ZAPISKI HISTORYCZNE

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ZAPISKI HISTORYCZNE

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FACULTY OF HISTORY
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ZAPISKI HISTORYCZNE
DEVOTED TO THE HISTORY OF POMERANIA
AND BALTIC COUNTRIES
VOLUME LXXVI – YEAR 2011
BOOK 3
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M i c h a l i n a B r o d a : Medical doctors from outside the Teutonic State in Prussia
serving Teutonic Grand Masters in the 14th and the first half of the 15th centuries.
K o n r a d B o b i a t y ń s k i : Between the Republic and Muscovy – Daugavpils and
Polish Livonia in the years 1665–1667. A r k a d i u s z S ł a b i g : Ukrainians in the
Gdańsk province during the years 1956–1970 in the light of archive material from the
public security system of the People’s Republic of Poland.
TORUŃ 2013
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FACULTY OF HISTORY
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ZAPISKI HISTORYCZNE
DEVOTED TO THE HISTORY OF POMERANIA
AND BALTIC COUNTRIES
PUBLISHED SINCE 1908
(TO 1955 AS ZAPISKI TOWARZYSTWA NAUKOWEGO W TORUNIU)
VOLUME LXXVI – YEAR 2011
BOOK 3
TORUŃ 2013
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EDITORIAL COUNCIL OF THE JOURNAL ZAPISKI HISTORYCZNE
Head of the Council: Mieczysław Wojciechowski
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Translation
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TORUŃ SCIENTIFIC SOCIETY
CONTENTS
Articles
Michalina Broda, Medical doctors from outside the Teutonic State in Prussia serving
Teutonic Grand Masters in the 14th and the first half of the 15th centuries ............. 5
Konrad Bobiatyński, Between the Republic and Muscovy – Daugavpils and Polish
Livonia in the years 1665–1667 ..................................................................................... 31
Arkadiusz Słabig, Ukrainians in the Gdansk province during the years 1956–1970 in
the light of archive material from the public security system of the People’s Republic of Poland ..................................................................................................................... 47
ZAPISKI
HISTORYCZNE
—
VOLUME
LXXVI —
2011
BOOK 3
MICHALINA BRODA (Toruń)
MEDICAL DOCTORS FROM OUTSIDE THE TEUTONIC STATE IN PRUSSIA
SERVING TEUTONIC GRAND MASTERS
TH
IN THE 14 AND THE FIRST HALF OF THE 15TH CENTURIES*
Key words: physicians, the Teutonic Order, Grand Masters, Malbork, Prussia, 14th–15th centuries
European rulers of the Late Middle Ages used the services of foreign doctors
relatively often – they even retained them as their personal physicians. For example, at the Angevin court during the rule of Charles Robert there lived foreign doctors, most of whom were Italian1. Polish monarchs also employed the services of
foreign physicians. Among the doctors of King Casimir the Great there were two
foreign physicians – clergymen: Heinrich from Cologne2 and Matthäus of Stachów
from the Wezenborg family3. During the years 1378–1382, Jan Pomorzanin4 held
the function of chaplain (“clericus domesticus”) of Louis the Great and his mother
Elizabeth of Poland [Elżbieta Łokietkówna]. He came from the Teutonic State of
Prussia and was highly educated – he held the title of Bachelor of Medicine. Despite his qualifications, in the sources Jan did not appear either as a royal physician
*
The first edition of the article was published in Polish in Zapiski Historyczne, 2011: 76, z. 3,
p. 7–36.
1
At the court of the Hungarian king there stayed a doctor from the Appenine Peninsula Benedict de Italia. His brothers Bartholomew and Nicholas, who also dealt with medicine, joined him
there. Moreover, Jacobus Longobardus called Jacobus de Piacenza treated Charles Robert until 1331.
His nickname suggests his foreign origin. About 1332 at the Hungarian court there was also Magister
Perechtoldus, a surgeon. However, no information is available that would prove his foreign origin
– comp. L. Fekete, Gyogytan a regi magyaroknal, Századok, [vol.] 8: 1874, p. 491; E. Bünz, Stift Haug
in Würzburg: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte eines fränkischen Kolegiatstiftes im Mittelalter, Teilbd. 2
(Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte, Bd. 128; Studien zur Germania Sacra,
Bd. 20), Göttingen 1998, p. 751; J. Dąbrowski, Ostatnie lata Ludwika Wielkiego 1370–1382, Kraków
2009 (wyd. 2), p. 24.
2
See more comp. K. Ożóg, Intelektualiści w służbie Królestwa Polskiego w latach 1306–1382,
Kraków 1995, p. 91, 106, 107, 31.
3
Ibid., pp. 91, 106, 136–137.
4
Ibid., pp. 105, 106, 125, 126, 133.
6
Michalina Broda
or a medical doctor in general5. Probably, Master Pavel Kravar6 was a personal
doctor of Władysław Jagiełło during the years 1423–1432. He was a Czech who
had obtained the title of Bachelor of Medicine at the university in Montepellier 7.
There might have been many reasons why sovereign rulers decided to employ
foreign doctors. First of all, a lack of local doctors or a serious illness afflicting a
monarch forced them to search for medical experts abroad and at the courts of
other monarchs. Besides, having a foreign doctor might have an added prestige;
the ruler wished to be surrounded by foreigners who could emphasize his power and influence the monarch’s standing in society. Supposedly, the mechanism
worked also in the opposite way. Affluent courts probably attracted physicians
from abroad, tempting them with high earnings.
The preserved source material allows us to examine the work of foreign physicians from outside the Monastic State of the Teutonic Order in Prussia, who served
the grand masters in the 14th and the first half of the 15th centuries. In literary
sources it is accepted that in the High Middle Ages, medical doctors (also referred
to as “medicus”, “physicus”, “Buchartz”) were persons who held the university titles
of Master or Doctor of Medicine. Nevertheless, at that time not much importance
was given to doctors’ empirical knowledge8. Foreign doctors were those who had
been educated at foreign universities and who came from outside the Monastic
State of the Teutonic Order. However, due to a lack of appropriate academic centres in the Teutonic State, it is impossible to apply only the first criterion. Thus,
among the medical doctors serving the upper echelons of the Teutonic Order there
were mainly the specialists who held the function of personal doctors for the grand
masters. It seems that we may include here also doctors who for some time were
in touch with the court in Malbork, stayed there or remained at the disposal of the
highest officials of the Teutonic Order.
The chronological timeframes of the issue examined here were imposed by
the reality of medieval Prussia. The first medical doctor of foreign origin in the
Monastic State of the Teutonic Order appeared in the sources in the first half of the
14th century – in 1323 to be precise. The final date was 19 October 1466 – the date
5
Many records underline medical education obtained by him – comp. Bullarium Poloniae, ed.
S. Kuraś, I. Sułkowska-Kuraś, [vol.] 2: 1342–1378, Romae 1985, nr 1124, 1138; [vol.] 3: 1378–1417,
Romae–Lublini 1988, nr 33; Monumenta Vaticana res gestas Bohemicas illustrantia, opera C. Krofta,
vol. 5: Acta Urbani VI. et Bonifatii IX, P. 1: 1378–1396, Pragae 1903, nr 87; Analecta Vaticana 1202–
–1366, ed. J. Ptaśnik (Monumenta Poloniae Vaticana, T. 3; Wydawnictwo Komisji Historycznej Akademii Umiejętności w Krakowie, N. 73), Cracoviae 1914, nr 422.
6
More about him comp. F. Šmahel, Die Prager Universitat im Mittelalter (Education and Society
in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, vol. 28), Leiden 2007, p. 153.
7
„[...] Paulus de Crawar, universitatis Parisiensis magister, et baccalarius medicinae universitatis
Montis Pessulani” (Liber decanorum facultatis philosophiae Universitatis Pragensis ab anno Christi
1367 usaque ad annum 1585, P. 1 (Monumenta historica Universitatis Carolo-Ferdinandeae Pragensis, vol. 1), Pragae 1830, p. 439).
8
B. D. Haage, Medizinische Literatur des Deutschen Ordens im Mittelalter, Würzburger medizinhistorische Mitteilungen, Bd. 9: 1991, pp. 222–223.
Z a pi s k i Hi s t o ryc z n e — Vo lu m e L X X V I — 2 0 1 1
Book 3
Medical doctors from outside the Teutonic State in Prussia...
7
of the conclusion of the Second Peace Treaty of Toruń. On the strength of the treaty, Prussia was divided and in large part incorporated into the Polish Kingdom9.
The analysis of the problem for later periods is complicated owing to considerable
territorial changes and the brevity of sources.
The first qualified and educated medical doctor, Magister Frugerius, stayed in
Prussia in the 1320s and 1330s. He was the first physician in the Teutonic State in
Prussia confirmed by sources – the first known personal doctor of the grand master
in Malbork and the first foreigner who, according to the sources, held this function.
In the list of witnesses of the notary certificate of Emperor Louis IV’s act prepared
on 21 March 1333 at the initiative of Luther von Braunschweig he was referred to
as a personal doctor of the grand master from the diocese of Parma10. Although it
is the earliest record about Frugerius as a personal doctor of the grand master, it is
not the earliest record concerning his person as such. Frugerius appeared in lists of
witnesses of documents drafted in the third decade of the 14th century.
According to the sources, in May 1323 in Christburg [Dzierzgoń] in the entourage of the last Provincial Master Fridericus de Wildenberch there appeared
Master Frugerius “medicine peritus” (“experienced in the field of medicine”)11. It
should be underlined that in another document prepared by the same draftsman
(analogically in the same place and on the same day) among the witnesses there
appeared “frater Merkelinus artis medicine peritus”12. As it is quite improbable that
the Provincial Master was accompanied by two doctors, the person mentioned
here should be identified as Frugerius (whose name did not appear in this document). Giving the name of Merkelinus as a medical doctor in the list of witnesses
seems to be an error of the writer or copyist who presented one person as two
different people13. All the more so because earlier in the document appeared the
name of brother Merkelinus – he was not defined as a medical doctor, but as a
companion of the commander [komtur]14. The publisher of the sources emphasized that there existed divergences in the lists of witnesses of individual copies of
the document15. Frugerius stayed in the entourage of Fridericus de Wildenberch
9
More about the resolution of the Second Peace of Toruń comp. M. Biskup, Polityka zewnętrzna zakonu krzyżackiego, [in:] Państwo zakonu krzyżackiego w Prusach. Władza i społeczeństwo, red.
M. Biskup, R. Czaja, Warszawa 2008, pp. 273–275.
10
„Magister Frigerius eiusdem domini [magistri] generalis medicus Parmensis dyocesis”,
Preußisches Urkundenbuch (further cit. PUB), hrsg. v. R. Philippi [i in.], Königsberg Pr.-Marburg
1882–2000, tu: Bd. II, Königsberg Pr. 1932–1939, nr 777.
11
PUB, Bd. II, nr 405.
12
Ibid., nr 406.
13
It is worth noting that in the index attached to the source publication the publisher included
the document reference no. 406 next to the entry Frugerius although the name of the doctor does not
appear there, comp. ibid., p. 613.
14
„Frater Merkelinus de Sparrenberg commendatoris socius” (ibid., nr 405).
15
„In C lautet der Text: Merkel von Sparrenberg, bruder Frederich Stange, Tulinke unser kemerer, Iohannes Lynke, Prawais, Cropolius und ander vil... Ofenbar ist in B ein Teil der Zeugen versehentlich ausgelassen”, comp. ibid., nr 406 – the publisher’s remarks.
Book 3
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Michalina Broda
also in November 1323. In the diploma issued in German among the witnesses he
appeared as “meyster Fongerius der arcztey”16. In April 1324 the name of the doctor was given in the list of witnesses of the document drafted by the commander of
Christburg [Dzierzgoń] Luther von Braunschweig17.
The few records provide little information about Frugerius, but on their basis
we can conclude that he was a physician from Italy from the diocese of Parma.
Frugerius must have possessed considerable medical experience and the degree of
Master. Supposedly, he was educated at the University of Bologna situated near his
home town. As early as the 1320s the medical doctor stayed in Prussia. According
to the sources, in 1333 he held the function of the personal doctor of Grand Master
Luther von Braunschweig, the former commander of Christburg [Dzierzgoń]. According to literature on this subject he appears to have been too hastily associated
with the entourage of the Provincial Master Fridericus de Wildenberch18. The Italian doctor was listed among witnesses of documents issued by this Teutonic official,
but the event took place in Dzierzgoń. When the Dzierzgoń commander Luther
von Braunschweig was appointed Grand Master, the name of the grand master’s
doctor Frugerius appeared in lists of witnesses of some notary instruments. That
is why Frugerius may be connected with the person of the Dzierzgoń commander.
Presumably, Frugerius won Luther von Braunschweig’s trust and with him he travelled to the capital city of the Teutonic State. It seems even more probable that in
1324, before the successor of Karl Bessart von Trier was elected, Frugerius was
among witnesses of the document issued by the Dzierzgoń commander19. Despite
the fact that it was not until 1333 that Frugerius was confirmed by the sources as
a personal doctor of Luther von Braunschweig, he seems to have held the position
earlier. Presumably, Frugerius commenced his service in Malbork in 1331 when
Luther von Braunschweig took the office of grand master. It is hard to define when
their cooperation finished. The latest source with his name was issued in 1333
– the previously mentioned document of the emperor20. Although Frugerius did
not appear in subsequent sources, it is not certain that he no longer worked for the
grand master in Malbork.
The preserved source material allows us to state that in the entourage of subsequent grand masters there were also physicians from the outside of the Teutonic
State in Prussia. Konrad von Leithen21 held the office of Ludolf König’s personal
16
Ibid., nr 426.
Ibid., nr 458.
18
Comp. Ch. Probst, Der Deutsche Orden und sein Medizinalwesen in Preussen. Hospital, Firmarie und Arzt bis 1525 (Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens, Bd. 29), Bad
Godesberg 1969, p. 160.
19
PUB, Bd. II, nr 458.
20
Ibid., nr 777.
21
More about him comp. K. Militzer, Zwei Arzte im Dienst der Hochmeister, Preußenland, Jg. 20:
1982, pp. 53–55. The doctor’s biography written by Klaus Conrad was attached to the article. The
article was based on the source records from the first half of the 14th century which had hitherto not
been employed in the research on Konrad von Leithen and were published mostly in Pommersches
17
Book 3
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doctor; later he served Heinrich Dusemer. Konrad appeared as a cleric from the
bishopric of Cologne and a doctor of the grand master in the supplication of 31
October 134422. It was then that Ludolf Köning, underlining his attachment to
Konrad who accompanied him even during meals, requested the Pope to appoint
Konrad a canon in the Collegiate Church of St. Andrew in Cologne. Moreover, he
also asked the Pope to enable Konrad to be appointed by a local prelate. Ludolf
Köning justified this by saying that the doctor might have fallen ill, and that the
Roman Curia was situated far away, which brought the threat of exposing Konrad
to dangers connected with such a long journey23. The Pope acceded to Köning’s request, which was confirmed by the document of 24 January 1347 issued by another
Grand Master Heinrich Dusemer. Among the witnesses of the notary event there
figured “magister Conradus Medicus, canonicus ecclesie Colon[iensis] collegiate
Sancti Andree”, which means Konrad possessing university education, a canon at
the Collegiate Church of St. Andrew in Cologne24. Supposedly, taking the office
improved the physician’s material situation. In December 1344, his income increased even more when in Malbork, in the presence of the grand master, a notary
document was drafted on the strength of which the annual payment for the doctor
was raised by the council of Trzebiatów [Treptow an der Rega]. According to the
document, the remuneration for Konrad was increased from 42 Mark of Kolberg
pfennigs to 300 Mark paid to him in Kolberg [Kołobrzeg] in two installments. The
money was to be collected in person by the doctor or his cleric and plenipotentiary
Johann von Serkem25.
Konrad’s family surname is not clearly identified. In the supplication of 1344
he appeared as “Conrad de Leythen“26. Christian Probst, assuming that the physician came from the diocese of Cologne, interpreted his surname as “von Leiden”27,
as did the publisher of the source. In this way, he associated the doctor with the
Urkundenbuch; comp. K. Conrad, Zusatz zur Biographie des Konrad von der Leithen, Preußenland,
Jg. 20: 1982, pp. 56–57.
22
It is the earliest source from the period during which Konrad von Leithen served the grand
master as his personal doctor. However, if we assume that K. Conrad was right to identify the doctor
with the official from Kamień, the first record concerning this doctor should be dated on 24 March
1335 as it was then that he participated in the conflict between the Dominican monastery in Kamień
and a knight Losekin von Bünnewitz. The following year Konrad as a general official of the Kamień
diocese ordered to excommunicate the knight in analogical circumstances. Moreover, the future personal doctor of the grand master witnessed the issue of two documents by the bishop of Kamień Jan
in January 1337; por. ibid., p. 57.
23
„Item supplicat sanctitati vestre, quatenus committere dignemini examen suum alicui prelate
illarum parcium, cum propter pericula egritudinis ipsius magistri ac eciam propter viarum distanciam et discrimina curiam Romanam no valeat visitare” (PUB, Bd. III/2, hrsg. v. H. Koeppen, Marburg 1958, nr 675a; Ch. Probst, op.cit., pp. 160–161).
24
PUB, Bd. IV, hrsg. v. H. Koeppen, Marburg 1960, nr 132.
25
„Johannes de Serkem suus clericus in suus prokurator” (Pommersches Urkundenbuch, Bd. 11,
bearb. K. Conrad, Köln 1990, nr 6331).
26
PUB, Bd. III/2, nr 675a.
27
Ibid.; Ch. Probst, op.cit., p. 160.
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Michalina Broda
Netherlandish town. Klaus Militzer doubted whether Konrad was connected with
Leiden. He maintained that Konrad came from the Westphalian small gentry, from
the family house of Leithen in Gelsenkirchen-Buer von der Leithen28.
The personal doctor of Winrich von Kniprode – Johann von Rode – also came
from this area29. The earliest records of him in sources of Teutonic origin are dated
19 October 1356. The surname of this doctor figured in a list of witnesses to notary
documents drafted that day in Malbork as ordered by the grand master30. Johann
came from a burghers’ family in Cologne31. He had a bachelor’s degree in medicine and a master’s degree in liberal arts32. It is hard to establish which university
he graduated from. He probably enjoyed the sympathy of the grand master, who
wanted to award his service by requesting the Roman Curia to grant Johann benefices. On 28 January 1357 Winrich von Kniprode sent a supplication to the Pope
requesting him to appoint Johann a canon in the diocese of Warmia [Ermland].
Pope Innocent VI acceded to the grand master’s request33. As early as 10 February
1357, he sent a letter to the bishop of Chełmno Land [Kulmerland] who was to execute his order to appoint Johann a canon in the bishopric of Warmia after he had
passed an appropriate examination. Moreover, the Pope ordered that the church
post of prebendary be reserved for him34. However, for unknown reasons Johann
did not receive the benefices promised to him. In 1363 Winrich von Kniprode
again wrote a supplication concerning this issue to the Pope. The Grand Master of
the Teutonic Order once again requested the Pope to appoint Johann a prebendary
in the bishopric of Warmia [Ermland] despite the fact that Johann was already a
parson in Malbork35.
The historiography provides information about another foreigner in the entourage of the Grand Master Winrich von Kniprode. Johannes Voigt mentioned a
28
K. Militzer, op.cit., p. 53.
More about the doctor Johann and his family ibid., pp. 55–56.
30
In three out of four notary documents issued on 19 May 1356 he was referred to as: “magister
Johannes de Royde magistratus in artibus et bacularius in medicis Coloniensis diocesis”. Only in one
document his name was shortened to “magister Johannes de Royde Coloniensis” (PUB, Bd. V/1,
hrsg. v. K. Conrad unter Mitarbeit v. H. Koeppen, Marburg 1969, nr 470, 471, 472, 473).
31
Johann von Rode was a son of the burger Giso von Rode. We do not know what his father’s
profession was. K. Millitzer put forward a suggestion that he was a merchant. In 1355 Doctor Johann’s parents died leaving five orphans. At that time Johann did not stay in his family town. In 1360
as a personal doctor of the grand master he left the legacy (“Erbe”) in Cologne for the benefit of his
sister and her husband; comp. K. Millitzer, op.cit., pp. 55–56.
32
Ibid., p. 55.
33
„de canonicatu ecc. warmien. dignemini providere, prebendam quoque ac dignitatem officium
vel personatum cum cura vel sine cura” (Avignonesische Quellen zur Geschichte des Ordenslandes
(1342–1366), hrsg. v. A. Motzki, Braunsberg 1914, nr 52).
34
PUB, Bd. V/2, hrsg. v. K. Conrad unter Mitarbeit v. H. Koeppen, Marburg 1973, nr 516. According to the document, Johann von Rode, like his predecessor, was a clergyman of the Cologne
diocese.
35
Avignonesische Quellen, nr 112.
29
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11
Bormienes36, a doctor of Armenian origin. He was probably a Teutonic knight who
had left Palestine for Venice, and later arrived at the court of the Grand Master in
Malbork, where in the autumn of 1361 the Black Death broke out. According to
J. Voigt, 3,000 people suffered from the plague and only one-sixth managed to survive. The Armenian doctor was to heal many patients suffering from the plague37.
The 19th century historian described the Armenian doctor’s road to the Teutonic
State in Prussia and confirmed his foreign origin. Nevertheless, it is hard to verify
the information provided by him, because the physician’s name fails to appear in
the source material38.
Undoubtedly, the poor condition of the Grand Master’s health forced him to
seek specialists outside the Teutonic State. Konrad von Jungingen, who at the end
of his life suffered from a kidney stone and other ailments39 – including probably
some eye diseases40 – enlisted the help of a few medical specialists who included
Master Johann Rogge (probably staying with the Grand Master during the years
36
The doctor’s name appeared in the same context also in earlier literature. However, neither
his foreign origin nor the manner he got to Malbork was indicated; comp. there C. T. L. Lucas, Geschichtliche Nachrichten von Stadt und Schlos Marienburg in Preusen, Beiträge zur Kunde Preussens,
Bd. 2: 1819, H. 4, p. 325.
37
J. Voigt, Geschichte Marienburgs, der Stadt und des Haupthauses des deutschen Ritter-Ordens in
Preussen, Königsberg 1824, p. 157.
38
Both C. T. L. Lucas and J. Voigt in their works referred to the 7th volume of the chronicle of
Lucas David, which was written in the 16th century and published in the second decade of the 19th
century. It should be noted here that the researchers indicated different page numbers, but neither
of them bears any records about Bormienes; comp. L. David, Preussische Chronik, hrsg. v. E. Hennig,
Bd. 7, Königsberg 1815, p. 28, 58; C. T. L. Lucas, op.cit., p. 325; J. Voigt, op.cit., p. 157.
39
We learn about Konrad von Jungingen’s kidney stone from his letter to the castellan and starost
of Cracow Jan of Tęczyn of 1405. The letter includes the word “calculus”, which according to Słownik
łaciny średniowiecznej w Polsce means “kamień tworzący się w pęcherzu lub w nerkach” [“a stone
developing in the bladder or kidneys” – transl. Ac. C.] (Słownik łaciny średniowiecznej w Polsce, red.
M. Plezia, vol. 2, z. 1 (9), Wrocław–Kraków–Warszawa 1959, kol. 35–37). The Pomesanian official
also informed about the grand master’s ailments in his chronicle written in the first decades of the
15th century. The records about it are to be found also in later chronicles (Geheimes Staatsarchiv
Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin–Dahlem (further cit. GStA PK), XX. Hauptabteilung (further cit.
HA), Ordensfolianten (further cit. OF), nr 3, p. 214; Johann’s von Posilge, officialis von Pomesanien,
Chronik des Landes Prussen, hrsg. v. E. Strehlke, [in:] Scriptores rerum Prussicarum, hrsg. v. T. Hirsch,
M. Töppen, E. Strehlke, Bd. 3, Leipzig 1866, p. 285; Historia brevis magistrorum Ordinis Theutonici
generalium ad Martinum Truchses continuata, hrsg. v. M. Toeppen, [in:] Scriptores rerum Prussicarum, Bd. 4, Leipzig 1870, p. 265; L. Blumenau, Historia de Ordine Theutonicorum cruciferorum,
[in:] Scriptores rerum Prussicarum, Bd. 4, pp. 55–56).
40
The information about the eye disease Konrad von Jungingen suffered from appeared in literature, but it is hard to indicate the grounds for it. It may have been reported on the basis of notes
included in the book of the Malbork treasurer. In the source there are records about eye doctors
paid from the Malbork treasury. However, it is hard to state whether they constitute sufficient evidence that Konrad von Jungingen suffered from eye problems as the records did not refer directly
to the treatment of the grand master; comp. Das Marienburger Tresslerbuch der Jahre 1399–1409,
hrsg. v. [E.] Joachim, Königsberg i. Pr. 1896 (further cit. MTB), p. 70, 112, 119, 120; A. Świeżawski,
Bartłomiej z Boreszewa lekarz wielkich mistrzów krzyżackich, Archiwum Historii Medycyny, vol. 24:
1961, p. 371.
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Michalina Broda
1400–1405)41. His successor was a doctor from Gdańsk called Nikolaus Birghayn.
In 1406 he was employed to serve Konrad von Jungingen42. However, as the Grand
Master’s physical condition was deteriorating, another medical doctor was hired
– Bartłomiej of Boreszewo43. Additionally, Wachsmut, a surgeon, advised Konrad
von Jungingen about his health. After the Grand Master’s death he was paid 5 grzywnas from the Malbork treasury for his help to the late Grand Master44. Besides, in
the book of the Teutonic treasurer we find records about eye doctors financed by
the central budget of the Teutonic Order45, but it is not certain whether they were
employed to treat Konrad von Jungingen.
As has been mentioned, among the medical specialist dealing with Konrad
von Jungingen’s health there was one doctor from the outside of the Teutonic State
in Prussia. It was Johann Rogge from Hamburg, who held a master’s degree in
liberal arts and a doctoral degree in medical science 46. He appeared at Konrad von
Jungingen’s court probably in 1400, although in the sources he appears first as his
personal doctor in January 1401 when he was paid the remuneration for the previous year – 30 grzywnas47. His remuneration did not change throughout his entire
41
In the literature of the subject matter it is assumed that Konrad von Jungingen’s personal
doctor in the years 1400–1405 was Johann Rogge. Actually, the figure of Doctor Johann appears in
many source records of the Teutonic origin. The surname Rogge (“Rocge”, “Rockge”, “Roge”) appeared merely four times in the account books of the Malbork treasurer from the second half of
May 1405 (it was not mentioned that he had a function of the grand master’s personal doctor) and
once in a letter written by the Teutonic procurator Peter von Wormditt in 1415. The publisher of
the latter source indicated that Johann Rogge in the years 1400–1406 held an office of Konrad von
Jungingen’s personal doctor. It seems to be the reason why the remaining records of the Teutonic
origin from Konrad von Jungingen’s term of office referred to Johann Rogge although his name did
not appear there; comp. Archiwum Państwowe w Toruniu (further cit. APT), Kat. I, nr 251; GStA
PK, XX. HA, OF, nr 3, p. 7; Die Berichte der Generalprokuratoren des Deutschen Ordensan der Kurie,
bearb. v. H. Koeppen, Bd. 2 (Verö. entlichungen der Niedersächsischen Archivverwaltung, H. 13)
(further cit. Berichte), Göttingen 1960, nr 130; MTB, p. 64, 71, 81, 82, 96, 110, 119, 122, 123, 140,
141, 177, 178, 182, 199, 240, 252, 276, 277, 283, 284, 287–288, 298, 310, 316, 342, 353, 366, 378, 538;
Ch. Probst, op.cit., p. 162; S. Jóźwiak, J. Trupinda, Organizacja życia na zamku krzyżackim w Malborku w czasach wielkich mistrzów (1309–1457), Malbork 2011 (wyd. 2), p. 263.
42
More about him comp. Ch. Probst, op.cit., p. 162.
43
More about him comp. M. Broda, Bartłomiej z Boreszewa – dziekan warmiński, lekarz, dyplomata przełomu XIV–XV w., [in:] Ludzie, którzy zmienili bieg historii, red. A. Piwek, Wrocław 2010,
pp. 33–40 (earlier literature collected there).
44
MTB, p. 425.
45
On the basis of very brief records from the book of the Malbork treasurer it is hard to say how
many oculists were employed. It seems there were one or two.
46
„[...] Mag. Iohannes Rogge de Hamborch, arcium magister et medicine doctor” (Acta facultatis medicae Universitatis Vindobonensis (further cit. AUV), vol. I: 1399–1435, hrsg. v. K. Schrauf,
Wien 1894, p. 96).
47
„Meister Johannes der arcz: zum irsten 30 m.; das gelt entpfing her selben von uns am obirsten
tage und der meister his uns ym das gelt selbir geben und ist das gelt, das ym gebort vom 1400. yare,
wen her im 1400. yare keyn gelt hatte genomen” (MTB, p. 96).
Book 3
13
service (until 1405)48 for the Grand Master49. Additionally, he received small sums
of money and emoluments such as furs or horses50.
Supposedly, he obtained medicines necessary to carry out treatments ordained
by him. Such a situation occurred for example at the beginning of April 1401 when
Johann was paid 8 skojecs for some unidentified medicines51. Probably, the doctor imported medicaments from a pharmacy in Elbląg [Elbing]52. In 1403 he purchased medicines himself in Torun [Thorn] where he was staying on his way to
Tuchola [Tuchel]53. However, the preserved records do not allow us to reconstruct
the list of medicines ordained by Johann54.
It seems that Johann left the castle of Malbork relatively frequently during his
travels outside the Monastic State of the Teutonic Order. Konrad von Jungingen
tried to protect his security. In archival material from the chancery of Grand Masters there is a copy of an undated document55 to whom it may concern. In the letter
Konrad von Jungingen tried to obtain a writ of protection for his doctor Johann56
to ensure safe travel for himself and his possessions through some unidentified
territory57. Although the records included in the Teutonic treasurer’s book confirm
numerous trips undertaken by the doctor Johann at that time, it is hard to establish
his exact destination in 1404.
What we know is that in 1400 he went with the duke of Gelderland to the German states, for which he was paid 30 Hungarian florins, which equaled 16 grzywnas and one wiardunek58. In the same year he was also sent to the prosecutor of
Bytów [Bütow]59 and the commander of Branderburg60. In 1401 he went to Gdańsk
together with an eye doctor called Konrad and the grand master’s servant61. In
January 1404 he was dispatched to Königsberg62 for some unknown reason. It is
48
In the book of the Malbork treasurer one of the records of 1409 concerned a doctor – also
Doctor Johann (ibid., p. 538). However, this doctor was not identified with the personal doctor of
Konrad von Jungingen presented here.
49
Ibid., pp. 96, 141, 199, 283, 298, 342.
50
Ibid., pp. 182, 276, 378.
51
Ibid., p. 110. The sources prove that Johann was paid out of the Malbork treasury for medicaments in the summer of 1401 and in December 1401, comp. ibid., pp. 122, 140.
52
Ibid., pp. 177, 178, 284.
53
Ibid., pp. 283.
54
Ibid., pp. 177, 178, 316.
55
It was made in 1401 at the latest as a copy of another source in the cartulary was added in 1404,
comp. GStA PK, XX. HA, OF, nr 3, p. 8.
56
It probably refers to Johann Rogge although his name does not appear in the source.
57
„[...] bitten wir begerlichin her unsirn lieben meyster Johann unßer arczt [...] mit euwir holffe
und forderunge durch euwir land, steten und gegende mit syner habe sicher und ungehindert moge
komen” (GStA PK, XX. HA, OF, nr 3, p. 7).
58
“Item 30 unger. guldin (16 m. 1 firdung) magistro Johanni deme arzte gegeben zerunge, also
her mit deme herren herzogen von Gelre ken Deutschen landen zoch” (MTB, p. 64).
59
Ibid., p. 71.
60
Ibid., p. 82.
61
Ibid., p. 119.
62
Ibid., pp. 287–288.
Book 3
14
Michalina Broda
difficult to determine the aim of all those journeys. Probably they were connected
with Johann’s medical activity. This medical doctor looked after the health of not
only the grand master but in 1404 he also ordained medicaments to the grand
commander and his predecessor, Grand Duke Vytautas’ wife, two Ruthenians63,
and the following year to the grand commander and the Teutonic treasurer64.
According to literary sources, it is assumed that Johann served at the court
of the grand master in Malbork until 140565. It was in 1405 that, according to the
notes made by the Teutonic treasurer, he was paid his last annual remuneration66.
It is hard to indicate how and when Johann’s cooperation with Konrad von Jungingen finished. Ch. Probst suggested that the physician moved to Toruń having
received recommendations from the grand master. However, he still remained in
touch with the Teutonic authorities67. The collections of the State Archive in Toruń
include a letter from Grand Master Konrad von Jungingen68 to the City Council
of Toruń, where he announced that he had parted with his medical doctor Johann
who had always behaved appropriately and honestly, for which the grand master
was grateful. Next, the grand master reported that the doctor intended to stay in
Toruń and requested that courtesy and kindness be shown to him as long as he
wished to stay there69.
The source cited here does not bear the year it was written. From the date
formula we may learn that the letter was issued in Malbork “an der mittewochen
vor circumcisionis domini”70, which means the Wednesday before the day of the
Circumcision of Jesus (1 January). If the letter really referred to Johann Rogge, the
63
Ibid., p. 310.
Ibid., pp. 353, 378.
65
Ch. Probst, op.cit., p. 162; S. Jóźwiak, J. Trupinda, op.cit., p. 263. The publisher of the Teutonic
procurator Peter von Wormditt’s correspondence was the only one whose opinion was different. He
indicated that Johann was Konrad von Jungingen’s personal doctor until 1406, comp. Berichte, Bd. 2,
nr 130 – the publisher’s notes.
66
„Des homeisters arzt: item 15 m. meister Johannes uf syn jorlon gegeben an der mitwochen
noch Scholastice virginis. item 15 m. meister Johannes uf syn jorlon gegeben am montage zu ostern.
das gelt nam meister Johannes selben” (MTB, p. 342).
67
Ch. Probst, op.cit., p. 162.
68
Helena Piskorska suggested that its author was Konrad von Wallenrode (H. Piskorska, Materiały do dziejów lekarzy i stanu sanitarnego miasta Torunia, Zapiski Historyczne (further cit. ZH),
vol. 25: 1960, z. 3–4, p. 129). However, the handwriting suggests it was written at the beginning of the
15th century. Moreover, the analysis of the partly damaged secret seal of the document allows us to
identify the grand master with Konrad von Jungingen. The seal presents the grand mater’s emblem
surrounded by six joint arches. The inscription in the rim which probably was “+ S FRIS CONRADI
DE IUNGINGEN MAGRI GNALIS” is not decipherable. However, it is possible to make out the
name of the highest Teutonic official and the last four letters of his family village “ngen”. That is why,
it is unquestionable that the author was Konrad von Jungingen, comp. APT, Kat. I, nr 251.
69
„Wir thun euch czu wissen, das meister Johann unßer Arczt mit fruntschaft sich von uns gescheiden hot und hot sich bie uns gehalden redelich und erbrclich, das wir ime danken; also hat her
willen eyne wyle tzu Thorun tzu bleiben. Hirumb zo bitten wir euch liben getruwen mit flisse begernde, das ir im fruntlichen und guten willen beweiset, die wyele her bie euch ist” (APT, Kat. I, nr 251).
70
Ibid.
64
Book 3
15
earliest possible time of it being written must have been the end of 1405, for in
February and April the doctor was paid his annual remuneration from the central
budget of the Teutonic Order71. Accordingly, Konrad von Jungingen’s letter may
have been issued on 30 Dec 1405 or 29 Dec 1406. The former date seems to be
more probable72.
Unfortunately, it is not certain whether Konrad von Jungingen’s doctor Johann
set off to Toruń. Despite the fact that in the town councillors’ book of the Old
Town of Toruń in 1407 there appeared a medical doctor with this name73, there
exist no grounds to identify those two persons as one and the same.
The content of Konrad von Jungingen’s letter makes it clear that Johann left
the court of the grand master amicably. Nevertheless, not all the sources present
Johann Rogge’s relations with the Teutonic authorities in such a positive light.
Namely, in 1415 at the Council of Constance Peter von Wormditt74 – the monastic
procurator at the Roman Curia – attempted to recruit a medical doctor for Grand
Master Michael Küchmeister. P. von Wormditt was very close to achieving his aim,
but his attempts were paralyzed by a certain Jacob. According to Wormditt, he was
sent by Johann Rogge to warn the recruited physician that the grand master owed
500 florins to Johann, which he refused to pay75.
The Teutonic procurator’s letter raises many doubts. Assuming that Konrad
von Jungingen’s personal doctor during the years 1400–1405 was in fact Johann
Rogge, the relations between him and the Teutonic Order might have deteriorated
after his departure from Malbork. It seems that the debt discussed by Peter von
Wormditt was not incurred during the rule of Konrad von Jungingen, but later. Although there is no source confirmation, supposedly the debt was connected with
Michael Küchmeister.
The Teutonic procurator’s letter appears to have been the most recent record of
Teutonic origin referring to Johann Rogge. He must have left the Monastic State of
the Teutonic Order in Prussia permanently. According to sources, on 26 February
1416 Johann was employed (possibly as a lecturer76) by the Faculty of Medicine at
71
MTB, p. 342.
The latest records referring to the grand master’s doctor named Johann included in the Malbork treasurer’s book come from the last days of December 1405, comp. ibid., p. 378.
73
Liber scabinorum veteris civitatis Thoruniensis 1363–1428, wyd. K. Kaczmarczyk (Towarzystwo Naukowe w Toruniu, Fontes 29), Toruń 1936, nr 701. Another record about Magister Johann as
the municipal doctor in the Old Town of Toruń appeared in 1408, comp. ibid., nr 976.
74
About this function comp. J.-E. Beuttel, Der Generalprokurator des Deutschen Ordens an der
römischen Kurie: Amt, Funktionen, personelles Umfeld und Finanzierung (Quellen und Studien zur
Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens, Bd. 55), Marburg 1999.
75
Berichte, Bd. 2, nr 130. More about Peter Wormditt’s letter to the grand master comp. below,
p. 24.
76
Johann held the title of medical doctor, which entitled him to teach at university; comp.
M. Kintzinger, Institutionalitat „akademischer Grade” an der mittelalterlichen Universitat, [in:] Examen, Titel, Promotionen. Akademisches und staatliches Quali] kationswesen vom 13. bis zum 21. Jahrhundert, hrsg. v. R. Ch. Schwinges, M.-C. Schöpfer-Pfa. en, Basel 2007, p. 82.
72
Book 3
16
Michalina Broda
Vienna University77. The university registers state that at that time he held the office of dean and rector of the parish church in the bishopric “Comtzensis”78.
According to the sources, Konrad von Jungingen did not fear to follow the advice of foreign medical doctors, but he was not always willing to enlist their help.
From the letter of 4 September 1405 written by the grand master to the castellan and
starost of Cracow Jan of Tęczyn, it may be concluded that the Polish official recommended a doctor to the grand master. Nevertheless, the head of the Monastic State
in Prussia declined his assistance saying that his physical condition had somewhat
improved and the pains caused by a kidney stone had become less bothersome79.
On the basis of the preserved source material, more can be learnt about medical doctors who applied for employment at the court in Malbork. One of them was
Johann Theodorus, who was quite an exotic individual. The Teutonic procurator
in Rome Peter von Wormditt devoted the whole letter sent from Rome probably
on 4 July 1406 to the ailing grand master80. According to the letter, the doctor assumed the name of Johann on the day of his christening – on the day of Johann the
Evangelist (probably 27 December 1405)81. The procurator provided an abundance
of information about Theodorus, but it remains quite mysterious to the contemporary reader. According to the letter, he owned three kingdoms and called himself
the governor82 of all India83. The procurator reported that Theodorus held both
the grand master and the commander of Elbląg (Werner von Tetingen) in high
esteem84. As Johann wanted to join the Teutonic Order, Peter von Wormditt in77
It is possible that Johann graduated from Vienna University.
„[...] decanus Comtzensis et rector parrochialis ecclesie ibidem” (AUV, p. 96). In literature this
place is identified with a German Town Konz situated in Rhineland-Palatinate; comp. H. Kühnel,
Mittelalterliche Heilkunde in Wien (Studien zur Geschichte der Universität Wien, Bd. 5), Graz–Köln
1965, p. 68.
79
GStA PK, XX. HA, OF, nr 3, p. 214.
80
Both the publisher of the letter and the creators of the registry books of correspondence maintained by the grand master’s chancery underlined that it was not entirely certain when the letter
was written by Peter von Wormditt; comp. Berichte, Bd. 2, nr 22; Regesta historico-diplomatica Ordinis S. Mariae Theutonicorum 1198–1525, Pars I: Index Tabularii Ordinis S. Mariae Theutonicorum,
Regesten zum Ordensbriefarchiv, Vol. 1: 1198–1454, bearb. unter Mitwirkung zahlreicher Anderer
v. E. Joachim, hrsg. v. W. Hubatsch, Göttingen 1948 (further cit. Regesta, P. I), nr 872.
81
Probably the information about Theodorus’ christening made Paul Nieborowski put forward
a suggestion that the recommended doctor was Jewish. However, Kurt Forstreuter stated that the
suggestion was unfounded; comp. P. Nieborowski, Peter von Wormdith: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des
Deutsch-Ordens. Mit Regesten und ungedruckten Archivalien, Breslau 1915, p. 72; K. Forstreuter, Der
Deutsche Orden und Sudosteuropa, Kyrios. Vierteljahresschrift für Kirchen- und Geistesgeschichte
Osteuropas, Bd. 1: 1936, H. 3, p. 267.
82
In the text of the document there appeared a term “rewardt”. K. Forstreuter tried to identify
it with the German word “Aufseher” having associated it with the term “regardus” (K. Forstreuter,
op.cit., p. 267).
83
For some unknown reasons in literature it was assumed that Johann Theodorus came from
Arabia; comp. Ch. Probst, op.cit., p. 163.
84
On the basis of this record the publisher of the source made a suggestion that the commander
Werner von Tetingen knew Johann Theodorus; comp. Berichte, Bd, 2, nr 22 – the publisher’s notes.
78
Book 3
17
formed him in a letter85 about the history of the institution from its beginnings in
the Holy Land to the conquest of Prussia and Livonia86.
It seems probable that Johann intended to serve the ailing Konrad von Jungingen as a medical doctor87, which is confirmed by the information that the Teutonic
procurator sent to the grand master a medicine accompanied by instructions as to
how it should be used. The medicine was handed to the grand master by Johann
Theodorus88.
The procurator’s account bears an analogy to a legend about a priest named
Johann and his kingdom, which was very popular in the Middle Ages. The story
dates back to the 12th century and remained in the consciousness of Europeans
until the 17th century. Naturally, it would have undergone various modifications
during this long period of time. Originally, it referred to the figure of priest Johann,
a stranger from the East, the sovereign of a lost Christian kingdom situated in Asia
or East Africa. The extensive description of the kingdom is to be found in the priest
Johann’s letter to the Byzantine Emperor Manuel I Komnenos, which is considered
a forgery. The oldest version of the letter was created in about 116589. Although it is
regarded as a falsification, Europeans were enchanted by the wealth and miracles
of the kingdom90.
Seemingly, some aspects of the myth may be found in the procurator’s account. First of all, the recommended doctor and the legendary ruler had the same
name. An analogy is drawn in reference to the territory rule of the person. In Peter
von Wormditt’s letters it reads that Johann had three kingdoms and was also the
governor of all India91. The legendary priest also ruled the territory comprising
“three Indies”92. The work written in the second half of the 15th century93 Tractatus
85
P. Nieborowski noticed that Wormditt had contacted Johann exclusively in letters. According
to the researcher’s assumptions, the doctor probably resided in Venice; comp. P. Nieborowski, op.cit.,
p. 72.
86
A short history of the corporation was also given in the Teutonic procurator’s letter to Konrad
von Jungingen (Berichte, Bd. 2, nr 22).
87
About Konrad von Jungingen’s health condition and medicine compare earlier deliberations.
88
Berichte, Bd. 2, nr 22.
89
The source was published by Friedrich Zarncke; comp. idem, Der Priester Johannes [Abhand.
1], Abhandlungen der Philologisch-Historischen Classe der Königlich Sächsischen Gesellschaft der
Wissenschften, Bd. 7: 1879, Nr. 8, pp. 909–934.
90
More about it comp. ibid., p. 827–1030; idem, Der Priester Johannes [Abhand. 2], Leipzig 1876;
S. Kałużyński, Dawni Mongołowie, Warszawa 1983, pp. 118–119; J. Delumeau, Historia raju: ogród
rozkoszy, transl. E. Bąkowska, Warszawa 1996, pp. 69–92; J. Strzelczyk, Król-kapłan Jan. Rzeczywistość
i legenda, [in:] W poszukiwaniu królestwa kapłana Jana, red. J. Strzelczyk, Gdańsk 2006, pp. 5–79.
91
„[...] [her h]at drey konigrich [...]. Dorczu so it her rewardt ober gancz India” (Berichte, Bd. 2,
nr 22).
92
„In tribus Indiis dominatur magnificentia nostra” (F. Zarncke, Der Priester Johannes [Abhand. 1], p. 910).
93
F. Zarncke indicated that the treatise must have been written after 1447 because it included the
reference to the times of the Pope Eugene IV, whose pontificate took place in the years 1431–1447
(F. Zarncke, Der Priester Johannes [Abhand. 2], p. 172).
Book 3
18
Michalina Broda
pulcherrimus94 informs that India was a vast territory divided into three parts: West
India (“anteriorem”), Central India (“interiorem”) and East India (“ulteriorem”). .
West India comprised the territory from Persia to the Indus River. Central India
included areas east of the Indus River to the Ganges. East India, which was situated
east of the Ganges River, was believed to be the wealthiest and without frontiers95.
Nonetheless, Jerzy Strzelczyk considered any attempts to associate the legend with
the geographical reality to be pointless and fruitless as the legend was “zawieszona
w próżni dziejowej” [“hanging in a historical void” – transl. A. C.]96.
The myth about the kingdom of the priest Johann often included the motif of
Alexander of Macedon. The Teutonic procurator’s letter of 1406 also made a reference to the figure of Alexander – the medicine sent to Konrad von Jungingen was
alleged to contain a few elements from the Caspian Mountains where, according to
the legend, Alexander walled in red Jews97. The editor of the source discussed the
whole story more extensively98, which was also reflected in the legend about the
priest Johann99. In the Middle Ages it was believed that the stranger from the East
guarded the apocalyptic tribes of Gog and Magog, who were gathered by Satan and
identified with the tribes of Israel who had betrayed God worshipping the golden
calf. At Alexander of Macedon’s request God surrounded the tribes by a ring of
mountains. This natural barrier is often identified with the Caspian Gateway or
Alexander’s Gateway. Jacob of Vitry, who lived at the turn of the 12th and 13th centuries, went by the name of Montes Caspii100 in reference to the legend.
Moreover, the story included references to attributes which had therapeutic
power. They may not have been associated with the medicine sent to Konrad von
94
The full title of the treatise, whose author remains unknown, is Tractatus pulcherrimus de situ
et dispositione regionum et insularum tocius Indiae, nec non de rerum mirabilium ac gentium diversitate. The work did not survive in the manuscript form – only in its printed version. The earliest
printed version comes from 1499. The treatise was attached to Itinerarium a Hierusalem by Johann
de Hese, a priest from Jerusalem (G. J. Spencer Spencer, T. F. Dibdin, Supplement to the Bibliotheca
Spenceriana, London 1822, p. 143; F. Zarncke, Der Priester Johannes [Abhand. 2], pp. 171–172).
95
„India autem maximum continet imperium, quod quidem in tres dividitur partes, videlicet in
anteriorem, interiorem et ulteriorem. Prima autem a Persis incipiens usque ad Indum fluvium protenditur, secunda ab ipso Indo usque ad Gangem, tercia nullum habet terminum, et illa est in opibus
et omni urbanitate longe aliis praestantior” (F. Zarncke, Der Priester Johannes [Abhand. 2], p. 176).
96
J. Strzelczyk, op.cit., p. 31.
97
„[...] es sein eczliche ding dorynne, die her hat lassen holen in den gebirgen Caspi [...], do die
roten juden von Allexandro vormuwert syn” (Berichte, Bd. 2, nr 22). Describing Jews as red (“roten”)
is quite mysterious and hard to understand. The publisher of the source tried to decipher it. He
maintained that the word referred to the colour of Jews’ hair, for the Jews who were walled in were
probably red-haired. Nevertheless, the second interpretation suggested by him seems to be more
reasonable – the red colour was to reflect the Jews’ disposition. The colour could express insincerity
and greed; comp.Berichte, Bd. 2, nr 22 – the publisher’s remarks.
98
Comp. ibid.
99
„Istas nempe et alias multas generationes Alexander puer magnus, rex Macedonum, conclusit inter altissimos montes in partibus aquilonis” (F. Zarncke, Der Priester Johannes [Abhand. 1],
p. 911).
100
J. Delumeau, op.cit., p. 84.
Book 3
19
Jungingen, but they are worth mentioning as they could indicate that the mythical Johann possessed some medical skills which could alleviate the suffering of
the sick. In a letter to Emperor Manuel I Komnenos (allegedly in 1165) the priest
Johann mentioned miraculous stones called “midriosi”. When worn on a finger,
they were to prevent bad eyesight and guaranteed its improvement – the condition of the eyesight could even become superior to the original if the clarity of
vision had deteriorated earlier. The precious stone had also other magic virtues101.
In the kingdom of the priest Johann there was another stone with an incomparable
healing power, which was guarded by two old men. It had the shape of a copper
conch the bottom of which was invariably filled with water. A person who needed
to be healed had to swear to the stone’s guardians that he was a Christian and declare that he wholeheartedly wanted to be cured. Having done so, the person could
enter the shell naked. Then, the level of water in the rock rose so as to cover the
cured individual. The process was repeated three times and the sick left the conch
completely cured. It must be noted that the stone healed exclusively Christians or
people who intended to be baptized. In other cases, the volume of the water did
not rise102.
On the grounds of this information, it may be concluded that the person recommended in 1406 by the procurator Peter von Wormditt to the highest official of
the Teutonic Order did not necessarily have the right qualifications. It is possible
that this Johann used the legend embedded in the consciousness of the Europeans
to get the post of a medical doctor at the court of Konrad von Jungingen. The effectiveness of his attempts should be judged quite skeptically from the perspective of
600 years. Rightfully, he was considered an impostor103. We should also agree with
Ch. Probst, who concluded that Johann did not manage to get the post104. If he had,
his person would have been reported in other sources from the Teutonic State.
It is curious why the grand master, who was seriously ill, did not accept Theodorus’ offer. Konrad had several doctors at his disposal, so he might not have hesi101
„Ibi sunt lapilli, qui vocantur midriosi [...]. Si quis illum in digito portaverit, ei lumen non
deficit, et si est imminutum, restituitur et cum plus inspicitur, magis lumen acuitur” (F. Zarncke, Der
Priester Johannes [Abhand. 1], p. 913).
102
„Est etiam inter mare harenosum et inter praedictos montes in planicie lapis admirandae
virtutis, vim in se habens fere incredibilis medicinae. Curat enim tantum christianos vel id fieri cupientes, a quacumque detineantur infirmitate, hoc modo. Est lapis quidam cavus ad modum conchae
aeneae, in quo semper est aqua in altitudine quatuor digitorum, et custoditur semper a duobus senibus, reverendae sanctitatis viris. Illi primo interrogant venientes, si Christiani sint vel fieri velint,
deinde, si sanitatem toto corde desiderent. Quod quum fuerint pro fessi, vestibus propriis exuti,
intrant concham. Et si vera professi sunt, aqua incipit crescere et adeo crescit, quod cooperit ita
eum totum, quod super caput eius ascendit. Idque tercio facit. Deinde paulatim decrescit et redit ad
cottidianam mensuram. Et sic qui intraverat ascendit de aqua sanus factus a lepra vel a quacumque
detinebatur infi rmitate” (ibid., p. 914).
103
K. Forstreuter, op.cit., p. 268; Berichte, Bd. 2, nr 22 – the publisher’s notes; Ch. Probst, op.cit.,
p. 163. P. Nieborowski considered Theodorus to be a cunning impostor. comp. P. Nieborowski,
op.cit., p. 72.
104
Ch. Probst, op.cit., p. 163.
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20
Michalina Broda
tated to employ another physician considering the fact that his physical condition
was deteriorating – he died almost a year later. It also seems that the content of the
letter, even though absurd from the point of view of a contemporary reader, should
not raise doubts in the grand master, for the significance of the myth in the context
of medieval man was considerable. The grand master must have been familiar with
the legend105.
In the second decade of the 15th century another foreigner attempted to obtain the post of the grand master Michael Küchmeister’s personal medical doctor.
The Teutonic procurator Peter von Wormditt attempted to recruit a doctor, whose
name is unknown, at the Council of Constance of 1414, as we know from the letter
written by him to the grand master on 25 October 1415106. The Teutonic representative in the Roman Curia assured the grand master that other great officials were
also eager to hire the doctor, but the physician was inclined to accept the Teutonic
procurator’s offer and was planning to set off to Prussia with the archbishop of Riga
or the commander of Dzierzgoń. However, he started to hesitate when a messenger
named Jacob sent by Johann Rogge informed him that the grand master was J.
Rogge’s debtor and refused to pay him 500 florins. Yet, Peter von Wormditt promised the grand master to send this doctor to Prussia together with the archbishop
of Riga or, should the doctor request it, he would accompany him himself107. It is
difficult to say who the doctor was. In the procurator’s letter his name did not appear, so seeking information about him in other sources seems fruitless. However,
he was probably a famous doctor, an outstanding specialist in medicine if so many
powerful people were willing to employ him. It is also confirmed by Peter von
Wormditt’s determination – he was ready to meet the exorbitant demands of the
doctor just to be able to bring him to the court in Malbork.
Another medical doctor who did not come for the Teutonic State, but was
connected with the court in Malbork was Johann Craft108. He probably arrived in
105
On 20 I 1407 Grand Master of the Teutonic Order Konrad von Jungingen wrote a letter to the
priest Johann, the king of Abyssinia. The highest Teutonic dignitary praised the ruler for his fight to
regain the Holy Land, and encouraged him to undertake further actions to defend Christianity. Despite the analogy, the addressee of the letter was not the legendary priest, but probably a real person.
According to K. Forstreuter in the Late Middle Ages all kings of Abyssinia were addressed with the
name of the mythical monarch from the East; comp. K. Forstreuter, op.cit., p. 272 (Anhang 5.).
106
Berichte, Bd. 2, nr 130.
107
Ibid., nr 130; Ch. Probst, op.cit., p. 165.
108
More about Johann Craft, comp. R. Ruciński, Craft (Crafft, Craffto, Kraft, Krafft, Kraffth) Jan,
[in:] Toruński słownik biograficzny, vol. 3, red. K. Mikulski, Toruń 2002, pp. 42–43 (find there earlier
literature and source records about him). However, it must be noted that publishers of the Toruń
Treasury Book discredited the date of Craft’s death (28 Sept 1456) as suggested by Robert Ruciński.
They suggested that the researcher had identified Craft with another person of the same name – Bartosz Craft – who was beheaded in 1456. Doctor Craft was still alive in 1457; comp. Księga kamlarii miasta Torunia z lat 1453–1495, wyd. K. Kopiński, K. Mikulski, J. Tandecki (Źródła do dziejów
średniowiecznego Torunia, cz. 3), Toruń 2007, pp. 7, 46, 155 – the publishers’ remarks; R. Ruciński,
op.cit., p. 42. Nevertheless, it seems that the dispute cannot be solved explicitly. Edmund Cieślak
including Bartosz Craft among the names of the beheaded punished for the participation in the
Book 3
21
the Monastic State of the Teutonic Order in Prussia in 1423. The Teutonic marshal
Ludwig von Landsee, at the request of the Sambian bishop, was trying to get a post
of prebendary in Königsberg for Craft, which he expressed in his letter written to
Grand Master Paul von Rusdorf in Wrocław109. The Teutonic dignitary stressed
that the presence of the learned medical doctor110 in Prussia would be beneficial
for the Teutonic Order111. This benefice was to guarantee Johann some income and
entice him to stay in Prussia, which leads us to the conclusion that Craft did not
come from the Monastic State. Otherwise, it would not have been necessary to
grant him benefices to keep him in the Monastic State112.
The preserved source material confirms Craft’s presence in Prussia also in a
later period113. The figure of the doctor Johann appeared in the sources of Teutonic
origin in 1433. In the chartulary of the grand master’s chancery there is to be found
a copy of a letter of 25 September 1433 to the Masovian princess Danuta Anna114.
The letter seems to have been a reply to her request to dispatch doctor Craft from
Toruń with her servant “Boghacko” to her place, because the princess was suffering from a serious disease and needed the doctor’s help. Paul von Rusdorf replied
that Johann had left Toruń and moved to Gdańsk. He also reassured the princess
rebellion pointed out that he was recorded as “Meister Craft” (only one record mentions “Bartsch
Craft”). He put forward a hypothesis that it was the same person. Moreover, he deduced what Craft’s
profession was from the letter of the Masovian princess Danuta Anna of 1433 (comp. further deliberations about the source). However, in the record the first name of the doctor did not appear and it
is not clear whether he could be identified with Bartosz Craft; comp. GStA PK, XX. HA, OF, nr 13,
s. 206; E. Cieślak, Walki ustrojowe w Gdańsku i Toruniu oraz w niektórych miastach hanzeatyckich
w XV w., Gdańsk 1960, p. 230. Cieślak’s suggestions could make publishers of Toruń’s city books
identify Master Craft with Bartosz – the alleged participant of the common people’s rebellion; comp.
Księga ławnicza nowego miasta Torunia (1387–1450), wyd. K. Ciesielska (Fontes TNT, vol. 63), Warszawa 1973, nr 2231 – the publisher’s notes; Księga ławnicza starego miasta Torunia (1428–1456),
cz. 1: (1428–1443), wyd. K. Ciesielska, J. Tandecki (Fontes TNT, vol. 75), Toruń 1992, nr 79 – the
publisher’s notes.
109
R. Ruciński stated that the Teutonic dignitary sent Craft to the grand master from Wrocław,
but the letter does not make it clear; comp. GStA PK, XX. HA, Ordensbriefarchiv (further cit. OBA),
nr 4067; R. Ruciński, op.cit., p. 42.
110
According to R. Ruciński, Johann Craft was educated at the university of Erfurt or Cologne,
but there is no evidence for this in the source material; comp. R. Ruciński, op.cit., p. 42.
111
„[...] meistir Johannes eyn gelelether man ist und were nutze im lande” (GStA PK, XX. HA,
OBA, nr 4067).
112
Nevertheless, it is hard to show explicitly where Craft came from. Wrocław does not seem to
have been his family town. Krzysztof Kopiński’s study presenting social and economic contacts between Toruń and Wrocław does not mention the medical doctor Johann; the book does not contain
any information about the Craft family, either; comp. K. Kopiński, Gospodarcze i społeczne kontakty
Torunia z Wrocławiem w późnym średniowieczu (Roczniki TNT, R. 91, z. 2), Toruń 2005.
113
Ch. Probst, who based his conclusions about Johann Craft exclusively on the above-mentioned source, stated that the medical doctor did not stay in the Monastic State of the Teutonic Order
in Prussia, comp. Ch. Probst, op.cit., p. 165.
114
See more. K. Jasiński, Rodowód Piastów mazowieckich, Poznań–Wrocław 1998 (Biblioteka
Genealogiczna, vol. 1), pp. 80–83, 223.
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Michalina Broda
that he had asked the local commander of the castle to inform the doctor about the
problem and to send him to Ostróda [Osterode]115.
The source fails to say when Johann had moved to Gdańsk. Probably it was a
short time before the princess sent the letter if at the end of September 1433 he was
still associated with Toruń. If this was the case, the document of 9 August 1433
enclosed with the letter from the grand marshal to the grand master probably also
referred to this doctor. The content of the attachment states that prior to the preparation of the letter the Teutonic knight von Plauen and the grand marshal met.
When they were parting in Gniew [Mewe], Plauen asked the marshal to call an
anonymous doctor from Toruń. The Teutonic official and the grand commander
acceded to Plauen’s request, but soon afterwards they went down with some unknown illness. Accordingly, they asked Paul von Rusdorf if the doctor from Toruń,
who was about to reach Grudziądz [Graudenz] soon, could stay and cure them – at
least for the period of the time when the doctor Mattyas from Gdańsk called by the
grand master would be treating Plauen116.
On the basis of the preserved sources it is hard to determine what the relationship between the grand master and the doctor Johann was like. The sources
fail to confirm that Craft was Paul von Rusdorf ’s personal doctor. However, it
seems that he remained at the grand master’s disposal, and the grand master could
send him to another place at his own discretion. It is perfectly understandable
that other monarchs requested the grand master to send them the medical doctor or to permit him to leave the Monastic State. Nevertheless, the content of the
grand marshal’s letter is astonishing as it states that the Teutonic dignitary called
the doctor from Toruń himself and it seems logical that the grand marshal should
give the physician further orders – i.e. to send him to treat Plauen, or to make
him stay longer in Grudziądz. He could also contact Plauen (at whose request he
had contacted Toruń’s medical doctor) and inform him of the situation and pos115
GStA PK, XX. HA, OF, nr 13, p. 206. It seems that Zdzisław Mameła referred to this situation. In his study there appears “Kraft M.”. According to the researcher, it was a medical doctor
who practiced in Toruń in 1433. Grand Master valued the doctor, who was called to the court of
Princess Danuta Anna thanks to Grand Master’s recommendation; comp. Z. Mameła, Poczet lekarzy
i aptekarzy dawnego Torunia, Toruń 1998, p. 41. It must be noted that the researcher’s interpretation
is not completely in accordance with the content of the source. It cannot be excluded that Johann
practiced in Toruń maybe even until 1433, which could be confirmed by another record (see further
deliberations). However, the copy of the Masovian princess’s letter does not say that Grand Master
recommended Johann. Moreover, probably Johann’s visit at the princess’s court was quite short. He
was called to treat her, and not to remain in her court.
116
„[...] als wir am neesten von der Mewe schieden, do bat uns der herre von Plauwen, das wir
umbe eynen artzt ken Thorun welden bestellen; so wir itzunt myt sampt dem großkompthur umb
den artzt ken Thorun bestalt haben; sien wir itzunt in swere krangheit gefallen; so das wir tzu Grudentz mussen bleiben legen; nu vornemen wir, das ir umbe meister Mattyaß tzu Dantzk bestalt habt
und vorsehe wir, das der artzt von Thorun nach hewten wirt sien tzu Grudentz und bitten euwir
gnade, das der artz von Thorun etzliche tzeith bey uns moge bleiben, u. das her uns helfen mochte; so
ferre andirs meister Mattyas itzunt bey dem vom Plauwen were adir kurzlich komen wurde” (GStA
PK, XX. HA, OBA, nr 6616).
Book 3
23
sible amendments to the former arrangements. However, for unknown reasons
the grand marshal notified the grand master of his plans and expected him to give
permission to carry them out. Supposedly, this could have been the result of the
doctor’s personal subordination to the grand master or extraordinary conditions
resulting from military campaigns taking place at that time117.
Another foreign medical doctor who served grand masters was a Jew called
Meyen, who maintained contacts with Konrad von Erlichshausen118. Undoubtedly,
the physician did not come from the Monastic State as Jews were not allowed to
settle there, according to the policy of the Teutonic Order: as organizers of crusades
they did not tolerate followers of other religions within the Teutonic boundaries119.
Moreover, Meyen’s origin is confirmed by sources. He lived in Poland – in 1446
he resided in Poznań. A preserved writ of protection issued in December 1446 by
Konrad von Erlichshausen in Bytów [Bütow] guaranteed protection to Meyen, a
doctor and Jew from Poznań120. Thanks to the writ, the Jewish doctor was allowed
to enter the Monastic State and stay there until 14 February, which meant over two
months. Nevertheless, he was not permitted to carry out medical examinations121.
Thus, it seems probable that Meyen was only passing the Monastic State on his
way from the Duchy of Pomerania to Poznań. On the other hand, other sources
relating to this doctor inform that before 17 June 1448 Meyen changed his place of
residence. On that day the Teutonic procurator from Bytów [Bütow] in his letter
to the grand master mentioned an educated Jewish doctor “Meiger”122 who lived in
Dybów ( Nowa Nieszawa)123.
117
Ch. Probst associated the two medical doctors’ journeys in the Monastic State of the Teutonic
Order with the war campaign. R. Ruciński concluded that due to the war Craft had submitted himself
under direct orders of Grand Master (Ch. Probst, op.cit., s. 166; R. Ruciński, op.cit., p. 42).
118
More about Meyen and another doctor of Jewish origin in the Monastic State of the Teutonic Order in Prussia in the 15th century see more: M. Broda, Żydowscy lekarze w państwie zakonu krzyżackiego w Prusach w późnym średniowieczu, Kwartalnik Historii Żydów, 2011, nr 4 (240),
pp. 435–443.
119
The exception were towns of the Neumark [the New March] purchased from Sigismund of
Luxembourg at the beginning of the 15th century, where the significant part of the population was
of Jewish origin. Zenon Hubert Nowak discussed the problem of Jews in the Monastic State of the
Teutonic Order in his work: Dzieje Żydów w Prusach Krolewskich do roku 1772. Charakterystyka,
[in:] Żydzi w dawnej Rzeczpospolitej. Materiały z konferencji „Autonomia Żydów w Rzeczpospolitej
Szlacheckiej”, Międzywydziałowy Zakład Historii i Kultury Żydów w Polsce, Uniwersytet Jagielloński,
22–26 IX 1986, red. A. Link-Lenczowski, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków 1991, p. 136.
120
„Meyen der Arsten und Juden von Poßnaw”.
121
122
In preserved sources the name of the Jewish doctor is spelt” “Meyne”, “Meiger”, “Meygen”,
“Maher”. Undoubtedly, all the names refer to the same person – comp. GStA PK, XX. HA, OBA, nr
9561, 9842; OF, nr 16, s. 299; nr 17, pp. 179–180, 809.
123
„[...] mgr Meiger der Yeden, der zu Diebaw wonnt” (GStA PK, XX. HA, OBA, nr 9561). The
record does not include any information that the Jew was a medical doctor. However, his medical
profession is confirmed in the copy of the letter from Grand Master to the starost Jan Kretkowski of
14 January 1449. The letter concerned an educated Jew “Meygen”, a doctor from Nieszawa (“meister
Meygen den Juden und artczsten von Nessauw”). The analogy of the name, the Jewish origin, higher
Book 3
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Michalina Broda
This letter is significant not only because it defined the doctor’s place of residence bus also because it leads us to assume that Konrad von Erlichshausen used
Meyen’s medical services. In the letter, the Teutonic official from Bytów informed
the grand master that the bailiff of the Duchy of Słupsk [Pomerania-Stolp] Jarosław
(“Jerslaf ”) dispatched Meyen with a Pomeranian knight named Ludwig Massow to
the capital city of the Monastic State of the Teutonic Order in Prussia. The author
of the letter expressed his hope that they would be helpful to the grand master124.
Although the Teutonic procurator did not say how they could help Konrad von Erlichshausen, it is assumed that he meant medical assistance125. As can be concluded
from later Teutonic and Polish sources, at the beginning of 1449 Meyen was sent to
the Monastic State in Prussia again to provide medical help. On 14 January 1449 at
the request of the knight Jan Bażyński from Chełmno Land [Culmland], the grand
master asked the starost of Nieszawa [Nessau] and Kuyavia Jan Kretkowski to send
Meyen with a Jewish servant to Prussia. The highest dignitary of the Teutonic Order guaranteed Meyen and his servant a safe journey to Malbork126. The confirmation that a proper document was drafted is to be found in the registry book of the
grand master’s chancery under the date 27 January 1449. On the same day in Elbląg
Konrad von Erlichshausen issued a writ of protection for the Jewish doctor named
Meyen and his servant who was also Jewish. He was guaranteed a safe journey to
Toruń, or from there to Malbork, and on his way back until 1 June 1449; he was also
granted complete immunity from the authorities, officials and Teutonic subjects127.
We learn about the Jewish doctor’s visit in the Monastic State of the Teutonic
Order in Prussia from the reply of the starost Kretkowski to the grand master’s letter.
In the letter issued on 11 February 1449 the Polish official notified the grand master
that Meyen had been sent to Malbork. From the letter it can be concluded that the
original destination of the Jewish doctor was to be Toruń128, where Meyen was to
start the treatment of Jan Bażyński. Nevertheless, the latter did not appear in Toruń.
As a result, Meyen together with Mikołaj Scharar – Jan Kretkowski’s resident129 – set
education and the same place of residence make it clear that the records concern the same person
(GStA PK, XX. HA, OF, nr 17, p. 809).
124
Ibid., OBA, nr 9561.
125
S. Jóźwiak, Kontakty komturów toruńskich z Żydami z Nowej Nieszawy w latach czterdziestych
XV wieku, Rocznik Toruński, 29: 2002, p. 46.
126
127
Ibid., pp. 179–180.
128
Sławomir Jóźwiak erroneously said that Meyen had stayed in Toruń for a short time, where he
lived in quarters prepared by him by a local commander; comp. S. Jóźwiak, op.cit., p. 45.
129
It should be noted that both Konrad von Erlichshausen’s letter and the record from the chancery book of the grand master show that the writ of protection was issued for two Jews; por. GStA
PK, XX. HA, OF, nr 17, pp. 179–180, 809. However, in the letter of the starost Jan Kretkowski it does
not say that Meyen’s companion Mikołaj Scharar was Jewish; on the contrary, he was described as
a burgher and nobleman (“nobilis et providus Niclos Scharar”); comp. GStA PK, XX. HA, OBA, nr
9842. It seems he could be identified with Niclos Scharar – Rypin’s burgher who came from Toruń
– considered a Teutonic agent under a pseudonym „N. S. Arman” – more about it comp. S. Jóźwiak,
Book 3
25
off directly to Malbork. Thus, the starost requested the grand master to provide security for Meyen during his journey. It must be noted that Kretkowski ended the letter
to Konrad von Erlichshausen wishing him good health and the best of luck130. The
manner in which he expressed his wishes leads us to suppose that Meyen was sent to
the court in Malbork to provide medical help to the grand master131, but we cannot
be completely sure about that. According to the sources, Konrad von Erlichshausen
tried to get Meyen’s help at the request of Jan Bażyński132. Thus, it seems probable as
a result of the fact that Bażyński did not appear in Toruń, the physician might have
gone to Malbork to treat him there.
In the mid-15th century there was also another foreign doctor who practiced
on the territory of the Monastic State of the Teutonic Order. The sources from
the years 1446–1459 confirm the presence of the Teutonic knight Jacob Schillingholtz133. We find out about the foreign origin of the doctor from the earliest source
of Teutonic origin concerning his person – from the report from the inspection of
the Gdańsk convent of 14 November 1446. Among other monks the report mentions “Jacob Schillingholtcz eyn Ryman und doctor in der artsteye”134 – a Rhinelander holding a doctor’s degree in medical sciences. The University of Padua’s
documents confirm that the doctor came from the Reich. In the notes of 14 June
1440 there appeared “Iacobus de Schillingholtz de Alemania ord. s. Marie de Cruciferis”135. Although there are no sources proving this, Jacob might have graduated
from the Universty of Padua.
Na tropie średniowiecznych szpiegów. Wywiad i kontrwywiad w polsko-litewsko-krzyżackich stosunkach politycznych w XIV i pierwszej połowie XV wieku, Inowrocław 2005, pp. 47–52.
130
„[...] dominus Deus det dominacioni vestre sanitatem longam et multas bonas” (GStA PK,
XX. HA, OBA, nr 9842).
131
S. Jóźwiak, Kontakty komturów, p. 45.
132
Comp. GStA PK, XX. HA, OF, nr 17, p. 809.
133
At the same time as Schillingholtz another physician – Antoni Müttel – was a member of
the Teutonic Order. He was Johann of Brandenburg’s personal doctor. It seems that Müttel committed some serious offence as he was expelled from the Order and excommunicated. However, on
31 March 1457 the Brandenburg margraves Frederick, Johann and Albert interceded for him with
Ludwik von Erlichshausen. Grand Master acceded to their request and restored him as a member of
the Teutonic Order. He also agreed for the physician to stay in the entourage of Johann of Brandenburg or to serve other courts. Although the doctor’s foreign origin has not been confirmed by the
sources, his stay in the entourage of the Brandenburg margrave and the grand master’s decisions do
not indicate that Müttel had any closer relationship with the Monastic State of the Teutonic Order
in Prussia. See more in: GStA PK, XX. HA, OBA, nr 14731; 14843; Ch. Probst, Drei Ärzte in den
Reihen des Deutschen Ordens. Beispiele ärztlichen Lebens und Wirkens im 15. Jahrhundert, [in:] Acht
Jahrhunderte Deutscher Orden: in Einzeldarstellungen, hrsg. v. K. Wieser (Quellen und Studien zur
Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens, Bd. 1), Bad Godesberg 1967, pp. 229–228; idem, Der Deutsche
Orden und sein Medizinalwesen, pp. 168–169.
134
Das grose Ämterbuch des Deutschen Ordens, hrsg. v. W. Ziesemer, Danzig 1921 (further cit.
GÄB), p. 709.
135
Acta graduum academicorum Gymnasii Patavini ab anno 1406 ad annum 1450, cur. G. Zonta,
G. Brotto, Vol. 2: 1435–1450, Padova 1970, p. 103. According to the record, Jacob was already a member of the Teutonic Order at that time.
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26
Michalina Broda
It is difficult to state exactly when Schillingholtz started his service in Malbork136. In 1446 the physician was present in Gdańsk137. Presumably, he stayed there
in 1448, because during that period he was not connected with the grand master,
who probably had a different personal doctor at that time138. Ch. Probst suggested
that the doctor still lived in Gdańsk in December 1449 and travelled from there to
Malbork to treat the commander of Elbląg Heinrich Reus von Plauen139. In another
record before 1450 referring to the Gdańsk convent there is information about an
anonymous physician with a doctor’s degree140. However, it must be noted that
Jacob was also included in the list of members of the Teutonic Order from the
Malbork convent141, which was probably drafted in 1448142.
As can be concluded from the preserved source records, Jacob was a respected
specialist, and his fame led many sick people to seek his advice with the permission
of the grand master. The group included, for example, the commander of Balga
Eberhard von Wesenthau. This Teutonic official wrote a letter to the grand master
on 29 May 1448, in which he described the worrying problem of one of the members of his convent – Doctor Johann de Godesberg143. The clergyman complained
to the commander that he suffered from serious problems with his eyesight, which
136
Ch. Probst indicated that Schillingholtz moved from the Gdańsk convent to Malbork in 1454.
The researcher connected this fact with the outbreak of the Thirteen Years’ War; comp. Ch. Probst,
Drei Ärzte, p. 227; idem, Der Deutsche Orden und sein Medizinalwesen, p. 167.
137
GÄB, p. 709.
138
In the letter of 29 May 1448 the commander of Balga requested Ludwik von Erlichshausen to
allow him to use the help of Grand Master’s personal doctor or Master Jacob (“[...] zcu euwir gnaden
artcz [a]dder tzu meister Jocob zcuczyhen [...]”). Accordingly, the conclusion is that Jacob was not
Grand Master’s personal doctor at that time (GStA PK, XX. HA, OBA, nr 9538).
139
According to the letter of the commander of Elbląg to the bishop of the Pomesanian diocese
of 9 Dec 1449, the sick Teutonic official was treated by Hans von Erfurt from Gdańsk, who was travelling through Malbork; por. ibid., nr 10107; Ch. Probst, Der Deutsche Orden und sein Medizinalwesen,
p. 166.
140
„Der doctor der artzte” (GÄB, p. 710). Despite the fact that neither the name of the doctor nor his surname appeared in the record, probably it concerned Schillingholtz. Ch. Probst also
concluded that the record referred to Doctor Jacob; comp. Ch. Probst, Der Deutsche Orden und sein
Medizinalwesen, p. 167.
141
„[...] Doctor Jacob” (GStA PK, XX. HA, OBA, nr 28323).
142
According to the most recent research the source was prepared about 1448 and it was probably dated by the creators of the register (Regesta, P. I, nr 28323; S. Jóźwiak, Liczebność konwentów
zakonu krzyżackiego w Prusach w pierwszej połowie XV wieku, ZH, vol. 72: 2007, z. 1, p. 14). In earlier
literature the date of the preparation of the source was established between 1454 and 1457; comp.
B. Jähnig, Der Danziger Deutschordenskonvent in der Mitte des 15. Jahrhunderts, [in:] Danzig in acht
Jahrhunderten. Beiträge zur Geschichte eines hansischen und preussischen Mittelpunktes, hrsg. v. B.
Jähnig, P. Letkemann (Quellen und Darstellungen zur Geschichte Westpreussens, Nr. 23), Münster
1985, p. 169.
143
In the text of the source he was referred to as “doctor Johannes Godersperg”. The figure appeared in registers of the University of Bologna. On 8 February 1441 Johann passed an examination
and obtained the title of the doctor of Canon Law; comp. Deutsche Studenten in Bologna (1289–
1562). Biographischer Index zu den Acta nationis Geramnicae universitatis Bononiensis, bearb. v. G. C.
Knod, Königsberg 1899, p. 162.
Book 3
27
bore unpleasant consequences in everyday life. Unfortunately, it is impossible to
make out what the symptoms of the ailment were, because the fragment of the text
was damaged. It seems that Johann found it difficult to cover the distance from
his room to the church and, when he finally got there, he had difficulties seeing
the host. To overcome his weakness, he had to stand facing the priest and probably had to stay close to him. Later in the letter the Teutonic official requested the
grand master for help. As the anonymous doctor from Elbląg was helpless in the
face of Johann’s illness, the commander insisted that the medical doctor serving
Konrad von Erlichshausen or Jacob himself144 deal with the sick member of the
convent. Otherwise – according to the author of the letter – Johann de Godesberg
could have lost his eyesight completely145. Requests of this kind were also directed
to the next grand master Ludwig von Erlichshausen. In August 1450 the bishop of
Warmia Franciszek Kuhschmalz asked the grand master to send Jacob to provide
him with medical advice146.
Jacob’s fame went beyond Prussia. The Livonian land master Heidenrich
Vincke von Overberg also tried to get Jacob’s help. In a letter of 23 February 1450
to the grand commander Heinrich Soler von Richtenberg, he wrote about a serious
disease weakening his body. He asked Doctor Jacob to come to him147, because he
wanted to describe to him his conditions in details. The Livonian master insisted
that the doctor arrive in Königsberg, where he could give him medical guidelines.
He also asked the grand commander to persuade the doctor to visit to him148. The
reeve of Szczecinek [Neustettin] Konrad (Kurt) Glasenapp149 enlisted Doctor Johann’s medical advice. In a letter of 6 February 1459 he complained to Konrad von
Erlichshausen about a pain lasting over 10 weeks connected with kidney stones.
The Pomeranian knight requested the medical doctor to send him an appropriate medicine together with guidelines how it should be used and how Glasenapp
should behave during his illness150.
144
Undoubtedly, it referred to Jacob Schillingholtz.
„[...] der doctor Johannes Godersperg ist wol bey mir gewest und hat dirclaget der gebrechen
seyner owgen, dorane her denn sere karng ist und magk kowme awß seyner kamer in dy kirche
gehen und wenn her in der kirchen unßer heere got sehen sal, so muß her vor den alter knyhen hert
hinder den priester [– – –] und meynet, das em der artcz czum Elbinge dorczu nicht moge hel. en.
Warumb so hat her mich gebeten, euwern gnaden vor en tzu schreben, das im dy welde [– – –] zcu
euwir gnaden artcz [a]dder tzu meister Jocob zcuczyhen, ap sy im rath muchten fynden, wenn wy
her lenger wurde beyten, so ist es vorsehelich, das her gantz bleith wirt” (GStA PK, XX. HA, OBA,
nr 9538).
146
Ibid., nr 10328.
147
It should be underlined that the author of the document defined Jacob as the doctor of the
Order – “doktor unsers ordens”.
148
Liv-, Est- und Kurlandisches Urkundenbuch, hrsg. v. P. Schwartz, Abt. 1, Bd. 11, Riga–Moskau
1905, nr 14.
149
More about him comp. M. Biskup, Trzynastoletnia wojna z Zakonem Krzyżackim 1454–1466,
Warszawa 1967, pp. 126, 128, 167, 168, 324, 378, 478, 498, 530.
150
“[...] wenne, adder wy vele, adder wy ich mich in der krangheit halden sall” (GStA PK, XX.
HA, OBA, nr 15257).
145
Book 3
28
Michalina Broda
As it can be concluded from source records, Jacob’s good fame did not end
with his death151, which is proved by a letter of 1 August 1460 written by the grand
commander to the grand master Ludwig von Erlichshausen. The Teutonic official
complained about the condition of his health. He feared being left without any
medical assistance owing to the war taking place at that time152. Thus, he asked the
grand master to send to Przezmark [Preußisch Mark] the same laxative153 as Jacob
had given the grand master154. It should be underlined here that the letter was written over a year after the physician’s death. So, we may infer that the medicine was
prepared in accordance with Jacob’s prescription, or it had been made by Jacob
himself before his death, and now the grand commander asked the grand master
to make part of the reserve available to him.
Jacob’s functions were not limited only to the role of Ludwig von Erlichshausen’s
personal doctor. Source records confirm that he took part in the diplomatic mission sent to meet the elector of Brandenburg Frederic who was making his way to
the court of Ludwig von Erlichshausen in July 1455155. Moreover, Jacob Schillingholtz represented the Teutonic Order in diplomatic contacts with Poland156. On 31
July 1455 in Malbork a list of envoys to be sent for negotiations was made, in which
the elector of Brandenburg was to act as a mediator. Apart from Doctor Jacob157
the list included: the grand commander Ulrich von Isenhofen, the commander of
Freiburg Beringer von Weiler, the grand master’s advisor Lorenz Blumenau and
the monk Wilhelm von Schonenburg158.
Ludwig von Erlichshausen trusted Jacob also in other matters. The doctor was
entrusted with other Teutonic dignitaries’ large sums of money for safekeeping.
According to the sources, on 18 September 1455 the grand master confirmed re151
Jacob Schillingholtz died before 24 March 1459 as it was the date when the commander of
Elblag Heinrich Reuß von Plauen wrote a letter informing him about the death of the doctor, comp.
ibid., nr 15274.
152
More about military actions in that period comp. M. Biskup, Trzynastoletnia wojna, pp. 565–
–607.
153
“[...] der selbigen purgacio” (GStA PK, XX. HA, OBA, nr 15516). The term referring to a
medicine derives from Latin. According to Słownik łaciny średniowiecznej w Polsce the noun purgatio, puragcio, -onis in medical terminology means “a purgative”; comp. Słownik łaciny średniowiecznej
w Polsce, red. K. Weyssenhoff-Brożkowa, vol. 7, z. 10 (61), Kraków 2000, kol. 1556–1557.
154
GStA PK, XX. HA, OBA, nr 15516. Although the doctor’s name did not appear in the source,
it undoubtedly referred to Jacob Schillingholtz.
155
Ibid., nr 13841; M. Biskup, Trzynastoletnia wojna, p. 398.
156
It should be noted that Jacob Schillingholtz was not the only personal doctor of the grand
master who accompanied the highest Teutonic dignitary in his diplomatic contacts. The same role
was played by Konrad von Jungingen’s and Urlich von Jungingen’s doctor – Bartłomiej of Boreszewo;
comp. M. Broda, Bartłomiej z Boreszewa, p. 36.
157
„[...] Jacobus medicine doctor diciti domini magistri generalis phisicus” (GStA PK, XX. HA,
Pergamenturkunden (further cit. Perg.-Urk.) 68/2).
158
Ibid. More about the prince elector of Brandenburg’s mediation in the negotiations between
the Polish king, the Teutonic Order and the Prussian estates comp. M. Biskup, Trzynastoletnia wojna,
pp. 397–404.
Book 3
29
ceipt of 1450 grzywnas from Doctor Jacob. The doctor had been entrusted with the
money in Königsberg by the grand dispenser of the Teutonic Order Winrich von
Manstede159. There is also information from the times of the Thirteen Years’ War
confirming the close cooperation between Jacob Schillingholtz and the Teutonic
grand master Ludwig von Erlichshausen160.
Another evidence of good relations between Ludwig von Erlichshausen and
Doctor Jacob Schillingholtz was a letter of 1 October 1453 sent from the grand master to the city of Lübeck. The highest dignitary of the Teutonic Order intervened on
Doctor Jacob’s behalf161. The letter says the doctor was refused two packages of cloth
belonging to him. The packages bore the doctor’s symbol, the copy of which was
placed by Erlichshausen in the letter. What is more, the grand master ensured that
the cloth was not the property of Englishmen, but belonged to Schillingholtz162. According to preserved source records, the Teutonic Order tried to use Jacob in their
policy of interference in the manning of church posts163. He was presented twice as
a candidate to such an appointment. The annex to the document (probably of 1456)
written to the Teutonic procurator in Rome Ludwig von Erlichshausen presented
Schillingholtz as a candidate for the post of parson in Gdańsk164. It seems that Jacob
was also taken into consideration as a candidate for the bishopric of Chełmno Land
[Culmland], which fell vacant after Johann Marienau’s death165. On 27 March 1457,
the commander of Elbląg Heinrich Reus von Plauen suggested Schillingholtz’s candidacy in a letter written to the grand master of the Teutonic Order. The Teutonic
dignitary emphasized that due to his material condition166 Jacob would be a better
159
„[...] wir van dem achtabren und wirdigen hern Jacobo Schillingholcz unsers ordens unsern und
unsers hoffes phisics doctori in medicinis uffgehaben und empfangen haben fum. Cienhalbhundert
mark prewssch geringes geldes von des Erbarn und geistlichen Wynrichs van Manstede unsers ordens
grosscheffer zcu Konigßberg, wegen das der genante Wynrich ken dem berurten unsiern physics zcu
getrauwer handt in vorwarunge hatte nydergeleget und dorumb so sprechen wir frey und qweit denselben hern Jacobum solcher 1450 marg in crafft diesses brieffes” (GStA PK, XX. HA, OBA, nr 13913).
160
Ibid., Perg.-Urk. XLII/9. See more M. Broda, „Lekarze w państwie zakonu krzyżackiego
w Prusach w XIV–XV wieku” (in print).
161
It should be underlined that in the letter Grand Master defined Master Johann as a doctor and
“physician” of his court – “meister Jacob unsers hoffes doctor und phisics”.
162
GStA PK, XX. HA, OBA, nr 12421. Ch. Probst stated that Schillingholtz’s goods were confiscated for it had been wrongly considered to belong to the enemy; comp. Ch. Probst, Der Deutsche
Orden und sein Medizinalwesen, p. 167.
163
More about it comp. Ch. Probst, Der Deutsche Orden und sein Medizinalwesen, pp. 167–168.
164
GStA PK, XX. HA, OBA, nr 14738. See also ibid., nr 14209.
165
The Bishop of Chełmno [Culm] Johann Marienau died a natural death in Toruń in March
1457. However, literature provides different day dates of his death – see more: M. Sumowski, „Jan
Marienau biskup chełmiński (1416–1457)” (in print).
166
It seems that information about Schillingholtz’s good financial situation made Ch. Probst
conclude that his status of a monk did not hinder his other activities. The researcher even put forward
a hypothesis that Jacob ran his own independent medical practice (Ch. Probst, Der Deutsche Orden
und sein Medizinalwesen, p. 167). Yet, it seems quite unlikely considering the fact that Schillingholtz
was the grand master’s personal doctor – as it can be deduced from preserved sources. As such he
must have been at the grand master’s disposal all the time and had to travel as ordered by his superior,
Book 3
30
Michalina Broda
candidate for the vacant bishopric167 than Magister Andreas168. According to the
Elbląg commander, the choice of the latter without the guarantee of remuneration
from the German master or from another source could lead to the situation that the
Teutonic Order would lose its influence on the appointment of the bishop’s post in
the Chełmno [Culm] diocese169. Probably Ludwig von Erlichshausen did not accept
the candidacy of Schillingholtz as part of the members of the Chełmno [Culm]
chapter who supported the Teutonic Order voted for Andreas Santberg170 according
to the will of the grand master.
In the second half of the 15th century another foreign medical doctor appeared
in Malbork – Antonius of Nuremberg. His presence in Malbork is confirmed in a
copy of a document issued by Ludwig von Erlichshausen on 23 December 1451 included in the cartulary of the grand master’s chancery. The highest dignitary of the
Teutonic Order stated that the physician was proficient in his trade and had helped
many people in his country, on the grounds of which the grand master permitted
him to practice as a doctor in the Monastic State of the Teutonic Order171.
Recapitulating the above deliberations, it must be stated that personal doctors
of grand masters in Malbork came from the outside of the Monastic State. Most of
them came from the Reich (Konrad von Leithen, Johann von Rode, Johann Rogge,
Jacob Schillingholtz, Antonius Müttel). However, at the court of Malbork there
also served physicians from the diocese Parma (Frugerius) or from the Kingdom
of Poland (Meyen). It should be underlined that Meyen was a Jew, so his identity
differed also in ethnic and religious terms. On the basis of the preserved source
records it is not possible to define the origin of all the medical doctors serving at
the court in Malbork. Johann Craft might have arrived in the Monastic State from
Wrocław, but there are no sources that would prove that this was his family town.
There was also the exotic figure of Theodorus from India who tried to get the post
of Konrad von Jungingen’s personal doctor, and an anonymous physician recruited
by the Teutonic procurator at the Council of Constance. However, it is difficult to
say where he came from. Bormienes, a doctor of Armenian origin, also belonged
to the group of grand masters’ doctors, but his figure seems to exist only in historiography as his presence in the Monastic State of the Teutonic Order in Prussia has
not been confirmed by available source material from the period.
which would have made his independent medical practice difficult to work properly. Furthermore,
the Thirteen Years’ War also did not facilitate such an activity of the doctor.
167
„[...] so were es besser und rathen getrewlich u. doctorum Jacobum, der dortzu gut ist und es
villeichte selber mit gelde hot czuvorlegen” (GStA PK, XX. HA, OBA, nr 14832).
168
It refers to the grand master’s chaplain Andreas Santberg. See more about him: B. Jähnig, Die
diplomatische Tatigkeit des Hochmeisterkaplans Andreas Santberg, [in:] Kancelaria wielkich mistrzów
i polska kancelaria królewska w XV wieku, red. J. Trupinda, Malbork 2006, pp. 127–143.
169
GStA PK, XX. HA, OBA, nr 14832.
170
The double election took place then as members of the charter who were loyal to Poland
supported Bartłomiej Rogser; comp. H. Schmauch, Das Bistum Kulm und das Nominationsrecht der
polnischen Könige, Zeitschrift des Westpreußischen Geschichtsvereins, H. 71: 1934, p. 119.
171
GStA PK, XX. HA, OF, nr 17, pp. 743–744.
Book 3
ZAPISKI
HISTORYCZNE
—
VOLUME
LXXVI —
2011
BOOK 3
KONRAD BOBIATYŃSKI (Warszawa)
BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC AND MUSCOVY
– DAUGAVPILS AND POLISH LIVONIA IN THE YEARS 1665–1667*
Key words: Daugavpils, Polish Livonia, Jacob Kettler, the Truce of Andrusovo, the war between the Republic and Muscovy 1654–1667
After the wars in the years 1600–1629 when Sweden conquered almost all Livonia behind the River Daugava, the Republic controlled only the south-eastern part
of Livonia taking up an area of 13,000 km2 – Latgale (the so-called Minor Livland).
After the outbreak of another great conflict in this part of Europe in 1654, this territory – referred to as Polish Livonia – attracted the attention of Muscovy owing
to its strategic location. Having conquered Daugavpils, Tsar Aleksey Mikhailovich
intended not only to take control of Lithuanian trade, but also the export of corn
and forest goods transported on the Daugava towards Riga. Moreover, he wanted
to establish a convenient bridgehead for his further expansion towards the Swedish estates on the Baltic Sea1.
Originally, not to provoke the Swedish into any military activity, only small
Muscovite military units entered Livonia (over 1000 soldiers), led by Lev Saltykov
and Stepan Jelagin. Although in October 1654 they managed to take over Rēzekne
and Marienhausen without conflict, and on 5 December – after a longer siege –
Ludza2, they were unable to even attempt to conquer Daugavpils. It was not until
the following year that the tsar decided to send to Latgale a more powerful corps
commanded by the voivode Drui Afanasij Ordin-Naszczokin. After many problems connected with the slow mobilization of the army on 28 April 1655, the Muscovite units undertook the siege of Daugavpils. Owing to a lack of heavy artillery,
the high level of water in the Daugava and the considerable Lithuanian forces sent
to help the town, the siege was not successful so that at the end of May the deci*
p. 37–55.
1
See more recent works on the subject of the Baltic policy run by the state of Muscovy in this period: Е. И. Кобзарева, Дипломатическая борьба России за выход к Балтийскому морю в 1655–
–1661 годах, Москва 1998; Б. Н. Флоря, Русское государство и его западные соседи (1655–1661
гг.), Москва 2010.
2
All the dates are given according to the Gregorian calendar.
32
Konrad Bobiatyński
sion was made to suspend military activity. The danger of Latgale being taken over
by the Muscovite army forced the Swedes to counteract. In July 1655 their troops
attacked the Republic from a few directions. The first town to be overrun by the
army of Charles X Gustav was Dugavpils which, after a few days‘ siege, surrendered to the units of Gustav Adolf Loewenhaupt3 on 11 July 1655 without having
taken recourse to all the defence strategies available to them.
This event obviously did not end the struggle for Latgale. The break in the
war with the Republic allowed Aleksey Mikhailovich to launch military actions
against Sweden and attack Livonia in the summer of 1656. The first target of the
Muscovite army led by the tsar himself (the actual commander was Jakow Cherkasski) was Daugavpils. The siege of the town commenced on 28 July 1656 and was
led by troops of about 3400 soldiers commanded by Semen Streschniev. It lasted
almost two weeks – until 10 August. The castle and the town were defended by a
relatively small garrison (not more than 400 soldiers), not sufficiently supplied
with food and gunpowder. Moreover, the intensive shellfire caused numerous fires
which destroyed most of the buildings. The soldiers’ morale was undermined after
the main storming which took place in the night of 9–10 August 16564. Let us add
here that until the end of the war with Muscovy (the armistice of Waliesaar of 30
Dec 1658) the Swedes were unable to concentrate bigger forces on this flank and
did not attempt to regain Daugavpils and the south-eastern part of Livonia, the
claims to which they eventually abandoned on the strength of the peace of Kardis
(1 August 1661)5.
The period of Muscovite occupation began for Daugavpils with a symbolic
name change. As the town was conquered a week after the day of the first saints
of Rus’ – Boris and Gleb (3 August) – the tsar ordered the name of the town to be
changed into Borisoglebov (sometimes the sources give the wrong name – Borisoglebsk)6. On 13 August Vasyl Fefilatiev became the first Muscovite voivode. Despite the fact that Aleksey Mikhailovich appreciated the strategic significance of
the town, Daugavpils was garrisoned by a small but select military unit which was
supplied with large quantities of food and war equipment. Unfortunately, we do
3
See more in: K. Bobiatyński, Dyneburg i Inflanty Polskie podczas wojny Rzeczypospolitej z Moskwą 1654–1656, Zapiski Historyczne, t. 70: 2005, z. 2–3, pp. 107–123; idem, Daugavpils un Poļu Inflantija (Latgale) Polijas-Lietuvas (Žečaspospoļitas) valsts kara laikā ar Maskaviju 1654–1655. gadā,
Latvijas Kara muzeja gadagramata, [t.] 6: 2005, s. 82–95; Б. Н. Флоря, op.cit., pp. 21–22.
4
A. Ivanovs, A. Kuznecovs, Dinaburga krievijas valsts seno aktu arhiva dokumentos (1656–
–1666), [vol.] 1–2, Daugavpils 2002 (A. Иванов, A. Kузнецов, Dинабург в документах российского
государственного aрхива древних актов (1656–1666), Dинабург 2002), here [vol.] 2, pp. 5–6,
53–54; И. Андреев, Алексей Михайлович, Москва 2003, pp. 302–303; Б. Н. Флоря, op.cit., p. 92.
5
N. Angermann, Die russische Herrschaft im östlichen und mittleren Livland 1654–1667, [in:]
Aus der Geschichte Alt-Livlands. Festschrift für Heinz von zur Mühlen zum 90. Geburtstag, hrsg.
v. B. Jähnig, K. Militzer, Münster 2004, pp. 355–357; И. Андреев, op.cit., s. 294–315; Б. Н. Флоря,
op.cit., pp. 346–430, 641–643; Е. И Кобзарева, op.cit., pp. 110, 224–231, 264–286.
6
А. М. Кузнецов, Почему Даугавпилс назывался Борисоглебовом, Русская речь, 1994, [nr] 1,
pp. 83–86; И. Андреев, op.cit., pp. 302–303.
Book 3
Between the Republic and Muscovy...
33
not have much data about the composition of the garrison in subsequent years.
We know, however, that until the end of the 1650s the number of soldiers was on
average 350–400, and in 1656 in Daugavpils around 200 soldiers from the regiment of Abraam (Alexander) Lesli as well as Cossack troops7 were stationed in
Daugavpils.
Aleksey Mikhailovich ordered the modernization of the fortifications, which
was completed in 16578. The castle of Daugavpils had quite modern fortifications
– a citadel with six Italian bastions and an embankment. Nevertheless, prior to
the outbreak of the war in 1654 the fortifications were quite neglected. They were
additionally affected during the sieges9. The fortifications were constructed by Stephen Báthory in 1582 to protect the road leading into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania against the Swedes (who at that time only constituted a theoretical threat to
the areas) and the Muscovite troops attacking from Pskov. From the south it was
defended by the Daugava River. Additionally, access to the castle was hindered
by a system of dams, which made it possible to flood some fields situated by the
river10.
The peace treaty with Sweden, signed in 1660, allowed the Republic to regain
the provinces in the east which had been lost in the years 1654–1655. Unfortunately, the peripheral location of Daugavpils meant that it was a long way from the
main focus of the successful offensive of the Lithuanian-Polish troops in 166011.
Also in the following years no action was undertaken to conquer the town. Admittedly, the Lithuanian banners of supplemental cavalry [jazda komputowa] and voluntary units appeared a few times near Daugavpils in 1661 and 1662 but, without
7
A. Ivanovs, A. Kuznecovs, op.cit., [vol.] 2, nr 3, pp. 6–9, 62; Ю. М. Васильев, Эволуция
города Даугавпилса (Динебурга) в XVI–XVIII веках, [in:] Arhitektūra un pilsētbūvniecība Latvijas PSR. Архитектура и градостроительство в Латвийской ССР. Rakstu krājums, II, atb. red.
O. Tīlmanis, Rīga 1971, pp. 103–104. The city of Koknese was much better protected than Daugavpils
– the administrative centre of the part of Livonia conquered by the tsar during the campaign of 1656
was situated there. In August 1657 about 1500 soldiers were stationed there. They were exclusively
units of the new system – 1100 soldats and 400 reiters, see: N. Angermann, op.cit., p. 362.
8
See the tsar’s instruction for W. Fefilatiev: A. Ivanovs, A. Kuznecovs, op.cit., [vol.] 2, nr 3,
pp. 6–9.
9
Lithuanian Grand Hetman Janusz Radziwiłł informed in the first months of the war that
“there is no fortification there, only one round hill with an old fence” (list do Kazimierza Leona Sapiehy, Mińsk 2 XI 1654., Biblioteka Narodowa, Biblioteka Ordynacji Zamojskiej, rkps 1795, vol. III,
k. 108–109).
10
About the fortifications of Daugavpils see: Encyklopedia wojskowa, ed. O. Laskowski, vol. II,
Warszawa 1931, p. 408; L. Plater, Krótka historyczno-chronologiczna wiadomość o dawnem Dynaburgu i o fortecy dynaburgskiej od roku 1667, o jej garnizonie, arsenale, tudzież o starostach dynaburgskich, Rubon. Pismo poświęcone pożytecznej rozrywce, ed. K. Bujnicki, vol. I, Wilno 1842, p. 21;
Słownik Geograficzny Królestwa Polskiego i innych krajów słowiańskich, red. B. Chlebowski, F. Sulimierski, W. Walewski, vol. II, Warszawa 1881, pp. 254–255.
11
There appeared ideas to try to conquer the city by means of a sudden attack conducted from
Courland by the standards of the left wing of the Lithuanian army (i.e. Krzysztof Zygmunt Pac do
Michała Kazimierza Paca, Gdańsk 15 IV 1660, Biblioteka Muzeum im. Czartoryskich w Krakowie
(further cit. BCzart.), rkps 418, nr 41, pp. 145–147).
Book 3
34
Konrad Bobiatyński
the support of the infantry and artillery, they did not attack the fortifications and
confined themselves to military clashes with the Muscovite cavalry.
First, in January 1661 the Lithuanian artillery officer [oboźny] Michał Kazimierz Pac, commanding 10 Cossack banners carried out a brave attack on southeastern Livonia and near Daugavpils he defeated completely the Muscovite troops
– three times bigger – commanded by Ivan Polujechtov. Another expedition of Pac
to the northern bank of the Daugava River which took place at the beginning of
March 1661 did not end in a military clash, but in a local armistice with the opponent for a period of six weeks (7 March 1661). Fighting erupted for the third
time near Daugavpils in July, when near Druya the Muscovite troops attacked the
Lithuanians who were building two bridges over the Daugava. The attack was repelled without any problems and the Lithuanians sent 20 banners of cavalry to follow the Muscovites. On 15 July near Daugavpils a skirmish ended up in victory for
the Lithuanians who “captured the captain alive and took other prisoners of war
having defeated two banners”12 [transl. A. C.]. Further sallies against the Muscovites took place in April and May 1662, the result of which was just the demolition
of the outskirts of the town, which significantly exacerbated the soldiers’ problems
with food supplies13.
In the years 1663–64, when military activity was concentrated mainly around
the Dnieper, the voluntary units led by the colonels Stefan Czarniawski and Jan
Lübeck (who was killed in May 1664) were the most prominent in the area. The
units approached Daugavpils many times, attacked the soldiers or made unsuccessful attempts to block the fortress. More serious conflict near Daugavpils occurred, such as the one in July 1663. On 1 July near the town, on the southern bank
of the Daugava, there appeared some units from Lübeck’s party, probably sent on
reconnaissance. They were defeated and routed as a result of a sally conducted by
the garrison commanded by Captain Feoktist Iżorin. A few days later, in the night
of 16–17 July, Daugavpils was suddenly attacked from four sides, and Lübeck was
accompanied by the larger units of Stefan Czarniawski. The Lithuanians managed
to capture and burn the lower town and even to get into the embankment of the
upper town (in the Muscovite sources the term probably referred to the castle), but
in the end – after a fierce fight lasting until dawn – they were driven beyond the
fortifications14.
12
Karol Karlick do Bogusława Radziwiłła, Birże 20 VII 1661 r., Lietuvos mokslų akademijos
Vrublevskių biblioteka (further cit. LMAVB), Fondas (further cit. F.) 31, nr 917. About fights taking place in the vicinities of Daugavpils in 1661 see: K. Bobiatyński, Michał Kazimierz Pac – wojewoda wileński, hetman wielki litewski. Działalność polityczno-wojskowa, Warszawa 2008, pp. 78–79,
81, 84; idem, Кар’ера і вайсковая дзейнасць гетмана ВКЛ Міхала Казіміра Паца, Беларускі
Гістарычны Агляд, т. 15: 2008, Сш. 1–2 (28–29), pp. 268–270.
13
Акты Московского государста, изданные Императорскою Академиею наук, т. III, сост.
Д. Я. Самоквасов, Санкт Петерсбург 1901, nr 565/1–2, s. 481; nr 580, p. 489.
14
The account of the voivode of Daugavpils Nikita Buchvostov about those events in: A. Ivanovs, A. Kuznecovs, op.cit., [vol.] 2, nr 42, p. 37; see also А. В. Малов, Московские выборные полки
солдатского строя в начальный период своей истории 1656–1671 гг., Москва 2006, p. 485.
Book 3
35
Although the voluntary troops did not take control of either the town or the
castle, the vicinities of Daugavpils within a radius of many kilometers were totally demolished, and the soldiers were cut off from their base for many months.
As a result, serious difficulties with food supply occurred as crops at that time
were mainly imported from Pskov (garrisons of occupied Livonian towns were
administratively subordinate to Pskov15), which was quite complicated logistically.
Soldiers were not paid. If they were, it was in copper coins which were not recognized by merchants and the local population due to their low value. Deteriorating
conditions of life led to desertions from the front of Daugavpils and difficulties in
maintaining discipline. In the summer of 1663 the soldiers had not been paid for
three months and – according to the reports of local voivodes – many of them died
of extreme poverty, famine and disease.
Taking over food supply from Lübeck’s troops during the first July armed
clashes improved the situation of the garrison for a short time only. At the end
of 1663 in Daugavpils merely 200 soldiers were stationed, at the limits of their
endurance and exhausted with the conditions in the town. The tsar on 17 January
1664 ordered the exchange of the garrison with the units from the Novgorod razriad (both from soldiers’ regiments and the rifle regiments). However, this did not
change the situation – in April 1664 in Daugavpils there were about 300 soldiers,
half of whom were sick; food provisions and money could last only until the end
of the month16.
Nevertheless, the Republic was not capable of benefiting from this situation.
The weaknesses of the Lithuanian army, which at that time had serious economic
and organizational problems, and its partial involvement in the civil war with Jerzy
Lubomiski meant that until late summer of 1665 Daugavpils was never under the
threat of external attack17. The dynamics of events in this part of Livonia escalated
considerably at the beginning of September 1665. On 3 September a few kilometers south of the town there appeared again the voluntary troops commanded by
Stefan Czarniawski and Jakub Salomonowicz who had taken control over the former party of Lübeck. They chased away a group of Dworianins who were staying
at that time on the Courlandish side of the Daugava River baking bread for the
garrison18.
15
Another solution consisted in organizing robbery expeditions to Courland, or purchasing
there missing products.
16
A. Ivanovs, A. Kuznecovs, op.cit., [vol.] 2, nr 43, 45–50, 53, pp. 37–43, 46–48; N. Angermann, op.cit., pp. 362–363, 367. About the exchange of the garrison and subsequent military clashes
with the volunteers: K. Karlick do B. Radziwiłła, Birże 9 III 1664 , LMAVB, F. 31, nr 946; see also
А. В. Малов, op.cit., pp. 485–487.
17
The garrison still had problems with food provisions – they were so serious that in the spring
of 1665 the Lithuanians believed that without food delivery “they will manage not more than a few
weeks”, see: list S. Czarniawskiego do M. K. Paca, Olszany 28 IV 1665 r., BCzart., rkps 394, nr 54,
pp. 355–356.
18
A. Ivanovs, A. Kuznecovs, op.cit., [vol.] 2, nr 52, pp. 45–46.
Book 3
36
Konrad Bobiatyński
Near Daugavpils considerable Muscovite military forces were stationed at that
time, which probably included about 8000 soldiers (mainly infantry)19. They were
commanded by Ivan Chowański – one of the tsar’s best known, but not very fortunate commanders , who was then the head of the army of the Novgorod razriad.
The main aim of his march to the Daugava River was to provide food supplies and
strengthen the garrisons of not only Daugavpils but also other fortresses located
at the river where the tsar’s garrisons were stationed – Polotsk and Vitebsk. That is
why, despite the fact that as late as August the Muscovite troops appeared on the
southern bank of the Daugava, they limited themselves to plundering the vicinity
of Druya. Having received the information about the activity of S. Czarniawski and
J. Salomonowicz, I. Chowański sent his son Peter to fight with them. Chowański’s
son entered the Duchy of Courland thus violating its neutrality. The voluntary soldiers did not feel up to facing the enemy in an open field. After a skirmish with the
Muscovite troops near Ilūkste, they withdrew towards Drysviaty20.
In the meantime, on 10 September the Lithuanian Field Hetman Michał Kazimierz Pac, alarmed by the news about the growing activity of the enemy, set off
towards Daugavpils from the camp near Kobylniki which was situated north of Vilnius. After a rapid concentration of troops he managed to command about 3,000–
–4,000 soldiers; probably exclusively from the division of the left wing21. I. Chowański
avoided an armed clash with the main Lithuanian forces – as early as 5 September
he withdrew his son’s troops to the northern bank of the Daugava River, and a week
later he started a planned retreat from Daugavpils to Osveja. There on 20 September
he dug in and waited to guage how the situation would develop. Having received the
information that the Lithuanian army had crossed the Daugava River and marched
north, the Muscovite commander lost his temper and bolted towards Opochka
19
In August 1665 Chowański commanded about 6000 people, see: О. А. Курбатов, Из истории
военных реформ в России во 2-й половине XVII века. Реорганизация конницы на материалах
Новгородского разряда 1650-х–1660-х гг., Москва 2002, p. 166 (a typed version of the doctoral
thesis which was never published, defended at the Russian Academy of the State Service. I would
like to thank Dr. Oleg Kurbatow for making it available to me). It is known that the Muscovite forces
were strengthened. On 30 September M. K. Pac wrote to Paweł Jan Sapieha that the enemy “counts
12000 [soldiers], but effectively it has 8000 soldiers at their disposal” [transl. A. C.] (BCzart., rkps
394, nr 87, pp. 555–557).
20
I. Chowański’s account for the tsar about those events see in: A. Ivanovs, A. Kuznecovs, op.cit.,
[vol.] 2, nr 52, pp. 45–46; K. Karlick do B. Radziwiłła, Birże 1 IX 1665 r., LMAVB, F. 31, nr 967; Antoni Kazimierz Kalinowski do B. Radziwiłła, Świadość 10 IX 1665 r., Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych
w Warszawie, Archiwum Radziwiłłów (further cit. AGAD, AR), dz. V, nr 6277, p. 2; Krzysztof Dobkiewicz do B. Radziwiłła, Wilno 29 VIII, 5 i 12 IX 1665 r., ibid., nr 3089, part III, pp. 60–62, 64–66,
69–72; see also: J. A. Chrapowicki, Diariusz, cz. II: lata 1665–1669, opr. A. Rachuba, T. Wasilewski,
Warszawa 1988, s. 69–71; О. А. Курбатов, op.cit., p. 166; А. В. Малов, op.cit., pp. 490–491.
21
Although M. K. Pac called the division of the right wing stationed in Minsk Province to join the
march to Daugavpils (see the copy of the order of the hetman to the chamberlain of Orsha Krzysztof
Stetkiewicz: AGAD, AR, dz. V, nr 11557, part III, p. 286), only two military units reached the place
delayed: the Cossack standard of Michał Kazimierz Radziwiłł and the squadron of Jan Henryk von
Alten Bockum (K. Karlick do B. Radziwiłła, Birże 20 X 1665 r., LMAVB, F. 31, nr 969).
Book 3
37
abandoning his cannons on the way. Despite the fervent pursuit by the Lithuanian
cavalry (18 light standards and volunteers of S. Czarniawski and J. Salomonowicz),
Chowański – after dramatic experiences but with insignificant losses – managed to
withdraw near Pskov. In the first half of October, the Muscovite units hibernated
in military winter quarters (near Pskov, Opochka and Velikiye Luki) and did not
undertake any activity until March the following year22.
The first Lithuanian unit appeared near Daugavpils as early as 17 September
and set about blockading the town. The troops were commanded by Karol Marson, lieutenant colonel of the infantry regiment of Lithuanian Grand Chancellor
Krzysztof Pac. The Lithuanians managed to take over the entrenchments on the
southern bank of the Daugava which protected a pontoon bridge built there by
I. Chowański. They were defended by about 500 infantry soldiers, and during the
fighting Bohdan Nieliudov’s (the voivode of Daugavpils) brother – Ivan – was taken prisoner by the Lithuanian army23.
The main Lithuanian forces (the cavalry – hussars and the infantry) along with
the Field Hetman crossed the Daugava on 25 September on a newly-built bridge
near Druya, and then they marched north in pursuit of I. Chowański. It was not
until the chase was interrupted that Pac marched towards Daugavpils, where he
probably arrived in the first days of October. With very little gunpowder and no
heavy artillery at his disposal (originally only 3 small field guns and 7 hundredweight of gunpowder; from the arsenal in Vilnius he later received 30 hundredweight of powder and 30 stones of lead), the hetman could not risk launching
a decisive storm. That is why, he decided to surround the town with a tight ring
blockade so as to induce the complete starvation of the enemy’s soldiers and their
consequent surrender24.
Having arrived at Daugavpils, the Field Hetman ordered the construction of
field fortifications which were to isolate the garrison completely from contact with
the world and to enable the Lithuanians to control navigation on the Daugava
River. A small wooden groyne was constructed above the castle, about 4 kilometres of Daugavpils from the side of Semigalia, at the mouth of the small River
22
M. K. Pac do P. J. Sapiehy, w obozie pod Platermujżą 30 IX 1665 r., BCzart., rkps 394, nr 87, pp.
555–557; A. K. Kalinowski do B. Radziwiłła, Świadość 10 IX 1665 r., AGAD, AR, dz. V, nr 6277, p. 2;
K. Dobkiewicz do B. Radziwiłła, Wilno 26 IX 1665 r., ibid., nr 3089, cz. III, pp. 78–84; J. A. Chrapowicki, op.cit., cz. II, pp. 72–73, 75, 77; J. W. Poczobut Odlanicki, Pamiętnik (1640–1684), opr. A. Rachuba, Warszawa 1987, pp. 71–72 (introduction), 216; see also the accounts of I. Chowański and
B. Niekliudov: A. Ivanovs, A. Kuznecovs, op.cit., [t.] 2, nr 52–53, pp. 45–49; О. А. Курбатов, op.cit.,
pp. 166–167.
23
A. Ivanovs, A. Kuznecovs, op.cit., [t.] 2, nr 53, s. 46–49; M. K. Pac do P. J. Sapiehy, w obozie pod
Platermujżą 30 IX 1665 r., BCzart., rkps 394, nr 87, s. 555–557; zob. też K. Dobkiewicz do B. Radziwiłła,
Wilno 12 IX 1665 r., AGAD, AR, dz. V, nr 3089, cz. III, s. 69–72; K. Karlick do B. Radziwiłła, Birże
7 X 1665 r., LMAVB, F. 31, nr 968.
24
A. Ivanovs, A. Kuznecovs, op.cit., [t.] 2, nr 53, s. 46–49; M. K. Pac do P. J. Sapiehy, w obozie pod
Platermujżą 30 IX 1665 r., BCzart., rkps 394, nr 87, s. 555–557; K. Karlick do B. Radziwiłła, Birże 7 X
1665 r., LMAVB, F. 31, nr 968; J. W. Poczobut Odlanicki, op.cit., s. 216.
Book 3
38
Konrad Bobiatyński
Lovkieska to the Daugava. A few hundred meters away from the castle, opposite
the castle, also on the other bank of the Daugava River, another fortification was
built, protected by numerous units of infantry (700 people) and cavalry (2 Tatar
standards); the Lithuanian artillery was also situated here. However, the fire directed at Daugavpils was rather symbolic and could not harm the garrison, as it was
probably conducted with the use of the same 3 small field guns brought by the hetman Pac from Vilnius. Opposite the town, on the southern bank of the river, other
entrenchments were constructed together with a small groyne erected 5 kilometres
down the river – manned with 300 soldiers. Other field fortifications were created
on the northern bank of the Daugava River. The whole blockade was commanded
by Karol Marson, while the hetman with most standards of the cavalry made a
camp near Tyn Muiża, about 10 kilometres south of Daugavpils, where “he was to
be stationed with his army until the winter finished”25.
The effective blockade system brought hopes that the defenders of Daugavpils
would commence talks about surrender very soon. Although I. Chowański succeeded in providing the town with considerable provisions of crops and strengthening the garrison with 100 soldiers and 123 Don Cossacks, at the end of October the hetman Pac announced that the Russians “have no timber, soldiers are
not attired, and the food provided by Chowański has gone bad and is now being
removed from the castle”. Later in the letter Pas wrote that “the presence of our
army near the castle is not at all to the enemy’s liking as they cannot get out of the
castle”26 [transl. A. C.]
In Daugavpils, resources to pay soldiers ran out very quickly; an increasing
number of soldiers deserted the garrison – by the second half of November as
many as 49 soldiers (over 20%!) from Chowański’s units had escaped. The Don
Cossacks who, according to the letter written by Pac one month and a half later,
“not being able to bear the boredom, left the commander and went to the entrenchments of the enemy to serve him” were particularly rebellious. In the first
half of December the hetman believed that the defenders of Daugavpils would
not stand more than two months, while the voivode B. Niekliudov was even more
pessimistic saying that the provisions of food would last until mid-January and he
would have to surrender were the relief force not to arrive on time27.
25
A. Ivanovs, A. Kuznecovs, op.cit., [vol.] 2, nr 53, s. 46–49; relacja B. Niekliudowa z 7 XI 1665 r.,
BCzart., rkps 399, pp. 333–336; M. K. Pac do P. J. Sapiehy, w obozie pod Platermujżą 30 IX 1665 r.,
ibid., rkps 394, nr 87, pp. 555–557; K. Karlick do B. Radziwiłła, Birże 7 X 1665 r., LMAVB, F. 31,
nr 968.
26
M. K. Pac do P. J. Sapiehy, Widze 28 X 1665 r., BCzart., rkps 394, nr 104, pp. 623–624; see also
A. Ivanovs, A. Kuznecovs, op.cit., [vol.] 2, nr 53, s. 46–49; О. А. Курбатов, op.cit., pp. 169–170.
27
M. K. Pac do królowej Ludwiki Marii, Lipniszki 10 XII 1665 r., BCzart., rkps 400, pp. 53–54;
A. Ivanovs, A. Kuznecovs, op.cit., [vol.] 2, nr 52–53, pp. 45–49; Theatrum Europaeum, vol. X, Frankfurt am Mayn 1677, p. 208. From the letter of Karol Marson to Hrehory Podbereski (from the entrenchment AT Daugavpils on 5 Nov 1665) we learn that refugees from the city told the Lithuanians
“that if food is not provided from Moscow, they will manage to survive only until Easter” (BCzart.,
rkps 394, nr 108, pp. 639–641).
Book 3
39
Not wanting to lose this strategically important town, the Russians tried to
persuade Pac to break the blockade at all costs. Not having adequate military capability, they used diplomacy to achieve their aim. The voivode Niekliudov maintained regular correspondence with the Field Hetman, as did one of the tsar’s leading diplomats Afanasij Ordin-Nashchokin, who was staying in Pskov at that time.
As a commissary of the peace negotiations with the Republic which, as had been
planned, were to be reopened in January 1666, he firmly demanded an armistice
be declared and the blockade be lifted so that he could get a free pass through the
region of Daugavpils to the site of the negotiations – near Smolensk. He also accused the Lithuanians that their military operations on the northern bank of the
Daugava River only delayed the conclusion of the peace agreement and caused the
unnecessary shedding of Christian blood28.
Understandably, their arguments were rejected by Pac, but the increasingly
complicated internal situation in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth helped
the Russians. The settlement signed with Jerzy Sebastian Lubomirski on 9 November 1665 near Palczyn did not finish the civil war, but only interrupted it for a few
months. The following year King John Casimir in the fight with Lubomirski’s Rebellion intended to involve more Lithuanian troops than in 1665, which naturally
weakened the forces involved in the offensive actions against Muscovy.
Undoubtedly, the internal situation in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania also influenced the events on the northern front. First, the Field Hetman M. K. Pac left
the camp (18 November) to attend the dietine before the seym of 1666; later, on 30
December 1665 the Grand Hetman and voivode of Vilnius Paweł Jan Sapieha died,
which completely changed the balance of power in Lithuania. A political fight for
power broke out between Lithuanian magnates, leading to the partial disbanding
of Sapieha’s party and the Pac family taking over the control of the army and political hegemony29.
In the short run the garrison of Daugavpils was saved by the upcoming winter
and worsening weather conditions. Areas near Daugavpils were ravaged to such an
extent that they could not provide food for a few thousand soldiers. That is why,
on 22 November almost all units of the left wing, even part of the infantry with
28
Various letters of Ordin-Naszczokin to Pac are stored in: BCzart., rkps 399 (for example pp.
299–302, 303–307, 321–323, 419–425, 433–434, 437–438, 443–445, 447–448, 455–457); see also:
B. Niekliudow do M. K. Paca, Borysochlebow 28 X i 10 XI 1665 r., ibid., pp. 295–297, 479–481;
M. K. Pac do A. Ordina-Naszczokina, Widze 24 X 1665 r. i b.m. 12 XI 1665 r., ibid., rkps 394, nr 103,
pp. 617–618; ibid., rkps 399, nr 15, pp. 105–106; Jan Kazimierz do M. K. Paca, Stryków 19 X 1665 r.,
ibid., rkps 394, nr 100, pp. 603–604; A. Ordin-Naszczokin do Jerzego Karola Hlebowicza, Moskwa
12/22 I 1666 r., ibid., rkps 160, nr 3, pp. 5–8; J. A. Chrapowicki, op.cit., vol. II, pp. 102–103, 116.
29
K. Bobiatyński, Michał Kazimierz Pac, pp. 164–166, 183–184; P. Krakowiak, Dwa sejmy w 1666
roku, Toruń 2010, pp. 57–61, 86–88; A. Rachuba, Boje Jana Kazimierza o Litwę w latach 1656–1668.
Sukces stronnictwa dworskiego w walce z opozycją, [in:] Dwór a kraj. Między centrum a peryferiami
władzy, red. R. Skowron, Kraków 2003, pp. 429–430; idem, Wielkie Księstwo Litewskie wobec rokoszu
Jerzego Lubomirskiego w latach 1664–1667, the doctoral thesis supervised by Dr. hab. T. Wasilewski
in the Historical Institute at Warsaw University, Warszawa 1979, pp. 198–232.
Book 3
40
Konrad Bobiatyński
cannons, started to leave the Livonian-Courlandish borderland and marched to
military winter quarters in Semigalia – near Bowsk, and also to Samogitia (hussars’ standards) and to the county of Vilkmergė30, commanded by the Lithuanian
Master of the Kitchen [kuchmistrz] Hrehory Podbereski.
Let us add here that the Courlandish duke Jakub Kettler protested against the
movement of the army. On the one hand, he realized that a few months’ stay by the
Lithuanian army in his duchy might badly affect the inhabitants of the duchy, who
still suffered from the effects of the war with the Swedes in the years 1658–166031.
On the other hand, it must be remembered that one of the main principles of Kettler’s policy was to maintain a good relationship with the tsar and to remain neutral in the conflict between the Republic and Muscovy32. The duke knew it perfectly
that his small military potential would not allow him to resist a possible aggression
by the Muscovite army; thus, he did not want to give the Muscovite commanders a
pretext to move their military campaigns to Courland or Semigalia33.
As early as the end of 1665 there were no more than 1000 soldiers left in field
fortifications near Daugavpils commanded by Karol Marson. Besides, on the
southern bank of the Daugava River some troops belonging to S. Czarniawski and
J. Salomonowicz were stationed. The hitherto effective blockade slackened considerably, which encouraged the Muscovite garrison, who now expected the relief
force and food provisions “to arrive in sleighs at Christmas”34. The Lithuanians
30
K. Karlick do B. Radziwiłła, Birże 20 X i 22 XI 1665 r., LMAVB, F. 31, nr 969, 971; M. K. Pac
do Ludwiki Marii, Lipniszki 10 XII 1665 r., BCzart., rkps 400, s. 53–54; B. Radziwiłł do K. Karlicka,
spod Tylży 12 XII 1665 r., AGAD, AR, dz. IV kopie, vol. IV, nr 35; see also A. Ivanovs, A. Kuznecovs,
op.cit., [vol.] 2, nr 52–53, pp. 45–49; Витебская старина, сост. A. Сапунов, т. IV, ч. II, Витебск
1885, nr 73, pp. 247–248.
31
Instrukcja M. K. Paca dla posła do Jakuba Kettlera, cześnika orszańskiego Ludwika Wysłoucha,
[wrzesień 1665 r.], BCzart., rkps 394, nr 88, pp. 559–560; odpowiedź J. Kettlera na poselstwo wojska
litewskiego (Mitawa 19 XI 1665 r.), ibid., nr 114, pp. 665–668; respons wojska litewskiego, Bowsk 16
XII 1665 r., ibid., nr 125, pp. 709–713; M. K. Pac do J. Kettlera, [wrzesień 1665 r.], ibid., nr 88, p. 561;
J. Kettler do wojska litewskiego, Mitawa 20 XI 1665 r., ibid., nr 115, p. 669; J. Kettler do M. K. Paca,
Mitawa 26 I 1666 r. i b.m. i d., ibid., rkps 399, nr 2, p. 5–6 i Latvijas Valsts vēstures arhivs in Riga (further cit. LVVA), F. 554, Apr. 1, nr 308, k. 167–167v; see also: B. Dybaś, Na obrzeżach Rzeczypospolitej.
Sejmik piltyński w latach 1617–1717, Toruń 2004, p. 127.
32
Е. И Кобзарева, op.cit., pp. 69–71, 93–94; Л. В. Заборовский, Россия, Рзч Посполитая
и Швеция в середине XVII в., Москва 1981, pp. 36–37, 129; idem, Русская дипломатия и начало
первой северной войны (январь–oктябрь 1655 г.), Советское Славановедение, 1973, [nr] 1,
pp. 43–46.
33
J. Kettler presented the principles of his policy in the memorial titled “Rationes neutralitatem
spectantes”, LVVA, F. 554, Apr. 1, nr 489, k. 33–33v, 36–36v (two copies slightly diverging from each
other). At that time Kettler was leading diplomatic negotiations with the tsar, the result of which was
the publication of a charter on 2 Dec 1666 in which Aleksy Michailovich ensured the duke that his
army would continue to respect the neutrality of Courland, but at the same time he requested him
not to provide quarters for the Lithuanian troops in his duchy. He even demanded that the duke deliver food provisions to the garrison for which he was to be paid from the tsar’s treasury! (A. Ivanovs,
A. Kuznecovs, op.cit., [vol.] 2, nr 54, pp. 49–51).
34
K. Marson do H. Podbereskiego, z szańca pod Dyneburgiem 5 XI 1665 r., BCzart., rkps 394,
nr 108, pp. 639–641.
Book 3
41
had to forget about regaining the town in March 1666, when most of the units of
the left wing were to be sent to the Crown to fight against the rokosz rebels. At the
end of March and the beginning of April the standards started to leave their winter
quarters to march through Samogitia towards Grodno, where the concentration of
the intervention forces was scheduled35.
The Muscovites obviously took advantage of the situation. Having received more
alarming reports from B. Niekliudov, in February the tsar ordered I. Chowański to
launch actions to improve the situation of the defenders of Daugavpils. After short
preparations, on 11 March the Muscovite leader set off from Pskov with 5000 soldiers (the whole regiment of Novgorod) hastily called up from their winter quarters. The effective concentration was possible thanks to the fact that most troops
were stationed not very far from Pskov. Despite hard weather conditions, heavy
snow and problems with food provisions, the Muscovite army moved south very
quickly. As early as 28 March they unexpectedly attacked the Lithuanians near
Daugavpils, causing them to withdraw to the Courlandish bank of the Daugava
River. The field fortifications constructed near the town were razed to the ground;
food, clothes and money were provided to the town, which boosted both the garrison’s morale and their physical condition36.
Although after this military clash I. Chowański withdrew to Pskov and the
tsar’s troops did not appear in the south-eastern part of Livonia for a long time, the
Lithuanians were not in a position to attack the garrison of Daugavpils effectively.
In May, only single companies from three infantry regiments (of Krzysztof Pac,
Maciej Gosiewski and Jakub Mailly-Lascaris) were stationed on the southern bank
of the Daugava River. They were accompanied by a few standards from the Tatar
cavalry “lying on strips of land”37. Near Daugavpils there were also voluntary units,
which disturbed the local people rather than the enemy. Not surprisingly, under
the influence of Jakub Kettler, King John Casimirus prohibited the volunteers to
occupy quarters in the Duchy of Courland and Semigalia. The duke achieved one
more success – the monarch ordered the destruction of the “entrenchment at the
35
H. Podbereski do J. Kettlera, Iłłukszta 23 III 1666 r., LVVA, F. 554, Apr. 1, nr 308, k. 168–
168v.
36
O. Kurbatov described the “winter march” of I. Chowański on the basis of the Muscovite
sources, op.cit., p. 167; see also А. В. Малов, op.cit., pp. 491–492. Lithuanian sources also reported
about“ the delivery of food provisions”, see: H. Podbereski do J. Kettlera, Iłłukszta 23 III 1666, LVVA,
F. 554, Apr. 1, nr 308, k. 168–168v; D. Kościuszko do B. Radziwiłła, Birże 8 IV 1666 r., LMAVB, F. 148,
nr 2, k. 36–36v, awizy dołączone do listu Tobiasza Pękalskiego i Krzysztofa Winklera do B. Radziwiłła,
Kiejdany 24 IV 1666 r., Vilniaus Universiteto Mokslinė Biblioteka, F. 4 (A-215), nr 16950.
37
Stanisław Hołownia do B. Radziwiłła, Szady 29 IV 1666 r., AGAD, AR, dz. V, nr 5306, part I,
pp. 12–13; K. Dobkiewicz do B. Radziwiłła, Wilno 30 V 1666 r., ibid., nr 3089, part V, pp. 1–7. The
documents said the regiments in the second half of 1666 consisted of almost 1600, but in reality they
were much smaller (see the book of military-financial commssion of 1667: Lietuvos valstybės istorijos archyvas w Wilnie (further cit. LVIA), F. SA, nr 4111, k. 79–115v). Besides, only some soldiers
were stationed in the entrenchment near Daugavpils.
Book 3
42
Konrad Bobiatyński
Daugava River situated on the territory of Courland, erected the year before”, for
“it is not needed any more, and creates an opportunity for the enemy to attack”38.
In return, J. Kettler declared that since then he would defend the Lithuanian
borders of his duchy using his own forces. He also repeated his offer, made in 1664,
that if the Lithuanian army did not manage to take control of Daugavpils, he could
supervise it until the peace treaty with Muscovy was signed. This was to guarantee
him more safety as the Muscovite army – according to him – should not undertake
any attacks on the territories controlled by the ruler who consistently maintained
neutrality during the war between the Republic and Muscovy. This quite unrealistic project was favourably received by John Casimirus, who “saw in it commodum
[...] that the Muscovites should not reach the areas up to Polotsk towards Osveja
sub ea neutralitate and that the counties of Vilkmergė, Upytė, Samogitia, Braslaw
have securitatem”39 [transl. A. C.]. It seems that the Vilnius szlachta gathered at the
dietine on 2 June judged Kettler’s idea more realistically stating with indignation
and sarcasm that “it should come this that we be defended by the Courlandish
Duke, who is not able to defend himself and trades like a Jew. He had better sell
herring and trade than watch our borders”40 [transl. A. C.].
Military activity near Daugavpils finally ceased on 17 June, nine days after
signing the armistice treaty for the period of peace negotiations between both
countries41. On the same day the infantry regiment of the Lithuanian chancellor
“demolishing the fortification near Daugavpils, marched to Baisogala in Samogitia
to have a rest and get some bread”. The remaining units of the army, artillery (later
transported to Vilnius) and Tatar standards (which were to march to Grodno)
also left the vicinity of the town42. As a result, the northern frontiers of the Grand
Duchy of Lithuania were practically unprotected as they were to be defended
38
Uniwersał Jana Kazimierza do M. K. Paca, maj (no day date provided) 1666 r., LVVA, F. 554,
Apr. 1, nr 308, k. 162; see also H. Podbereski do J. Kettlera, Iłłukszta 23 III 1666 r., ibid., k. 168–168v.
The king’s orders were ineffective; that is why, on 17 Dec 1666 King Jan Kazimierz again ordered the
army to stop taking bread from Courland and prohibited them to organize winter quarters there
(ibid., k. 3).
39
K. Pac do komisarzy na rokowania z Moskwą, Warszawa 11 V 1666 r., BCzart., rkps 160,
nr 76, pp. 291–294; zob. też Z. Wójcik, Traktat andruszowski 1667 roku i jego geneza, Warszawa 1959,
p. 167–168).
40
K. Dobkiewicz do B. Radziwiłła, Wilno 6 VI 1666 r., AGAD, AR, dz. V, nr 3089, cz. V,
pp. 9–14.
41
See a letter concerning this written by the commissaries appointed to lead negotiations with
Muscovy to the commanders of Dzisna [Dysna] and the entrenchment of Daugavpils (Jan Krüger
and Karol Marson), Kadzyń 30 V 1666 r., BCzart., rkps 160, nr 106, pp. 436–437.
42
Daniel Kościuszko do B. Radziwiłła, Birże 19 VI 1666 r., LMAVB, F. 148, nr 2, k. 26; S. Hołownia
do B. Radziwiłła, Świadość 24 VI 1666 r., AGAD, AR, dz. V, nr 5306, cz. I, pp. 15–16; K. Dobkiewicz
do B. Radziwiłła, Wilno 26 VI i 17 VII 1666 r., ibid., nr 3089, part V, pp. 24–28, 43–45; see also a letter
of K. Dobkiewicz of 15 July 1666 concerning the damages caused by soldiers of the units in Samogitia
and the counties of Ukmergė and Upytė (ibid., pp. 39–41). J. de Mailly’s regiment marched into the
central part of Lithuanian as early as May (see T. Pękalski do B. Radziwiłła, Kiejdany 30 V 1666 r.,
AGAD, AR, dz. V, nr 11560, part I, pp. 37–40).
Book 3
43
mostly by Stefan Czarniawski’s volunteers supported by scarce supplemental standards [chorągwie komputowe]43.
The future of Daugavpils and this part of Livonia was to be decided through
diplomatic talks. Considerable controversies arose about it from the very beginning of the peace negotiations between the Republic and Muscovy, renewed on 10
May 1666 in Andrusovo. Opinions of the commissaries from both parties diverged
considerably. While during the first round of the negotiations in 1664 the Muscovites offered to return Daugavpils for signing the peace treaty, two years later they
would not hear of it44. The tsar’s commissars offered to return only Polotsk and
Vitebsk. As for Latgalia, they argued that the Republic should not have any claims
to it as Muscovy had received it from Sweden on the strength of the Eternal Peace
of Cardis45. Leaving Daugavpils under the authority of the tsar was also – according to his diplomats – to guarantee an economic balance between both countries:
“when we send goods from Smolensk land and you do us harm in Polotsk and
Vitebsk, we can take revenge on you in Daugavpils – in this way safety will be ensured on both sides”46.
As the Republic did not want to renounce Daugavpils, the problem was one of
the most controversial issues during the negotiations and made it hard to reach a
compromise. The Lithuanian party still hoped to force the Muscovite commissaries
to agree to compromise (“that the enemy of Daugavpils, Livonia and Kiev should
yield to the Crown” [transl. A. C.]) by means of military arguments. Unfortunately,
the military demonstration in Smolensk land, scheduled for the late autumn of 1666,
which was to be carried out by the Lithuanian army returning from the Crown after
the civil war, could not take place. The reason for this was the disastrous condition
of the army, exhausted by a long-lasting campaign, and unable to undertake any
military actions and was immediately sent to winter quarters in Belarus47.
43
Czarniawski’s regiment in November and December 1666 was stationed near Drysviaty to
disturb the garrison of Daugavpils in the delivery of food provisions from Courland (see S. Czarniawski’s letter written probably to H. Podbereski of Kalcuty 4 XI 1666 r., LVVA, F. 554, Apr. 1, nr 308,
k. 2; comp. M. K. Pac do M. K. Radziwiłła, b.m.id. (grudzień 1666 r.), AGAD, AR, dz. V, nr 11209,
part III, pp. 117–119).
44
The tsar’s diplomats presented the declaration to return Daugavpils and Livonia during the
negotiations of 15 July 1664, almost a month after the spectacular victory (16 June) of Pac at Vitebsk
over I. Chowański’s troops (see J. A. Chrapowicki, Diariusz, vol. I: lata 1656–1664, opr. T. Wasilewski,
Warszawa 1978, pp. 501–502; Z. Wójcik, op.cit., pp. 174–175).
45
J. A. Chrapowicki, op.cit., vol. II, pp. 146–147, 201–203, 219, 221; see also a letter of the commissaries for the negotiations with Muscovy to M. K. Pac, Kadzyń 16 IX, 26 X 1666 r., BCzart., rkps
160, nr 285, pp. 1241–1244; ibid., rkps 161, nr 36, pp. 137–139; Z. Wójcik, op.cit., pp. 236–240.
46
J. A. Chrapowicki, op.cit., vol. II, pp. 210, 218–219; see: a letter of the commissaries to King Jan
Kazimierz, Kadzyń 16 IX 1666 r., BCzart., rkps 160, nr 285, pp. 1235–1239.
47
K. Pac do M. K. Paca, Wiłkowiszki 9 XI 1666 r., BCzart., rkps 413, nr 34, pp. 111–116; see
also: K. Pac do komisarzy na rokowania z Moskwą, Warszawa 31 VIII 1666 r., ibid., rkps 160, nr 270,
pp. 1155–1158; komisarze do Jana Kazimierza, Kadzyń 30 IX 1666 r., ibid., nr 298, pp. 1301–1303;
komisarze do M. K. Paca, Kadzyń 6 X 1666 r., ibid., rkps 161, nr 6, pp. 19–20; K. Bobiatyński, Michał
Kazimierz Pac, p. 174–178; Z. Wójcik, op.cit., pp. 242–243.
Book 3
44
Konrad Bobiatyński
When it was already settled that Daugavpils would remain under the tsar’s
authority, in the last round of the negotiations in January 1667 there was another
unexpected turning point. As early as 30 December 1666, after breaking off the
fourth seym and when the tragic information about the Crown troops being defeated by Tatars and Cossacks of Peter Doroshenko reached Varsaw, the Council
of the Senate decided that the negotiations with Muscovy should be finalized so
as to avoid waging a war on two fronts. In return for the alliance against the Turks
and Tatars and signing the truce for the period of 15 years, the Muscovites were
to receive the Polish part of Livonia (for an unidentified sum of money in the way
of financial compensation). At the same time the peace negotiations carried out in
Andrusovo were close to breaking down owing to difficulties in reaching a compromise. However, one of the tsar’s commissaries, Grigorij Karpowicz Bogdanow,
arrived at the site of the negotiations on 7 January before the king’s letter with the
decision concerning Daugavpils reached the Lithuanian-Muscovite border. The
commissar brought an unexpected message that Aleksy Michajlovich, who was
pressed for time, agreed to return Daugavpils and the south-eastern part of Livonia to the Republic in return for a fifteen-year truce48.
The tsar’s concessions were the effect of a deteriorating economic situation in
Muscovy, the result of which was serious social unrest which, since the spring of
1666, had been escalating into an open Cossack-peasant rebellion in areas near
the Don River and the Volga River. Moreover, another cause of concern was the
unstable situation in left-bank Ukraine, which faced increasing pro-independence
tendencies. Additionally, the state of Muscovy had increasingly serious external
problems – the relations with the Turks and Tatars were deteriorating and some
unrest occurred on the border with Sweden49.
In this situation the Polish and Lithuanian commissars did not reveal the content of the Polish king’s letter, which arrived four days later – on 11 January50. On
31 January a truce for a period of 13 and a half years was concluded. In article
three of the treaty it was stipulated that the Republic regained Polotsk, Vitebsk,
Daugavpils, Ludza, Rēzekne and Marienhausen “with all southern Livonia“, and
the evacuation of the Muscovite troops was to be effectuated by 11 March 166751.
48
K. Pac do komisarzy, Warszawa 30 XII 1666 r., BCzart., rkps 161, nr 116, pp. 449–450; Jan
Kazimierz do komisarzy, Warszawa 31 XII 1666 r., ibid., nr 118, pp. 453–455; pismo komisarzy moskiewskich z 7 I 1667 r., ibid., rkps 162, nr 7, s. 29–30; K. Pac do komisarzy, Warszawa 8 I 1667 r., ibid.,
nr 8, pp. 33–40; Jan Kazimierz do komisarzy, Warszawa 9 I 1667 r., ibid., nr 11, pp. 47–49; komisarze
do Jana Kazimierza, Kadzyń 14 I 1667 r., ibid., nr 16, pp. 69–71; zob. też J. A. Chrapowicki, op.cit.,
vol. II, p. 252, 261–264; Z. Wójcik, op.cit., pp. 248–252.
49
Z. Wójcik, op.cit., pp. 222–227, 249; idem, Dzieje Rosji: 1533–1801, Warszawa 1971, pp. 153–
–169; И. Андреев, op.cit., pp. 531–555.
50
One of the Lithuanian commissaries – J. A. Chrapowicki –made a note about this in his diary
(op.cit., vol. II, pp. 262–263); also Z. Wójcik, op.cit., pp. 252–253.
51
The text of the Truce of Andrusovo: Pisma do wieku i spraw J. Sobieskiego, publ. F. Kluczycki,
vol. I, Part I, Kraków 1880, nr 261, p. 569; see also: letters of the commissaries for the negotiations
Book 3
45
The deadline was kept and the Lithuanian garrison marched into Daugavpils
again after 12 years. In the subsequent years the garrison included about 400 soldiers. It contained the Reiter squadron of Colonel Jan Andrzej Plater52. In January
1667 Karol Marson, the leader of the blockade in the years 1665–1666, wanted
to become the commander of the fortress. Despite the fact that he was supported by Krzysztof Pac, in 1667 the commander of the garrison was elected Major
Władysław Asman53 – closely connected with the Grand Hetman. The governors
of Daugavpils became very close clients of Michał Kazimierz Pac – in 1669 the
office was taken by the pantler of Vilnius Kazimerz Chojecki, and in 1679 by Jan
Andrzej Plater, who as early as 1670 took over the command of the local garrison
and the responsibility for the condition of the castle54.
It must be noted that Michał Kazimierz Pac continued to take interest in the
matters of Daugavpils. On the one hand, he undoubtedly appreciated the considerable strategic significance of the town and its role in the defence system of the
northern border of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. On the other hand, officially he
was obliged to do this as he was appointed starost of Daugavpils by the king on 20
August 1666 – he held the office for 4 subsequent years55. Shortly after Daugavpils
was abandoned by the Muscovite garrison and was taken over by the Lithuanians,
the renovation of the badly impaired fortifications commenced, which was fully
financed by Pac with his own resources56. The hetman also provided the fortress
with a powerful and numerous artillery (in 1670 it consisted of 28 cannons, 19 har-
with Muscovy to M. K. Pac, Kadzyń 31 I 1667 r., BCzart., rkps 162, nr 36, pp. 163–166; J. A. Chrapowicki, op.cit., vol. II, p. 267; Z. Wójcik, op.cit., pp. 254–257.
52
At the turn of 1666–1667 in the Lithuanian supplemental units there were two Reiters’ standards of J. A. Plater, which had suffered great losses during the fights with J. S. Lubomirski’s troops in
1666 – they now included merely 90–95 horses. It was to be liquidated after the end of the session of
the military-financial commission in Vilnius in the second half of 1667, which probably never happened as Plater’s squadron appeared in the Lithuanian army in subsequent years, presumably still as
part of the garrison of Daugavpils. It consisted of 94 horses (LVIA, F. SA, nr 4111, k. 11–21v; nr 4114,
k. 9–10v; see also J. W. Poczobut Odlanicki, op.cit., p. 346: aneks nr 4: „Komput wojska zwinionego
i niezawinionego w 1667 r.”).
53
K. Pac do M. K. Paca, Warszawa 23 I 1667 r., BCzart., rkps 416, nr 28, pp. 121–124; L. Plater,
op.cit., p. 26; S. Uruski, Rodzina. Herbarz szlachty polskiej, vol. I, Warszawa 1904, p. 51.
54
Национальна библиотека Украини им. В. И. Вернадського, Kиив, фонд 1, nr 5953,
k. 389v; L. Plater, op.cit., pp. 27, 29, 49 (here the text of M. K. Pac’s appointement for J. A. Plater,
Wilno 17 VIII 1679 r.), 55; T. Wasilewski, Plater Jan Andrzej, [in:] Polski Słownik Biograficzny, vol.
XXVI, Wrocław–Warszawa– Kraków–Gdańsk–Łódź 1981, p. 658.
55
On 3 May 1670 Jan Andrzej Plater became starost (Urzędnicy inflanccy XVI–XVIII wieku.
Spisy, opr. K. Mikulski i A. Rachuba, Kórnik 1994, s. 180–181; L. Plater, op.cit., p. 27).
56
M. K. Pac do C. P. Brzostowskiego, Lipniszki 25 XII 1669 r., BCzart., rkps 2105, pp. 239–242;
see also: M. K. Pac do B. Radziwiłła, Dyneburg 1 VIII 1667 r., AGAD, AR, dz. V, nr 11209, part II,
p. 99; L. Plater, op.cit., pp. 27–28, 47–48. By 1671 the hetman Pac had spent at least 22,470 zlotys on
the “renovation of the castle (almost the whole castle was restored de novo)”, the artillery, payments
for the garrison, food provisions, spies to Sweden and Muscovy, which was partly given back to him
from the state treasury (BCzart., rkps 404, pp. 598–603).
Book 3
46
Konrad Bobiatyński
quebuses and 1 mortar) as well as war materials57. Thanks to his efforts, Daugavpils
soon became one of the best maintained Lithuanian fortresses, and it remained
within the borders of the Republic as the administrative centre of the PolishLithuanian part of Livonia until the first partition of Poland in 177258.
57
See inventories of the Daugavpils arsenal of 1670, 1683 i 1696 r. in: L. Plater, op.cit., pp. 31–
–32.
58
B. Dybaś, Inflanty a polsko-litewska Rzeczpospolita po pokoju oliwskim (1660), [in:] Między
Zachodem a Wschodem. Studia z dziejów Rzeczypospolitej w epoce nowożytnej, ed. J. Staszewski,
K. Mikulski, J. Dumanowski, Toruń 2002, pp. 116–120; E. Kuntze, Organizacja Inflant w czasach
polskich, [in:] Polska a Inflanty, ed. J. Borowik (Pamiętnik Instytutu Bałtyckiego, vol. XXXIX, seria
Balticum, z. 14), Gdynia 1939, pp. 42–45; G. Manteuffel, Zarysy z dziejów krain dawnych inflanckich,
czyli Inflant właściwych (tak szwedzkich, jako i polskich), Estonii z Ozylią, Kurlandii i Ziemi Piltyńskiej,
opr. K. Zajas, Kraków 2007, pp. 158–162.
Book 3
ZAPISKI
HISTORYCZNE
—
VOLUME
LXXVI —
2011
BOOK 3
ARKADIUSZ SŁABIG (Słupsk)
UKRAINIANS IN THE GDANSK PROVINCE
DURING THE YEARS 1956–1970 IN THE LIGHT OF ARCHIVE MATERIAL
FROM THE PUBLIC SECURITY SYSTEM
OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF POLAND*
Key words: Ukrainians, the Ukrainian minority, the “Akcja Wisła” campaign, Gdansk Province, the Security Service, the Tricity, Gdańsk, the Ukrainian Social-Cultural Society (UTSK),
surveillance, counter-intelligence, the Greek Catholic Church
INTRODUCTION
The article attempts to present the experiences of the Ukrainian community
in Gdańsk on the basis of some materials from the secret political police – until
November 1956 referred to as the Security Bureau (UB). After November 1956
when the security apparatus was incorporated into the Ministry of Home Affairs
(MSW) the name Security Service (SB)1 came into being. The preserved archival sources demonstrate that the security apparatus was interested in the life of
the local Ukrainian community, while at the same time exhibiting distrust of the
Ukrainians regarding them as the power-base of the nationalist movement2. The
materials reflect the national policy of the People’s Republic of Poland which in*
p. 57–97.
1
At the central level the security apparatus was supervised by the Department of Public Security
(July–December 1944), the Ministry of Public Security (January 1945–December 1954), the Committee for Public Security (December 1954–November 1956), and the Ministry of Home Affairs (November 1956–April 1990 until it was formally dissolved). More about the structures of the Security
Service and its activity see: Aparat bezpieczeństwa w Polsce. Kadra kierownicza, vol. 1: 1944–1956, red.
K. Szwagrzyk, Warszawa 2005; vol. 2: 1956–1975, red. P. Piotrowski, Warszawa 2006; vol. 3: 1975–
–1990, red. P. Piotrowski, Warszawa 2008; Aparat Bezpieczeństwa w województwie gdańskim w latach
1945–1990. Obsada stanowisk kierowniczych. Informator, wstęp i opracowanie M. Węgliński, Gdańsk
2010; A. Dudek, A. Paczkowski, Polska, [in:] Czekiści. Organy bezpieczeństwa w europejskich krajach
bloku sowieckiego 1944–1989, red. K. Persak, Ł. Kamiński, Warszawa 2010, pp. 393–468.
2
After 1956 officers of the security apparatus invigilating the Ukrainian community used the
term ‘nationalist’ relatively frequently. It was used to refer to a social activist who tried to stop the
process of “natural” assimilation of Ukrainians in Poland, who expressed the needs of their community and criticized the policy of the Soviet and Ukrainian authorities. The term “nationalist activity”
referred to a social-cultural activity in a national sense, free from any communist influence.
48
Arkadiusz Słabig
volved representatives of the local authorities (including workers of the Security
Bureau/Service). The sources used here come from the collections of the Branch of
the Institute of National Remembrance in Gdańsk.
POPULATION AND DISTRIBUTION
The majority of the Ukrainian population in the Gdańsk province arrived
there as a result of the deportation known as the “Akcja Wisła” campaign (1947)3.
Some controversy still surrounds the number of deported people4. According to
minimum estimates the number of deported people to be around 5247 (about
1400 families)5 whereas the maximum number is estimated at 6838 persons (about
1690 families)6. The reports of the 1950s and 60s provide us with much lower figures, which could have resulted from the migration of the Ukrainians within the
country, hiding their identity, assimilation or inaccurate estimates. In 1957 the
number of the Ukrainian minority was estimated at around 4,000 persons (about
650 families), who were distributed as follows: Nowy Dwór Gdański – 1111 people
(319 families), Elbląg – 745, Lębork – 109, Sztum – 4000 (50 families), Wejherowo 152 (37 families), Pruszcz Gdański – 20 (5 families) and the Tricity – about
1507. In 1962 the Security Service (SB) from Gdańsk announced that the Ukrainian population consisted of 4617 Ukrainians (1518 families), or alternatively 4900
(1600 families)8. Three years later it was claimed that the number had risen to
5000 (1600 families)9. It is difficult to define the number of people who had left
the Gdańsk province for good by the mid-1960s. What we know is that 11 families
from the county of Kwidzyn and 9 families from the county of Sztum returned to
their original places of residence, while about 60 people (mostly from the younger
3
About the ‘Wisła’ campaign see Akcja „Wisła”. Dokumenty, oprac. E. Misiło, Warszawa 1993;
R. Drozd, Droga na zachód. Osadnictwo ludności ukraińskiej na ziemiach zachodnich i północnych
Polski w ramach akcji „Wisła”, Warszawa 1997; idem, Polityka władz wobec ludności ukraińskiej w Polsce w latach 1944–1989, Warszawa 2001; S. Dudra, Poza małą ojczyzną. Łemkowie na Ziemi Lubuskiej, Wrocław 2008; I. Hałagida, Ukraińcy na ziemiach zachodnich i północnych Polski 1947–1957,
Warszawa 2002; J. Syrnyk, Ludność ukraińska na Dolnym Śląsku (1945–1989), Wrocław 2007.
4
It is difficult to estimate the number of the Ukrainians living in the area prior to the resettlement (I. Hałagida, Społeczna, kulturalna i oświatowa działalność Ukraińców w województwie gdańskim po 1945 roku, [in:] W starej i nowej ojczyźnie. Mniejszości narodowe w Gdańsku po drugiej wojnie
światowej, red. I. Hałagida, Gdańsk 1997, p. 67).
5
Idem, Ukraińcy w województwie gdańskim w latach 1947–1956, [in:] Między Odrą a Dnieprem.
Wyznania i narody, red. T. Stegner, Gdańsk 1997, p. 167.
6
R. Drozd, Polityka władz, p. 75.
7
The Archive of the Institute of National Remembrance (further cit. as AIPN Gd), sygn. 003/142,
vol. 15, Informacja w sprawach ludności ukraińskiej, czerwiec 1957, k. 226.
8
Ibid., sygn. 003/142, vol. 3, Raport z przeprowadzonej kontroli organizacji pracy i pracy operacyjnej nad problemem nacjonalistów ukraińskich w poszczególnych Referatach powiatowych,
w Grupie V-ej Wydziału II i w Grupie III Wydziału III, 30 April 1962 r., k. 36.
9
Ibid., sygn. 003/142, vol. 3, Informacja: stan spraw operacyjnych i materiałów dotyczących
osób znajdujących się aktualnie w rozpracowaniu po zagadnieniu nacjonalizmu ukraińskiego,
30 May 1965 r., k. 14.
Book 3
Ukrainians in the Gdansk Province...
49
generation) moved to the provinces of Olsztyn and Zielona Góra. A few Ukrainians were permitted to emigrate to the USSR10.
RELIGIOUS ISSUES
An important factor which helped to maintain the national identity of the
Ukrainians was their participation in the life of non-Roman Catholic religious
groups – mainly the Greek Catholic community and (to a lesser extent) the Ortodox Church. If the former (which was entirely Ukrainian in character) was almost
totally liquidated11 in postwar Poland, then the latter was approved of by the communist authorities due to its supranational character12.
In 1947 most Greek Catholic priests adopted biritualism and worked in Latin
parishes as vicars or administrators. One of them was the priest Bazyli Hrynyk
who exerted great influence on the history of the Ukrainian minority in Poland13.
In 1948 he became resident in a Roman Catholic church in Wierciny in the county
of Malbork14. Wanting to provide religious services to the Ukrainians deported
there, he tried to extend his activity. Having received permission of the church
authorities, he started to celebrate Greek Catholic masses in Nowy Dwór Gdański
(from April 1948), which were later celebrated in a branch church in Cyganek
(August 1952). In Cyganek the priest, and rector of the church, B. Hrynyk, regularly celebrated masses in the Eastern Rite, gave sermons and took confessions of
the faithful in the Ukrainian language15. The margins within which his work was
tolerated (excluding the period when he was arrested and imprisoned) were transmitted after 1957 to other regions inhabited by the Ukrainians. In March 1957
10
Ibid., sygn. 003/142, vol. 15, Informacja w sprawach ludności ukraińskiej, czerwiec 1957 r.,
k. 228.
11
In Poland the Greek-Catholic structures were disintegrated, which was not based on any
official document, but resulted from the mass displacement of the Ukrainian population and the
post-war change of the borders. In adjacent communist countries the delegalization of the Uniate
churches took place upon passing pseudo-conciliar resolutions on the strength of which they were
incorporated into the structures of the Orthodox Church.
12
Stefan Dudra, referring to the situation of the diocese of Wrocław and Szczecin, stated, “the
Orthodox Church did not become the basis of the social or political life of a given ethnic minority. It
was neither Ukrainian nor Lemko – it was Orthodox. The Orthodox Church considers religion to be
superior to nationality, and in the situation of an ethnic diversity of its believers is not perceived from
the ethnic point of view” [transl. A. C.] (idem, Cerkiew w diasporze. Z dziejów prawosławnej diecezji
wrocławsko-szczecińskiej, Poznań 2009, p. 72).
13
See more I. Hałagida, Polityka władz komunistycznych wobec Kościoła greckokatolickiego w PRL
(etapy i próba ogólnej charakterystyki), [in:] Polityka władz państwowych wobec Kościoła katolickiego
na Pomorzu Zachodnim i ziemi lubuskiej w latach 1945–1989, red. ks. T. Ceynowa, P. Knap, Szczecin
2010, pp. 157–210.
14
From February 1949 when the Roman-Catholic parish church was established in Wierciny,
the priest B. Hrynyk was its parish priest (I. Hałagida, „SzpiegWatykanu”. Kapłan greckokatolicki
ks. Bazyli Hrynyk (1896–1977), Warszawa 2008, p. 64).
15
I. Hałagida, „Szpieg Watykanu”, pp. 66, 79–80; see also: Spohad Jarosława Zaricznoho,
narodżenoho w Kornjach Rawa-Ruskoho powitu, [in:] 1947. Propam’jatna Knyha, oprac. B. Huk,
Warszawa 1997, pp. 308–311.
Book 3
50
Arkadiusz Słabig
in response to numerous demands of former Greek Catholic priests and activists
of the Ukrainian Social-Cultural Society (UTSK) the Office for Religious Affairs
agreed to some partial solutions. An idea was accepted to create a dozen Greek
Catholic churches where priests approved of by Primate Stefan Wyszyński16 were
to practice the Greek Catholic rite. In October 1958 the head of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland decided to extend pastoral rights17 to 16 Greek Catholic clergymen working in the so-called Regained Lands18. As a result of these changes, the
priest B. Hrynyk also began to organize masses in Gdańsk from May 1957. They
were first celebrated in the Roman Catholic churches of St. Bartholomew and St.
Francis, and from 1958 in the former Evangelical temple of St. Jacob in GdańskOliwa19. In 1968 after the priest B. Hrynyk had been appointed general vicar for the
affairs of Greek Catholics and moved to Przemyśl, he was replaced in Gdańsk Pomerania by the priest Michał Werhun. According to the data of June 1970, church
services in Gdańsk attracted 20–50 people, predominantly the elderly20. From the
end of the 1950s the pastoral service in the Greek Catholic rite was also conducted
in Dzierzgoń (the priest Eustachy Charchalis) and Lębork (the priest Stefan Dziubina)21.
The beginnings of the Orthodox Church in Pomerelia [Gdańsk Pomerania]
date back to the 13th century, but the first parish was not established in Gdańsk
until the 1920s22. In 1945 its activity was interrupted by the approaching front and
mass migrations of the population. In the same year, upon the arrival of migrants
from the Eastern Borderlands (Kresy Wschodnie), Orthodox church services
were resumed and they originally took place in the post-Evangelical church in
Sopot23. The official erection of the parish church, whose patron was St. Nicholas
the Wonderworker, took place in June 1946. The proto-priest Eugeniusz Naumow
16
R. Drozd, Polityka władz, pp. 145–147.
They were allowed to baptize, give marriages, to celebrate funerals and provide other priestly
services. They were bound to run register books. However, the decision to make certain sacral buildings available belonged to local Roman Catholic priests.
18
I. Hałagida, Działania aparatu bezpieczeństwa PRL wobec greckokatolickiego kapłana ks. mitrata Stefana Dziubiny, [in:] Aparat bezpieczeństwa wobec mniejszości narodowych i etnicznych oraz
cudzoziemców, red. J. Syrnyk, Warszawa 2009, p. 223.
19
Idem, „Szpieg Watykanu”, p. 155.
20
According to the authorities, the turnover was determined by the weather and the believers’
attitude towards the priest (AIPN Gd, sygn. 003/142, t. 1, Notatka służbowa ze spotkania z pomocą
obywatelską ps. „Sambor”, 7 June 1970 r., k. 46).
21
I. Hałagida, „Szpieg Watykanu”, p. 157. It should be underlined that in the Gdańsk Province
there stayed another priest of the Greek-Catholic Church – the priest Jan Jaremin, who was a RomanCatholic chaplain in a hospital in Elbląg in the years 1949–1982. He returned to his original rite in
1959 as a priest in Pasłęk (1959–1991) and Elbląg (1974–1991) (ibid., p. 119, 138, 160).
22
In the years 1942–1945 the parish priest of the Gdańsk Orthodox parish was the priest Piotr
Rodkiewicz (K. Urban, Kościół prawosławny w Polsce 1945–1970 (rys historyczny), Kraków 1996,
p. 151).
23
Announcements appeared in the Gdańsk daily press (S. Dudra, Kościół prawosławny na ziemiach zachodnich i północnych Polski po II wojnie światowej, Zielona Góra 2004, p. 114).
17
Book 3
51
was appointed as the church’s parson; his successors in the period of interest were
the priests Leonidas Byczuk (1952–1956) and Borys Szwarckopf (1956–1976)24. In
1947, probably in response to the forced displacement of the Ukrainians, a pastoral
centre in Nowy Dwór Gdański was set up. The structures of the Orthodox Church
in the Gdańsk Province eventually stabilized at the beginning of the 1950s. The
hitherto established parishes in Gdańsk, Elbląg and Kwidzyn created the Gdańsk
deanery which was part of the Białystok–Gdańsk diocese25. Simultaneously, the
venue for the celebrations of Orthodox services in the Tricity moved a few times.
In 1946 it was switched from Sopot to the Gdańsk district of Wrzeszcz, to a building situated in Sienkiewicza Street. After eight years a building in the cemetery in
Traugutta Street26 was adapted to religious needs.
PROFESSIONAL STRUCTURE, PARTICIPATION IN LOCAL AUTHORITIES
AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
Among the Ukrainians living in the countryside the majority were individual
farmers. Only a small percentage (about 15%) of the displaced did not receive a farm
– most of them were people working in non-farming professions27 and the elderly
living alone. The problem of acts granting the farms was not regulated until 1957.
Settlers (i.e. inhabitants of the village of Olszówka in the county of Kwidzyn) living
in miniscule farms unable to function independently refused to accept the regulations. They demanded the permission to return to their lost estates of one dozen
hectares in the south-east of the country. Almost the whole Ukrainian population
in Gdańsk Pomerania (mainly in the counties of Kwidzyn, Nowy Dwór Gdański
and Sztum) hoped that their forced displacement would be cancelled. By the mid1960s there had been reports of people neglecting their farms and agricultural
production. Representatives of the authorities suggested that the Ukrainian settlements in the counties of Kwidzyn and Lębork were in the most miserable situation.
Some of the farms, such as Bądki (the county of Kwidzyn), almost entirely died out
having been abandoned or neglected by their owners who remained indifferent to
their growing devastation. The situation in the county of Elbląg was different. The
exceptional thrift of the local Ukrainians was emphasized many times. From 1961
a positive change signaling the approaching stability was perceived for the first
time in the county of Nowy Dwór. In both cases it was even underlined that “many
former members of OUN-UPA [the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists – the
Ukrainian Insurgent Army] having served their sentence, broke away from hostile
24
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 251, 261. The number of Orthodox believers in the Gdańsk deanery was about 1034
people, 1000 in the Gdańsk parish and 34 in the Elbląg parish. There is no data concerning other
churches (K. Urban, op.cit., p. 120).
26
http://www.orthodoxgd.republika.pl/Witryna/Historia.html (available on 1 Feb 2011).
27
In villages of the Gdańsk Province Ukrainians were mainly employed in gmina’s cooperatives
“Samopomoc Chłopska”, companies dealing with land reclamation (especially in Żuławy), state machinery centres and small industrial plants.
25
Book 3
52
Arkadiusz Słabig
activity, took up decent work and fulfilled their responsibilities towards the state”
[transl. A.C.] At the same time more and more Ukrainians were moving to the
biggest cities of the province. In the Tricity, people of Ukrainian origin were employed in Gdańsk Shipyards (32 persons), trade (15), the Water Supply and Sewage
Enterprise (10), education (7), grocery factories (6), the city administration at the
county and province level (5), the Polish Ocean Lines (3) and the Prosecutor’s Office (1). The group included also an unidentified number of medical doctors and
46 students. In Elbląg there were 4 engineers, 3 technicians, 10 teachers, 1 medical
doctor and 1 priest of Ukrainian nationality28.
According to the information of the representatives of the Social-Administrative Department of the Presidium of the National Council of the Province (WSA
PWRN) in Gdańsk of March 1958 national councils (RN) included 31 representatives of the Ukrainian minority (28 members of the gromada national council,
2 members of the county national councils, and 1 member of the national council of the city) 29. Four years later the presence of 20 Ukrainian councilors in the
gromada national councils was recorded. In that period only 88 Ukrainians were
members of the Polish United Workers’ Party in the Gdańsk Province (only 8 in
The Tricity). In the county of Elbląg, one person of Ukrainian nationality held the
position of the head of the County’s Board of the Association of Rural Youth and
also was a member of the executive of the County Committee of the Polish United
Workers’ Party. In the village of Darżewo (the county of Lębork) a Ukrainian was
a secretary for the Basic Party Unit (POP). Apart from this, 100 Ukrainians in the
Gdańsk Province belonged to the United People’s Party30.
THE UKRAINIAN SOCIALCULTURAL SOCIETY UTSK
IN THE GDAŃSK PROVINCE  ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
In 1956 after several months of preparations, the authorities decided to create the Ukrainian Social-Cultural Society (UTSK)31. Their intention was to set
up structures facilitating the stability of the Ukrainians resettled in the Western
and Northern Lands, which would allow them to engage in cultural activities to
a limited extent. Such activities supervised by the administration and the security apparatus would constitute a “safety valve” for a community defending itself
against the process of assimilation. The authorities hoped to erase the so-called
28
AIPN Gd, sygn. 003/142, vol. 3, Raport z przeprowadzonej kontroli organizacji pracy i pracy
operacyjnej nad problemem nacjonalistów ukraińskich w poszczególnych Referatach powiatowych,
w Grupie V-ej Wydziału II i w Grupie III Wydziału III, 30 April 1962, k. 36–51.
29
Ibid., vol. 15, Notatka służbowa, 8 March 1958, k. 181.
30
Ibid., vol. 3, Raport z przeprowadzonej kontroli organizacji pracy i pracy operacyjnej nad
problemem nacjonalistów ukraińskich w poszczególnych Referatach powiatowych, w Grupie V-ej
Wydziału II i w Grupie III Wydziału III, 30 April 1962, k. 54.
31
The first national convention of the UTSK took place on 16–17 June 1956 in Warsaw. Jarosław
Syrnyk presented a more extensive analysis of the Society’s activity (idem, Ukraińskie Towarzystwo
Społeczno-Kulturalne (1956–1990), Wrocław 2008).
Book 3
53
cultural underground movement which consisted in maintaining national traditions by means of social and family meetings in private houses. In previous years
such meetings had taken place both in the countryside and in the Tricity, where
the young Ukrainian intelligentsia could mingle and integrate32. The establishment
of the Ukrainian Social-Cultural Society (UTSK) helped to clamp down on those
forms of activity which were getting out of control and gave them a structure which
the authorities could approve.
In the early spring of 1956 the Tricity’s local dailies published some information about a planned meeting of the authorities’ representatives with citizens of
Ukrainian origin. The information aroused consternation among the Ukrainians.
Later it turned out that the initiator of the talks had been Andrzej Kucharuk, the
head of WSA MRN [the Social-Administrative Department of the City National
Council] , a person of Ukrainian origin who offered his help in organizational
matters. After some time there was another meeting with the authorities – this
time at the province level (PWRN – the Presidium of the National Council of
the Province). Following a few months of preparations, in June 1956 some delegates attended an organizational convention of the UTSK in Warsaw, and later the
Province Organizational Committee of the UTSK (also known as the Temporary
Board of the Ukrainian Social-Cultural Committee) was established in Gdańsk33. It
consisted of Jakub Sawczuk, Jarosław Zariczny, Jan Makowiecki, Michał Łoziński,
Bazyli Bryl, Michał Kozak, Aleksy Kociuk and Helena Walkowska34.
In order to extend the UTSK’s scope, at the beginning of September activists
from Gdańsk decided to organize meetings with the dispersed Ukrainian population. H. Walkowska35 and P. Krzemiński were delegated to organize the meetings.
They were supported by an informer “Walter Weto”, who was probably a worker
of the province administration36 He was responsible for establishing the dates and
venues for the Gdańsk activists’ meetings with local Ukrainians37. Eventually, during the period of September–October 1956 five county boards of the UTSK were
32
I. Hałagida, Ukraińcy w województwie gdańskim, pp. 178–179.
P. Kreminśkyj, 45 roki w ukrajinśkoji domiwky w Gdanśku, Ukrajinśki Almanach, 2003,
p. 85; I. Hałagida, Społeczna, kulturalna i oświatowa, pp. 70–71; J. Syrnyk, Ukraińskie Towarzystwo
Społeczno-Kulturalne, p. 97.
34
AIPN Gd, sygn. 003/142, vol. 15, Notatka służbowa, 12 IX 1956 r., k. 280–281; ibid., Spis delegatów na Zjazd Towarzystwa Ukraińskiego w Warszawie z terenu województwa gdańskiego, 12 Sept
1956, k. 282.
35
In one piece of information provided by the agent, she was characterized as follows “Citizen
Walkowska is one of the most involved Ukrainian activists in the Gdansk Province. She is very energetic and displays a great deal of initiative in consolidating Ukrainians scattered all over the region
[...]. She tries to unite those frightened and devastated people and to spur them into action. She visits
them in most remote places, giving them hope in a better future and maintaining the national spirit”
[transl. A. C.] (AIPN Gd, sygn. 003/142, vol. 15, Doniesienie „Wrzosa”, 24 Oct 1956, k. 257).
36
Ibid., Notatka służbowa, wrzesień 1956, k. 269–270.
37
Ibid., Doniesienie „Waltera Weto”, 13 September 1956 r., k. 265–267; ibid., Doniesienie „Waltera Weto” dotyczące osób narodowości ukraińskiej zamieszkałej w powiecie Kwidzyn, 11 X 1956 r.,
k. 262.
33
Book 3
54
Arkadiusz Słabig
set up which supervised 12 local circles (data from June 1957), six of which were
located in the county of Nowy Dwór, four in the county of Elbląg, one in the county
of Lębork and one in the county of Kwidzyn38. The most active was the Gdańsk circle, which in 1965 included as many as 100 members, mainly young people39. Both
the number of the circles and the members of the UTSK underwent some fluctuations. The number of groups belonging to the Society reached a peak in 1963 (as
many as 18 circles with 446 members)40, while the highest number of members
was recorded two years earlier (600 members in 10 circles)41. In 1970, which is the
last year considered in this study, the UTSK in the Gdańsk Province included 440
members, about a hundred of whom belonged to the circle in Gdańsk, 46 to the
circle in Nowotki, 36 – in Marzęcin, 32 – in Elbląg and 26 in Dzierzgoń. In the remaining circles, which were somewhat inactive, there were approximately a dozen
members registered in each circle42.
The creation of the UTSK coincided with a short-term liberalization of the political system and a temporary paralysis of the security apparatus. The moment the
control of the authorities over the Society slackened, the Ukrainian community
started to treat it as a platform to protect their fundamental interests. People who
attended meetings expressed not so much the need to engage in a cultural activity
as the desire to do away with the effects of the forced resettlement. At a meeting
organized in Kwidzyn (5 Sept 1956) in the seat of the Presidium of the National
Council of the County (PPRN) “the citizens en masse expressed a willingness to
return to their homeland demanding that assistance be provided to them by the
Cultural-Educational Ukrainian Committees [transl. A. C.]”43. Similar demands
were recorded in Sztum (16 October 1956) where, apart from requests for permission to return to the county of Przemyśl, the Ukrainians articulated their dissatisfaction with housing conditions44. The Ukrainians looked at the newly established
38
Ibid., Informacja w sprawach ludności ukraińskiej, czerwiec 1957 r., k. 228. Different information was provided by Paweł Krzemiński. According to him, five county boards and nineteen circles of
the UTSK had been created by 1957, which altogether included 461 members. Smaller administrative
units and circles of the Society were as follows: the county of Elbląg – Krzewsk (41), Nowotki (28),
Kępniewo (31), Jegłownik (10), Elbląg (18), Tolkmicko (15); the county of Nowy Dwór – Drewnica
(9), Ostaszewo (24), Marzęcino (26), Stegna (14), Przemysław/Orłowo (10); the county of Lębork
– Lubowidz (12), Cewice (17), Krępa (20); the county of Sztum – Mątów (16), Dzierzgoń (16), Bruk
(14); the county of Kwidzyn (47); Tricity – Gdańsk (93). (P. Kreminśkyj, op.cit., p. 86).
39
AIPN Gd, sygn. 003/142, vol. 3, Informacja: stan spraw operacyjnych i materiałów dotyczących osób znajdujących się aktualnie w rozpracowaniu po zagadnieniu nacjonalizmu ukraińskiego,
30 June 1965 r., k. 14.
40
J. Syrnyk, Ukraińskie Towarzystwo Społeczno-Kulturalne, p. 99.
41
In 1960 it was estimated that the UTSK had around 850 members (AIPN Gd, sygn. 003/142,
vol. 15, Meldunek specjalny dotyczący akcji wyborczej do władz UTSK, 2 March 1961, k. 116).
42
Ibid., vol. 2, Analiza zagadnienia nacjonalizmu ukraińskiego na terenie województwa gdańskiego, 21 August 1970, k. 46.
43
Ibid., vol. 15, Notatka informacyjna, October 1956, k. 253.
44
Ibid., Pismo kierownika Powiatowej Delegatury ds. Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego w Sztumiedo
naczelnika Wydziału II WU ds. BP w Gdańsku, 30/10/1956, k. 271–272. The document bears a hand-
Book 3
55
Ukrainian Social-Cultural Society (UTSK) with some reservation due to fear of
repressive measures taken by the authorities who in previous years had even resorted to provocation. The information from the meeting in Lębork (23 September 1956) confirms the motive. Among the local Ukrainian community rumours
spread that “the convention was a trap set by the Public Security Service to catch
some participants, which was why at the convention there were mainly women
and the elderly” [transl. A. C.]. Eventually, about 200 people turned up, who misidentified some representatives of the authorities as officers of the Security Bureau.
The increasing mistrust was hard to combat, which was why the meeting was considered to be “quite unnatural”. A Ukrainian paper was read (probably a weekly of
the UTSK Nasze Słowo), a few songs were sung and there was a discussion about
the possibility of returning to the homeland45. When some members of the underground turned up at the Ukrainian Social-Cultural Society urging people to leave
the sites of forced resettlement, the officers of the Security Service concluded that
“nationalistic tendencies were developing under the cover of the Ukrainian SocialCultural Society”46 [transl. A. C.].
UTSK AND LOAN ASSISTANCE FOR UKRAINIAN SETTLERS
In the years 1956–1960 the loan assistance provided by the state to Ukrainian settlers influenced the activity of the Ukrainian Social-Cultural Society47. “The
subject discussed at meetings of local circles of the Ukrainian Social-Cultural Society is the problem of the distribution of non-returnable loans and discrimination
in the form of shouting matches (a few cases) as well as the issue of returning to
previous places of residence” – as it was described in one of the documents. Material support assigned by the authorities was to be another measure to provide
stability for the resettled Ukrainians, who still lacked a sense of permanence. The
effects of this measure were manifold. On the one hand some farmers, particularly
in the county of Elblag, used the financial support to modernize and develop their
farms. However, farmers who did not feel attached to the current place of residence tended to spend all the money on consumer goods. Officers of the Security
Service suggested that the Ukrainians in the county of Nowy Dwór use the nonreturnable loans to purchase motorcycles, washing machines, furs and television
sets. A similar situation was reported in other counties. Nevertheless, any hope
of returning to their homeland was dying, which forced the Ukrainians to attach
written note: “To Citizen Zawadzki: we have to have someone in the authorities of the Society, and
prepare a network of agents to record opinions concerning the activity of the UTSK” [transl. A. C.].
45
Ibid., Pismo kierownika Powiatowej Delegatury do Spraw Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego w Lęborku do naczelnika Wydziału II WU ds. BP w Gdańsku, 27/10/1956, k. 273–274.
46
Ibid., Informacja o sytuacji w skupiskach nacjonalistów ukraińskich w okresie wyborów
i obecnie, 14.02.1957, k. 182–183.
47
Seemoreabout the loanaction in: R. Drozd, Pomoc materialna państwa polskiego dla ludności ukraińskiej w latach 1947–1960, [in:] Ukraińcy w najnowszych dziejach Polski (1918–1989), t. I,
red. R. Drozd, Słupsk–Warszawa 2000, pp. 204–208.
Book 3
56
Arkadiusz Słabig
more significance to agricultural production and the modernization of residential buildings (“probably because the buildings had started to crumble” – as one
worker of the Security Service remarked)48. The actions were accompanied by the
regulation of endowment acts and the precise definition of the ownership of lands
and buildings. The role of the county boards of the UTSK came down to explaining
to Ukrainian farmers the regulations and directives as well as cooperating with the
committees responsible for granting loans.
In 1956 the Presidium of the National Council of the Province (PWRN) in
Gdańsk assigned Ukrainian and indigenous farmers non-returnable loans of
1 million zlotys, which included 100 000 PLN in the county of Gdańsk, 200 000
PLN in the county of Nowy Dwór, 50 000 PLN in the county of Malbork, 100 000
in the county of Sztum, 250 000 PLN in the county of Kwidzyn, 100 000 PLN in
the county of Elbląg, 150 000 PLN in the county of Lębork and 50 000 PLN in the
county of Wejherowo. One year later the authorities assigned 2.5 million zlotys
for this purpose. According to the data of 20 July 1957 the Ukrainians filled in
650 application forms, 278 of which were accepted (their total value amounting to
2 329 000 PLN)49. The distribution in respective counties was as follows: the county of Lebork 207 000 PLN, the county of Nowy Dwór 240 000 PLN, the county of
Sztum 80 000 PLN, the county of Elbląg 204 000 PLN and the county of Wejherowo 57 000 PLN. The county of Kwidzyn received 500 000 PLN to be spent on the
Ukrainians and indigenous farmers, but it was decided to allocate only 190 000
PLN to the needs of the Ukrainians while the rest of the resources was to support
Polish settlers. The average value of this one-off financial assistance ranged from
2 000 to 15 000 PLN. The situation of small farm owners and people unable to
make a living did not improve. Their requests for loans were rejected50. Remittable
loans for the Ukrainians and indigenous people were granted for another three
years. In 1958 4.66 million PLN and 5 million PLN was assigned for the purpose.
Finally, in April 1960 four million zlotys was assigned for the last time51.
The material situation of the Ukrainians and the problem of their return to
previous places of residence dominated the sessions of the First Province Convention of the UTSK (October 1957), which was held in the Province National
Council (WRN) in Gdańsk52. Seventy-five delegates, ten guests and eighty-five au48
AIPN Gd, sygn. 003/142, t. 3, Raport z przeprowadzonej kontroli organizacji pracy i pracy
w Grupie V-ej Wydziału II i w Grupie III Wydziału III, 30/04/1962, k. 46
49
Ibid., vol. 15, Tłumaczenie referatu na konferencję sprawozdawczo-wyborczą UTSK w Gdańsku, 17/03/196, k. 101.
50
Ibid., vol. 15, Informacja o sprawach ludności ukraińskiej, June 1957, k. 226–227.
51
R. Drozd, Polityka władz, pp. 181–185. According to the estimates by Igor Hałagida, in the
years 1959–1960 displaced Ukrainians in Gdańsk Province received 4,581,500 zlotys’ worth of loans.
(idem, Społeczna, kulturalna i oświatowa, p. 73).
52
The Province Board in Gdańsk was elected at the convention. From among 13 candidates,
handwritten notes were added to three names (Arsen Sagan, Andrzej Mentuch, Smolij) “ustalić
i zebrać, b[rak] d[anych]” [“investigate and collect data, no data”].
Book 3
57
ditors from the whole province attended the convention. It was reported that 32
people took part in the discussion. As Mikołaj Szczyrba, plenipotentiary of the
Main Board of the UTSK, remarked, “the whole discussion revolved around making complaints”. The allegations concerned the improper distribution of loans and
insufficient involvement of the county boards of the UTSK. The committees at the
presidiums of the National Councils of the Province were accused of not knowing
the real situation and needs, which resulted in the granting of insufficient funds for
the modernization of farms. The phenomenon concerned mainly agricultural lands
of low quality. Another problem was the organization of education in the Ukrainian language for young people living in different areas and the growing conflicts
with the Polish entourage (“persecutions inflicted by Polish nationalists”). Most
Ukrainians believed that the solution to all their problems would be the permission to return to their previous places of residence, or to emigrate to the USSR53.
It was also suggested the whole resettled Ukrainian community should reside in
one place in the Western or Northern Lands. However, the suggestions were not in
accordance with the policy of the authorities. As a result, the leaders of the Ukrainian Social-Cultural Society (UTSK) in the Gdańsk Province limited their current
tasks only to recording the names of people who had not received their own farms
and they had applied for compensation, collecting data about the distribution of
the Ukrainian minority, defining the number of people applying for permission
to return to their previous places of residence, examining the actual feasibility of
their return, and organizing labour cooperatives54. Nevertheless, the situation did
not change for another four years. Meetings with the Ukrainians during election
campaigns to the authorities of the UTSK were again marked by complaints about
their material situation. Sometimes membership of the UTSK was perceived as a
way to obtain financial assistance55. However, the organization’s inability to improve the situation of the Ukrainian minority was more and more noticeable. In
1959 it was mooted that a special delegate from the UTSK be elected to work in
the Presidium of the National Council of the Province (PWRN) as a representative
of the Ukrainians. However, two years later it was stated that “the Society will not
help us”, and it was suggested that “if the Ukrainians join national councils and the
Polish United Workers’ Party, the results will improve”56.
53
The authorities did not plan mass returns to Ukraine. They only considered single applica-
tions.
54
AIPN Gd, sygn. 003/142, vol. 15, Protokół z Pierwszego Wojewódzkiego Zjazdu Ukraińskiego Towarzystwa Społeczno-Kulturalnego w Gdańsku z dnia 20 października 1957 r., 22/10/1957,
k. 198–205.
55
One of the speakers stated that “only those who received loans should join the Society, as other
Ukrainians’ membership in it has no grounds” [transl. A. C.] (ibid., Ocena działalności Ukraińskiego
Towarzystwa Społeczno-Kulturalnego na terenie województwa gdańskiego, [1961], k. 125).
56
Ibid., Meldunek specjalny dotyczący przebiegu akcji wyborczej do władz UTSK, 2/03/1961,
k. 116–117; Ocena działalności Ukraińskiego Towarzystwa Społeczno-Kulturalnego na terenie województwa gdańskiego, [1961], k. 126.
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Arkadiusz Słabig
CULTURAL ACTIVITY
OF THE UKRAINIAN SOCIALCULTURAL SOCIETY UTSK
Over the years, when the loan campaign finished and the stability of the
Ukrainian settlers was improving, the UTSK focused mainly on cultural activity.
Like religion, it had a considerable influence on the integration of the scattered
Ukrainian minority and helped prevent them from being stripped of their national identity57. Cultural work encountered numerous obstacles, the most serious of
which was a lack of useable areas. Originally, the problem also concerned Ukrainians in the Tricity, who were forced to change locations for their organizationalcultural activity58. Thus, until the first half of 1957 Ukrainian activists in Gdańsk
more often than not met in private homes. Invitations to meetings were distributed
by Ukrainian students at the Gdańsk Polytechnic. Eventually, in June 1957, on the
strength of the decision of the Presidium of the National Council of the Province
(PWRN), the Province Board of the UTSK was allocated a site in the Construction
Design Bureau of the Province’s Cereal Plants in Długi Targ. It consisted of a room
for cultural purposes and a smaller space for the secretary’s office59 rented free of
charge for an unspecified period of time.
After nine years (October 1966) there was a risk that the UTSK might be given
notice to vacate the rooms. The Housing Department of the Presidium of the City’s
National Council in Gdańsk (PMRN) commenced actions aimed at taking over the
rented space in connection with the extension of the tourist infrastructure within
the city. This gave rise to critical comments among Ukrainians, who suggested that
it was the beginning of the end for the UTSK with the aim of total assimilation for
the Ukrainians in Poland. Taking away the spaces designed for Ukrainian culturaleducational activity made it impossible to integrate the dispersed community. It
was bitterly pointed out that in the inter-war period the Ukrainian minority had
had incomparably greater possibilities to develop their own social and even political activity. Some people suggested it necessary to inform Ukrainian representatives
about the authorities’ intentions. The decision of the officials from the Presidium of
the City’s National Council in Gdańsk (PMRN) was probably blocked by officers of
the Security Service, who suggested that the situation “would lead to the Ukrainians
gathering in private homes, which could facilitate clandestine activities”60. In other
57
Ibid., Notatka służbowa, 24/11/1958, k. 169.
The first temporary seat of the UTSK was in the City National Council (MRN) in Gdańsk;
another suggestion was to install it in the seat of the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society (TPPR). In the
subsequent months rooms at 15 Sobótki Street and at 22 Aleja Rokossowskiego were also considered
(P. Kreminśkyj, op.cit., p. 85).
59
According to the information provided by P. Krzemiński, the authorities did not charge the
UTSK for the rent. The UTSK paid Orly telephone bills (P. Kreminśkyj, op.cit., p. 86.; see also: I. Hałagida, Społeczna, kulturalna i oświatowa, p. 72; J. Syrnyk, Ukraińskie Towarzystwo Społeczno-Kulturalne, p. 100).
60
AIPN Gd, sygn. 003/142, vol. 15, Informacja naczelnika Wydziału III KW MO w Gdańsku
ppłk. Jana Kujawy, 22/11/1966, k. 13–14; J. Syrnyk, Ukraińskie Towarzystwo Społeczno-Kulturalne,
p. 100.
58
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59
parts of the province at the beginning of the 1960s only the circles of the UTSK in
Dzierzgoń (the county of Sztum) and Krzewsko (the county of Elbląg) had their
own clubs. In the latter, Ukrainian farmers converted the dilapidated building of an
old school for the purposes of the UTSK’s cultural activity61.
It was estimated that the City Circle of the UTSK in Gdańsk was the most active as it included a few dozen Ukrainian students. The organizational work of the
members of the Board – Paweł Krzemiński and Helena Walkowska – were also
praised. Thanks to their initiative, drama and dance clubs were established, as well
as a declamation section and a choir which performed both in the Gdańsk Province
and at national contests. Organized events included celebrations commemorating
eminent people such as Taras Shevchenko, Ivan Franko, Lesya Ukrainka and anniversaries of the October Revolution, the establishment of socialist Ukraine and
the rebirth of the Polish state. Knowledge was spread through lectures on many
subjects (i.e. literature, art, architecture and history), and there were Ukrainian
language classes for adults. The Gdańsk circle of the UTSK also organized meetings for children and the elderly (e.g. at Christmas time) and dances which enabled
people to meet their life partners and proved very popular among the youth62.
The circle in Elbląg was also active, but to a smaller extent. Despite lacking
their own venue, it organized choir performances, Shevchenko celebrations and
meetings with activists of the Communist Party of West Ukraine. On the other
hand, the circle in Krzewsk, using the money earned during some theatrical performances given by its drama club, managed to collect funds to construct a permanent stage for one of the local educational institutions63. In the county of Sztum the
centre for cultural work was the clubroom in Dzierzgoń, which contained a library,
a reading room, and from time to time organized temporary exhibitions. In the
county of Nowy Dwór a UTSK choir performed, which in 1959 gave as many as
11 concerts and received financial rewards64. In the county of Lębork and Kwidzyn
where the Ukrainian community was scattered, their activities were limited to the
distribution of Ukrainian calendars and the sale of donations for a grant fund65.
Outside the Tricity and the county of Elbląg meetings were hardly ever organized;
there were no plans for cultural work and many people stopped paying their membership fees. Even election meetings seldom took place due to poor attendance66.
61
Members of the agricultural circle in the village were predominantly Ukrainians, who
were considered to be leading farmers (AIPN Gd, sygn. 003/142, vol. 15, Tłumaczenie referatu na
konferencję sprawozdawczo-wyborczą UTSK w Gdańsku, 17.03.1961, k. 108).
62
Ibid., Notatka służbowa, 12/12/1957, k. 185–186.
63
Ibid., Tłumaczenie referatu na konferencję sprawozdawczo-wyborczą UTSK w Gdańsku,
17/03/1961, k. 108.
64
Ibid., Notatka służbowa, 12/12/1957, k. 185–186. The founders of the choir were Eugeniusz
Buraczuk and Helena Maciganowska (I. Hałagida, Społeczna, kulturalna i oświatowa, p. 76).
65
AIPN Gd, 003/142, t. 15, Tłumaczenie referatu na konferencję sprawozdawczo-wyborczą
UTSK w Gdańsku, 17/03/1961, k. 109–110.
66
Ibid., vol. 3, Informacja: stan spraw operacyjnych i materiałów dotyczących osób znajdujących się aktualnie w rozpracowaniu po zagadnieniu nacjonalizmu ukraińskiego, 30/06/1965, k. 14.
Book 3
60
Arkadiusz Słabig
Another factor which had a negative impact on the development of the Ukrainian cultural activity in The Gdańsk Province was a shortage of financial resources provided by the administrative authorities. In 1957 the Province Board of the
UTSK was provided a full time cultural-education instructor and a motorcycle67.
However, at the beginning of the 1960s there were not enough funds to finance the
redecoration of the club room in Gdańsk, visits to village clubs, the purchase of
books and newspapers, and even paying telephone bills. The authorities persisted
in maintaining that they had no money which could be allocated to support the
activity of the Ukrainian Social-Cultural Society (UTSK)68. On the other hand,
the representatives of the Main Board of the organization did not show much understanding of the problem saying that “if no action is undertaken, the Ukrainian
Society will be dissolved”69.
A confidential contact person (KP) under the pseudonym “Czarny” described
the financial problems in the Gdańsk City Circle in October 1961: “The Ukrainian
Society there fails to undertake any social-cultural activity. The club room is attended by a few Ukrainian students who watch films or play chess. There are no
prospects for the revival of the social-cultural activity”70. The representatives of the
Presidium of the National Council of the Province (PWRN) shared this opinion
and during a conversation with an officer of the Security Service they stated that
the activists of the UTSK had ceased drafting plans of work, organizing lectures
and field visits. Evening meetings to commemorate Shevchenko and Franko were
no longer organized. At the same time the activists of the Society evinced a certain
resistance to the communist ideology71. They ignored a lecture given by Prof. Libacki entitled “Social formations and culture”, which was advertised in the press.
After a mordant comment: “we won’t have you spreading Marxism here!” it was
decided to carry out a choir rehearsal in the presence of the lecturer. During another meeting, members pointedly chose to watch TV. Libacki, offended with such
a response to his lecture, wrote a complaint to representatives of the Department
of Home Affairs of the Presidium of the City National Council (PMRN) where he
stated that “the authorities of the Society are indoctrinating the Ukrainian youth
67
Ibid., vol. 15, Pismo naczelnika Wydziału III mjr. D. Lesińskiego do naczelnika Wydziału III
Departamentu III MSW, 20/04/1957, k. 245–248; Doniesienie agenturalne „Waltera Weto”, 7/06/1957,
k. 232–233.
68
Ibid., Tłumaczenie referatu na konferencję sprawozdawczo-wyborczą UTSK w Gdańsku,
17/03/1961, k. 110; Pismo naczelnika Wydziału III mjr. D. Lesińskiego do naczelnika Wydziału III
Departamentu III MSW, 20/04/1957, k. 245–248.
69
70
71
In 1970 an administration worker in her conversation about the UTSK with an officer of the
Security Service pointed out that “ the Society’s members are not involved in any political activity
despite the fact that reports underline the communist party’s members’ activity in the UTSK” [transl.
A. C.] (ibid., vol. 1, Notatka służbowa z przeprowadzonej rozmowy z pracowniczką WSW WRN
w Gdańsku ob. K. Wroną, 17/10/1970, k. 67–68).
Book 3
61
with nationalistic ideas”72. At the turn of the 1950s and 1960s the Society did not
include religion in its activities. The reasons might have been a fear of restrictions
imposed by the authorities and some disagreements with the priest B. Hrynyk,
who in a sermon in Cyganek in January 1960 said that “some people boast about
holding important positions in the UTSK, but in fact they make fools of themselves, because they have to do what communists tell them to do”73. The authorities
of the city circle of the Society were originally quite unwilling to respond positively
to the youth’s suggestions concerning the organization of Christmas evening meetings with the participation of this priest74.
Activists from Gdańsk used the preparations for national conventions of the
UTSK (including reporting and election conferences) to formulate demands with
the aim of improving the situation of the Ukrainians in Poland and developing
the activity of the UTSK. In December 1967 a list of such demands was made and
it included: the re-establishment of the committee for national minorities at the
Province Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party in Gdańsk, the participation of the representatives of the Ukrainians in national councils, maintaining a
secondary school in Olsztyn with classes held in the Ukrainian language, the creation of radio and television auditions devoted to the Ukrainian issue, a wider access to films from the USSR, providing more funds to the UTSK, the organization
of summer holidays for children from the Ukrainian community, the establishment of an artistic team (the beginning of a travelling theatre), and the protection
of Ukrainian cultural monuments in the south-east of the country75.
At the end of the 1960s it was reported that the Gdańsk circle of the UTSK
had reestablished its statutory activity. A confidential collaborator (TW) under the
pseudonym “Misiek” related: “Recently the cultural activity has livened up thanks
to meetings, lectures and talks concerning Ukrainian culture, meetings with
Ukrainian men of letters or writers who live in the USSR and other people who
have something interesting to say about present-day Ukraine”. During entertainment meetings popular quizzes concerning Ukraine were organized (e.g. “What
do you know about Lviv?”), the winners of which were awarded with books76.
In November 1969 artists from the Kiev Operetta Theatre were invited, and two
months later a Christmas evening was held (according to the Julian Calendar) dur72
Ibid., vol. 15, Notatka służbowa kpt. St. Fryszkowskiego, 30/01/1962, k. 81–82.
Ibid., vol. 3, Aktualizacja charakterystyki kontrwywiadowczej po zagadnieniu nacjonalizmu
ukraińskiego, 9/03/1961, k. 98.
74
After Christmas the priest B. Hrynyk refused to make a round of Christmas house calls at the
houses of the UTSK’s members from Tricity (ibid., vol. 15, Notatka służbowa kpt. St. Fryszkowskiego,
30/01/1962, k. 81–82).
75
Ibid., vol. 15, Wnioski dla delegatów województwa gdańskiego na IV Zjazd Ukraińskiego Towarzystwa Społeczno-Kulturalnego sformułowane na podstawie dyskusji na naradzie w dniu 3 XII 1967 r.
i wniosków z VIII wojewódzkiej konferencji sprawozdawczo-wyborczej, 3 XII 1967 r., k. 11–12.
76
Ibid., vol. 1, Notatka służbowa z odbytego spotkania z TW ps. „Misiek” w dniu 27 XI 1970 r.,
k. 86.
73
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62
Arkadiusz Słabig
ing which Ukrainian carols and songs were sung77. There were also attempts to
recruit more members. “Recruiting members to the club is organized in a way that
a member gives Luba [Lubomira Bołdys – the secretary – A. S.] some addresses
of potential candidates. Next, Luba with a friend pays a visit to a given person
and tries to talk them into joining the club. They select mainly young people with
secondary education, or students. They want to attract as many members of the
Ukrainian intelligentsia as possible” wrote the confidential collaborator under the
pseudonym “Koral”78.
THE UKRAINIAN SOCIALCULTURAL SOCIETY’S ATTITUDE TOWARDS
TEACHING THE UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE IN THE GDAŃSK PROVINCE
An essential element of the UTSK’s activity resulting from its statute regulations was support for the teaching of the Ukrainian language79. In The Gdańsk
Province Ukrainian was taught in special centres created in primary schools, and
less frequently in the clubrooms of the UTSK80. One document read: “Members
of the Ukrainian Social-Cultural Society (UTSK) should make sure that parents
send their children to Ukrainian language classes; they should also find teachers, increase the discipline of learning, encourage teachers to work in Ukrainian
centres. We should take care of the children who have already studied Ukrainian. The Boards [of the circles] should distribute primers and school books”81. In
the years 1956–1957 at meetings held in the counties inhabited by the Ukrainians
there was a demand that the Ukrainian language be introduced in primary schools
in Marzęcin, Ostaszów, Stegna, Jantar, Krzewsk, Nowotki, Dzierzgoń, Żułwieniec,
Cewice, Tolkmick, Elbląg, Gdańsk, Rozpędziny and Wandowo. However, a serious
setback was the shortage of qualified teachers82. The attempt to send a few people
to a course in teaching Ukrainian did not bring the expected results. Nevertheless, the so-called social teachers offered their help. One of them was a doctor
from Stegna Lewko83. In July 1959 The Province Board of the Ukrainian SocialCultural Society (UTSK) applied for the appointment of a supervisor and inspec77
Ibid., Notatka służbowa ze spotkania z TW „Heniuś” odbytego dnia 23 I 1970 [r.] w kawiarni
Mocca, 24 I 1970 r., k. 49–50; Doniesienie TW „Heniuś”, 28/11/1969, k. 91.
78
Ibid., Doniesienie [TW ps.] „Koral”, 15/10/1970 , k. 61–62.
79
According to J. Syrnyk, ‘the UTSK was a body which initiated , monitored, coordinated and
facilitated the system of the Ukrainian language learning” [transl. A. C.] (idem, Ukraińskie Towarzystwo Społeczno-Kulturalne, p. 328).
80
The legal basis was a circular letter issued by the Ministry of Education on 4 Dec 1956, which
allowed teaching the Ukrainian language in places where at least 7 children wanted to learn the language with the permission of their parents (I. Hałagida, Społeczna, kulturalna i oświatowa, p. 75).
81
AIPN Gd, sygn. 003/142, vol. 15, Tłumaczenie referatu na konferencję sprawozdawczo-wyborczą UTSK w Gdańsku, 17/03/1961, k. 105.
82
There were a few qualified teachers of Ukrainian origin who were unwilling to teach Ukrainian.
83
He taught Ukrainian to twelve children (AIPN Gd, sygn. 003/142, vol. 15, Notatka służbowa,
12/12/1957, k. 185–186).
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63
tor of Ukrainian education. The vice-inspector Piguta from Elbląg was elected for
the post. Eventually, teaching Ukrainian started in Żurawiec, Żułwienice (Piotr
Kowal), Nowotki (Eugeniusz Nakonieczny), Gdańsk and Ostaszów (Krystyna Libacka)84. Starting language courses for adults was also considered. Thanks to announcements in the paper Nasze Słowo an increasing number of teachers from
other parts of the country showed the willingness to cooperate. However, the local
educational authorities were not able to guarantee them a job85. The question of the
effectiveness of the education in the Ukrainian language was quite problematic.
It seems that the only people who really cared for the Ukrainian education to be
introduced were members of the intelligentsia from the UTSK who had neither the
resources nor the right to organize and supervise the education of young people.
Teachers were discouraged by the indifference of parents who were not interested
in their children’s progress in learning the mother tongue. As a result, the effects
of teaching were not satisfactory86. The maximum scope of the Ukrainian language
teaching took place in the school year 1966–67 when in six centres 87 pupils were
taught87. In the subsequent years there were attempts to increase the number of
such centres. In October 1970 during a meeting of activists of the Province Board
of the Ukrainian Social-Cultural Society (UTSK) it was demanded that Ukrainian
be taught in Elbląg by teachers moved there from other areas of the county88. Another issue was the creation of the grant fund for Ukrainian students by the Province Board of the Ukrainian Social-Cultural Society (UTSK). Voluntary donations
were made and the names of donors were published in Nasze Słowo. In February
1959, 1900 zlotys was given to the fund. Moreover, some poorest students received
some material help89.
THE SECURITY APPARATUS AND THE UKRAINIAN MINORITY
IN THE GDAŃSK PROVINCE
The Ukrainian community was the focus of interest for both the province and
county structures of the security apparatus. In the years 1954–1956 the problem of
“eastern” national minorities was dealt with by the counter-intelligence – Group V
84
I. Hałagida enumerates also the following teachers: Anna Czosnyk, Katarzyna Junko, Olga
Werbowa and Włodzimierz Romańczuk (idem, Społeczna, kulturalna i oświatowa, p. 75).
85
AIPN Gd, sygn. 003/142, vol. 15, Tłumaczenie referatu na konferencję sprawozdawczo-wyborczą UTSK w Gdańsku, 17/03/1961, k. 103–104.
86
Ibid., Meldunek specjalny dotyczący przebiegu akcji wyborczej do władz UTSK, 2/03/1961,
k. 116–117; Ocena działalności Ukraińskiego Towarzystwa Społeczno-Kulturalnego na terenie województwa gdańskiego, [1961], k. 126.
87
I. Hałagida, Społeczna, kulturalna i oświatowa, p. 76. For the sake of comparison let us provide
the data from the years 1957–1958 – 38 pupils while in the years 1969–1970 – sixty-nine pupils in
5 learning centres (J. Syrnyk, Ukraińskie Towarzystwo Społeczno-Kulturalne, p. 422).
88
AIPN Gd, sygn. 003/142, vol. 1, Notatka służbowa z przeprowadzonej rozmowy z pracowniczką WSW WRN w Gdańsku ob. K. Wroną, 17/10/1970, k. 67–68.
89
Ibid., vol. 15, Tłumaczenie referatu na konferencję sprawozdawczo-wyborczą UTSK w Gdańsku, 17/03/1961, k. 106.
Book 3
64
Arkadiusz Słabig
of Department II of the Province Bureau for Public Security (WU ds. BP) in
Gdańsk. It was assisted by local officers of the county branch offices for Public
Security. When the secret political police underwent the reorganization at the turn
of 1956 and 1957 and became part of the Citizens’ Militia , the “Ukrainian issue”
was to be dealt with by: Group III of Department III and Group V of Department II of the Province Headquarters of the Citizens’ Militia in Gdańsk. Their task
was to establish bureaux for security (R ds. B) called bureaux for Security Service
(R ds. SB) in the county headquarters of the Citizens’ Militia (KP MO). At the
province level the units of Department III were to fight the opposition, which in
the case of the Ukrainians meant the “protection” of the UTSK and religious sites
against the danger of “nationalism”. Pillar II kept under surveillance people associated with social and political organizations before 1945 and inhabitants of the
Gdańsk Province who maintained contacts with Ukrainian emigrants in the West,
particularly with representatives of various factions of the nationalist movement.
The formal division of the Ukrainian problem turned out to be unsuccessful – it
led to the disorganization of operational work. There were complaints about a lack
of cooperation between Departments II and III. It was underlined that “Ukrainian nationalists are prone to conducting both intelligence and nationalist activities. Thus, it is necessary to coordinate more important ventures and to exchange
compiled information”90. The problems started at the end of January 1965 when
the Ukrainian issue ceased to be of interest to the counter-intelligence91. While the
province structures of the Security Service from Gdańsk concentrated mainly on
inhabitants of the Tricity, local circles were observed by the county offices. A note
from 1962 read that “despite the fact that the Ukrainian problem has been treated
marginally for some time (since October), the general insight into the situation
can be defined as satisfactory”92. Exceptionally serious cases were dealt with by the
province structures of the Bureau for Public Security. The county branch offices
received assistance in acquiring new agents – particularly in communities with a
high percentage of former members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). On an ad hoc basis the
structures in The Gdańsk Province cooperated with units for Pubic Security in
other provinces, which often consisted in the exchange of information, and less
frequently involved common operational activities93.
90
Ibid., vol. 3, Informacja o sytuacji wśród mniejszości ukraińskiej na terenie woj. gdańskiego,
1/03/1962, k. 61.
91
Ibid, vol. 2, Plan pracy po zagadnieniu nacjonalizmu ukraińskiego i białoruskiego na okres
1/01/1965 do 3/06/1965, 15/02/1965, k. 192.
92
Ibid., vol. 3, Raport z przeprowadzonej kontroli organizacji pracy i pracy operacyjnej nad
problemem nacjonalistów ukraińskich w poszczególnych Referatach powiatowych, w Grupie V-ej
Wydziału II i w Grupie III Wydziału III, 30/04/1962, k. 55–56.
93
Ibid., Informacja o sytuacji wśród mniejszości ukraińskiej na terenie woj. gdańskiego,
1/03/1962, k. 59.
Book 3
65
From the end of the 1960s materials resulting from the complex surveillance
of the Ukrainian minority were collected within the so called problem files (cases).
For some time the structures of Department II (from May 1962)94 and Department
III (from January 1959) dealt with the matters separately95. In January 1965 Department III of the Province Headquarters of the Citizens’ Militia in Gdańsk combined
all the existing operational materials in one problem file under the code-name
“Sotnia”. It included materials from single operations: cases of operational observations (SOO)96 and operational control (SOS). The latter were used to monitor
people who were potentially dangerous to the political system, while the task of the
former unit was to confirm preliminary data about the preparation of an activity
which would negatively impact the political system. There also appeared materials
connected with operational-investigative cases which concerned the examination
of the forms of the “subversive activity” – the evidence was later passed over to
prosecutors in order to punish the offender97.
An important element of the surveillance of the Ukrainian community was
the cooperation with the administrative authorities (mainly the Social-Administrative Department and the Department for Religious Denominations of the Presidium of the Province National Council – PWRN) and the party management
(The Province Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party). In the first case
administrative workers remained to a certain extent at the disposal of the secret
political police. When the network of agents was destroyed as a result of the political thaw, information provided by people taking part in meetings of the UTSK or
committees for national minorities became much more significant. Information
transmitted orally or via formal documents made the Security Service familiar
with the organizational development of the UTSK and the current situation of the
Ukrainian community. At the same time some operational information was sent
from the Province Headquarters of the Citizens’ Militia to the administrative and
party authorities of the province. Probably they contributed to shaping the coveted social attitudes and sustained pressure on people whom the Security Service
treated with suspicion. In the instruction of March 1962 the order was given to
maintain “a systematic contact with the Province Committee of the Polish United
Workers’ Party, the Department for Social Affairs and the Department for Religious Denominations of the Presidium of the Province National Council with the
aim of transmitting current information”. The order was also given to “to ridicule
staunch Ukrainian nationalists and present them to society as worthless”98.
94
Ibid., Wniosek o zezwolenie na zarejestrowanie sprawy zagadnieniowej – bazy nacjonalizmu
ukraińskiego pod krypt. „Sotnia”, 27/05/1962, k. 7.
95
Ibid., Postanowienie o założeniu teczki zagadnieniowej, 26/01/1959, k. 6.
96
Until 1960 this category of cases was referred to as identification – observation (SEO).
97
See more about the classification of operational cases and applied terminology in: F. Musiał,
Podręcznik bezpieki. Teoria pracy operacyjnej Służby Bezpieczeństwa w świetle wydawnictw resortowych Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych PRL (1970–1989), Kraków 2007.
98
AIPN Gd, sygn. 003/142, vol. 3, Informacja o sytuacji wśród mniejszości ukraińskiej na terenie woj. gdańskiego, 1/03/1962, k. 59.
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66
Arkadiusz Słabig
The creation of the Ukrainian Social-Cultural Society (UTSK) in Gdańsk overlapped with the end of the investigation under the code-name “Spółka III” which
was carried out by the local Department II of the Province Bureau for Public Security until June 1956. The investigation concerned ten representatives of the young
Ukrainian intelligentsia (some of them were activists of the Society), students of
higher institutions in the Tricity (Helena Walkowska, Paweł Krzemiński, Andrzej
Mentucha, Michał Kozak, Teodor Babij, Daria Kozioryńska, Katarzyna Rawlik,
Maria Proć, Bazyli Bilczuk, Barbara Zawrotiuk)99. As explained further on in the
document, these people “in their free time gathered to organize various cultural
events and parties maintaining their national rituals and traditions. No evidence
was found that would indicate the organized hostile nationalist activity of the
group. The case was closed owing to a lack of evidence”100.
Further actions of a reconnaissance nature started in September 1956 when
the local structures of the Ukrainian Society in The Gdańsk Province developed.
The magnitude of the interest in the Ukrainian organization is reflected in tasks
given to the informer “Walter Weto” (who was an administration worker participating in the creation of the Society’s structures): “Try to start a closer relationship
with [Helena – A. S.] Walkowska through whom you should find out what the situation among the members of the Ukrainian Society is like. You are to learn what
political ideas are promoted among the members of the Society and who takes an
active part in promoting them”101. “Walter Weto” was to be employed as a full-time
instructor of culture and education in the Society. “I think that if it happened, we
would have a complete picture of the Society’s activity and its tendencies” wrote
an officer of the Security Service102. Due to a lack of data, it is hard to state whether those plans were put into action. What we know is that “Walter Weto” taking
part in county “conventions” of the Ukrainian community provided the Security
Service with the names and addresses of 23 people from The Gdańsk Province
who insisted on being allowed to return to their former places of residence103. His
information corresponded with reports prepared by the county units of the security apparatus. It included general information from organizational meetings
and guidelines concerning people who joined county boards. Among the latter
there were persons kept under surveillance and people who belonged to the espionage network104. Moreover, “Walter Weto” obtained a list of delegates from The
99
Three informers were used to invigilate the group (‘Kruk’, ‘Lucyna’ and ‘Kobzar’).
AIPN Gd, sygn. 003/142, vol. 8, Pismo kpt. mgr. Z. Barlikowskiego do naczelnika Wydziału
III KW MO w Koszalinie, 25/09/1970, k. 11–12.
101
Ibid., vol. 15, Notatka służbowa, wrzesień 1956 , k. 269–270.
102
Ibid., Doniesienie „Waltera Weto”, 5/03/1957, k. 254–255.
103
Ibid., Doniesienie „Walter Weto”, 13 IX 1956 r., k. 267; Doniesienie „Waltera Weto” dotyczące
osób narodowości ukraińskiej zamieszkałej w pow. Kwidzyn, 1/10/1956, k. 262.
104
An informer ‘Roman’ joined the County Board of the UTSK in Kwidzyn; his counterpart in
Sztum was an infomer ‘Guma’.
100
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Gdańsk Province to a national convention of the Ukrainian Social-Cultural Society (UTSK) in Warsaw105.
After a few month’s break in operational work caused by the reorganization of
the security apparatus, in April 1957 the data about the Ukrainian population in
the Gdańsk Province was systematized. Guidelines sent by Department III Division III of the Ministry of Home Affairs gave the order to define the number of
units of the UTSK in the Gdańsk Province and characterize the people (mentioning also their past activities) who were members of province and county boards. It
was recommended to pay more attention to “nationalist activists” – persons who
in the past had been involved in various Ukrainian political, social and military
structures, and who had now become part of the UTSK’s authorities. The next
question to be examined was the magnitude of the phenomenon of the Ukrainians’ returning to their former place of residence. It was necessary to estimate the
number of legal and illegal returns to southeastern areas. Finally, it was ordered to
present all operational questions concerning the Ukrainian minority106. Following
the guidelines of the “headquarters”, similar instructions were sent to county units
of the Security Service. “As in the area supervised by you there exists a problem
of Ukrainian nationalism I ask you to take an interest in the activity of the legal
Ukrainian Social-Cultural Society among the members of whom there appear tendencies to conduct a hostile policy towards the People’s Republic of Poland. We
want you to discern the forms of their activity, what the Ukrainians’ reaction to the
establishment of the UKSK was, and who is actively involved in the activity” wrote
the head of Department III of the Province Headquarters of the Citizens’ Militia
in Gdańsk107.
In the light of the information from subsequent months we know that the
control of Gdańsk’s UTSK was given priority and mostly workers from the Social-Administrative Department of the Presidium of the National Council of the
Province (WSA PWRN) were involved. Supervising the Society’s activity, they
transmitted information concerning changes in the composition of the Province
Board, its sessions and celebrations to the Security Service. They also provided the
Security Service with the personal data concerning students involved in the activity of the City Circle of the Society and cultural-educational instructors. The data
was complemented by information provided by an agent in the Province Board
(“Jaś”), an agent who maintained social contacts with the members of the Province
Board (“Helbruk”) and an agent connected with them religiously (“Wrzos”)108. If
105
AIPN Gd, sygn. 003/142, t. 15, Notatka służbowa, 12 IX 1956 r., k. 280–281; Spis delegatów
na Zjazd Towarzystwa Ukraińskiego w Warszawie z terenu województwa gdańskiego, 12/09/1956,
k. 282.
106
Ibid., Notatka służbowa, 17 /04/1957, k. 243–244.
107
Ibid., Pismo naczelnika Wydziału III KW MO w Gdańsku do zastępców komendantów
powiatowych MO ds. Bezpieczeństwa w Nowym Dworze Gdańskim, Sztumie, Kwidzynie, Elblągu
i Lęborku, 3/04/1957, k. 249.
108
Ibid., Doniesienie agenturalne informatora „Walter Weto”, 7/06/1957, k. 232–233; Notatka
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Arkadiusz Słabig
the activity of Gdańsk’s activists went beyond the borders of The Gdańsk Province,
information was obtained from other units of the Security Service109.
Operational actions intensified during the preparations for national UTSK
conventions. It was necessary to find out about the composition of delegates from
a given province, the elimination of unwanted participants, the introduction of
agents and the scope of the subject matter of sessions. According to a note from
October 1959, 70 representatives of the Ukrainian minority from the Gdańsk
Province participated in a pre-convention conference of the province branch of
the UTSK. In the group there were the informers “Romko”, “Jaś” and “Czarny” who
was elected delegate for the Second National Convention of the Ukrainian SocialCultural Society110. A list of other representatives who should not participate in
the convention according to officers of the Gdańsk Security Service was issued to
Department III of Division III of the Ministry of Home Affairs. The list included
Eugeniusz Boraczuk (a person under surveillance involved in an identificationobservational case – SEO – who recently had promoted the idea of returning to
the former place of settlement and now intended to apply to the state authorities
with a series of demands), Władysław Kurawski (another person involved in a
SEO case, receiving money from the West for illegal literature of emigration) and
Andrzej Mentuch (who refused to cooperate with the Security Service)111. Several
days later when consulted about the composition of the Main Board of the Society,
the Gdańsk Security Service did not express reservations about the participation
of Helena Walkowska, Paweł Krzemiński and Jarosław Zariczny112. Similar preventive actions were undertaken in subsequent years. In the autumn of 1963 in
connection with the preparations to the Third Convention of the Society a secret
agent under the pseudonym “Czarny” provided information about the composition of the delegation113 and the most important problems to be discussed by its
members114. In June 1970 a secret agent named “Misiek” was ordered to examine
the situation within the Society in connection with the up-coming elections to the
Society’s authorities115.
The circle and boards of the UTSK did not undergo such a strict scrutiny except when its activists were involved in work at both local and province levels.
służbowa, 17/04/1957, k. 231–232; Doniesienie agenturalne informatora „Helbruk”, 2/12/1957; Notatka służbowa, 12/12/1957, k. 18.
109
Ibid., Wyciąg z doniesienia informatora ps. „Kobzar”, 19/03/1957, k. 251.
110
Ibid., Informacja o nastrojach wśród mniejszości ukraińskiej w okresie kampanii przedzjazdowej w UTSK na terenie woj. gdańskiego, 1959 r., k. 155–166.
111
Ibid., Pismo naczelnika Wydziału III KW MO w Gdańsku mjr. D. Lesińskiego do naczelnika
Wydziału III Departamentu III MSW, 20/12/1959, 152–153.
112
113
Secret collaborators ‘Roman’ and ‘Mazur’ belonged to it.
114
AIPN Gd, sygn. 003/142, t. 15, Pismo zastępcy naczelnika Wydziału III KW MO w Gdańsku
kpt. M. Pietrasa do Wydziału III Departamentu III MSW, 19/10/1963, k. 59–60.
115
Ibid., vol. 1, Notatka służbowa ze spotkania z TW ps. „Misiek” odbytego w dniu 22 VI
1970 [r.], 23/06/1970, k. 53.
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69
W. Kurawski, the “influential nationalist” mentioned above and the head of ZP
UTSK Sztum (located in Dzierzgoń), belonged to the group. In order to investigate the problem of the samizdat prints of forbidden texts sent to his address, his
correspondence was monitored. The informer “Jan” was to obtain those texts, pass
them to the Security Service, establish their source of origin, and check “whether
the forbidden literature is read and discussed among the members [...] of the Society”116. In November 1960 during the preparations for an election campaign to the
authorities of the Society, the head of Department III of the Province Headquarters of the Citizens’ Militia in Gdańsk wrote in a letter to county branches of the
Security Service: “From our observations it can be said that the Ukrainian nationalists are attempting to spread nationalist propaganda via the election campaign,
and are trying to become members of the newly elected UTSK boards. Thus, with
deference to the order from the Head of Department III of the Ministry of Home
Affairs we request to protect the flow of information concerning the election campaign in the supervised area and to pass information about forms of nationalist
activity in special reports to Department III of the local headquarters”117.
Nevertheless, according to a note from 1962, officers of the county branches
still tended to ignore the Ukrainian problem. This can be proved by the fact that
they “had an insignificant number of cases and secret agents, as well as a lack of
information about hostile activists’ conduct in the entourage. The unsatisfactory
condition of the network reduces the possibility of a broader flow of information
and has a negative impact on our operational interest” explained representatives
of the Inspectorate of the Security Service of the Province Headquarters of the
Citizens’ Militia in Gdańsk. An order was issued to recruit new secret agents [TW]
“who had conditions to inform us about the attitude and conduct of young Ukrainians from the circles of the UTSK. At the same time it should be examined whether
the youth is not influenced by members of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army”. The latter were considered to be prone to “reactivating hostilities towards the People’s Republic of Poland”. It was decided that “units of the Security Service should monitor
such people, their conduct and intentions”118.
The dynamics of operational activities in relation to the UTSK depended to
some extent on how active the Society’s structures were. The revival of the city
circle in Gdańsk observed at the end of the 1960s prompted an energetic reaction
from the Security Service. In the mid-1970s among students in the clubroom of
116
Ibid., vol. 15, Pismo zastępcy komendanta powiatowego MO ds. bezpieczeństwa w Sztumie
do naczelnika Wydziału III KW MO w Gdańsku, 7/02/1958, k. 184.
117
Ibid., Pismo naczelnika Wydziału III KW MO w Gdańsku D. Lesińskiego do zastępców
komendantów powiatowych MO ds. bezpieczeństwa, 18/11/1960, k. 141; Meldunek specjalny,
25/11/1960, k. 138–139; Wykaz miejscowości województwa gdańskiego, w których odbędą się zebrania sprawozdawczo-wyborcze na kołach UTSK, b. d., k. 133.
118
Ibid., Pismo naczelnika Wydziału III KW MO w Gdańsku ppłk D. Lesińskiego do zastępców
komendantów powiatowych MO w Elblągu, Kwidzynie, Sztumie, Tczewie, Nowym Dworze Gdańskim i Wejherowie, 22/10/1962, k. 34.
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Arkadiusz Słabig
the UTSK there appeared a secret agent [TW] under the pseudonym “Misiek”, who
“informs us [...] that he has already settled in at the clubroom of the UTSK, has
made many new acquaintances and is now ready to start examining the activity
of the club and its members” stated an officer of the Security Service119. Tasks assigned to the agents show that the Security Service incessantly searched for some
evidence to compromise Society activists. It could be used for repressive purposes
such as a purge in the organization or the closure of the clubroom. There was probably a plan to plant a wire tap in the clubroom. After a few months “Misiek” was
told to “find out whether there have been any complaints from neighbours about
the noise, hooligan behavior or drinking alcohol in the clubroom of the UTSK;
whether there is somebody else who uses the clubroom and who has the keys to
it”120. At the same time the secret agent [TW] under the pseudonym “Koral” was
told to make an impression of the key to the clubroom. The secretary of the circle
was also put under surveillance. “In order to check whether Lubomira Bołdys really plans to get married and move to Szczecin all the correspondence sent to her
private address and the address of the clubroom should be under surveillance”121.
The question of the Greek Catholic Church was a major element in the Security Service’s operational work. From November 1957 the branch of the Security
Service in Nowy Dwór Gdański investigated the priest B. Hrynyk122. General information about the priest’s activity was provided by agents connected with the
Orthodox clergy (“Wrzos”)123 and the UTSK (“Jaś”)124. Nevertheless, the scrutiny
was considered to be insufficient. “We do not have appropriate agents to be able to
uncover the priest’s contacts and his hostile intentions; thus, new agents should be
recruited” wrote an officer of the Security Service125. In January 1959 the case was
taken over by Department III of the Province Headquarters of the Citizens’ Militia
in Gdańsk – the case was given the operation-code name “Łemko”126. The priest
B. Hrynyk was characterized as follows: “he is known as a fervent religious fanatic
119
Ibid., vol. 1, Notatka służbowa ze spotkania z TW ps. „Misiek” odbytego w dniu 22 VI 1970
[r.], 23/06/1970, k. 53.
120
Ibid., Notatka służbowa z odbytego spotkania z TW ps. „Misiek” w dniu 27 XI 1970 [r.],
28/11/1970, k. 86.
121
Ibid., Notatka służbowa z odbytego spotkania z TW ps. „Koral” w dniu 26 XI 1970 [r.],
27/11/1970, k. 84; Notatka służbowa z odbytego spotkania z TW ps. „Misiek” w dniu 27 XI 1970 [r.],
28/11/1970, k. 86.
122
See more about the priest’s earlier fate, his involvement in the operation ‘C-1’ and his being
arrested in: I. Hałagida, „SzpiegWatykanu”.
123
AIPN Gd, sygn. 003/142, vol. 15, Wyciąg z doniesienia informatora „Wrzos” z dn. 7 VI 1957 r.,
k. 235.
124
“During Hrynyk’s visits try to win his trust and identify his real role in the region. Continue
to maintain friendly relationships with Tychowski [a parish activist – A. S.], through whom we will
be able to identify Hrynyk’s contacts in Tricity” [transl. A. C.], ibid., t. 13, Doniesienie (ustne) informatora „Jaś”, 3/05/1958, k. 220).
125
Ibid., vol. 1 11, Raport o zezwolenie na opracowanie wytypowanego kandydata na werbunek
po zagadnieniu nacjonalizmu ukraińskiego, 23/09/1958, 217.
126
I. Hałagida, „Szpieg Watykanu”, pp. 201–203, 207.
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71
who runs nationalist campaigns under the cover of religious activity. He maintains
contacts with centres in the Federal Republic of Germany, England, France and
the USA from where letters, parcels and dollars are sent to his address. Materials
collected by us show that he uses sermons and direct contacts with believers to destroy the UTSK describing it as a communist organization. In the last few years he
has criticized the state’s resolutions stirring up mass fear and insecurity among the
Ukrainians (information of 14 February and 21 March 1960). As far as religious
matters were concerned (following the guidelines from the Vatican) the priest is
running a propaganda campaign against the Orthodox Church. Whenever he can
– during sermons and at private meetings – he warns believers against adopting
the Orthodox religion and threatens them. To maintain old traditions he tries to
organize new religious sites and convince the Ukrainians, especially the Lemkos,
to convert to the Greek-Catholic religion”127. The Security Service was increasingly
concerned about the gradual improvement of the relations between the priest and
the UTSK, which was reflected in the organization of Christmas meetings and
private teaching of religion in flats of the UTSK’s members128. It was decided to
introduce a series of “preventive” measures not to allow the priest B. Hrynyk to
become more influential in the Ukrainian entourage. Through the Department
for Religious Denominations, the Presidium of the National Council of the Province (PWRN) warned the priest about the consequences of his actions. At the
same time they tried to discourage secular activists from any cooperation with the
priest. There were also unsuccessful attempts to collect materials compromising
the priest, which would have led to the curtailment of his religious activity and
his being sent to a monastery. However, the priest was very cautious, and gave the
authorities no grounds for undertaking more drastic repressive measures against
him. As a result, the case under the code-name “Łemko” was increasingly neglected and passed over to other structures of the Security Service – first to Department
IV of the Province Headquarters of the Citizens’ Militia (the religious pillar of the
Security Service), and later to another unit (R ds. B) in Nowy Dwór Gdański. It was
probably closed in 1968129.
As mentioned earlier, until the mid-1960s the Ukrainian minority was also
the target of surveillance by the counter-intelligence (Group V of Department
II of the Province Headquarters of the Citizens’ Militia in Gdańsk). However, it
was not a priority issue. More attention was given to the surveillance of people of
Belorussian and Lithuanian origin who were much more actively involved with
the German authorities. It was not until the end of May 1962 that the Ukrainian
127
AIPN Gd, sygn. 003/142, vol. 3, Informacja o sytuacji wśród mniejszości ukraińskiej na terenie woj. gdańskiego, 1/03/1962, k. 60–61.
128
Private classes of religion were organized in Ostaszewo in the house of Jarosław Zariczny,
the secretary of the local PGRN and a member of ZW UTSK. When it was revealed, Zariczny was
dismissed from administrative work.
129
I. Hałagida, „Szpieg Watykanu”, p. 207–209.
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72
Arkadiusz Słabig
problem was given its own separate case file130. During an inspection carried out in
November 1962 by representatives of Division V Department II of the Ministry of
Home Affairs, subordinates from Gdańsk were told to “work more intensively on
the Ukrainian case, which has been neglected so far by Group V”131.
At the turn of the 1950s and 1960s the Gdańsk structures of counter-intelligence examined contacts between the local Ukrainians with representatives of
the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHWR) from Cleveland (the USA).
As part of the operation case under the code-name “Wola” Piotr Dorosz from
Kwidzyn, a former member of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), was kept under surveillance. He corresponded with Jan Olijar, an emigrant activist, to whom
he passed information about former members of the underground. Olijar sent
them parcels with food and other products. The Security Service searched Dorosz’s
flat in March 1960 and found there 29 foreign addresses and 78 Polish contacts
which were checked. No evidence was found to prove Dorosz’s involvement in
espionage activities or in any other tasks for the emigration centre. A decision was
taken to plant a bug and bring into the case a secret agent under the pseudonym
“Stach”. As the surveillance brought no effects and it was impossible to punish
Dorosz, the case was closed with “preventive-explanatory talks conducted with
some intervals”, which was to create an impression among the Ukrainians that
Dorosz cooperated with the Security Service132. In 1962 Dimitri Struś from Cleveland visited the Ukrainian community in Elbląg. The Security Service carried out
a secret body search, which showed that Struś had several addresses of former
members of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Poland whom he was to contact at
the command of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHWR)133. His visit
had also a personal character, which was noted by the secret political police. Like
many other emigrants, D. Struś looked for a wife in the Ukrainian community in
Poland134. From the point of view of Security Service officers, marriages concluded
between citizens of the People’s Republic of Poland and foreigners entailed the
130
In the justification document it read:” Having considered the materials concerning the question of Ukrainian nationalism, I declare that the area is inhabited by quite a few people who in
the times of the bourgeois Ukraine worked in the bodies of the capitalist oppression. During the
Nazi occupation they cooperated with the occupying forces. They moved to the Regained Lands to
avoid punishment. At present they are involved in nationalist activity against the People’s Republic
of Poland and the Soviet Union. They also maintain correspondence with activists of the Ukrainian
emigration in West Germany, England, the USA and Austria, which are connected with the counter-intelligence” (AIPN Gd, sygn. 003/142, vol. 3, Wniosek o zezwolenie na zarejestrowanie sprawy
zagadnieniowej – bazy nacjonalizmu ukraińskiego pod krypt. „Sotnia”, 27/05/1962, k. 7).
131
The excuse were inadequate office space and problems with the personnel. (ibid., t. 3, Raport
z analizy pracy operacyjnej Grupy V Wydziału II SB w Gdańsku, 18/12/1962, k. 23).
132
Ibid., Kontrwywiadowcza charakterystyka po zagadnieniu bazy nacjonalistyczno-ukraińskiej
województwa gdańskiego, 27/05/1962, k. 77–78.
133
Ibid., vol. 2, Analiza zagadnienia nacjonalizmu ukraińskiego na terenie województwa gdańskiego, 2/08/1970, k. 46.
134
It was facilitated by matrimonial announcements in Nasze Słowo.
Book 3
73
danger of Poland being infiltrated by foreign intelligence services. Paradoxically,
such marriages also made it possible to keep an eye on immigrants abroad135. It is
proved by the case of Anna P., an inhabitant of the Tricity, whose brother-in-law
was an activist of the Ukrainian National Associations in the USA. Anna P. attracted the interest of the counter-intelligence when a relative promised to invite
her to the USA and help her to find a husband. “As it often happens that on such
a pretext Ukrainian nationalists come to Poland and under such cover they run
their espionage activities [– explained the head of Division V Department II of the
Ministry of Home Affairs – A. S.] we ask to examine Anna P. and define the possibilities of her recruitment, which would allow us to monitor the activity of her
brother-in-law or send her abroad as our agent”136. There is no information how
the preparations ended, but it should be noted that contacts made by mail were
sometimes an unpleasant experience for Polish Ukrainians. It sometimes turned
out that a candidate for a husband had a complicated family situation, was not very
attractive physically or did not have money to pay for the wedding137.
Contacts with the Ukrainian émigrés led to the second stage in the surveillance of Andrzej Mentuch and Helena Walkowska – distinguished activists of the
Gdańsk UTSK. The former was investigated in the years 1958–1959 when he under consideration to be recruited for cooperation. As a secret collaborator [TW]
he was to be “employed to monitor Ukrainian students” in the Tricity and, moreover, to conduct operations with the Ukrainians in the West. The Security Service
was familiar that Mentuch received material help from emigrants138 and that he
planned to study in France. In December 1959 the Security Service’s plans were
thwarted by Mentuch’s refusal to cooperate with them139. A year later the surveillance of H. Walkowska commenced. She maintained contacts with Walery Fedortiuk (Fiedorczuk), an inhabitant of Sweden, who as an officer on trade ships often
arrived at Polish harbours. The Security Service suspected him of cooperation with
the Swedish counter-intelligence and Ukrainian nationalist organizations (mainly
the OUNz – Zakordonni Czastyny OUN – foreign branches of the Organization of
Ukrainian Nationalists). The KGB joined the operation140. There were plans to bug
135
AIPN Gd, sygn. 003/142, vol. 12, Raport o zezwolenie na przeprowadzenie rozmowy z Anną
P., 27/12/1961, k. 332.
136
Ibid., Pismo zastępcy naczelnika Wydziału V Departamentu II MSW mjr. Szyszkowskiego do
naczelnika Wydziału II SB KW MO w Gdańsku, 2/08/1961, k. 405.
137
Ibid., Raport z przeprowadzonej rozmowy z P. Anną zamieszkałą w Gdańsku przy ul. Partyzantów, 12/12/1962, k. 394–396.
138
It concerned mainly Dr. Ołeks Horbacz invigilated by the Security Service in the case under
the code-name ‘Saturn’.
139
AIPN Gd, sygn. 003/142, t. 8, Notatka służbowa na podstawie akt sprawy agenturalnego
sprawdzenia „Spółka III” nr archiwalny Z-352 (styczeń 1959 r.); Pismo naczelnika Wydziału V Departamentu II MSW do naczelnika Wydziału II KW MO w Gdańsku, 5/05/1959, k. 117; Pismo kpt.
mgr. Z Barlikowskiego do naczelnika WIII KW MO w Koszalinie, 25/09/1970, k. 12.
140
“Soviet comrades” advised that H. Walkowska should be recruited and used for the case of
W. Fedortiuk (Fiedorczuk) and MichałNiedźwiecki who was connected with the OUN Melnyk fac-
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Arkadiusz Słabig
H. Walkowska’s flat and organize there a meeting of W. Fedortiuk with his relative
used by the Soviet special services as agent “Denisiuk”141. Probably in 1966 the
surveillance of Walkowska was abandoned.
At the turn of the 1950s and 1960s the Ukrainians who had settled in Gdańsk
Pomerania before 1945 once again became the centre of interest for the Security
Service142. They were mostly former students of Gdańsk Polytechnic (Technische
Hochschule Danzig), who belonged the organization “Osnowa”143 which constituted
the recruitment base of the Ukrainian Military Organization (Ukrajinska Wijśkowa
Orhanizacija)144. Former members of the Ukrainian National Union (Ukrajinśkie
Nacjonalne Objednannia)145 were also under surveillance by the Security Service. They were characterized in the following way: “They are still convinced that
the Ukrainian nation will regain its ‘freedom’, and that the present circumstances
should be used to educate the Ukrainians and to get rid of their ignorance. At the
moment they are not involved in any hostile activity, but they are waiting and resisting the assimilation which is taking place among the Ukrainian population in
our area”. Most representatives of the group fell victim to Soviet repression after the
war. In addition, the special services of the Second Polish Republic had prepared
evidence incriminating them, which was now at the disposal of the communist
authorities. Thus, measures undertaken by the Security Service (first Group V Department II, later Group III Department III of the Province Headquarters of the
Citizens’ Militia in Gdańsk) had a preventive-explanatory character and their aim
tion. They probably met in their former places of residence – Kremenets [Pol. Krzemieniec] and
Rovno [Pol. Równo] in Volyn (AIPN Gd, sygn. 003/142, vol. 9, Notatka, 25/04/1960, k. 55).
141
Ibid., Notatka służbowa dotycząca Walkowskiej Heleny, opracowana na podstawie materiałów zawartych w sprawie agenturalnego sprawdzenia prowadzonej do 1962 r. przez Grupę IX Wydziału II w Gdańsku, 29/10/1963 r., k. 11; Tłum[aczenie] z rosyjskiego nr ODD 6/209/64, k. 100;
Pismo ppłk. J. Adamczyka naczelnika Wydziału III KW MO w Opolu do naczelnika Wydziału III
Departamentu III MSW, 29/10/1966, k. 170–171.
142
In 1924 in the Free City of Gdańsk the permanent residence of 200 Ukrainians was recorded (P. Fedusio, Ukraińcy w Wolnym Mieście Gdańsku (1920–1939), [in:] Między Odrą a Dnieprem,
p. 138). Supposedly, the first stage of the invigilation of their entourage by the Security Service took
place in the years 1949–1954.
143
Ukrainian young people who decided to study in Gdańsk were referred to as “Danzigers”
– the term comes from the name of the city at that time – Danzig. In the academic years 1922/1923 as
many as 105 Ukrainians went to Danzig to study from Eastern Galicia. Their decision was influenced
by the fact the Ukrainians boycotted Polish higher institutions; moreover, it was easy to get a passport, and the costs of living and university fees were relatively inexpensive in Danzig (from 1924).
The majority (according to the data of 1933 from 75–87.5%) belonged to the organization ‘Osnowa’
(see more in: E. Wiszka, „Dancigerzy” – działalność ukraińskich organizacji studenckich na Politechnice Gdańskiej w latach 1922–1933, Rocznik Gdański, t. 60: 2000, z. 1, pp. 63–69).
144
In 1932 the Ukrainian Military Organization (Ukraijinska Wijśkowa Orhanizacija –UWO)
was incorporated into the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (P. Fedusio, op.cit., p. 143).
145
It was an organization established in Germany in 1933 which represented the local Ukrainian
community. According to the information collected by the Security Service, the Ukrainian Committee in Gdynia set up during the war was supervised by the organization. In 1957 the presence of 11
people connected with it was recorded in Tricity.
Book 3
75
was: to complete the data about pre-war Ukrainian organizations, to extend the
network of agents and to discourage selected people from undertaking any “hostile
activity”, which was tantamount to not being involved in the life of the UTSK and
Greek-Catholic churches. Briefly speaking, the “omniscience” of the security apparatus was manifested once again, which is confirmed by a conversation with one of
former members of “Osnowa”. “It can be said that the conversation was necessary
[– as it was concluded in the résumé – A. S.] because the suspicions were clarified,
and on the other hand he was informed that the Security Service was interested in
the case and warned against the possible consequences of restarting any activity.
Now, we can be sure that ‘S’ will isolate himself completely from former nationalist
activists and when contacted by them he will pass all information to us, since at
his age he wants to live in peace, which he strongly emphasized”146. The meeting
was an introduction to talks conducted in January 1961 with Aleksander Zhorlakiewicz147, who was also kept under surveillance. During the talks “the scope
of activity undertaken by the Ukrainian nationalist organization prior to the war
and during the occupation was explained; information about connections with
the Germans was provided; and the list of former Ukrainian nationalist activists
presently inhabiting our area in West Germany was updated”148. A. Zhorlakiewicz
himself was kept under surveillance by the Security Service for some time in the
1970s owing to his eventful past and contacts with members of the UTSK.
The socio-cultural or religious activity and contacts with foreigners were not
the only reasons for the surveillance of the Ukrainian minority. Another factor
independent of the Ukrainians but affecting the intensity of their surveillance were
turning points in national and international politics. In the 1960s the reactions of
some social and ethnic groups to the tension caused by the construction of the
Berlin Wall and the Cuban missile crisis were examined149. However, in case of
the Ukrainians from the Gdańsk Province, reactions to the events of March 1968
deserve special attention. From a confidential source it was known that “recently
after the events in Warsaw and Gdańsk there is unrest among the displaced within
the context of operation ‘W’ in the county of Nowy Dwór Gdański. In bigger communities such as in Marzęcin people believe that war is imminent, and that preparations are being made to liquidate the [Ukrainian – A. S.] minority”. The fears
146
AIPN Gd, sygn. 003/142, t. 11, Notatka służbowa, 9/12/1960, k. 284–286.
In the 1930s Aleksander Zhorlakiewicz was one of the leaders of the Gdańsk branch of
OWU-OUN. The General Commissioner of the Republic of Poland insisted on arresting A. Zhorlakiewicz and his co-workers and passing them over to the Polish authorities owing to their anti-Polish sabotage and intelligence activity, but his efforts came to nothing (P. Fedusio, op.cit., p. 143–158).
In the years 1946–1957 Zhorlakiewicz was imprisoned in the Soviet Union.
148
AIPN Gd, sygn. 003/142, t. 11, Plan rozmowy operacyjnej z kandydatem na werbunek inżynierem S. Jarosławem, 26 II 1960 r., k. 281–283; Aktualizacja charakterystyki kontrwywiadowczej po
zagadnieniu nacjonalizmu ukraińskiego, 9/03/1961, k. 101.
149
See more in: J. Syrnyk, Kryzysy polityczne w Polsce od lat 60. do początku lat 70. XX w. a ludność ukraińska, [in:] Wokół Marca ’68 na Dolnym Śląsku, red. J. Hytrek-Hryciuk, W. Trębacz, Wrocław 2008, p. 127.
147
Book 3
76
Arkadiusz Słabig
made six people travel to the consulate of the USSR in Gdańsk to find out about the
possibility of emigrating to the Soviet Union150. Apart from a real fear for the future, there was another argument – the desire to improve their material situation.
A “Sambor” used as the so-called civil assistance (PO) explained to an officer of
the Security Service that in Soviet Ukraine his pension would amount to 98 rubles
instead of 1471 Polish zlotys, which together with land allotment would improve
his standard of living three-fold. The whole older generation of the Ukrainians
were to express a similar view151.
A characteristic element of the authorities’ policy during the period of the socalled small stabilization were show trials, the aim of which was to discipline society and fight attitudes frowned upon by the team of Władysław Gomułka. In the
case of the Ukrainian minority, any attempts to break the information blockade
which was to protect the USSR and satellite states were persecuted. There were attempts to eliminate the uncontrolled information leak reflecting the policy of the
communists towards the Ukrainians. In July 1965 the Security Service obtained
information about an intriguing meeting in Elbląg in Leon Horak’s flat. One of
the guests was Stefan Pawliszcze who, having returned from his studies in Kiev,
decided to present materials prepared by Ukrainian dissidents to a group of trustworthy persons. The participants of the meeting decided to copy and distribute the
acquired samizdat prints, which resulted in a counter-operation by the Security
Service in Gdańsk, which launched an operational-investigative case under the
code-name “Skoroszyt”. The aim was to “recognize and document the nationalist
activity of Stefan Pawliszcze and others”. At the end of August 1965 the abovementioned were detained and all the samizdat prints and their copies were requisitioned. L. Horak and S. Pawliszcze admitted to having transported the illegal
materials and their copying, but they denied the anti-Soviet character of the samizdat prints. Soon afterwards an expert from the Province Office for the Scrutiny
of Publications and Performances issued a negative verdict, which corresponded
with the intentions of the Security Service. However, the guidelines provided by
representatives of the KGB USSR which arrived in December 1965 played a key
role. “Soviet comrades” suspected that S. Pawliszcze , having contacted other suspects of the case under the code-name “88”, had created an illegal channel for
the conveyance of propaganda materials to the West. The information meant that
L. Horak and S. Pawliszcze were arrested and accused by the Province Prosecutor.
They were charged with “the distribution of materials which could be pernicious
to the interests of the Polish state” (a risk of loosening the alliance between the
People’s Republic of Poland and the USSR) and were sentenced to three years in
150
151
AIPN Gd, sygn. 003/142, t. 3, Notatka służbowa, 6/04/1968, k. 40.
Ibid., Notatka służbowa ze spotkania z pomocą obywatelską (PO) ps. „Sambor”, 7/04/1970,
k. 46.
Book 3
77
prison. The case, like the repressions of a similar nature, received a lot of publicity
in the Ukrainian community in Poland152.
In 1970 the province and county units of the Security Service were obliged to
organize operations in relation to the Ukrainian minority. Their specific feature
were synthetic descriptions of the whole Ukrainian community (or “suspected individuals”) prepared on the basis of the results of quasi-sociological survey analyses. According to the survey of August 1970, in the Gdańsk Province there lived
460 former members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, the Ukrainian
Insurgent Army, Special Services “Galizien” and other nationalist organizations
functioning since 1945. Special interest was focused on 230 persons of Ukrainian
nationality, who – according to officers of the Security Service – were somehow
engaged in some “nationalist activity”, or could have become involved it owing
to their past, current political standpoint or contacts. Taking into consideration
the structure of the employment, the group included: 50% farmers, 15% physical
workers, 10% office workers, 20% pensioners and only 5% members of the intelligentsia and people with higher education. Only 7% of them belonged to political
parties (the Polish United Workers’ Party, the United People’s Party and the Democratic Party), but as many as 205 were involved in social activities. More than a half
(120) had been connected with the underground or nationalists organizations in
the past. It was pointed out that the Ukrainian minority did not undergo assimilation and was not prone to changing their political convictions. As a result, a lack
of data about the sign of their nationalist activity should be interpreted as a proof
of “insufficient infiltration and operational surveillance of the community, its personal and correspondence contacts with Ukrainians from capitalist countries, the
USSR and People’s Republics”. It was indicated that the fact of failing to monitor a
relatively large group of former members of the underground and nationalist activists (with their families) “creates an opportunity [for them – A. S.] to undertake
an activity pernicious to the People’s Republic of Poland”153. Further omissions in
operational work, particularly a lack of protection for agents, were to entail the inability to “paralyze hostile intentions, to prevent actions and to obtain evidence”. It
was planned to extend the information network in all bigger centres inhabited by
the Ukrainians with the aim of further observation of the community, the surveillance of the youth whose parents had been involved in nationalist activities until
152
I. Hałagida, Rozprawa z szestydesatnikamy – wątek Polski. Przyczynek do działań komunistycznych organów bezpieczeństwa wobec mniejszości ukraińskiej w Polsce oraz współpracy SB i KGB, [in:]
Służby Bezpieczeństwa Polski i Czechosłowacji wobec Ukraińców, red. G. Motyka, Warszawa 2005,
pp. 250–255.
153
It was suggested that the magnitude of the invigilation of the ‘nationalist element’ was too
small in some counties. For example, in the county of Sztum “merely” 26 out of 1500 Ukrainians
were kept under surveillance (the number included former members of the UPA); in the county of
Kwidzyn 12 out of around 700, while in the county of Nowy Dwór o 13 out of 600 (AIPN Gd, sygn.
003/142, t. 2, Analiza zagadnienia nacjonalizmu ukraińskiego na terenie województwa gdańskiego,
21 VIII 1970 r., k. 50).
Book 3
78
Arkadiusz Słabig
1945, the monitoring of trips to the West, the disclosure of “nationalist activists
and people prone to taking up a hostile nationalist activity”, and finally the examination of the connections of local “nationalists” with emigration centres in order
to take over “communication channels” between emigrants and the Ukrainians in
Poland and the USSR154.
On the basis of the information obtained there was an intention to carry out a
selection which would make it easy to pick out the following people: those prone
to nationalist activity, those who had been engaged in nationalist movements, persons who owing to their social or professional positions could constitute an “object
of interest” for emigration centres, and people revealing their nationalist opinions and maintaining correspondence contacts with the Ukrainian diaspora. The
Ukrainians leaving Poland for countries where nationalist centres were located
were warned not to take “materials with hostile content and not to provide information which could harm the interests of the People’s Republic of Poland”. At the
same time, people returning from the West were sounded out and told to provide
information about established contacts and “methods by which political centres influenced the Ukrainian minority”. Those who were suspected of cooperation with
émigré organizations had their correspondence monitored for a short time, which
was to help to check the real character of their connections. Moreover, Ukrainian
foreigners, particularly those arriving in sites with military and strategic complexes or those who visited families involved before in nationalist activities, were kept
under surveillance155. One of the operational elements was the evaluation of people
on the basis of a survey with 32 points, which took into account their education,
address, profession, income, the place of residence during WWII, the membership
in organizations, criminal record, contacts abroad and at home, warning talks, the
distribution of literature, transmitting materials to emigration centres, listening to
hostile broadcasting stations, current hostile activity, any surveillance in the past,
operational work, preventive talks, the restriction of their influence on the community and the present conduct. On the basis of the survey’s results the decision
was made whether it was necessary to continue operational control (most often
with the so-called identification questionnaire156) or to renounce it157.
It is quite difficult to identify the network of agents after 1956. Probably in
the years 1956–1957 its size was reduced, which resulted from the fact that many
people decided to interrupt the cooperation with the Security Service. In 1959
the extension of the information network in the UTSK and youth organizations
was launched. Apart from informers/secret agents, people belonging to the Polish
154
Ibid., k. 52
Ibid.
156
People prone to undertaking a hostile activity were prophylactically monitored through identification questionnaires, as it had been with identification-observation cases and cases of operational observation conducted in previous years.
157
AIPN Gd, sygn. 003/142, vol. 8, Ankieta, k. 9
155
Book 3
79
United Workers’ Party158 started to play an increasingly important role which – in
connection with the formal prohibition to recruit members of the party – resulted
in categorizing them as the so called confidential contacts and the citizens’ assistance. This kind of agent network very often was not recorded in lists of informers. According to the data of April 1962, Departments II and III of the Province
Headquarters of the Citizens’ Militia in Gdańsk and county branches of offices
for security used 16 secret informers – TW (and probably a few confidential and
official contacts) in relation to the “Ukrainian problem159. Eight years later three
secret informers TW were at the disposal of Department III of the Province Headquarters of the Citizens’ Militia, and eight secret informers cooperated with county
offices (office branches for security: Elblag 3, Lębork 3, Kwidzyn 1 and Nowy Dwór
Gdański 1)160. In the documents from the years 1956–1970 there appear informers/
secret agents under the following pseudonyms: “Adam”, “Bałtyk”, “Butelka”, “Don”,
“Gafka”, “Guma”, “Helbruk”, “Heniuś” (later known as “Koral”), “Jagoda”, “Jan”,
“Jaś”, “Kobzar”, “Kowalksi”, “Kruk”, “Leon”, “Lewandowicz”, “Lucyna”, “Mazur”,
“Michalski”, “Misiek”, “Olsza”, “Roman”, “Romko”, “Stach”, “Stasiak”, “Skowronek”,
“Tadeusz”, “Technik”, “Walter Weto”, “Włodzimerz”, “Wróblewski”, “Wrzos”, “Zapolski”. The list includes also confidential contacts (“Czarny”, “Wysoki” and “KP”),
official contacts (“Orysia”) and the citizens’ Assistance (“Sambor”). As far as older
agents – recruited before “the October turning point”– were concerned, the main
factors which made them cooperate with the Security Service were compromising materials at the disposal of the authorities, financial motives and a sense of
loyalty.
The last motive was to play a decisive role in one of the recruitments in 1959.
A preliminary operational talk with a potential informer was to check his usefulness for operational work. The meeting started with a general discussion concerning
the situation in his workplace (the protection of confidential information, opinions
expressed by his subordinates). In this way a “degree of honesty and willingness to
provide information was checked”. Next, the discussion skillfully centered around
problems in Poland. “At the right moment the conversation should touch upon the
political situation in our country, particularly changes taking place after the October events [recommended an officer of the Security Service in Gdańsk – A. S.]. You
should tackle the problem of ethnic minorities, including the Ukrainian population, the Resolution and Directive of the Party and the Government – and how they
were enforced in everyday life. The question of socio-cultural work in the UTSK
– losses and achievements – the participation of the youth and the elderly, the signs
158
Former members of the Ukrainian underground were not admitted to the Polish United
Workers’ Party.
159
AIPN Gd, sygn. 003/142, vol. 3, Raport z przeprowadzonej kontroli organizacji pracy i pracy
w Grupie V-ej Wydziału II i w Grupie III Wydziału III, 30/04/1962, k. 52–54.
160
Ibid., vol. 2, Analiza zagadnienia nacjonalizmu ukraińskiego na terenie województwa gdańskiego, 21/03/1970, k. 50.
Book 3
80
Arkadiusz Słabig
of the nationalist tendencies should be addressed. It should be underlined that we
are not interested in the socio-cultural activity as such, but the signs of hostile activity under cover of both Ukrainian and Polish nationalist elements which paralyze
the activity”. Finally, the Security Service appealed to the person’s honesty and loyalty. “I explained that in our bodies much has changed [wrote the same representative of the Security Service – A.S.]. I underlined that we are no longer interested
in insignificant matters and if we turn to him, we request him to provide only true
information concerning political offenders, and not rumours spread in his workplace. We turn to him for help since in such criminal cases the assistance of honest citizens is indispensable”161. Another manner of acquiring a secret informer (or
strengthening the existing connections) was to offer him support in case he should
have some personal problems. The secret agent “Misiek”, a student of Gdańsk Polytechnic invigilating the local circle of the UTSK, was helped to pass his end-of-term
examinations. “To contact the Head of the Department in order to help “Misiek” to
pass his exams, which would make him more connected with our institution” suggested an inspector of Department III of the Province Headquarters of the Citizens’
Militia in Gdańsk162. In relation to unmarried women, the Security Service used
so-called controlled social contacts. Material help was offered to women by men
who did not reveal their belonging to the Security Service. It is reflected in a note
from a meeting with the secretary of the circle of the UTSK in Gdańsk arranged by
a common acquaintance of both parties. It allowed the Security Service to obtain
information about the activity of the Gdańsk club of the UTSK and its representative. “Citizen B. was relaxed during our conversation as she did not know where
we work. She agreed to maintain the acquaintance giving us her telephone number
[...], asking for help to get to know in which housing cooperative waiting to get a flat
lasts the shortest time. I think that we should maintain contacts with her owing to
her considerable possibilities to obtain information necessary to us” suggested an
officer of the Security Service163.
Actions aiming at commencing the cooperation were interrupted when it
turned out that a given person had only superficial contacts with an monitored
entourage, or if he/she flatly refused to cooperate. In the latter case, if the Security Service did not have a sufficient number of levers, the refusal did not entail
any repercussions. One of the UTSK’s activists, when pestered by an officer of the
Security Service, refused to continue the conversation explaining that “he did not
commit any crime, and if we have any charges against him, we should bring the
case to court”. Moreover, quite arrogantly, he demanded the Security Service officer to reimburse the costs of his trip to Gdańsk164.
161
Ibid., Raport o wyrażenie zgody na przeprowadzenie rozmowy operacyjnej z inżynierem Kiczorowskim Mirosławem, 6/05/1959, k. 270; Notatka operacyjna, 20/05/1959, k. 272.
162
Ibid., Notatka służbowa ze spotkania z TW ps. „Misiek” odbytego w dniu 22 VI 1970 [r.],
23 June 1970, k. 53.
163
Ibid., vol. 6., Notatka służbowa, 17/12/1969, k. 24.
164
Ibid., vol. 8, Notatka służbowa dotycząca M. Andrzeja, 2/12/1959, k. 223–224.
Book 3
81
CONCLUSION
For the Ukrainians in the Gdańsk Province the years 1956–1970 were the period when they were forced to accept the irreversibility of the effects of the forced
displacement. Agreeing to stay in a new place, they accepted to participate in the
cultural activity of the
Ukrainian Social-Cultural Society (UTSK), religious life of Greek Catholic and
Orthodox churches, and they also enjoyed some material help assigned by the state.
They gradually moved to towns where the Ukrainian intelligentsia was growing.
Nevertheless, being additionally charged with the responsibility for tragic events
of the past, they were condemned to being incorporated into the mono-ethnic
Polish society. The Ukrainians maintaining contacts with their compatriots spread
all over the world also aroused suspicion. Thus, they were kept under special surveillance by the administration, party bodies and the secret political police, which
lasted until the beginnings of the 1990s.
Book 3
Elbląg
150 members of the United
People’s Party (ZSL) and the
Polish United Workers’ Party
(PZPR) – with 60% belonging
to ZSL, 1 secretary of the Basic
Party Unit (POP) Darżewo
15 members of PZPR and a few
members of ZSL, the head of the
county board of the Association
of the Rural Youth and a member
of the executive Party Committee of the Polish United Workers’
Party (PZPR), 4 engineers,
3 technicians, 1 doctor,
10 teachers, 1 priest, 3 village
leaders (sołtys), 15 cmembers of
the Gromada National Council,
8 members of the cooperative,
25 members of farmers’ clubs
2 cases including:
1 SOS “Okoń”,
(unidentified
“gatherings”),
1 SOO no. 103/60
(contacts with the
Ukrainian Supreme
Liberation Council
– UHWR)
no data
People oppressed
in the past
22 Lębork (21),
Nowa Wieś (110),
Cewice (109),
Łęczyce (70),
Łebień (65),
Wicko (51),
Sasino (25),
Choczewo (15),
Rozłazino (15)
1236
Elbląg (56),
RSA PPRN,
Żyrawieć (323),
around 2000
Nowakowo (187),
(data of the Se- Komorowo (129),
curity Service) Milejewo (97),
Zwierzno (85),
Jegłownik (78),
Tolkmicko (72),
Łęcze (71),
Markusy (67),
Gronowo (46)
Operational cases
and their type
Condition
of the network of agents
Suspects
Lębork
520 (250)
in individualgromadas
Ukrainians belonging
to political organizations
and holding public functions
R ds. B Lębork
persons
(families
in total)
R ds. B Elbląg
County
People of Ukrainian origin
Unit of the Security
Service
Table 1. The number of the Ukrainians in the Gdańsk Province and the magnitude of their invigilation by the local structures of the Security Service on
the basis of the data of April 1962
10
6
1
(“Adam”)
3
2
15
2
(“Lewandowicz”
and
“Kozłowska”)
—
Secretcollaborators
Candidates
to become
secret collaborators
4 members of the Gromada
National Council
(3 Dzierzgoń and 1 Żuławka)
600 (200)
Marzęcino (60),
Ostaszewo (50),
Drewnica (40),
Stegna (15),
Lubiszewo (5),
NDG (5),
other gromadas
about 25
a few members of the United
People’s Party (ZSL), 5 members
of the Polish United Workers’
Party (PZPR), 4 workers of
the Presidium of the County
National Council, 1 member of
the Gromada National Council
(at the same time holding the
position of the secretary of the
County Gromada National
Council), 1 teacher – the head
of a school)
700 (200)
Wandowo (200),
Gardeja 150,
Rakowiec 150,
Sadlinki 150,
Janowo 40
no data
People oppressed
in the past
Operational cases
and their type
Suspects
Service
R ds. B Sztum
Dzierzgoń (200),
Żuławka Sztumska (175),
Szropy (50),
Gosciszewo (30),
Mikołajki (20),
Stary Targ (20),
Ryjewo (20)
Sztum Podzamcze (20)
R ds. B Nowy Dwór Gdański
1500 (525)
Nowy Dwór Gdański
Kwidzyn
R ds. B Kwidzyn
persons
(families
in total)
Sztum
County
Condition
Secretcollaborators
Candidates
to become
1 SOAS “Wrzos”
(contacts with
UHWR the Ukrainian Supreme
Liberation Counci)
no
data
24
3
(“Słomski”,
“Mazur”, “Jan”)
—
1 group SOO
„Banderowcy”
(the control of
former members of
the underground),
1 SOO „Marzyciel”
(contacts with
UHWR); moreover
fragmentary observations of the priest
B. Hrynyk
no
data
no
data
3
(„Wróblewski”,
„Romko”,
„Zapolski”)
—
1 SOO „Wola”
(alleged nationalist
activity)
no
data
no
data
2
(„Skowronek”
and „Tadeusz”)
—
—
36 (12)
Gromada Wisin
(the village of Głodowo)
—
no data
no data
Service
—
no
data
no
data
no data
no data
—
no
data
no
data
no data
no data
2 SOS
(former nationalist
activists)
no
data
no
data
no data
no data
Operational cases
and their type
R ds. B
Koscierzyna
Kościerzyna
Tczew
People oppressed
in the past
Gromada Gniewino
no data
Condition
Suspects
25 families
R ds. B Wejherowo
R ds. B
Tczew
persons
(families
in total)
Wejherowo
County
Secretcollaborators
Candidates
to become
predominantly
Gdańsk-Wrzeszcz
PMRN Gdańsk (3) and PWRN
(2), The Province Prosecutor’s
Office (1), education (3 professors and 3 teachers), 8 members
of the Polish United Workers’
Party (PZPR), 46 students
(including 34 students of
Gdańsk Polytechnic)
100 – the United People’s Party
(ZSL), 88 – the Polish United
Workers’ Party (PZPR),
20 – members of the Gromada
National Council (GRN),
3 – village heads
Province and county
units of the Security
Service
Gdańsk Province
4617 (1518)
or according to other data
4900 persons (1600 families)
1 SOR, 5 SOO
15 cases (1 SOR,
4 SOS, 10 SOO)
People oppressed
in the past
1 SOS “Arka”
(suspicion of maintaining contacts
with the foreign
counter – intelligence 0, 2 cases run
by branch offices
for security)
Suspects
Operational cases
and their type
Group III
Department III
Tricity
185 (70)
Service
persons
(families
in total)
Group V
Department II
County
Condition
Secretcollaborators
Candidates
to become
7
no
data
—
1
no
data
no
data
5
3
25
no
data
16
9
Source: AIPN Gd, sygn. 003/142, vol. 3, Report from the audit of the organization of work and operational work on the problem of Ukrainian nationalists
in individual county office branches, in Group V of Department II and in Group III of Department III, 30 April 1962, k. 36–54.
ZAPISKI
HISTORYCZNE
—
VOLUME
LXXVI —
2011
BOOK 3
LIST OF AUTHORS OF BOOK 3
Konrad Bobiatyński, PhD, Historical Institute, Warsaw University, [email protected]
Michalina Broda, MA, Institute of History and Archival Research, Nicolaus Copernicus
University in Toruń, [email protected]
Arkadiusz Słabig, PhD, Institute of History and Political Studies, Pomeranian Academy
in Słupsk, [email protected]
SALE OF CURRENT AND ARCHIVED ISSUES OF THE JOURNAL
in:
Torun Scientific Society’s Office
ul. Wysoka 16
87-100 TORUŃ
tel./fax 056-622-39-41
www.tnt.torun.pl
e-mail: [email protected]

ZAPISKI HISTORYCZNE

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