BREIVIK CASE" AS AN EXAMPLE OF MORAL SUICIDE

Journal of Geography, Politics and Society,
ISSN 2084-0497
Year III, no. 1(5), June 2013
[email protected]
BREIVIK CASE" AS AN EXAMPLE
OF MORAL SUICIDE
A lex ey TR O TSA K
Im m a n u e l K a n t B altic F e d e ra l U n iv ersity , K a n t In s titu te ,
K a lin in g ra d , R u s s ia
E -m ail: alek se i_ tro c a k @ m a il.ru
S u m m a ry : T h e g e n e ra l p h ilo so p h ic a l m e a n in g of su ic id e is still
o ften c o n n e c te d w ith th e p ro b lem of free will, w h ic h t r a n s la te s
in c o rre c tly n o t only in to ev ery d ay life b u t also in to p h ilo s o p h ic a l
tre a tis e s . T h e c o n n e c tio n of su ic id e to th e p ro b le m of free will is
m e n tio n e d by th e sto ic, S e n e c a , w h o n a m e d s u ic id e a lib e ra tio n from
th e n e c e s s ity of n a tu r e .
K eyw ord s: s u ic id e , m o ra l s u ic id e , p h y sic a l s u ic id e , su ic id e
typology, c a s u is try , A n o th e r o ne, th e lim its of free will, m o tiv e a n d
m ove.
Introduction
problem
-Suicide
as
a
general
philosophical
The g eneral philo so p h ical p ro b lem of su icid e cam e into
th e w orld lexicon of e th ics, psychology a n d sociology in XX
cen tu ry . W orld w a rs a n d cata c ly sm s forced a h u m a n being to
d o u b t in th e belief of h is m ig h t a n d h is u n lim ited pow er over
n a tu re , w hich c a u se d (or provoked) in dividual or even m assive
c a se s of self-deprivation of life b a se d on different b a ck g ro u n d s.
T h a t's w hy K an tian e th ics, th a t s ta n d for h u m a n
au to n o m y , have b een sh a rp ly criticized especially by th e
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p h ilo so p h ies of th e XX c e n tu ry a n d p a rtic u la rly by th e
p h ilo so p h e r O.W eininger: “K an t's lonely m a n does n o t d an ce or
laugh; he n e ith e r b raw ls n o r m a k e s m erry; h e feels n o n eed to
m ak e a noise, b e c a u se th e u n iv erse is so silen t a ro u n d h im ”
(W eininger 1906: 98).
The g en eral p h ilo so p h ical m ean in g of suicide is still often
co n n ected w ith th e problem of free will, w hich tra n s la te s
incorrectly n o t only into everyday life b u t also into
p hilo so p h ical tre a tise s. The co n n ectio n of su icid e to th e
problem of free will is m en tio n ed by th e stoic, S en eca, w ho
n a m e d suicide a lib eratio n from th e n e ce ssity of n a tu re .
F. N ietzsche co n n ected th e ascetic ideal w ith th e desire of
deriving free from life by th e «Wille zum Nichts», J . H illm an,
w ho guided stu d ie s for C.G. J u n g , conceived of su icid e a s a
release of a h u m a n bein g from deep in n e r w orries. A lo t of
th in k e rs u n d e rs ta n d (perceive) su icid e a s a relief or a n a ct of
free will in o th e r w ords. The p h e n o m en o n of suicide h a s b een
ex p ressed in th e philo so p h y of th e 2 0 th c e n tu ry so frequently
th a t it w as even referred to by one of th e k ey re p re se n ta tiv e s of
existen tialism , A. C am u s, a t th e b eginning of h is w ork, “The
M yth of S isy p h u s” (“Le M ythe de S isy p h e”): T h ere is b u t one
tru ly serio u s p h ilosop h ical problem , a n d th a t is suicide.
J u d g in g w h e th e r life is or is n o t w o rth living a m o u n ts to
an sw erin g th e fu n d a m e n ta l q u e stio n of p h ilo so p h y ” (C am us
1955: 3).
The problem of suicide also offers a g en eral q u a n d a ry in
p hilosophy, w hich affects th e q u e stio n of free will a n d j u s t how
easily a h u m a n m a k e s a choice to keep living or to die
consciously. The q u e stio n of freedom to u c h e s th e b a sic s of
p hilo so p h ical m odels in gen eral, w hich are relev an t to th e
p ro b lem s of first principle, prim e c a u se , sp o n tan e ity ,
m otivation, categories of n e ce ssity , ra n d o m n e ss (eventuality).
From th e first p o in t of view, it seem s th a t B reivik's actio n
is n o t co n n ected to th e problem of suicide a t all. T his
im p ressio n a p p e a rs j u s t b e c a u se th e m ajority of people
u n d e rs ta n d suicide a s a p h y sical a c t of self-d estru ctio n , b u t
we s h o u ld n ’t forget th a t a n actio n is a re s u lt of a clear m otive
a n d m otives determ in e action.
B reivik's action does n o t en d w ith h is self-m u rd er, - he
d id n ’t w a n t th a t. B u t th e q u e stio n is if h e cro ssed th e line of
m orality a n d resp o n sib ility by killing o th e r people. In th is case
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we sh o u ld ra ise a problem of m o ral suicide a s a condition
(state) w h en th e su b je c t lo ses p rem ised borders ev en th o u g h he
does n o t destro y h im se lf physically.
“B re iv ik 's ca se ”
It is know n th a t on 22 of J u ly 2011 on 3:25PM th e re w as
a n explosion in th e G o vernm ental d istric t of Oslo. As a re s u lt
seven people died on site, one p e rso n p a ss e d aw ay in h o sp ita l
b e ca u se of in ju ries, 92 people got in ju ries a n d 15 of th e m were
w ounded.
An h o u r a n d a h a lf after th e explosion in th e c e n te r of
Oslo B reivik h a d re a ch e d th e ferry of th e U toya Island. There
w as a n A U F's su m m e r cam p, w here 6 5 5 y o u n g people a t th e
age of 14-25 y e a rs old w ere stay in g a t th a t tim e. Breivik
s ta rte d sh o o tin g people on th e Islan d a n d killed 6 9 of them .
B reivik's actio n a s a m odel of b eh av io r c a n n o t find an y
re a so n e d th in k in g in th e c o n sc io u sn e ss of in telligent h u m a n
beings. B u t even in c o u rt Breivik defiantly acted like a p e rso n
w ho d id n ’t reg ret w h a t h e h a d done. D riven by political
slogans, he fo u n d a n ex cu se for h im se lf by following V oltaire’s
principle of “a sm a ll evil fo r a bigger c a u s e ”.
Owing to th e topicality of th is p a rtic u la r event, it is
im p o rta n t to force ou rselv es n o t to get sid e-tra ck e d by th e
views of th e m a ss e s b u t to try to d eterm in e th e core a n d th e
so u rce of B reivik's actio n s. T hereby “B reivik's case” sh o u ld be
co m p reh en d ed a s a specific situ a tio n , w h en h is free will
derived from a f a ls e idea th a t fo u n d e x p ressio n in a
m u rd e ro u s act.
The core q u e stio n s of th e lim its of free will a p p e a r a t th a t
tim e w h en a p e rso n is losing th e re a so n th a t freedom g ra n ts.
T hese c rite ria m ay be a n d m u s t be ‘A n o th er’ su b je c t . The
m e an in g of “A nother” w as conceived in th e w o rk s of M. B uber,
J -P S a rtre , G. M arcel. The relativity of “Me & A n o th er” is
relev an t n o t only in u n d e rs ta n d in g m o ral in te ra c tio n b u t also
in th e coexistence of civilizations, - Breivik forgot a b o u t th e
m oral fo u n d atio n of th is relativity a n d w en t exactly a g ain st
m u ltic u ltu ra lism a n d accep tab le re a so n .
If th e su b ject destro ys A noth er one
H ypothesis: indirectly h e d estro y s him self: h is m oral
entity, since he alm ost co m m its a suicide. If one im agines a
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closed society of ind iv id u als w ho ex ist in a h o stile en v iro n m en t
a n d one of th e se ind iv id u als decides to d estro y a n o th er, th is
m u s t le sse n h is own c h a n c e s of survival. T he w orld of n a tu re
can be a n tag o n istic to u s a n d a h u m a n being can lose th e
d istin c tio n th a t m a k es h im a h u m a n being. Of co u rse, s u c h a
s itu a tio n is m ore po ssib le in a confined en v iro n m en t, for
exam ple, in th e prim itive co m m u n a l sy stem , w here th e very
clim ate a p p e a rs a s a d e te rm in a n t for h u m a n existence an d
behavior.
The eth ics of K ant also c o n tain th e idea of m o ral su icid e
in c o n ju n ctio n w ith th e a tte m p t to ta k e th e life of a n o th e r
h u m a n being. In “The M etap h y sics of M orals" h e develops a n
idea a b o u t th e concept of liability a n d resp o n sib ility in relatio n
to a n o th e r su b je c t (h u m an being): “M an c an th erefo re have no
d u ty to any beings o th e r th a n m en: a n d h e th in k s h e h a s
s u c h d u tie s, it is b e c a u se of a n am phiboly in h is concepts o f
reflection, a n d h is su p p o se d d u ty to o th e r b ein g s is only a d u ty
to him self. He is led to th is m is u n d e rsta n d in g by m ista k in g h is
d u ty w ith regard to o th e r b ein g s for a d u ty to th o se b ein g s”
(Kant 1991: 237)
The obligation a n d p u rp o se of a h u m a n sh o u ld be
a n tith e tic a l w ith h a tre d on an y level: “B u t hatred of m a n is
alw ays h atefu l, even w h en it ta k e s th e form m erely of
com pletely avoiding m en (se p a ra tist m isan th ro p y ), w ith o u t
active hostility tow ard th em . For benevolence alw ays re m a in s a
d u ty , even tow ard a m isa n th ro p ist, w hom one c a n n o t indeed
love b u t to w hom one c a n still do good” (Kant 1991: 203).
T h a t's w hy a n in d iv id u al ru in s h is m o ral co ndition by
n eglecting th is obligation a n d p u rp o se . And in th e case of
h a tre d to w ard s A noth er w hich e n d s w ith collapse an d even
d e a th , h is a n im al egoism triu m p h s w h ilst ru in in g h is m oral
a ttitu d e to w ard s "Me & A nother".
In sh o rt, th e re is n o e sse n tia l difference betw een m o ral
su icid e a n d p h y sical su icid e, th e en d is still th e d e stru c tio n of
m orality a n d m entality , w hich m e a n s th e o b literatio n of
b o rd e rs of freedom .
T hese ty p es of self-d e stru ctio n (m oral a n d physical)
d e m an d
th a t
we
c o n sid er
th is
p h e n o m en o n
m ore
scru p u lo u sly . P e rh a p s th e difference betw een m o ral an d
p h y sical self-d e stru ctio n c o n sists in th e m otivation a n d th e
direction of a n a c t a n d also in th e tim e seq u en ce: m oral
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suicide com es after th e m u rd e r of o th e r people — p h y sical
suicide com es w h en th e re is n o ability for m o ral su icid e to
p o ten tialise a s life is alread y ex tin g u ish ed .
L et's im agine th is th o u g h t in th e form of m atrix.
S p ecific
difference
Motive
Act
Result
Moral
suicide
D irected
inside
C ould be
d irected
in sid e or
o u tsid e of
y o u rself
E x ecu to r is
physically
alive
for th e
s u p p re ssio n
of rem o rse
for th e
d e stru c tio n
of o th e r
s u b je c ts
D irected
insid e
D irected
in sid e
for th e ability
of m o ral self­
perfection
d e stru c tio n
for th e
d e stru c tio n
of y o u rse lf
Physical
suicide
E x ecu to r
physically
h a s n ’t exist
alread y
Tab. 1. Motive an d Move vector of th e d irectio n w hile suicide
In b o th c a se s of self-h arm a n d h a rm to o th e rs, liability is
ab so lu te. As s u c h , we c a n n o t ta lk a b o u t a n y m o ral law in
action. However, to u n d e rs ta n d th e c h a ra c te r of B reivik's
action deep er we sh o u ld look th ro u g h th e typology of suicide.
The k ey fa cto r that d efin es moral or p h y sica l su icid e is a lw a y s
th e motive.
D epending on th e m otive, we c an identify th e
following ty p es of drive for th e en d in g of life: 1. “dom estic
su icid e”; 2. “p h ilosop h ical self-m u rd er”; 3. “political self­
m u rd e r” or a self-m u rd e r c a u s e d by a political m otive
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All th is typology could be applied to m o ral su icid e so as
to physical.
S p ecific
difference
Domestic
Philosophical
Political
The nature
o f action’s
reason
E x tern al
re a s o n s (e.g.
poverty,
fin an cial
debt,
u n re q u ite d
love a n d so
forth).
In te rn a l
re a so n s: th e
d ish a rm o n y of
p erso n ality
w ith th e
o u tw ard
th in g s.
E x tern al
re a so n s:
rig h ts an d
dignity
a b u s e s of one
p e rso n or
g ro u p s of
people
Action’s
content
The s itu a tio n
on th e
em otional
level seem s to
be unsolvable
by y o u r own
U naccep tan ce
of th e w orld a s
a n id e a b a se d
on th e
a b s tra c t level
of th in k in g
U n accep tan ce
of c ertain
social
m e ch a n ism
or s ta n d a rd s
Action’s
purpose
Self­
deliverance
from th e
problem s.
R ealization of
th e id e a "for
th e oneself"
R ealization of
th e id ea for
th e good of
society
Tab. 2. S uicide typology
H ere it sh o u ld be ex plained th a t self-sacrifice (the
m otivation of th e id ea of service to society) in th e case of self­
d e stru c tio n for th e sak e of th e h u m a n race - we c a n conclude
th a t Breivik did n o t ta k e p a rt in m o ral or political m u rd er.
A ctually Breivik h a d no re a so n to d estro y o th e r people b e ca u se
h is ex isten tial n e e d s w ere n o t p rim ary - t h a t’s w hy th e re is no
m eta p h y sic a l ju stific a tio n for h is actio n s. H is h a tre d for
liberalism ,
m u ltic u ltu ra lism ,
co sm o p o litan ism ,
th e
d isse m in a tio n of Islam ic id e as an d so on provides only a
th e o re tic al objection to life a n d n o t a n excuse for m u rd e r. His
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political objections could hav e fo u n d th e o re tic al a n sw e rs in th e
d em o cratic p ro c e ss th a t h e failed to tr u s t in.
B reivik's action is th e actio n of a cow ard a n d of an
individual w ith o u t conscience, w ho so u g h t to p u n is h o th e rs for
societal grievances y e t to m inim ize th e p o ssib le d am ag e to h is
own life. B reivik w a n ted to live, th a t is w hy h e laid dow n h is
g u n in fro n t of th e policem en th u s signaling th e v alu e h e
p laced on h is ow n existence.
We sh o u ld u n d e rs ta n d th erefo re th a t m o ral d e stru c tio n
does n o t e q u ate to p h y sical d e stru ctio n . B u t th e d e stru c tio n of
o n e's in te rn a l m oral w orld is th e giving in to o n e's own an im al
n a tu re — a n d m ak in g m o ral n o rm s sim ply relative.
W hen m oral freedom is u n d e rm in e d , legal ju s tic e m u s t
intervene. The N orw egian legislative sy stem is p e rh a p s far too
liberally d isp o sed to w a rd s th e likes of Breivik. J u s t tw enty-one
y e a rs in p riso n will n o t co m p en sa te th e victim s' fam ilies n o r
p robably ch an g e th e m a n him self.
(Translated into E n g lish by E ka terina Shevtsova ; E d ited b y A n d y Zneim er)
R E FER EN CES
C a m u s A., 1955, T he M y th o f S is y p h u s a n d o th er E s s a y s , Alfred A.
Knopf. New York.
K a n t I., 1991, T he M e ta p h y sic s o f M orals, C a m b rid g e U n iv ersity
P ress.
W e in in g er O., 1906, S e x a n d C haracter. W illiam H e in e m a n n , G. P.
P u tn a m ’s s o n s , L o n d o n , New York.
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