Stepien T web - E

CONGRESSO TOMISTA INTERNAZIONALE
L’UMANESIMO CRISTIANO NEL III MILLENNIO:
PROSPETTIVA DI TOMMASO D’AQUINO
ROMA, 21-25 settembre 2003
Pontificia Accademia di San Tommaso
–
Società Internazionale Tommaso d’Aquino
New conceptions in the understanding
of man at Warsaw School of
Consequential Thomism
Rev. Dr. Tomasz Stepien
University of Cardinal Stephan Wyszynski, Warsaw (Poland)
One of the new propositions of interpreting the texts of St. Thomas and of developing his philosophy is the School of
Consequential Thomism in Warsaw. The founder of that school, M. Gogacz, believes that the texts of Aquinas contains
complete philosophical system and he proposes to study the texts of Aquinas without the support of modern
philosophical schools. The most important feature of the metaphysics of St. Thomas is the discovery of the act of
existence (ipsum esse) as a principle of the individual being. The scholars of the Warsaw school consequently place an
emphasis on the role of the act of existence in the field of metaphysics and other philosophical disciplines, including
philosophical anthropology. Two most important results of the studies on the act of existence in understanding the
human being are: a new theory of person, and the modification of the theory of creation. The new understanding of the
person is related to the new approach to the essence of man which can be described as subsistence (subsistentia). This is
made possible to formulate the new definition of person which is an individual being of intellectual subsistence
(intellectualis subsistentia individuum ens). The second presented issue concerns a new approach to the understanding of
creation. God as the subsistent act of existence creates the act of existence of an individual being but does not create
form, which is made into a real and individual being by a created act of existence in cooperation with other external
principles. Those principles are called end principles, and are related to the essence of man.
Introduction
In Poland there are some Thomistic schools which try to study
philosophical anthropology in the spirit of St. Thomas. One of them is a school
in Warsaw called “Consequential Thomism”. M. Gogacz, founder of that
school, has proposed a specific approach to the writings of St. Thomas. 1 This
new approach is an attempt to understand the texts of St. Thomas more
precisely, but it also develops certain problems, which had only been alluded to
Differences between Thomistic schools are well shown in: K. Bankowski, Tomizm
konsekwentny na tle odmian tomizmu, Studia Philosophiae Christianae, XXXII/1996 nr 2, pp.
211- 219; and also:, M. Gogacz, Wspólczesne interpretacje tomizmu, in: Znak 113, (1963),
pp.1339-1353.
1
© Copyright 2003 INSTITUTO UNIVERSITARIO VIRTUAL SANTO TOMÁS
Fundación Balmesiana – Universitat Abat Oliba CEU
T. STEPIEN, New conceptions in the understanding of man at the Warsaw School of Consequential Thomism
by St. Thomas. A very accurate reading of the texts goes hand in hand with an
effort to develop the pure thought of St. Thomas without the support of
phenomenology or other modern philosophies. In the writings of Aquinas we
can find a complete theory of being that is the basis of all parts of the
philosophical system, including philosophical anthropology. Therefore there is
the conviction at our school that attempts to better understand human nature
can be fruitful only in the light of the metaphysics of St. Thomas. The
metaphysics of St. Thomas is revolutionary because it is not a metaphysics of
essence but of existence. That is why following the path shown by Aquinas
means underlining the role of the act of existence (ipsum esse) in individual
beings. Scholars of our school consequently place an emphasis on the role of the
act of existence which leads to new conceptions in the field of philosophical
anthropology.
Orders of matters in a metaphysics of man.
In the introduction to the treatise about man in the Summa Theologica, St.
Thomas explains the proper order of problems in the metaphysics of man. The
distinction must be made between the problem of how man exists, the nature of
man and how man comes into being, and the production of man.2 M. Gogacz
called these two aspects of understanding of man a structural approach and a
hereditary approach.3 To understand human nature is to show the metaphysical
principles of the man. These principles are set in a metaphysical structure and
therefore this first aspect of the understanding of the human being was called
structural approach. The term nature used by St. Thomas means essence of man
with all accidents which are needed to operate, that is, an essence in operation.
To understand being is of course to understand its essence, but essence itself is
not a full metaphysical structure. The term proposed by M. Gogacz – structural
approach – is also a proposition to take a broader look at the human being.
Human is not only an essence or nature, but an individual being. Men do not
differ in nature and when one comprehends nature, one comprehends the
common essence of all men. The act of existence (ipsum esse) is the principle
which makes man a concrete and real individual being. The act of existence, the
first act of individual being, is for M. Gogacz the most important principle of
man. This is a full identification of the principles (principia) of man, which are:
act of existence (ipsum esse), form (forma) which is the soul (anima) and matter,
which is the body (corpus). It is worth noticing that this development of St.
Thomas’ thought is made in his spirit because probably one of the most
important features of Thomistic philosophy is that it is realistic. This means that
2
3
S.Th. I, q. 75, intr.: Et primo de natura ipsius hominis et de eius productione.
M. Gogacz, Elementarz metafizyki (Warszawa 1987), pp. 33-38.
p. 2
Congresso Tomista Internazionale
man as an individual being exists first before our cognition of human nature
and structural approach is an attempt to understand man as it is in the real
world which differs from an existence of man in our cognition.
The second aspect, called by St. Thomas a production of man, was recalled
to a hereditary approach. This change is not only a change of words but also an
attempt to show that coming into being is something more than a production.
In the modern world the term production can be understood as the composition
of a structure from previously existing elements. The metaphysical structure of
man cannot be made in this way because it is not only a physical structure. The
structure of man is a metaphysical structure of being. It must be created, not
only composed. The term hereditary approach excludes an understanding of man
only as composition of bodily organs. There is also another linguistic problem
which comes with this terminology. In Polish M. Gogacz uses term ujecie
genetyczne¸ which can be simply translated in English as genetic approach but this
term can be taken as referring to genetics which is part of biology, so we
decided to translate it as hereditary approach.
It is worth mentioning that the sequence of these two aspects of
understanding man, structural and hereditary approach, seems to be natural.
Firstly we must understand the structure of existing man, and only then we can
ask how this structure came into being. Now I would like to highlight the two
most profound new conceptions in the understanding of man developed at the
Warsaw School of Consequential Thomism, which are the consequences of the
importance of underlining the role of the act of existence in the individual
being. These new conceptions are: conception of man as a person in the
structural approach and a new understanding of creation in the hereditary
approach.
The new understanding of man as a person.
To better understand the new conception of man as a person we must
start with a more specific identification of the principles of man. The first act of
man is an act of existence (ipsum esse), which is an act to essence (essentia). This
is the first composition of act and potency in human being. Essence is composed
of form (forma) which is the soul (anima) and of matter, which is the body
(corpus), and this is a second composition of act and potency in the human
being. However we must broaden the commonly held opinion that the human
body consist only of matter. When St. Thomas talks about matter, he
understands it in the metaphysical sense, which is material potentiality. The key
to this problem is in the distinction between primary and secondary matter. The
p. 3
T. STEPIEN, New conceptions in the understanding of man at the Warsaw School of Consequential Thomism
terms primary matter and secondary matter are used by Aristotle. St. Thomas
does not use these terms because they were wrongly understood by other
medieval Aristotelians (eg. David of Dinant said that God is primary matter).
St. Thomas always uses the term matter in a metaphysical sense. In the school of
Consequent Thomism matter in the metaphysical sense is called material
potency. Secondary matter (matter in the physical sense) is described with many
terms, like proper matter (materia propria), matter as dimension (materia sub
dimensione), matter as quantity (materia sub quantitate) etc. The human body can
therefore be described as physical matter with a certain dimension and
quantity, which is in material potency. I mentioned the problem of
understanding the human body, because it is also an issue developed by P.
Milcarek, a scholar of our school in Warsaw. 4 P. Milcarek in his book about
understanding the human body in the texts of Aquinas also gives a good
introduction to the problem of person. He proposes that a human body in a
philosophical anthropology should be described in relation with a specific
approach to an essence of human being.5 The new understanding of human as a
person is also linked with an approach to human essence. There are three basic
aspects in which we can understand human essence. Human essence can be
taken as quidditas, which is the essence described in the definition of man. And
to define a man it is sufficient to show the matter only, from which genus can be
taken, and form, from which species difference (differentia specifica) can be taken.
If the quidditas is a basis of the definition so there can only be the one quidditas of
all man.6 But even in a common sense human essence is not only pure essence,
because every human being has accidents which are not included in the
definition of the man. Therefore there is a second approach to man’s essence
which is nature. Nature as we mentioned above is an essence with all accidents
taken in a common sense as the powers of human soul. St. Thomas says that
there are several definition of nature, but all of them underline form as the
principle of motion and form can be a principle of motion through its powers. 7
As we know, there is also only one nature of man, which we can call humanity.
We are not different in our humanity but each of us is an individual being, so
finally there is a third approach to human essence, which is subsistence
(subsistence). Subsistence is an essence understood with transcendental qualities
like realness, difference and unity.8 Subsistence therefore is an approach to
P. Milcarek, Teoria ciala ludzkiego w tekstach sw. Tomasza z Akwinu, (Warszawa 1994).
Ibid. 153-179.
6 De ente et essentia , II.
7 S.Th. III, q. 2, a. 1, corp.
8 The term subsistence has many meanings in the text of Aquinas. A definition of
subsistence as an approach to essence was worked out in our school. M. Gogacz, Próba
heurezy subzystencji i osoby, Studia Philosophorum Medii Aevi, t. 8, Subzystencja i osoba
wedlug sw., Tomasza z Akwinu, (Warszawa 1987) pp. 119 - 131.
4
5
p. 4
Congresso Tomista Internazionale
essence as it is in the individual human being. Individualization is the most
important feature in understanding the human being as a person. The word
individual is always present in the definition of person, because the concept of
person always refers to an individual human being.
St. Thomas accepts the classical definition of person as proposed by
Boethius (rationalis naturae individua substantia), and when he discusses the
problem of Divine Persons in Summa Theologica, he makes a great analysis of it.9
This analysis is based on the problem of individualization, because he would
like to show how one God can be three Divine Persons. In my opinion this
article shows not only that a person is an individual being of a certain
substance. It seems that Aquinas wants to tell us more, namely that a being
which has a rational nature is more individual than non intellectual beings. So
in the personal being there must be a specific reason of individualization and
the matter cannot be the only source of that individualization. The person
differs from other individuals of the same species not only in body but also in
intellect so this reason of individualization must be related to the intellect,
which has an immaterial nature. As I mentioned above the principle which
makes the essence a real and individual being is the act of existence. One of the
transcendental qualities which are the effect of the act of existence in the essence
of being is difference (aliquid). Therefore this principium which is a reason of
special individualization of the intellectual being is the act of existence related
to intellect. That is why the proper understanding of the person must be related
not only to the essence of man but also to the act of existence, and the definition
of Boethius seems to be insufficient.
We can see more clearly the unique role of the act of existence in
understanding the person with a closer look at another aspect of personal being
proposed by St. Thomas in the Summa Theologica. In the 3rd article of the 29th
question he asks if the term person can be applied to God. Answering that
question, Aquinas says something very important, that person means some
kind of perfection in creatures so God, who is not only perfect but is perfection,
must be a person.10 In another place in the Summa Theologica St. Thomas tells us
that to be perfect means to be in an act.11 He refers to God who is the subsisting
act of existence so, to say it more precisely, to be more perfect means to exist in
a more perfect way. The first act of being is not the form which is the act in
essence but the act of existence (ipsum esse), which is an act of being. Perfection
of being is not only perfection of form, but also perfection of existence. The
well-known 4th way of proving God’s existence taken from the degrees of
S.Th. I, q. 27, a. 1.
S.Th. I, q. 29, a. 3, corp.
11 S.Th. I, q. 4, a. 1, corp.
9
10
p. 5
T. STEPIEN, New conceptions in the understanding of man at the Warsaw School of Consequential Thomism
perfection tells us more about the perfection of being. Aquinas says that:
“Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the
like.”12 Truth and good are transcendental qualities which are the effects of the
act of existence present in the essence of being. Thanks to the act of existence we
can recognize being as something true or good. Therefore to be more or less
perfect means to present transcendental qualities in a more or less intensive
way. Now we can come back to the problem of person. The person exists in a
more perfect way, so its act of existence causes the transcendental qualities to be
present in the essence of the person in a more intensive way. The person is
simply more distinctive, more unified, more real, truer, more good and more
beautiful than a non personal being. It can be illustrated using the example of
transcendental truth. This transcendental quality means that being itself can be
apprehended as it exists. Being is a condition for all apprehension. But a
personal being which has an intellectual essence cannot only be apprehended,
but can also inform us about itself, so that its openness to apprehension is more
perfect.
That is why at the school of Consequential Thomism there appeared the
conviction that the definition of Boethius should be modified in the light of the
new existential metaphysics of St. Thomas. Boethius associates his definition
with the act of essence, which is form, but it should be associated to the first act
of being – act of existence, because persons exist in a more perfect way than non
personal beings. M. Gogacz has proposed a new definition of person. The
person is an individual being of intellectual subsistence (intellectualis subsistentia
individuum ens).13 As we can see, the term natura used by Boethius was replaced
by subsistentia, which is another approach to the essence of being. Subsistence is
an essence of the individual being understood as having transcendental
qualities, which refers the definition of person to the act of existence. The term
rationalis was replaced by intellectualis, which refers the definition to the power
of the human soul rather than to operations made by the intellectual being. The
term reason describes the intellectual powers in operation when reasoning and
evaluating, so the definition of Boethius described the person in the aspect of
operation. A being who can operate reasonably is a person. The new definition
refers to the metaphysical structure of the person who is intellectual, so it
describes a person more precisely and according to the metaphysical method of
Aquinas. Operation is an accident, but accidents are always posterior to
substance so the proposed definition says that a being can operate reasonably
because it is a person.
S.Th. I, q. 2, a. 3.
M. Gogacz, Próba heurezy subzystencji i osoby, Studia Philosophorum Medii Aevi, t. 8,
Subzystencja i osoba wedlug sw., Tomasza z Akwinu (Warszawa 1987) p. 14.
12
13
p. 6
Congresso Tomista Internazionale
The new definition of person is certainly a very interesting attempt to
understand human nature better. It is also very important as a basis for other
problems of philosophical anthropology, like the dignity of the person, and
specific relations between personal beings.
New conception of creation.
The second consequence of underlining the role of the act of existence in
a human being, which I would like to present, is a new approach to the problem
of creation. The structural approach does not indicate all the principles of man,
because the principles in a man that exists are not sufficient to explain how that
man came into being. Man cannot create himself and therefore there must exist
an external principle or principles. The first and most important external
principle is God who is the supreme act of existence and the causal principle.
The most obvious description of the creation of man is that God as the
subsisting act of existence (ipsum esse subsistens) creates the act of existence
(ipsum esse) of man. However, in the texts of St. Thomas we cannot find such a
description. In all places where the creation of man is discussed Aquinas makes
a distinction between the creation of the human soul and the creation of the
human body.14 This does not help us understand this problem. In the questions
about human nature, he is arguing that man is a substantial unity of body and
soul.15 These arguments are very strong because of a common opinion held in
his age that the human soul is in itself a substance and is only linked to a
body.16 This unity of body and soul seems to be broken in the hereditary
approach. It seems natural to say that the creation of man is a creation of his act
of existence. To create is to give existence to something which did not exist. St.
Thomas discusses the creation of body and soul in specific questions saying that
the human soul is created by God but that the body comes from the parents. 17
So after placing the emphasis on the substantial unity of the human being in the
structural approach we observe a very severe distinction between body and
soul. This issue seems to be even more problematic when we add what Aquinas
says, namely that only the human soul needs to be created directly by God,
because only the human soul is subsistent. The human soul is subsistent so it
has existence itself but non rational souls have existence as a composition of
St. Thomas describes creation of human in this way in: In Sent., II, 18, 2, 1; C.G., II,
87; S.Th. I, q. 90- 91.
15 S.Th. I, q. 75.
16 E. Gilson, Historia filozofii chrzescijanskiej wieków srednich (Warszawa 1987) p. 326.
17 There is a distinction between an origin of first and all other men. The body of
Adam was made by God of the slime of the earth. S.Th. I, q. 91, a. 1.
14
p. 7
T. STEPIEN, New conceptions in the understanding of man at the Warsaw School of Consequential Thomism
form and matter.18 It is clear that Aquinas, by saying that, is defending the
immortality of the human soul, but this does not remove the difficulty of a
division between body and soul in the creation of the human being.
Those problems were the inspiration to develop the theory of the
creation of man in the Warsaw School of Consequential Thomism in the light of
the metaphysics of existence. God is pure act of existence and as existence he
gives existence. The effect must be proportional to the cause and therefore to
create means to give existence, not form.19 The act of existence in the moment of
creation gives realness to the essence, which is forming thanks to the other
external principles which are effecting on the new being.20 This process cannot
be understood in a physical way like the moments in time but in a metaphysical
way. The act of existence is firstly only metaphysical and we cannot say that
there was a moment in time when the human being existed without the essence.
However we can clearly see that the act of existence is no longer only the
existence of essence in a passive way. It is rather active; it makes essence
something real. The basic consequence of understanding creation in that way is
that God can no longer be an exemplar cause. St. Thomas says that God as a
creator of form must have the ideas, exemplar and ideal forms of all created
forms.21 Therefore M. Gogacz proposed a new understanding of other external
principles in place of an exemplar cause. These external principles are related to
the essence of man and are called end principles. The understanding of these
principles is another subject developed in the Warsaw School of Consequential
Thomism. According to M. Gogacz the end principle operates in a way that is
different from that of the causal principle. The former operates by making being
like itself. The essence of man is the composition of body and soul. 22 The chief
end principle of the body is the DNA of the parents, and also food and
everything else which is necessary to build the human body.23 The human soul
is different than that of an animal and therefore it needs a special end principle
which is appropriate to the human soul. This principle is an immaterial
substance which is traditionally called angel. The necessity of an angel as the
end principle of the human soul is also proposed by M. Gogacz.24
S.Th. I, q. 91, a.1.
M. Gogacz, Czlowiek i jego relacje (Warszawa 1985) p. 21.
20 Ibid, 22.
21 S.Th. I, q. 15, a. 3.
22 M. Gogacz, op. cit., p. 36.
23 Ibid, 36- 39.
24 M. Gogacz, Filozoficzna koniecznosc istnienia aniolów jako celowych przyczyn dusz
ludzkich, Czlowiek we wspólnocie Kosciola (Warszawa 1979) pp. 87- 116.
18
19
p. 8
Congresso Tomista Internazionale
Probably the most important difficulty which appears with this new
understanding of the origins of man is how God, the causal principle, knows
what he creates. If he is not the creator of form, how does he create man as a
man? We must notice that this question can also be posed when we accept St.
Thomas’ understanding of creation but then it concerns non intellectual beings,
whose form is not created by God. The answer to that question is simple. God
does not create the act of existence anywhere but in a certain place and in the
environment of other end principles. Human beings cannot be created without
cooperation of the parents, and in this new conception without the cooperation
of a substance separated from matter. It is worth noticing that this approach to
the genesis of the human being indicates that man becomes man at the very
moment of conception, because at this moment man has all the principles which
make him what he is, that is, a human being. This ends all theories that an
intellectual soul can be created later and then joined to a body, as was
suggested by many commentators of St. Thomas. This new theory of creation
certainly needs more careful study, but it also an attempt to solve the above
mentioned problems in the spirit of St. Thomas.
Conclusion
I believe that by presenting these two problems of philosophical
anthropology I showed an example of the attempts to develop the thought of St.
Thomas in the Warsaw School of Consequential Thomism. These attempts
testify that the writings of Aquinas are not only worth studying but that they
could be an inspiration to formulate new conclusions to the problems which
had only been alluded to by St. Thomas, as I believe the doctrine of Aquinas is
not a fully closed system, but rather it permits the intellect to search for new
paths to the truth.
p. 9