Attitude of the Muslim Provinces of Nigeria

British Colonial Officer H. R. Palmer:
"Attitude of the Muslim Provinces of Nigeria" During World War I
Confidential.
APPENDIX
A.
ATTITUDE OF THE MUSLIM PROVINCES OF NIGERIA.
F r o m t h e b e g i n n i n g of the war to N o v e m b e r 1916, if t h e r e was a n y T u r k i s h or
Senusi p r o p a g a n d a in t h e n o r t h e r n provinces of N i g e r i a , its effects w e r e n e g l i g i b l e
a n d its r e c e p t i o n cold. C e r t a i n persons w e r e c a p t u r e d d u r i n g 1915 who d e c l a r e d
they w e r e T u r k i s h agents, b u t it is extremely doubtful w h e t h e r they w e r e i n fact
such, a n d w h e t h e r t h e i r professions w e r e not i n d u c e d b y a n i n h e r e n t love of
c h a r l a t a n i s m a n d t h e ordinary motives of a m e n d i c a n t .
B u t it m u s t be r e m e m b e r e d t h a t to the F u l a n i r u l e r s of N o r t h e r n N i g e r i a , a n d still
more to t h e i r subject people t h e Hausa, all t h a t comes from the E a s t is a n object of
veneration ; h e n c e any w a n d e r i n g Muallim or professed saint or political a g e n t is
always c e r t a i n of food a n d hospitality. T h e people live a n d h a v e lived a p a r t from the
g e n e r a l c u r r e n t of the Muslim world, a n d have not t h e slightest real i n t e r e s t in or
feeling a b o u t m a n y of the questions w h i c h loom so l a r g e in E a s t e r n politics. T h e y
have never h e a r d of t h e A g h a K h a n , h a r d l y k n o w t h a t there a r e s u c h people as I n d i a n
Muslims, a n d loqk on the S u l t a n of T u r k e y merely as a p e e r of the E m i r of Sokoto,
who himself professes to be, a n d to t h e m is, the only Khalif (Amir ul M u m i n i n ) t h a t
m a t t e r s . I n fact, they d i s r e g a r d all Muslim, history between the d e a t h of t h e last of
t h e four " r i g l i t l y directed Khalifs " and t h e accession of t h e first F u l a n i Emir—O t h m a n clan Hodio—in 1807.
T h e British G o v e r n m e n t h a s p u r s u e d a policy of r e t a i n i n g u n d e r t h e g u i d a n c e of
Residents the n a t i v e r u l e r s a n d t h e i r Muslim polity, shorn of abuses ; so t h a t t h e
u p p e r classes i n Nigeria have e v e r y t h i n g to lose a n d n o t h i n g to g a i n by a n y k i n d of
d i s o r d e r — a t least, most of t h e m h a v e .
Many of t h e chiefs—especially those who owed t h e i r position e n t i r e l y to t h e
B r i t i s h G o v e r n m e n t — w e r e extremely uneasy about t h e W a r u p to the date of the fall
of G a r u a i n t h e Cameroons. T h e r e can, I t h i n k , b e little d o u b t t h a t G e r m a n a g e n t s
(probably a g e n t s of the G e r m a n companies t r a d i n g in Nigeria) h a d p r o m i s e d n e a r l y
all the deposed E m i r s a n d other chiefs out of office a speedy r e t u r n to p o w e r w e r e
the G e r m a n s to b e successful locally.
W ifch the fall of G a r u a , however, a n d s u b s e q u e n t conquest of t h e Cameroons, r u l e r s
and people b e c a m e entirely reassured. T h e war to t h e m was t h e war in t h e C a m e r o o n s .
T h e w a r in E u r o p e w a s too d i s t a n t and too imperfectly envisaged really to affect
their m i n d s for t h e m o s t p a r t , except that in l a r g e centres like K a n o , w h e r e t h e r e
exists a fairly l a r g e T r i p o l i t a n colony, there w a s u n d o u b t e d l y a certain u n d e r c u r r e n t of
s e n t i m e n t for t h e T u r k s , a n d pious hope t h a t they m i g h t recover N o r t h Africa.
In
this connection t h e G e r m a n s w e r e viewed m e r e l y as t h e instrument
by w h i c h t h e T u r k s
m i g h t come b a c k to t h e i r own. It will be a p p a r e n t t h a t no a n t i - G e r m a n p r o p a g a n d a
of ours would p r o b a b l y affect these views.
W e r e N i g e r i a an isolated country, there would b e little more to say a b o u t its
a t t i t u d e to the W a r , a n d one could almost h a v e said for c e r t a i n t h a t n o t h i n g w o u l d go
wrong there.
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , however, it is impossible to consider N i g e r i a n politics w i t h o u t
reference to the countries to t h e east and n o r t h a n d west of i t - t h e E a s t e r n C h a d
basin, t h e S a h a r a , a n d t h e W e s t e r n Sudan—-because really t h e whole S u d a n b e l t is
one country w i t h no real g e o g r a p h i c a l obstacles, with h o m o g e n e o u s peoples h a v i n g a
common religion, a n d with few or no real r a c i a l a n t i p a t h i e s .
F r o m Darfur to t h e Senegal a n d from Yola to A g a d e s the chiefs e x c h a n g e
p r e s e n t s a n d n e w s , a n d a r e often u n i t e d b y m a r i t a l a n d o t h e r ties. W h i l e t h e y are
not intolerant Muslims as a r u l e , they are far m o r e fervid believers in and votaries of
t h e essential t e n e t s of I s l a m t h a n t h e average T u r k or A r a b of N o r t h Africa.
They
would be quite capable u n d e r certain circumstances of fighting for t h e i r faith as did
the dervishes at O m d u r m a n , t h o u g h t h a t is h a r d l y a likely c o n t i n g e n c y in N i g e r i a so
long as their Muslim life and social order a r e protected as t h e y h a v e been since 1 9 0 3 .
U p to the p r e s e n t the p r i d e of t h e F u l a n i in t h e i r own position a n d history h a s entirely
discounted the political influence of external sects. T h e E m i r s have usually dismissed
Senusi a g e n t s w i t h p r e s e n t s a n d n o t h i n g more, n o t because t h e y d i s a p p r o v e d of t h e i r
aims, b u t b e c a u s e t h e y wordd n o t be p a t r o n i s e d by Sidi A h m e d or anyone else.
A (33)2044 Pk 98 83 3/17 B & S
T h e r e would, however, p r o b a b l y b e a point at w h i c h t h e i r g e n e r a l s e n t i m e n t for
I s l a m a n d a n instinctive desire for i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d freedom from C h r i s t i a n control
m i g h t g e t t h e u p p e r h a n d of t h e i r discretion, a n d assert itself.
T h a t p o i n t h a s (since 1914) b e e n b r o u g h t a p p r e c i a b l y n e a r e r b y two t h i n g s .
(1) T h e I t a l i a n evacuation of the Tripoli h i n t e r l a n d .
(2) T h e F r e n c h " c o n s c r i p t i o n " of S u d a n e s e natives for service in F r a n c e d u r i n g
1915-1916.
T h e I t a l i a n evacuation of t h e Tripoli h i n t e r l a n d p r o d u c e d a n i m m e n s e m o r a l
effect all over t h e S u d a n , and especially in K a n o , w h i c h is so closely connected w i t h
Tripoli commercially.
T h e F r e n c h " c o n s c i d p t i o n " of natives for active service h a s e m b i t t e r e d a n d
e n v e n o m e d n o t only t h e vast b u l k of the Moslems to t h e i m m e d i a t e n o r t h of B r i t i s h
t e r r i t o r y , b u t a v e r y l a r g e n u m b e r of our own people who are in m a n y ways closely
c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e m . " H e r e , " say they, " h a v e t h e s e N a s s a r a (Christians) b e e n for
" t w e n t y y e a r s p r e a c h i n g and l e g i s l a t i n g a g a i n s t slavery, a n d now t h e y t h e m s e l v e s
" a r e s l a v e - r a i d i n g o u r villages a n d t a k i n g a w a y our children to fight for t h e m . "
It
w o u l d a p p e a r p e c u l i a r l y . u n f o r t u n a t e t h a t the F r e n c h did not except from this s y s t e m
certain p a r t s of the W e s t e r n S u d a n , for, as far as can b e j u d g e d from Ivano information,
they h a v e t h e r e b y m a d e t h e local leaders of the Tijani tarikh (a sect g e n e r a l l y c o n s i d e r e d
t h e m o s t friendly to Europeans) extremely hostile a n d a n t i - F r e n c h .
A n y intelligent a n d well informed native will tell oue t h a t t h e F r e n c h haA e r u i n e d
t h e c o u n t r y to t h e i m m e d i a t e n o r t h of Nigeria, a n d E u r o p e a n m e r c h a n t s a t K a n o
c o n c u r i n t h a t opinion from t h e i r point of view..
A s is well k n o w n , a n d was i n fact to be expected, T u r k i s h a n d A r a b a g e n t s h a v e
succeeded i n s t i r r i n g u p t h e T u w a r e g in the Sahara, a n d sporadic o u t b r e a k s h a v e been
g o i n g on for t h e p a s t year. Officers from Bilma, A g a d e s , a n d o t h e r posts who passed
t h r o u g h K a n o last a u t u m n were all v e r y pessimistic as to t h e state of the S a h a r a .
' T h e F r e n c h h a v e killed a great m a n y of certain tribes, e.g., t h e Ulimmiden, b u t t h e
T u w a r e g are b o r n lighters, and k e e p r e t u r n i n g to the c h a r g e by c o m m i t t i n g some n e w
o u t r a g e from t i m e to t i m e . J u s t before l e a v i n g K a n o in. N o v e m b e r 1916 I h e a r d t h a t
t h e K e l g e r e s h a d a m b u s h e d a n d a n n i h i l a t e d a F r e n c h patrol.
T h e relations b e t w e e n Sokoto, Katsina, K a n o , a n d B o r n u a n d such p l a c e s as
Bilma, A g a d e s , a n d T a w a are so constant and i n t i m a t e t h a t t h e failure of t h e F r e n c h
to p r e s e r v e o r d e r i n t h e i r territory c a n n o t ; b u t react in g r e a t e r or less d e g r e e on t h e
E m i r a t e s of N i g e r i a . Once t h e a t m o s p h e r e of u n r e s t is created, t h e i m m e d i a t e
occasion of t r o u b l e is m o r e likely to be some petty local affair t h a n a n y l a r g e question
of w o r l d - w i d e i m p o r t a n c e . As Muslims, the E m i r s c a n h a v e only one real g r i e v a n c e ,
i.e., t h a t t h e y a r e u n d e r a Christian G o v e r n m e n t ; b u t even t h a t d i s a d v a n t a g e does
n o t loom l a r g e in t h e i r eyes beside t h e i r anxiety to m a i n t a i n t h e i r p r e s t i g e a m o n g
t h e i r people, a n d t h e personal security of themselves a n d t h e i r families.
I t will, therefore, be a p p a r e n t that the p o t e n t i a l sources of clanger in N i g e r i a are
r a t h e r a m o n g (1) people of the r u l i n g caste who a r e not actually i n power, (2) the
r a t h e r l i m i t e d class of pious fanatics, or clever c h a r l a t a n s , a n d (3) t h e i g n o r a n t
p e a s a n t r y , t h a n a m o n g t h e actual rulers of t h e c o u n t r y .
T h e l a t t e r will p r o b a b l y c o n t i n u e in the future, as in t h e past, to d i s c o u r a g e any
society or p r o p a g a n d a w h i c h m i g h t cause a n u p h e a v a l . I t m u s t b e added, however,
t h a t the m o r e i n t e l l i g e n t a n d informed E m i r s w h o k n o w s o m e t h i n g of, or are in touch
with, t h e - E a s t r e g r e t t h a t G r e a t B r i t a i n h a s b e e n compelled to act a g a i n s t T u r k e y in
A r a b i a a n d P e r s i a . T h i s is, I t h i n k , d u e to a fear t h a t w e m a y become too m u c h
involved i n A r a b i a n politics. O n t h e subject of t h e declaration of i n d e p e n d e n c e b y
t h e Sherif of Mecca, t h e i r a t t i t u d e Avas one of d o u b t w h e t h e r h e would succeed in
m a i n t a i n i n g his i n d e p e n d e n c e — a d o u b t m a i n l y d u e to past history ; b u t at t h e same
time t h e i r s e n t i m e n t s are c e r t a i n l y not u n f r i e n d l y to t h e S h e r i f s position, and, i n fact,
w i t h t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r views of Muslim history, t h e r e is every reason to t h i n k t h a t they
would prefer to r e g a r d a n Arab of the K u r a i s h as t h e E a s t e r n Khalif r a t h e r t h a n the.
very distant, s h a d o w y , a n d " a j a m " (foreign) p o t e n t a t e k n o w n to t h e m as t h e S u l t a n ,
of S t a m b o u l .
T h e r e can b e n o d o u b t that, if a safe p i l g r i m a g e to Mecca is a s s u r e d to t h e m u n d e r
t h e n e w regime, t h e y will u l t i m a t e l y not only acquiesce in it, b u t welcome it.
r
M a r c h 2nd, 1917.
H . R . PALMER.