agendas. Heads of Russian women‟s organizations have
stressed that it was their partners from Scandinavia that for the most part contributed to
the spread of gender discourse in the Republic of Karelia. Another interesting fact is that
cross-border co-operation is developing between partners operating on different scales.
For instance, the majority of the Finnish partners with which Karelian CSOs collaborate
are umbrella organizations operating at the national level in Finland (such as the Union of
Invalids of Finland) and these are the main donors for Karelian CSOs. This situation is
due to the weak presence of national Russian CSO organizations in Karelia.
A New Economic Image
In both Russian and Finnish Karelia the influence of the border has been a
dominant factor in regional development.10 Due to the closed nature of the border and the
systemic differences between Finland and the Soviet Union, economic exchange was
limited. Nevertheless, the economic activities that took place across the border were vital
for both sides; a synergistic relationship developed between industrial firms in the area of
wood, paper and pulp production and mining. This situation intensified the domination of
extractive industries and low added-value economic activities (round wood, aluminium,
paper sacks, newsprint, cellulose and ferrous metals) as well as the export dependency of
both Finnish and Russian Karelia.11 By the same token, there are few exportable
manufactures. Thus, Karelia has been „trapped‟, as local economists argue, within an
10
The term „Russian Karelia‟ refers to the Republic of Karelia or Karelian Republic, a constituent
part (or „subject‟) of the Russian Federation. These terms are used interchangeably.
11
In comparison to Finland‟s overall economic relations, economic relations between Finland and
Russia are based relatively more on trade and only to a limited degree on investments. Finland is
the first economic partner of the Republic of Karelia (in 2006 30% of the total turnover, or about
500 mln. dollars) and one of the most important partners of Leningrad region (about 12%) and
Murmansk region (23%). The trade between Finland and neighbouring Russian regions in 20002006 more than doubled. A rapid increase of Finnish investments could also be observed, though
it is relatively modest in absolute figures. The total amount of Finnish investments in Karelia in
2006 reached 81 mln. dollars. They have significantly contributed to the modernization of
Karelian economy.
135
unfavourable resource-export development path (Druzhinin 2004).12 To exacerbate the
situation, regional politics have at times tended to favour conservation rather than
restructuring of weakly competitive industries a development path that has been
recognized as inefficient and unsustainable. More recently, regional administrations on
both sides of the border have begun to try to stimulate inward investments into highervalue-added industries, such as environment technologies, eco-tourism and more
sophisticated forms of wood-processing.
Cross-border interaction has received attention as a solution to the structural
problems of Eastern Finland since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Recent development
trends in Russia, that is, the relative stability of political conditions and economic growth,
have led to a new wave of interest in cross-border activity in the Karelias. Economic
connections have grown and „Russian connections‟ are seen as a key strategy in regional
development in eastern Finland where concrete measures have been prepared for their
enhancement (Etelä-Savon maakuntaliitto 2005). Siginficantly, and in contrast to the more
traditional and central state oriented regional development policies employed in Russian
Karelia, cross-border regional economic co-operation has since the mid-1990s been
conceptualized in terms of creating a new economic regional image. While this „imagemaking‟ objective has been more pronounced on the Russian side, it has resonated with
local and regional actors in Finnish Karelia who are also seeking to counteract perceptions
of peripherality and economic backwardmess. The principal economic economic vision in
this regard is the cross-border framing of Karelia as an ecoregion – basically as a
touristically attractive region concerned with sustainability, trade, non-polluting
manufactures and entrepreneurial development in improved extractive technologies. This
ecoregional visions is largely inspired by the natural landscape and rural character of
Finnish and Russian Karelia. Allied with the ecoregional image is the promotion of
Karelia as a special region in Europe with a specific history and cultural/historical
commonalities and as a fascinating point of contact.
Progress in this area has been slow in terms of large investments. Amongst
Russian enterprises with Finnish Karelian particpation only the Stora Enso‟s saw mill,
PKC Group‟s automobile wiring plant, Helkama‟s refrigerator plant and a number of
timber-logging enterprises and subcontracting ventures in the clothing industry stand out.
At the same time, tourism and trade have increased considerably.
Concluding Remarks on the Construction of Familiarity
Often understood as a pragmatic exercise in coordinating public and societal
action across borders, cross-border co-operation more often than not involves an
orchestration of identity politics in order to create a sense of mutual familiarity. This is,
furthermore, a highly selective process, understood and exploited largely by those who
sense a long-term benefit in CBC and persons dedicated to intercultural dialogue.
Nevertheless, it would be dangerous to generalise about CBC as a means to promote a „de12
In the Leningrad region, by contrast, its influence has been combined with other powerful
factors, such as the proximity to St Petersburg, direct access to the Gulf of Finland and generally
more developed transport infrastructure and communications. During almost a decade of
economic growth, Leningrad region demonstrated much higher rates than the country in average,
and has considerably improved its position in the list of Russian regions. Its economy is directed
in-ward and has little to do with cross-boundary interactions. Regional authorities, both in
Russian Karelia and in the Leningrad region, have been rather enthusiastic about CBC.
136
bordering‟ of European societies. The case of Karelia is a positive case of a mutual
rediscovery and exploitation of historical commonalities, common landscapes and
regional traditions, but it is not immune to the vicissitudes of security polices, strict border
and visa regimes as well as the ups and downs of EU-Russia relations.
To be somewhat provocative: the political construction of familiarity between
Finnish and Russian Karelia has its limits. The decisive role belongs to those whose
everyday practices of cross-border interaction have contributed to the emergence of crossborder lifestyles; these are Finns and Russians who spend their weekends and own property
on the other side, who have close friends and/or relatives there and often run a business
venture of cross-border nature. At present, it is primarily (but by no means only) Russians as
well as former Russian citizens of Finnish (Ingrian) ethnicity allowed to migrate to Finland)
who lead these cross-border lifestyles. For them, the Finnish-Russian trans-border region
has already become a reality. Their exposure to both cultures makes them bicultural, i.e.
capable of efficiently utilizing the opportunities existing on both sides of the border. It is
expected that under the present conditions this small stratum will grow and eventually
become capable of political self-organization with the aim to defend their interests. In
addition, this group could provide a resource for future cross-border interaction.
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Demographic changes as a challenge for the geo-economy
a geo-policy of the European Union
Josef ABRHÁM
Abstract: The European Union faces many challenges, which may in the next few
decades, change its geo-economic and geopolitical position. Among these challenges we can
include, inter alia, the ongoing population changes (slow population growth and namely
population ageing). The aim of this paper is to assess current population trends and prospects for
the development of the population of the European Union and to outline possible effects and tools
to address the aging of the population. We focus here not only on the European Union as a whole,
but also on the comparative profile of the member countries. The study is based on an analysis of
statistical indicators and projections of the European Statistical Office.
Keywords: European Union, demographic changes, ageing of the population
Introduction
The European Union is one of the most important as well as advanced centres of
today's global economy. The EU plays an essential role in the field of international
political relations. However, at the same time it faces many challenges, which gradually
weaken its position. Among these challenges we include, inter alia, the ongoing
population changes. Reducing the share of Europe on the world population and negative
changes in age structure can, over the next three to five decades, dramatically change the
geopolitical and geo-economic position of the EU.
It is already quite a well-known fact that changes in social conditions and individual
values produce significant demographic problems, the scope and seriousness of which
have no analogy in the modern history of Europe.
The aim of this paper is to assess current population trends and prospects for
development of the population of the European Union and to outline the possible effects and
tools to address aging of the population. We focus here not only on the European Union as a
whole, but also on the comparative profile of the member countries. The study is based on
an analysis of statistical indicators and projections of the European Statistical Office.
1. Demographic trends and perspectives
According to current estimates, should the population of the European Union
slightly grow due to immigration until 2040 and then it is expected to decline, which could
make 10% in some countries by 2050. Population EU_25 should be reduced from 456.8
million in 2005 to 449.8 million in 2050. The share of the Union on the worldwide
population during the same period is likely to be reduced from 12 to 6%, which will
reduce the weight of Europe in the global economy. Of the five largest EU countries only
the population of Great Britain should grow between 2005 and 2050 (European
Commission, 2009: 11).
Aging of population in coming decades may significantly jeopardize economic
growth and competitiveness of the European Union and the sustainability of current
social, pension and health systems. The main trends of population changes in the
European Union are:
 persistently low birth rate, which is far below the rate necessary to restore the
population,
140
 increasing life expectancy, which is due to significant progress in the health and
quality of life,
 changes in the structure of the population - a growing proportion of
 older people who are economically dependent on the shrinking population of
working age.
Birth rate, apart from the migration, belongs among the main characteristics
affecting the population increases. To monitor the fertility indicator of total fertility rate is
used, which reflects the average number of children per woman over a lifetime. A key
threshold that ensures natural reproduction of the population is on average 2.1 children per
woman. (European Commission 2005: 1-13).
Demographers also prognosticate that the population with a stable level of fertility
at 1.3 children per woman will fall to 25% of its original size in a hundred years. Fertility
rate at 1.9 will cause a decrease in population at around 80% of baseline in a hundred
years. Of course, if we do not take into account the impact of immigration (European
Commission, 2007a: 31-33).
Fertility rate: trends and assumptions (constant scenario)
Country
1960
1980
2008
France
2,9
1,9
2.0
Ireland
4,0
2,9
1.9
Sweden
2,3
1,7
1.9
Denmark
2,6
1,4
1.9
Finland
2,7
1,7
1.8
UK
2,8
1,8
1.8
Belgium
2,7
1,6
1,8
Luxembourg
1,8
1,8
1.7
Netherlands
3,2
1,5
1.7
Estonia
1,9
2,1
1.6
Cyprus
3,4
3,5
1.5
Bulgaria
2,2
2,0
1.4
Greece
2,3
2,0
1.4
Spain
2,9
1,9
1.4
Latvia
1,9
2,0
1.4
Malta
3,1
2,0
1.4
Austria
2,8
1,8
1.4
Portugal
3,1
2,0
1.4
Czech Republic
2,2
2,0
1.3
Germany
2,5
1,5
1.3
Lithuania
2,4
2,0
1.4
Hungary
1,8
1,8
1.4
Poland
2,7
2,3
1.3
Romania
2,0
2,3
1.3
Italy
2,5
1,5
1,4
Slovenia
2,3
1,9
1.3
Slovakia
2,9
2,3
1.3
EU_27
2,6
1,9
1,5
2030
2,0
1,9
1,9
1,9
1,8
1,8
1,8
1,7
1,7
1,6
1,5
1,5
1,5
1,5
1,5
1,5
1,5
1,5
1,4
1,4
1,4
1,4
1,4
1,4
1,5
1,4
1,3
1,6
Table 1
2050
1,9
1,9
1,9
1,9
1,8
1,8
1,8
1,7
1,8
1,6
1,6
1,5
1,5
1,5
1,5
1,5
1,5
1,5
1,5
1,5
1,5
1,5
1,4
1,5
1,5
1,5
1,4
1,6
Source: EUROSTAT
141
Table 1 shows that a common feature of the European Union has represented a
significant decline in fertility in the last thirty years. In the light of demographic estimates
we can assess the current level of fertility in all countries EU_27 as low or very low.
Among a group of countries with low fertility (rate of fertility in the range of 1.6 –
2.0) we may include France, Ireland, Scandinavian countries, the Benelux countries and
the United Kingdom. Very low birth rates (ranging from 1.2 to 1.5) are at all other
countries (new member states of Central and Eastern Europe, countries of southern
Europe, Germany and Austria).
Projected changes in the age structure of the EU_27 population (as % of total population)
Table 2
Country
France
Ireland
Sweden
Denmark
Finland
UK
Belgium
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Estonia
Cyprus
Bulgaria
Greece
Spain
Latvia
Malta
Austria
Portugal
Czech Republic
Germany
Lithuania
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Slovenia
Slovakia
Italy
0-14
18
20
17
18
17
18
17
18
18
15
18
13
14
15
15
16
15
15
14
14
14
15
15
15
14
16
14
2008
65 and 80 and
15-64
over
over
65
17
5
68
11
3
66
18
5
66
16
4
67
16
4
66
16
5
66
17
5
68
14
3
67
15
4
68
17
4
70
12
3
69
17
4
67
19
4
69
17
5
69
16
3
70
14
3
68
17
5
67
17
4
71
15
3
66
20
5
69
17
4
69
16
4
71
13
3
70
15
3
70
16
4
72
12
3
66
20
5
0-14
17
17
16
16
16
17
16
16
15
14
15
12
13
13
12
13
14
13
12
13
12
13
11
11
13
11
12
2060
65 and 80 and
15-64
over
over
57
26
11
58
25
10
57
27
10
59
25
10
56
28
11
59
25
9
58
27
10
60
24
10
58
27
11
55
31
11
59
26
9
54
34
13
55
32
13
55
32
14
53
34
12
55
32
12
57
29
11
56
31
13
54
33
13
55
32
13
53
35
12
55
32
13
52
36
13
54
35
13
54
33
14
53
36
13
55
33
15
Source: EUROSTAT
Declining birth rates in the new EU member countries came later (about 20 years
compared to the Northern and Western Europe and 10 years later than in Southern
European countries), but it was a lot stronger. The situation is not surprising. The change
of the economic, social and political conditions in the 90th of the last century played an
important role here. The rate of social security expenditure on family policy at the
beginning of the transition period significantly decreased. Moreover, increasing
opportunities for work, social and individual sports contributed to this change as well. The
142
development in southern European countries, however, can be marked as a particular
surprise, especially if we take into account the differences in the understanding the
meaning of family in the Northern and Southern Europe. The north, once predominantly
Protestant, is now largely secular and individualistic, while the south remains under
significant influence of Catholicism. Yet it is precisely in the southern European countries,
where women protest against their traditional role of mother and decide whether to opt for
work or family life (Liddle and Lerais 2006, 14-18). The explanation is likely to be sought
in new value systems of the young generation and in new conditions allowing to cosine
work and family life.
The constantly improving system of follow-up and preventive health care and the
trend for healthy lifestyle lead to the reduction of mortality and extending the age of the
population. It is estimated that the average and median age will increase in the European
Union between 2005 and 2050 by almost ten years.
Life expectancy in the EU_25 increased between 1960 and 2000 by 8 years to 76
years for men and 82 years for women. This increase should continue in other decades.
For the year 2050 life expectancy in EU_25 is estimated to 82 years in case of men and
even at 87 years in case of women.15 Longer life expectancy is recorded for both men and
women from the original EU_15 countries compared with the new ones (with the
exception of Cyprus and Malta). In the future differences between the sexes and the
member countries should reduce slightly.
Concurrency of increased life expectancy and low birth rate causes changes in the
age structure of population. The reduction in the birth rate came after the years of strong
population from the 50th, 60th and 70 of the last century, which is the cause of the current
high population aged between 45 to 65 years. This large age group will gradually move
into retirement age and 14 Age, probably lived by a person born n or a person of a given
age when keeping the age-stay mortality rates.
Based on the European Statistical Office data increase the negative relationship
between productivity and generation of seniors. According to population projections
published in the materials of the European Commission there will be in 2050 an increase
in the number of elderly people aged 65 years by almost 60 million and their share on the
total population grow to about 30%. The proportion of people aged over 80 years is even
going to triple compared to the present value, while the working-age population around
15-64 reaches a peak around 2010 and then will gradually decrease. Its share declines
from the current 67% to 57% in 2050 (European Commission, 2007a).
2. Economic and social impacts of population ageing
Seriousness of the ongoing changes in population structure arises from the
potential implications for economic and social systems. Low fertility rate will push on the
reduction of a number of people at their working age and subsequently also on a decline in
a total employment rate as well as slower growth of the potential output. The aging of the
population will in turn require higher spending on social and welfare systems (pension
systems, health care, long term care for seniors, etc.), which will have negative impacts on
the sustainability of public finances.
The impacts on the economy and social systems will, of course, not be obvious
immediately. A forecast study of the European Commission published in 2006 estimates
that the impact on a total employment rate will take effect until after 2018. In the current
decade, the Union should benefit from a favourable combination of growth in the working
age population and increasing employment rates. Between 2011 and 2017 the increase in
143
1
work participation rate should still offset the decrease in the share of the active
population and only after 2018, the demographic effects should outweigh.
The total number of employed persons in the European Union (EU_25)
should decrease between the years 2004 to 2050 by about 5%, despite of achieving
71% employment rate. According to the above-mentioned study by the European
Commission [Caron, G., Cecile, D. (2006)] both New Member States of the EU
(especially the Baltic States, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) and the
states of Southern Europe (Italy, Greece, Portugal) should be most affected by a decrease
in labour input while the increase in total employment in the coming decades is
prognosed for Cyprus, Luxembourg, Ireland, Malta, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands,
France and Great Britain.
Old-age dependency ratio (population of 65+ as a percentage of the population between
15-64 years)
Table 3
Country
France
Ireland
Sweden
Denmark
Finland
UK
Belgium
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Estonia
Cyprus
Bulgaria
Greece
Spain
Latvia
Malta
Austria
Portugal
Czech Republic
Germany
Lithuania
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Slovenia
Slovakia
EU_27
2007
25
27
26
23
25
24
26
21
21
25
18
25
28
24
23
19
25
26
20
30
25
23
19
21
23
16
25
2030
39
25
37
38
44
33
38
31
40
34
27
34
38
34
35
39
38
37
36
46
35
34
36
30
41
32
38
2050
45
40
42
41
47
38
44
38
46
47
38
55
57
59
51
50
48
53
55
56
51
51
56
54
59
55
50
Source: EUROSTAT
The population aging population will logically have negative implications for the
economic growth. The report of the Kok Group on the review of the Lisbon strategy (Kok,
2004) predicts that the demographic population aging could cause a decline in potential
output growth in the EU_25 from current 2 and 2.25% to 1.25% in 2040. The study of the
1
It is under the assumption of the incerase in employment of the youth, women and the elderly.
144
European Commission study from 2007 projects even a slowdown in growth in the period
2031-2050 to 1.2% (European Commission, 2007c: 15).
Falling employment rate and population aging both threaten the sustainability of
public finances and the current social model. Seniors belong among the biggest
beneficiaries from pension and health funds. While maintaining the existing mechanisms
of social protection in Member countries it is estimated, under the condition of a constant
increase in the demographic scenario, for the EU (EU_27), according to the European
Commission (European Commission, 2009: 32-37) that:
increase in the share of expenditure on retirement pensions to GDP from the
current 9.1% to 11.4% of GDP in 2050 (about a fifth)
increase in the share of health expenditure to GDP from the current 6.7% to 7.5%
of GDP in 2050 (roughly a quarter)
increase in the share of spending on long-term care for the elderly from the current
0.9% to 1.7% in 2050 (about 40%).
3. Options to tackle demographic changes
For the above projections it is not necessary to take any crisis scenarios. The
published studies only confirm quite clearly a well-known fact that in order to ensure
economic prosperity and sustainability it will be necessary to reform the current pension
and social systems. Most of the activities associated with the solution of demographic
change falls within the scope of the Member States or regional authorities and social
partners. The severity of demographic problems and the current state of reform processes
in the 27 member countries are at a different level, therefore it is necessary to design
policies and measures to address the demographic challenges according to the needs of
each country. Yet, in the following, we try to look closer at some measures and to find
generally recommendable steps with regard to the current trends in the EU:
 measures to improve the population trends
 support for increasing employment,
 reception and integration of immigrants,
 reform of pension and social protection
It shows that a low birth rate is the result of restrictive conditions that limit the full
development of private and family life. Surveys have documented a significant difference
between the number of children the citizens of the European Union would like to have
(2.3) and how many of them they are actually nurturing (1.5) (European Commission,
2007: 161). The importance of appropriate measures for the stimulation of population can
be documented on the examples of successful countries. For example, in France or
Sweden, where, thanks to measures taken in favour of families and in favour of
reconciliation work and private life, there is an "acceptable level" of fertility. That is still
below the replacement level of 2.1, but with adequate level of migration may prevent
population decline. The comparative profile of member countries shows (see Table 1) that
the traditional Catholic states are faced with relatively low fertility rate (e.g. Italy, Poland,
etc.). On the contrary, the Protestant Northern Europe shows satisfactory results.
Economic policy makers should, therefore, when solving the aging of the population take
into account the changing shape of the contemporary European society and family. As
appropriate the measures enabling women and men to reconcile family and working life
can be suggested. These are mainly the following: securing adequate child-care services at
the preschool age, adequate financial and tax support for families and parental leaves,
support for flexible forms of work and time, housing support for socially vulnerable
families or single parents, etc.
145
An important factor in solving the economic impacts of population aging
represents a level of employment. The estimated demographic trends will lead to a
reduction in the proportion of Europeans at the working age and in this respect, the need
to increase the potential workforce will become more urgent.
At the European Union level, employment belongs among the main priorities to
sustain growth and competitiveness of the member countries. At the European Union
level, employment gets between the main priorities to sustain growth and competitiveness
of member countries. In the original Lisbon Strategy in 2000 there were in the area of
employment set two main objectives (European Council, 2000):
 move the employment rate to 70% by 2010,
 to increase women's employment rate to 60% by 2010.
At the European Council in Stockholm another goal was added:
 raise the employment rate of older people (55-64 years) to 50% by 2010.
The new "Europe 2020" strategy reforms the goals that should be achieved in the
area of labour market and social policy up to 2020 as follows (European
Council, 2010):
to increase employment for people aged 20-64 years from the current 69% to at
least than 75,
However, the real situation in the field of employment lags significantly behind
the objectives. In the period 2000-2007 significant progress was made in the area. Overall
employment rate has risen from 62 to 65%. Even greater progress can be seen in case of
the female employment rate (increased by 4 percentage points to 58%) as well as the
employment rate of older people, which even rose from 37 to 44%. Despite the improved
performance, the fulfilment of the so-called Lisbon targets cannot be realistically expected
by 2010. Only the target value of 60% female employment rate may be attacked. The
employment rate in 2006 was 64.5% in the EU, 72% in the U.S. and 70% in Japan.
However, the global financial crisis brought a significant turnover. The employment rate
in EU_27 declined in 2009 to 64% and even this year one cannot expect any significant
improvement.
Considerable reserves are particularly noticeable in terms of young workers,
women and elderly persons at who we will look with a little more detail. As we already
reported, Europeans still live longer lives and enjoy better health for longer period of time
(with the exception, of course, for physically demanding manual jobs). The share of
people aged 55-64 should go up from the current 17 percent to almost 30 percent in 2050.
At the same time, employment with this group of workers is almost half the population
aged between 25-54 years. The employment rate for workers aged 60-64 is below 27%
and for the oldest group aged 65-69 years even only 8%. In the case of both age groups,
the European Union significantly lags behind the United States. The only exceptions are
some states where the employment of seniors 60 + very high (e.g. Sweden, Denmark,
Cyprus and Portugal).
The issue of aging of the active population and pursuit for increasing the potential
of workers aged 55-64, or. 65-69 years should therefore get in the following years to the
forefront in both creating and implementing labour market policies.
In the light of the current the situation mainly the following measures appear as
appropriate:
• extension of the retirement age and approximation of the standard retirement
age for men andwomen,
• reduction of "attractive incentives" for the elderly to leave the labour market (a
relative penalization of early pensions and social benefits in relation to
146
employment; strict control of sickness and disability pays);
• creation of a targeted active employment policies and educational programs that
enhance the employability of older workers,
• guarantee of comparable rates of older and younger workers for employers (shift
from benefits based on the principle of seniority; eradication of policies based on
subsidies or preferences in employment of younger workers, etc.).
• flexible working conditions (a combination of wages and pensions, part-time
jobs, working conditions for temporary).
In connection with the demographic situation in the European Union the issue of
immigration is also often mentioned. From the perspective of an integrated country one
can actually record the whole range of economic and non-economic impacts. The
immigration means inflow of workforce, which may lead to the increased employment in
sectors in need of additional manpower and consequently to the increased inflow of funds
into government budgets (in the form of direct and indirect taxes on consumption).
Besides the economic impact of immigration there are demographic effects as well.
Migrants usually have a much younger age structure so they can "rejuvenate" the
population. Depending on the country of origin they tend to have higher levels of fertility
(BICANOVÁ, 2004).
The net inflow of migrants has been a major factor in population growth in
Europe for quite a long time. The intensity of the population inflow, however, lags behind
in international comparisons. The share of foreign-born population in the total population
in 2006 reached more than 9%, while in the United States it was 12%, almost twice as
much in Canada -18%- and even 23% Australia. However, substantial differences can be
traced among the Member States. From the Old Members (EU_15) Luxembourg (40%),
Austria (15%) and Sweden (14%) reach the highest proportion of immigrants. They are
followed by Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands and Great Britain, where the share is above
10%. As promising we can see a positive trend of increasing inflow of immigrants, who
recorded most of the countries EU_15 (European Commission, 2008: 18, 19, 129).
Migrants such as, however, do not create jobs or generate added value. It depends
on the type of migrants, qualifications, possibilities of integration into society, etc. Many
countries of the European Union have their own experience with the employment of
immigrants, especially with regard to immigrants from countries outside the Union. The
membership base of the European Union can be divided into two groups in terms of the
participation of immigrants born outside the EU. On one hand, one can find the countries
of North-western Europe, where the rate of employment of domestic workers is much
higher than the value attained by immigrants (e.g., Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Belgium, France, Scandinavian countries, Great Britain). The second group that is
characterized by opposing tendencies, one can add Southern Europe countries and the
New EU countries (except Poland). The causes may be found primarily in the relatively
generous social systems of the EU_15 countries, which may act as a magnet for
immigrants. Furthermore, we can find them also in the restrictions, which do not allow to
enter labour markets for the relatives of foreign workers (employment for immigrant
women is substantially lower than men). As other possible explanations one can name the
fact that the developed countries of the European Union accepted immigrants from other
than purely economic grounds (e.g. humanitarian-driven inflows).
The immigration is unlikely to reverse the population trends in the European Union,
but may act in combination with the other already mentioned measures as a significant
mitigating factor. The migration potential is not fully exploited in most Member countries
therefore it seems to be more appropriate to further enhance an effective and transparent
147
procedure for the admission of third country nationals to enter the country as well as an
active implementation of integration policies. Insufficiencies may be found primarily at the
level of labour participation and integration of immigrants and also in their skill and
educational level. As for the integration of third country nationals, special programs that
would allow immigrants to obtain the necessary qualifications and language skills during
training in Europe could be of much help. It is also important to address the issue of
recognition of diplomas and other qualifications in order to avoid a situation in which
immigrants perform significantly less well paid work than to which they are qualified. A
large majority of Member States currently suffers from acute shortage of highly skilled
workers, but conditions for their integration are not yet appropriate.
The above mentioned measures may help alleviate the effects of aging, but it
seems like inevitable to reform pension systems. Those have been undertaken in recent
years in all EU Member States, but their intensity and focus varies significantly from state
to state and therefore it is, as a matter of fact, impossible to generalize the common
practice for all countries EU_27.
All pension schemes used in the European Union are based on the so called threepillar system. The first pillar, which is based on intergenerational solidarity and is funded
by a continuous manner, represent state-guaranteed pensions. The second pillar is
composed by the activities of employers seeking to provide benefits to citizens in old age.
The third pillar creates private activities of citizens (Brdek, 2002:108-113). Individual
pillars are in the European Union funded in a variable way and therefore have a different
weight in the total pension. Their voluntary or obligatory nature differs according to
Member States, too.
The reforms of pension systems implemented in the EU after the year 2000 seek
to adapt the systems to new demographic trends. In all EU countries, the retirement age
for men and women is extended are instruments from the first pillar based on the PAYG
(pay-as-you-go) system are gradually reduced and on contrary, tools based on greater
participation of private or corporate finance (2nd and 3rd pillar of the social system) are
increasingly used. The procedures and the intensity of reforms, however, differ considerably.
As the examples of current reforms we can name the pension systems in the New
Member States (Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Hungary and the Slovak Republic), which combine a
system of ongoing funding with private funding, so that private schemes are mandatory for
people under a certain age and voluntary for older people. Austria in the reforms from the year
2004 and 2005 supported the sustainability of the pension system by strengthening the
relationship between the amount of contributions and disbursements from the system and also
increased the incentives to stay longer in employment and reduced the profitability of early
pensions (the bonus). The incentives to extend the employment have also been made in
Portugal, Finland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Great Britain went through more
effective regulation of the pension system when simplified the tax regime of pension funds
and enhancing the protection of final pay schemes.
Conclusions
The implementation of economic and social policies should already be based on
demographic trends. Low fertility rate will push on the reduction of a number of people at
their working age and subsequently also on a decline in a total employment rate as well as
slower growth of the potential output. The aging of the population will in turn require
higher spending on social and welfare systems (pension systems, health care, long term
care for seniors, etc.), which will have negative impacts on the sustainability of public
finances. Given the current trends, it seems appropriate to support measures to improve
148
population trends, to increase employment and to accept and integrate immigrants, and to
implement reforms in pension and welfare systems in the European Union.
If the European countries would like to mitigate the decline of the population they
should take into account the changing shape of contemporary families. The measures to
enable women and men to reconcile family and working life seem to be appropriate.
These are mainly the following: securing adequate child-care services at the preschool age
of a child, adequate financial and tax support for families and persons on parental leaves,
support for flexible forms of work and working hours, support of housing for socially
vulnerable families or single parents, etc.
Europeans live longer and enjoy better health (with the exception, of course,
physically demanding manual jobs). The proportion of people aged 55-64 go up from the
current 17 percent up to almost 30 percent in 2050. While the employment rate of this
group is almost half of that of the population aged between 25-54 years. The employment
rate for workers aged 60-64 reaches less than 27% and the oldest group aged 65-69 years
even only 8%. The issue of active aging and improvement of the potential of workers aged
55-64, or 64-69 years should therefore be in the following years in the forefront of the
implementation of labour market policies.
In the light of the current the situation mainly the following measures appear as
appropriate: extension of the retirement age and approximation of the standard retirement
age for men and women; reduction of "attractive incentives" for the elderly to leave the
labour market (a relative penalization of early pensions and social benefits in relation to
employment; strict control of sickness and disability pays); creation of a targeted active
employment policies and educational programs that enhance the employability of older
workers; guarantee of comparable rates of older and younger workers for employers (shift
from benefits based on the principle of seniority; abolishment of policies based on subsidies
or preferences in employment of younger workers) and flexible working conditions (a
combination of wages and pensions, part-time jobs, working conditions for temporary).
The immigration is unlikely to reverse the population trends in the European
Union, but may act in combination with the other already mentioned measures as a
significant mitigating factor. The migration potential is not fully exploited in most
Member countries therefore it seems to be more appropriate to further enhance an
effective and transparent procedure for the admission of third country nationals to enter
the country as well as an active implementation of integration policies. Insufficiencies
may be found primarily at the level of labour participation and integration of immigrants
and also in their skill and educational level.
Decreasing employment together with population aging threatens also the
sustainability of both public finances and the current social model. Seniors belong among
the biggest beneficiaries from the pension and health funds. The scientists estimate that
the increase in government spending would create, while maintaining the existing budget
and economic arrangements, a sharp increase in public debt and weakening the
competitiveness of European economies from 2020.
149
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politiku, Brusel.
L‟Union Européenne e le Mexique: l‟Accord régional de partenariat
comme instrument géopolitique face à l‟Aléna et à la globalisation
Angelo SANTAGOSTINO, Andrea FORNARI, Luisa BRAVO
Abstract: Latin America especially since the accession of Spain in 1986 has been
strategically important for Europe. At the same time is the sub-continent has continued to be
relevant for in the external policies of United States. Mexico is the example of a country where
these geopolitical interests have crossed. The Nafta, on the part of the United States, negotiated
and entered into force at the beginning on the nineties. As an answer to Nafta, a few years later, in
the mid 1990s, the European Union negotiated an Economic Partnership, Political Coordination
and Cooperation Agreement with Mexico, which was signed in 1997 and entered into force in
2000. This Agreement provides a suitable framework for both deepening and strengthening EUMexico political relations. The Agreement has three main pillars: political dialogue, trade and
cooperation. It also allowed the EU to reinforce its economic and commercial positions in Mexico,
which had been under considerable pressure since the entry into force of NAFTA.
Keywords: European Union, Mexico, agreement, cooperation, globalization
Introduction
L‟entrée de l‟Espagne dans l‟Ue au milieu des années ‟80, le profond changement des
politiques économiques en Amérique Latine aussi a partir de la moitié des années ‟80 et
l‟accru intérêt des Etats Unies face au Mexique, qui s‟est manifesté dans cette même période,
son les facteurs qui ont poussé l‟Union Européenne (UE) à intensifier ses rapport avec le
Mexique et, plus en général avec l‟Amérique Latine. L‟instrument choisi soit par les Etats
Unies soit par l‟Europe à soutien de leurs stratégies géopolitiques a été celui des accords
bilatéraux, soit dans la forme régionale que dans la forme interrégionale : c'est-à-dire l‟Accord
de libre échange nord-américain (ALENA) pour les Etats Unies et l‟Accord de partenariat
économique, de coordination politique et de coopération (APEPC) pour l‟UE. Il est nécessaire
de souligner que le deuxième, c'est-à-dire l‟APEPC, présente une ampleur bien plus vaste que
celle de l‟ALENA. En effet ne se limite pas aux aspects de libéralisation commerciale mais
inclut le dialogue politique et la coopération économique et technique.
Les accords régionaux comme instrument de géopolitique.
En 1993, tandis que l‟Europe des douze inaugurait en janvier le grand marché
unique, les pays de l‟Amérique du Nord complétaient la dernière vague des négociations
nécessaires à l‟aboutissement du projet de création d‟une zone de libre-échange entre les
États-Unis, le Canada et le Mexique : l‟ALENA
Au même temps, les deux blocs s‟affrontaient à la table du GATT, afin de trouver
un compromis satisfaisant en vue d‟une plus grande libéralisation des échanges mondiaux
dans le cadre du cycle de l‟Uruguay Round. Les tractations multiples autorisèrent
finalement, en décembre 1993, l‟approbation par 117 nations d‟un vaste programme libreéchangiste, prévoyant notamment la naissance d‟une institution nouvelle : l‟Organisation
mondiale du commerce (OMC), susceptible, entre autre, de veiller à ce que la constitution
de zones commerciales préférentielles. Pour éviter la diffusion d‟un isolationnisme
régional contraire aux principes d‟intégration de l‟économie mondiale.
Régionalisme et globalisation s‟opposent-elles ? Les conditionnes dans lesquelles
se sont développés les échanges mondiaux depuis la seconde guerre mondiale, tendent
151
plutôt à démontrer que bilatéralisme et multilatéralisme sont
routes a fois
complémentaires a fois alternatives dans un contexte de globalisation.
L‟intensification des échanges commerciaux est une des caractéristiques majeures de
l‟économie mondiale durant la seconde moitié du XXe siècle. Tout au long de cette période
multilatéralisme et régionalisme sont allées main dans la main et, ensemble, ont donnée une
grande contribution a l‟intégration de l‟économie mondiale et au développent d‟un réseau
d‟accords qui ont eu une grand influence sur l‟action des états et leur relations mutuelles.
Toutefois, au cours de la première décennie du XXI le multilatéralisme a connu
une crise lourde, tandis que les meilleurs résultats ont été obtenus par les accords
régionaux et interrégionaux. Ainsi face a la globalisation et a la difficulté des négociations
multilatérales, évidence par la paralyse du cycle de Doha, les accords bilatérales, soit a
niveau régional que a niveau interrégional, ont connu un grand essor. Dans un monde de
plus en plus intégré du point de vue économique, ils sont devenus un instrument essentiel
de la stratégie politique d‟un pays ou d‟un ensemble de pays comme le cas de l‟UE.
Le Mexique a signé son premier accord pour une zone de libre échange avec le
Chili en 1992. Le 1°Janvier 1994 est entré en vigueur le Traité de Libre Commerce de
l'Amérique du Nord entre le Mexique, les États-Unis et le Canada. En 1995, toujours le
premier Janvier, sont entrés en vigueur les traités de libre échange entre Mexique et
Bolivie, comme celui entre Mexique et Costa Rica. Le Traité du Groupe de Trois, G -3,
qui comprend le Mexique, la Colombie et le Venezuela, est aussi entré en vigueur le
premier Janvier 1995. L'accord entre le Mexique et le Nicaragua entra en vigueur le
premier juillet 1998, afin d'obtenir un meilleur équilibre dans les relations commerciales
entre les deux Pays. Le premier août 1999 est entré en vigueur l'amplification de l'accord
Commercial avec le Chili du1992. Le 10 mai 2000 le Mexique et le Triangle du Nord, El
Salvador, Guatemala et Honduras concrétisèrent les négociations pour un Traité de libre
commerce entré en vigueur le premier janvier 2001.
Le Mexique participe également depuis 1991 aux activités de l‟OCDE ainsi qu‟a
celles du Conseil économique de la zone Asie Pacifique (APEC). Il est membre fondateur
de la BERD (1990) et bénéficier depuis 1992 du financement de la Banque Européenne
d‟Investissement (BEI). Il est par ailleurs membre fondateur de l‟Association des États des
Caraïbes (AEC) laquelle a su le jour en août 1995. Le Mexique assume pleinement un rôle
d‟acteur significatif dans son environnement régional et dans le système multilatéral.
Dans les 15-20 dernières années, en partie comme réponse à la crise du
multilatéralisme, nous avons assisté dans le monde à une forte prolifération des Accords
commerciales régionaux (ARC). À un principe de 2010 le nombre d'ARC notifiés l'OMC
étaient 462. Ils semblent opérationnels seulement 271. Le 90 % des ARC opérationnels est
constitués par des accords de libre commerce, alors que les unions douanières couvrent le
restant 10 %. Le Mexique participe à 15 ARC, entre lesquels l‟ALENA et des accords
avec pays de l'Amérique latine et des États-Unis.
Au mois d‟octobre 2000 est entré vigueur l‟ « Accord de partenariat économique,
de coordination politique et de coopération » incluant la « libéralisation bilatérale et
préférentielle, progressive et réciproque, du commerce des biens et des services »,
autrement connu comme Traité de libre-commerce UE-Mexique (TLCUEM). Comme
conséquence au cours des premiers dix années du XXI siècle, l‟UE et le Mexique ont
réalisé d'importants progrès dans le renforcement de leurs relations bilatérales et surtout
celles basées sur la libéralisation des échanges commerciaux. Ainsi, dans le cadre de la
diversification des relations internationales du Mexique, l'UE est prioritaire, compte tenu
de ses apports en matière d'investissements, de commerce et de coopération au
développement. De son côté, le Mexique s'est affirmé comme un interlocuteur et un
152
partenaire commercial de plus en plus important pour l'UE dans le contexte de ses
relations avec l'Amérique latine.
Contenus du Traité de libre commerce e de l‟Accord de partenariat.
Le but principal du TLCUEM est de garantir les meilleures conditions pour les
flux de biens, services et investissements à travers l'Atlantique. Le Mexique est ainsi
devenu un partenaire commercial importante de l'UE en Amérique Latine et un marché
stratégiquement important pour ses exportations.
Le TLCUEM a institué une large zone de libre-échange en projetant la
libéralisation tant dans le commerce des biens (y compris les biens agricoles) que celui des
services, des investissements et des paiements correspondants. Le Traité a aussi déterminé
l‟ouverture réciproque des marchés publics et inséré un mécanisme de coopération en
matière économique.
L‟Accord se compose, en second lieu, de la coordination politique. L‟Accord a
ainsi instauré le Conseil conjoint UE-Mexique, chargé de superviser son application. Ce
Conseil conjoint adopte les décisions nécessaires à la libéralisation du commerce des biens
et des services, des investissements et paiement correspondants, ainsi qu‟à la protection
suffisante et effective des droits de la propriété intellectuelle et à l‟instauration d‟un
règlement des différends. Le volet politique contient une clause démocratique. Les
principes démocratiques et les droits de l‟homme fondamentaux constituent un élément
essentiel de l‟accord. Leur violation autorise les parties à prendre les mesures appropriées.
De plus, à l‟instar des accords signés entre l‟UE et d‟autres pays latino-américains un
dialogue politique est inséré dans le corps même du traité. Il s‟agit d‟un dialogue qui
couvre toutes les matières bilatérales et internationales d‟intérêt commun et même à une
consultation plus étroite entre les parties au sein des organisations internationale donc
elles sont membres1.
Le volet de coopération de l‟accord est également ambitieux. Les domaines
couverts sont larges et divers et concernent tant la coopération économique (promotion
des investissements, coopération en matière de services financiers, et de petites et
moyennes entreprise) que politique (coopération sur la question des refugies, des droits de
l‟homme et de la démocratie) ou encore le domaine de la culture et de l‟éducation.
Les motivations géopolitiques et économiques pour conclure l‟Accord de partenariat
Plusieurs raisons expliquent l‟adoption de l‟Accord de partenariat
Les motivations européennes
Sur le plan géopolitique l‟Accord de partenariat est la réponse de l‟UE au
NAFTA. C‟est l‟action pensée pour balancer la croissante influence des EUA soit au
Mexique qu‟en Amérique Latine. L‟Europe pour longtemps a négligé les relations avec
l‟Amérique Latine, laissant champ ouvert aux EUA, soit pur des motifs politiques
(absence de démocratie), soit pour des motivations économiques (absence de stabilité
macroéconomique). Tout ça a eu comme conséquence une faible présence européenne
dans la région, malgré les liens historiques. Toutefois à partir du milieu des années ‟80 le
retour a la démocratie des pays de la région et le drastique changement des politiques
économiques, passées du populisme protectionniste au libérisme interne et externe,
mouvement - ce-dernier - qui à commencé justement au Mexique, ont induit l‟UE, soit ces
pays membres, a changer d‟attitude vers l‟Amérique Latine, à montrer plus d‟intérêt pour
1
Article 3 de l‟accord global du 8 décembre 1997
153
ses économies, qui s‟ouvraient a la concurrence internationale. Dans cette nouvelle vision
le Mexique, pour ce qu‟on va voir ensuite, présentait des liens intéressants non seulement
avec l‟Amérique du Nord, mais aussi avec l‟Asie.
Sur le plan économique, le Mexique représentait potentiellement une destination
importante des investissements européens en considérant aussi que et le Pays était très
actif sur le plan international et régionale, comme démontré par son entrée au GATT, à
l‟OMC, puis à l‟OCDE et son réseau avec les autres pays de l‟Amérique Latine, et les
pays asiatiques dans le cadre du forum d‟Asie pacifique (l‟APEC).
De plus, dans le cadre de l‟ALENA, le Mexique bénéficie d‟un traitement
préférentiel avec les EUA et le Canada pour le commerce des biens, des marchés publics,
des services, et des investissements. C‟est également le cas d‟autres domaines, tels que la
concurrence ou les droits de propriété intellectuelle. Or, la stratégie de l‟UE est de
pénétrer le marché américain via le Mexique. L‟Europe a souvent, lors des négociations
du TLCUEM, présenté l‟ALENA comme le standard minimal à adopter. On évoque, à ce
propos le « NAFTA party » c‟est-à-dire avec le traitement octroyé par le Mexique aux
membres de l‟ALENA.
Les motivations mexicaines
La volonté du Mexique de conclure le TLCUEM se fondait sur des raisons
géopolitiques et économiques. L‟adoption d‟un accord avec l‟Europe s‟inscrivait dans son
processus d‟ouverture et de démocratisation et constituait un contrepoids à ses relations
avec l‟Amérique du Nord. Par ailleurs, l‟UE c‟était et continue à être aujourd‟hui un
marché attractif pour les produits mexicains autant qu‟une source de capital, de
technologie et de coopération. En outre, le pays latino-américain connaissait un déficit
commercial avec l‟Europe, le volume des importations provenant de l‟UE étant
pratiquement le double de celui des exportations 2. Enfin, la négociation d‟un accord
commercial ambitieux ne présentait pas d‟obstacles majeurs, l‟UE et le Mexique ayant des
économies davantage complémentaires que concurrentielles 3.
L‟objectif général du Traité4 est clairement exprimé, il s‟agit de renforcer le cadre
des relations internationales notamment entre l‟Europe et l‟Amérique Latine.
Conséquences du TLCUEM
Le Mexique a baissé entre 2000 et 2007 ses taxes douanières des deux tiers, c‟està-dire qu‟a ramené son niveau moyen de taxation au 15% ad valorem ; en outre entre 2000
et 2007 son marché en franchise douanière a atteint le 100% des produits industriels.
L‟un des effets les plus notables de l‟accord a été celui de mettre fin à des pics
tarifaires qui existaient dans certains domaines, comme l‟automobile ou les taxes
douanières pouvaient s‟élever jusqu‟à 20%, le textile où elles atteignaient parfois 35%, ou
encore les spiritueux pour lesquels les taxes approchaient souvent 20%. L‟accord donne
2
Commission européenne, Document de stratégie 2002-2006 Mexique p.10
D‟aucun considération, cependant qu‟il n‟existe pas à la différence des relations entre l‟UE et le
Chili d‟affinités commerciales qui pourraient se traduire pas des marchés importants entre le
Mexique et l‟UE.
4
Article 4, L'objectif : l'objectif du présent titre est d'instaurer un cadre de nature à favoriser le
développement du commerce des biens et des services, y compris une libéralisation bilatérale et
préférentielle, progressive et réciproque, du commerce des biens et des services, en tenant compte
du caractère sensible de certains produits et services et conformément aux règles de l'OMC.
3
154
aussi accès aux marchés publics dans des termes définis comme « substantiellement
similaire à ceux de l‟Alena ».
Le Mexique trouve ainsi des meilleures conditions d‟exportation de ses moteurs
d‟automobile vers l‟Europe, qui constituent l‟un de ses points forts. L‟UE a toutefois
imposé au Mexique un certificat d‟origine des produits automobiles pour une valeur
ajoutée locale de 60% qui a été atteinte en 2005. L‟accord concerne aussi une partie des
échanges agricole, excluant toutefois les produits les plus sensibles comme les produits de
l‟élevage, les bananas et les céréales. En outre établissent des quotas pour certaines
spécialités, en particulier le miel, les fraises et les crevettes.
Le Mexique est devenu le seul pays au monde, à l‟exception d‟Israël, à avoir
simultanément libre accès aux deux plus grands marchés de la planète avec l‟espoir à
terme de contrebalancer, avec l‟Europe, le poids des EUA.
La coopération commerciale UE-Mexique.
Le TLCUEM fait partie, comme nous avons vue, des accords régionaux du
Mexique. Il est donc encadré dans l'Accord de Partenariat Économique, qui contemple la
coopération, est au développement qu'économique.
Cette structure a permis d'ajouter un instrument d'importance au TLCUEM : un
projet de facilitation de l'implémentation du Traité même. La rationalité de ce projet est de
créer le capital humain qui permet au Mexique de profiter pleinement des opportunités
offertes par le Traité.
Au mois de novembre 2004 l'UE et le Mexique ont souscrit une Convention de
financement qui a établi les conditions de coopération du Projet. Coopérer dans la mise en
œuvre du libre-échange est fondamental pour que la création d'une zone de libre-échange
puisse dévoiler sa séance plénière potentielle et augmenter les échanges commerciaux et
les flux d'investissement.
Ce Projet (PROTLCUEM) prévoit un financement par une quantité totale de 16
millions d'euro, apportés par des parties égales. Initialement la durée du Projet avait été
établie pour octobre 2010. Postérieurement, étant donné les bons résultats atteints, son
utilisation a été étendue à au 31 décembre 2011. L'apport financier additionnel a été établi
dans 3 million, pour un total de 19 millions.
Objectif général du projet est le renforcement des relations économiques,
commerciales et patronales entre le Mexique et l'UE. L‟objectif spécifique est de faciliter,
d'accélérer et de promouvoir l'échange commercial et les flux d'investissement, en prenant
comme référence le Traité, pour fortifier les capacités des dépendances, organismes et
organismes gouvernementaux responsables de son application.
Pour atteindre ces objectifs, le Projet a développé une série actions et activités visant à
résoudre des problèmes prioritaires et à fortifier les capacités institutionnelles et humaines.
Le Commerce UE-Mexique
Entre 2004 et 2008 le commerce UE-Mexique est passé de 21,6 milliards d‟euro à
35,9. Soit une croissance du 70% environs. A cause de la crise, le 2009 a vu une chute
remarquable, qui l‟a fait retourner a 25 milliards. Il faut souligner que l‟UE est le deuxième
partner commercial du Mexique, avec un pourcentage du 9,6% du commerce globale. Le
premier Partner est les EUA, qui couvrent le 64,3%. La dimension du commerce avec les
EUA est de 248 milliards d‟euro (2008), soit presque 10 fois celle de l‟UE.
Les exportations mexicaines vers l'UE sont accrues entre le 2005 et le 2008
constamment, avec un arrêt fort en 2009. En 2007 le déficit a atteint presque 9 milliards
d‟euro, tandis qu‟en 2008 il est descendu à 8 milliards. En 2009 il est ultérieurement
155
descendu à 6 milliards, quand la crise a frappé soit les importations de l'UE que les
exportations mexicaines de manière égale presque, les deux -28%.
La plus grande partie des produits que l‟UE a exportés vers le Mexique sont des
biens instrumentaux ou intermédiaires, largement utilisé pour produire les marchandises
mexicaines puis exportées aux EUA. Pour tel motif, une partie du déficit commercial du
Mexique avec l'UE trouve sa raison d'être dans son surplus commercial avec les pays à
nord-américaines et les autres partenaires commerciaux en Amérique Latine.
Au le cours des années dernières, les principales exportations mexicaines vers
l'UE ont été les produit minéraux (pétrole brut), les outillages et les appareilles électriques,
moyen de transport et médicales, comme les instruments de précision. Les exportations
ont atteint un pic de 13,7 milliards en 2008.
En 2009 à cause de la crise économique au Mexique et en Europe, les
exportations totales ont diminuées d'environ 4 milliards (-28%). Cette crise a aussi
déployé ses effets sur la structure des exportations mexicaines vers l'UE: les
hydrocarbures ont glissé à la troisième place après les produits électriques (principalement
téléphones fixes et parties d'ordinateur) voitures et leurs composants. Autres groupes de
produits importants au cours du 2009 ont été les appareils mécaniques, les produits
sanitaires de base et les instruments médicales. Les exportations des produits en fer et
acier (-74%) comme les parties pour le secteur aéronautique (-62%), ont diminuées plus
que la moyenne. Au contraire, les pharmaceutiques et quelques produits agricoles et
alimentaires Mexicains ont fait enregistrer une augmentation des exportations vers l'UE au
cours du 2009, même si à un niveau très bas.
Les importations mexicaines provenantes des 27 État membres de l'UE ont atteint
un niveau de 21,9 milliards en 2008. La chute en 2009 a été du 28%. Essence, produits
mécanique et machines électriques, ainsi que produits électroménagers, voitures,
composants pour l'industrie aéronautique et produits en acier, ont constitué la plus grande
partie de telle diminution. Ces secteurs, qui représentent environ 80% des pertes au cours
du 2009, produisent principalement des biens capitaux et intermédiaires, moins
nécessaires à l'industrie dans un moment d'investissements plus faible à cause de la crise.
Il y n'a pas de changements importants dans la structure générale des exportations de l'UE
vers le Mexique. Les groupes de produits les plus importants sont les mécaniciens et
machines électriques et appareils, suivis par essence, voitures et composants et par les
produits pharmaceutiques, qui représentent environs du 60% des exportations totales de
l'UE au Mexique.
Les Investissements de l‟UE au Mexique
Pendant les années 1990 les flux d‟IDE de l‟UE à destination de l‟Amérique
Latine ont connu une forte augmentation parallèle à l‟accroissement des flux d‟IDE à
l‟échelle mondiale. Les entrées nettes d‟IDE qui s‟établissaient à 1.898 dollars en 1994
ont atteint 6.709 en 2006, au Mexique, l‟UE est devenue le deuxième investisseur étranger
plus important, après les EUA et loin devant Japon.
La rapide expansion de l‟IDE enregistrée au Mexique à partir du milieu des
années 1990, pour la précision 1994, est le résultat d‟une part, de l‟élimination des
restrictions à l‟IDE par le gouvernement mexicain et d‟autre part, de la privatisation d‟un
grand nombre d‟entreprise publiques ayant pour effet d‟élargir la place du secteur privé dans
l‟économie. L‟adoption d‟une nouvelle branche d‟activité économique et simplifiée les
démarches administratives nécessaires à l‟autorisation de l‟investissement. En vertu de ta
nouvelle loi, à partir de la fin du 1993, l‟IDE a été autorisé dans tous les secteurs sauf ceux
où il est explicitement spécifié qu‟il est soumis à restrictions. Parmi ces derniers figurent le
156
pétrole, certains industries pétrochimiques, l‟électricité, la production d‟énergie nucléaire,
les minérales radioactifs, les communications par satellite, certains services de transport.
Au Mexique en 2009 presque 7.000 entreprises ont reçu des investissements de la
part de l'UE. Cela signifie qu‟il y a une participation des investisseurs Européens dans le
22% des entreprises qui ont reçu des investissements directs étrangers. Les entreprises qui
ont reçu investissements européens sont principalement du secteur de services (52% du
totale, y inclus transports et communications, services financiers et d'autre type) et
manufacturier (35%). Le secteur bancaire a reçu environ 15 milliards de dollars
américains de la parte d‟investisseurs Européens au cours des derniers 10 années.
Entre le 2000 et le 2009 les IDE de l'UE au Mexique IDE ont été de 75,6 milliards
de dollars, ce qui représente le 34% des investissements directs étrangers que le Pays a
reçu au cours de cette période: environ 218 milliards de dollars américains. L'UE est de
fait la seconde source d'investissements directs étrangers au Mexique. Les État membres
de l'UE avec les investissements plus importants sont l'Espagne, 46%, Bas Pays, 31%,
Royaume-Uni, 9,3%, Allemagne, 5%.
Les IDE au Mexique ont enregistré une baisse au cours du 2009 respect par année
précédente (-11,1 milliards de dollars, soit le 51%). Les EUA ont été de toute façon en 2009 le
principal investisseur étranger du Mexique, avec le 49% du totale : 6,1 milliards de dollars.
Commerce UE-Mexique 2005-2009 (Millions €)
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Import
Variation
9.245
10.564
12.113
13.721
9.879
14,3%
14,7%
13,3%
-28,0%
% du total
EU Imp.
0,8%
0,8%
0,8%
0,9%
0,8%
Export
16.837
19.130
20.970
21.934
15.869
Table 1
% du totale
Variation
Balance
UE Exp.
1,6%
7.592
13,6%
1,6%
8.566
9,6%
1,7%
8.857
4,6%
1,7%
8.213
-27,7%
1,5%
5.990
Source des tables 1-5: Eurostat
UE, Importations du Mexique (2009, millions d€)
TOTAL
Machinery and transport equipment
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials
Miscellaneous manufactured articles
Chemicals and related products
Food and live animals
Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material
Commodities and transactions
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels
Beverages and tobacco
Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes
Table 2
Valeur
% du
totale
% du totale
EU Imp.
9.879
4.800
1.473
1.306
584
459
450
284
208
191
9
100,0%
48,6%
14,9%
13,2%
5,9%
4,6%
4,6%
2,9%
2,1%
1,9%
0,1%
0,8%
1,4%
0,5%
0,7%
0,6%
0,7%
0,4%
0,7%
0,5%
4,0%
0,2%
157
UE, Exportations vers le Mexique (2009, millions €)
Table 3
Produits
Value
TOTALE
Machinery and transport equipment
Chemicals and related prod
Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials
Miscellaneous manufactured articles
Food and live animals
Beverages and tobacco
Commodities and transactions
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels
Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes
15.869
6.504
2.828
1.969
1.588
1.423
214
212
189
170
27
% du
totale
100,0%
41,0%
17,8%
12,4%
10,0%
9,0%
1,3%
1,3%
1,2%
1,1%
0,2%
Commerce du Mexique, principaux partner (2009, millions €)
Principaux importateurs
Monde (tous les pays)
178.061
EUA
101.617
EU27
17.448
Table 4
Principaux marchées d‟exportation
Monde (tous les pays)
160.509
57,1% EUA
116.046
72,3%
9,8% Canada
10.425
6,5%
UE27
8.979
5,6%
Commerce du Mexique avec EUA (Millions US$)
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Import.
170.109
198.253
210.714
215.941
176.654
% du totale
UE Imp.
1,5%
1,4%
1,5%
1,4%
2,8%
1,2%
0,5%
1,2%
0,5%
0,7%
1,1%
Variation
16,5%
6,3%
2,5%
-18,2%
Flux des IDE au Mexique (millions US$)
Export.
120.248
133.722
135.918
151.220
128.892
Table 5
Variation
balance
-49.861
11,2%
-64.532
1,6%
-74.796
11,3%
-64.721
-14,8%
-47.762
Source: US Census Bureau
Table 6
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005 2006
2007
2008
2009
Total FDI 18.098 29.774 23.636 16.579 23.811 22.352 19.946 27.440 23.682 12.522
US
12.989 21.363 13.070 9.267 8.659 11.828 12.757 11.689 9.845 6.097
%
72%
72%
55%
56%
36%
53%
64%
43%
42%
49%
EU
3.237 6.467 9.082 6.136 12.613 6.375 6.781 12.182 8.239 4.492
%
18%
22%
38%
37%
53%
29%
34%
44%
35%
36%
Source: US Census Bureau
Conclusions
L‟UE a donné une grande impulsion, tout au cours des quinze dernières années,
aux accords régionaux de caractère multiple : commercial, politique, culturel et de
coopération. Celui avec le Mexique, qui inclue ces caractéristiques, peut être considéré,
come le pionnier de cette vague d‟accords. L‟Accord de partenariat s‟est révélé, dix ans
après son entrée en vigueur, c'est-à-dire au début des années ‟10 du XXI siècle, comme un
choix clairvoyant. En effet, pour son développent, ses ressources naturelles et pour sa
position géographique le Mexique et devenu, un carrefour de la globalisation. Condition
qu‟il a su exploiter de la meilleure façon. Au nord il s‟est lié aux EUA et au Canada avec
le traité ALENA. Au sud le Pays est implique dans plusieurs accord de libre échange avec
158
les pays latino-américaines. Il est lié avec les pays du Pacifique par les accords Apec.
Enfin son atlantisme est complété par les accords avec L‟ UE. Ont peut conclure que, face
a la crise du multilatéralisme, le Mexique, comme l‟UE, a basé sa stratégie géopolitique
sur les accords régionaux.
En effet, la période d'or du multilatéralisme coïncide avec le GATT, sont dernier
grand succès étant les Accords de Marrakech de 1995. Tout de suite, l'échec du Millenium
Round de 1999 et la stagnation des négociations dans le domaine de la Ronde Doha, est
émergé l'incapacité des pays membres de l'OMC à faire fonctionner le système
multilatéral en manière efficace. La crise financière et économique commencé en 2007 a
ajouté des obstacles ultérieurs à la fin de la Ronde Doha.
Le motif essentiel des difficultés se trouve dans la transformation du commerce
international, à partir des années ' 90, à l'égard de la période antérieure, ou bien à la
période d'or du GATT. Une structure traditionnelle du commerce international, qui voyait
les pays industriels du Nord échanger entre leur des mêmes produits manufacturés
(commerce dénommé interindustriel) et, en même temps, importer des produits primaires
des pays du Sud, en les échangeant avec des produits industriels, on est trouvé en face de
la globalisation. La ligne entre les pays avancés et les pays en développement est moins
marquée que dans la période du GATT. L'agriculture est dépêche (partie) de négociés
globaux et de l'Afrique et l'Amérique Latine ne sont plus disposés à tolérer le
protectionnisme agricole de l'Europe, des États-Unis et du Japon.
Enfin les services et la propriété intellectuelle deviennent plus importants du
commerce international des produits manufacturés. Ceux-ci sont les nouveaux aspects du
commerce international qui rendent les négociations multilatérales plus problématiques. Si le
multilatéralisme a été la force la plus puissante qui explique les progressions du commerce
international dans la période d'or, le régionalisme joue un rôle autant important aujourd‟hui.
En effet e régionalisme permet d'atteindre un degré d'intégration indubitablement
plus élevé que le multilatéralisme. Le multilatéralisme est nécessairement limité à
produire des bénéfices dans la libéralisation commerciale et en particulier dans la
libéralisation des produits manufacturés, alors que le régionalisme peut arriver à
l'intégration commerciale complète (le marché unique européen) et aussi aller plus loin, en
impliquant à d'autres secteurs, comme la coopération, la culture, la lutte au trafic de
stupéfiants et le dialogue politique.
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future impact on the development of the multilateral system of international trade. The issue has been
analysed taking into account the experiences of Pax Britannica and Pax Americana. The authors
come to the conclusion that the polycentric world economic order does not favour the strengthening
of a global trade system, which results in the inadequacy of international trade policy towards the
global dimension of market mechanism. The two main centres of the world economy (the US and the
EU) have different strategies of trade liberalisation. The United States prefer liberalisation in
bilateral and regional agreements. They develop trade and investment links with the developing
countries that are interested in access to the US market. This is also the strategy that enable control
over the global trade relations. In the situation when the EU does not have the majority in WTO and
bilateral agreements are the prevailing trend in trade policy of many countries, the EU position in
international trade and its impact on global trade relations depend on the competitive advantage. The
potential possibilities of the large EU internal market, as a lever by means of which benefits from
globalisation may be achieved, have not been used so far.
Keywords: EU trade, competitiveness, trade policy, global trade system, US strategy of
trade liberalisation
1. Introduction
The traditional approach to economic frontiers in the conditions of intensive
globalisation of economic phenomena and processes is hardly useful. Geographic frontiers
of countries no longer define the spatial dimension of their economic activity. Development
processes are intensified by cross-border transfers of goods, services and production factors.
Internationalisation of economic activity, specialisation and increased economic openness of
countries have contributed to the creation of the global economic space.
Interdependence and significance of interactions between the global market
participants are on the rise and the market role as a mechanism shaping conditions of
business activity development has grown substantially. Domestic markets, as segments of
the global market, affect demand, supply and prices according to their potential. The
global dimension of market mechanism and increased economic interdependence result in
reduced effectiveness of national economic policy instruments, including also the
realisation of its aims arising from the plans of development of economic relationships
with foreign countries. In the conditions of growing competition in the global market
states and regional blocks support competitiveness of their economic entities. And this is
the purpose of the Lisbon Strategy as well.
Globalisation and fundamental changes in the conditions of the functioning of
enterprises and other market participants cause the building of the global economy‟s
multinational system to become more and more important so that it could serve the better
allocation of production factors, gaining larger scale effects of production, dissemination
of technology and reducing economic disparities between countries and the world‟s
regions (Mucha-Leszko, Kąkol, 2009: 21). Consequently, the importance of cooperation
and international policy is growing. This is a condition for limiting conflicts resulting
from different aims of countries‟ economic policies and from increased competition in the
161
global market. The greatest influence on the principles of the economy‟s functioning in a
global scale is exerted by major participants of international economic relations with the
biggest share in the world‟s GDP, international trade, capital transfers and possessing
competitive advantage.
The foundations of the global economy were created by the United Kingdom,
which was the world‟s main economic centre in the 19th century and lost its leadership
after World War I when the economic potential and competitive advantage of the United
States increased. Yet they did not decide to fulfil leadership functions during the interwar
period, which contributed among others to the disintegration of international economic
relations and a decline in trade.
The strengthening of the United States‟ economic position, especially during
World War II and directly after its ending, allowed them to build the Pax Americana – a
multilateral economic order. High economic growth in Japan and in Western Europe as
well as the creation of the European Economic Community and the attainment of more
and more advanced stages in integration of the member countries‟ economies led to the
changes in the positions of the major world powers and the rise of the world economic
triad. The feature of this system is the great advantage of the US and the EU over Japan as
regards the economic potential. Trade and investment links within the triad are also
characterised by asymmetry. The most important, from the point of view of bilateral
relations but also from the global perspective, are economic transfers between the US and
the EU. Japan is much more tied to the United States‟ market than to the one of the
European Union. An important phenomenon that shapes new economic interdependencies
in Asia in the global dimension is the growing significance of China as a new dynamic
centre of the world economy.
Changes in the positions of major economic powers always had and still have
substantial influence on the development of international cooperation and the principles of the
functioning of the world economy. If there is one main world centre with distinct competitive
advantage then it aims at building a global economic system. By contrast, polycentrism and
rivalry between the major world powers leads to regionalisation of the world economy.
Since the 1970s the European Economic Community, owing to integration of the
member countries‟ markets and consecutive enlargements, has become a more and more
important entity of international economic relations and an assertive participant in
international trade negotiations. Currently the European Union is a centre of the world
economy possessing a potential comparable with the United States and it has even gained
the leading position in some sectors of the economy. The EU has got a greater share than
the US in the global output, exports of goods, exports and imports of services and it is the
world‟s leading development aid provider. While the EU has gained an advantage
regarding a share in the world‟s market of goods and services the United States still
remain the main centre on the international financial market. They impact the situation on
international capital market as well as money and currency markets through the potential
of their own financial market and the dollar‟s strong position as a world currency. The
dollar has a considerable advantage over the euro in transactions on the international
financial market in all regions except Europe. The dollar is the main reserve currency with
a share of above 60 percent in the currency reserves held by central banks while the euro
position has not been changed for years. The euro share in central banks‟ reserves was
rising up to 2002, in 2004-2005 it declined and then increased and stabilized at the level of
26.5-27.0%. Nevertheless, we should take into consideration the dollar exchange rates
fluctuations, the depreciation of the dollar automatically increases, as it were, the euro
share in currency reserves.
162
In the assessment of an economic position, apart from quantitative measures one
also applies qualitative measures characterizing the economy‟s effectiveness and its
technological and competitive advantage. In the appraisal by qualitative criteria the United
States come out definitely better than the European Union.
Taking into account the possibilities of the world‟s main economic centres to affect
the external environment as a consequence of their economic and market potential, position
in international trade and transfers of capital, the conclusion arises that the European Union,
being the greatest participant in international trade, also has the largest possibilities of
influencing the global trade relations and trade principles. Working on that assumption, the
authors adopt as the purpose of their study the evaluation of the European Union‟s previous
and future impact on the process of introducing the multilateral system of international
trade. The issue has been analysed taking into account the experiences of Pax Britannica and
Pax Americana. The subject of assessment is the growing significance of EEC/EU share in
international trade and of its activity as an entity of international trade policy.
The authors will try to give answers to the following questions:
1) Has the European Union gained an influence on the principles of functioning of the
world economy proportionally to the increase in its economic and market potential?
2) Is the EU, with its greatest share in international trade, able to bring about
strengthening of multilateral trade system?
3) What are the main difficulties in the implementation of aims of the EU external
trade policy?
2. The configuration of economic powers and its influence on the functioning
of the world economy and the framework of international trade
The dynamics of economic processes and structural changes are mainly influenced
by technological progress, economic growth and the configuration of economic powers
being shaped by the rising impact on economic and political relations of one or a few
centres that have gained a large share in the global output, trade and investments as well
as technical and competitive advantage. It is the main centre or centres that have a
decisive impact on the international economic order, that is the principles of functioning
of the world economy, especially on international trade policy, competition policy,
liberalisation of capital and labour flows and international currency policy. It is up to the
leading entity or entities of the world economy to decide upon the basis of international
economic relations – whether it should be bilateral, regional or multilateral agreements.
Together with changes in the configuration of economic powers the aims and
principles of foreign economic policy, the attitude towards international cooperation and
at the same time the conditions of conducting cross-border activity were also altering. A
thesis can be advanced that liberalisation of economic flows in the global dimension is
much faster in the conditions of economic dominance of one centre that has obtained a
competitive advantage as a result of higher labour productivity. The basis of such an
advantage is technological leadership. To substantiate this thesis one can give examples of
economic orders – Pax Britannica and Pax Americana.
Dominance of the United Kingdom lasted until 1880 when its share in the world
manufacturing output still amounted to 22.9%, of the United States 14.7%, Germany 8.5%
and France 7.8% (Kennedy, 1990: 259). In 1900 the United States were already absolutely
the first industrial power with a share of 23.6% in the world manufacturing output and the
share of the United Kingdom dropped to 18.5% (Kennedy, 1990: 259). The foundation for
the strong economic position of the United Kingdom was exports of goods and capital and
the effect of the Pax Britannica period was the development of global economic links in the
163
conditions of liberalisation of trade, capital and labour flows and exchange rates stability.
Thus in the 19th century the open and stable global economic system came into being.
Technological progress and manufacturing development (2nd wave of
industrialisation) brought about changes in the potentials and positions of economic
powers. Already in 1913 the United States‟ share in the world manufacturing output
enlarged to 32%, of Germany to 14.8% and the one of the United Kingdom decreased to
13.4% (Lake, 1995: 125). The lessening share of the United Kingdom in trade also proved
the decline in its importance in the global economy. While in 1870 this share in the world
trade amounted to 24% it dropped to around 15% before World War I (Lake, 1995: 125).
After World War I, in spite of the growing economic advantage of the United States, the
United Kingdom was still striving for restoration of the global economic system based on
mutual openness of its participants. The economic leadership of the United Kingdom in
the 19th century was not founded on a big internal market but on the control over an open
global system of trade relations, and rising protectionism after World War I constituted a
serious obstacle to the development of the country. In 1877-1885 the trade share in the UK
GDP was 49% and in 1909-1913 it increased up to 52% (Lake, 1995: 125).
The United States, having gained the position of the leading centre of the world
economy in the interwar period, not only did not decide to apply liberal economic principles
and to continue the United Kingdom‟s policy but themselves contributed to the growth in
protectionism and the collapse of international trade (at the beginning of the 1930s).
The policy of economic openness and creation of the global trade system were
important elements of Pax Americana (economic order). The United States initiated and
brought about the adoption of the formal institutional principles of the functioning of the
world economy. At the conference in Bretton Woods (1944) the multilateral principles of
international settlements were established and the three newly founded international
organizations were recognized as the main pillars of Pax Americana. They were to ensure
elimination of barriers and an increase in international trade as well as economic growth
and also a rise in employment and incomes (James, 1996: 27).
According to the Bretton Woods Agreement the International Monetary Fund, the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Trade
Organization were to be created. The first two organizations started their activity after
ratification of the Bretton Woods Agreement. The International Trade Organization did
not come into existence because the US Congress rejected the Havana Charter, which was
supposed to be its formal framework.
Nevertheless, the US authorities did not leave the issue of elimination of barriers
in international trade without a formal solution. In 1947 the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) was signed, which provided a possibility of multilateralisation of the
principles of international trade until the establishment of the World Trade Organization in
1995. Trade liberalisation in the global dimension ensured the United States‟ export
expansion and the limitation of potential activities of the United Kingdom and France
aiming at strengthening their trade relations in colonial systems and at greater trade
regionalisation (Oatley, 2008: 31-32).
Configuration of economic powers started to change in the 1960s. as a result of
high economic dynamics in Japan and in Western Europe and especially because of
decreasing technological and competitive advantage of the US. The establishment of the
European Economic Community (1958), creation of the customs union (1968) and
adoption of the common external tariff based on the arithmetic average of the six member
countries without considering the size of good flows and the size of member countries‟
markets contributed to the deterioration in trade conditions of the third countries,
164
including the United States. Out of the EEC countries the biggest competitor to the US
was the Federal Republic of Germany. On the markets for high-technology manufactured
goods (including the US market) the Japanese enterprises effectively gained an advantage.
The FRG‟s share in the world exports increased from 5.2% in 1953 to 11.6% in 1973
(WTO, 2009: 10). In the same years Japan‟s share in the world exports rose from 1.5% to
6.4% (WTO, 2009: 10)
The economic position of Western Europe (including EEC) and Japan was growing
stronger also in consequence of the general deterioration in economic situation of the
United States from the second half of the 1960s. This was the result of many factors, the
most important being (Agnew, 1987: 137):
1) a decrease in labour productivity growth,
2) a decline in competitive advantage,
3) reduced trade competitiveness, which, in the conditions of growing economic
openness, resulted in US enterprises losing to foreign competitors in their own market,
4) rising costs of the Vietnam war,
5) inflation and supporting the dollar‟s value decreased price competitiveness.
Despite the decrease in US economic dominance and the emergence of the
configuration of three economic centres the United States retained control over the global
trade system in 1947-1972. The European Economic Community did not yet represent at
the time such economic power as to be able to manage GATT together with the US (Levy,
2006: 342). However, the decline in economic dominance of the US was highly visible. In
1948 the US GDP amounted to around 65% of the total GDP of GATT members and the
combined US-UK GDP accounted for about 75% of total (Levy, 2006: 345). In 1970 the
US GDP represented 46% of the GATT total and the European Economic Community
GDP 14% of this value (Levy, 2006: 345). However, it should be emphasised that during
the 6th Round of GATT negotiations (Kennedy Round 1964-1967) it came to a test of
strength between the US and the EEC. Aiming at limiting the effects of trade integration
(growth of mutual trade) in the EEC, the United States wanted to conduct a great
reduction of tariffs on manufactured products and achieved their target only in part
(Tsoukalis, 1997: 16-17).
During the Pax Americana period the main factors contributing to the development
of international trade were: a decrease in transport costs, a reduction of tariffs, the stability
of prices and a low exchange rate risk, which was ensured by the Bretton Woods monetary
system. The suspension of the convertibility of dollars into gold on 15 August 1971 and
transition to floating exchange rates (1973) was recognized as a fundamental infringement
of the rules of Pax Americana. Moreover, the economic position of the EEC was
reinforced in Europe and in the world economy due to the North enlargement. The
accession to the EEC of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark influenced the rise in
the EEC share in GATT GDP to about 25% (Levy, 2006: 346). There was an increase in
the negotiation power of the group of countries that the United States had to take into
account, the evidence of which was the course of negotiations during the Tokyo Round of
GATT (1973-1979).
The US competitive advantage in international trade declined in the period when
trade turnover was rising dynamically (1965-1970). The fall of Pax Americana and the
strengthening of the economic position of the EEC and Japan weakened the US impact on
the global economic relations. Formally the US continued their support for trade
liberalisation but in practice they contributed to the return of protectionism because in the
1970s they were conducting a policy of restricting import. For this purpose they
165
introduced a new regulation - the Trade Act of 1974 - and in 1973-1978 they were
conducting a policy of dollar depreciation in order to increase export competitiveness.
Such a fundamental change in the configuration of economic powers and the
weakening of technological leadership and competitive advantage of the US made them
lose interest in trade liberalisation and especially in the development of international trade
policy. Up to the 1970s they consistently hampered the development of regional
integration in Latin America and Asia.
The strengthening of the triad economic powers took place in the 1980s. After
stagnation in the market integration process (in the 1970s), the European Economic
Community regained its capacity for effective cooperation and took up two challenges –
the South enlargement and the Single European Market Programme. The introduction of
SEM was supposed to contribute not only to reaching significant progress in liberalisation
of goods, services, capital and labour flows but first of all to the elimination of physical an
technical barriers. An increase in the significance of the EEC and of its internal market
resulted in the other European countries being much more interested in the EC
membership. There were also intensified tendencies towards the creation of regional trade
blocks in other parts of the world.
The situation in US foreign trade started to deteriorate at the end of the 1970s
although their trade deficit in 1979-1982 did not exceed 40 billion dollars. During three
consecutive years it increased to 122.2 billion dollars (1985) (Destler, 2005: 46). In 19821985 the US exports were lower than in 1981. There was a great decline in the price
competitiveness of exports, which was the result of the Fed‟s monetary policy (under P.A.
Volker‟s direction) aiming at lowering inflation. The growth in interest rate, inflow of
foreign capital and increased demand for dollars contributed to the appreciation of the US
currency and to the rise in export prices. In order to improve their position in international
trade the United States sought to lower the dollar‟s value and accelerate multilateral trade
liberalisation. Therefore, it was the US, not the EEC, that initiated trade negotiations at the
GATT forum and as a result of eight-year conflicts and compromises an agreement was
reached that allowed the execution of the greatest changes in international trade policy
since the GATT came into force (1948).
In the mid-1980s the United States were also interested in currency cooperation
with the FRG, Japan, France and the UK in order to agree on exchange rates adjustments
in the situations of large appreciation or depreciation of currencies on the market. The US
initiative and the meeting of finance ministers of the five countries were finalized by
signing the Plaza Accord (1985) and by the depreciation of the dollar‟s value against the
yen and Deutsche mark by 10%-12% through selling 18 billion dollars on the currency
market (Oatley, 2008: 251). Finally the dollar depreciated at the beginning of 1987 by
40% in relation to its highest value reached in the spring of 1985 (Oatley, 2008: 251).
The Plaza Accord (1985) was supposed to be the beginning of currency
cooperation leading to (Oatley, 2008: 251; Mucha-Leszko, Kąkol, 2010: 445 ): 1) the
creation of currency area and permanent exchange rate adjustments with permissible
fluctuations of +/- 10% on the currency market, 2) the coordination of macroeconomic
policy to regulate current account balances of the US, the FRG and Japan. The United
States tried to convince the FRG and Japan to conduct a fiscal policy directed towards
increasing demand and imports. At the same time the US themselves intended to attain a
greater economic balance by implementing a more restrictive fiscal policy. These plans
were not carried out.
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3. The contemporary development of international trade policy
The most important goal of the foreign economic policy of the US and other
countries is to create favourable conditions for the development of exports. The new
strategy in the US trade policy was adopted at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s. It was an
attempt to achieve two objectives: 1) the development of regional trade agreements, 2) the
effective conclusion of the GATT Uruguay Round. On the one hand the Bill Clinton
administration tried to reinforce the global system of free trade based on multilateral
cooperation and on the other hand it worked for the expansion of free trade areas with the
countries of both Americas and Asia.
An important area of US foreign trade policy at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s
was cooperation with the EEC/EU. It was initiated with the signing of the Transatlantic
Card in 1990. However, the subsequent programmes undertaken for building the
multilateral system of international trade and deepening bilateral cooperation
(Transatlantic Free Trade Area) did not bring the expected results.
In 1986-1994 the rivalry within the Triad was exacerbated and both the US and
the EEC/EU conducted a policy of market enlargement, thus building more solid bases of
their economies. The European integration process became more dynamic owing to the
introduction of the Single European Market and the admission of new member countries
strengthened the economic power of the group. Meanwhile the United States created a free
trade area with Canada and Mexico. From the 1990-1993 crisis the rate of Japan‟s
economic growth decreased and cooperation between the US and the EU had an
increasingly great impact on the development of international economic policy. This could
be seen among others in shaping the principles of trade policy. The European Union
explicitly maintained its stance on developing the multilateral trade system while the
United States preferred regional and bilateral agreements.
The last success of international trade policy was the effective conclusion of the
GATT Uruguay Round and the creation of the World Trade Organization. However, from
the end of the 1990s the multilateral trade policy has not been developing in accordance
with the assumptions made during the Uruguay Round and the aims contained in the Doha
Agenda (2001). What impact on the EU trade does the break in negotiations at the WTO
forum have? The EU as a participant in international trade with a share of over 37% in the
world exports of goods is the most interested in progress towards trade liberalisation as a
result of multinational cooperation initiated, organized and supervised by WTO. If
liberalisation on a global scale is not continued then there is growing interest in creating
the regional, sub-regional and bilateral trade agreements.
What influence can trade regionalisation have on the development of the world
trade? The views on that matter are divided. From a theoretical point of view the creation
of free trade areas or customs unions means preferential conditions of trade only for the
countries of a given area, while the countries outside these agreements have a more
difficult access to markets, thereby being discriminated to a certain extent.
An appraisal of the impact of regional liberalisation on an increase in trade on a
global scale is difficult because it is one of many factors that influence a rise or decline in
trade. And the benefits of a group of countries are the greater, the greater is the market and a
growth in mutual trade. These are mainly the scale effects of production, the benefits from
an increase in competition and the pro-growth benefits (employment, GDP). The European
Union is the biggest market and the largest exporter of goods and services. Charters 1 and 2
illustrate the EU position in the world trade as well as that of its main competitors.
167
Chart 1. Shares of the European Union, the United States, Japan and China in the world
exports of goods in 1995-2009 in %
Note: EU-15 in 1995-2003; EU-25 in 2004-2006; EU-27 in 2007-2009.
Source: World Trade Organization, Statistics database, Time Series on international trade,
http://stat.wto.org/Home/WSDBHome.aspx
Chart 2. Shares of the European Union, the United States, Japan and China in the world
exports of services in 1995-2009 in %
Source: World Trade Organization, Statistics database, Time Series on international
trade, http://stat.wto.org/Home/WSDBHome.aspx
168
Returning to the question about the importance of a multilateral trade policy for
the European Union it should be stressed that despite signing many preferential trade
agreements around 75% of its imports is still realised on non-preferential rules (Evenett,
2007: 62). The high economic openness of the EU causes changes in demand on the
foreign markets to influence the rate of GDP growth.
The polycentric world economic order does not favour the development of a
global trade system. Economic interests of the United States and the European Union are
divergent. Rivalry prevails over cooperation. The two main centres of the world economy
have different strategies of trade liberalisation. The trade policies of countries aim first of
all at facilitating expansion of their economic entities into external markets. From the EU
perspective the best solution is to transfer the competence to conduct a trade policy to
WTO, and to settle, at the international level, the primary problems resulting from
breaking the principles of free trade by participants in the global market.
The reason for weakening trade liberalisation is the dispute in a group of the
developed countries concerning the reform of trade policy, and especially elimination of
those instruments that are not in accordance with the principles of free competition. Also,
an international competition policy promoted by the European Union becomes more and
more desired. The multilateral rules of competition would ensure the effective control of
the global market structure and the protection of free trade. An increase in the number of
mergers and acquisitions and of cartels on international scale that lead to the strengthening
of the position of multinational corporations in markets constitutes a threat to smaller
market participants. Unlike the European Union the United States have their own strategy
through which they strive to reinforce their position in the global trade relations. This is a
strategy of creating sub-regional and bilateral free trade areas. The US are interested in
covering by bilateral agreements especially small countries with high trade openness from
the regions of Asia and Central and South America. Due to the bilateral agreements the
United States gain an influence on the developing countries that constitute the majority in
WTO, they bind them gradually but stronger and stronger by trade and investments to
their own economy. The developing countries are interested in the preferential access to
markets of the developed countries, they enter eagerly into free trade areas and with this
possibility they do not support the multilateral trade system.
To sum up: by means of bilateral agreements the United States strive to realize the
following aims: 1) obtain an easier access to the foreign markets and ensure their
companies a greater space for economic expansion, 2) gain a larger impact on
international trade policy through the creation of a coalition supporting the initiatives and
the position of the US, 3) get a stronger control over the global economic and political
relations and achieve a wider influence on them.
Not only does the European Union not have the majority in WTO but it is even
not supported by Japan in its striving to develop an open global trade system. Like many
other countries Japan concentrates in its trade policy on signing bilateral agreements. Will
the European Union, when the United States build their own system of trade links and the
developing countries are not interested in trade liberalisation on multilateral principles, be
able to find allies in WTO in order that such a model of international trade policy will not
be marginalized? An important condition for retaining influence on the principles of the
functioning of trade is the trade position including above all the technological and
competitive advantage. This issue is the subject of the following analysis.
169
4. The EU position and competitiveness in international trade in 1995-2009
In Table 1 we present data illustrating the development of exports and imports and
trade balance of the United States and the European Union in 1995-2009. The economic
situation in that period changed and the most favourable time for the development of
international trade was 1995-2000 and 2004-2007. Recessions appeared in 2001-2003 and
2008-2009. The world exports of goods were rising dynamically from 1994 to 2000
(9.3%, 7.4%, 5.1%, 10.1%, 4.6%, 4.6%, 10.8%) (WTO, 2009: 174). Against the
background of the high rate of growth in the world exports of goods the EU exports hardly
developed and in 1997 even declined compared with the previous year by 0.6% whereas
the world exports increased by 10.1%. The United States achieved much better outcomes
as the rate of growth in exports of goods was in principle comparable (except 1998) to the
rate of growth in the world exports. These were the years of intensive development of ICT
technologies and the high rate of growth in labour productivity in the US. At the same
time new jobs were created in the EU at the cost of technical equipment and labour
productivity. In 1995-2000 the average growth rate of labour productivity accounted for
2% in the US and 1.4% in the EU. 1 It was an important factor reducing the
competitiveness of the EU exports.
Value and dynamics of exports and imports and trade balance of the United States and the
European Union (intra + extra) in 1995-2009 in billion dollars in current prices and in %
Table 1.
Years
United States
European Union
Export Import Trade
Export Import Trade
Exports Imports
Exports Imports
dynamics dynamics balance
dynamics dynamics balance
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
584.7
625.1
689.2
682.1
695.8
781.9
729.1
693.1
724.8
814.9
901.1
1026.0
1148.2
1287.4
1056.9
770.9
822.0
899.0
944.4
1059.4
1259.3
1179.2
1200.2
1303.1
1525.7
1732.7
1918.1
2020.4
2169.5
1603.8
6.9
10.3
-1.0
2.0
12.4
-6.8
-4.9
4.6
12.4
10.6
13.9
11.9
12.1
-17.9
6.6
9.4
5.1
12.2
18.9
-6.4
1.8
8.6
17.1
13.6
10.7
5.3
7.4
-26.1
-186.1
-197.0
-209.8
-262.2
-363.6
-477.4
-450.1
-507.1
-578.3
-710.8
-831.6
-892.1
-872.2
-882.0
-546.9
2083.7
2154.9
2140.9
2233.6
2237.5
2316.3
2319.5
2465.7
2926.5
3729.0
4026.2
4544.0
5338.7
5899.9
4567.1
2050.9
2101.3
2089.6
2212.0
2262.5
2404.8
2361.8
2462.4
2946.5
3807.4
4165.7
4759.9
5602.6
6280.0
4714.2
3.4
-0.6
4.3
0.2
3.5
0.1
6.3
18.7
27.4
8.0
12.9
17.5
10.5
-22.6
2.5
-0.6
5.9
2.3
6.3
-1.8
4.3
19.7
29.2
9.4
14.3
17.7
12.1
-24.9
32.8
53.6
51.3
21.6
-25.0
-88.6
-42.3
3.3
-20.1
-78.4
139.5
215.9
264.0
380.1
147.1
Source: World Trade Organization, Statistics database, Time Series on international
trade, http://stat.wto.org/Home/WSDBHome.aspx
1
According to GDP per hour worked. André Sapir and others, An Agenda for a Growing Europe.
The Sapir Report, Oxford University Press 2004, p. 32.
170
During the recession at the beginning of the new century losses in exports were
incurred first of all by the United States. Exports of goods decreased by 6.8% in 2001 and
by 4.9% in 2002. The European Union obtained better outcomes, exports rose in 2002 by
6.3% and until 2009 (except 2005) the EU had comparable dynamics of exports to the US
or even higher. The EU trade balance deteriorated from 2004 (there was an increase in
deficit) although the deficit was not high if we accept as a reference value the size of the
US deficit, the shares of the US and EU in the world trade and primarily the relation of the
deficit to the GDP. In 2008 it accounted for 1% of GDP in the EU while in the US it
exceeded 5% of GDP. However, it should be emphasised that in the case of the US the
trade deficit was increasing rapidly from 1999 to 2006 and in the consecutive years it
stabilized at a somewhat lower level than in 2006 (892 bln dollars).
The trade deficits of the US and the EU decreased visibly in 2009 as a result of a
much greater decrease in the value of imports in comparison with exports, especially in
the United States, when international trade collapsed in the last quarter of 2008. In the
period from September 2008 to March 2009 trade of goods declined by 16% (in the real
values) to the level of the year 2005 and the decrease in trade in the nominal terms
amounted to 23% (di Mauro, Forster and Lima, 2010: 8).
The rise in the EU trade deficit in 2004-2008 was closely connected with the
growth in oil prices and imports from the Asian countries, mainly from China.
Nevertheless, the overall outcome of the external EU trade is shaped by exports and
imports of member countries. Some of them gain trade surplus and others have a balance
problem. In 2008 Germany, Sweden and Ireland had the largest surplus in trade of goods
and the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Spain the greatest deficit.
The trade balance is determined not only by the level of exports but also by their
geographical and product structure. Possibilities to enlarge exports depend directly on the
level and structure of demand in the foreign markets. If exports are concentrated in the
dynamically developing world regions then the prospects of export growth are greater and
the decrease in competitive advantage affects the reduction of its quantity to a lesser
extent. During the crisis of 2008-2009 the largest losses on account of the decrease in
demand in foreign markets were suffered by those of the EU countries that were the most
open regarding trade and had the biggest trade surpluses. A greater decline in demand
took place on the investment market and a smaller for the consumption products.
Specialization in investment products caused a larger decrease in exports in Germany, the
Netherlands, Finland and Austria.
The trade balance is also influenced by the product structure of trade. In the EU
exports the manufactured products prevail (around 83% of the total exports of goods in
2008). Within this group the biggest share in exports goes to machines and means of
transport as well as chemical products. In the group of manufactured products the EU
achieves a large trade surplus. The level of deficit also depends on the quantity of imports
and the prices of energy raw materials and fuels. The fuel share in extra EU-27 imports
increased in 1999-2008 from 11.3% to 28.6% (Mucha-Leszko, Kąkol, 2009: 36).
In the EU exports medium technology products predominate. This is an adverse
phenomenon as regards the possibilities to increase exports because the highest rate of
growth in demand characterizes high-tech products such as electronic equipment,
including consumption electronics, scientific equipment and pharmaceuticals.
Evaluating the technological advancement of the European Union‟s export
specialization one can indicate that in the segment of high technology products these are
mainly the products of the pharmaceutical industry. According to the analyses of the
European Commission the EU position in international trade is characterized by the
171
competitive advantage in the sectors of medium-high and medium-low technologies while
in the field of high technologies it occupies the third place after the United States and
Southern and Eastern Asia (without China) (European Commission, 2005: 80).
In the next analysis of the Commission published in 2009 and covering the years
1999-2006 the shares of low, medium and high technology products in the total exports of
manufactured products by the old and the new member countries were presented. The share of
low technology products in the total exports of manufactured products in 1999 amounted to
31% in the new member countries and 22% in the old ones (UE-15), and in 2006 in the first
group of countries it decreased to 21% and in the second group to 18% (European
Commission, 2009: 68). The medium technology products were presented according to the
division into: medium-low technology products and medium-high technology products. In the
case of the first subgroup the share in exports of the new member countries rose from 21% to
22% and of the EU-15 from 17% to 19% (European Commission, 2009: 68). The positive
change characterized the second subgroup, in which the growth in share was as follows: of the
new member countries from 37% to 42% and of the old ones from 43% to 46% (European
Commission, 2009: 68). By contrast, in the group of high technology products the share of the
new member countries increased from 11% to 14% and of the EU-15 declined from 18% to
16% (European Commission, 2009: 68).
However, if we apply the division into two groups: 1) low and medium-low
technology products, 2) medium-high and high technology products, then the share of
manufactured products of the first group in the total exports of this sector in 2006
accounted for: 43% in the new member countries and 37% in the old member countries.
The share of products of the second group was 57% and 62% respectively. The results of
the Commission‟s analysis confirm that the EU is the world leader in exports of medium
technology products with a predominance of medium-high technology products. The new
member countries represent a similar level in this respect (the technological gap is small).
F. di Mauro, K. Forster and A. Lima estimated the average indexes of revealed
comparative advantage according to the level of product technological advancement and the
input of production factors in the euro area and selected countries for the years 1993-2008.
Especially interesting is the comparison of the revealed comparative advantage indexes by the
criterion of technological advancement of products. They were presented in Table 2.
Average indexes of revealed comparative advantage according to the level of product
technological advancement in the euro area, the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom
and China in 1993-2004 and 2005-2008
Table 2
Type of products
1993-2004
High-tech products
Medium-high-tech products
Low-tech products
2005-2008
High-tech products
Medium-high-tech products
Medium-low-tech products
Low-tech products
euro area
US
China
Japan
UK
0.9
1.2
0.9
1.4
1.1
0.8
1.0
0.6
1.6
x
x
x
x
x
x
0.9
1.2
0.8
0.9
1.3
1.1
0.8
0.8
1.5
0.7
0.6
1.2
1.0
1.5
0.9
0.4
1.2
1.0
0.7
0.9
Source: European Central Bank, „Monthly Bulletin”, January 2008, s. 77 and Filippo di Mauro,
Katrin Forster and Ana Lima, The Global, op. cit, p. 20.
172
It follows from the numerical data in Tables 1 and 2 that the revealed comparative
advantage indexes in the euro area in the years 2005-2008 did not change compared to the
period 1993-2004. The export specialization of the euro area is still medium-high-tech
products. Much more beneficial export specialization indexes were those for the United
Kingdom (specialization in high-tech and medium-high-tech products). However, the
highest export specialization index (1.5) of China in high-tech products does not mean that
this country is the technological leader. It is a result of foreign direct investments.
Chart 3. Shares in the world exports of the euro area, the United States, the United
Kingdom, Japan and China in 1999-2009
Notes: Real export market share corresponds to the volume of exports divided by a
country-specific weighted average of the import volumes of major trading partners.
The most recent observation refers to 2009. Calculations based on IMF, ECB and
Eurostat data.
Source: Filippo di Mauro, Katrin Forster and Ana Lima, 2010, p. 18, Chart 11.
The indexes of revealed comparative advantage according to the input of
production factors indicate three export specializations in the euro area: in capitalintensive, science-intensive and labour-intensive products (like the United Kingdom).
Japan has a large comparative advantage in capital-intensive and science-intensive
173
products, and the United States mainly in science-intensive products. The highest index of
comparative advantage in exports of labour-intensive products (2.3) in 2005-2008
characterized China (di Mauro, Forster and Lima, 2010: 20). An interesting phenomenon
is China‟s high index of export specialization (comparable with the euro area) in the field
of science-intensive products. It is a result of outsourcing by foreign enterprises to China
of labour-intensive production occurring in the technological process of science-intensive
final products (di Mauro, Forster and Lima, 2010: 20).
Globalisation and an increase in competition caused the countries with low
production costs, and especially China, to strengthen their position in trade of goods. It
appears from the analysis that this country has the greatest comparative advantage in
exports of labour-intensive products. Such an export specialization constitutes a serious
challenge to some of the new EU member countries but also to these euro area countries
that have a comparable export specialization to China like Greece, Portugal and Italy (di
Mauro, Forster and Lima, 2010: 20).
What the effects of competition in trade of goods are, is best reflected in the
changes of the share in the world exports. It appears from Chart 3 that in 1999-2009 the
largest growth of the share in the world exports was achieved by China and the greatest
decline in the share took place in the euro area.
5. Labour productivity and ICT technologies
The decrease in the world export share of a country or a group of countries under
the conditions of high economic openness limits the possibilities of economic growth to a
great extent. An improvement of the competitive position and regaining a share in foreign
markets in the long term can take place as a result of the growth in labour productivity and
specialization in production. In the short term competitiveness is affected by the prices of
production factors and exchange rates.
The rate of growth in labour productivity in the EEC/EU countries remained at a
higher level than in the US until the mid-1990s and also the difference in labour
productivity levels between the EEC/EU and the US was decreasing. In the first half of the
1990s labour productivity in the US and the EU was comparable (Gomez-Salvador,
Musso, Stocker and Turunen, 2006: 12). A significant change in this respect took place
from the mid-1990s. The higher rate of growth in labour productivity in the US in
comparison with the EU-15 and the euro area continued in 1996-2005. That unfavourable
trend (for the EU) reversed only in 2006 when the rate of growth in labour productivity in
the US declined to 0.8% (compared to 2005) and in the EU-15 it increased to 1.5% (in the
euro area 1.4%). However, already in 2007 the indexes of labour productivity growth in
the EU-15 and in the euro area went down to 1.0%, i.e. they were minimally higher than
in the US (0.8%).
With the outbreak of the financial and economic crisis the rate of growth in labour
productivity in the US declined only in 2008 by 0.4 percentage points, in 2009 it increased
to 1.1% and in 2010 it is projected to achieve 3.2%, whereas in the European Union and
the euro area there were considerable changes in this regard: the indexes of labour
productivity growth fell to negative values in 2008-2009. The detailed data on the growth
in labour productivity expressed as GDP per employee in the US, the EU, Japan and
China in 1995-2010 are contained in Table 3.
174
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
World
US
EU-27
EU-15
Table 3
1995
Annual rates of growth in labour productivity (as GDP per person employed)
2.4
1.0
2.7
1.8
1.6
2.2
1.5
1.2
2.2
2.1
2.1
1.7
0.6
2.7
1.7
1.2
2.0
3.1
2.3
1.2
3.1
2.6
2.4
1.7
0.9
1.0
1.2
0.5
1.6
2.1
1.5
0.5
2.4
1.7
1.2
0.7
3.0
2.4
2.0
1.5
2.7
1.3
1.2
0.9
3.1
0.8
1.7
1.5
3.4
0.8
1.3
1.0
1.3
0.4
-0.1
-0.3
-1.3
1.1
-2.5
-2.5
3.0
3.2
2.4
1.9
Euro area 1.8 1.1 1.8 1.0 1.1 1.5 0.4 0.3 0.4 1.4 0.8 1.4 1.0 -0.2 -2.3 2.0
Japan
1.7 2.2 0.9 -0.9 1.2 3.4 0.9 1.8 1.7 2.5 1.5 1.6 2.0 -0.8 -3.9 3.0
China
13.1 0.9 3.9 -0.9 5.2 7.6 9.0 10.6 13.1 8.6 9.0 10.2 11.5 8.5 8.0 8.2
Source: The Conference Board Total Economy Database, September 2010, http://www.conferenceboard.org/data/economydatabase/
A more reliable measure of labour productivity growth than GDP per employee is
GDP per hour worked, because the length of work time varies in different countries. For
example in 2006 the average time of work per employee in France amounted to 1540
hours, in the UK 1670 hours, in the US 1710 hours and in Japan 1784 hours (Cette,
Kocoglu, Mairesse, 2009: 46)). In 2009 the labour productivity expressed in terms of GDP
per hour worked in relation to the US accounted for: 2 82.6% in the EU-15, 72.2% in the
EU-27, 81.2% in the euro area and 38.1% in the EU-12.
Chart 4. ICT investment – GDP ratio in France, the United Kingdom, the United States
and Japan for 1980-2005, in percentage points
Scope: Economy as a whole
Source: Gilbert Cette, Yusuf Kocoglu, Jacques Mairesse, Productivity, op. cit., s. 38.
2
The US = 100, The Conference Board Total Economy Database, September 2010, table 8.
175
The level of labour productivity depends on capital deepening and total factor
productivity, i.e. quality of labour, organization of work, technological progress, structural
changes, more effective use of resources etc. The total factor productivity growth is
interpreted as a measure of technological progress and structural changes.
The revolutionary changes in the US and the world economy were brought about
by ICT technologies, which developed highly intensively from the mid-1990s. They
created technical progress in the other sectors of the economy and led to structural
changes. However, they did not become a factor dynamising the EU economic
development and much less that of the euro area. Only Finland, Sweden and the United
Kingdom can be compared with the United States in this respect. In Chart 4 we present
ICT investments in relation to GDP in 1980-2005.
It appears from Chart 4 that at the end of the 1980s ICT investments in the UK
and the US represented a similar level to GDP and their growth in consecutive years was
comparable in relative figures. In France in turn, an increase in ICT investments ranged
from a slightly above 1% of GDP in 1980 to 3% of GDP in 2001 and in subsequent years
there was a decrease below 3% of GDP.
Annual rates of growth in total factor productivity (TFP)
1995
1.5
-0.2
2.4
2.1
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
0.4 0.6 -1.0 0.3 1.6 0.1 1.0 1.8
1.3 0.4 0.5 1.2 1.2 0.0 0.6 1.1
0.5 0.9 0.4 0.4 1.4 -0.3 0.3 0.3
0.3 1.0 0.3 0.3 1.2 -0.3 0.0 0.0
Table 4
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
2.0 1.5 1.6 1.7 -0.2
1.8 0.9 -0.3 -0.2 -0.9
0.7 0.5 1.3 0.5 -1.1
0.4 0.3 1.1 0.2 -1.4
World
US
EU-27
EU-15
Euro
1.5 0.3 1.2 0.4 0.3 1.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 0.2 0.3 1.1 0.3 -1.3
area
0.4 -0.1 -0.2 -2.6 0.1 1.2 -0.7 0.2 0.3 1.9 0.9 0.3 1.2 -1.3
Japan
7.5 -4.9 -1.5 -5.9 0.4 3.0 4.4 5.5 7.2 1.9 1.8 2.8 4.1 1.3
China
Source: The Conference Board Total Economy Database, September 2010, http://www.conferenceboard.org/data/economydatabase/
The rise in the technological gap of the EU and the euro area in relation to the
United States in 1996-2005 is confirmed by the indexes of total factor productivity growth
shown in Table 4. In 2006-2007 there was an improvement in the indexes of TFP growth
in the EU and the euro area whereas in the US they had negative values, but in 2008 the
decline in TFP growth in the EU and the euro area was greater than in the US.
6. Conclusions
The improvement in economic and trade position of the EEC enhanced its
influence on international trade policy. With the growth in significance of the single
European market and the Community share in the world trade the EEC was more and
more interested in the development of multilateral trade policy. By contrast, the decline in
US dominance in the global relations from the 1970s (and in competitive advantage from
the second half of the 1960s) was the reason why the US were not fully convinced to
continue the multilateral model of international trade policy. In the 1970s and 1980s there
was a decrease in competitive advantage of the US on the markets of smelting products,
consumption electronics and cars. The US trade position deteriorated in the mid-1980s,
there was a fall in the volume of exports and a rise in the trade deficit. That is why, despite
their much deeper interest in the creation of regional free trade areas, the US contributed
176
to the beginning of trade negotiations in the planned eighth Round of GATT (Uruguay
Round). They were also the initiator of the development of international currency
cooperation and of the Plaza Accord.
At the turn of the 1980s and 1990s the rivalry between the US and the EEC/EU
was exacerbated. The EU admitted new member countries and introduced the single
market and the US created a free trade area with Canada and Mexico (NAFTA). In this
situation great progress in trade liberalisation during the Uruguay Round was a success.
From the mid-1990s the world economy is characterized by the following
phenomena and processes:
1) changes are taking place in the configuration of economic powers, the shares in
international trade of China, India and Brazil are increasing;
2) the process of internationalisation of production is progressing;
3) economic interdependence, also in trade, is increasing on a global scale;
4) in international trade policy we can observe a decrease in significance of
multilateral agreements and WTO while the number of free trade areas and of
sub-regional and bilateral arrangements is on the rise;
5) the polycentric configuration of powers does not favour the development of a
global trade system, which results in the inadequacy of international trade policy
towards the global dimension of market mechanism.
In the EU-US relations rivalry prevails over cooperation. The two main centres of
the world economy have different strategies of trade liberalisation. The EU‟s high
economic openness and the large share in imports (around 75%) outside preferential
agreements cause the EU to strive for the strengthening of the global system of
international trade.
The United States apply the competitive strategy of trade liberalisation, signing
first of all bilateral and sub-regional agreements. They bind the developing countries to
their own economy by trade and investments. This is the strategy of expanding influences
in global trade relations and gaining support and the majority in WTO as well as
enhancing control over the global market.
In the situation when the EU does not possess the majority in WTO and bilateral
agreements are the prevailing trend in trade policy, the EU position in international trade
and its impact on global trade relations depend on the competitive advantage.
On the basis of the analysis conducted the following conclusions can be made:
1. In the EU exports of goods medium-tech manufactured products with a
predominance of medium-high-tech products prevail. The revealed comparative
advantage indexes by product technological advancement for the euro area did not
change in 2005-2008 compared with the period 1993-2004.
2. The export specialization indexes by production factor input estimated for the
euro area prove that out of the four possible specializations the euro area
possesses three (di Mauro, Forster and Lima, 2010: 20): a) in capital-intensive
products (1.2), b) in science-intensive products (1.1), c) in labour-intensive
products (1.1), while the United States has one distinct specialization – in scienceintensive products (1.4). Generally, one can say that the euro area did not achieve
any specialization in respect of production factor input.
3. The effects of trade competition measured by a share in the world exports are
negative for the euro area. In 1999-2009 it incurred the greatest losses in this
respect compared to the US, the UK and Japan. Competitiveness (in the long
term) depends on the growth in labour productivity. In 2009 labour productivity in
the EU-15 accounted for 82.6% of the US productivity and that of the EU-27
177
72.2% of the US level. In 1996-2005 there was an increase in technological gap of
the EU and the euro area in relation to the United States.
4. The financial and economic crisis influenced the decline in indexes of labour
productivity growth in the EU to a larger extent than in the United States.
In conclusion, the results of our study, in spite of the strengthening of the EU
international trade position, are not optimistic. The condition for maintaining the position
of the main centre in the world economy is the rise in innovativeness, labour productivity
growth rate and competitiveness. During the phase of the development of ICT
technologies the EU technological gap towards the US deepened. Potential benefits of the
large EU internal market have not been used so far to increase competition and
technological advancement.
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4. Focus
Dorin I. Dolghi (Oradea) ◄► Geopolitics and security in the
European Neighbourhood
Geopolitics and security in the European Neighbourhood
Dorin I. DOLGHI
Abstract: The article explores the current geopolitical configuration around the Eastern
border of the European Union. From this perspectives, there are geopolitical determinations of the
political, economic and security dynamics for the states that are considered both in the European
Neighbourhood Policy of EU and also in the Near Abroad Policy of Russia. To this end, each
power – EU and Russia – conducts policies to influence the regional preferences of the states
situated at the eastern border of EU. Our main question is addressed to the capacity of the EU
neighbourning states from the East to promote long term agendas in their internal and external
politicies.
Keywords: European Union, neighbourhood, geopolitics, security
In its earliest manifestation, the European project was explicitly a security project.
The European Coal and Steel Community, in addition to providing an institutionalized
mechanism for consolidating and rationalizing the European coal and steel industries after
the war, provided France and the other European states a security guarantee against a
rearmed Germany (Kirchner, Sperling, 2007: 1). The main goal of European integration
project was reached and consolidated. The interdependences created through integration
led to an interdependence system where a member state cannot act against another
member state without affect its own interests. The US, managed to get involved and
determine the European security architecture based on the principle to keep the Americans
in, the Germans down and the Russians out. The Cold War period consecrated a balance
of power where USA and Soviet Union were retained form aggressive actions on the
background of Western Europe.
As the bipolar system become obsolete after the failure of communist regimes, the
European Communities were found in the position to express their influence and
consolidate the European framework of security, on the same functional economic and
societal relations that ensured the peace in the past five decades. The emergence of the
European Union, as a political structure aimed to go beyond the economic goals and to
strengthen a European identity addressed to its citizens. New dimensions of security were
formally approached within the European Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and
Home Affairs. The Maastricht Treaty represents the dawn of the European security
identity, apart from external influences but constrained by internal divergences.
One of the most challenging issues that Europe is trying to respond in the past two
decades is related to its security identity and its role in the global and regional system. The
reconfiguration of international system at the end of Cold War, the challenges of Eastern
enlargements and the shift in the international security paradigm after the 9/11 impose a
distinct position of EU in the international arena. Only in 2003 the European Union manage
to adopt its first security strategy, which identified the main threats, risks and vulnerabilities
to European security. Another important dimension is related to the efforts to strengthen the
internal security within the EU. In search of an efficient and clear international identity,
beyond the economic cooperation, the issue of security became more rigorous within the
European Foreign and Security Policy and internal affairs. Formal political agreements were
reached but action and resources became subject of bureaucracy within a field dominated by
the intergovernmental negotiations based on national preferences.
182
The Eastern dimension of EU security was a concern in relation with the 2004 and
2007 enlargements and the new neighbourhood. EU had a relative control on the
developments within the Eastern candidate countries through the monitoring of integration
processes during the accession negotiations. Those processes were favourable to impose
measures to secure the Eastern space and to provide security for the EU. The postenlargement perspectives and the relation with the Eastern neighbourhood does not
provide to the Union clear mechanisms to impose security measures in the relation with
those states. Therefore, the Eastern border of EU has a specific meaning regarding the
security dynamics and influences around the border. The securitization and the
development of new cooperation frameworks in the East seem to be the option to ensure a
secure Europe, both internally and externally. Different approaches had to be investigated
and assumed within a security architecture that is designated to protect not necessarily the
EU territory, but the EU interests beyond its frontiers. Consequently, the EU must adopt
and implement a strategy that should consider the functionality of the Eastern cooperation
as the main tool to secure the Eastern frontier. If the functional or functioning economy
principle was a precondition for accession to EU, the same functional approach shall be
addressed to the future forms of cooperation with the neighbouring states in the East.
Some authors considers that the national authorities in the EU can no longer
unilaterally fulfill their primary security responsibilities of maintaining territorial integrity,
ensuring economic growth and support the social development (Kirchner, Sperling, 2007:
9). Within the EU Eastern context, this affirmation is false. We can bring, as an argument
that that the nationalistic movements are not overdue and in terms of what Moscow‟s
influence can change political preferences or manipulate the energy access. Even if we
exclude Moscow form this equation, there are a whole range of variables and potential
sources of conflicts, territorial disputes and divergent views.
The meaning of EU Eastern border
The border can be understood as a limit separating two areas, two states, a clash
between two manners of space organization, between communication networks, between
societies often different and sometimes antagonistic, represents the interface of territorial
disruption (Brie, Horga, 2009: 16). From an anthropological and socio-psychological
viewpoint, the basic delimitation of the territories requires a line between the self and the
other, between the own group and the other group, between friends and the enemy
(Pfetsch, 2007: 12). During the history, the Eastern borders of Europe have fluctuated
according to political and power expressions of empires, alliances and states. Within the
European integration experience, the state monopoly of the border control is shared within
regional and international arrangements. European security is covered by regional
organizational structures which act as forms of alliances and structures of multilateral
cooperation. EU is more secure and more flexible inside, through the implementation of
the Schengen Agreement. The new members are willing to implement and strengthen the
Eastern flank of European security even if national expressions are more “aggressive”
toward the containment of Russia‟s influence in the region.
In order to understand the meaning of EU borders we should make a clear
distinction that emphasises two dimensions: there is a mental map of Europe, perceived by
those who considered themselves Europeans and there is a formal map, acknowledged by
the European political actors gathered within EU and NATO and shared with the Eastern
European actors. The dynamics around the border will always meet and overlap the both
dimensions. The first dimension will ensure the legitimacy of the action of the second
dimension. The European borders have its own particularity through its own multi-
183
dimensional processes of manifestation: economic, cultural, religious, social, political and
psychological. From a constructivist approach, the border can be perceived as a social
phenomenon and affects all the other processes (Bǎdescu, Dungaciu, 1995: 2). Therefore,
even the border is a subject of change. Within geographical Europe, the West-East
relationship is a catalyst of ideological, cultural, political and security manifestations where
identities, interests and resources are mobilized to secure Europe, but also to exploit the
opportunities around and beyond the borders. The European Security Strategy, issued in
2003, acknowledges that “the post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open
borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked”
(European Council, 2003: 2). Therefore, the Eastern border of EU has an important
geopolitical value in relation with EU identity and the relationship with the neighbourhood.
In the context of EU and NATO Eastern enlargements, the geopolitical definition
of the European area was reopened and the significance of the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus was
visibly reactivated. The perceptions on the limits of Europe have gathered, during the
time, many definitions and variables of interpretation. In this perspective, the main
question is: to what extent the Eastern border represents a challenge of security or an
opportunity for cooperation? Our answer tends to emphasise the connection between
challenges and opportunities on the both sides of the border based on the interaction
between the interests of the regional actors. If there are common interests on both sides of
the border, there is an opportunity for cooperation. If there are divergent interests, there is
a potential source of conflict and separate contradictory actions which can led to weakness
the security environment.
Europe and the Neighbourhood
In the past two decades, the issue of neighbourhood became an important aspect of
Europe‟s geopolitical reconfiguration. The EU and national interests and preferences were
shifted due to the new context that emerged after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. Also, the
neighbouring states of EU reconfigured their preferences according to the new context.
These changes in the regional arena brought in the same degree a large spectrum of
challenges and opportunities on both sides. This situation is not a unique one for the
European experience. Since the Greek Europe, we can identify that different historical
contexts contributed to the idea of Europe and the limits of Europe. Therefore, both Europe
and the neighbourhood were always in a relationship of mutual influence. Sometimes, the
neighbourhood became the enemy, other times the neighbourhood was an opportunity for
economic and social development or assimilated (through integration or conquest) but every
time each side – Europe and the neighbourhood – had to consider the potential, threat or
cooperation perspectives, with the other side. This relationship is very important in order to
understand the evolution of Europe, its expectations and behaviour towards its neighbours.
EU is interested to have a stable, secure and predictable neighbourhood.
One of the main issues regarding the limits of Europe was discussed within the
framework of “variable geometry”. This concept can be used as an “excuse” for the great
challenge to define the dynamics of Europe, but more importantly, it can led to the search
of different variables that can affect Europe‟s evolution and its frontiers. Indeed, we can
approach Europe from different perspectives: geography, history, culture, society,
economy, security, values, lifestyle, etc. and each approach can reveal different Europes.
From the EU perspective the impact of enlargement has brought into attention
new frontiers of Europe, new neighbours and new challenges and opportunities within a
different regional system of interdependences. In this context, a functional relation with
the neighbourhood became a precondition for political stability and economic
184
development within and beyond the new borders. To this end, the promotion of regional
and sub regional cooperation had to be considered within a strategic political framework:
the European Neighbourhood Policy. The EU offers to its neighbours a privileged
relationship, building upon a mutual commitment to common values (democracy and
human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable
development). Therefore, a very important challenge occurs for EU because it placed itself
in the position where is fundamentally important to eliminate possible feelings of rivalry
or competition within the neighbours, mainly created by preferential access on the
European market or due to hopes and expectations related to future enlargements.
The main argument is to avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe and to
involve the neighbours in transnational exchanges that can bring benefits for all parts. To
this end, the EU‟s enhanced partnership relations with its neighbouring countries 1 must be
based on a long term approach of sustainable development and cooperation. In fact, a
specific policy toward the neighbourhood was determined due to the interdependences
that occurred in the global system and underlined in the regional context. Different
transnational challenges and opportunities cannot be managed and exploited without
cooperation, especially among neighbours that share common preferences and
expectations. Still, the ENP does not imply the replacement of bilateral framework which
consists in Association Agreements but to supplement existing policies and arrangements.
According to the European Commission, the EU‟s approach could therefore be
based on the several incentives such as: extension of Internal Market and regulatory
structures; preferential trading relations and market opening; perspectives for lawful
migration and movement of persons; intensified cooperation to prevent and combat common
security threats; greater EU political involvement in conflict prevention and crisis
management; greater efforts to promote human rights, further cultural cooperation and
enhance mutual understanding; integration into transport, energy and telecommunications
networks and the European Research Area; new instruments for investment promotion and
protection; support for integration into the global trading system.
The European Neighbourhood Policy was established as an alternative policy for the
European Union‟s neighbouring countries without real prospects of joining the European
Union in the foreseeable future. Even though it addressed soft issues, such as economy and
democracy, the ENP has clear geopolitical implications (Duna, 2009: 10). The
Neighbourhood policy represents simultaneously an institutional closure to the „Others‟ not the „radical‟ Other, but the „different‟ neighbour - and an openness to the extent that the
„different‟ neighbour behaves like the Europeans but without being a cultural carbon copy of
the Europeans” (Holm, 2005: 3).
Security and securitization at the Eastern border of EU
During the European history, security was generally understood in military terms
and related to violence, aggression, war, state survival and the use of force. The state
centric perspectives on security, explained by the realist theory, are focused on the
capacity of the state to use legitimate force to defend its existence and promote its
interests within an anarchical international system. As a result, the classical or
1
The European Neighbourhood Policy applies to the EU's immediate neighbours by land or sea –
Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova,
Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. A special strategic
partnership was developed with Russia.
185
conventional conflicts around the border have always gathered and clashed national
preferences and were addressed to national security.
At the beginning of the 21st Century, the national security remains the main
variable that affects the international behaviour of a state. Even within alliances and
regional organizations, the states are in a permanent search of security and the collective
frameworks of security are nothing but opportunities to increase and strengthen the
national security. From this perspective, the shift in foreign policy and security of the
Central and Eastern European states after 1989 can be understood as a seek for security
outside the Moscow‟s influence. Also, the NATO and EU enlargements toward East can
be seen as the Eastern process to secure Europe.
Even if the Westphalian system defined the state as the main international actor,
the alliances were those who represented the main factors of stability or change in Europe.
The Central and Eastern Europe has always represented a geopolitical importance,
especially in relation of the Western Europe with Russia. All the historical evolutions in
the past centuries were conducted through alliance systems and today the same tendency
is maintained. Europe has strengthen is security through NATO and EU and Russia is
consolidating is power through regional arrangements and direct exercise of power, such
as military intervention in Georgia in August 2008 or energy monopoly in the region.
The historical status of the “buffer states” from the Central and Eastern European
states between Western Europe and Russia and the experience of the Cold War made a
shift in the security preferences in the region, leading to the search of guarantees within a
collective framework of security. The military dimension is covered by the NATO
membership and the protection within the 5th Article of the Alliance. Economic and
internal security is managed within EU, from a societal perspective with clear goals,
policies and resources addressed to this matter.
All the security reconfigurations in the Eastern Europe after 1989 can be understood
within the security complex approach, defined as a set of states whose major security
perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot be
reasonably analysed or resolved apart from one another (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, 1998: 12).
The catalyst that gathered national security preferences toward the Western integration was the
experience under the Soviet influence. This catalyst managed to overlap bilateral political
disputes, to redefine national preferences and to express future expectations.
The Eastern border of EU might be taken unitary, from the Baltic Sea to the Black
Sea, as a formal delimitation from the Eastern neighbourhood. But regional particularities
emphasises different approaches determined by the regional complexes of security. For
instance, there are differences in the security perceptions in the Baltic States, which are
different from the Black Sea Area; Poland has its own perspective in relation with the East.
The EU‟s role is to consider the regional complexes and expectations and to offer a common
framework that should respond unitary to the eastern challenges and opportunities.
Within the European security framework, we believe that the non-military
security approaches are more important for the stability and cooperation at the eastern
border of EU. The non-military approach allows the development of mutual trust and the
exploration of extensive frameworks of cooperation. That is why, within the debates on
the international security, there is a clear distinction between the military and non-military
approaches. This debate, “wide” versus “narrow” emphasises the increasing importance of
non-military security aspects for the regional and international system (Buzan, Wæver, de
Wilde, 1998: 2). The “narrow” approach is focused on the conventional threats and risks,
in terms of military, balance of power and interstate conflicts. The “wide” approach
186
investigates other dimensions that can affect negatively the actors (or the levels) of the
international system.
Within the European security system, the “narrow” or military dimension is
covered by the North Atlantic Alliance as a hard power and the EU, as a soft power, is
managing challenges and threats that are not necessarily required to have a military
approach in their management.
In our opinion, the understanding of security considers that an actor is secure
when he has the perception that no direct or indirect threats can affect its existence, status
or interests. The key word is perception. A wrong or incomplete perception of security
can be translated into insecurity. Also, the perception of security can be approached within
two dimensions: collective security and individual security. We stress that collective
approach of security challenges will prevail in the regional security framework. To this
end, communication, cooperation and common actions among EU members and between
EU and its neighbours are the key elements for a secure Europe.
Within this context, the approach of the security at the Eastern border of EU
implies also a shift in the perception and the meaning of the border. Apparently
contrasting, the Eastern EU border represents both a limit, designated to secure EU, its
member states and citizens and an area of cooperation, exchange, dialogue and
opportunities with the neighbours.
In theory, securitization, as an extreme version of politicization, means that an issue is
presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside
the normal bounds of political procedures (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, 1998: 23-24). Within
international relations, the securitization process throughout an actor is consolidating its
security, can be translated as an element of insecurity for another actor (Hlihor, 2008: 13).
Consequently, the actor that identifies insecurity will act to counterbalance the situation
through its own measures of securitization. Therefore, this permanent search of security is
situated within a security balance and adapting security policies. This might be seen as the
negative effect of securitization. On the other hand, if the securitization of an actor is
considering the other actors preferences and interests, there is a possible cooperation
framework for a common action of securitization. In reality, both perspectives are taken into
consideration. For example, the EU-Russia Relations are based both on common and separate
measures of securitization. The common framework is addressed to terrorism and organized
crime and the separate securitization underlines the strengthening of those capabilities that can
be used against the other (such as energy resources or political influence).
Some of the earliest examples of the securitization of migration in Europe can be
found throughout the text of the Schengen Agreement. For example, Title 1, Art. 7, provides
for the approximation of the signatories‟ visa policies as soon as possible “in order to avoid
the adverse consequences in the field of immigration and security that may result from
easing checks at the common borders,” and the application of visa and admission procedures
“taking into account the need to ensure the protection of the entire territory of the five States
against illegal immigration and activities that could jeopardize security.”
Security and securitization of EU implies two interrelated dimensions: security
within the EU border and security beyond the EU borders. The security challenges that
cannot be managed at the border can affect the EU society. Therefore, the EU securitization
implies the implementation of coherent internal policies and external policies.
Vulnerabilities, risks and threats at the Eastern border of EU
There is a direct linkage between the vulnerabilities, risks and threats within the
security management. If vulnerability is not identified and proper measures are not
187
addressed, it can become a risk or a threat and the costs to deal with are increased.
Therefore, it is very important to have an integrated approach to what each concept means
and how they are interrelated and approached at the EU Eastern border.
Within the European Security Strategy, the key threats identified within the
international system are characterised by their ability to transcend borders: terrorism,
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMS), regional conflicts, state failure and
organised crime. These are the key elements that affect the contemporary international
security system. The manifestation of these threats indicates that there is a need to a
different approach in securing states and citizens because these are not conventional
threats. The new developments in the management of unconventional threats insist on the
transcendence from military based approaches as a reaction or intervention tool, to
intelligence based approaches as a preventive mechanism.
A “wider” security perspective at the Eastern border shall consider the relation
between the challenges and the capabilities. This relationship, approached within a
common framework, can secure Europe and its interests.
One of the main challenges at the Eastern border consists in its permeability and
vulnerability related to immigration. The existing discourses on migration in Europe have
been grouped along four different dimensions: the economic discourse of threat, which
focuses on job losses and the financial burden of immigration; discourses of solidarity,
which focus on democratic values and human rights; discourse of security, with
emphasizes criminality and social security (Ibryamova, 2004: 4). As Javier Solana noticed
in 2003, a “massive flow of drugs and migrants are coming to Europe and affect its
security. These threats are significant by themselves, but it is their combination that
constitutes a radical challenge to our security”. 2 International immigration as a nontraditional security threat for EU implies related criminal activities that can affect the
overall security and security perception within the EU society.
Cross-border organized crime involving trafficking human beings, drugs, stolen
automobiles and illegal cigarettes, cross-border smuggling, and other related activities to
organized crime can be identified as a security threat. The EU response is shared
according to the intensity and judicial approach of each cross-border activity. What EU
has brought as supplementary mechanisms to cope with these challenges are the
information networks and intelligence exchange, within informational integrated systems
developed within the implementation of the Schengen Agreement.
Also, the border represents a challenge related to arms trafficking that can be used
in criminal or terrorist activities. In this perspective, the management of these threats is a
subject for specialized cooperation with the EU Eastern neighbors. Bi-lateral agreements
or general regional frameworks can provide common solutions to common challenges.
The securitization of the EU space should take into account that the terrorism and
regional conflicts can affect directly the safety of EU and its neighbours. Terrorism has
been proved to be a major challenge since the 9/11, having in minded the terrorist attacks
in Madrid (2004) and London (2005). The same threat is affecting Russia and its partners
taking into consideration the Moscow Theatre or Beslan tragedies. From this viewpoint,
terrorism represents a factor that imposes a common approach of this challenge. The
international implications make NATO and USA partners also.
Energy security represents a new dimension in the EU- Russia relations. As Western
Europe strengthened its influence in the East, Russia has found in its resources a tool to
2
Summary of the Address by Mr. Javier Solana, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and
Security Policy to the European Parliament. (Brussels, 18 June 2003).
188
influence the EU Eastern dynamics. The gas crises in the past winters underline the
dependency of Central Europe from energy sources of the East. As long as EU fails to manage
commonly this challenge, Russia has a geo-economical advantage that can be translated into
security terms. That is why, alternative routes of energy, especially from the South Caucasus
region are taken into consideration in order to surpass the Moscow‟s monopoly.
One of the most delicate issues of security around the border can be approached by
the analysis between stability and instability of the democratic systems within the states
situated at the Eastern border of EU or within the sphere of EU interest. We have in mind
the former Soviet republics that are geopolitically situated within EU and Russia areas of
interest. The democratic change (or election results) was always fluctuated between political
groups that have in their agenda the EU option or the Moscow option. As example, we can
mention the recent change in presidential discourse in Belarus, the reconfiguration of Kiev
foreign policy toward Russia or the European path chosen by the republic of Moldova.
These changes are no later than twelve months and do not represent a steady variable in the
perspective of four or five years. That‟s why, within the ENP, one of the main goals are
addressed to manage a cooperation framework to stabilise these political systems in order to
develop a predictable framework for future EU engagements in the East. In geopolitical
terms and actions, Russia is not favourable to this approach and tries to get its influence
according to its interests. Therefore, within regional political dynamics at the Eastern border
of EU there is acknowledged the idea of Russia‟s interests to maintain a controlled
instability. This approached is related to the “Grand Chessboard” and the undergoing
consequences of the reconfiguration of the influences after the bi-polar order.
Security governance at the Eastern Border of EU
The perception of security, as an objective reality, can be influenced by several
factors that affect the regional dynamics and the behavior of the actors. As security will
always be addressed to specific interests and preferences, the diversity of regional
interests, especially along the border, will meet divergences and possible opposite views.
Beyond the national political and military structures dedicated to manage security, the
transnational frameworks of security tends to strengthen securitization processes,
especially in collective approaches such as EU or NATO. Still, the intergovernmental
character of European security and the common political goals of the EU members are
subject to a supranational approach conducted by the Commission. So far, there are clear
established principles, goals, competence share, mechanism and resources that can be
approached within a security governance model.
According to Emil J. Kirchner, the rationale for the EU as a security actor
supplementing or supplanting the member states reflects five major calculations: first, the
EU can aggregate national capabilities, thereby facilitating the economies of scale
currently eluding Europe, and release Europe‟s latent diplomatic, economic and militarystrategic power in the service of European security interests; second, the EU, if it were to
achieve a foreign policy and security identity, could leverage European security
preferences in international negotiations, particularly vis-à-vis the United States; third, the
EU provides at a minimum the institutional framework enabling the member states to
coordinate and harmonize their security strategies; fourth, the post-Westphalian character
of European states has made it manifestly impossible for those states to achieve many of
their security objectives autonomously; and finally, the very variety of security challenges
confronting the Europeans today presents a particularly acute collective action problem
owing to the absence of an uncontested leader or even a stable duopoly or oligopoly that
189
consistently exerts leadership or is unwilling provide a collective security goods in the
presence of free-riding (Kirchner, 2009: 4).
The EU occupies a central and unique role in the governance of European
security. The Council and the Commission have not only created a plethora of quasiautonomous networks and institutions sapping the policy and sovereign prerogatives of
the member states, but replaced the hierarchy of the Westphalian order with postWestphalian heterarchy (Kirchner, 2009: 25).
Security governance tries to describe new modes of security policy that differ
from traditional approaches to national and international security. While traditional
security policy used to be the exclusive domain of states and aimed at military defense,
security governance is performed by multiple actors and is intended to create a global
environment of security for states, social groups, and individuals. By pooling the strength
and expertise of states, international organizations, and private actors, security governance
is seen to provide more effective and efficient means to cope with today‟s security risks
(Daase, Friesendorf, 2010).
The Eastern border has its own specific security challenges. The main variable is
represented by Russia whose policies and actions are focused on the counterbalancing EU
and NATO security influences in the region. The regional dynamics around the border
cannot be taken separately by the two sides of the border. There are too many common
challenges than individual threats. Therefore, it is necessary to go beyond individual
securitization measures and to adapt a rational framework to deal with common security
challenges. A functional approach is indicated in the sense that can develop a clear
framework of mutual understanding on what are the common threats and how their
management can cover security on both sides, with shared and low costs.
On geopolitical and strategic matters that are separately identified as important,
these can be left outside or transferred to another dimension of bi-lateral cooperation or
individual expression.
Within the geographical space, the security governance at the Eastern border of
EU shall take into consideration the following variables that affect the behavior of all the
actors, on both sides of the border:
- the EU common position (political)
- national preferences of the EU member states (political and military)
- the preferences of the Eastern neighborhood states (political and military)
- the preferences of Russia (economic, political, military)
- national political majorities (pro-European vs. Euro-skeptics/pro-Russia)
- political communication and bi-lateral relations across the border
- economic and military capabilities
- international guarantees within an institutionalized framework
- the perception of security among citizens
A functional approach of security governance shall take into account the
relationship and interdependencies among the above variables, whose nature and dynamics
can made them dependent or independent, according to the specific security dimension
where are translated. When addressed directly to EU security, some of the variables can
affect the internal security and the perception of security within the European society. When
some challenges are addressed in partnership with the Eastern neighbors, the effects can be
mutually recognized and sustained. The main challenge consists in the delimitation between
what EU security interests are and the correspondence with the security challenges of its
Eastern neighbors. The answer will emphasize the need for cooperation as long as no
particular interests are above a common approach of regional security.
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Conclusion
As EU is trying to define its global role, there are many regional issues related to the
management and security governance at its borders. As the security identity is not clearly
clarified within its internal institutional structures, there is a framework that underlines a
common perception of the main security challenges. Today, the EU is strengthening its
security identity by taking measures and conducting internal negotiations that can transcend
national interest toward a common interest regarding the societal security.
Regional complexes of security are a part of strong manifestation within internal
structures and international structures when we address the West-East relationship in
Europe. The same complexes shall take into consideration that the international security
paradigm is changed, in some regional contexts the state choose to transfer sovereignty
and integrate within regional alliances. Europe is strengthening its collective security
identity but is taking into consideration that its security depends on the overall
international security system. The East is no longer a potential enemy, nor an outside
threat. Within the globalization and enhancement of communication networks, Eastern
neighbours are closer to Europe.
Security governance shall involve all the states and their particular interests, on
the both sides of the border. There is no positive or negative distinction in this approach.
We accept that the national preference will prevail over the regional or international
options but also regional particularities will determine a compromise between the national
and international clashes.
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Book Reviews
The meeting of classical geopolitics and modern geography
Kurilla Annamária
Pap, Norbert: Magyarország a Balkán és a Mediterráneum vonzásában
– Hungary‟s relation to the Balkans and the Mediterranean region
Publikon Publishing, Pécs, 320p.
The author, Norbert Pap defended his thesis at the Hungarian Academy of
Sciences in May 2009. His diverse and manifold dissertation was converted into the
volume called „Magyarország a Balkán és a Mediterráneum vonzásában”. The author
has been analysing the concerned region for years and has travelled through it several
times. He constantly follows the changes going on, therefore owns a comprehensive
aspect of the area‟s various problems. Although the author has already published a large
number of volumes, scientific articles and analyses about the processes being witnessed in
the region, his results are presented in this form for the first time.
The volume consists of 320 pages, discussing the Balkans and the Mediterranean
region, as well as their relation to Hungary. The structure of the book is systematic: it
starts from the clarification of the geographic basic terms, and describes the strategic role
of Pécs at the end. The volume covers a huge territory, and far exceeds the limits of a
geographical analysis. Nevertheless, the author does not attempt to provide a wide-ranging
regional investigation of the area; he rather focuses on the processes affecting Hungary in
the past, present and future. The interrelationships of the territory are detailed and
revealed like the different layers of onionskin. The author examines the Southern
European region in its wider sense, the Mediterranean area and the Balkans, finally arrives
to Hungary and to his narrower environment, Pécs.
The author explains his view on geography and future visions already in the foreword.
He claims that his work should belong to the category of “pragmatic geography”, since it
involves a strong critical tone sometimes. Following the introduction, the author clarifies some
basic terms, emphasises the most prominent features of geographical space, then analyses the
interrelationship of politics and geographical space – therefore he links the two scientific fields
together and defines his own limits of investigation. The third chapter includes the values and
structural content of the territorial categories of the Balkans, Southern Europe and the
Mediterranean region. The most essential improvement of the chapter is represented by the
special factors that determine the internal and external borders of the examined area, as well as
the occurring breaking lines.
The fourth chapter discusses the characteristics of Southern European states and
Anatolia from an economic and political geographical point of view. The author does not
aim at the representation of the whole regional geographical description of the region‟s
states; this chapter rather focuses on the political geographical analysis. The fifth chapter
presents the Hungarian geographical science‟s studies related to Southern Europe, while
the sixth chapter reveals the political and economic geography of Hungary‟s foreign
affairs. These two chapters mention Hungary and its relation to Southern Europe for the
first time. The seventh chapter called “The Hungarian economic, political and cultural
relations with the Southern European area” is so closely linked to the two previous
chapters that it would have been unnecessary to separate them.
The eighth is the longest chapter of the volume; it discusses the Hungarian-Italian
relationship and the characteristics of the south-western corridor. This is not surprising in light
194
of the fact that Italy plays a significant role in the author‟s studies and field of interest. Starting
from the social, economic and political geographical analysis of Italy, we get to the economic
relation between Southern Transdanubia and Italy. Meanwhile, we also get insight into the
changing character of the Hungarian-Italian relationships as well. Further to this, the reader
gets familiar with the different aspects of the Hungarian and Italian students‟ books, which
examination is based on the mental mapping referred to by the author.
The ninth chapter gives an extremely complex picture about the strategic
importance of Pécs, as well as about the possible dimensions of a south-western relational
direction. Though this chapter is not the longest, it is definitely the most important in
terms of recent processes. Regarding Pécs, the year 2010 is doubtlessly of an outstanding
importance. Nevertheless, the title of “European Capital of Culture” has commitments and
future tasks alike. Hungary is going to be the next president of the EU in 2011, therefore it
has to face the fact that – since it is located in the neighbourhood of the Balkan region – it
has to express its attitude and take measures related to the south-eastern states‟ join to the
EU. In this regard, Pécs – being the gate to the Balkans – can receive a strategic role.
The work of Norbert Pap is unique regarding both the research of the
Mediterranean region and the Balkans. One of the most important scientific benefits of the
volume is the nearly 20 page long bibliography, which is not a mere list, but is organically
built into the author‟s work; he proves his claims and supports his opinion with them.
The language and style of the book is elaborate, though the quality of the included
figures is quite varied. Some figures and maps are extraordinarily well constructed and
newly designed (e.g. on page 220), but some of them need to be “refreshed” (e.g. on page
180). Apart from the changing quality of the illustrations, one can claim that the figures
well complement the main text and confirm the descriptions. The typographic design of
the book is also exquisite. The colours of the cover reflect the preferred colours of the
Eastern Mediterranean and Balkan Studies Centre founded by the author; the picture
shows a Hungarian rider shooting an arrow backwards, therefore foreshadows the content
of the book, namely the relation between the Carpathian basin and Southern Europe.
The volume called „Magyarország a Balkán és a Mediterráneum vonzásában” is
the summary of a work going on for long years. The author detected the topic more than a
decade ago, though it became current only nowadays. Further to the fact that it is a
scientifically valuable work, the reader can encounter an outstandingly actual volume. In
order to be capable to give proper answers to the recent challenges, we have to understand
Hungary‟s relation to Southern Europe, and we also have to face the tasks based on the
regional position of Hungary; therefore it is necessary to reveal the processes going on in
the discussed area. The book of Norbert Pap lends us an excellent helping hand and stable
starting point in this.
Building the European Identity
Dana Pantea
Review Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein, European Identity,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, ISBN 978-0-521-70953
We live in an epoch when globalization deepens every day; communication brings
people together helping to construct new political, economical and social structures.
European Union has been expanding since its birth and there are candidate countries
waiting for a positive answer to their request to accession. Under these circumstances the
question of a European identity arises. But inside the European Union there are many
cultures which we should also take into consideration when talking about a European
identity. So who is the European today? Who feels to be European? It is a difficult
question to answer because in the old Europe identity was in strong connection with
territory, but starting with the European Steel and Coal Community the perspective upon
identity has changed.
European integration has offered opportunities for employment all over Europe,
so there are millions of Europeans who travel across national borders, who work in other
countries, thus coming to know, understand, and appreciate other cultures and traditions
and learn languages they have never thought to learn before. Most likely to live this
experience are business people, white-collars and young people, mostly students who have
the opportunity to study and practice in different European Union universities. There also
people from Eastern and Central Europe who (im)migrated to countries such as Italy,
France, Germany, Great Britain, Spain in their attempt to make a better living. All these
movements have their impact upon the European identity and European multiculturalism.
Migration has brought new communities to different countries in Europe and integrating
these communities into European societies is a very difficult process.
Building the European identity is a subject that has been widely discussed since
the birth of the European Steel and Coal Community, and ever since this subject has been
dealt with by scientist from different domains of research from anthropology, to politics,
history and culture. This is the reason why Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein,
when were approached by John Haslam and Andreas Follesdal to write about European
identity, first thought it was not necessary as such studies had been done before. But, as
they confess in the preface of the book European Identity they first edited in 2009, they
began to “warm up” to the idea and they did an approach from multiple disciplinary
perspectives of today‟s enlarged and politicized Europe.
The first chapter, The Politicization of European Identities, written by the two
editors begins with a metaphoric presentation of the European identity seen as a ship
which has entered uncharted waters, with its crew vying for ranks and positions, with
some passengers happy with their accomplishments while others anticipate bad times thus
creating an atmosphere of uncertainty and anxiety. Having seen Europe under these
circumstances, the editors have decided to explore the politics of European identity from a
multidisciplinary perspective by turning to anthropology, sociology and history. In this
way we have the opportunity to reach a full understanding of Europe, of those who are
optimists and pessimists, of movers and stayers in a space with borders becoming more
and more permeable.
196
Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein reveal the fact that bureaucrats and
intellectuals play a key role in crafting Europe and European allegiance, but they are not
alone: there are nationalists, anti-globalization Euroskeptics and last but not least is the
past experience of Europeans, a legacy reflected in today‟s ambivalence. Taking into
account all these, the editors want their volume to be “a statement on how we should go
about studying” identities, as they should be revealed by social practices, political
attitudes, social and geographical structures and national contexts. Their intention is to
encourage pluralism, to raise new questions, to open new directions of research in order to
build up a volume about how to study European identities.
Thus the first chapter presents in three parts the arguments developed by the
editors for a research on European identity which could bring about a fresh look. The first
part is a survey of the most important theoretical approaches to European integration; the
second explores the politicization with regard to the understanding of the contemporary
construction of European identities, while the last one traces the main lines of argument in
the chapters that follow.
Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein make a chronological presentation of
the theories in the world of scholarship from the integration theory in the 1950s and 1960s
to the 1990 analyses of multilevel governance. They make a brief study of the literature
written upon these theories focusing mostly on such authors as Ernst W. Haas and Karl W.
Deutsch. They explain Haas‟s neo-functional theory and Deutsch‟s theory which was
more pessimistic and explicit than Haas‟s. Beginning with 1990s they observe a new kind
of literature which does research on multilevel governance, historical institutionalism,
ideational-constructivist frameworks. The editors highlight the idea, which they consider
as a central theme of the present volume, according to which “identity in Europe starts at
home”. They also draw the attention upon the most recent theories based on the social
theory of J Habermas. Their conclusion is that all these literatures underplay the
importance of politics and processes of politicization. The editors mention the fact that
important political elements are left unexamined and they give the example of London and
Madrid where identity became a matter of life and death.
This together with the latest enlargement, the constitutional process which have
significantly politicized European identities are strong arguments for the authors of this
book to look for other social disciplines in order to bring about fresh perspectives on the
evolution of the European identities. One of these disciplines is anthropology; another is
sociology and last but not least is history.
From now on the book is divided into three main parts: the first part deals with the
European identity as project, the second one deals with European identity as process and
the last one speaks about European identity in context.
The first part begins with a study written by Dario Castiglione, professor at the
Department of Politics, University of Exeter. His aim, as he states at the beginning of his
study, is to prove that the construction of European political identity is not based on the
concept of what it is to be European. His purpose is to analyze the state of debate about
European political identity concentrating on normative aspects. He shows that this debate
is strongly connected to that of the nature of the European political community and goes
on presenting two different conceptions of European political identity.
Castiglione brings to the foreground the observation according to which the
present day debate ranges between a more traditional and nation-like conception of
identity and a post-national conception that sees the EU as a new form of state. He also
considers this debate as part of the political nature of the European Union. The author
makes a survey of two conceptions of European political identity: the nation-like ones and
197
constitutional patriotism. When talking about the former, Dario Castiglione presents two
particular phenomena: the internal mobility determined by the freedom of movement of
skilled and unskilled workers from new East European countries towards the old member
states, a fact which caused national reactions as an attempt to protect local population; and
the emergence of Euroskepticism in some new member states. When dealing with the
latter, the author explores the analytical and normative elements of Habermas‟s position,
which he finally he considers to be a failure because his conception of democratic politics
is over-reliant on the idea of consensus.
Douglas R. Holmes suggests another approach of the identities in his study
Experimental identities (after Maastricht). He considers it to be a challenge to admit that
identity has become an ambiguous term and a vexatious issue for the people at the
beginning of the twenty first century who are negotiating among liberal and illiberal
perspective upon identity. He argues that an address of Jean Marie Le Pen delivered in
Budapest can be considered the moment which marks a shift in the meaning of identity.
Holmes analyzes Jean Marie Le Pen integralism which has brought about a series of
innovations which operate in all European Union countries, the key point here being that
identity emerges as a phenomenon that can or must be framed in reference to the
contemporary institutional realities. The author goes deep into his subject writing about
the audience: farmers, veterans, pensioners, schoolteachers, factory workers, owners of
small shops and businesses, university students, - groupings for whom the political
meaning can be dealt with only from the point of view of family town, country, ethnic and
linguistic assemblages, religions and ends by analyzing Tony Blair‟s speech: “Our
Nation‟s Future: Multiculturalism and Integration”.
As for the forth chapter of the first part, “The public sphere and the European
Union‟s political identity”, a survey written by Juan Diez Medrano, it studies the public
sphere from the point of identity both at the elite and mass levels. Medrano states at the
very beginning of his work that he has narrowed his focus on political identity as political
self-understanding, namely on the project dimension of political identity as the editors of
this volume have discussed in the first chapter. The author analyzes the public sphere
because it is a factor that shapes the citizens‟ attitude toward the European Union thus
trying to explain the low level of EU support and the rejection of the European
Constitution by a majority of French and Dutch voters. The end of this survey concludes
by supporting Katzenstein and Checkel‟s criticism of simplistic polarities which dominate
the literature on European identity.
The second part of this volume European Identity as a Process begins with a
chapter written by Holly Case, Being European: East and West, dedicated to the different
understanding of the European identity determined by a Western or Eastern perspective.
The author does his study from a historical perspective as he explains that the modern
conceptions of European identity have emerged during wars, revolutions which were
differently interpreted according to locality. His perspective touches certain historical
moments of Europe: the French Revolution, the Fascism, the World War II, the Balkan
Wars, 1989, all having an impact on the meaning of identity.
The sixth chapter, “Who are the Europeans and how does this matter for politics”,
a survey done by Neil Fligstein, raises a question: why after half a century of integration
the political support still remains tepid? The main problem under discussion here is that of
the consequences of migration. The author argues that in spite of the agreements to guide
the interaction of EU countries, in spite of the rules market transactions, in spite of the
common currency, the rule of law, there are only certain categories who benefit from all
these: business people, students, white-collars, workers, while others are left aside without
198
being able to interact with people from other countries. Those in the first category have
the possibility to meet and discuss and settle different European problems.
Adrian Favell‟s survey, “Immigration, migration, and free movement in the
making of Europe”, continues the problems raise by Fligstein by building a bridge
between historical analysis of the phenomenon and emerging patterns that shape Europe
as a space for migration and mobility.
The third part of the book, European identity in context, contains only one survey,
Identification with Europe and politicization of the EU since the 1980s, done by Hartmut
Kaelble. The author of the last survey analyzes the process undergone by Europe after
1980s dominated both by politicization and de-politicization. The European identification
is seen from five different points of view, each being largely discussed and explained. In
the end of this survey Hartmut Kaelble answers to the question of how politization and
indentification with Europe have become intertwined.
The problem under discussion in this book, the European identity brings to the
foreground a full understanding of Europe‟s ambivalence, the idea of a politicized
identity, the emergence of a populist identity construction, the attempts to de-politicize the
identity, the combination of hopes and fears that dominate present day European Union.
This book can be considered of great interest not only for scholars of European politics
but also for the large public.
Constructions and Imperial Strategies in the Romanian Space
Alina Stoica
Sorin Şipoş, Mircea Brie, Ioan Horga, Igor Şarov, Ion Gumenâi, Imperial
Policies in the Eastern and Western Romanian Space, University of Oradea
Publishing, Cartdidact Publishing from Chişinău, 2010, 583 p., ISBN 978606-10-0190-3, ISBN 978-9975-4001-2-1
In the recent years, finding that the Romanian world, along the centuries, was the
point of confluence of imperial interests and pressures, constituted the premise of starting
a chain of conferences, result of the collaborations between the University of Oradea and
the State University of Moldova, Chisinau.
In this context, appeared this volume "Imperial Policies in the Eastern and
Western Romanian Space", the result of the third meeting "Romania and Romanian" from
Oradea. „These developments, whose lists will enlarge - there is no question about it - in
the coming years due to the duplication of scientific motivation around themes of common
interest on the two ends of the Romanian space, whose debate allows, each time
comparatively, to be held due to specific historical developments in different
circumstances and surprising similarities with a human, emotional one” 1.
By meeting the terms of approximately 40 researchers in the field of history,
archeology, political science, European studies, law and not least economics, the present paper
sees and examines from various angles the imperial policy "which is seen not only in threw the
antagonistic relation between the conqueror and the conquered, by convenient clichés of
explaining the lagging behind in certain planes of the Romanian society, in comparison with
the Western one, but also by the civilizing adding of some states like Austria which, at least in
some periods, threw the modernization and punctual sustainment measures, obviously
interested, contributed to the social, cultural and political arising of the Romanians”2.
The volume was systematized into five sections, each comprising works that
address the empire issues from different perspectives and different areas, thus giving to
the general theme an interdisciplinary aspect. Presented in a chronological perspective, in
particular, the sections of the paper are largely balanced enough.
The first section, Empires, Models and Imperial Policy: Sources and
Historiography, is opened by the work of a "keen observer of the world shaped by Eastern
Christianity, which applies a vision of modern historiography” 3. It is about Professor
Dragnev Emil, the one who states and brings very relevant arguments about providential
and divine destiny of the Roman Empire, which, according to his statement, "we find in
the work of many heathen authors. In fact, given the definition of the universe as a space
inhabited by civilized people under Roman rule, the providential destiny of the Empire,
inevitably overlaps with that of the universe” 4. The section continues with the work of a
1
Barbu Ştefănescu, „Cuvânt înainte”, in Sorin Şipoş, Mircea Brie, Ioan Horga, Igor Şarov, Ion
Gumenâi, Politici imperiale în Estul şi Vestul spaţiului românesc, Editura Universităţii din
Oradea, Editura Cartdidact din Chişinău, 2010, p.7
2
Ibidem
3
Ibidem, p. 8
4
Emil Dragnev, „Imperiu, profeţie, mesianism, escatologie. O moştenire bizantină în estul
Europei”, in op.cit., p.15
200
well known Romanian specialist in mental history and the rural world, Barbu Stefanescu,
who starting from the testimony columnist Michael Csere, has proposed to explain the
position of the Romanian and Hungarian historiography regarding the metaphor of
replacing the Turkish wooden yoke with the Austrian iron yoke, at the turn of XVII-XVIII
centuries. Inside the historiographical discussions, especially on shaping a response to the
pressures of Romanian historians of Stalinist ideological bill, permitted, even claimed by
the communist regime in Romania, but also of the attempt to seize the historical writing of
nationalist communism, ranges also the contribution of Gabriel Moisa, while Igor Sarov
submits the contemporary Russian historiography to a review from his relations positions,
almost uncensored, with politics, because of recurrent imperial mentality, in the context of
identity debates, that take place in Moldova, regarding the state and nation, of the role
held in this context by the history textbooks 5. Finally it should be emphasized the analysis
made by Andrei Cusco and Victor Taki, to the seemingly contradictory policy pursued by
the Russian Empire on the periphery administration, also the Bessarabia's case: on the one
hand, the impose of the center's will under the appearance of promoting some values of
modernization, on the other hand, the compromise with local elites, with the fundamental
traditions that fundament the social hierarchies, to which Moscow has not abandoned
throughout the nineteenth century.
The papers contained in the second section of the volume, Policy, Administration
and Society in the Empires of the Modern Age, contributions from established historians or
of some young becoming historians, are in fact the reporting of the historical realities
circumscribed to the Romanian medieval world to the materialization forms of the
imperial idea. A modern perspective of a very good connoisseur of medieval world
history, brings Serban Turcuş, by the special interpretation that gave to some documents
on the offensive Papacy, after the victory against the German emperors in the investiture
dispute, with the purpose of the concept of overlapping Christianitas, by which expressed
their own version of putting into practice the idea of empire over the Christian world, in
one of the most glorious moments in the history of papal institution, the one from the 12 13th Century. In this context the example of Transylvania was recovered on its integration
into Christian universality, as a result of increased interest for it in the context of the
Crusades. Interest on the realities of the first centuries of the Hungarian kingdom, also
showed Florin Sfrengeu.
Identifying the Hungarian chronicles, the Gesta Hungarorum, of the notary
Anonymous, at the Painted Chronicle in Vienna, the historian noted the anti-empire attitude
as a response to the embodied policy of the Roman-German Empire in the first place, but
also of the Byzantine Empire in this respect. An important contribution of the Holy See's
efforts to expand their spiritual influence to the East of Byzantium dominated by resizing
actions "missionary", coordinated by the papacy in various ways to attract the "pagans,
heretics and schismatic" from the Eastern Hungarian Kingdom, the Transylvania and outside
the Carpathian arc, brings the erudite study of the Acad. Ioan-Aurel Pop. It should be
highlighted then the Professor Ion Eremia initiative to engage in historiographical old
dispute about the Moldavian - Russian "Treaty" of 1656. The analysis was based on a
number of documents belonging to Russian historiography. The author argues that in fact
such a treaty was not signed, never really looking at the project proposed by the Moldavian
side, an act which was written in Greek in Moscow on 17 May 1656.
The study signed by Michael Georgita, is aimed at the conquest period of Oradea
and its transformation and of a large part of Bihor region into Ottoman pashalic. Based on
5
Ibidem, p.9
201
original archive material, the article analyzes the social and religious change, marked by
economic transformations in the area. The Hungarian Protestant powerful center in Oradea
will be transformed into a Muslim city.
In a well-documented paper, Sorin Sipos is involved, from the standpoint of the
historian by profession, without religious overtones, into the developed discussions, held
in the Romanian historiography often from partisan positions, on time and documents of
the Transylvanian Romanians Union at the turn XVII-XVIII centuries, with the Church of
Rome. There are also caught the very interests of the Habsburg Empire to rebuild the
battered positions of the Catholic Reformation in Transylvania by attracting the religious
beliefs of the majority and the Transylvanian Romanian clergy interest to overcome the
precarious social conditions, by accepting a compromise considered minor. Also a replay
of the discussions around the historical circumstances of the establishment of Habsburg
rule in the Transylvanian area also propose Florina Ciure, of the Habsburg uprising led by
Francis Rákóczi the II, seen through the Venetian archives researched in the original
documents, which shall highlight the Sernissima interest, directly involved in the events,
to the development of the relations between the Ottoman and Austrian and after the Peace
of Satu Mare.
The third section of the volume, Policy, Administration and Society inside the
Empires in the Modern Age, groups circumscribed contributions of the imperial policy of
modernization both in the Eastern and Western Romanian. In the reconstruction of
historical realities often on a documentary basis, we learn about the various measures
taken on different plans by the Austrian state in Transylvania, on preventing and
combating famine in the eighteenth century, analysis made by Ioan Ciorba. The same
Habsburg state with modernizer appetit has made efforts to raise social and cultural life of
the peasantry, for economic, fiscal, and political or religious, as demonstrated in the study
signed by Bodo Edith, on the realities of Bihar after the Theresian settlement of land
records relationships, in parallel with the gradual establishment of control over family,
marital relationships - pursued on legislative plan in Mircea Brie‟s study, from the decrees
in this respect of Joseph the II, to the laws adopted in the dualist period -, for
implementing, at the parish level, a minimum bureaucratic records that have been
successful, with significant temporary differences, also in the Orthodox church, an idea
demonstrated by the work approved and signed by Cristian Apati.
One of the policies pursued by the empires of the modern era was that of
uniformity in several ways. In terms of administrative and institutional, not always with
success expected, idea approved on Ludmila Coada's paper regarding the impose on the
Basarabia space of the zemsta. Conceived as an instrument of domination of the center,
through its representatives into the local population in Basarabia, became a Romanian
national and local resistance. In terms of religious, the practice unit was applied for both
empires that fit the current Romanian state. The Habsburg Empire was trying to make out
of Catholicism the unity element of the ethnic mosaic empire, and the Russian one was
trying to use in the same goal the orthodoxy. This king of compared analysis was
proposed by Ion Gumenâi. On the same line, Andreana Brandas and Emilia - Adina Gale
propose an approach from the micro-history of the confessional liability at the Romanian
population of Transylvania, understood in its large sense, at the level of a community
taken as study case, part of a larger phenomenon of frequent passes on one side or another
of the confessional border inter-Romanian, very vague from the point of view of the
peasant- Christians, of returning to orthodoxy of some communities that passed previously
to the Greek-Catholicism, in the new politic and legislative context of the 1848-1849
202
revolution and its consequences 6. Another institution used by the modern state to
implement its policy was school, as demonstrated by Radu Românaşu, referring again to
Transylvania (XIX-XX).
The Empire, its stiffness in relation to institutional spirit of the times, hence the
need to reform, was of interest to the thinkers and politicians of the time, one of the
solutions agreed upon, including the Romanian politicians, is that of federalism, as
demonstrated by the study proposed by Ovidiu Muresan with the historical realities of
central and southeastern Europe dating from the nineteenth and early twentieth century.
Starting from the important Romanian contributions to the exchange of ideas in
international relations system, such as those of David Mitrany, Adrian Popoviciu's study,
deals from a functionalist perspective the activity of the European Commission of
Danube. Also in the field of international relations, the role given to images of countries
and peoples considered exemplary, the case of England and English people in national
pedagogy of the new states with archaic societies such as Romania, are seen also in the
research of Dana Pantea.
The first works that make up the fourth section of the volume, titled Building and
Imperial Strategies in the Romanian Space of the 20th Century, have a common point and that
is the crossing of Basarabia from the Russian Empire to the Romanian state, respectively from
the Soviet Union and its consequences. We see here the contributions of Octavian Ticu of the
interrelationship between the development of Basarabia as part of the inter-war Romanian
state and discussions, maintained by the Soviet Union on its international status, of Theodore
Candu on the administrative organization of Basarabia as part of the Romanian state, the
George Palade considerations regarding the Romanian intellectual drama experienced as a
result of the annexation of Bessarabia in the Russian province, in 1940the value judgments
made by Penka Peev on U.S. foreign policy on Russia and Eastern Europe, expressed at a
conference in Moscow in 1945 and its consequences for Romania and Bulgaria, in line with
their entry into the Soviet sphere, and Mihai Drecin's considerations relating to changes in the
guidelines of the Romanian foreign policy, from obedience to Moscow on what he called a
policy of "national dignity". The second section includes papers that examine the institutional
changes triggered by the entry of Transylvania in the Romanian state, as is the case of
Florentina Chirodea's work on the transition from the Hungarian authorities to the Romanian
of the Law Academy of Oradea and ends with the ultimatum given in the summer of 1940 by
Russia to Romania the question of Basarabia, as it appears from the reports of French
diplomats, recovered by Antonio Faur. The work proposed by Istvan Polgar is a discussion on
the older argument, supported in the historiographical and political Hungarian circles, the
civilizing mission of the Hungarians in Central Europe and the Balkans as part of the theory of
the historical rights of Hungary over Transylvania, which opposed the demographic principles
on which Europe's political map was redrawn after World War I.
Finally, the fifth section of the volume, Consequences and Echoes of Imperial
Policies in Recent History, collected works on todays international relations from which
do not miss the reflexes of imperial policy, whether it is about the imperial tendencies
identified by Ioan Horga in the global international society, in which a small number of
states have the power structures and influence the nature of international relations and
efforts to preserve the traditional interests in the Black Sea area, of identification of others
in the new geostrategic context (Dorin Dolghi), of the foreign policy characteristic of the
great powers, primarily Russia, but not only, of seeking pretexts to justify the maintaining
of a climate of conflict in the former Soviet Union, to look like the rescuer and the
6
Ibidem, p.10
203
guarantor of peace (Titus Fizeşan). Of the attempt to impose to the states drawn from the
Soviet empire, in search of identity, with the support of pro-Russian political regimes - the
case of the communist one in the Moldavian Republic - through textbooks, always
forming of opinion, a convenient historic speech, etc.., treated by the historian Sergiu
Musteaţă. Luminita Soproni's paper reminds us that we live in a world where the
imperialism is promoted not only by states but also by transnational companies, such as
"communication empires", the great trust and support aimed at globalization and exerting
influence in today's world of multiple influences, including political. In her paper,
Cristina Dogot argues that the state structures are, or should be, increasingly dependent on
operating principles as the private sector, bringing as a case study the Romanian
administrative system, which increases the pressure on reform, despite some inertial
resistance. Last but not least, Constantin Toca urges on reflection on the relationship
between global and local level, necessary to keep a balance between two trends, bringing
the case as an example of Oradea, from many points of view, a Europe in miniature.
Therefore, a volume in which thematic variety inevitable to the large number of
works of authors with different concerns, is tempered by the value of studies on several
fronts to support the high pressure exerted by the empires of the area, both East and West
in the Romanian space, with converged finalities, those of ruling and dominate, with the
propagandist assuming of a civilized messianic, with partial differentiation in terms of
means and outcomes.
Romanian-Hungarian-Ukrainian Cross-border Cooperation
Constantin – Vasile Ţoca
Ioan Horga, István Süli_Zakar, Cross-border Partnership with special
regard to the Hungarian-Romanian-Ukrainian Tripartite Border, Oradea
University Press, ISBN 978-606-10-0153-8, University of Debrecen Press,
ISBN 978-963-473-145-7, 264 pp.
Ioan Horga and István Süli – Zakar are two important personalities amongst the
academics in Oradea and Debrecen. They are also co-directors of the Institute for
Euroregional Studies with a remarkable activity in cross-border research, international
topic conferences. Last but not least they are the fathers of Eurolimes, a journal highly
quoted and regarded on an international level. The contribution of professors Ioan Horga
and Istvan Suli-Zakar is highlighted by their regional, national and international input
according to articles in the field.
The volume “CROSS-BORDER PARTNERSHIP WITH SPECIAL REGARD TO
THE HUNGARIAN-ROMANIAN-UKRAINIAN TRIPARTITE BORDER” is made up of
seven chapters each corresponding to a topic of interest for the investigated field, such as:
Cross-border Cooperation, Human Resources, Economy in the Border Regions, Transport,
Regional Development, Tourism in the Border Regions, International Law.
Hungary and Romania are two European Union Member States, while Ukraine is
not a member of the European Union, so that the borders of the two EU Member States
are EU external borders. At this level, there are two cooperation instruments through
Cohesion Policy and European Neighbourhood Policy as well as the cooperation on the
level of Euroregions. The Romanian-Hungarian-Ukrainian intersection area stands for a
space providing several cooperation opportunities. Thus there are several fields of crossborder interest needing joint support and intervention. The religious dimension is brought
to the foreground due to the role played by the Reformed Church in Beregszaz in the
Hungarian-Ukrainian cross-border cooperation programmes. On the other hand,
educational culture is stressed through existing connections and others in development in
the field. An example in point could be the communities in Debrecen and Oradea through
the European students and staff exchange programmes.
Through its institutions, the European Union brings to the foreground the
importance of cross-border cooperation by turning to its specific instruments. The main
objective is preventing the isolation of border areas by promoting cross-border
cooperation relations, considering that these neighbouring areas face a similar situation,
which strengthens the development of cross-border relations in different fields of interest
on both sides of the border.
There are surveys on human resources regarding the importance of the Academy
of Law in Oradea considered an important educational centre, when the municipality of
Oradea used to be a remarkable cultural, economic and administrative centre. Another
branch relating to education makes reference to the Attraction Zone of the Ferenc Rakozi
II Transcarpathian Hungarian College, a college in Ukraine that is the only institution
where the educational process is carried out in Hungarian. It is an important centre for
human resource development in the field.
The elements focusing on demographic evolution in the Upper Bistra Valley
(Bihor County, Romania) are statistically analysed throughout time as of the 1890s to
205
2002 drawing attention to the historical importance of the region that has undergone a
series of representative events throughout history. As to crime in Debrecen and the HajduBihor County, statistical data are provided on the diversity of criminal acts based on
police reports.
The economic dimension in the border region shows some interesting elements,
such as:
a) The importance of liquid, solid and gas products on the industrial and urban
levels. If ill-managed, they may lead to serious environmental issues in the Bihor
– Hajdu-Bihar Euroregion. Several relevant statistical data are provided for the
region with significant indices based on a representative sample for different
periods in 1999 – 2004.
b) The importance of Romania‟s Western Region from the point of view of the
companies in the region, as it is considered an advanced dynamic area as
compared to other regions from the socio-economic point of view with
development opportunities in 2007-2013. Romania‟s Western Region is analysed
due to quantitative indices, such as: company typology, number of employees,
income, level of investments and their actives. At the same time, based on the
aforementioned indices, the Western Region is involved in a macro-comparison in
Romania with the aim of showing the differences.
c) The development chances and the local attractiveness mainly depend on the
business environment, the state regulators, region, subregion or settlements with
changing position, Hungary v Slovakia.
d) The dissemination of the Cash and Carry Metro network in Romania and
Hungary, their importance as main investors in the area as shown by the historical
analysis and the international dissemination of the Metro network and the
particular analysis in Romania and Hungary.
e) Investment attractiveness of Special Legal Regime of Economic Activity
(SLREA) in EU border regions of Ukraine. Thus, the Ukrainian border region
with the EU on the SLREA level is shown. There are ten SLREA entities and a
wide range of indices envisaging a special regime of economic activity on the
level of the borders where the abovementioned economic dimension is triggered.
f) The Hungarian-Slovak border analyses the perspective of small settlements:
Hidvegardo and its neighbours. They are submitted to a rigorous analysis from the
point of view of the inhabitants by the decreasing number of people, the
demographic mixture, the decreasing economic activity, the level of employees
and finally a series of opportunities to improve the situation, as well as a possible
pattern of development for the micro-region.
Transport is shown on the level of the Public Transport of the Cities of Northern
Plain Region by analysing three representative cities (Debrecen, Nyiregyhaza, and
Szolnok) through a comparative analysis of public transport, number of passengers (where
applicable, in 1985-2007), the number of vehicles for 1000 inhabitants with statistic data
for 1992-2007; another indicator is the vehicle stock.
Another area analysed in the transport chapter from the point of view of traffic
and infrastructure is the Harghita County regarding soil level on roads and air, airports and
public transport. The county of Harghita is analysed through different quantitative
indicators regarding traffic and communicational infrastructure as compared to other
counties belonging to the Central Region of Romania. On the level of air transport in the
Central Region, there are two international airports in Targu Mures and Sibiu with main
air companies operating in the two international airports.
206
Multilevel governance (MLG) is analysed as compared to the principle of
subsidiarity laying stress on the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU relations with their institutions
and the establishment of new communication and dialogue instruments on a political
level, as well as the Regions Committee (CoR).
The analysis through GIS aims at seizing the features of the Somes region, the
flood risk and the enforcement of flood risk management. From the same regional
perspective, an efficient comparison is shown on the Romanian-Hungarian cross-border
level, the Northern Great Hungarian Plain and the North-Western Region with regional
similarities and differences. Besides the two regions mentioned above, other regions are
analysed, such as the Western Transdanubian Region.
Besides the macro-regional cross-border development, an analysis on the microregional level is carried out, that is, rural development in the Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg
counties lying stress on agriculture, habitat rehabilitation and ecotourism.
The tourist potential of the triple Romanian-Hungarian-Ukrainian border is
remarkable and renowned yet not necessarily fully valued, so that surveys in the field aim at
promoting the tourist potential and the priorities of cross-border tourist cooperation priorities.
The last chapter entitled International Law approaches a series of significant
topics covering a wide range in the field of the European social law, the regime of
liberalising visas in the EU and Ukraine, the cooperation for fiscal administration on the
level of the Romanian-Hungarian border, the controversies regarding the Trianon Treaty
and last but not least the comparative analysis of offences in different legal systems.
In conclusion, we may say that the volume entitled “CROSS-BORDER
PARTNERSHIP WITH SPECIAL REGARD TO THE HUNGARIAN-ROMANIANUKRAINIAN TRIPARTITE BORDER” provides an accurate image of the major topics
investigated at the Romanian-Hungarian-Ukrainian borders stressing the existing
cooperation and at the same time identifying new priorities with the aim to harmoniously
develop on the cross-border level by turning to the functional European instruments and
funds granted by the EU institutions. We have to remind here the ENPI Cross-border
Cooperation Programme Hungary-Slovakia-Romania-Ukraine 2007-2013. The general
aim of the programme is to promote activities strengthening and deepening social and
economic cooperation in the Ukrainian regions and the Member States with common
border, as well as local, regional, national and European institutions focusing on crossborder cooperation with the support of the European Union.
About the authors
Josef ABRHÁM, PhD, born in 1977, a director of the Centre for European Studies at the
University or Economics, Prague. His research interests concentrate in european economy,
european integration processes and economic policy of the EU. He is author or co-author
of more than houndred publications, published in Czech Republic or abroad. Residential
research at Catholik university University of Ljubljana (2008), Leueven (2005), TU
Dresden (2003). (E-mail: [email protected]).
Luisa BRAVO, MA in International Economics at Brescia University and Master in
European Studies at Padova University. Is collaborating with the Jean Monnet Chair in
Economics of the European integration at the University of Brescia.
Zsuzsa M. CSÁSZÁR, PhD, is a professor at University of Pécs, Faculty of Sciences,
Institute of Geography, Department of Political Geography and Regional Development where
she teaches courses on methodology of geography, Historical Geography of the Europe,
Human geography of Balkan, History of culture in Balkan, Balkan ethnical and cultural
geography. Her main research topics are: the spatial pattern of human resources, social
geography, educational geography, the Balkan in political, cultural and social aspects.
Olivier DEHOORNE is Professor of Geography at the Université des Antilles et de la
Guyane. His main interest is in the tourism geography of Antilles an many other regions
of the world. He focuses on the problems of small islands in a world dominated by
globalisation. (E-mail: [email protected])
Dorin I. DOLGHI, is a lecturer within the Department of European Studies and
International Relations from the University of Oradea, where he teaches courses on
security studies, conflict management, EU integration and diplomacy. He is the
coordinator of the MA program in European Security and the Editor in Chef of the
Romanian Journal of Security Studies. (E-mail: [email protected])
Dacian DUNA, is a lecturer within the Department of Contemporary History and
International Relations at the “Babeş-Bolyai” University of Cluj-Napoca. He has a PhD in
International Relations with a thesis on “European Security Policy at the beginning of the
21st Century”. His research interests include international and European security studies,
IR theory, geopolitics and conflict management. (E-mail: [email protected])
Gennady FEDOROV graduated from Geographic faculty of St-Petersburg State
University (1972). He obtained degrees of Candidate of Science in Geography (1977),
Dphil (1988), Professor (1989). He works in the Kaliningrad State University (in 20052010 Immanuel Kant State University of Russia, since the end of 2010 -Immanuel Kant
Baltic Federal University) since 1972. He was the Rector of the University in 1994-1998,
the Vice-rector for research in 1990-1994 and since 2003 till nowadays. G. Fedorov is the
Head of the Chair of the Socio-economic Geography and Geopolitics since 1982 till
nowadays. His scientific specialization is Social, Economic and Politic geography of the
Baltic Sea region. He is the author of 370 publications, incl. 40 publications abroad (USA,
Germany, Finland, Poland, Lithuania). Co-chair of editorial board of the journal “Baltic
Region” (printed in Russian and English). He was co-ordinator or expert of more than 20
international research projects about Russian-European co-operation in the Baltic Sea
Region. ([email protected])
210
Andrea FORNARI is Gratuated in Economics at Brescia University. Presently is
manager of a multinational company. Collaborator of the Jean Monnet Chair has
published articles on EU external relations, Turkey and Mediterranean policy.
([email protected])
Vasile GRAMA received his BA degree in Geography in 2006. Since 2007 he has been
enrolled as PhD student in Political Geography focusing on Eastern External Border and
Borderlands of the European Union. Since 2005 is active in the Lifelong Learning
Programme, being responsible for the International Relations of the Department of
Geography, Tourism and Territorial Planning, coordinating 38 bilateral agreements
between University of Oradea and several Universities all over Europe, South America,
China etc. He‟s currently involved in the Department of Geography, Tourism and
Territorial Planning daily activities, teaching to undergraduates students and supporting
the department in developing various research projects proposals, financed through
Romanian or international programs. (E-mail: [email protected])
Alexandru ILIEŞ studied Geography at the „Babes-Bolyai” University in Cluj- Napoca
(Romania) and received his Ph.D. in 1997. Starting 2004 is Full Professor at the
University of Oradea, establishing the first Chair of Political Geography. Since 2005 is
also Full Professor of the University of Gdansk, Poland. Currently he is the Head of
Department of Geography, Tourism and Territorial Planning, and Director of the Centre of
Studies and Territorial Analyses. He is member of the Steering Committee of International
Geographical Union – Commission on Political Geography, since 2004; member of
Institute of Euroregional Studies Oradea – Debrecen since 2005, Editor in chief of the
scientific review Romanian Review on Political Geography. In February 2009 he was
awarded by the Hungarian Academy for Science. (E-mail: [email protected])
Dorina Camelia ILIEŞ works as Associate Professor at the Department of Geography,
Tourism and Territorial Planning, University of Oradea. Her Competence domains are in
Geography, Economy, Geology, Environment protection, Geosites, GIS applications in
Geology and Geography. She is the Editor in Chief of scientific journal “GeoJournal of
Tourism and Geosites” and Visiting professor at the Universities from Modena (Italy),
Koper (Slovenia), Gdansk (Poland), Pecara (Italy), Debrecen (Hungary), Venice (Italy) in
the frame of Socrates/Erasmus programme. (E-mail: [email protected])
Magdalena KĄKOL, PhD, is a lecturer at Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin
(Poland), Faculty of Economics, Chair of the World Economy and European Integration.
She earned two M.A. degrees: in economics and law from the same university. During her
studies and scientific activity she obtained four foreign grants and scholarships. In her
research work she specialises in international economics and European integration and
especially in monetary integration and EU competition policy. She is the author or coauthor of over forty publications. She is also a member of Euro Team – the group of
national experts for Euro introduction. (E-mail: [email protected])
Valentin KORNEEVETS graduates from Byelorussian Agriculture Academy (1980). He
obtained degrees of Candidate of Science in Economy (1989). He works in the
Kaliningrad State University (in 2005-2010 Immanuel Kant State University of Russia,
since the end of 2010 Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University) since 1991. He was
Researcher, Associate-Professor of Department of Economic Geography, Head of the
211
Laboratory of Regional Planning in 1991-1999, Head of the Department “Social and
Cultural Service and Tourism” and Vice-rector for Economic Affairs of the University
since 2000 till nowadays. His scientific specialization is regional economy, transborder
cooperation of the Baltic Sea
region. He is author of 180 publications, incl. 20
publications abroad (USA, Germany, France, Poland). He is participant of different
international programmes: UNIDO, TACIS, VASAB-2010, he has professional training in
Yale University (1997), Grenoble University (1998), Haage (2001). He was co-ordinator
or expert of more than 10 international research projects: “Social-economic development
of Kaliningrad oblast”, “Development of health resort and tourist complex”,
“Development of agroindustrial complex”, “Kaliningrad Region into Baltic Economical
Space” and other. (E-mail: [email protected])
Bogumiła MUCHA-LESZKO is a professor at the Faculty of Economics within Maria
Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin (Poland) where she is in charge of the Chair of the
World Economy and European Integration. Her research and teaching interests lie in
international economics and European integration, especially in the global economy,
international trade and monetary integration. Since 1995 she is a holder of the Jean
Monnet Chair in Economics of European Integration and the scientific editor of the
“European Bulletin”, a book series of the Maria Curie-Skłodowska University‟s
Publishing House. She is the author or co-author of more than a hundred publications,
published in Poland and abroad. She earned many grants and scholarships from the US
and European institutions and took part in as well as coordinated several research-teaching
projects, finances by the European Commission. She is also a member of Euro Team – the
group of national experts for Euro introduction. (E-mail: [email protected])
Adrian-Claudiu POPOVICIU is a Assistant PhD at the European Studies and
International Relations Chair. Founding member and secretary of the Romanian
Association of International Relations and European Studies, founding member of the
Institute for Euroregional Studies (ISER). Author of 1 book and 11 articles in Romanian
and European magazines and journals, participating in several projects with European
funding, beneficiary of over 10 Lifelong Learning Programs/Erasmus Staff Training and
Lifelong Learning Programs/Erasmus Teaching Assignments Didactic competences:
International Law, European Community Law, European Social Law, Cross-Border
Cooperation, Cross-Border Law. (E-mail: [email protected])
Angelo SANTAGOSTINO is Jean Monnet professor of Economics of the European
Integration at the University of Brescia. He studies economics of international integration,
applied both the European and Latin America cases. He is author of a book and articles
related with Turkey and EU‟s Mediterranean policy. He has also analyzed the relations
between Europe and the Islamic world. (E-mail: [email protected])
Nicolae TOBOŞARU, PhD, is a retired Lieutenant Colonel of the Romanian Army and
associate lecturer at the University of Oradea, within the MA program of European
Security where he teaches courses on national security policies and management of
unconventional threats management. His research interest is focused on Romania-US
Partnership, security dynamics at the eastern border of NATO and EU and national
security
212
Constantin-Vasile ŢOCA is a lecturer at the Facultaty of History, Geography and
International Relations from the University of Oradea. He is also the coordinator of the
European Information and Consulting Center, and member of the Institute for
Euroregional Studies. He obtained his licence degree in sociology at the University of
Bucharest, master degree in Euroregional Studies at University of Oradea, and he is a PhD
student at the University of Debrecen in the field of social geography and regional
development and at the University of Oradea in the field of sociology. Published articles:
Constantin – Vasile Ţoca, Sociological research: University of Oradea‟s student‟s
knowledge regarding the Bihor – Hajdu Bihar and Carpathian Euroregions, in Regional
Development in the Romanian – Hungarian cross-border space – from National to
European perspective, edited by Istvan Suli – Zakar, Ioan Horga, a Debreceni Egyetem
Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadoja, Debrecen, 2006, pp 129 – 137; Ţoca Constantin, Ioan Horga,
Sociological research. Thinching the future together the Debrecen – Oradea cross –
border agglomeration, in Neighbours and Partners: on the two sides of de border, Edited
by Istvan Suli – Zakar, a Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadoja, Debrecen, 2008,
pp 73-83; Ţoca Constantin – Vasile, Hataron ativelo agglomeratio: Debrecen –
Nagyvarad SWOT Analiyise, in ACTA IUVENTUTIS GEOGRAPHICA, edited by Istvan
Suli – Zakar, a Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadoja, Debrecen, 2009, pp 217223. E-mail: [email protected]
Jan WENDT studied Geography and History at the Gdańsk University (Poland) and
received his Ph.D. in 1996 at Institute of Political Sciences PAS at Warsaw. Starting 2008,
after habilitation at Institute of Geography and Spatial Organization PAS (Warsaw), is
Professor at the Gdańsk University. Since 2008 is also Professor of the University of
Oradea, Romania. Currently he is working at Department of Regional Development
Geography, Institute of Geography Gdańsk University. He is member of International
Geographical Union – Commission on Political Geography, member of Scientifical Board
of Baltic Institute, and member of several scientific boards of journals and magazines.
Tomasz WISKULSKY finished Geography at the Gdańsk University (2009) and he is
PhD student at Institute of Geography, at Department of Regional Development
Geography. He is interesting in developing transport net and regional and local
development.
Eurolimes
Has published
Vol. 1/2006 Europe and its Borders: Historical Perspective
Vol. 2/2006 From Smaller to Greater Europe: Border Identitary Testimonies
Vol. 3/2007 Media, Intercultural Dialogue and the New Frontiers of Europe
Vol. 4/2007 Europe from Exclusive Borders to Inclusive Frontiers
Vol. 5/2008 Religious frontiers of Europe
Vol. 6/2008 The Intercultural Dialogue and the European Frontiers
Vol. 7/2009 Europe and the Neighbourhood
Vol. 8/2009 Europe and its Economic Frontiers
Vol. 9/2010 The Cutural Fronties of Europe
Will publish
Vol. 11/2011 Leaders of the Borders, the Borders of the Leaders
Vol. 12/2011 Communication and European Frontiers
Vol. 13/2012 Permeability and the impermeability of socio-economic frontiers
within European Union
Vol. 14/2012 Enlargements, Borders and the changes of EU political priorities
Vol. 15/2013 A security dimension as trigger and result of frontiers modifications

The Geopolitics of the European Frontiers

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