Peer Review: `Youth Guarantees: PES approaches

Dialogue Conference:
‘Activation and integration: Working with Individual Action Plans’
(Brussels, 8-9 March 2012)
Executive summary
Introduction
The last decade has seen considerable progress in the practice of individual
action planning, with a greater focus on early intervention and ongoing
monitoring and adjustment.
The conference held under the auspices of the “PES to PES Dialogue” programme
sought to build on existing research evidence to discuss current practices in
individual action plans (IAPs) with regard to the preparation, monitoring and followup of IAPs. In doing so, it aimed to contribute to the objectives of the Europe 2020
Strategy by strengthening the development of personalised services in PES. In the
Employment Guidelines, emphasis has been placed on earlier intervention,
continuous monitoring and the regular adjustment of IAPs where necessary.
Through evidence based exchanges between PES managers, PES practitioners,
representatives of the European Commission, the OECD and the academic
community, the conference also highlighted interactions between the practice of
individual action planning, the effective and efficient allocation of Active Labour
Market Policy Measures (ALMPs) and the shape of the benefits framework in
different Member States.
Evidence presented by the OECD showed the progress being made in action
planning over the past decade, also linked to the priorities of the European
Employment Strategy regarding activation.
1. Development and design of IAPs: creating an effective ‘enabling’ tool
Emphasis in the development and implementation of IAPs is towards more
enabling, individualised and adaptable approaches which put the job seeker in
charge and emphasise their strengths, whilst PES offer support. This requires
quality employment guidance and counselling.
Diversity remains at Member State level with regard to who is entitled to an IAP and
at which stage in the unemployment spell. Key to decision making in this regard is
often the use of more or less sophisticated profiling systems, which seek to assess
the likelihood of an individual becoming long-term unemployed and their particular
integration requirements which were already the subject of another PES to PES
Dialogue Conference in 2011.
Although in their dual role, PES tread a fine line between „enabler‟ and „controller‟ (of
requirements for benefit receipt), in many PES the focus of employment counselling
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has been placed on the empowerment of job seekers. In terms of counsellor skills
and training, this requires techniques which allow them to shift the locus of
control to the individual job seeker. Taking more individual responsibility can be a
particular challenge for low skilled job seekers and individuals from certain target
groups who may have „learnt‟ negative perceptions of their ability to affect their own
destiny.
A number of PES underlined the importance of identifying strengths ("selling points")
of a job seeker first during the process of assessment of strengths and weaknesses.
Overall, there is increasing recognition of the importance of transferable labour
market skills. This has also translated into a greater emphasis on soft skills in
assessment. The identification of such job seeker strengths is often used by
counsellors to „market‟ job seeker skills acquired outside the labour market, or to
work towards the accreditation of informal skills attained in previous employment. A
variety of hard and soft profiling tools are being used in different PES to support the
assessment. Overall, the emphasis in PES has been towards a more enabling
approach.
It is important that the IAP reflects mutual obligations. This is best achieved
with a document agreed and signed by both sides.
IAPs are an important tool as they create a mutual obligation, on the one hand for
the PES to provide support, and on the other hand for the job seeker to take
prescribed steps towards the labour market against an agreed time horizon. This
mutual commitment is strengthened if both sides sign the agreement.
In a number of Member States, there is a recognition that certain types of job
seekers, above all those with more complex employability barriers (long-term
unemployed, certain target groups etc) can be more effectively assessed and
assisted by organisations which can offer specialist services not available
within the PES. This can be true of non-governmental organisation (NGO) providers
(such as those representing disabled individuals or certain ethnic groups) or of
private providers. In both cases, it is, however, important that the PES maintain a link
to monitoring outcomes and ensuring quality control.
Despite the term IAP, it is acknowledged that the extent to which planned
interventions are really individual depends on a number of factors, including
The ratio between counsellor and job seekers (and therefore the time
available to prepare and review plans for each individual);
Level of training and skills of individual counsellors;
Legislative provisions relating to ALMPs which can also restrict the extent to
which IAPs can be tailor made.
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2. Monitoring and follow-up of IAPs: No one size fits all in balancing
support and sanctions
Emphasis is increasingly on more regular monitoring, while the frequency of
contacts depends on client/counsellor ratios and PES regulations.
It is in relation to the monitoring and follow-up that the dual role of PES in
„supporting‟ and „controlling‟ job seekers is clearly evident, although there are
indications the supporting function clearly prevails and the share of job seekers
sanctioned is rather low (only around 10%).
Processes of monitoring and follow-up of IAPs vary significantly between Member
States, including in terms of
Frequency
Method (e.g. face to face or online)
Timescale and method for adaptation of IAPs
Potential reasons for sanctioning
Severity and duration of sanctions
Most PES review IAPs on a regular basis to ensure they remain appropriate to the
jobseeker‟s current situation and requirements. However, it is fair to say that the
extent to which such adaptation takes place depends on the ratio between
counsellor and job seekers and PES regulations.
Frequency of monitoring can be linked to the particular profile or target group of the
individual in question and ranges from weekly monitoring to follow-up only every few
months. It is difficult to create a clear linkage between the frequency of monitoring
and the emphasis which can be seen to be placed on the controlling versus
supporting aspects of the PESs‟ work. While in some countries frequent and early
monitoring is part of a strong enabling approach, in others the emphasis is on short,
regular meetings primarily to monitor job search activity or other aspects of
compliance with the action plan. Overall, the trend has been towards more frequent
and continuous follow-up.
In order to make best use of increasingly scarce resources, some PES tend to
place more emphasis on electronic or telephone channels for monitoring. This
approach is most developed in the Netherlands, which seeks to direct 90% of its
interactions with jobseekers to the online channel by 2014. Such an approach
requires „renegotiation of the psychological contract‟ between PES and job seekers,
towards much greater responsibility and autonomy on the part of job seekers.
Frequent and short face-to-face interaction currently remains favoured in the UK as a
result of research indicating that off-loads from the claimant register diminish as the
interval between visits to PES offices increases. Other methods include the
approach used in Malta which also requires regular visits to PES offices but utilises
fingerprint technology to record attendance and triggers the delivery of a printed
record of their obligations under the IAP and the support available to them.
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The share of job seekers that are sanctioned is limited. Sanctions should be
clear, fair, immediate and graduated
The question of sanctioning is a politically and indeed psychologically sensitive one
for policy makers and PES employment counsellors. The latter tend to see
themselves as enablers, wishing to assist job seekers in making positive and
sustainable transitions, whereas political emphasis can be on rapid transitions
achieved through a sensitive balance between „carrot and stick‟. In the context of
more difficult labour market conditions with more scarce employment opportunities,
this balance clearly becomes more difficult to strike. Although the political debate is
often dominated by questions of what may be defined as a „reasonable‟ job offer in
situations where any suitable job has to be accepted by law (link to previous
qualifications, distance to travel to work etc), statistics on sanctions demonstrate that
refusal of a „reasonable work job‟ is only one reasons sanctions are imposed. Other
reasons include failure to attend meetings and to take part in agreed measures. It is
self-evident that a sanctioning regime can clearly only help to correct behaviour
in situations where job seekers are in receipt of benefits. As a result, in
countries where benefits are only paid for a limited duration, the potential impact of
sanctioning regimes is also restricted (although arguably the short duration of benefit
payments could also act as an incentive in itself for a more rapid return to the labour
market in situations where social benefits payable after unemployment benefits are
significantly lower).
To conclude from PES experience, a balance also needs to be struck between
reasons for sanctions being laid down in law and covered by clear guidance,
and discretion in individual cases. It is important for counsellors to be able to
inform job seekers (who are entitled to benefits) of the consequences of not meeting
the requirements of the IAP. There are differences of opinion as to who is best
placed and should be responsible for administering sanctions. In some countries this
is the responsibility of individual counsellors, which could cause friction between
counsellors and clients. However, difficulties can also arise in systems where this
responsibility lies at the higher level of the PES (or indeed with another
organisation). Delays in sanctioning, or a lack of follow through, can undermine the
clarity of interactions or the credibility of counsellors.
Considerable differences exist between countries in the severity and duration
of sanctions applied. This ranges from the removal of all benefits (including welfare
benefits) after missing only one appointment to the withdrawal of some benefits,
taking into account any potential hardship caused to the household in such
circumstances.
The share of job seekers sanctioned tends to be low. Some research carried out on
the impact of more controlling (instead of enabling) regimes shows that while such
approaches may lead to more rapid integration, outcomes are often less sustainable.
In conclusion, PES managers argued that sanctions have a higher impact if they
are clear, graduated, immediate and fair but that sanctioning which leaves
individuals in severe financial hardship can be counter-productive. There is also
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evidence that different groups of job seekers can be motivated (or de-motivated) by
different types of sanctions. Such factors need to be better understood.
More information on the Dialogue conference is available here.
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