Etnografia Polska vol. XXVIII, 1984, book 2 PL ISSN 0071

Etnografia Polska vol. XXVIII, 1984, book 2 PL ISSN 0071

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Etnografia Polska vol. XXVIII, 1984, book 2
PL ISSN 0071-1861
ZOFIA SOKOLEWICZ
THE BASIC MODELS OF SCIENCE
AND SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS OF ETHNOLOGY IN POLAND
Part I
The development of science in the 20th century is characterized by an explosion of
scientific theories. Currently, we no longer refer to the language but to the languages of
science, and, in consequence, the problem of the correspondence (or its lack) between
theories arises. The existence of a multitude of theories forces researchers to choose
between them. The choice is usually unconscious and I will omit the reasons and
mechanisms which lie behind the ones made. There is an increasing number of various
theoretical proposals and their combinations, and thus – a corresponding rise in the
necessity to make such choices. The community of academics is growing proportionally to
the growth of society. There is no one, leading orientation (or we are incapable of noticing
it), to which one could refer the constantly being created theories. Science is currently
moving along many tracks. In order to portray this, it is no longer enough to use the
metaphor of the evolutionary tree. Rather, one would need a drawing showing an infinite
number of parallel lines of the historical process, with inimitable courses. Therefore, in the
20th century it has become necessary to research science itself, a need for the sociology1 and
philosophy of knowledge2, which could introduce order into this chaos created due to the
profusion and variety of epistemological statements.
In the second half of the 20th century, the sociology of knowledge (not to mention its
older counterpart – the philosophy of knowledge) is characterized by a fairly well-defined
field of research. Admittedly, its beginnings reach back to the works of K. Marx and E.
Durkheim, therefore being strongly embedded in the 19th century, but it was only M. Weber
1
M. Mulkay, Science and the sociology of knowledge, London 1979; R. Кeat, J. Urry, Social theory as science,
London 1975; K. Mannheim, Essays on the sociology of knowledge, London 1952.
2
R. Aгоn, La philosophie critique de I'histoire, Paris 1969; J. Życiński, Język i metoda, Kraków 1983.
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and K. Mannheim who endowed it with a more distinct shape3, and it is mainly thanks to
them that it gained the right to an existence. Despite this, its coagulation as a separate
discipline has not yet been completed. In 1981, Jerzy Szacki wrote that “the sociology of
knowledge remains up until today a discipline which is far from having been systematised
and from having specified its fundamental assumptions”4. Nonetheless, it is becoming clear
that the manner in which we analyse reality, the assumptions we make about its nature, and
primarily the results of our research show signs of a new quality, they are a “cultural
product” – as K. Moszyński would say, they are a “historical fact” – as K. Dobrowolski5
would say, and thus they can, or even should be the subject of research as an important
element of culture.
The above-mentioned processes of the formation of new theories and of the
comparisons among them do not progress as sharply within ethnology as within other fields
of science. Ethnology does not suffer from the over-abundance of theory, it sometimes even
seems that we are dealing with its lack. However, even within such a situation, the problem
remains of communication between the supporters of various theories and – what is more
important – of the issue of comparing the results they have achieved by using various paths.
Many a time, it is necessary to clarify if the researchers representing various theoretical
orientations are analyzing the same object or a different one. Either way, the necessity exists
for the comparison of different ethnological theories.
These issues may seem to have been simpler in the first half of the 20th century,
looking at them from the perspective of time. During this period, evolutionist theories
reigned in most European ethnological circles. The theories of the culture-historical school,
including the theory of culture circles, were being developed mainly in Germany, Austria
and Switzerland, while within Anglo-Saxon countries functionalism was being formed.
Debates between the representatives of various orientations were rare. On numerous
occasions, the historians of ethnography have, for example, wondered about the attitude of
Bronisław Malinowski’s functionalism to W. Schmidt’s culture-historical school. In the
1930’s, B. Malinowski sharply attacked the culture-historical school, among other things in
the entry culture6. On the basis of the accounts of participants in his seminars (L. Mair, R.
Firth, I. Schapera), it can be inferred that he did not spare the school any spiteful comments
criticizing their methodological assumptions. He was of the opinion that the search for and
3
M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie, Tübingen 1976: 1; R. K.
Merton, Social theory and social structure, New York 1957; K. Mannheim, Ideology und Utopia, New York
1936.
4
J. Szacki, Historia myśli socjologicznej, Warszawa 1981, vol. 1: 27.
5
K. Dobrowolski, Zagadnienia metodologii nauk w Polsce w dobie Odrodzenia, Warszawa 1953; K.
Dobrowolski, Dwa studia nad powstaniem kultury ludowej w Karpatach Zachodnich, [in:] Studia historyczne
ku czci Stanisława Kutrzeby, vol.. 2, Kraków 1938: 181-246, map 1.
6
B. Malinowski, “Culture”, Encyclopaedia of the social sciences, vol. IV, New York 1931: 621-646.
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reconstruction of historical ethnic and cultural processes on the basis of ethnographic
material are unscientific and worthless. He rejected their approach in its entirety on the basis
of the accusation that the results of research cannot be verified. It seems, however, that no
discussion between the schools ever occurred. Among Malinowski’s numerous works, it is
possible to note a series of reviews of various texts concerning specific research conducted,
from E. Durkheim7, G. Frazer8, to articles referring to the fringes of linguistics, law,
economy, psychoanalysis. Among these works there is only one which indicates a trace of a
discussion on the epistemological assumptions of other schools. This would be The Life of
Culture9, prepared together with G. Elliot Smith, (?) Herbert, J. Spinden and Alexander
Goldenweiser.
Perhaps further research connected with the publishing of Malinowski’s collected
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works will allow us to determine exactly with whom he was having a discussion and whom
he passed over in silence (in print). The results of the assessment of his works so far show
that no discussion between the representatives of both schools occurred, because it was as if
one did not exist for the other11. The approaches of their representatives are irreconcilable.
The genetic-historical problems formulated by W. Schmidt cannot be translated into the
language of functionalism. Thus, the problem of communication or translation of one
language into the other does not exist. Even the use of material collected according to
completely different conventions remains questionable, even if purely for the reason that
they do not contain information essential for the other side.
These difficulties in the potential communication between the two schools came into
being due to the adoption by each of the sides of different research questions, various
methods of analysis of the material and finally – different assumptions about the nature of
science, a different model of science. W. Schmidt opted for a historical, humanistic model of
ethnology. Malinowski employed a positivistic model of science and constructed ethnology,
and later social anthropology, as sciences in the strict sense of the word.
Polish ethnology and ethnography from the period between the two World Wars left
behind an interesting, though not always appreciated, collection of theoretical achievements.
Each of the professors from this period left behind a different, original methodological
7
B. Malinowski, review of: Durkheim, E., Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse, “Folk-lore”, vol. 24:
1913: 525-531.
8
B. Malinowski, Is humanism dead? review of: Frazer, J . G., Publii Ovidii Nasonis Fastorum Libri Sexi: The
fasti of Ovid, “Naturę”, vol. 125: 1939: 847-849.
9
G. E. Smith, B. Malinowski, H. J. Spinden, A. Goldenweiser, Culture — the Diffusion controversy, London
1928.
10
B. Malinowski, Dzieła wszystkie, vol. 1-3, Warszawa 1979 and later. Regret can only be expressed that the
data contained in the first volumes does not include any new assessments of Malinowski’s works.
11
Oral tradition conveys the opinion of supporters of the culture-historical school about functionalism and
Malinowski, in which they compare this field to journalism (J. Manugiewicz); also A. R. Radс1iffe-Вrown,
Method in social anthropology, Chicago 1958.
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proposal: S. Poniatowski12, K. Moszyński13, E. Frankowski14, J. Czekanowski15, Baudouin
de Courtenay-Ehrenkreutz-Jędrzejewiczowa16, J. S. Bystroń17, K. Dobrowolski18, to the
eclusion of academics from related fields (S. Czarnowski, L. Krzywicki) or younger
researchers (J. Obrębski, K. Zawistowicz-Adamska). In one of her publications19, C.
Baudouin de Courtenay-Ehrenkreutz attempts to conduct an overview of these proposals,
treating them as if they supplemented each other. Nowadays, we can observe that it cannot
have been easy to add them to each other. Each of these trends is today used as if separately,
while their fate is still awaiting an exhaustive analysis by a historian of knowledge20. We do,
however, know that both the few printed polemics as well as oral tradition21 indicate that
each of the above-listed researchers searched for their own individual paths. These attempts
do not supplement each other, through together they form a very multicoloured image of the
interests of Polish ethnography during the period between the two World Wars.
Not only the war and the death or emigration of part of the professors contributed to
the severance of the continuity of scientific tradition within Polish ethnology. Another factor
was the discussion concerning the use of the methods of dialectical and historical
materialism as the only scientifically sound methods which would ensure the proper results
of the conducted research. The programmes constructed in accordance with these methods or
similar to them eliminated most of the questions posed by the ethnography of the interwar
period.
The sociological orientation referring to the programme prepared by K.
Dobrowolski22 with developments introduced after the war, as well as that which was
derived from the attempts made by K. Zawistowicz-Adamska23, were the trends which were
the most popular in the period of the first ten years after World War II. A partial
12
S. Poniatowski, O pochodzeniu i praojczyźnie Ariów, [in:] Wiedza o Polsce, vol. 1, Warszawa 1932.
K. Moszyński, Kultura ludowa Słowian, vol. 1-2, part 1-2, Kraków 1925-1939.
14
E. Frankowski, Sztuka Ludowa, [in:] Wiedza o Polsce, vol. III, Warszawa 1935.
15
J. Czekanowski, Wstęp do historii Słowian, Lwów 1927.
16
C. Baudouin de Courtenay-Ehrenkreutz-Jędrzejewiczowa, Ze studiów nad obrzędami weselnymi ludu
polskiego, Wilno 1929.
17
J. S. Bystroń, Kultura ludowa, Warszawa 1947.
18
K. Dobrowolski, Dzieje kultu św. Florjana w Polsce do połowy XVI w., Warszawa 1923; idem, Zagadnienie
kultury, [ in:] Kalendarz Ilustrowany Kuriera Codziennego na rok 1937, R. 10, Kraków 1936: 68-71; idem, Ze
studiów nad życiem społecznym i kulturą, Wrocław 1968.
19
C. Baudouin de Courtenay-Ehrenkreutz-Jędrzejewiczowa, Materiał naukowy i przedmiot etnologii, “Lud”,
vol. XXII, 1923.
20
Perhaps the most accurate study, though the shortest (maybe this is the reason behind its accuracy), of the
history of Polish ethnography is: А. Kutrzebianka, Rozwój etnografii i etnologii w Polsce, Kraków 1949.
21
Oral tradition in not used in works about the history of Polish ethnography. It seems, however, that the small
sample I introduced in an article about J.S. Bystroń seems promising, cf.: Bystronia kultura “otwarta”,
“Kultura”, 9 VII 1972.
22
K. Dobrowolski, Drogi rozwoju etnografii polskiej, jej obecne zadania, metody i związki z innymi naukami,
“Etnografia Polska”, vol. 1: 1958: 72-83.
23
K. Zawistowicz-Adamska (ed.), Pomoc wzajemna i współdziałanie w kulturach ludowych, “Prace i Materiały
Etnograficzne”, vol. VIII-LX: 1951, as well as other articles to be found within this volume concerning the
tradition of cooperation in the Polish countryside.
13
15
standardisation of research approaches and methods was reached through the elimination of
certain trends and traditions. Proof of this can be found in the publications from 1953-1970.
Functionalism in principle did not have any continuators in Poland, aside from A.
Waligórski24 and some less significant researchers of the younger generation25, who were
aware that this trend was undergoing a crisis26 and who did not have any proposals about
how to transform it. Structuralism, timidly announced within ethnography in 1960 with the
Polish publication of Tristes tropiques27, has actually only begun developing since 1972.
Despite many individual and original attempts (among which the discussion in 1947-1948
within the Polish Ethnological Society should be mentioned), Polish ethnology does not
suffer from an over-abundant diversity of research approaches. It is only the end of the
1970’s which brought a certain theoretical animation, however slight it might have been.
Undoubtedly, a huge role in making Polish ethnographers aware of the significance of
theoretical problems was played by a text which presented a synthesis of Polish
ethnography28, regardless of how it is evaluated by various people. It showed everyone what
questions had been answered and allowed them to consider whether these answers had been
satisfactory, as well as enabling them to see which issues had not been engaged with or not
carefully enough and which questions had not been asked but could have been. The
bibliography of the above-mentioned synthesising text reveals the fact that the material
collected for a specific purpose may not (and most often does not) contain the information
essential for the execution of different research aims. The issue of comparing different
research orientations becomes significant also for that reason.
The comparison of any two things requires the establishment of a common
denominator. Its determination for the purpose of comparing theories requires a departure
from ethnology and a focus on the theory of science.
24
A. Waligórski, Antropologiczna koncepcja człowieka, Warszawa 1973.
М. Trawińska-Kwaśniewska, Zagroda chłopska, Wrocław 1968; Z. Sokolewicz, Analiza funkcjonalnostrukturalna zmian kulturowych w społeczności chłopskiej, [ in:] K. Zawistowicz-Adamska (ed.), Zmiany
kultury chłopskiej, Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków-Gdańsk 1973: 51-73; М. Trawińska-Kwaśniewska, O
niektórych ograniczeniach funkcjonalizmu-strukturalizmu w tłumaczeniu zmiany kulturowej, “Etnografia
Polska”, vol. XIII: 1969, no. 1: 25-43; K. Kwaśniewiczowa, Doroczne i rodzinne zwyczaje na tle
współczesnych przeobrażeń wsi podkrakowskiej. Studium wsi Niegoszowice w woj. krakowskim, WrocławWarszawa-Kraków 1979.
26
I. Jarvie, Revolution in anthropology, London 1964.
27
The Polish translation of С. Lévi-Strauss’s Tristes tropiques was published in 1960 as Smutek tropików,
while the remainder of his works was only made available in 1968 (Totemism and Conversations with C. LéviStrauss). The Savage Mind was published in 1969. As Lévi-Strauss was previously mainly known on the basis
of his French-language works, he did not arouse much discussion within Polish academic circles until the
beginning of the 1970’s. Also cf. Z. Sokolewicz, T. Drewnowski, Dzicy i cywilizowani, z profesorem C. LéviStraussem rozmawiają..., “Polityka”, 4 VII 1964.
28
Etnografia Polski. Przemiany kultury ludowej, ed. by. M. Biernacka, B. Kopczyńska-Jaworska, A. KutrzebaPojnarowa, W. Paprocka, Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków-Gdańsk 1976 (vol. 1), 1981 (vol. 2).
25
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The reasons behind the contemporary diversity of science are sought out by
following the usual path from the differences of opinion between Plato and Aristotle
concerning the essence of the world and the essence of cognition, or alternately we can refer
to sources of this differentiation within modern science, i.e. to Descartes and Bacon. It seems
that we do not analyze carefully enough what happened within philosophy following Kant
and as a reaction to Hegelian idealism – at least within the field of ethnography. Today’s
trends within ethnology are rooted in the differentiation of cognitive approaches which
appeared towards the end of the 18th century and in the 19th century29. Obviously, these new
trends refer to neo-Kantianism, positivism, Marxism, phenomenology, and existentialism.
The influence of neo-Kantianism on world ethnology appeared in the form of a
fascination with E. Cassirer’s proposals30, a representative of the Marburgian school. The
influence of the second off-shoot of this trend, i.e. of the Badenian school, is even more
noticeable. The model of the humanities, proposed by W. Windelband and H. Rickert and
further developed by W. Dilthey, was adopted by W. Schmidt. A slightly different version
was employed within the works of M. Weber, and indirectly by the Chicago school. It was
represented by F. Znaniecki. The models of humanistic sociology and ethnology are derived
directly from the Badenian and Chicago schools of thought.
However, positivism affected the formation of 19th-century models of science with
equal force. Its significance for ethnology lies not only in the fact that this was the
philosophy of evolutionism. Primarily, the influence of so-called positivism II (or empiriocriticism) turned out to be very important. Positivism had a strong influence on E. Durkheim,
and thus indirectly on the whole generation of ethnologists from the first 20 or 30 years of
the 20th century. B. Malinowski inherited his concept of science not only from E. Durkheim,
but undoubtedly he also took with him the influence of empirio-criticism from his native
Kraków31. All those researchers who considered ethnology to be a science and not only an
art, at that time had to pronounce themselves as being either proponents of positivism or of
Marxism. Up until the 1950’s, Polish ethnology was dominated strongly by the influence of
positivism. It could even be stated that it remains a strong influence up until this day32.
However, neo-Kantianism, positivism, Marxism, to list the most significant trends of
the beginnings and second half of the 20th century (to the exclusion of the smaller, less
29
Z. Sokolewicz, Szkoły i kierunki w etnografii polskiej (do 1939 г.), [in:] Historia etnografii polskiej, ed. M.
Terlecka, Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków 1973: 115-169; M. Frankowska, Etnografia polska po 1939 r., [in:]
Historia etnografii polskiej, ed. M. Terlecka, which do not give an exhaustive analysis of the issue. The topic
has not yet been adequately researched by any historian of knowledge.
30
E. Cassirer, Esej o człowieku, Warszawa 1974.
31
A. Paluch, introduction to B. Malinowski, Dzieła zebrane, vol. 1, Warszawa 1979.
32
I would like to present this issue within Part II of this article, where I will be analysing contemporary works
by Polish ethnologists. This issue has also been noted by P. Sztompka, Metoda funkcjonalna w socjologii i
antropologii społecznej. Studium analityczne, Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków-Gdańsk 1971; idem, Teoria i
wyjaśnienie, z metodologicznych problemów socjologii, Warszawa 1973.
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original trends, however interesting from the perspective of the ethnologist, such as for
example W. Wundt’s so-called inductive metaphysics) do not exhaust the wide range of
possible solutions to the disputes about reality, about epistemological principles, about the
reality of the soul and its place within reality. For this reason, phenomenology and
existentialism should also be mentioned. The former remains important up until this day
within ethnology, as the ideas of M. Eliade, R. Otto, the Utrecht school (which has achieved
prominence within phenomenological religious studies and has had significant influence on
other, even quite distant disciplines as, e.g. geography33) are all derived from Husserl. On the
other hand, it is difficult to discuss the influence of existentialism on ethnology, especially in
Poland. This is yet another issue to be analysed by a historian of knowledge34.
Various considerations concerning the different models of science were published in
“Etnografia Polska” for the first time by the much regretted Gerhard Kloska as early as in
197535. It seems this article did not meet with much of a response. In June 1979, during a
session of the Committee of Ethnological Sciences of the Polish Academy of Science, I
presented a paper entitled “Podstawowe modele nauki a sposób uprawiania etnologii w
Polsce” (The basic models of knowledge and the method of practising ethnology in Poland).
My aim was to indicate the reasons behind certain problems in the mutual communication
between researchers, as well as their usage of different scientific languages and their posing
of different research questions. I am of the opinion that despite these difficulties, there is at
least one point in which the comparison of different research trends is essential. Namely, this
is when we formulate research questions and are considering how to answer them and what
research procedure to choose.
For this reason, considerations concerning models of science, especially models used
within social studies, were introduced in 1978 into the university programme for the theory
of culture, obligatory for students of ethnography in Warsaw. The following overview is a
summary of the most important points of this programme. If there are many ethnological
theories of culture, can they be compared to each other? How should this be done? Is it
possible to compare the results of research within which the basic concept used is that of the
“cultural product” (K. Moszyński), the “historical fact” (K. Dobrowolski), the “institution”
(B. Malinowski), the “meaning” and the “structure” (C. Lévi-Strauss)? Do these taxonomic
33
А. С. M. Jansen, A phenomenological orientation in the spatial sciences?, Amsterdam 1980 (material
duplicated from the conference organized in April 1980 by the University of Warsaw and University of
Amsterdam, archive of the Department of Ethnology and Cultural Anthropology, University of Warsaw).
34
C. Lévi-Strauss, Smutek tropików, Warszawa 1968: 57. It can be assumed that for a certain period of time C.
Lévi-Strauss remained under the charm of existentialism. It is, however, difficult to consider it as having left a
permanent trace within his works.
35
G. Kloska, Trzy modele nauk społecznych, “Etnografia Polska”, vol. XIX: 1975, book 2: 109-137.
18
units actually refer to the same thing? What can be said about the other concepts within these
theories?
The concept of the model of science enables a comparing of different theories by
formulating their common denominator. Within the philosophy and sociology of
knowledge36 quite a lot has been written on the topic. By comparing the different approaches
of various researchers, including those whose activities are considered exemplary, a model
for others – such as E. Durkheim, M. Weber or G. Myrdal37, all of whom have been
described by G. Kloska – the conclusion can be reached that each researcher, when
constructing his/her own theory, must answer a few fundamental questions. The answers to
these questions are an indicator of what model of science the given researcher is using within
his/her work. Therefore, one must primarily establish whether one accepts the assumption
about the unity of the object of science and, in consequence, whether or not one
differentiates between science and art. If one adopts the thesis about the unity of science,
does one take experimental science as one’s model to be imitated? How does one define the
relationship between the object and the subject of the research? Does, for example, the object
of the research exist independently of the researcher who gains knowledge of it by looking at
it as if from a distance or are we dealing with the strict interdependence of the object and the
subject? What is the source of cognition: empirical data, data from observations, our
experiences, sensations or yet other forms? How are the relations between theory and
observation presented? Can data be found within the theory which is not present within the
observations? What type of explication does the given author adopt (by referring to general
laws, by the statistical establishment of the place of the element within a system, by
determining the structure of the phenomenon, etc.)? Does the author distinguish within the
reality being examined between the various levels of organisation or accessibility of
observations (the observable level versus the unobservable one, etc.)? What are the basic
concepts of the language of a given theory (the taxonomic unit, the understanding of time,
space, etc.)? How are theories proven? When is a theory considered to be true and when can
it be rejected as untrue?
Within a detailed critical analysis of each of the analysed theories many more such
specific questions must be asked. As an example may serve the above-discussed analysis
conducted by Kloska38 or the exegesis of C. Lévi-Strauss’s Totemism by the same
researcher39. I have, however, acknowledged that the questions listed above allow for
36
M. Polanyi, Knowing and being, London 1969; E. А. Вurll, The metaphysical foundations of modern
science, London 1926; T. Benton, Philosophical foundations of the three sociologies, London 1980; M. Hollis,
Models of man. Philosophical thoughts on social action, Edinburgh 1979.
37
Kloska, op. cit.: 109.
38
Kloska, op. cit.
39
G. Kloska, Totemizm C. Lévi-Straussa, “Lud”, vol. 67, 1974.
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acquiring enough information in order to answer the issue of what model of science we
encounter in a specific case and what the epistemological assumptions are for a given
researcher.
Proceeding in the footsteps of theoreticians of science, it is possible to distinguish the
following basic models of science: classical positivistic, realistic and conventional (all of
which are formulated on the basis of an assumption of the unity of the world and the unity of
science). If we, however, assume the dissimilarity of the humanities from the sciences in the
strict sense of the word, then we should also take into account at least some of the
characteristic models for such an approach, such as the model of the interpretative
humanities and the phenomenological model.
I. THE POSITIVISTIC MODEL OF SCIENCE
Positivism within philosophy and the corresponding model of science should be
discussed with an awareness of the existence of this trend for over 150 years, with various
phases and varieties. This results in the fact that the classical positivism of Comte has little
in common with and is very different from positivism II (empirio-criticism) or the neopositivism of the Vienna circle. Nevertheless, it seems that the basic features of what we call
the positivistic model of science have remained relatively stable up until today. This model
has perhaps been given the most detailed account by C. G. Hempel 40. It was constructed on
the assumption that science enables the establishing of predictions (this is its aim) and in
this way it explains the world. This is possible thanks to the construction of a theory
consisting of general statements, establishing permanent relations between elements of
reality. These statements, also known as laws, enable the prediction of phenomena
discovered through systematic observation and experimentation.
An explication thus consists in the showing that the investigated “something” is a
specific case of these regularities, a case of the functioning of a general law. Therefore, it
can be predicted also in the future.
It is significant that the truth of these statements is not simply a logical necessity,
neither is it possible for it to be known a priori It must be proven on the basis of observation
and experimentation, the only sources of sure and irrefutable empirical knowledge.
Experimentation and observation are also the tools of all statements, if they are to be of a
scientific nature.
40
C. Hempel, Metodologia nauk przyrodniczych, Warszawa 1968; idem, Philosophy of natural science,
Englewood Cliffs 1966.
20
Science does not have to, and it even should not, reach deep into or go outside of the
phenomenon experienced by a human being through sensory cognition. Such a departure
from information provided to us by our senses means to rely only on speculation. This is
where we find the sources of arguments directed by functionalists against the “speculations
of the culture-historical school”41. It can be assumed that the same considerations guided the
critics of the newly-born culture-historical school – critics derived from the circle of
Bastianian evolutionism42. It was exactly the adoption of the same model of science which
has led to the existence of similarities between evolutionism and functionalism43, while both
these trends differ fundamentally from the culture-historical school (even if the theories of
cultural circles were to be omitted – the most difficult to maintain).
Positivistic views on science have become the source of the separation of what was
considered to be the object of scientific cognition (i.e. through experimentation and
observation and what can be as a consequence predicted as a series of results) from what is
the product of human imagination, feelings, creativity, poetry, that which is unpredictable,
which – in summary – is part of the humanities, or in other words: art (art versus science).
In the case that the whole reality is acknowledged as one object of science, the sphere
of the humanities was to be subjected to the same rigour and research procedures as the
customary sphere of experimental research. Thus, the main criterion of the truthfulness of a
theory should be the empirical criterion of concordance with experience, while conclusions
were to be based on observation and experimentation, etc. The fact that this is not easy is
attested to by the accusations made by the students of K. R. Popper44 (J. Agassi, E. Gellner,
I. Jarvie) against functional anthropology, which in their opinion – despite its pompous
declarations – did not manage to formulate even one generally applicable law. This difficulty
is also attested to by the attempts of K. Moszyński. Even though he encompassed the whole
of culture with his conceptual apparatus, in the case of the interpretation45 of art he attempted
to refer to Bergson’s ideas, departing in this way from the classically used positivistic model.
C. G. Hempel emphasizes that the explication within the positivistic model of science
takes on a particular structure. Its significant components are that of the explanandum and
the explanans46. The explanans consists of general laws (the lack of which or the difficulties
with their formulation being the main reasons for complaints among so-called humanists)
41
A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, The method in social anthropology, London 1958.
S. O. Stoil, Die Entwicklung der Völkerkunde von ihrer Anfängen bis in die Neuzeit, “Mitteilungen der
Geographische-Ethnographische Gesellschaft”, Zurich 1917-1918, vol. 18: 105.
43
Sokolewicz, op. cit.: 78; Szacki, op. cit.: 413.
44
Jarvie, op. cit.: 138; K. R. Popper, Open society and its enemies, vol. 2, London 1946: 278.
45
K. Moszyński, Kultura ludowa Słowian, vol. II, part 2: Sztuka, Kraków 1939: 18 ff.; Z. Sokolewicz, Teoria
kultury Kazimierza Moszyńskiego jako punkt wyjścia do badań etnogenetycznych, “Etnografia Polska”, vol.
XXIII 1979, no. 2: 83-109.
46
Hempel, op. cit.: 403.
42
21
and the conditions which precede the coming into existence of a specific phenomenon. Thus,
they constitute the premises of an explication. The classical example of the reaction of the
mercury column within the thermometer placed into boiling water constitutes a variant of an
explication called a deductive nomological one. This type of explication was widely used
within ethnology by Malinowski and its detailed analysis has been presented by P.
Sztomka47. The second type of positivistic explication is called the explanation of inductive
probability (statistical). In this case, instead of general laws statistical (or probabilistic)
generalisations are to be found within the explanans, and the relation between the premises
and the conclusion takes the form of inductive probability. This method of explication is
widely used in American anthropology, torn apart since the times of F. Boas by the doubts
concerning the legitimacy of the adoption of a scientific approach within the research of
culture rather than that of historical explication (in the sense of a reconstruction of the
inimitable and unpredictable results of isolated events). It seems that the so-called
Californian school of anthropology was inclined towards this second type of explication,
especially the group of statisticians under the direction of H. Driver48. S. Klimek49, a student
of Jan Czekanowski, cooperated with them. The scholarly achievements of the latter are also
very interesting from our point of view. It could be assumed that studying in Germany
during the period of the methodological offensive of the culture-historical school, including
the theory of the cultural circles of F. Graebner (which enchanted S. Poniatowski for the rest
of his life), would attract Czekanowski to this milieu. They represented a school which
strongly emphasized the dissimilarity between the humanities and the natural sciences,
opting for the scientific model of Windelband and Rickert. This is clear in the works of L.
Frobenius, who searched for the final instance of the “soul” of the African continent50, in the
works of W. Schmidt, who directly mentioned the “soul” of various cultures 51, as well as in
the works of H. Ankermann and F. Graebner. However, undoubtedly the fact that
Czekanowski was a natural scientist and that through the English biometric school he came
in contact with English empirical philosophy resulted in the use of the inductive probability
explication within his works. His epistemological assumptions are clearly closer to
positivism than to the German philosophy of Windelband and Rickert. However, for the
47
Sztompka, op. cit.
H. Е. Driver, “Cultural Diffusion”, [in:] Raoul Naroll, Main currents in cultural anthropology, Englewood
Cliffs, New York 1973.
49
S. Klimek, Metoda ilościowa w badaniach nad historią kultury, “Roczniki Dziejów Społecznych i
Gospodarczych”, vol. 3: 1934: 57-76; S. Klimek, W. Milke, An analysis of the material culture of the Tupi
peoples, “American Anthropologist”, vol. 37: 1935: 71-91; S. Klimek, Culture element distributions, I: The
structure of California Indian Culture, “University of California, Publications in American Archaeology and
Ethnology”, vol. 37, 1935: 1-70.
50
L . Frobenius, Kulturgeschichte Áfricas: Prolegomena zu einer histo-rischen Gestaltlehre, Zurich 1933.
51
A. Bronk, Język teorii religioznawczej W. Schmidta, Lublin 1972; W. Schmidt, Der Ursprung des
Gottesidee, Tubingen 1911.
48
22
reason that his research was concerned with anthropology and historical ethnology, the
object of his observations became not historical facts but rather sources, on the basis of
which conclusions about the past were to be reached. The presence of a source was thus a
decisive factor in establishing the truth of the theory. On the issue of the approach to the
source, Czekanowski is close in his opinions to the culture-historical school. European (and
world) ethnology owes this school the establishment of the fundaments of source criticism52.
The conviction that the appropriate method would constitute a guarantee of true results, held
both by the positivism of the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries and by at least some of the
fields of the humanities, is surely a feature of the entire epoch.
According to the positivistic model of science, theories are constructed on the basis
of empirical data. Within classical positivism, observation and empirical data precede a
theory. This view, which today can no longer be retained, was broken off with by the neopositivism of the Vienna circle and by K. R. Popper who was closely connected to this
circle. In ethnology, this view can still be encountered even today, not only as an echo of F.
Boas’s functionalism and scientism (in certain periods), but also as a view held by historical
(positivistic) schools in European ethnology, e.g. K. Moszyński53. In the case of this last
mentioned researcher, we are dealing with a variant of the positivistic model of science
adapted to the consideration of past phenomena. We know of the effects of historical events,
we know of the general laws of culture derived by Moszyński from the model of language
or from morphological analyses. The task of the researcher in this situation was to
reconstruct the premises behind the existing state on the basis of his knowledge of the effects
and general laws.
Moszyński shared the view of the positivists concerning the method of constructing
theories. Theories consisted of statements of a high level of abstraction, the truth or falseness
of which may be stated only through systematic observation and experimentation. The
theory must be constructed with objectively existing facts. Nothing more can be placed
within the theory than was previously present in the facts. This view can also no longer be
retained at this point in time. We owe its negation to a large extent to J. Piaget54.
II. THE REALISTIC MODEL OF SCIENCE
This model has many characteristics in common with the positivistic model. K. Marx can
be considered to have been its main representative. The realists recognize the unity of the
52
F. Graebner, Methode der Ethnologie, Heidelberg 1911; W. Schmidt, Mefhode der Ethnologie, Berlin 1935.
Sokolewicz, op. cit.: s. 87
54
J. Piaget, Epistemologia i psychologia, Warszawa 1972.
53
23
world and the unity of the object of science. This is where the stubborn, and for many
incomprehensible, emphasis on the scientific character of the humanities during the period
of the discussion on dialectical and historical materialism in the 1950’s in Poland originates
from. In accordance with the assumptions of materialism, the broadly-understood
humanities, with the separated out subgroups of social studies and the studies of art, were to
explain the world analogically to the natural sciences. As a consequence of the explication, it
was to predict the results of different activities and change the world. In comparison to the
positivistic model, the main modification concerned the criterion of truth. In the previous
case, it had been based on empiricism. Here, it was based on social practice, the ability and
pertinence of usage. Similarly to the positivists, the realists were of the opinion that science
is based on empiricism, it is rational, and cognition is of an objective nature. As a
consequence, within realism there is no dispute concerning the nature of the humanities.
These disciplines also serve the purpose of changing the world. The realists introduce,
however, a strong – much stronger than in earlier times – postulate of formulating general
laws also within the humanities, connected to which it is possible to note the occurrence of
frequent discussions during the last thirty years concerning the nature of these general
laws55.
There are however significant differences between positivism and realism in their
methods of explication. In order to explain something, for realists it is not enough to indicate
that the investigated “something” is a particular case of a general law, of some regularity in
the succession between elements of the observed reality. It is necessary to determine the
permanent relations between phenomena, to discover the hidden structures and mechanisms
of its functioning. In such a situation, the accusation – put forward by various researchers
(Lyons, Radcliffe-Brown) – of the reification of culture by functionalist ethnologists
disappears. The ontological being possesses not only that which is perceivable by our senses.
This signifies the postulation of the existence of observable beings and also of unobservable
processes – which we are unaware of but whose existence we can infer on the basis of the
occurring effects. Thanks to such an assumption we can move on to investigating what is
beneath the surface of the phenomenon, to their nature, to something we call the essence and
which is hidden. This is connected with the strengthening of the conviction within many
fields of science that what is really important is hidden beneath the surface of the
information about the world which is accessible through our senses and that we are aware of.
For a realist, scientific theories are a description of structures and mechanisms which
generate observable phenomena. The description of these structures allows for an
55
A. Malewski, J. Topolski, Studia z metodologii historii, Warszawa 1960; J. Topolski, Metodologia historii,
Warszawa 1968.
24
explanation of what can be perceived superficially and which cannot be interpreted in and of
itself. Commensurate with reality, the appropriate explication requires the uncovering of the
permanent relations between phenomena and of the mechanism which connects them.
Explaining the phenomenon, we can only discuss the initiating moment in the process of its
formation. We must give a description of the mechanism which generates a given process56.
Within the natural sciences, such laws as those which pertain to the temperature of
bodies, their capacity or the pressure of gases no longer suffice. In order to know the reason
behind a rise in the temperature, we must know the molecular construction of the gases. The
significant aspect for the mode of explication used within the realistic model of science is the
investigation of the structure of the object of research. Realists are of the opinion that in
order to answer the question of “why”, it is not enough to indicate the recurrent effects,
because first the questions of “what” and “how” must be answered.
The answer to the question “what” consists of establishing the essence of a
phenomenon, thus – its structure (e.g. the structure of the system of kinship, the structure of
various cultural phenomena). Within world ethnology, C. Lévi-Strauss57 can be given as an
example of this type of approach (most probably inspired by Marx). The answer to the
question “how” is meant to determine the mechanism set in motion by some action (e.g. the
establishment of a bond through the presenting of a gift to another person, etc.) The classical
example of the use of the realist model of science is the one created by Marx. The theory of
economic-social formation may serve as a detailed example. The most important aspect of
this theory is the assumption that people are not conscious of the mechanisms which are
hiding behind their actions. The class structure, the laws of the market, the occurrence of
added value, all of which workers are not aware of – these are the hidden mechanisms which
a researcher should describe in order to explain what is happening on the surface – within
people’s consciousness.
When constructing theories, the realist researcher must take into account the fact that
he/she does not encompass this (for us – the most significant) element of reality with his/her
senses. For this reason, models are most often constructed using the method per analogiam.
The model of the solar system was used for the construction of the atom, models of light and
sound waves are based on the movement of waves of water which occur when a stone is
thrown in (an analogy also used in K. Moszyński’s proposition). The formulation of theories
in realism is based on the creation of models which are then checked against observable
reality. Models relate to the unobservable, while empiricism to the observable. The model
56
A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and function, London 1959; J . Lyons, The verbal communication, [in:] R.
Hinde, Non verbal communication and other essays, London 1974.
57
C. Lévi-Strauss, The scope of anthropology, “Current Anthropology”, vol. 7, 1966, no. 2: 112-124; idem,
Anthropology: its achievements and future, “Current Anthropology”, vol. 7, 1966, no. 2: 124-128.
25
must take into account the necessity of moving during reasoning from one level to another,
as well as indicating whether its functioning actually causes the investigated effects to occur
in reality. Every verification of the model with reality requires a return to the model and
subsequent, sometimes multiple, corrections. Positivistic theories were most often based on
an inductive principle of transition from certain phenomena to all of them, to their
generalisation. On the other hand, within realism, we are dealing with a transition from the
observable to the unobservable. This is not only an issue of the level of generality of the
uttered statements, but also of the level of reality to which they refer.
The realistic model of science was used within world ethnology by the already
mentioned C. Lévi-Strauss58 and this is precisely where his dependency on K. Marx lies, to
whom Lévi-Strauss in fact refers to directly59. C. Lévi-Strauss’s epistemological principles
and some of his assumptions underwent certain changes throughout his life and within his
academic work. There can, however, be little doubt that until the end of the 1960’s, he
represented the point of view he declared during the famous inaugural speech given at the
College de France in 1965.
The realistic model within Polish ethnology was primarily used by L. Krzywicki,
while currently it is being implemented by K. Dobrowolski, as well as — in the 1960’s — by
K. Zawistowicz-Adamska. The method of description and of determining his field of
research adopted by K. Dobrowolski has caused this researcher to explain culture not
through referring to the hidden structures of culture — as is postulated by Lévi-Strauss and
as he himself was inclined to within his own, pre-war works60— but by referring to the
principles of effects within the historical process. Dobrowolski’s integral method61 and his
postulate to place researched facts within a wide context have caused that he may refer only
to the so-called laws of socio-economic development (and thus to the non-cultural sphere of
reality) and not to the hidden structure of culture itself. Cultural studies cannot go more indepth with such a large quantity of variables as are taken into account by Dobrowolski, nor
can this be done with such conceptual apparatus. Culture can only be treated as a correlate of
socio-economic structures. An example of precisely such a procedure is Etnografia Polski.
Przemiany kultury ludowej62 prepared under the influence of Dobrowolski’s school of
thought. I do not, however, consider the procedure used there to be fully in accordance with
58
Lévi-Strauss, op. cit.: 121.
Sokolewicz, Drewnowski, op. cit.; L . Sebag, Marxisme et structuralisme, Paris 1964.
60
K. Dobrowolski, Zagadnienie kultury, [in:] Kalendarz Ilustrowany Kuriera Codziennego na rok 1937,
Kraków 1936, vol. 10: 68-81; idem, Dzieje kultu św. Florjana w Polsce do połowy XVI w., Warszawa 1923;
idem, Dwa studia nad powstaniem kultury ludowej w Karpatach Zachodnich, [in:] Studia historyczne ku czci
Stanisława Kutrzeby, Kraków 1938, vol. 2: 181-246.
61
A. Kutrzeba-Pojnarowa, Metoda integralna K. Dobrowolskiego, [in:] Metody etnologii, part 1, Warszawa
1980.
62
Etnografia Polski. Przemiany kultury ludowej.
59
26
the requirements of the realistic method. The fundamental question which should be
answered is first “what” (the hidden structure) and next “how” (the mechanism, the
transition from the observable to the unobservable), and finally “why”. I am of the opinion
that these questions have not been answered within the above-quoted work and that certain
methodological indications remained only within the sphere of postulates. I also think that
Dobrowolski himself, despite a series of declarations in these regards, does not use this
model consistently63. The situation is quite similar with all those works known to me
concerning cultural change which did not venture beyond empirical (source) descriptions,
beyond the establishment of the effects in the historical process and finally – beyond
referring to socio-economic regularities. In this sense, they seem to represent a positivistic
model of science (it is striking to note the strong emphasis on empiricism) rather than a
realistic model. For this reason, C. Lévi-Strauss can be considered to be closer to Marx than
some who have declared themselves to be Marxists.
III. THE CONVENTIONAL MODEL
In the second half of the 20th century, the so-called conventional model became widespread within science. Among its representatives, the best known in Poland (translated and
quoted) would be T. S. Kuhn64, P. K. Feyerabend65, as well as N. R. Hanson66 and S. E.
Toulmin67. It can also be deemed that the already mentioned K. R. Popper is also inclined
towards conventionalism (despite his affinity with neo-positivism), and the same can be
stated about some of his students (I. Jarvie)68. Conventionalism is also present in Poland,
though it is not always called by this name. Its assumptions can be observed within the
works of S. Amsterdamski, while the journal “Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa” publishes
quite a number of articles on the subject69.
Conventionalism begins with an attack on positivism in its various forms and on
realism. According to the conventionalists, a theory is not neutral towards observation.
Perception is dependent on how the world is categorised, on how relations between
distinguished categories of phenomena are ordered, or – in other words – it is dependent on
63
Also compare the analysis of Dobrowolski’s methodology in: Sztompka, op. cit.
T. S. Kuhn, Struktura rewolucji naukowych, Warszawa 1968.
65
P. K. Feyerabend, Jak być dobrym empirystą, Warszawa 1978; idem, Against method, London 1975.
66
N. R. Hanson, Patterns of discovery, Cambridge 1965; idem, Perception and discovery, San Francisco 1969.
67
S. E. Toulmin, Foresight and understanding, New York 1968.
68
Jarvie, op. cit.
69
“Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa”, vol. XIV, 1978, no. 2; W. Krajewski, E. Pietruska-Madej, J. M. Żytkow
(eds.), Relacje między teoriami a rozwój nauki, Warszawa 1978; W. Krajewski, W. Mejbaum, J. Such (eds.),
Zasada korespondencji w fizyce a rozwój nauki, Warszawa 1974.
64
27
the theory. Even individual observational statements are dependent on it. The theory
attaches meaning to the particular concepts of language which the researcher uses. What
they mean is decided by the mutual relations between the concepts (and not between them
and the observable reality), similarly as in any natural language.
In conventionalism, the concepts of observation, observable facts and observational
statements undergo changes. Within such an approach, it may be concluded that the
observed reality cannot ensure the criterion of the truth of the theory (the empirical
criterion). Therefore, the fundamental claims of positivism and realism are being attacked:
the ones stating that empirical evidence is a sufficiently objective scientific test of a theory
(the criterion of social practice in realism also has an empirical character) and that scientific
testing and acceptance or rejection of a theory is based on this evidence. The old arguments
against positivism are repeated, such as that empirical tests never grant us certainty, only
allowing for a certain level of positive confirmation. Or that if the conclusions which have
been inferred from some theory turn out to be untrue in light of experience, it still does not
grant us certainty as to the truth or falsity of the theory itself. There is no method of
ultimately verifying or rejecting a theory in light of purely empirical data. And thus
methodologically naïve falsificationism will always reject a theory if it is not in accordance
with an observation. A more refined methodologically form of falisficationism (among
others, represented by Imre Lakatos) requires the formulation of an alternative theory. The
same approach, it should be remembered, is represented within ethnology by A. R.
Radcliffe-Brown70.
Thus, conventionalism attacks positivism and realism primarily on the basis of the
issue of the neutrality of the theory and of its verifiability in practice, as well as regarding
the empirical criterion of truth as being an illusion. It agrees with the empiricists on the issue
of the source of our knowledge (empiricism), but it rejects empiricism as a norm which
allows us to refer to experience as an element which verifies theory. A theory is true if it is
cohesive. The criterion of truth moves from outside of the theory to being inside it.
Conventionalism also attacks the realistic division into observable and unobservable
reality71, not so long ago considered to have been a very important theoretical achievement
within ethnology72. Its attack is based on the claim that observation is dependent on the
apparatus, on the development of science and technology73. Hanson and Toulmin, as well as
Feyerabend who is the most well-known in Poland, undermine the positivistic myth about
the infallibility of the method, they emphasize the significance of the human factor within
70
Radcliffe-Brown, op. cit.
M. Mulkay, Science and the sociology of knowledge, London 1979.
72
H. G. Nutini, Lévi-Strauss conception of science, [in:] Echanges et communications, H. G. Nutini, P.
Maranda (eds.), vol. II, Paris 1968: 543-571; Z. Sokolewicz, Wprowadzenie do etnologii, Warszawa 1974: 258.
73
Mulkay, op. cit.; M. Hesse, The structure of scientific inference, London 1974.
71
28
research74. The relationship between the answer and the posed question – this iron rule of
the folklorists – finds a use for itself also within this general theory of science. One could
wonder whether the works published in the 1970’s by C. Lévi-Strauss (who has been
mentioned here as being one of the realists) are not examples of the use of the rules of
conventionalism. However, it seems also that in Poland such an approach was chosen by the
structuralist-semiotic orientation. The anti-naturalist, and more importantly, the antiempirical statements of its representatives seem to suggest such a conclusion75. On the basis
of such an assumption, the project of the dictionary Słownik wierzeń, obrzędów i symboli w
polskiej kulturze ludowej na tle słowiańskim76 was prepared. This is currently quite a
frequent approach within the ethnographic centre in Warsaw.
IV. NON-SCIENTIFIC MODELS OF SCIENCE
Another group of models of science, which stand in opposition to the positivistic,
realistic and conventional models, is connected with the adoption of the assumption
concerning the dissimilarity between the spheres of human thinking and acting and those of
the natural sphere. Among others, such propositions are becoming increasingly significant
within religious studies and outside this field – also in Poland – phenomenology. An
interesting article by Z. Benedyktowicz discusses this model of science77. I would only like
to draw attention at this point to the fact that phenomenology proposes a description of the
world which does not have any space for explicatory models. Rather it aims at
understanding or penetrating the essence of a phenomenon, at experiencing it. Intuition is
here an extremely significant research tool. If we were to adopt Bachtin’s division into
nomological and dialogic sciences78, then ethnology would belong here to the dialogic
group. It relies on constant transitions between the object and the subject.
Within various Polish ethnological works, proposals appear linking the principles of
phenomenology with those of structuralism. I consider this to constitute a misunderstanding,
which it seems has been adequately explained by C. Lévi-Strauss in Tristes tropiques79.
74
Feyerabend, op. cit.
L. Stomma, Magia dzisiaj, rozważania o metodzie, part I, “Polska Sztuka Ludowa”, R: 33, 1979, no. 4: 195205.
76
Słownik obrzędów, wierzeń i symboli w polskiej kulturze ludowej na tle słowiańskim, prepared within the
frameworks of central issue 11.1. (Polish national culture, its developmental tendencies and perception) in
the Department of Ethnology and Cultural Anthropology of the University of Warsaw.
77
Z. Benedyktowicz, O niektórych zastosowaniach metody fenomenologicznej w studiach nad religią,
symbolem i kulturą, part I, “Etnografia Polska”, vol. 24, 1980, no. 2: 9-46.
78
M. Bachtin, Twórczość Franciszka Rabelais’go a kultura ludowa średniowiecza i renesansu, Moskwa 1969;
idem, Słowo w poezji i prozie, “Literatura na świecie”, vol. 6, 1973: 3-47.
79
Lévi-Strauss, op. cit.
75
29
The philosophical and methodological proposals of Windelband and Rickert have
infiltrated ethnology by taking two paths. The first is through the mediation of the culturehistorical school in Poland, which has not had many supporters, aside from such persons as
S. Poniatowski and J. Manugiewicz. J. Czekanowski has been mistakenly associated with
this school. This epistemological trend within sociology has resulted in a humanistic
orientation, which adopts M. Weber (as described by G. Kloska in the afore-quoted article).
The influence of M. Weber or the Chicago school (through F. Znaniecki) has only left a
slight impression on Polish ethnology. I will omit the permeation of these ideas into
ethnology through historical studies.
The above-presented first part of the article has more of a didactic aim than a
cognitive one. The described models of science, after referring them to some of the more
important trends of Polish ethnography, allow for an initial arranging of the main
approaches and of the differences between researchers. In the second part, I would like to
consider in more detail the basic epistemological assumptions of the more significant trends
within contemporary ethnology. Therefore, I will return to the conventional model, as well
as those of the interpretative humanities and phenomenology.
Translated by LINGUA LAB, www.lingualab.pl, Miłosława Stępień
This project is financed by the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education as part of the
National Program for Development of Humanities, 2012-2014.