Veronika Bajt Slovenian nationalism

Sprawy Narodowościowe. Seria nowa, 24-25 – Abstracts
Veronika Bajt
Slovenian nationalism
The article presents the rise of Slovenian nationalism as an ideology founded
and spread by the Slovenian national movement. As an opening remark the author
stresses that nationalism is a modern phenomenon. She also introduces the division between ethnic nation (Kulturnation, narod) and political nation (Staatsnation,
nacjia). The Slovenes first defined themselves as an ethnic nation but having gained
their own nation-state in 1991, nowadays, they are free to redefine their nation in
civic terms. The dynamics of Slovenian nation-building unfolded in agreement with
the Czech historian Miroslav Hroch’s scheme. It shows that ethnic nation states start
as an idea of a handful of intellectuals, before the national message is taken up and
spreads among the members of the postulated nation. Then the nation has commenced its existence indeed.
The term ‘Slovenia’ though known since the 16th century, intellectuals have
used it consistently for denoting the Slovenian nation only after 1848. Still the Carniolan identity persisted. The 1840 national program demanded the administrative
unification of the lands inhabited by Slovenes, Slovenian as a medium of education,
and it opposed the construction of a German nation-state that would include the
Austrian Empire along with Slovenia. Like the Czechs of Bohemia, the Slovenes did
not crave for independence but Vienna’s protection. In the second half of the 19th
century the mass Slovenian national movement grew frustrated by the progress of
German nationalism and the continuing division of the Slovenian lands between
Austria, Hungary, and Italy.
Only during World War I the idea of independence gained popularity but was
not actualized due to the inclusion of the Slovenes in Yugoslavia. It appeared a backward and heavily centralized state that thwarted the national goals of the Slovenes
despite the administrative unification of almost all their lands. Another World War
split Slovenia among Germany, Hungary and Italy so communist Yugoslavia appeared the only way to ensure national survival. Federalization of this state with a
national republic for the Slovenes too, did not ensure economic stability. This bred
discontent in Slovenia – Yugoslavia’s richest region – and spawned systemic-cumnationalist opposition during the 1960s and 1970s. After Tito’s death (1980), in the
next decade Slovenian politicians and intellectuals openly advocated independence.
The establishment of the independent Slovenian nation-state finally fulfilled the program of Slovenian nationalism as well as commenced the breakup of Yugoslavia.
Sprawy Narodowościowe. Seria nowa, 24-25 – Abstracts
Nacjonalizm słoweński
Artykuł omawia narodziny nacjonalizm słoweńskiego jako ideologii stworzonej
i rozpowszechnionej przez słoweński ruch narodowy. W uwagach wstępnych autorka podkreśla, że nacjonalizm jest zjawiskiem nowoczesnym. Wprowadza ona także
rozróżnienie na naród etniczny (Kulturnation, narod) i naród polityczny (Staatsnation, nacjia). Słoweńcy początkowo odnosili do siebie miano narodu etnicznego, lecz
uzyskawszy własne państwo narodowe w 1991 roku, obecnie korzystają z możności ponownego zdefiniowania swojego narodu w kategoriach obywatelskich. Proces budowania narodu słoweńskiego postępował i rozwijał się według wzorca podanego przez czeskiego historyka Miroslava Hrocha. Pokazuje on, że naród etniczny
ma swoją genezę jako idea garstki intelektualistów, po czym treści narodowe zostają
podjęte i upowszechnione pośród członków postulowanego narodu. Wówczas naród
zaczyna swój rzeczywisty byt.
Termin „Słowenia”, choć znany od XVI wieku, był przez intelektualistów konsekwentnie odnoszony do narodu słoweńskiego dopiero od 1848 roku. Mimo to nadal trwała tożsamość kraińska. Program narodowy z 1840 roku postulował unifikację administracyjną ziem zamieszkiwanych przez Słoweńców i uznanie języka
słoweńskiego za język nauczania; sprzeciwiał się natomiast budowaniu niemieckiego państwa narodowego, które obejmowałoby Imperium Austro-węgierskie wraz ze
Słowenią. Podobnie jak Czesi w Bohemii (Czechach), tak samo Słoweńcy wcale nie
tęsknili do niepodległości, ale pragnęli dla siebie opieki Wiednia. W drugiej połowie
XIX wieku narastał masowy słoweński ruch narodowy w odpowiedzi na frustrację
powodowaną postępami nacjonalizmu niemieckiego i nadal trwającym podziałem
ziem słoweńskich pomiędzy Austrię, Węgry i Włochy.
Idea niepodległościowa zyskała sobie popularność dopiero podczas pierwszej
wojny światowej, jednak nie została zrealizowana z powodu włączenia Słoweńców
do Jugosławii. Przedstawiała się ona jako państwo zacofane i silnie scentralizowane,
które pokrzyżowało narodowe cele Słoweńców, pomimo administracyjnego scalenia
prawie wszystkich ich ziem. Kolejna wojna światowa przyniosła podział Słowenii pomiędzy Niemcy, Węgry i Włochy, zaś jedyną drogę zapewnienia przetrwania narodu
zdawała się zapewniać socjalistyczna Jugosławia. Federalizacja tego państwa również
z narodową republiką dla Słoweńców nie przyniosła stabilizacji gospodarczej. To zrodziło niezadowolenie w Słowenii, najbogatszej republice Jugosławii, zasiewając ziarno
nacjonalistycznej opozycji w latach sześćdziesiątych i siedemdziesiątych XX wieku.
W następnym dziesięcioleciu, już po śmierci marszałka Tity (zm. 1980), słoweńscy
politycy i intelektualiści otwarcie opowiedzieli się za niepodległością. Powstanie niepodległego słoweńskiego państwa narodowego ostatecznie w pełni spełniło program
nacjonalizmu słoweńskiego, jak też zapoczątkowało rozpad Jugosławii.
Sprawy Narodowościowe. Seria nowa, 24-25 – Abstracts
Bernd Baumgartl, Johen Fried
Austrian ambiguities revisited
The entrance of Jörg Haider’s populist FPÖ to the governing coalition at the beginning of 2000, triggered off the Europe-wide ostracism of Austria. These events
shook the four pillars on which the Austrian national identity has rested since 1945,
namely: the negative assessment of the Anschluß, neutrality, social partnership and
ethnic homogeneity. When these identification points of reference started vanishing, it turned out that many of Austrian national myths are similarly ambiguous as,
for instance, that one on “small Austria” always harmed by its bullying neighbors.
In this manner there was erased the memory of the eager participation of the Austrians in the Great German nation-state of the Third Reich, as well as of the division
of their state between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies that lasted from 1945
to 1955. On top of that Austria’s 1995 accession into the European Union has not become part of the Austrian popular mind yet.
Is it not then a “country without qualities”? A country where despite the official
Anti-Fascism the FPÖ was allowed into the governing coalition just for the sake of
perpetuating the hold on power, which the governing elites had enjoyed for the last
30 years? If so Haider’s unprecedented entrance into the mainstream of Austria’s
politics speaks volumes on the weaknesses of Austrian democracy. Therefore it is
high time to commence honest discussion on Austrian national myths so that to
reconstruct the ideological foundations of this democracy. However, it is not only a
problem of “small Austria” but also of established democracies of Western Europe,
where previously marginal populist parties with neo-Fascist, anti-immigration, xenophobic and ethnonationalist programs are increasingly allowed into the mainstream of politics.
Sprawy Narodowościowe. Seria nowa, 24-25 – Abstracts
Austria – kraj o wieloznacznej tożsamości?
Dojście do władzy populistycznej partii FPÖ Jörga Haidera na początku roku
2000 spowodowało ogólnoeuropejski ostracyzm Austrii. Wydarzenia te wstrząsnęły
czteroma filarami, na których od 1945 r. wspiera się austriacka tożsamość narodowa:
negatywna ocena Anschlußu, neutralność, partnerstwo społeczne oraz etniczna
homogeniczność. Gdy zabrakło tych pewników, okazało się też, że wiele z austriackich mitów narodowych jest co najmniej dwuznacznych, tak jak ten o „małej Austrii”
zawsze krzywdzonej przez większych sąsiadów. W ten sposób wymazuje się pamięć
o chętnym udziale Austriaków w wielkoniemieckim państwie narodowym Trzeciej
Rzeszy czy też o podziale ich państwa na strefę zachodnią i sowiecką w latach 19451955. Ponadto akcesja Austrii do Unii Europejskiej w 1995 r. wciąż nie stała się faktem stanowiącym integralną część popularnej umysłowości Austriaków.
Czyżby więc był to „kraj bez właściwości”, gdzie nie bacząc na odgórnie
zadekretowany antyfaszyzm, rządzące nieprzerwanie od 30 lat elity dopuściły do
władzy FPÖ, tylko po to by wciąż utrzymywać się przy władzy? Jeśli tak, to wejście
Haidera na polityczne salony to oznaka słabości austriackiej demokracji. Dlatego
należy rozpocząć uczciwą dyskusję na temat austriackich mitów narodowych, która
uzdrowiłaby ideologiczne fundamenty demokracji w Austrii. Lecz wejście w główny
nurt polityki do tej pory marginalnych populistycznych partii neofaszystowskich,
ksenofobicznych, etnonacjonalistycznych i antyimigracyjnych nie jest li tylko problemem „małej Austrii”, ale i innych państw Europy Zachodniej.
Sprawy Narodowościowe. Seria nowa, 24-25 – Abstracts
Mikołaj Stanek
Ethnicity as a form of social ties
The article discuses issues related to ethnic ties. On the basis of theoretical assumptions connected with ethnicity, such problems as the shaping of ethnic ties and
core ethnic values, as well as the importance of mythical consciousness and myths
in these processes, are taken into consideration. In this approach ethnicity is founded on the feeling that a number of shared core values unites members of the group.
The values in question, involving language, territory, imagined blood unity, history
of the group, customs, religion, and the ethos of the group, are objectified and become symbolic attributes of the ethnic group. The above enumerated values form the
basis on which the group is designated a community by its members. Members of
the group recognize these values as objective data which simultaneously define the
group as a single entity. The ethnic group, thus, can be termed a specific “imagined
community of values.” The existence of ethnic core values is facilitated through the
process of mythologization, i.e. conscious imposition of a sacral category, extraempirical, on particular qualities of ethnic groups. Mythical consciousness gives ethnic
qualities an axiological dimension, thus being an important, though indirect, factor
of the formation of ties.
Sprawy Narodowościowe. Seria nowa, 24-25 – Abstracts
Krzysztof Jaskułowski
Classes, Nations and Races. Karl Marx’s and Frederick Engels’s
Reflection on Nationalism
The aim of this article is to analyse an approach of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels to nationalism and related phenomena like nation-state, national movements,
ethnicity and race. These two theoreticians are usually regarded founding-fathers of
social sciences and their ideas influenced many contemporary thinkers. In the field
of nationalism studies there is a group of scholars who attempt to develop Marxist theory of nationalism. Marxism had also enormous impact on politics in many
countries in the 20th century. The communists governments had to deal with nationalism which was their main ideological rival.
It is argued in the article that the writings of Marx and Engels did not provide
any systematic and comprehensive approach to nationalism. There were various and
contradictory trends in their writings on nationalism. It is usually said that Marx
and Engels had no understanding of the significance of nationalism, and underestimated its strength. Their central thesis was that the essential division in society was
not horizontal but vertical, i.e. not between nations but between classes. However,
although they were usually critical of nationalist ideas, they were not immune to
nationalism. Frequently, they took the nation for granted or exaggerated its significance in their analysis. Moreover, the nation was sometimes defined in biological
terms. Occasionally, they spoke of different races whose capacities were determined
by their anatomical features and claimed that some races were superior over the
others.
Sprawy Narodowościowe. Seria nowa, 24-25 – Abstracts
Lech M. Nijakowski
The meaning of territory for social sciences and culture
Relevance of space and territory for the social world and ethnic and national
groups is discussed in this article. The analysis of the meaning of the terms ‘territory’
and ‘space’ (social and natural) in various social sciences, such as: sociology, psychology, sociobiology (resp. evolutionary psychology), human geography and cultural
anthropology is undertaken by the author. The author also analyses the akin categories in these sciences (such as: aggression, violence, border, territorialism, behaviour
setting, ecosystem, social and personal distance), which are used to create theories of
social space and human behaviour. The fenomenological and anthropological analysis of the category ‘territory’ constitutes a considerable part of the text. A conception
of the theoretical framework of the term ‘ontological residuum’ in social sciences is
also presented in the article (according to – for example – the theory of culture by
Antonina Kłoskowska). The intention of the author is to concentrate mainly on the
ethnic and national sense of the categories under discussion. Therefore the concept
of the ethnic constructions on the base of a territory is also presented in the text.
Sprawy Narodowościowe. Seria nowa, 24-25 – Abstracts
Tomasz Kamusella
Standardization of the Upper Silesian Language and ITS
Social and Political Implications (Especially in Opole Silesia)
Upper Silesia is a Central European region today locted in Poland though its
southernmost slither is also included in the Czech Republic. This division dates back
to 1740-42 when Prussia wrested Lower and Upper Silesia away from Vienna. After World War I the German (Prussian) share of Upper Silesia was divided between
Germany and Poland. During World War II National Socialist Germany seized almost entire historical Upper Silesia including Czechoslovakia’s section of this region. In 1945 this section was returned to Czechoslovakia, while the rest of Upper
Silesia (along with almost all Lower Silesia) was granted to Poland.
In the pre-modern times Latin, chancery German and chancery Bohemian
(“Czech of the Prague court”) were used as written languages in Upper Silesia. After
Prussia’s seizure of this region standard German won the day though in 1849-1873
standard Polish was introduced as a medium of education to elementary schools for
Slavophone population. The conjunction between standard languages (construed as
“national”) and Central European nationalisms strong, in the course of the 20th
century standard Czech, German and Polish were forced on the inhabitants of Upper Silesia in an effort to make them into indistinguishable part of the Czech, German or Polish nation.
In modern times the Upper Silesian population spoke West Germanic and
North Slavic dialects as well as the Germanic-Slavic creole that emerged in the three
last decades of the 19th century due to the intensive interaction of both these groups
in the industrial basin. Shortly the Germanic-speakers acquired standard German,
while frequent changes in the imposition of various standard languages on the Slavic-speakers entrenched them in their dialects and creole. After 1945 with the removal of Germans and the ban on German, this language and the Germanic dialects disappeared in Upper Silesia. Today the German minority speaks a Slavophone
dialect and the creole to mark their ethnic difference vis-ŕ-vis the Polish nation,
while these two language forms are used by those considering themselves of the
Silesian nation/ethnic group for the very same purpose. Obviously, languages being
the basis of Central European nationalism, standardization of Upper Silesia’s Slavophone dialect(s) and creole into a standardized Upper Silesia language may have
wide-ranging effects: from divisive to integrating the ethnically variegated inhabitants of Upper Silesia.
Sprawy Narodowościowe. Seria nowa, 24-25 – Abstracts
Radosław Zenderowski
Between Russia and Germany:
Political and cultural identification of Poles and Czechs
Political and cultural identification of Poles and Czechs (and their countries)
remains in strong relation to Germany and Russia. This problem can be seen from
two fundamental perspectives.
First is a glance at Poles and Czechs from “outside.” Here we find two important
questions. Primo, one should analyse changes in Poland and Czechoslovakia after
Second World War. Both countries that in the consequence of cold-war political arrangement were forced to the east side of the „iron curtain.” It has influenced policy,
demography and territorial status (all these transformations are described in this article). Secundo, one should take into consideration intentions, character and degree
of Russia’s and Germany’s influence on Poland and Czechoslovakia. It is interesting
to find reasons of shaping attitudes of Poles and Czechs with reference to Russia’s
and Germany’s behaviour in international relations. What is the role and political
interest of Russia and Germany in Central Europe?
The second prospect is to look from “inside” at Russia’s and Germany’s acting
on political and cultural identification of Poles and Czechs. Primo, a question appears about defining and expressing national identities by both nations on international level. Political and cultural identity of Poles and Czechs is a subject of research
into outer relations (international). We ask about influence of two factors: Russian
and German and their consequences on political and cultural behaviour of Poles
and Czechs. There are four sociological aspects of this problem. The first important
thing is to watch the evolution of social relation to Russia (Russians) and Germany
(Germans) by Poles and Czechs since the end of war, particularly after the so called
peace revolution (1989). It is a question about a scale of positive and negative feelings
to Russians and Germans. The second aspect is identification by Poles and Czechs of
typical features of average Russian and German. Third, one should consider at the
opinion about relations to Russian and German states on the base of social research
made in Poland and the Czech Republic. Fourth, it is interesting to learn what Poles
and Czechs, think about their own national identity, about their place and role in
Europe in context of close neighbourhood of European and Euro-Asian powers. Secundo, one should put an open question about importance of transnational identification of Poles and Czechs in relation to Central European community.
Sprawy Narodowościowe. Seria nowa, 24-25 – Abstracts
Anna G. Piotrowska
Polish songs performing national anthem function
National anthem – one of national culture symbols – is a musical manifestation
of identification with a given nation. Polish national anthems stem either from religious songs or from patriotic ones.
Among religious songs “Bogurodzica” is worth noting as a song deeply set in
Polish cult for Virgin Mary. Both “Gaude Mater Polonia” and “Boże, coś Polskę”
(composed by Jan Nepomucen Piotr Kaszewski) also served as national anthems.
Carols viewed as national songs hold a very special position. “Bóg się rodzi” with text
by Franciszek Karpiński was considered a national anthem, too.
Among patriotic songs used as national anthems “Hymn do miłości ojczyzny”
written in 1774 (text by Ignacy Krasicki) and “Mazurek Dąbrowskiego” written in
1797 (text by Józef Wybicki) belong to the oldest. The latter was officially recognized in 1926 as Polish anthem. In the 19th century French songs with Polish texts,
such as “Marsylianka” or “Karmaniola,” were quite popular as anthems. A lot of
songs functioning as national anthems exploited traditional Polish dances in their
musical forms. After 1918 a few more songs (for example “Rota”) were suggested
as possible national anthems of the independent Poland but eventually “Mazurek
Dąbrowskiego,” along with the white and red flag, became one of Polish national
symbols.
Sprawy Narodowościowe. Seria nowa, 24-25 – Abstracts
Izabela Idzik
Is there the need for intercultural education?
The article discusses some problems of intercultural education in Poland. The
author, who has practical experience in intercultural education within the voluntary
non-government Society “ONE WORLD,” aims at the analysis of the current situation from the perspective of the anthropologist. She first presents contemporary Poland’s cultural frame, which becomes increasingly multicultural, and next describes
the actual situation in the Polish school, typically homogenous, which exhibits no
need for shaping the attitude of tolerance among young people.
Another part of the article is devoted to terminological issues, theoretical assumptions, and themes of intercultural education. In the literature on the subject,
we can read about education/ pedagogy/studying on the one hand, while on the other hand the adjective multicultural/ intercultural/international is added. The abundance of terms is one indication of how issues of education can be developed in the
name of understanding and communication between cultures, and also about the
multitude of attitudes.
The author describes barriers of intercultural education known to her from her
own professional experience. Bureaucracy, a reluctance towards change in the student’s attitudes, and most of all, the lack of qualified staff – these all are major obstacles in the development of this type of education.
The author postulates a special role in this field for anthropologists and for students of ethnology and culture who as yet do not show enough commitment to intercultural education.
Sprawy Narodowościowe. Seria nowa, 24-25 – Abstracts
Łukasz Kwadrans
Intolerance towards national minorities and ethnic groups:
the case of Romany
The Romany are most helpless and unwanted among European national minorities. It is possible to notice their increasing impoverishment. Communities in
certain countries tend to isolate them. The Romany are also left without jobs, their
health care conditions are getting worse and the education level among the children
and young people is low.
Two thirds of Gypsies in Europe live in the countries which are members of
the European Union and they usually play a secondary role in the societies. This article presents psychological and sociological factors which distinguish the Romany
among the majority of the society. This leads to high exposure to the acts of discrimination, intolerance and the lack of acceptance of the Gypsies leaders. Such cases
happen in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, and in other countries.
The documentation of the European Roma Right Center concerning such discrimination acts towards the Romany is getting bigger. Many documents include
numerous cases of hate speech, situations like the one in Usti on the Elbe and acts of
violence towards the members of this community. These events increase the tempo
of departures of the Romany to the countries of Western Europe and influence their
ethnic mobilization. Such cases also create certain organizational structures which
are able to represent the Romany interests.
Sprawy Narodowościowe. Seria nowa, 24-25 – Abstracts
Piotr Andrusieczko
Changes in Ukraine’s national and linguistic structure
according to the 2001 census
The situation of ethnicity and language in Ukraine is complex. In December
2001, for the first time since the declaration of independence in 1991, a census was
carried out there. Previous censuses during the era of the Soviet Union had suggested unfavorable tendencies for the Ukrainians: their numbers declined, while the
Russian population grew, and the Russian language become increasingly more important among the inhabitants of Ukraine. On the basis of preliminary sociological
research it is possible to conclude that since 1991, in comparison with the1989 census, the tendencies earlier observed are changing.
The 2001 census confirmed the following observations. In contrast to the previous census, the number of people who declared their identity Ukrainian increased
to 77.8 percent, in comparison previously to 72.7 percent, while the number of people declaring Russian identity declined to 17.3 percent (from 21.1 percent). As far as
language goes, 67 percent declared Ukrainian their first language (an increase of 2.8
percent), while the Russian language was spoken by 29.6 per cent (a decrease of 3.2
per cent). Yet the actual situation in Ukraine, at least concerning language issues,
demonstrates that the information supplied during censuses differs from reality.
Sprawy Narodowościowe. Seria nowa, 24-25 – Abstracts
Jan Prokopiuk
Ethnolinguistic structure of Belarus in the late 20th century
The article examines the demographic and national structure of Belarus in light
of the national census which took place in early 1999. That census demonstrated
how the political, social, and economic transformation of the last decade influenced
demography and ethnic composition in Belarus, as well as the national identity of
its citizens. One such example is the Chernobyl catastrophe, which spurred migration within the Republic and also awakened the Belarusians’ consciousness of national distinctness. In the period between the census of 1959 and the recent one, a
permanent and significant increase in the Russian population and a limited growth
of the Belorussian population were observed; simultaneously, the Polish and Jewish
populations declined. The 1999 census demonstrated that this tendency was halted:
the number of Russians declined (they left Belarus), while the Belarusian population increased (they keep returning home from other republics of the former Soviet
empire).
The article also considers the status of the Belarusian language, which is the first
language of 73.7 percent of citizens of Belarus, although only 36.7 per cent of Belarusians use it in everyday communication. Thus, the dominant position is occupied
by the Russian language, which is used in everyday communication by 63 percent of
people of Belarus. The favored position of Russian is fostered by the policies of Alexander Lukashenko, the President of the Republic.