Case Studies in Public Health Decision Making in Response to
Transkrypt
Case Studies in Public Health Decision Making in Response to
Wczesne wykrywanie czynników biologicznych w warunkach polowych: studia przypadków w kontekście procesu podejmowania decyzji w instytucjach zdrowia publicznego w sytuacji reagowania na przewidywane uwolnienie niebezpiecznego środka biologicznego 2014 Konferencja Epimilitaris w Rynie, Polska Suzet M. McKinney, Doktor Zdrowia Publicznego, magister Zdrowia Publicznego, Zastępca Komisarza Departamentu Zdrowia Publicznego w Chicago City of Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel Chicago Department of Public Health Commissioner Bechara Choucair, M.D. Misja i zadania BioWatch Misja − Zapewnić, utrzymywać i wspierać ciągłą możliwość monitorowania zagrożenia bioaereozolem w wybranych obszarach metropolitarnych Zadania − Wykrywanie i charakterystyka atak z użyciem broni biologicznej przeciwko miastom naszego Narodu, high value assets and special events − Zwiększyć i udoskonalić możliwość monitorowania zagrożenia bioareozolem i potencjał, jednocześnie ograniczając wydatki − Dostarczać wskazówki i wsparcie agencjom federalnym, państwowym i lokalnym w zakresie zarządzania skutkami − Zapewnienie interoperacyjności z innymi krajowymi systemami monitorowania zagrożeń bioaerozolem i Partnerstwa BioWatch Operacje polowe Operacje laboratoryjne Agencja Ochrony Środowiska Ministerstwo Obrony Operacje zdrowia publicznego Federalne Biuro Śledcze Zarządzanie w sytuacjach kryzysowycht Centra Kontroli i Prewencji Chorób Organy ochrony porządku publicznego Asystent Sekretarza ds. Gotowości i Reakcji na Incydenty Pierwsza linia reagowania Tajna Służba Stanów Zjednoczonych Właściciele obiektów Wykon awcy Laboratoria krajowe BioWatch Ćwiczenia BioWatch w Chicago Maj 2009 Opis ćwiczeń Ćwiczenia funkcjonalne – Sieć Metro w Chicago (CTA) – Scenariusz pod dachem – Skupienie się na pobieraniu próbek ze środowiska – Forward Command – Informacja publiczna/ media Scenariusz – Gęsto zaludniona przestrzeń miejska – Pozytywne wyniki wykrycia wąglika w dwóch kolektorach Opis ćwiczeń Maj 20 (22:00) – Maj 21 (04:30) – Łączne Dowodzenie na posterunku forward command – Etap I pobieranie próbek ze środowiska peronu metra Lipiec 18 (09:00 – 15:00) – Analiza laboratoryjna próbek pobranych w ramach etapu I – Zmiana harmonogramu ze względu na reakcję na grypę H1N1 w laboratorium w maju Ćwiczenia Exercise conducted overnight; shut-down of downtown subway station Four city blocks cordoned off for exercise play Unified command established Initial briefing at forward command post followed by development of an Incident Action Plan (IAP) Mock press conferences Personnel decontamination Environmental sampling Sample transport Laboratory analysis Lessons Learned After Action Report – The potentially exposed population may have been too narrowly defined – The media spokesperson communicated some inaccurate or unclear information at mock media briefings – Laboratory-specific MOUs do not exist for surge support following a BioWatch event Lessons Learned Internal evaluations/observations – Members of the unified command (UC) were hard to identify – Process for conducting coordinated criminal and epidemiological investigations was unclear – Familiarity with radio use varied amongst responders Anthrax Response Exercise Series April 2010 Exercise Overview Tabletop Exercise Opportunity to asses target capabilities associated with the response to biological threats and to improve the management of the public health response to an anthrax incident across all levels of government Target Capabilities tested – – – – – – Communication Emergency Public Safety and Security Emergency Public Information and Warning Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution Mass Prophylaxis Medical Supplies Management and Distribution Participants 130 Participants (50 agencies) Local representation − Law Enforcement (Chicago Police Department) − Fire/ Rescue (Chicago Fire Department) − Emergency Management (OEMC, CCDHSEM, DCHSEM) − Public Health (CDPH, CCDPH, DCHD) − Other: Aviation, Environment − Hospitals (MCHC, IHA) Participants State representation – – – – IL Department of Public Health IL National Guard IL Emergency Management Agency IL Environmental Protection Agency Federal representation – – – – – Office of Health Affairs Department of Homeland Security White House-Homeland Security Council US DHHS FEMA Exercise Play Facilitated Discussion Lead representatives of various departments and agencies 3 Modules progressive phases of response – Initial response actions following a positive detection – Initial response actions – Continued response to a prolonged PH emergency and recovery Lessons Learned Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution – Processes for managing and allocating resources across region should be better defined – Should consider development of a regional SNS plan for situations when multiple jurisdictions are impacted by an incident – Laboratory capacities would be quickly overwhelmed Mass Prophylaxis – Regional planning team to consider alternative distribution methods would be beneficial – POD operations plans differ across the region Lessons Learned Medical Supplies Management & Distribution – Monitoring of supply usage and stockpile levels vary across the region – Review of existing plans and consideration of regional planning concepts for supply usage monitoring would be useful Chicago-Milwaukee Regional BioWatch Exercise August 2014 Exercise Overview Multi-jurisdictional, multi-agency tabletop exercise Provided an opportunity for participants from both jurisdictions to discuss regional coordination in response to an interstate biological incident Objectives: – Explore effectiveness of notifications, maintenance of multi-agency/ multi-jurisdictional strategic coordination during a biological event – Discuss the types and frequency of critical information/intelligence exchange – Examine joint strategies and resources necessary for the rapid and effective collection, analysis, and interpretation of environmental sampling data and human/animal surveillance data Exercise Overview Core capabilities tested: – Environmental Response/Health and Safety – Intelligence and Information Sharing – Operational Communications – Operational Coordination – Planning – Public Health and Medical Services – Situational Assessment Exercise Play Facilitated discussion Included key public health and emergency management officials from neighboring jurisdictions Scenario involved a positive detection on an American holiday in a mid-size city during a summer festival attracting thousands of people from a neighboring large, urban city. The following day, 2 positive detections were made during a large fireworks display attracting millions of people in the large, urban city. Lessons Learned Operational Communications − Formalized interstate notification protocols will enhance response operations in neighboring jurisdictions Planning − Regional planning should be conducted to minimize vast differences in response to field detection of biological threats in neighboring cities. − Indoor detections create significant community and economic impacts that must be resolved Lessons Learned Operational Coordination − Regional ICS structures should be considered to enhance interstate response efforts Intelligence and Information Sharing – Protocols for efficient intelligence sharing between fusion centers and partners should be clarified between neighboring jurisdictions Environmental Response/Health and Safety − Availability of federal resources could be scarce due to requests from multiple jurisdictions Overall Findings Early-warning systems are critical in the ability to detect environmental occurrences of biologic threats Exercise examples include three different scenarios of varying size, scale and scope Some lessons learned in public health decision making were consistent across all three scenarios, despite size, scale or scope Overall Findings Most critical public health decisions are in the areas of: − Emergency Public Information and Warning − Notification of elected officials and other political leaders − Management of healthcare notification vs. public notification − Timeline for transition to all-hazard response plans − Considerations for joint criminal and epidemiological investigations − Initiation of medical countermeasure distribution − Care and management of at-risk populations @ChiPublicHealth facebook.com/ChicagoPublicHealth 312.747.9884 [email protected] www.CityofChicago.org/Health